



United Nations Environment Programme

Terminal Evaluation of the Project
“Integrating Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate
Change into Sustainable Development Policy Planning and
Implementation in Southern and Eastern Africa
(ACCESA)”

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List of Acronyms

ACTS	African Center for Technology Studies
ALRMP	Arid land management programme
ASAL	Arid and Semi-Arid Land
CCA	Climate Change Adaptation
CITT	Center for Innovation and Technology Transfer
CSTI	Center for Science and Technology Innovations
EA	Executing Agency
GEB	Global Environmental Benefit
GEF	Global Environment Facility
IA	Implementing agency
IISD	International Institute for Sustainable Development
INGC	Institute for disasters risk management
KIST	Kigali Institute for Science and Technology
PRO-GRC	Project for managing disaster risk (Mozambique)
PRODER	Project for rural development in central Mozambique
PSC	Project Steering Committee
SPA	Strategic Priority for Adaptation
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme

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Executive Summary

1. The “Integrating Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change into Sustainable Development Policy Planning and Implementation in Southern and Eastern Africa” (ACCESA) project was a 2,065,000 US\$ regional initiative that took place from 2005 to 2010, and was financially supported by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) from late 2006 to 2010.
2. The project was designed as a response to climate change vulnerability in developing countries, and was articulated around three pillars: a first pillar concerned the implementation of concrete adaptation activities in three countries (Kenya, Mozambique and Rwanda); a second pillar consisted of using these demonstrated adaptation benefits as a mechanism to promote the integration of vulnerability in the three countries’ policies; and a third pillar sought to create knowledge and lessons related to adaptation to be shared regionally and with other groups.
3. The project was executed through a partnership between UNEP and the African Center for Technology Studies (ACTS) and the International Institute for Sustainable Development, the latter two both acting as co-executing partners for a time. Each national project was executed through a national institution, the Kenya Academy of Sciences’ (KAS) Centre for Science and Technology Innovations (CSTI – who later participated in the project as an independent entity), the Kigali Institute of Science and Technology (KIST), and the GTZ PRODER project in Mozambique. These national institutions were contracted initially by ACTS and then by IISD when the latter took over the project execution.
4. In Kenya, the purpose of the pilot was to demonstrate approaches for reducing vulnerability to climate change induced drought. The project included interventions designed to improve climate information availability and use through downscaling; income generating activities and crop improvements to increase food security; and water mobilization and conservation (sand dams). The project also included the engagement of policy makers towards the integration of adaptation and vulnerability to drought into sustainable development policies.
5. In Mozambique, the purpose of the pilot project was to demonstrate approaches for reducing vulnerability to uncontrolled fires, which are considered to potentially increase due to combined effects of climate change, drought, and unsustainable land use. Activities included awareness raising and training in community-based fire management, as well as policy briefings and the development of a fire-warning system for local application.
6. In Rwanda, the purpose of the pilot project was to demonstrate approaches for reducing climate change impacts on hydro-energy potentials by promoting watershed rehabilitation, reduced deforestation, and sustainable land use. The project included activities related to the promotion of alternative sources of energy (efficient cookstoves), zero grazing practices, terracing and income generation (beekeeping). Policy oriented interventions were also planned.

7. A regional component was also targeted towards the production of technical advice, knowledge on adaptation and its linkages to the issues tackled by the project, as well as learning, through the involvement of two observer countries (Madagascar and Tanzania).
8. If in Kenya the pilot project achieved all its intended activities, outputs and outcomes, the rate of achievement was somewhat lower in Mozambique, where there was little success in the policy component of the pilot project. Moreover, the Rwanda project was closed before completion of activities due to management failures and the termination of the relationship with the executing agency, KIST. Management challenges created difficulties for the project as a whole, with the original executing partner, ACTS, having to transfer its responsibilities for the project to the IISD in 2008. However, despite these challenges, the project exhibited a relatively satisfactory degree of achievement of results.
9. This evaluation was undertaken under the aegis of the UNEP Office of Evaluation, based on a comprehensive set of criteria, indicators and sub-indicators (111 in total), as can be found in the Annex 1 (Evaluation Matrix). Methods for the evaluation included a comprehensive review of available documentation (project reports, meeting minutes, project outputs and financial reports) (see Annex 2 for a list); a set of interviews with key stakeholders (see Annex 3 for a list); and an evaluation mission. The evaluation mission visited the pilot project site in Kenya, but was not able to access the sites in Rwanda or Mozambique due to logistical constraints and the unavailability of some project team members to meet with the evaluator.
10. Overall, the evaluation found the following results were achieved:
 - A measurable and sustained reduction in vulnerability to drought among targeted communities in the Kenya pilot project, along with increased levels of food security. Concepts related to vulnerability were also successfully integrated at the policy level in Kenya.
 - The institution and application of a fire warning system accessible and usable by targeted communities in Mozambique, along with training of all relevant groups on the management of fire incidents.
 - The completed reforestation and erosion control in the pilot sites in Rwanda, along with some works to rehabilitate water conservation infrastructures and income-generating activities¹. Unfortunately, the Rwanda pilot was closed before it could complete its planned activities.
 - Despite some shortcomings, the project contributed to changes in behaviour as regards the mainstreaming of vulnerability and adaptation into sustainable development plans and planning processes in Kenya and it had increased capacity to generate and use information about climate change to effect change in relevant development policies (Section A.3).

¹ Although the evaluator was not able to witness first-hand the extent of completed works in Rwanda or Mozambique, these findings are supported by available documentary evidence (e.g. mission reports from the IISD, reports from AMBERO-IP) as well as through interviews conducted during and after the mission.

- The project also encouraged learning among the beneficiaries and participants, at least at the individual level, as well as within targeted communities in Kenya and Mozambique.
11. The evaluation found that the project was, and continues to be, relevant and consistent with GEF and UNEP policies and programmes. The project’s design was reasonably solid in its logic, despite some shortcomings in the formulation and articulation of some of the project’s elements (e.g. activities, indicators, assumptions).
 12. In terms of sustainability, the evaluation concludes that the project demonstrates a satisfactory level of institutional, environmental and socio-political sustainability but that, as with many pilot projects, its long-term financial sustainability leaves much to be desired. That said, in Kenya, the full conditions for long-term sustainability were put in place, demonstrating that the conditions for success in cases like these include:
 - A solid anchoring in a country-driven program or project,
 - Well-established capacity for project implementation and execution within country partner institutions,
 - High degrees of community mobilization and
 - A close fit between national priorities and community needs.
 13. The evaluation also found that participation by institutions and individuals was encouraged and well facilitated by the project’s structures and design but this was insufficient to ensure the engagement of higher-level policy makers and regional partners. In addition, the evaluation found that, in Rwanda and to a lesser degree in Mozambique, the country ownership of this project also left much to be desired, and that governments in the three pilot countries remained somewhat removed from the project’s implementation.
 14. The project encountered some major difficulties in some operational and management aspects, which contributed to making it inefficiently executed (Section A.4). There were numerous delays, which were due to a combination of factors, including an incomplete design and a low degree of preparedness, inadequate expectations regarding the capacity of some of the key executing partners, and overly complex execution arrangements. Furthermore, the project encountered some hurdles in terms of financial planning and management, which raise some concerns as regards the application of appropriate standards in one specific case.
 15. The evaluation concludes that the overall average rating for this project, compiled from ratings across the 19 criteria and 111 sub-indicators, is Moderately Satisfactory.

Table 1: Summary of evaluation ratings

Key Evaluation Criteria	Rating
1. Attainment of Objectives and Planned results	MS
1a. Achievement of outputs and activities	S
1b. Relevance	S
1c Effectiveness	S
1d. Efficiency	U

1e. Review of Outcomes to Impacts	MS
2. Sustainability, Replication and catalytic role	S
2a. Socio-political sustainability	MS
2b. Financial sustainability	MU
2c. Institutional sustainability	MS
2d. Environmental Sustainability	S
2e. catalyzed behavioural changes	MS
2f. Replicability	MS
3. Processes affecting attainment of project results	MS
3a. Preparation and readiness	MU
3b. Implementation approach and adaptive management	MU
3c. Stakeholder Participation and Awareness	S
3d. Country Ownership and Driven-ness	MS
3e. Financial Planning and Management	MS
3f. UNEP Supervision and Backstopping	S
3g. Monitoring and Evaluation	MS
4. Complementarities with UNEP strategies and programmes	S
4a. Linkage to UNEP's Expected Accomplishments and POW 2010-2011	S
TOTAL AVERAGE RATING	MS

16. Based on the evaluation's findings, the following two recommendations are made:

17. **Recommendation 1.** That UNEP systematically perform a strategic assessment of its Executing Agency Partners prior to agreement signing, during project preparation phase, that includes an assessment of fiduciary management practices and standards, staff skills and availability, substantive expertise and purpose, and any systemic issues that may facilitate or hinder project implementation. In cases where capacity is found wanting, projects should include capacity building measures in the first year of implementation, prior to the start of activities.
18. UNEP's 2009 Policy on Partnerships² covers some elements of this recommendation as regards the establishment of organization-wide partnerships towards programme development. This evaluation further recommends that a set of criteria for assessment of organizational capacity be applied prior to signing Project Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) or implementation contracts.
19. **Recommendation 2.** That UNEP institute a more formal process for project risk management, with clear milestones and triggers, that enable it to make decisions regarding the continuation of activities or agreements. These milestones and triggers should be made known to the project partners and form part of a 'performance agreement' at the time of Project Document signing.
20. It has been noted that such a process is currently under discussion within UNEP and should be operational towards the end of 2012.

² UNEP Policy on Partnerships and Guidelines for Implementation, 2009. Available at http://www.unep.org/civil_society/PDF_docs/UNEP-PolicyonPartnerships.pdf (last accessed May 29, 2012)

21. Furthermore, the evaluation puts forward the following key **lessons learned**, that would be applicable to other similar initiatives throughout UNEP's programmes:
22. **Lesson 1:** Projects aiming at supporting policy and planning that are well embedded within nationally-driven, well-resourced, larger programmes will often show a higher rate of success. This is consistent with the current GEF model of programming, where 'incremental activities' are added upon 'baseline activities'. In terms of overall process, efforts to achieve policy mainstreaming, or to effect any sort of policy change in a country, should be inscribed in longer-term projects or programmes that engage the appropriate level of stakeholders and policy makers in a continuous dialogue. While the demonstration of local benefits of a certain policy approach is an extremely useful tool to promote rapid uptake, the national policy-making processes, cycles and durations should also not be ignored. In many contexts, the demonstration of local benefits is in fact insufficient to effectively drive the policy process.
23. **Lesson 2:** For any project relying heavily on new partners for execution, it is of crucial importance to conduct a thorough assessment of potential partner institutions' capacities to ensure their capacity for adequate execution, respect of fiduciary standards, as well as production of quality outputs and services. A capacity assessment of local executing agencies should form part of a project preparation phase and capacity strengthening measures could be built into projects for efficient execution, when necessary.
24. **Lesson 3:** Project execution arrangements, especially in the case of multi-country or regional projects, should be streamlined and simplified to allow for transparent and simplified lines of accountability and reporting, transparent flows of information, and reduced transaction costs. Adequate risk management processes, with clear milestones and triggers should also form part of project execution agreements with partner institutions.
25. **Lesson 4:** From a substantive point of view, a real reduction of vulnerability to climate change at the local level can only be achieved as a result of a comprehensive strategy that includes various elements, including: enhanced climate-related information, alternative and diverse livelihoods (to reduce dependency on climate sensitive resources), and ecological regeneration for continued ecosystem services. This 'integrated' strategy is now being implemented in numerous adaptation projects, and if implemented in a policy-receptive context, the demonstration of economic benefits to local communities will support spontaneous uptake, and ultimately policy integration.

Part I - Evaluation Background

Context

26. African countries are considered the most vulnerable to the negative impacts of climate change. This inherent vulnerability is a result of low institutional capacity, lack of human and technical resources, and mostly a greater dependence on natural resources for subsistence and livelihoods. It has been recognized that adapting to the impacts of climate change will require the implementation of comprehensive strategies for development that take into due consideration the array of potential impacts on ecosystem services and ecological productivity that is at the basis of livelihoods.
27. One of the first climate change adaptation (CCA) projects to have been designed and implemented through the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the ACCESA project was designed to respond to climate adaptation priorities that were identified through National Communications and other relevant assessments of the participating countries (Kenya, Mozambique and Rwanda).
28. The project was designed under the broader framework of the GEF's Strategic Priority on Adaptation (SPA), which was launched in 2004 and which supported a total of 22 adaptation projects before its closure in 2010. Projects under the SPA were intended to achieve the dual objectives of protecting or generating Global Environmental Benefits (GEBs) while demonstrating innovative approaches to adaptation to climate change at the local and national level.
29. The project was designed by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in collaboration with participating country institutions and based on the available knowledge and practices regarding adaptation to climate change. UNEP acted as Implementing Agency for the GEF (IA).

The Project

Project goals and objectives

30. The project was designed as a regional initiative intended to bring forward new learning regarding adaptation options, practices and policies. It was designed to be implemented through three country-based pilot projects that would include the demonstration of adaptation approaches and technologies in sectors of focus for each country. Two observing countries were also invited to participate to further accelerate learning. Pilot projects were designed in Kenya, Rwanda and Mozambique, and Tanzania and Madagascar were to participate as observer countries.
31. The project's conceptual framework, as represented in Figure 1 below, places a square focus on the implementation of local-level activities and adaptation practices, so as to generate policy-relevant learning. The stated **goal** of the project was "to reduce vulnerability of communities to the impacts of climate change, thereby improving their well-being and protecting their livelihoods." The **objective** of the project was to "promote the mainstreaming or integration of vulnerability and adaptation to climate change into sustainable development plans and planning processes through the three pilot projects". In line with SPA requirements, the project also intended to "provide global

environment benefits by contributing to the mitigation of land degradation and greenhouse gas emissions”.

32. To support the achievement of the objective, the project³ was intended to achieve three outcomes, as follows:

- Generation of capacity in each pilot project country to implement adaptation measures in the field that will reduce their vulnerability to climate change
- Increased capacity in each country to generate and use information about climate change to effect change in relevant development policies
- Increased knowledge of the linkages between development planning and climate change, including policy processes and methodologies.




Figure 1: ACCESA Conceptual Framework (reproduced from Project document)

33. Each pilot project was subsequently designed and developed to address a key adaptation priority, as follows:

Kenya: Increasing community resilience to drought in Makueni District.

34. The stated objectives of the Kenya pilot project were:

- To reduce community vulnerability to drought exacerbated by climate variability and change in the Makueni District by implementing a field demonstration project to produce tangible benefits to the community, and;

³ (A1b). Final Project Document, October 2006.

- To gather information from the field and relate it to the information needs for policy makers in order to inform relevant policies, particularly those on Environment and Development, Natural Resources Management, National Disaster Management, and Sustainable Development of Arid and Semi Arid Lands (ASAL).
35. In its final design, this project comprised a blend of scientific and technical activities (establishment of a system of early warning for drought), community-based adaptation activities (revenue generating activities, diversification, agriculture improvements), and policy-oriented activities (briefings and communications with policymakers). The project was implemented in partnership with an ongoing national programme, the Arid Lands Resource Management Programme, which provided backstopping, linkages to communities, and additional co-financing.

Mozambique: Community-based Fire management Strategy in Central Mozambique

36. The objectives of this project were “To reduce impacts of climate change on forest fires through improved management of carbon stocks and forest management⁴”. It was designed to achieve three outcomes:
- Community-based preventive measures for wild land fire management in context of climate change are accepted in selected fire prone districts of Central Mozambique;
 - A round table for the coordination of wild land fire management in the context of climate change matters in central Mozambique is supported by the main participants; and
 - Community-based fire management strategies are accepted by local and national decision makers (stakeholders) and integrated into national policies.
37. In its final design, the project included a set of community-based trainings on fire prevention and management, institutional capacity building (local fire management committees) and the development of a fire alert system. Policy-oriented activities (briefings and policy dialogue) were also intended as part of this project. This project was implemented in partnership with the ongoing GTZ-supported project PRODER that focused on rural development (and subsequently the PRO-GRC project that focused on disaster risk management).

Rwanda: Reducing the vulnerability of the Energy Sector to the Impacts of Climate change

38. The objective of this project was to “to reduce vulnerability of micro-hydro to the impacts of climate change and to secure sustainable energy supply for rural areas⁵” in

⁴ (A1a) Request for CEO endorsement, 2005. It should be noted that this formulation is absent from the UNEP template document.

⁵ (A1a) Request for CEO Endorsement, 2005. It should be noted that this formulation is absent from the UNEP template document.

light of potential climate change impacts on river flows. The project included some policy-oriented activities (policy reviews, briefings, trainings), as well as field-based activities (watershed regeneration, improved land use planning and erosion control) and community oriented adaptation activities (revenue generation through diversified livelihoods). The project was implemented by a local academic institution, the Kigali Institute of Science and Technology.

39. As approved by the GEF, the project's budget was as presented in Table 2 below. A more detailed description of financing sources and co-financing arrangements was subsequently described in the UNEP Project document that was developed in 2006 (Table 3 below).

Table 2: ACCESA financing plan at CEO endorsement

FINANCING PLAN (US\$)	
GEF PROJECT/COMPONENT	
Project	\$1,000,000
PDF A*	N/A
Sub-Total GEF	\$1,000,000
CO-FINANCING**	
GEF Agency	\$235,000
Government	\$220,000
Bilateral	\$800,000
NGOs	
Others (EAs)	10,000
Sub-Total Co-financing:	\$1,065,000
Total Project Financing:	\$2,065,000
FINANCING FOR ASSOCIATED ACTIVITY IF ANY:	

Table 3: ACCESA Project financing as per UNEP Project Document

Cost of the Project:	US\$	%
Cost to the GEF Trust Fund:	1,000,000	
Sub-Total	1,000,000	48
Co- financing		
<u>In-cash</u>		
Netherlands	300,000	
Sub-Total	300,000	15
<u>In-Kind</u>		
GTZ- Mozambique	500,000	
International Institute for Sustainable Development -	25,977	

Canada		
Kigali Institute for Sustainable ⁶ Technology – Rwanda	113,340	
Kenya National Academy of Sciences- Kenya	37,266	
UNEP (Project: DPL/2485)	20,000	
ACTS	68,417	
Sub-Total	765,000	37
TOTAL	2, 065,000	100

40. The project was intended to last 3.5 years. The expected date of completion at the time of CEO endorsement was December 2008, whereas the expected date of completion at the time of internalization by UNEP was June 2009. A further revision of this date was undertaken during the first year, moving the intended date of completion to September 2009⁷.

Key milestones and Implementation Summary

41. Design activities for this project were first undertaken in 2004-2005, through meetings between UNEP and various country partners, and at the behest of the Global Environment Facility⁸. In 2004-2005, using funding provided through the UNEP-Netherlands Climate Change partnership, UNEP developed a set of five technical papers in order to inform the project's design:

- “Climate change and Development: General Concepts”
- “Climate change and vulnerability assessments for selected countries in Eastern and Southern Africa”
- “Vulnerability, Adaptation and Poverty Reduction”
- “Mainstreaming environment into development planning”
- “Tools and methodologies for mainstreaming vulnerability and adaptation to climate change into sustainable development planning”

42. The request for approval by the GEF Chief Executive Officer (CEO) was submitted in September 2005 and approved in February 2006. This request contained a preliminary project design, as it was understood that each pilot project would be the object of further elaboration through the development of Implementation Plans, and that “a methodology and project design will be finalized within the first few months of the project”.

43. An inception mission took place in September-October 2005. A first meeting of the Project Steering Committee (PSC) was held in Montreal in December 2005, on the margins of the 11th Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

44. Between December 2005 and April 2006, activities focused on the development of Implementation Plans, further project design (for both regional and pilot projects), negotiation of sub-contracts and agreements with and among the executing partner

⁶ This table is reproduced without editing from the UNEP project document. This should read “Kigali Institute of Science and Technology – Rwanda”.

⁷ A1a, A1b, D1

⁸ Interviews: L. Leclerc, C. Uramutse

agencies, and the formation of national project steering committees⁹. In accordance with procedures in force within UNEP at the time, a UNEP project document (“internalization document”) was finalized in 2006¹⁰. This document contained more elaborate project rationales and logical frameworks, as well as a detailed budget.

45. The first disbursement of GEF funds to the project was made in November 2006, marking the official commencement of the GEF project.¹¹ The first year following this was dedicated to the completion of MOUs and implementing agreements, pilot projects logical frameworks and financial design. It should be noted that, since the projects were building on ongoing programming, some activities¹² took place in 2006 using support from other non-GEF sources.
46. Implementation arrangements set up for this project were relatively unusual, in that a number of organizations were involved. UNEP acted as GEF Implementing Agency, and the project was to be co-executed jointly by the Nairobi-based African Center for Technology Studies (ACTS), a Nairobi-based organization, and the Canada-based International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD). Each of these two organizations was attributed a set of responsibilities in the management and delivery of project outputs. As regards the pilot projects, ACTS was responsible for steering the implementation of the Kenya pilot project, UNEP was initially responsible for the Mozambique project (through the GTZ), and IISD for the Rwanda project¹³. However, these arrangements were shifted after signing of the agreement between ACTS and UNEP in November 2006, with ACTS officially given responsibility for oversight of the Mozambique project. Later in 2008, ACTS’s responsibilities in project management were transferred to the IISD.

⁹ C1a, C1b, 2006.

¹⁰ Interviews (Leclerc). Currently, procedures require the submission of the UNEP project document or internalization document, at the same time as the request for Council or CEO approval.

¹¹ D1.

¹² For example, In Kenya the first downscaling of weather forecasts and advice on crop planting took place in 2006. In Mozambique, training in fire fighting occurred as part of the PRODER project in 2005 and 2006.

¹³ A1b.




Figure 2: Project implementation and support arrangements as per original project document

47. There were early delays in launching the implementation of substantive activities due to institutional challenges such as: inconsistencies between local EA policies and UNEP policies, high rates of staff turn-over, and capacity constraints, which led to some revisions on the project management arrangements (namely by transferring some responsibilities from ACTS to IISD). By mid-2008, however, these challenges appeared overcome and field-level activities were well underway in the three pilot countries, and some awareness raising activities were also being deployed (website, video, brochures). In 2009, the Mozambique project completed its activities with the provision of policy guidance to national and provincial stakeholders on the establishment of fire management systems. In Kenya, project activities at the local level (improved grains and land management practices, revenue diversification schemes, water conservation technologies) were also completed in late 2009, and were integrated into the work of the ALRMP. Policy mainstreaming was achieved in 2009 with the integration of adaptation into the National Disaster Management Policy. In Rwanda, the project's field level activities were stalled in 2009 after the initial set of implementation measures (procurement of equipment such as tanks and beekeeping materials, terracing works and reforestation works), due to management challenges within the national implementing partner, KIST. After protracted negotiations and discussions, the project was cancelled in June 2010. Unspent funds were designed to be returned to the GEF.
48. The project was officially completed in June 2010, and financial closure is pending, following finalization of this evaluation. In total, the project lasted 44 months. The total ratio of delivery, computed from the compilation of realized activities, is 59%, and at June 2010 the total expenditures represented 79% of the total GEF grant, or \$790,510 USD.

Evaluation Objectives, Scope and Methodology

Objectives

49. In line with the UNEP Evaluation Policy¹⁴, the UNEP Evaluation Manual¹⁵ and the Guidelines for GEF Agencies in Conducting Terminal Evaluations¹⁶, this terminal evaluation is undertaken at the end of the project to assess project performance (in terms of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency), and determine outcomes and impacts (actual and potential) stemming from the project, including their sustainability. The evaluation has two primary purposes: (i) to provide evidence of results to meet accountability requirements, and (ii) to promote learning, feedback, and knowledge sharing through results and lessons learned among UNEP, the project co-executing partners (ACTS and IISD), the GEF and their national partners. The evaluation seeks to provide answer to the following four key questions:

- How successful was the project in promoting mainstreaming or integrating vulnerability and adaptation to climate change into sustainable development plans and planning processes in the participating countries (Kenya, Mozambique and Rwanda)?
- How successful was the project in generating the required capacity for implementing adaptation measures in the field in the participating countries?
- How successful was the project in increasing the capacity of the key stakeholder target group to generate and use information about climate change to drive change in relevant development policies in the participating countries?
- To what extent did the project increase knowledge of the linkages between development planning and climate change, including policy process and methodologies in the participating countries?

Approach and Methodology

50. This evaluation was conducted using a mix of approaches, and based on comprehensive Terms of Reference (included in Annex 5): a desk review of available documentation, including project reports, outputs, studies, meeting minutes, Implementation and Financial reports; a set of interviews with key project partners, participants and beneficiaries; and country visits. The lists of consulted documents and interviewees are available in Annexes 2 and 3. The evaluation was conducted by a Consultant, Joana Talafré, under the supervision and with the support of the UNEP Evaluation Office. A short Consultant's CV is included in Annex 6.

51. Based on the analysis of documentation, and in order to support a comprehensive Review of Outcomes to Impact analysis, a reconstruction of the project's Theory of Change was

¹⁴ <http://www.unep.org/eou/StandardsPolicyandPractices/UNEPEvaluationPolicy/tabid/3050/language/en-US/Default.aspx>

¹⁵ <http://www.unep.org/eou/StandardsPolicyandPractices/UNEPEvaluationManual/tabid/2314/language/en-US/Default.aspx>

¹⁶ http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/TE_guidelines7-31.pdf

also completed. The evaluation provides analysis and ratings according to the following elements, criteria and indicators (a complete evaluation matrix can be found in Annex 1):

A. Attainment of Objectives and Planned Results

52. The evaluation assesses the relevance of the project's objectives and the extent to which these were effectively and efficiently achieved¹⁷.
53. *Achievement of Outputs and Activities*: This includes the project's success in producing the programmed outputs both in quantity and quality, as well as their usefulness and timeliness. (2 indicators)
54. *Relevance*: This assesses, in retrospect, whether the project's objectives and implementation strategies were consistent with: i) national environmental issues and needs; ii) the UNEP mandate and policies at the time of design and implementation; and iii) the relevant GEF focal areas (Climate Change, Land Degradation) and strategic priorities (Strategic Priority for Adaptation, SPA). This is supported by the 2010 Terminal Evaluation of the GEF Strategic Priority for Adaptation, which includes an assessment of this project¹⁸. (3 indicators)
55. *Effectiveness*: This seeks to determine to what extent the project has achieved its main objective **to mainstream or integrate vulnerability and adaptation to climate change into sustainable development plans and planning processes** and its various outcomes and component objectives. A brief similar analysis is also provided for each of the sub-project's objectives. (5 indicators)
56. *Efficiency*: This includes an assessment of the cost-effectiveness and timeliness of project execution. (3 indicators)
57. *Review of Outcomes to Impacts (ROI)*: This includes a reconstruction of the project's Theory of Change (intended logical pathways from project outputs to impacts). The review of outcomes to impacts includes an assessment of to what extent the project contributed, to: its intended **outcomes** and the likelihood of those leading to the intended impact **impact**. (4 indicators)

B. Sustainability and catalytic role

58. Sustainability is understood as the probability of continued long-term project-derived results and impacts after the external project funding and assistance ends. This evaluation includes the following aspects of sustainability:
 1. *Socio-political sustainability*. (3 indicators)
 2. *Financial sustainability*. (3 indicators)
 3. *Institutional sustainability*. (2 indicators)
 4. *Environmental sustainability*. (2 indicators)
59. The evaluation assesses the catalytic role played by this project through 8 indicators, namely to what extent the project has:

¹⁷ Extracted from Terms of Reference.

¹⁸ GEF Evaluation Office, Terminal Evaluation of the GEF Strategy Priority on Adaptation, 2010.

1. *catalyzed behavioural changes* in terms of use and application by the relevant stakeholders of: i) technologies and approaches show-cased by the demonstration projects; ii) strategic programmes and plans developed; and iii) assessment, monitoring and management systems established at the national level;
 2. provided *incentives* (social, economic, market based, competencies etc.) to contribute to catalyzing changes in stakeholder behaviour;
 3. contributed to *institutional changes*. An important aspect of the catalytic role of the project is its contribution to institutional uptake or mainstreaming of project-piloted approaches in the national demonstration projects;
 4. contributed to *policy changes* (on paper and in implementation of policy);
 5. contributed to sustained follow-on financing (*catalytic financing*) from Governments, the GEF or other donors;
 6. created opportunities for particular individuals or institutions (“*champions*”) to catalyze change (without which the project would not have achieved all of its results).
60. The evaluation also assesses the approach adopted by the project to promote replication and to what extent actual replication has already occurred (4 indicators). This analysis is supported by an examination of learning mechanisms (Monitoring and evaluation, policy linkages) established in the project and on the evidence of replication strategies.

C. Processes affecting attainment of project results

61. The evaluation assesses the various factors that determined the rate of results achievements and circumstances prevailing on the project that affected its implementation, positively or negatively. This includes:
62. *Preparation and Readiness*. This includes an analysis of project design (support by the above theory of change analysis), institutional factors, management issues and other frameworks governing the implementation of the project. (7 indicators)
63. *Implementation Approach and Adaptive Management*. This includes an analysis of approaches used by the project, its management framework, the project’s adaptation to changing conditions (adaptive management), the performance of the implementation arrangements and partnerships, relevance of changes in project design, and overall performance of project management. Assess the role and performance of the units and committees established and the project execution arrangements at all levels. (7 indicators)
64. *Stakeholder Participation and Public Awareness*. The assessment considers three related and processes: (1) information dissemination, (2) consultation, and (3) active engagement of stakeholders in project decision making and activities. (5 indicators)
65. *Country Ownership and Driven-ness*. This includes an assessment of the extent to which participating governments have assumed responsibility and provided support for project

- execution, and any other indicators of country ownership of project activities, outcomes and objectives. (5 indicators)
66. *Financial Planning and Management*. This includes an assessment of the quality and effectiveness of financial planning and control of financial resources throughout the project's lifetime. The assessment considers actual project costs by activities compared to budget (variances), financial management processes and procedures (including disbursement issues), and co-financing. (5 indicators)
67. *UNEP Supervision and Backstopping*. The evaluation considers the effectiveness of supervision, and administrative and financial support provided by UNEP during project design and implementation. (5 indicators)
68. *Monitoring and Evaluation*. The evaluation includes an assessment of the quality, application and effectiveness of project monitoring and evaluation plans and tools, including an assessment of risk management based on the assumptions and risks identified in the project document. This includes an assessment of the efficiency of the design of the M&E system as well as an analysis of its implementation. (13 indicators)

D. Complementarities with UNEP strategies and programmes

69. This evaluation also provides an analysis of the linkages between this project and UNEP's policies and strategies, namely the *Expected Accomplishments, POW 2010-2011*, the *Bali Strategic Plan*, and policies on *Gender and South-South Cooperation*. (4 indicators)

Notes

70. For the purposes of this evaluation, the term **Project** refers to the regional project as formulated by UNEP and financed by the GEF. The term "**sub-project**" or "**pilot**" are interchangeably used to designate each of the three country-based pilot projects in Kenya, Rwanda and Mozambique.
71. For ease of reference, documentation consulted during this evaluation was classified and coded according to their subject matter. They are listed as coded references in the text and footnotes, but a complete listing can be found in the Annex 2. Codes represent the following categories:

A. Project documents and budget (original and revised)

B. MOUs and executing agencies

C. Project reports

1. General reports for 2005
2. Kenya (2005)
3. Mozambique (2005)
4. Rwanda (2005)
5. General reports for 2006
6. Kenya (2006)
7. Mozambique (2006)
8. Rwanda (2006)
9. General reports for 2007
10. Kenya (2007)

- 11. Mozambique (2007)
 - 12. Rwanda (2007)
 - 13. Project activities 2008
 - 14. Project activities 2009
 - 15. Project activities 2010
 - D. PIRs
 - E. Kenya pilot project
 - F. Mozambique pilot project
 - G. Rwanda pilot project
 - H. Project Steering Committee
 - I. Reporting on partnership with Netherlands
 - J. Technical Assistance
 - K. Technical papers
72. Ratings for each criterion and element are provided based on an average of each indicator's ratings. Ratings range from Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory.

Table 4: Ratings

Rating	
Highly Satisfactory	HS
Satisfactory	S
Moderately Satisfactory	MS
Moderately Unsatisfactory	MU
Unsatisfactory	U
Highly Unsatisfactory	HU

Scope and Limitations

73. This evaluation focuses on identifying key outcomes and outputs, successes and challenges and on drawing lessons for future project implementation. Although it takes into consideration activities under the project since its inception, this evaluation focuses on activities deployed after the official commencement of the project (November 2006), when GEF approval and funding was secured.
74. The evaluation considers aspects related to financial management and financial flows with respect to: consistency between planned and realized expenditures, efficiency of financial planning and reporting mechanisms, and the transparency of financial management processes. The evaluation did not include an assessment of financial management in the fiduciary sense, which would normally be delivered through regular account audits.
75. The Executive Director of ACTS declined a meeting with the evaluator and did not respond to a set of questions sent via email. A set of email exchanges and telephone interviews were held with the IISD team in charge of the project before and after the evaluation mission, but person-to-person interviews were not possible.
76. Due to logistical difficulties, it was not possible to organize full field visits to each of the three pilot countries; furthermore, a number of project participants were either unable or unwilling to meet with the evaluator during the field visit. Therefore, their perspective

- may not be fully represented in this report. Nevertheless, a full site visit took place in Kenya, with the support of the ALRMP team, which included meetings with key partners in capital and a community-based evaluation meeting in the Sakai sub-location, where project activities were deployed.
77. In Rwanda, the intended field visit did not take place due to a lack of logistical means and arrangements. The host organization, KIST, was not able to make arrangements for a visit to the sites, and therefore it was not possible to witness first hand what remained of the project's activities in the two districts. A number of former project team members were out of the country or otherwise unavailable during the evaluation. A short telephone interview took place at the behest of the Director General of Rwanda's REMA, with a former vice-mayor of Burera, who had been involved in the project and testified to its achievements locally.
78. The evaluator did not travel to Mozambique, as nearly the entire former project team (AMBERO-IP and GIZ) had left the country on reassignment and the former project manager had passed away. This was replaced by a review and analysis of available reports, outputs and other documentation, and a telephone interview with an early project team member. As a result, the Mozambique project team's views may be under-represented in this report.
79. It should also be noted that a considerable amount of time had passed between project completion in the three countries and the timing of this evaluation. Hence it was sometimes difficult to obtain accurate information, or to locate project staff and beneficiaries. For this same reason, the evaluation may have appeared irrelevant to some participants, since the project has been completed for some time and there are no prospects for new or additional funding.

Part II - Project Performance and Impact

A. Attainment of Objectives and Planned Results

80. This section considers the extent to which the project as a whole, through each of its sub-projects (pilots) achieved its intended objectives. The section is divided into five elements, each of which is separately assessed and rated according to a series of indicators. (For a detailed evaluation matrix, and indicator-based ratings, see Annex 4).

A.1 Achievement of Outputs and Activities

81. In its original form as embodied in the 2006 UNEP Project Document, the Project was divided into Outcomes, Outputs, and Activities, with each pilot considered an activity under the broader Project. The Logical Framework of the project links activities to outputs, and outputs to outcomes. However, the rate of output and outcome achievement is far from a straightforward addition of activity-based scores due to a number of intervening factors, assumptions and drivers. The analysis of the Project's Theory of Change provides additional insight into this. Furthermore, the formulation of some of activities below is subject to interpretation as to the precise nature of activities intended (for example, activities 1.1.4 or 2.1.1). It therefore fell on the evaluator to "reconstruct" the intended activities based on project reports, available documentation and interviews.

82. In most cases, achievement ratings in this report confirm the ratings contained in the last Project Implementation Report that were attributed by the project team. In some cases, however, these ratings were revised to reflect new information or different qualitative assessments. These cases are indicated in the footnotes.

Activity Completion

83. Overall, the Project has a rate of activity completion of 62%, based on the averaged rate of achievement of the list of intended activities presented in Table 5 below, which was compiled from project reports, and, wherever possible, confirmed during the evaluation mission or interviews.

Achievement of Outputs

84. As regards the achievement of outputs, the project achieved Output 1.1 only partially, since although the three projects were 'designed collaboratively', their implementation was not entirely complete. At least in the case of Rwanda, it cannot be said that 'vulnerability was reduced' nor that the project was implemented. Output 2.1 can be said to have been achieved entirely despite the fact that the single activity it contained was only achieved to 30%. This is mostly due to its formulation, which provides no qualitative or quantitative unit of measurement: hence, indeed, "information, tools and knowledge to support mainstreaming" were in fact produced by the project. The same could be said for Output 2.2, which was in fact achieved, though without any qualitative measure.

85. Output 2.3 cannot be considered as fully realized, since its formulation implies the production of a ‘strategy’ or ‘plan’ for mainstreaming (ie, a document). However some mainstreaming was indeed achieved by the Kenya and Mozambique pilots, to varying degrees. As for Output 3.1, it was fully achieved, since lessons documents are available (for example publications on the IISD website, and formerly on the ACTS website) and have been disseminated to the public and other audiences. It is assumed that this evaluation constitutes the mechanism by which Output 3.2 was to be achieved, since it indeed comes two years after the end of the project – however, it is not certain that it was originally intended to be used for this purpose.

Table 5: Summary of Rates of Achievements for Activities and Outputs

	Rate of Achievement (%)
Outcome 1: Capacity is generated for implementing adaptation measures in the field in the three countries	
Output 1.1: Three field level adaptation projects are designed by national implementation teams and implemented collaboratively with relevant stakeholders to achieve reductions in vulnerability in areas of global significance.	75
1.1.1 Kenya Pilot Project: Field level implementation component	100
1.1.2 Mozambique Pilot Project: Field level implementation component	100
1.1.3 Rwanda Pilot Project: Field level implementation component	30
1.1.4 Technical Assistance related to field component activities	60
Outcome 2: Increased capacity to generate and use information about climate change to effect change in relevant development policies	
Output 2.1: information, tools and knowledge to support mainstreaming	90
2.1.1: Technical assistance: related to policy upscaling – technical papers and expert guidance[2]	30
Output 2.2: Policy- and decision makers engaged in adaptation to climate change	90
2.2.1: Kenya Pilot Project: Policy Engagement Component	100
2.2.2: Mozambique Pilot Project: Policy Engagement Component	80
2.2.3: Rwanda Pilot Project: Policy Engagement Component	0
Output 2.3: Production of plan or strategy for mainstreaming adaptation to climate change into sustainable development planning at the national level	50
2.3.1: Kenya Pilot Project: Policy upscaling component	100
2.3.2: Mozambique Pilot Project: Policy upscaling component	50
2.3.3: Rwanda Pilot Project: Policy upscaling component	0
Outcome 3: Knowledge of the linkages between development planning and climate change including policy process and methodologies, is increased	
Output 3.1: lessons derived from implementation of project and products disseminated to a broad audience	100
3.1.1 Regional meetings held in 2006 and 2008 engage a diversity of stakeholders	40
3.1.2 Project management: outreach and engagement activities related to regional meetings as well as pilot project activities	90
Output 3.2: Lessons learned for GEF adaptation projects are produced two years after the end of the project to assess long term impacts	0
3.2.1 Monitoring and Evaluation	90
AVERAGE RATE OF ACTIVITY COMPLETION	62
AVERAGE RATE OF OUTPUT ACHIEVEMENT	68

86. The results presented above can be summarized into an overall Moderately Satisfactory (MS) rating for this element. The analysis has also revealed some weaknesses in the logical framework of the project and in the formulation of the results statements at various levels that prevent a thoroughly qualitative assessment of the extent to which the intention of the project was achieved.

A.2. Relevance

87. In retrospect, it is possible to affirm that the project's objectives were fully consistent with the national and international priorities of the time. Adaptation to climate change was becoming a major political and technical issue within the Climate Change talks when the project was first designed, and there was a great eagerness on the part of countries, multilateral agencies and the GEF to begin to demonstrate concrete progress in addressing these key priorities.

88. At the national level, all three pilots were created to respond directly to national priorities, and in all three cases, the pilot's objectives were found to be in line with national directions. In Rwanda, the pilot was designed at a time when decreased hydrological flows were already causing difficulties for energy production; in Kenya, the pilot was designed at a time when years of drought were taking a heavy human toll; and the Prime Minister of Mozambique had expressed strong interest in addressing the recurring problems of bush fires, which were damaging the country's resources¹⁹.

89. However this statement should also be considered in light of the degree of national investment (in terms of energy, attention as well as funding and human resources) that was mobilized for these pilots and for the regional components. Here, an examination of the degree of engagement of stakeholders reveals varying degrees of political and policy ownership, ranging from high in Kenya to low in Mozambique, and very low in Rwanda. In addition, the two observing countries (Tanzania and Madagascar) demonstrated so little interest in the project that the regional components had to gradually be downscaled from the project. It may be that, while the objectives of the project and the pilots were considered relevant and of high priority, other aspects of the project contributed to decreasing the level of relevance in some cases: the scope of the project may have been considered too small to effect real impact, or the implementation approach and strategy could have been considered inadequate for the scope of needs.

90. As regards the project's overall relevance to the UNEP mandate at the time, it should be noted that adaptation was a new area of work for many agencies, and therefore that there was no precedent in UNEP on which to base this project's design. Since the intention of the GEF's Strategic Priority on Adaptation was to provide or protect Global Environment Benefits (GEBs), this provided a clear rationale for UNEP involvement. Furthermore, the project was designed in line with the expectations of UNEP's "comparative advantage" at the time, for example for regional projects as opposed to national projects. As a first adaptation project for UNEP, this project was therefore considered very relevant to the Agency.

91. The Terminal Evaluation of the Strategic Priority for Adaptation (2011) revealed that, while all of the projects approved under the SPA did comply with its rules and

¹⁹ Interviews. See also C4a and A1a.

procedures, few projects did succeed in ensuring adaptation benefits for GEBs in practice. It is also the case for this project, which – although it clearly identifies the GEBs it aims to generate or preserve – did not have the means to measure GEBs : in fact the project documentation contains no indicators related to GEBs. The same Evaluation report found that many projects, including this one, exhibited some difficulties in presenting an argumentation of GEBs. Nevertheless, this project was relevant and compliant with GEF strategies, policies and operational programmes in force at the time of approval.

92. This translates into an overall rating of SATISFACTORY in terms of this project's relevance to the various national and international policies, strategies and operational guidelines of the time.

A.3 Effectiveness

93. This element of the evaluation concerns the extent to which the project achieved its main outcomes and objective: “to mainstreaming or integrate vulnerability and adaptation to climate change into sustainable development plans and planning processes”. Section A.1 already presents an assessment of the project's rate of achievement of its various outputs and activities.
94. To conduct this assessment, this section considers the extent to which the project's own indicators were achieved. We will also consider the extent to which each of the pilot projects objectives were achieved.

Achievement of Objective

95. Regarding the overall project **objective**, an analysis of project documentation, as well as various interviews, confirm that the objective was only partially achieved, due in part to the low rates of activity completion in Rwanda, and to a lesser degree in Mozambique. This partial achievement could also be attributed to weaknesses in the logical chain of results, project assumptions and unknown drivers of impact (see section A.5 for a more thorough analysis of the Theory of Change).
96. The indicator selected to measure this objective was multiple: “by the end of the project, a strategy has been designed and initiated to integrate vulnerability to climate change into the three respective policies selected for intervention. The benefits are demonstrated through the implementation of three field projects”. Examination of the available evidence shows that vulnerability to climate change was integrated into the Kenyan National Disaster Management Policy, the Kenya Climate Change Response Strategy, and the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands Policy, and more recently within the Drought Management Policy. There is no evidence that similar integration took place in Mozambique (in this case a component of fire management was integrated in the workplan of the National Commission on Disaster Management only) or in Rwanda. Only two of the three pilots “demonstrated benefits”.
97. A better, perhaps more straightforward indicator of the achievement of the project's objective could have been “the extent to which climate change and vulnerability issues were integrated into policy”. However even such an indicator would have raised issues of verifiability and attribution, since mainstreaming is by necessity a long-term, iterative

process that involves multiple stakeholders and dynamics. Regardless of the quality of the indicator, the rate of achievement of the project objective remains the same, indicating that perhaps the project's objective itself would have benefited from further reformulation or a more refined scope.

Achievement of Outcomes

98. In terms of **Outcome 1**, the project can be said to have “generated capacity to implement adaptation measures in the field” among the key stakeholders at local level in Kenya and Mozambique, though it should be mentioned that in both those cases, the pilots were implemented with the support of a larger, well-organized ongoing programme (ALRMP in Kenya and PRO-GRC in Mozambique) and pre-existing project implementation capacity. This cannot be said in Rwanda, where field activity implementation failed due to capacity constraints among the implementing stakeholders. In the account of interviewed project members at country and international levels, the project did generate new capacity for implementation of adaptation initiatives: IISD, as well as national-level organizations such as ALRMP, all testified to learning valuable lessons about the identification and implementation of adaptation measures.
99. A similar situation can be derived for **Outcome 2**, where the project was found to have ‘increased capacity to generate and use information about climate change’ in Kenya. In Mozambique, the information generated and used was about fire incidence (as opposed to climate change). In both cases, however, some change was effected in ‘relevant development policies’ thanks to this project. For example, in Kenya, the issues of vulnerability and adaptation to drought and climate change were integrated into the disaster management policies, the drought management policy and, more recently, the work of the newly created Drought Management Agency. This can be directly attributed to the project since it is a result of the direct intervention of project team members, themselves using information provided by project outputs and results, that this integration has taken place. In Mozambique, the changes effected did not reach the level of “development policy” but integration of the issues was made in the work plan of the National Disaster Management Committee (INGC). The outcome was not achieved in Rwanda.
100. Finally, **Outcome 3** is also partially achieved, since the project generated knowledge that could serve to increase the understanding of the linkages between climate change and development planning: for example, the project generated information on how climate change could affect development or sectoral priorities, as well as lessons about how to integrate climate change and adaptation issues into development planning (in the form of vulnerability studies, baseline assessments, technical studies, training needs assessments and lessons learned). However, if the knowledge was produced, it is uncertain whether the understanding was in fact increased in all cases. Interviews confirm that much learning has taken place in Kenya as a result of this project, but this cannot be said of Mozambique or Rwanda. Furthermore, a direct attribution to this project may not be possible, since much knowledge and information about climate change and adaptation was also being produced, disseminated and integrated by project participants through other fora and venues.
101. The table below lists the project's Objective- and Outcome-level indicators and explains their achievement.

Table 6: Measuring effectiveness using the project indicators

Project element	Indicator (2006 Project Document)	Indicator Achievement Rating and Notes
OBJECTIVE: To promote the mainstreaming or integration of vulnerability and adaptation to climate change into sustainable development plans and planning processes through implementation of three pilot demonstration projects.	By the end of the project, a strategy has been designed and initiated to integrate vulnerability to climate change into the three respective policies selected for intervention. The benefits are demonstrated through the implementation of three field projects.	Moderately Unsatisfactory , as the objective was only achieved in Kenya.
Outcome 1: Capacity is generated for implementing adaptation measures in the field in three countries	Three field projects are designed and implemented by a broad range of stakeholders Globally significant goods related to GEF Focal areas are better managed	Satisfactory , since three field pilots were designed, and two of the three were fully implemented. Moderately Satisfactory . In Kenya and Mozambique the “globally significant goods” consisted in land and biomass, and both pilot projects contributed to better land management. In Rwanda, some works were completed for reforestation and terracing. However there was no effort to measure the result of this management in terms of environmental or global benefits.
Outcome 2: Increased capacity to generate and use information about climate change to affect change in relevant development policies	Based on pilot project outcomes, three plans are developed to change relevant policies in order to reduce vulnerability to climate change (mainstreaming) Policy recommendations devised/developed jointly between climate and non-climate experts	Unsatisfactory . Despite some localized success in changing relevant policies, there is no evidence of three explicit or implicit plans being developed. The integration that did indeed take place was achieved based on ad hoc opportunities. Unsatisfactory . The mainstreaming process was achieved in a more informal manner, through the participation of project stakeholders in other policy forums. Efforts to develop

	Increased regional information available on linkages between V&A and development	policy recommendations were scaled down during the project's course. Unsatisfactory. The regional component of the project was also downscaled during implementation when it was realized that the five countries had few priorities in common and that the three pilot projects were not delivering common information. Learning on the linkages between V&A and development at the regional level has however occurred within the IISD and UNEP.
Outcome 3: Knowledge of the linkages between development planning and climate change, including policy process and methodologies, is increased	Non-pilot countries engage actively in regional meetings on their own and request information from project	Highly Unsatisfactory. The two observing countries did not participate in the regional meetings, and did not request information from the project.

102. Upon further analysis, the indicators for Outcome 1 appear to be somewhat disconnected from the overall outcome, and reveal the presence of certain assumptions regarding “capacity to implement adaptation initiatives”. A better indicator for this outcome could have included the development of capacity needs assessments for adaptation, with before-and-after scores, or even a perception-based indicator measurable through interviews and surveys (e.g. “percentage of project stakeholders who perceive their capacity to implement adaptation as increased at the end of the project”. Using such an indicator, the evaluation could – and does - conclude that the project did indeed achieve its Outcome 1, at least in Kenya and to some extent in Mozambique, as per the perceptions of the majority of project stakeholders.

103. This analysis, combined with the assessment of achievement of outputs, outcomes and activities presented in section A.1, reveals a disconnect between the project's indicators and the outputs produced by the activities, and between its objectives and outcomes.

Kenya Pilot Project Objectives

- To reduce community vulnerability to drought exacerbated by climate variability and change in the Makueni District by implementing a field demonstration project to produce tangible benefits to the community, and;
- To gather information from the field and relate it to the information needs for policy makers in order to inform relevant policies, particularly those on Environment and Development, Natural Resources Management, National

Disaster Management, and Sustainable Development of Arid and Semi Arid Lands (ASAL).

104. Based on an examination of available evidence, and confirmed through the evaluation mission, it can be affirmed that these two objectives were fully achieved. The project succeeded in ensuring continued food security and basic livelihoods among participants during recurring episodes of severe drought, which means that their vulnerability was reduced.

Mozambique Pilot Project objectives

105. “To reduce current vulnerability to bush fires in Sofala Province, Central Mozambique, and promote the inclusion of vulnerability to climate change into relevant district level and national policies”.

106. Based on available information, it is not possible to conclude whether or not the Mozambique pilot project succeeded in reducing vulnerability to bush fires. While activities did succeed in establishing a fire early warning system and a fire danger rating system in the targeted province, it is not clear if the existing vulnerability to fire was in fact reduced. For example, there is no data available on the number of fires avoided, or fires extinguished using the established systems. In addition, it could be argued that vulnerability to bush fires could be related to other (non-climate change related) factors, such as the degree of poverty. Finally, in this case, the relationship between the pilot project’s interventions and climate change vulnerability is less clear, given the limited scope of the pilot’s interventions.

Rwanda Pilot Project objectives

107. “To improve the management of the hydro potentials of Rwanda and identify the causes for reductions in water potentials across the country with respect to weather and climate change phenomenon”.

108. In the case of the Rwanda project, it is possible to affirm that this objective was not met by the pilot project. The project did succeed in creating some understanding of the linkages between watershed management and hydro-electric potentials, among some stakeholders. However due to the lack of completion of activities, it cannot be said that the management of such potentials was enhanced.

109. The overall rating for the Effectiveness element of this evaluation is therefore Moderately Unsatisfactory.

A.4 Efficiency

110. This section examines the degree to which the implementation of the project as a whole, and of the pilot projects, was cost-effective and timely. First, the project was intended to last 35 months; instead it lasted over 44 months, 5 years if one accounts for the additional period since GEF CEO approval (October 2005) and official completion (June 2010). This is due to a combination of factors:

- Delays in the start-up phase due to a lack of adequate project design. At CEO approval, the project design did not include detailed pilot project implementation plans, and agreements between the various project partners were also not concluded.
- Delays due to capacity constraints and lack of compliance with project reporting and financing mechanisms by the main project co-executing partner (ACTS). Project reports mention delays in submitting required documentation in order to ensure a continuous flow of funds, leading to delays in payments.
- Delays in initiating pilot project implementation due to changes in co-financing arrangements, for example in Mozambique, where GTZ co-financing had to be remobilized between 2006 and 2008. In fact, the project had to mobilize additional co-financing a few times during its implementation due to the insufficiency of project budgets.
- Delays throughout implementation due to staff changes within the partner institutions. In Rwanda, for example, changes in the project staff at the Centre for Innovation and Technology Transfer (CITT), a division of KIST, (the first executing partner), and then at KIST created a situation where new project teams needed to be briefed almost every year. A similar situation was also experienced in Mozambique, although at lesser frequency. UNEP also experienced some change of staff in 2009, which may have slowed down the decision-making process.
- Finally, although activities were technically completed in 2009 in Mozambique and Kenya, there were also delays in closing the project, due to protracted discussions with the Rwanda team on the possibility of re-initiating or completing the pilot project. A decision on this matter was made in early 2010.

111. In terms of cost-effectiveness, that is the degree to which the project funds were used in an optimal manner in order to achieve project results, the evaluation concludes that on the whole the project was not entirely cost effective for a variety of reason. In the case of Rwanda, for example, salary top-ups may have been provided to officials from KIST who were not directly involved in project delivery, in addition to overhead charged by the organization for services that were not always rendered efficiently (e.g. financial management, see section III for more details). In the case of the Mozambique pilot, it is not certain based on this evaluation, that a focus on training constituted the best available use of project funds to achieve the project objectives. Additional or more varied activities could have been added to the project's interventions to provide for a deeper anchoring of the issues in the communities (for example, as was the case in the other two projects, a series of income generating initiatives). In the case of Kenya, some of the locally-selected income generating initiatives could be seen as inconsistent with the project's declared objectives of reducing vulnerability (for example, trade in petroleum fuel based on micro-credit schemes within the women's groups), and, as potentially negative for the environment.

112. At the regional and global levels, the project's cost-effectiveness suffered very simply from a lack of proper funding, with many of the information and awareness

generating activities funded from additional resources or IISD's own budgets. As it has appeared from the consideration of project budgets, allocations were not made for many of the project's activities that were in fact central to the project's ambitions: regional meetings and participation of observers, production of information and public material, participation in information sharing events. These actually depended on the mobilization of additional resources in an ad hoc manner. Another case in point might be the lack of specific budgeting for the generation of lessons "two years after the project", which has resulted in this evaluation being used as an output of the project and blurring the line between implementation and completion.

113. Overall, then, the rating for this evaluation element is UNSATISFACTORY.

A.5 Theory of Change and Review of Outcome to Impacts

114. This section provides an analysis of the extent to which the project achieved its desired impacts, using a reconstruction of their theory of change. It should be noted that the project was designed at a time before the emergence of results based frameworks for adaptation and concepts of theories of change; therefore the purpose of this assessment is not one of 'compliance' or 'consistency' but rather one of learning, to determine how project design can act as a determining factor of success.

115. The overall project's logical chain of results, as embodied in the 2006 Project document, can be summarized as follows: First, using GEF and other financial resources as the main *input*, a series of seven *activities* are foreseen, which together contribute to the realization of six *outputs* grouped under three *outcomes*. These elements combined are expected to contribute to achieving the project's *objective*.

116. The project's intended *impact* (though not formulated as such) can be derived from the following statement of objective²⁰: "to mainstream adaptation to climate change into development planning in the participating countries that are facing increasing impacts from climate change *to ensure that vulnerability is reduced and maladaptations avoided*"²¹. One other possible expected impact is found in the Project document, formulated as a goal: "*to reduce vulnerability of communities to the impacts of climate change* thereby improving their wellbeing and protecting their livelihoods". Therefore it may be said that the project's desired impact was 'reduced vulnerability to climate change', and that all other elements in the formulations above are indicative of means, expected co-benefits, or location.

117. The figure below provides an overview of this logical chain of results, as it was intended in the 2006 version of the project document:

²⁰ A1a. Another formulation of the project objective is found in the same document, in the logframe on page 47 "to promote the mainstreaming or integration of vulnerability and adaptation to climate change into sustainable development plans and planning processes through three pilot demonstration project".

²¹ A1b.




Figure 3: Logical chain of results, as intended in 2006 Project document (abbreviated titles)

118. The project assumes that achieving the project's objective "to mainstream adaptation to climate change into development planning" will lead to the desired impact of "reduced vulnerability to climate change". However, that is not an entirely correct assumption, since there are many intermediate states and intervening variables between development planning and vulnerability. While mainstreaming may be a necessary element of a strategy to reduce vulnerability, as has been recently demonstrated by experience, it is not necessarily sufficient.
119. Next, the project is designed to produce three outcomes:
- Outcome 1: Capacity is generated for implementing adaptation measures in the field in the three countries
 - Outcome 2: Increased capacity to generate and use information about climate change to effect change in relevant development policies
 - Outcome 3: Knowledge of the linkages between development planning and climate change including policy process and methodologies, is increased
120. Together, these three outcomes can make a contribution to the achievement of the objective of mainstreaming adaptation, although mainstreaming could in theory be achieved without capacity for implementing adaptation measures in the field. In fact, Outcome 1 bears a more directly link to the project's intended impact than to its objective. As was demonstrated during implementation, successes and lessons learned from field implementation were not systematically used in the mainstreaming process (e.g. in the case of Mozambique). Because of the Mozambique experience, it can be deduced that the capacities for implementing field projects and the capacities required for mainstreaming are quite different, separate and independent. The stakeholders involved are also different in most cases.
121. At the level of outputs, the project's construction and robustness varies. Outcome 1 is designed to be the direct result of a single output, which refers to the design and implementation of three pilot projects. This implies that the process of project design and development, as much as the process of implementation, is expected to generate capacity. This may be true, and it has been found that higher levels of implementation effectiveness occur when teams have participated in project design. However, this project's experience provides a more nuanced account of this causal pathway, and there are some flaws in the formulation of the output: it is somewhat circular, since in order to design and implement field projects, one needs capacity already; and in fact, this is reinforced by the fact that the only two successful pilots in this project were closely linked to, if not entirely dependent, on ongoing programmes and pre-existing capacity.
122. The second outcome is intended as the combined effect of three outputs, which represent different elements of a mainstreaming plan: production of information and tools (output 2.1), engagement of policy makers (output 2.2) and deployment of a mainstreaming strategy (output 2.3 to some extent). This mainstreaming strategy represents a somewhat simplistic approach since the third step is somewhat vague and under-developed, but it reflects the knowledge available at the time. There is little difference between outputs 2.2 and 2.3 in practice, since an effective mainstreaming strategy consists essentially in engaging policy makers and contributors. Nevertheless,

the logical pathway between these three outputs and the second outcome seems relatively unambiguous. A result of these three outputs might indeed be increased capacity to use climate information in policy making processes.

123. Finally, the third outcome is dependent on two outputs which seem very similar, since both concern the production of lessons learned, albeit for different audiences and at different times. Here again, however, there are no intervening missing assumptions, and the outputs would indeed contribute to the production of “knowledge of the linkages between development planning and climate change” (meaning knowledge on the impacts of climate change on development priorities, and knowledge of the means by which climate change can be integrated into policy making processes). This would be the result, provided, of course, that this is what the lessons learned were.
124. In its intended activities, and in their formulation, the project’s design exhibits some weaknesses. For instance, it is not always possible to understand precisely what is intended by reading the project’s activity list. Some activities are formulated as inputs (e.g. “technical assistance”), or results statements (e.g. “regional meetings held”), and some others as component (e.g. “Mozambique pilot project: policy upscaling component”). One has to refer to the Pilot Project Logical Frameworks and Implementation Plans in order to understand the scope of activities intended.
125. A number of assumptions appeared to have influenced the design and implementation of the project. First is the key postulate that this project overall was intended as a test-case: this means that the project design was oriented towards the production of knowledge and lessons, be they the result of successful strategies or not. This also means that it was assumed that the implementation of three small pilot projects would be sufficient to generate high-level policy interest, technical capacity and lessons learned for rapid upscaling of adaptation later on. It was also assumed that the results of a localized pilot project would be sufficient to create a basis for national –level policy change.
126. The project logical framework also spells out a set of assumptions that deserve to be discussed:
127. First, there are a number of assumptions of ‘interest’, ‘buy-in’, and ‘policy receptiveness’²². These may seem obvious but they do constitute a basic condition without which this project would not achieve its intended impact. Indeed, implementation experience has proven that different degrees of interest and receptiveness have contributed to produce significantly different results in the three countries. The assumption of interest on the part of observer countries is another case in point, as was the key assumption that the three projects would have sufficient common elements to create regional synergies and learning. These assumptions all proved to be untrue.
128. In this project, ‘policy receptiveness’ is seen as a key **impact driver** that could be influenced by the project (see Figure 3): it was expected that the demonstration of local benefits would create this receptiveness. In practice, it was in fact a pre-requisite to achieving the project’s impact upon which the project had little control. As a result, it

²² While the project design attempts to make its key assumptions explicit, a number of ‘assumptions’ are actually formulated as ‘risks’, e.g. “due to weak writing capacity, insufficient time will be allocated to reviewing papers and for peer review”, or “subsequent implementation of relevant policy is weak”.

was **an insufficient assumption** (see Figure 4). Lessons from other projects have shown that the correct identification of the obstacles to policy integration is key to framing successful “mainstreaming” projects. Issues may be related to ‘policy interest’ but also dependent on systemic issues, macro-level policy settings, economic issues, human and technical capacity, to name a few. In the case of this project, it was assumed that the ‘lack of sufficient information to measure vulnerability reductions and enhancements of well-being’ was the constraining factor (A1b p.35). However, producing this information proved insufficient to achieve integration in all three countries. The figure below represents the reconstructed Theory of Change.




Figure 4: reconstructed Theory of Change

129. There is also a distance between the three outcomes of the project and the project’s desired impact, which supposes a number of intermediate states. The key assumption here is that each of the three countries would be able to implement similar interventions in a larger scale, using the lessons delivered by the project, and to mobilize the resources to do so effectively. The creation of capacity for implementing adaptation measures (Outcome 1) does not necessarily imply that local vulnerability will be reduced: adaptation measures must be successfully designed and implemented first. Similarly, increased capacity to generate and use information about climate change (Outcome 2) or the availability of knowledge on linkages (Outcome 3) do not lead to reduced vulnerability without the application of policy and technical measures on the ground. In fact, outcome 1 is perhaps the closest expression to an intermediate state between this

project's outputs and its intended impact. Beyond this, however, other intermediate states were not identified in project design, and there was no strategy to move towards the impact after the project funding was completed.

130. Since the project's intended outcomes were only partially delivered, were not explicitly designed to feed into a continuing process after project funding, and have only partially achieved the intermediate state, the combined rating for the Review of Outcome to Impact for this project would be CC+, or Moderately Likely.

131. Additionally, if one considers the extent to which the pilot projects generated a change in the natural resource base, which could also be considered as an intermediate state between outcomes and impact (reduced vulnerability), then it can be said that the project fully achieved this state in Kenya, partially in Mozambique (there is evidence of an improved management system for fires, but none of its effectiveness in ensuring ecological integrity), and to a lesser degree in Rwanda (through the terracing works). Using this intermediate state, the ROTI rating for this project would be CA for Kenya (highly likely), CC for Mozambique (Moderately Likely), and DC for Rwanda (Moderately Unlikely).

B. Sustainability and Catalytic Role

132. This section considers the extent to which the results achieved by the project are likely to continue to deliver long-term impacts. Because this evaluation is completed two years after the completion of activities, it benefits from a longer-term assessment of the project's sustainability.

B.1 Socio-political sustainability

133. From an examination of results achieved thus far, one of the key socio-political aspects that appeared to influence the implementation of the project and its pilots was the degree to which the pilot projects were embedded within ongoing programmes. In Kenya and Mozambique, both pilot projects whose rate of outputs and outcomes achievement were reasonably high, the implementation of the activities was supported by ongoing, well-functioning projects: ALRMP in the case of Kenya, and the GTZ programming in Mozambique. This factor was missing from the Rwanda project.

134. This seems to imply that a certain degree of project implementation capacity was needed in order to achieve outputs and to deliver the projects activities. In fact, the Rwanda project experienced significant constraints that were directly attributable to the lack of institutional capacity for project implementation within the host agency, KIST. Established local linkages, procedures and procurement processes, as well a logistical network of support and substantive expertise in the areas of concern appear as crucial factors of institutional capacity.

135. This is also linked to another factor of long-term sustainability: linkages between institutions, and between the participating organizations and the broader policy-making spheres appear to also have acted as a key variable in achieving the project's desired objective. For example, in Kenya, members of the project were well connected with the various policy-making decisions that were taking place at the time, and were able to inform these processes. In Mozambique, however, because this was an externally managed project (GTZ and AMBERO), this contact with the policy-makers beyond those directly connected to the INGC, was more difficult to achieve.

136. The level of ownership of the project among the key stakeholders was also much higher in the case of Kenya than in the other two countries. In Rwanda, although the issue tackled by the project was one of key national priority, members of the steering committee, who represented the various ministries, did not appear to mobilize significant interest in the project. Meetings were infrequent, and often focused on procedural issues, and few committee members contributed beyond their attendance at semi-annual meetings. In Mozambique, the project was also unable to leverage ownership beyond the immediate circle of beneficiaries, trainees and participants. No success was obtained in attempts to engage policy makers in a broader circle.

137. In the case of the Kenya pilot project, the rating for this aspect of sustainability would be Highly Satisfactory, whereas it would be Unsatisfactory for the Rwanda pilot, and Moderately Satisfactory for the Mozambique pilot. As an average rating for the project as a whole, this translates into a Moderately Satisfactory rating.

B.2 Financial Sustainability

138. This institutional anchoring has also had another impact: in the case of Kenya, since the project was well grounded in national capacity, within national institutions, the project's activities were well integrated into the ongoing ALRMP programming, and to this day continue to be integrated in the programme of work of the newly created Drought Management Agency. Former project staff have been integrated into the ranks of the new organization, and are now able to continue project activities with new financial resources. This is not the case in Mozambique, where activities ceased once project funds were completely spent. Although the fire warning system apparently continues to be used, there is no more training or local organization strengthening as part of any ongoing programme. As for the case of Rwanda, additional funding was mobilized for adaptation activities that include similar activities, under a different mechanism (the Least Developed Country Fund), but using a different implementing mechanism.

139. As a result, the rating for this element of sustainability is Moderately Unsatisfactory, since with the exception of the Kenya pilot project, no other pilot was able to mobilize further funding or resources to continue to implement adaptation measures as a result of this project. Other project participants, such as IISD, have also succeeded in mobilizing funding for adaptation programming, but it cannot be said that this is attributable to this project.

B.3 Institutional sustainability

140. Because of the way the project was conceived, it is possible to affirm that the sustenance of results and onward progress towards impacts is entirely dependent on the establishment of a conducive institutional framework. Indeed, the project was conceived to lead to the development of a policy context favourable to the replication and upscaling of adaptation measures through the demonstration of local adaptation benefits.

141. Unfortunately, the project did not succeed in every case in setting up this institutional context. In Mozambique, as mentioned earlier, the linkages between the demonstrated benefits at local level and the overall policy context was not successfully established, despite the successful and continuing application of the methods promoted by the project. This, according to interviewees and project reports, was due to insufficient time available for engaging policy-makers appropriately. It may also have been due to the fact that this project was anchored within another donor's programming rather than within a nationally driven programme or institution, thereby creating an additional layer of communication.

142. In Kenya, as we have seen, this was more successful due to the fact that project participants were involved in setting up and reforming the broader institutional context governing drought management issues in the area. Conversely, the linkages were made impossible in Rwanda because the local benefits were not completely demonstrated, and because the project's overall lack of success created some tensions among participants.

143. Moreover, at the regional and global levels, the linkages and institutional context that were anticipated (regional learning, cross-fertilization among countries, knowledge generation and dissemination) were also not fully achieved. The transfer of capacity to

the main executing agency, ACTS, which should have been able to take a lead role in pursuing project impacts after the completion of activities, did not successfully take place since the organization was gradually removed from project executing structures. Only one regional meeting did take place, and further regional sharing was also gradually downscaled from the project, due to a lack of interest on the part of the five countries.

144. As a result, it can be said that on the whole, the institutional achievements made by this project were not very robust, except at the local level in Kenya, where conditions are emerging for a full-scaled integration of climate vulnerability into the programmes and policies of the various drought management stakeholders, and where reductions in vulnerability can already be observed. As a result, the overall project's rating for this criteria is Moderately Satisfactory.

B.4. Environmental sustainability

145. If one considers the project design as a whole, no environmental factors, positive or negative, were really likely to influence the way the overall results were achieved. However, when one considers the specific design of each pilot project, all of these were highly susceptible to being disrupted by environmental factors, more specifically by climate factors. As was testified, the course of the implementation of the Kenya pilot project was significantly influenced by drought: in the first year of the project's implementation, drought caused the project to struggle because the safeguards that were being implemented in terms of seed varieties and agricultural practices proved insufficient. However, after adjusting these, project participants were able to achieve a certain degree of food security despite severe recurring droughts. As it was demonstrated during these first years, environmental factors could still affect the sustainability of the project, if the project's achieved results are insufficient to withstand more severe droughts, for example, or the disappearance of other social safety nets.

146. In the case of the Mozambique pilot project, there is no evidence that environmental factors significantly influenced the achievement of project results (except when flooding caused some delays in 2007). There is only anecdotal evidence that fires occurred in the targeted region during the project's duration, but this is mentioned only to the extent that more accurate baseline data on disasters and their impacts were necessary²³. There is similarly no evidence that points to a similar environmental impact on the Rwanda pilot project.

147. All three pilot projects achieved some physical outputs and therefore had some environmental effects. The evaluation has found that in all three cases, the environmental effects achieved were positive, and that no harm came to the environment or ecological services as a result of the project. For example, in Rwanda, 140,000 trees were planted as part of an effort to achieve efficient terracing for erosion control (160 hectares)²⁴; in Kenya, environmental benefits arose from the creation of sand dams that contributed to regenerating vegetation along river beds and their vicinity, in addition to creating water sources even during severe drought events. These elements are in fact the strongest contributing factors to ensuring that the project achieves its long-term intended impact of reduced vulnerability. However, the evaluation noted that some of the income-generating

²³ See F4, F2.

²⁴ C15a.

activities supported by the Kenya pilot project, namely the trade in fuel promoted among women's groups, was not consistent with the project's logic and overall spirit to curb climate change, and that this could, albeit indirectly and at a small scale, lead to a negative impact on the environment. It should be noted that this activity was not foreseen at the start of the project, but that since drought had affected the other income generation activities, the women's groups adjusted to their circumstances during the course of the project.

148. Overall, therefore, the rating for this criterion is Satisfactory.

B.5. Catalytic Role

149. The extent to which this project, and its sub-projects, have catalyzed behavioural change is difficult to determine. Changes in behaviour appear in this project's design, as shown in the Theory of Change, as an intermediate state between improved planning framework and processes and reduced vulnerability of people and the environment. What is not clear in the project design is the intended level of the catalyzed behavioural change. As mentioned earlier, it was assumed that the pilot project's interventions would be sufficient to leverage the significant policy-level buy in and engagement required to transform policy-making and implementation in the long-run.

150. At the local level, it can be said that the Kenya and Mozambique pilot have most certainly led to behavioural changes among project beneficiaries and participants. The evaluation mission and interviews confirmed that practices instituted by the two pilot projects were being maintained to this day (agricultural practices, water management, fire prevention and warning systems). It can also be said that, due to its untimely cessation, the Rwanda pilot project did not lead to significant behavioural change – although there was anecdotal evidence that could lead one to believe that the terracing works were being used and maintained²⁵.

151. Furthermore, it can be said that the pilot projects, at least in Kenya and Mozambique, contributed to provide and demonstrate clear incentives for proactive adaptation at the local level. Both pilot projects resulted in direct economic benefits and avoided losses in livelihoods as well as in indirect benefits from ecological regeneration. These incentives have provided the basis for a rapid uptake of demonstrated approaches, at least in Kenya at the community level.

152. It cannot, however, be said with any degree of certainty, that any of the pilot projects or the project as a whole, contributed to creating significant institutional or policy changes, or have catalyzed behavioural change at the level, time frame, or geographic scope required to effectively translate “mainstreaming” into “reduced vulnerability”. Furthermore, while there is evidence of continued follow-on financing in all three countries, it is not certain that this can be attributed to the project's interventions. Donor funding continued through the GTZ in Mozambique, to address disaster risk management, which included fires as a continued priority issue in the country; in Rwanda, additional funding was mobilized for adaptation (also using watershed management) through the LDCF (every country was entitled to a certain allocation); and

²⁵ Interviews.

in Kenya continued funding flowed through the mandate of the continued ALRMP and now the Drought Management Agency.

153. As a result of the above, the overall rating for this criterion is Satisfactory.

B.6 Replication

154. As mentioned earlier, this project was intended as a pilot project which, through the demonstration of benefits, would lead to the development and implementation of a replication and upscaling strategy, through identification of lessons and through mainstreaming into key policies. Some of these objectives were only achieved partially (e.g. mainstreaming), and therefore the key elements of the replication plan for the project were not in place at the time of closing. In terms of the pure replicability of project outcomes, it can be said that these are (or would have been) highly applicable to other contexts and countries, and indeed they have been proposed as part of other projects, more recently. However, the project did not benefit from a consistent, coherent replication strategy, despite its earlier intentions to develop one for each pilot.

155. The project did succeed in identifying key substantive and process-oriented lessons, which were disseminated to broader audiences through meetings, videos, documentation, as well as through general awareness raising undertaken by the IISD and other partners. In addition, many of the people interviewed confirmed that much learning about adaptation and its links to the priority issues in the various countries had occurred at least at the individual level. The key implementing partners, such as IISD and UNEP also drew lessons (positive or negative) regarding the development and implementation of projects that were later on applied in other cases. In at least one case, the pilot project's activities were being replicated at the time of this evaluation, as a sort of spontaneous replication strategy, by communities and organizations who were able to witness the benefits of the proposed approaches (e.g. the Sakai district). For these reasons, the average rating for this criterion is Moderately Satisfactory.

C. Processes affecting attainment of project results

156. This section examines the various factors that influenced the attainment of results, from the project's design, which was partially explored in the section on Theory of Change, to the mechanisms and effectiveness of its implementation.

C.1 Preparation and Readiness

157. This project was developed along a somewhat unusual process, since, unlike many other projects, it did not benefit from preparation resources (funds or time). The project was first developed as a rather rudimentary concept, which merely foresaw the further development of activities during its first year. This concept was approved by the GEF CEO, but it was not until a year later that a full project document, providing a more thoroughly discussed rationale, was approved by UNEP. Yet, according to UNEP records, and confirmed in interviews, the thinking process had begun earlier, with the development of the five technical papers.

158. Despite this time lag, however, the project required another year before the pilot projects were designed at an acceptable stage and approved by all the partners. As a result of this delay, the project's original duration of 3.5 years was extended, and the project lasted nearly 5 years (from CEO approval to completion).

159. Furthermore, as briefly discussed earlier, the project's components, objectives and activities were not always clear and the results chain was not necessarily always logically articulated. At the level of the Project, activities were vague, perhaps in order to allow for flexibility in the design of pilot project activities. The linkages between each pilot project's activities and the components listed in the Project document also show some logical shortcomings, and an unnecessarily complex project architecture. This, however, is clarified at the level of each pilot project, where activities are concrete and well formulated, and where the links among the components are clearer.

160. One of the major shortcomings of this project lay in the capacities of the implementing partners that were selected to lead the various components. Unfortunately, the selection of implementing institutions was not the object of any systematic assessment, therefore the capacities of the institutional partners were not well known at the start, and assumptions were made that created political and management difficulties. That said, the roles and responsibilities of each of the various partners were clearly spelled out in the Memoranda of Understanding that governed the project management arrangements. These provide details of expected outputs, workplans and financial allocations, as well as roles and responsibilities of each partner.

161. Poor overall performance on the part of ACTS, the main executing agency, was cited as early as 2007 as a key reason for lack of progress on the overall project, and responsibilities were gradually shifted over to the IISD (informally in 2008 and

- formally in 2009)²⁶. According to various interviews, ACTS did not have sufficient human or technical resources for managing this project, there was high staff turnover rates, and the organizations had no previous experience in managing field-level projects of this size. This resulted in delays, and general difficulties in ensuring that an adequate level of quality of outputs was maintained²⁷.
162. However, IISD's own capacities to manage local field-level projects was also limited at the time, and geographic distance created an additional hurdle, not to mention costs when it came to monitoring implementation in the three pilot countries.
163. In the case of the CITT-KIST, the lead implementing agency for the Rwanda pilot, it also appears that the level of implementing capacity was underestimated. Whereas the original arrangement for implementing the project foresaw that the CITT would handle delivery of the project activities, this arrangement did not last, due to high staff turnover rates. A transfer to KIST (the CITT's parent organization) was therefore effected in 2008, but this did not serve to the advantage of the project. As an academic organization, the KIST did not have the necessary project management capacity, and it appeared severely constrained due to ineffective and inefficient administrative procedures. As a result, expenditures were routinely blocked, and activities were not implemented.
164. Overall, the project's management arrangements were unduly complex and prevented UNEP from performing adequate risk management. Because the primary legal relationship was between UNEP and ACTS (as EA), the other MOUs were signed between ACTS and each national implementing partner. Funds also flowed from UNEP to ACTS, and then were subsequently transferred to national partners. ACTS reported on behalf of the three projects. When ACTS was relieved of its management responsibilities, this duty fell to the IISD.
165. Additionally, the project relied on a regional-level Steering Committee, as well as national-level Steering Committees. These did not show the same level of engagement, capacity and mobilization in the three countries. For example, despite numerous discussions, the Rwanda PSC was unable to come to a decision on the role of KIST in the project when presented with repeated poor performance. This led to the continuation of an ineffective situation for much longer than necessary.
166. It is unclear why this type of project management was selected by UNEP when designing this project, when other projects provided examples of more efficient, cost-effective mechanisms.
167. As a result of these factors, the overall rating for this project is Moderately Unsatisfactory.

²⁶ C15a, D1 to D4.

²⁷ Interviews

C.2. Implementation Approach and Adaptive Management

168. As mentioned above, the project implementation mechanisms were spelled out clearly in the project's early documentation, and varied little until the actual execution of activities began to reveal a need for adjustments. The original implementation arrangements called for Joint Project Management between ACTS and IISD, with detailed terms of reference established in 2005, at CEO approval. Terms of Reference for the Steering Committee and Technical Advisory Group were also developed early on.
169. It could be said, however, that these terms of reference left some room for interpretation which could have led to early misunderstandings regarding each agency's responsibility. For example, many tasks are attributed jointly to ACTS and IISD, whereas others are attributed to one or the other agency as a lead, with a supporting role for the other²⁸. For the pilot projects, lead responsibility was to be entrusted to ACTS for the Kenya and Mozambique pilots and to IISD for the Rwanda pilot, with supporting roles for the other institution in each case.
170. These early arrangements were maintained to a certain degree: whereas ACTS ensured coordination activities for the Kenya pilot for a time, and IISD continued to maintain linkages with the Rwanda project for its duration, oversight on the Mozambique pilot was informally transferred over to the GTZ. As a result, there was less engagement on the part of the three leading organizations on this project.
171. When faced with the difficulties presented by ACTS in managing its attributed responsibilities, the project was able to adapt and to devise an alternate management strategy, by transferring responsibilities over to IISD which, in effect, became the Executing Agency for the project from late 2008²⁹. However the project was less responsive to the difficulties experienced by the Rwanda pilot project, and the development and approval of an 'adaptive management response' ultimately came too late for the pilot project to be salvageable.
172. It is not clear if the project's overall implementation arrangements were an impediment to the achievement of results, since the results varied from one country to another. Rather, it is the combination of the complexity of the arrangements with the capacity of the participating institutions that may have created bottlenecks in certain cases. Therefore an important lesson in developing implementation mechanisms might be to ensure that they are adapted to the participating partners' capacities.
173. In terms of the role and performance of the various committees established by the project, the evaluation found that more frequent meetings of the Project Steering Committee could have been helpful in addressing implementation issues earlier on. From the start of the project, there were two PSC meetings, and that full participation by all countries was not always mobilized; it was noted by some interviewees that there was no dedicated resources to support travel costs for

²⁸ A1a, Annex B and A1b, Annex III.

²⁹ H1, H1b, C15a, D3.

participants, and therefore that PSC meetings needed to be organized on the margins of other events, such as UNFCCC meetings³⁰.

174. As for the Technical Advisory Group, there is no evidence that this group was ever formally constituted or ever met; however the project did hire individual experts to provide advice on various technical issues, throughout the project³¹. This is perhaps due to the late realization on the part of the project team that regional aspects of this project were too challenging to identify, and therefore that technical advice was best targeted to individual pilot projects³².

175. At the national level, the performance of steering committees also varied. In Kenya, the local district committee, as well as the national level structure, appeared more engaged in the project. In Rwanda, it was noted by many participants that the Steering Committee lacked leadership, authority to make decision, and overall commitment, and that communications between the project management unit (KIST) and the PSC were inadequate³³. In at least one case, the Rwanda project management team (KIST) did not comply (or significantly delayed compliance) with instructions received from the steering committee, regarding the setting up of separate bank accounts.

176. Overall, these various shortcomings meant that the responsibilities for project execution, output quality, monitoring and supervision, were dispersed and not always effectively discharged by the relevant partners.

177. The project, and some of the pilots as well, encountered a number of administrative, operational and technical problems that can be summarized as below:

The Project

178. The project encountered some difficulties in identifying common threads among the three pilot countries which, combined with the low level of interest on the part of observing countries Tanzania and Madagascar, reduced the synergistic aspects of this project. As a result of this technical issue, only one regional meeting was held in 2007.

179. Financial constraints prevented the project from delivering its intended outreach activities. As noted in the final report, “the project’s outreach and communications efforts were financed through IISD’s workplan with NORAD, other projects in which ACTS or IISD were involved, or were volunteer activities” (C15a).

180. Staff turnover among the key agencies (ACTS, UNEP, and the local teams) also created delays which, in some cases, prevented activities from taking place.

³⁰ C15a.

³¹ Targeted technical papers and consultancies were commissioned, including one consultancy on fire and climate change (Mozambique), one on hydro-power (Rwanda), one on policy capacity (General), and one on the district-level socio-political context (Kenya). See J1a to J4c.

³² Interviews.

³³ Interviews, minutes of 2008-06 Rwanda Steering Committee.

There were also delays in delivering administrative tasks, such as financial and narrative reports that created further delays in funds transfers.³⁴

Kenya Pilot Project

181. As confirmed during the evaluation mission, the Kenya pilot project experienced few technical difficulties. However, recurrent and severe droughts created some difficult conditions in which to operate which, ultimately, required the establishment of a district food security “safety net” for communities when crops failed. This safety net was used in 2008-2009, but became un-necessary later on, when rains resumed closer to normal expected levels³⁵, and when water availability was ensured through sand dams. Despite increases in crop yields even under drought conditions, this hints at a need for continuous improvements to the project’s methods and techniques so as to ensure that adaptive capacity is maintained regardless of the extreme climate situation.

182. Another minor technical problem was experienced in the design and implementation of the biogas digester that was anticipated by the project. As noted during the field mission, the digester had indeed been built (hosted on a private property) but it was not functional due to some flaws in technical design; as a result of this, the intended bakery was also not built, since it could not be powered. At the evaluation mission, the DMA had agreed to provide funding for a re-examination of the digester’s design and functioning.

Rwanda Pilot Project

183. The Rwanda pilot project encountered a significant number of technical, administrative and operational problems that ultimately led to its failure to achieve its final outcomes. First, a number of changes to the operational structure of the project were undertaken without prior consultation or consent from IISD or UNEP: the project’s delivery modalities were changed and the selected villages for implementation were also relocated without prior justification. Funds were transferred from CITT to the districts for implementation of a set of activities that were integrated into the district’s regular work plan, although this fund transfer was not the originally agreed upon delivery method. This led to problems when the districts’ expenditures exceeded the amounts made available to them in their advances and the KIST-CITT were unable to make subsequent appropriate payments³⁶. This resulted in KIST owing the districts for expenditures incurred under the project, which were reimbursed when the Termination Agreement was signed between KIST and IISD, in 2010.

184. Various documents, including KIST’s own investigation report, cite “lack of substantive communication and failure to provide documentation concerning the project planned activities and progress reports”, an “inability to comply with deadlines”, and “rigidity in cash disbursement and long administrative procedures in KIST” as factors that contributed to the failure of the pilot³⁷.

³⁴ See also D1 to D4, PIRs.

³⁵ Evaluation mission, interviews, see also E1 and E2.

³⁶ Evaluation mission, interviews.

³⁷ KIST, Report from investigative committee, May 2010.

185. On the part of KIST's senior management, the evaluator has found that very little effort was made to correct inefficient procedures or to facilitate project implementation. There was no internal mechanism for monitoring project implementation, and the project team alone bore the responsibility of success or failure, despite its reliance on KIST's internal structure and procedures. Combined with a high rate of resignations among project staff, this contributed to creating an unhealthy, inefficient climate, with very little transparency.

Mozambique Pilot Project

186. The Mozambique pilot project encountered some delays at its start, due to a change in project team and to a delay in confirming the co-financing pledged by the GTZ. Beyond that, however, it met with little technical difficulties, and it was generally well supported by the local GTZ-AMBERO-IP consortium³⁸.

Summary

187. As a result of these considerations, the criterion rating for the Kenya pilot project is Satisfactory; for Mozambique, it is also Satisfactory; and for Rwanda, it is Highly Unsatisfactory. Overall, the Project's rating of implementation approach and adaptive management is Moderately Satisfactory.

C.3 Stakeholder Participation and Public Awareness

188. The Project's overall approach to stakeholder participation and public awareness was to be deployed according to three different tracks: a first track concerned community-level awareness of vulnerability and adaptation within each pilot project; a second concerned engagement of policy makers within each country as a mechanism for upscaling and mainstreaming adaptation; a third track was to be deployed at regional and international levels, through the development of information products, lessons, and through regional meetings.

189. From a design perspective, this approach is effective and efficient, and in line with regular practice regarding awareness raising. At the local level, there is significant evidence that both the Kenya and Mozambique projects succeeded in mobilizing communities to a great extent. In both cases, community groups were created or supported that served as a basis for organizing community-level trainings and activities. In Kenya, those community groups were still in existence and active at the time of this evaluation (it was not possible to verify this in Mozambique). A household survey also confirms the effectiveness of the approach in the case of the Kenya pilot project in terms of building an understanding of resilience among project beneficiaries and participants. There is no evidence that a similar approach was used in Rwanda, or that special community groups were mobilized as recipients of activities, since most of the activities that were delivered were channeled through regular district activities.

³⁸ D1 to D4, C15a, F3, F9.

190. The second track that concerned the engagement of policy makers met with mitigated success, depending on the location. All three pilot projects succeeded in engaging district-level authorities and planners, but only the Kenya pilot project succeeded in mobilizing policy change.
191. Finally, the project's activities on the third track also had mitigated success, since they had to be funded from outside sources despite having been included in early project budgets. Nevertheless, a large number of awareness products and events were organized around this project, which no doubt contributed to creating knowledge among those who participated.
192. On the whole, as a pilot project whose primary objective was to generate lessons about mainstreaming adaptation, however, this strategy may have fallen a little short of the desired result, due simply to a lack of funds and time. This translates into an overall rating of Satisfactory.

C.4. Country Ownership and Drivenness

193. This project was designed, in part, to create an awareness and a sense of ownership of an issue that was not very recognized as a priority at the time of design. Therefore, the degree of ownership and drivenness to be expected should be moderated against this basic fact. However, at the time of project design, there was a great deal of interest in adaptation issues, and all three countries selected to work on issues that were already at the heart of national policy (drought, land management, energy and fire management). There was, at least then, a high degree of consistency between the countries' priorities and this project.
194. During implementation, the ownership of the project was somewhat more dependent on the leadership demonstrated by national implementing institutions; therefore it is not a surprise, in light of what has already been said, that the level of ownership of this project was higher in Kenya and Mozambique than it was in Rwanda, despite the importance of the issue. This is likely due to the nature of the project implementing arrangements, and to the project's relatively small scope.
195. Government institutions were not very involved in these pilot projects in general, except serving as members of the Steering Committee. This may have contributed in making the linkages between pilot project and policy more difficult to achieve than anticipated. And given the degree of difficulties that this project encountered in its management structure, it is difficult to ascertain whether the cooperation received from various institutions was efficient; if this evaluation mission can be used as a proxy by which to judge ownership of the project's outcomes and results, the overall assessment is not entirely positive: as mentioned earlier, some of the project's key partners refused to meet the evaluator; in other cases, entire project teams had been dispersed, or no replies were received to repeated requests for meetings.
196. Overall, the degree of ownership of this project appeared as Moderately Satisfactory.

C.5 Financial Planning and Management

197. On the whole, the quality and efficiency of financial planning in this project respected the standards in force at the time of implementation. Budgets were developed according to the required templates and procedures, with acceptable levels of detail, and the controls implemented under UNEP financial procedures were adequately delivered. As regards procurement of goods and services, in most instances the evaluation was able to retrace the original calls for proposals and terms of reference that served as a basis for recruiting consultants. In most cases, the recruitment of project coordinating staff was left to the executing partner (ACTS, KCAS/CSTI, KIST and the GTZ all self-appointed their lead staff members).

198. The overall project budget was revised twice in 2008, after a very low rate of expenditures in the first two years of the project, to reflect the changes in the project management structure, and to reallocate some funds to better meet project needs. The increase in project personnel costs and decrease in sub-contract costs is mainly due to the status change of IISD from sub-contractor to project executing partner. The second budget revision also extended the project duration to June 2010. There was a third budget revision in 2011 at project completion to accommodate this Terminal Evaluation and the remaining GEF funds were parked under a new sundry budget line. Most of the latter will never be spent and is expected to be returned to the GEF upon project closure. Table 7 below shows the original budget (2006) and the final, revised budget at completion (2011).

Table 7: Summary of major budget variances

Description	Original Budget (2006)	Budget at Completion (2011)
Project Personnel	57,032	108,015
Consultants	28,987	5,748
Travel on official business (above staff)	13,032	19,228
Sub-contracts	770,861	607,930
Meetings/conferences	23,951	4,827
Non-expendable equipment (computers, office equip...)	60,000	36,009
Reporting costs (publications, maps, printing...)	3,737	723
Sundry (communication, postage, freight, clearances...)	2,400	8,030
<i>Sub-Total</i>	<i>960,000</i>	<i>790,510</i>
Sundry (communication, postage, freight, clearances...)		169,490
Evaluation	40,000	40,000
<i>Grand Total</i>	<i>1,000,000</i>	<i>1,000,000</i>

199. Due to the closure of the Rwanda pilot project, the Project was not able to spend all of its allocated resources. At time of writing, a balance of 169,490 US\$ remained, which was slated for return to the GEF.³⁹ Table 8 below presents the planned and real expenditures.

³⁹ see A1c (final project budget 2006), A14, A15, and A16 (budget revisions 1, 2, and 3)

Table 8 : Planned vs. Real Expenditures

Year	Planned	Real
2006	410,759.00	-
2007	352,491.00	118,287.00
2008	236,750.00	138,320.00
2009		454,747.00
2010		79,156.00
2011		40,000.00
Total	1,000,000.00	830,510.00
Unspent		169,490.00

200. Each of the pilot projects also developed a detailed project budget, and provided quarterly financial reports. In addition, there exist annual financial reports provided by the country teams to IISD and UNEP covering all activities for 2009 and 2010. It was not possible to locate similar reports (certified annual statements of expenditures) for individual pilot projects for the previous years, and no audit reports were available for the Rwanda and Mozambique pilot project accounts. It can be said that no pilot project spent in excess of its available budget, and only the Rwanda pilot project spent less than its available budget. It should be noted that, by the time the Rwanda pilot was closed, it was too late to reallocate any of the unspent resources to another pilot. Additionally, reallocating the funds from one pilot to another might have required a more formal approval from the GEF CEO.

201. The project also experienced difficulties due to lack of available funding for some of the regional and knowledge-oriented elements. Co-financing had to be mobilized from other sources to ensure the delivery of some of the awareness elements that had been under-budgeted in the project’s overall design. Hence the IISD used some resources provided to it by the Government of Norway between 2007 and 2009, and in-kind contributions from the host governments were increased (from 0 to 20,000 US\$).

202. It also appeared that at least one of the national executing agency – in this case the KIST - was receiving both overhead costs and salary top-ups from project budgets, as agreed in the Memoranda of Understanding signed by IISD and KIST⁴⁰. In itself this does not represent an irregular situation, although the evaluator finds the practice somewhat unusual as it could represent a double charge to the project for a similar service. It should be noted that as per today’s practice, many of the costs included under the “overhead” rubric (office space, lighting, electricity, etc...) would be expected to be provided by the country as counterpart or in-kind co-financing. Furthermore, it raises the question of the appropriateness of charging overhead fees, even if low, when the project’s activities are effectively suspended by the organisation’s own inability to deliver intended activities. It should, however, be noted that overhead charges and salary top-ups varied

⁴⁰ see G1, 2, 3, and 4 (MOUs between IISD and KIST, and IISD and CITT)

according to the rate of project delivery (lower when activities were stalled, higher when more progress was to be expected).

203. According to quarterly financial reports provided during the evaluation mission, between July 2007 and June 2008, a total of 5,382 US\$ was used in salary top-ups, while another 9,927 US\$ were spent in overhead costs and equipment related expenditures were of 19,000 US\$⁴¹. This means that over one year, 34,309\$ were dedicated to operations (salaries, overhead and equipment), whereas the reported activity expenditures were of 47,089 US\$ during the same period. At the very least, this does not represent a cost-effective manner of achieving a project's objective or of managing a project's resources, particularly when the total budget available is less than 200,000 US\$.

204. As regards co-financing, the CEO endorsement document stated an expected co-financing amount of 1,065,000 US\$ of which 300,000 US\$ was a cash contribution from the Netherlands that preceded the project's approval by the GEF (used for the 5 technical papers as well as some project activities completed in 2005 and 2006). Other contributions were mobilized in-kind, as follows:

Table 9: Summary of co-financing

Contributor	Pledged at CEO endorsement (US\$)	Received (US\$)
Government of The Netherlands	300,000	300,000
Government of Norway	-	145,575
ACTS	68,417	38,700
IISD	25,977	82,024
CSTI -Kenya Academy for Sciences	37,266	17,911
ALRMP (Kenya)	-	52,905
KIST (Rwanda)	113,340	57,145
GTZ (Mozambique)	500,000	503,314
UNEP	20,000	N/A*
National Governments	20,000	-
TOTAL	1,065,000	1,197,575

*) The UNEP contribution of 20,000 US\$ was allocated to UNEP preparatory activities preceding the launch of the GEF-funded project.

205. As seen in Table 9 above⁴², the realized co-financing was slightly higher than anticipated, despite some pledged contributions, namely from ACTS and KIST, falling through. Other than in the case of Kenya, where the ALRMP (and now DMA) are continuing activities, the project did not leverage any further resources, either regionally or nationally.

206. Within each pilot project, the evaluation found that procedures for financial management had been respected, executed transparently and efficiently, with the exception of the Rwanda pilot project that was subject to some difficulties.

⁴¹ see G2a to G2d, Financial reports for Q3 of 2007 until Q2 of 2008.

⁴² A17, cofinancing report (UNEP).

207. As mentioned earlier, the KIST and their staff were, at the time of the project, benefiting from overhead payments as well as salary top-ups as part of the original execution agreement; it appears from this and other evaluations that “the project team was more interested in sustaining the project than in accomplishing intended tasks and achieving intended outcomes”⁴³. In the view of the evaluator, this constituted a cause for serious concern on the part of institutions in charge of monitoring; while the issue was raised, namely by the IISD, in numerous instances⁴⁴, the Project Steering Committee saw no cause for questioning the KIST’s practices or procedures.
208. From an administrative and financial perspective, it appears from available evidence that the project funds were first disbursed into the KIST’s general account. In line with procedures adopted by the KIST, the project management team (project coordinator, accountant or staff) was not authorized to incur expenses without the written authorization of senior KIST staff (Vice-Rector for Finance or Vice-Rector for Academics), which created delays, especially when combined with extremely rigorous procedures (e.g. requests for original contracts, stamped letters of request, etc). It also appears that the project management team was not authorized to access information on project accounts (only the Vice Rectors), which made it difficult to report or plan on future activities, although this was somewhat alleviated in 2009 with the creation of a separate bank account for the project.
209. There is anecdotal evidence pointing to the fact that project funds were used for other purposes, such as for ensuring regular KIST operations, with the assumption that the project would be refunded when funds became available - but that on numerous occasions the project team was told the funds were unavailable⁴⁵ or the Finance department delayed the approval of expenditures. This constitutes poor management of available resources, and a lack of forward planning. On one occasion, it was presented to the evaluator that expenses were over-estimated (or over-reported) in relation to the service or good obtained. In KIST’s own ex-post analysis of the project, it is noted that “There is also no tracking of activities or financial details/transactions before 2009”⁴⁶. Furthermore, there appears to have been some disagreement between KIST and the districts regarding the submission of “official” or “stamped” copies of invoices for expenditures incurred, which created further delays in reimbursing expenses. The same report notes that it is impossible to track the outputs of certain activities, consultancy contracts, and logistical expenditures (e.g. travel). Further investigation by Rwandan authorities, such as an audit of expenditures incurred within KIST and the districts, may be warranted, if it is felt that these issues could constitute more than mis-management of the project and its funds.
210. The overall project’s rating for this criterion is Moderately Satisfactory, with the caveat that the financial management in the case of the Rwanda pilot project was highly unsatisfactory.

⁴³ KIST, Report from investigative committee, May 2010..

⁴⁴ Id.

⁴⁵ Interviews, KIST report from investigative committee, C15a.

⁴⁶ KIST, report from investigative committee, may 2010.

C.5 UNEP Supervision and Backstopping

211. UNEP's supervision tasks were determined early on by GEF and UNEP procedures. These included the consideration of quarterly financial reports, semi-annual narrative reports, and annual Project Implementation Reports (PIR). The process was in accordance with procedures in force at the time and were executed according to plan, although not with some delays. The evaluation found that all PIRs and quarterly reports were submitted and duly completed⁴⁷. An examination of the various ratings and comments in the PIRs lead one to conclude that, for the most part, the ratings were realistic and plausible⁴⁸.
212. These delays are mostly attributed to the fact that UNEP was reliant on ACTS as the main Executing Agency for the transmission of reports, and ACTS was reliant on the timely transmission of information from various national project partners. Later on this responsibility fell to the IISD, who also acquitted this task in an appropriate manner. This arrangement may however have created an unnecessary layer of intermediates, that in the end prevented UNEP from being properly informed of project implementation and project risks in a timely fashion.
213. The evaluation also found that UNEP provided adequate technical and substantive support to individual pilot projects as well as to the executing partners. There were a number of supervision missions, some involving UNEP staff, and some involving only ACTS or IISD. Only two elements were found that could have prevented UNEP from delivering its duties to the project supervision adequately:
214. One is the fact that there may have been a lack of transparency in some of the information transmitted by project partners. This may have contributed to mask, for a while, the low rate of project achievement, or some inaccuracies in financial management. Another is the lack of an appropriate, well supported, risk management strategy that could have prevented the long delays experienced in the project, particularly when dealing with inadequate performance from project partners. Early PIRs do not seem to contain risk ratings (e.g. 2006 or 2007). From late 2007, risk ratings contained in the PIRs (2007-2008) show that the concerns related to the management and governance of the project were already well known (rated as substantial), but the mitigation strategies were not fully explored in the documentation available.
215. Overall, the rating for this criterion is Satisfactory.

C.6 Monitoring and Evaluation

216. The Monitoring and Evaluation system that was established at the start of the project included a set of indicators for each output and outcome, as well as a supervision plan (noted above). The Project Implementation Report template also provided for a number of specific monitoring and evaluation tasks, risk

⁴⁷ see D1 to D4, and C5, C13, C14.

⁴⁸ In the rare cases where the evaluator felt a need to revise the ratings, reasons have been given in the first section of this report.

management and assessment to be undertaken at regular intervals. In its architecture, the M&E system appeared complete.

217. However, an examination of the project's indicators reveals some inadequacies in the system. First, the indicators are not always formulated in a consistent manner. For example, some indicators are formulated as 'targets' (e.g. "three field projects are designed and implemented" or "five technical papers are produced by climate and non-climate experts"). Second, not all indicators are SMART: many are not very specific (e.g. "globally significant goods related to GEF focal areas are better managed"), or time-bound, and a few are not easily measurable (e.g. "development of resources for influencing the SASAL and disaster management policy"). Third, the means of verification for these indicators is not indicated (e.g. "increased number of development practitioners having access to guidance ...). Finally, it appears that only the outcome indicators and targets were effectively measured during the project's implementation (PIRs), and compared to a baseline value. It follows from this that if one was to compare the activity-based indicators contained in the project document with the reality of implemented activities, one would find the project as having achieved less than it did.

218. At pilot project level, a set of indicators was included as part of each logical framework (not available for Rwanda). In all three cases, a baseline study was completed, which provided clear and detailed information on specific reference values. In 2010, the CSTI completed a household survey in the area of the Kenya pilot project, which tracked some but not all of the indicators of the project. There is no other report that provides detailed or synthetic information on the indicators and the rate of target achievement. For example, although it is clear from available information that food insecurity was reduced in the Kenya pilot project, the "proportion of food insecure households" was not measured after the baseline study⁴⁹, and it is unclear whether the Mozambique project succeeded in reducing "by at least 20% the burnt areas in the pilot communities". Similarly, although the project was due to promote or protect Global Environmental Benefits under the GEF's SPA policy, no systematic effort to measure these was included in the M&E system.

219. This may be because the responsibilities for monitoring the pilot project's indicators were not made clear, because there was no apparent expectation or demand at the regional level for this information, or because there were insufficient resources and technical capacity to perform this sort of comprehensive and detailed monitoring.

220. Finally, although a mid-term review was not originally foreseen, it was then added to the plan in 2008, but was never realized due to delays in the project,

⁴⁹ The 2010 household survey performed in Kenya provides some quantitative information on food security in the area. For example, it reports that "In 2006, 70% of the households spent between 50-98% of their incomes on food. In 2010 on the other hand, 83.9% indicated that they had reduced their household food expenditure significantly – this varied from 10 – 80%." The report also states that "The baseline survey conducted in 2006 indicated that over half (54.7%) of the households in Sakai did not have enough to eat. Although, in 2009 production was not as high because of drought, most households still had enough to eat but not for sale as indicated by a male farmer from Linga".

transition within UNEP, and ultimately due to the decision to stop activities in Rwanda.

221. As a result of the above, the overall rating for this aspect of the evaluation is Moderately Satisfactory.

D. Complementarities with UNEP Strategies and Programmes

222. This final section provides an analysis of the extent to which the Project was consistent with UNEP's policies, strategies and programme of work. It should be noted, however, that this project was designed in 2004-2005, and therefore that it precedes many of the emerging knowledge, strategic thinking or programming on adaptation and climate change at UNEP.

223. Nevertheless, the evaluation found that, in its intention, the project was consistent with the objectives of the Bali Strategic Plan (2005), in that it made an indirect or implicit contribution to its objectives as set out in paragraphs 3(a)(iv) *"To strengthen the capacity of Governments of developing countries as well as of countries with economies in transition, at all levels: ... (iv) To achieve their environmental goals, targets and objectives, as well as environment-related internationally agreed development goals, including those contained in the Millennium Declaration, the Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development and the outcomes of other major United Nations conferences and international agreements, thus enhancing the environmental sustainability of their countries' development;* paragraph 3b: *"To provide systematic, targeted, long and short-term measures for technology support and capacity-building, taking into account international agreements and based on national or regional priorities and need"* and paragraph 3j: *"To promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, access to and support of environmentally sound technologies and corresponding know-how, especially for developing countries as well as countries with economies in transition"*. The project is also consistent with the thematic areas listed under paragraph 20 of the Bali Strategic Plan⁵⁰.

224. A rapid review of the project's objectives and achievements also shows that the project can be considered a contribution to the priorities and key achievement results contained in UNEP's current Medium-Term Strategy (2010-2013), despite having been developed many years before. Specifically, this project makes an early and direct contribution to the objective highlighted for the Climate Change Area of Focus: *"To strengthen the ability of countries to integrate climate change responses into national development processes"*. In its intention at least, the project makes a contribution to the expected accomplishment: *"That adaptation planning, financing and cost-effective preventative actions are increasingly incorporated into national development processes that are supported by scientific information, integrated climate impact assessments and local climate data"*. The pilot project in Kenya also makes a

⁵⁰ Bali Strategic Plan for Technology Support and Capacity –building, UNEP UNEP/GC.23/6/Add.1, available at <http://www.unep.org/GC/GC23/documents/GC23-6-add-1.pdf> (last accessed April 19, 2012)

contribution to the first expected accomplishment under the Disaster and Conflicts Area of Focus: “b) *That acute environmental risks caused by conflicts and disasters are mitigated*”.

225. Finally, the evaluation found that, although no specific mention is made of gender issues in the overall design of the project, the implementation of activities at the pilot project level did, to a certain extent, take gender considerations into account. This is perhaps more particularly in true in the case of the Kenya pilot project, where gender-specific activities were designed to respond to different patterns of land use and gender-based occupations as well as different measures of vulnerability to drought. As was noted during the valuation mission, women’s activity groups remained very active and showed a high degree of continued success and motivation. There is no similar evidence for the Rwanda or Mozambique pilots, and neither the project nor the pilot projects contain gender-disaggregated indicators to facilitate the integration of gender-specific issues, as is current practice.
226. As a result of the above considerations, the overall rating for this project is Moderately Satisfactory.

Part III - Conclusions and Recommendations

A. Conclusions

227. In conclusion, this evaluation found that this project was moderately successful in delivering its intended outputs but moderately unsuccessful in achieving its anticipated outcomes. At least in the case of one pilot project, the project is well on its way to achieve its desired impact of reducing vulnerability (Part II, Section A.1). Among the main concrete results achieved by this project, the evaluation found:
228. A measurable and sustained reduction in vulnerability to drought among targeted communities in the Kenya pilot project, along with increased levels of food security. This was achieved through a combination of techniques, including early warning based on downscaled climate information, crop diversification, water conservation and mobilization works, and alternative revenue generation. Concepts related to vulnerability were also successfully integrated at the policy level in Kenya.
229. Available documentary evidence also shows the establishment and application of a fire warning system accessible and usable by targeted communities in Mozambique, along with training of all relevant groups on the management of fire incidents. This was also accompanied by the inclusion of fire risks among the elements of the Disaster Risk Management Programmes being implemented at the time.
230. Documentary evidence also shows some completed reforestation and erosion control works in the pilot sites in Rwanda, along with some works to rehabilitate water conservation infrastructures and the purchase and distribution of efficient cookstoves, as

well as the initiation of income-generating activities, such as distribution of improved-race cows and establishment of beekeeping structures⁵¹.

231. As a demonstration project, and the first of its kind for UNEP at the time, it also delivered some lessons, both substantive and process oriented, that can be of relevance to other projects and initiatives. The evaluation found that the project, both in its design and in its implementation, exhibited a high degree of relevance to the GEF and UNEP policies at the time, and that it continues to be relevant to UNEP's strategies and programmes (Sections A.2 and D).
232. The evaluation also found that, despite some shortcomings, the project contributed to changes in behaviour as regards the mainstreaming of vulnerability and adaptation into sustainable development plans and planning processes in at least one case, and that it had increased capacity to generate and use information about climate change to effect change in relevant development policies (Section A.3). The project also encouraged learning among the beneficiaries and participants, at least at the individual level, as well as within targeted communities in Kenya and Mozambique.
233. The Theory of Change and Review of Outcomes to Impact analyses reveal that the project's design was reasonably solid in its logic, despite some shortcomings in the formulation and articulation of some of the project's elements (e.g. activities, indicators, assumptions). (Section A.5)
234. In terms of sustainability, the evaluation concludes that the project demonstrates a satisfactory level of institutional, environmental and socio-political sustainability but that, as with many pilot projects, its long-term financial sustainability left much to be desired (Sections B.1 to B.4). That said, in at least one case, the full conditions for long-term sustainability were put in place, demonstrating that the conditions for success in cases like these include: a solid anchoring in a country-driven program or project, well-established capacity for project implementation and execution within country partner institutions, high degrees of community mobilization and a close fit between national priorities and community needs. These conditions also form the basis for the replicability of the project's outcomes and results.
235. The evaluation also found that local stakeholder engagement was high in most cases, and that participation by institutions and individuals was encouraged and well facilitated by the project's structures and design (Section C.3). However, the evaluation found some shortcomings in the engagement of higher-level policy makers and regional partners that was to be the tool for achieving mainstreaming and upscaling of the project's results (Section C.4). In addition, the evaluation found that, in some cases, the country ownership of this project, also left much to be desired, and that governments in the three pilot countries played a remote role in the project's implementation. (C.4)
236. The project encountered some major difficulties in some operational and management aspects, which contributed to making it inefficiently executed (Section A.4). The project encountered numerous delays, which were due to a combination of factors,

⁵¹ While it was not possible to visit the project sites in either Rwanda or Mozambique, the available documentary evidence it itself based on a project site visit to both countries, conducted by IISD in the course of its mandate as executing agency. In both cases, this evidence is also supported by at least one interview.

including an incomplete design and a low degree of preparedness (Section C.1), inadequate expectations regarding the capacity of some of the key executing partners, and overly complex execution arrangements (Section C.3). Furthermore, although it was appropriately managed by UNEP and most other partners, the project encountered some hurdles in terms of financial planning and management, which raise some concerns as regards the application of appropriate standards in one specific case (Section C.5). An incomplete Monitoring and Evaluation system, along with complexities in the management and accountability structure of the project, may have reduced the efficiency of UNEP’s supervisory functions, and hindered the delivery of appropriate project risk management (Sections C5 and 6).

237. The evaluation concludes that the overall rating for this project, compiled from ratings across the 19 criteria and 111 sub-indicators, is Moderately Satisfactory. A summary of evaluation ratings is presented in the table below:

Table 10: Summary of evaluation ratings

Key Evaluation Criteria	Rating
1. Attainment of Objectives and Planned results	MS
1a. Achievement of outputs and activities	MS
1b. Relevance	S
1c. Effectiveness	MU
1d. Efficiency	U
1e. Review of Outcomes to Impacts	MS
2. Sustainability, Replication and catalytic role	
2a. Socio-political sustainability	MS
2b. Financial sustainability	MU
2c. Institutional sustainability	MS
2d. Environmental Sustainability	S
Overall sustainability rating	MU
2e. Catalyzing behavioural changes	MS
2f. Replicability	MS
Overall rating for catalytic role	MS
3. Processes affecting attainment of project results	
3a. Preparation and readiness	MU
3b. Implementation approach and adaptive management	MU
3c. Stakeholder Participation and Awareness	S
3d. Country Ownership and Driven-ness	MS
3e. Financial Planning and Management	MS
3f. UNEP Supervision and Backstopping	S
3g. Monitoring and Evaluation	MS
4. Complementarities with UNEP strategies and programmes	S
OVERALL RATING	MS

B. Lessons Learned

238. This evaluation has revealed a few lessons that may be of relevance to future GEF or UNEP programming:
239. **Lesson 1:** Projects aiming at supporting policy and planning that are well embedded within nationally-driven, well-resourced, larger programmes will often show a higher rate of success. This is consistent with the current GEF model of programming, where ‘incremental activities’ are added upon ‘baseline activities’. In terms of overall process, efforts to achieve policy mainstreaming, or to effect any sort of policy change in a country, should be inscribed in longer-term projects or programmes that engage the appropriate level of stakeholders and policy makers in a continuous dialogue. While the demonstration of local benefits of a certain policy approach is an extremely useful tool to promote rapid uptake, the national policy-making processes, cycles and durations should also not be ignored. In many contexts, the demonstration of local benefits is in fact insufficient to effectively drive the policy process.
240. **Lesson 2:** For any project relying heavily on new partners for execution, it is of crucial importance to conduct a thorough assessment of potential partner institutions’ capacities to ensure their capacity for adequate execution, respect of fiduciary standards, as well as production of quality outputs and services. A capacity assessment of local executing agencies should form part of a project preparation phase and capacity strengthening measures could be built into projects for efficient execution, when necessary.
241. **Lesson 3:** Project execution arrangements, especially in the case of multi-country or regional projects, should be streamlined and simplified to allow for transparent and simplified lines of accountability and reporting, transparent flows of information, and reduced transaction costs. Adequate risk management processes, with clear milestones and triggers should also form part of project execution agreements with partner institutions.
242. **Lesson 4:** From a substantive point of view, a real reduction of vulnerability to climate change at the local level can only be achieved as a result of a comprehensive strategy that includes various elements, including: enhanced climate-related information, alternative and diverse livelihoods (to reduce dependency on climate sensitive resources), and ecological regeneration for continued ecosystem services. This ‘integrated’ strategy is now being implemented in numerous adaptation projects, and if implemented in a policy-receptive context, the demonstration of economic benefits to local communities will support spontaneous uptake, and ultimately policy integration.

C. Recommendations

243. A number of the issues raised above have been addressed in recent years. For example, UNEP and the international adaptation community, have gained significant experience in designing projects that have a solid “theory of change”, in which indicators are well articulated, and which strive to achieve realistic objectives. There is also significantly more experience and expertise on the monitoring and evaluation of adaptation projects, which is applied internationally. Bearing this in mind, and based on the above findings and lessons, the evaluation makes the following recommendations:

244. *Recommendation 1.* That UNEP systematically perform a strategic assessment of its Executing Agency Partners prior to agreement signing, during project preparation phase, that includes an assessment of fiduciary management practices and standards, staff skills and availability, substantive expertise and orientation, and any systemic issues that may facilitate or hinder project implementation. In cases where capacity is found wanting, projects should include capacity building measures in the first year of implementation, prior to the start of activities.
245. Elements of UNEP's Policy on Partnership, particularly the criteria designed to assist in the selection of organizational partners, could be applied in a more rigorous manner to the selection of project implementing partners and the design of execution arrangements.
246. *Recommendation 2.* That UNEP institute a more formal process for project risk management, with clear milestones and triggers, which enable it to make decisions regarding the continuation of activities or agreements. These milestones and triggers should be made known to the project partners and form part of a 'performance agreement' at the time of Project Document signing.

Annexes

1. Evaluation Matrix and Indicators List
2. List of documents
3. List of meetings and interviews
4. Completed evaluation matrix – Indicators and ratings
5. Terms of Reference

Annex 1 – Evaluation Matrix

Key Evaluation Criteria

1. Attainment of Objectives and Planned results

1a. Achievement of outputs and activities

Extent to which programmes activities were delivered

Degree of success in achieving expected outputs

1b. Relevance

Extent to which the project's objectives and implementation strategies were consistent with national environmental issues and needs

Extent to which the project's objectives and implementation strategies were consistent with UNEP mandate and policies at the time

Extent to which the project's objectives and implementation strategies were consistent with the relevant GEF focal area strategies, operational policies and strategic priorities

1c Effectiveness

extent to which the project has achieved its main objective to mainstream or integrate vulnerability and adaptation to climate change into sustainable development plans and planning processes

Degree of success in achieving expected outcomes

1d. Efficiency

Extent to which overall project implementation was timely and cost effective

Evidence of cost-saving or time-saving measures put in place

Extent of project delays affecting execution

Cost vs. Achievement ratio

Cost vs. Time ratio

1e. Review of Outcomes to Impacts

Extent to which the project has contributed to changes in behaviour as regards the mainstreaming of vulnerability and adaptation into sustainable development plans and planning processes

Extent to which the project has contributed to changes in behaviour as regards improved strategies to manage land and water resources

Extent to which the project has resulted in changed behaviours as regards established practices for sustainable land use and water resources to adapt to climate change

Extent to which the project has led to a change in the natural resource base and the benefits derived from the environment (improved ecosystem integrity, reduced ecological and community vulnerability)

2. Sustainability, Replication and catalytic role

2a. Socio-political sustainability

social or political factors that may influence positively or negatively the sustenance of project results and progress towards impacts

level of ownership by the main national stakeholders

Level of government and stakeholder awareness, interests, commitment and incentives to execute, enforce and pursue the programmes, plans, agreements, monitoring systems etc. prepared and agreed upon under the project

2b. Financial sustainability

extent to which the continuation of project results and the eventual impact of the project are dependent on continued financial support

likelihood that adequate financial resources[1] will be or will become available to implement the programmes, plans, agreements, monitoring systems etc. prepared and agreed upon under the project

financial risks that may jeopardize sustenance of project results and onward progress towards impact

2c. Institutional sustainability

extent to which the sustenance of the results and onward progress towards impact dependent on issues relating to institutional frameworks and governance

Degree of robustness of institutional achievements such as governance structures and processes, policies, national agreements, legal and accountability framework

2d. Environmental Sustainability

Environmental factors, positive or negative, that can influence the future flow of project benefits

Are any project outputs or higher level results that likely to affect the environment

2e. catalyzed behavioural changes

use and application by the relevant stakeholders of technologies and approaches show-cased by the demonstration projects

use and application by the relevant stakeholders of strategic programmes and plans developed

Use and application by the relevant stakeholders of assessment, monitoring and management systems established at the national level

Extent to which the project has indentified incentives of adaptation or sustainable land and water management

Degree of institutional uptake or mainstreaming of project-piloted approaches in the national demonstration projects

Evidence of policy changes as a result of the project

Evidence of sustained follow-on financing

Extent to which the project has created opportunities for particular individuals or institutions (“champions”) to catalyze change (without which the project would not have achieved all of its results).

2f. Replicability

Lessons learned are identified and disseminated
A strategy for replication of project results is identified
Project results are replicable to other countries, contexts, capacity situations

Replication of project outputs has already occurred.

3. Processes affecting attainment of project results

3a. Preparation and readiness

Extent to which the project's objectives were clear, practicable and feasible within allocated time and resources

Extent to which the capacities of executing agencies properly considered when the project was designed

Degree of clarity of the project document, targets, results and responsibilities

Degree of clarity of identified implementation arrangements

Extent to which national resources and enabling legislation were assured at start of project

Extent to which the implementation arrangement were appropriate

Evidence of incorporation of lessons learned into project design

Factors influencing quality at entry of project design

3b. Implementation approach and adaptive management

Extent to which recommendations from SC meetings were integrated into project approach

Extent to which the project implementation mechanisms outlined in Project document have been followed

Extent to which the planned project implementation mechanisms were effective in delivering project outputs and outcomes

Assess the role and performance of units and committees established

Extent of effectiveness of project execution arrangements

Degree of effectiveness and efficiency of Project management by the EA

Identify administrative, operational or technical constraints that influenced the implementation of the project

3c. Stakeholder Participation and Awareness

the approach(es) used to identify and engage stakeholders in project design and implementation was effective

degree and effectiveness of collaboration and interactions between the various project partners and stakeholders during the course of implementation of the project

degree and effectiveness of any public awareness activities

how the results of the project (strategic programmes and plans, monitoring and management systems, national agreements etc.) engaged key stakeholders

Extent to which non-governmental stakeholders (CSOs, communities, private sector, NGOs) have been included in the project

3d. Country Ownership and Driven-ness

Extent to which Governments have assumed responsibility for the project and provided adequate support to project execution

degree of cooperation received from the various contact institutions in the countries involved in the project

extent to which the political and institutional framework of the participating countries has been conducive to project performance

to what extent the Governments have promoted the participation of communities and their non-governmental organisations in the project

Degree of responsiveness of the Governments to UNEP supervision and the project implementation adjustments

3e. Financial Planning and Management

Degree of budget variance (original Prodoc vs. Completion revision)

Degree of application of proper standards (clarity, transparency, audit etc.) and timeliness of financial planning, management and reporting

Planned co-financing was mobilised

Effectiveness of administrative processes such as recruitment of staff, procurement of goods and services

The project has leveraged additional resources

3f. UNEP Supervision and Backstopping

adequacy of project supervision plans, inputs and processes

Degree of emphasis given to outcome monitoring (results-based project management)

Degree of realism and candour of project reporting and ratings

quality of documentation of project supervision activities

Financial, administrative and other fiduciary aspects of project implementation supervision

3g. Monitoring and Evaluation

quality, application and effectiveness of project monitoring and evaluation plans and tools

Quality and effectiveness of the risk management strategy

The project has a sound M&E system at design

The project indicators are SMART

Timelines for reporting and M&E activities are clear

Quality of the project logframe as a planning and monitoring instrument

Extent of clarity of baseline information on performance indicators

The responsibilities for M&E activities were clearly defined

the frequency of various monitoring activities was specified and adequate

specific targets were specified for project outputs

support for M&E was budgeted adequately and was funded in a timely fashion during implementation

annual project reports and Progress Implementation Review (PIR) reports were complete, accurate and with well justified ratings

the information provided by the M&E system was used during the project to improve project performance and to adapt to changing needs

4. Complementarities with UNEP strategies and programmes

4a. Linkage to UNEP's Expected Accomplishments and POW 2010-2011

Extent to which the project makes a tangible contribution to any of the Expected Accomplishments specified in the UNEP MTS

Extent to which the project makes a tangible contribution to the Bali Strategic Plan (BSP)

Extent to which the project takes gender dimensions into consideration

Extent to which the project generates or facilitates South South Cooperation

Annex 2 – List of documents

A. Prodoc and General Info Docs

- A1a. CEO Approval MSP Proposal for GEF Submission, 2005
- A1b. Final prodoc, 2006
- A1c. Project Budget - Final _GEF funds, 2006
- A2. ID2752-Regional-ReviewSheet, 2005
- A3. Adaptation in eastern and southern Africa, presentation by Jo-Ellen Parry, 2006
- A4. Integrating Socio-economic –information, presentation by Maggie Opondo, 2008
- A5. Project Document, Final draft revised 04-06-08
- A5b. 2007 - ACTS-IISD Project Management_reallocation2007_confirmed
- A6. Kenya Project Document final version
- A6b. 2007 - Internalization document - update 2007_to UNEP.doc
- A7. Project Budget - Final REV_GEF funds.xls
- A7b. 2007 - Project Budget_Revised_27092007.xls
- A8. 2008-08 - Amendment of MOU between ACTS and IISD_NOT SIGNED
- A9. Project revision 1 GFL_4956, 2008
- A10. Vulnerability & Adaptation Rev 1 27 08
- A11. 2009 - UNEP and IISD Project Revision Document
- A12. ACTS Draft Letter - ACCESSA Project.doc
- A13. Assignment letter
- A.14. Project revision 1, with budget and workplan (2008)
- A15. Project revision 2, with budget and workplan (2009)
- A17. Project completion revision (revision 3) (2010)

B. MOUs with Executing Agencies 2005 and 2006

- B1. 2005 - MOU - ACTS and UNEP for June to December 2005
- B2. 2005 - MOU - IISD and UNEP for June to December 2005 - final
- B3. 2006 - Contract between UNEP and ACTS_final version
- B4. 2006 - MOU ACTS with IISD_signed by IISD
- B5. 2006 - MOU ACTS with IISD_signature page
- B6. ACTS- CSTI MOU 21 05 07- CA comments
- B7. ACTS- CSTI MOU 21 05 07- FINAL
- B8. Budget for MOU_draft_2007-05-03
- B9. MoU ACTS-AMBERO final draft (2007 12 14)
- B10. MOU-Partnership Mozambique_Final_07-09-07
- B11. ACTS_CITT_MOU_draft_final revised 2007-06-28_to UNEP.doc
- B12. ACTS- CSTI MOU_final signed June 8 2007
- B13. IISD-CSTI agreement_amendment 1_fully signed
- B14. IISD-CSTI Agreement_final (2009 07)
- B15. IISD-CSTI agreement_final signed by all parties (2009 07 09)
- B16. IISD-CSTI agreement_amendment 2_fully signed
- B17. IISD-CSTI agreement_amendment 3_IISD signed
- B18. 2005 - MOU PRODER - draft (2005 08 02)
- B19. 2005 - MOU PRODER - Letter of Intent (2005 06 21)
- B20. 2008 - Mou ACTS and Ambero-IP signed

C. PROJECT REPORTS

C1. Reports for 2005

- C1a. 2005-06 to 2006-04 - ACTS Terminal Narrative Report.doc
- C1b. 2005-06 to 2006-04 - IISD Narrative Report Phase 1 (2006 05 22)_final.doc
- C1c. Invitation to UNEP Project Steering Committee 2005-11-05.doc
- C1d. Invitation to UNEP Project Steering Committee 2005-11-12.doc
- C1e. Invitation letter to UNEP PSC - 15 Nov 2005.doc
- C1f. Invitation letter to UNEP PSC-Pirenne.pdf
- C1g. Travel costs for September 2005 trip IISD.xls
- C1h. Trip approval IISD.doc

C2. Kenya (2005)

- C2a. Kenya Project Document final version-2.doc
- C2b. Presentation on Land Suitability Evaluation for arable crops using GIS
- C2c – presentation on Climate change
- C2d. Creating a GIS for mapping climate change
- C2e. Landcover and human influence, presentation.

C3.Mozambique (2005)

- C3a. Newspaper article - Diario 30.9
- C3b. Letter-President-Guebuza-28-Oct-2005
- C3c. Newspaper article - Noticias 1.10
- C3d. Newspaper article - Noticias 19.10.05 Queimadas
- C3e. Newspaper article - Noticias, 27.10.05, GRC Caia

C4.Rwanda (2005)

- C4a. Minihydro project Rwanda workplan.doc
- C4b. Map of hydro sites Rwanda.jpg
- C4c. 2005 Steering committee MINUTES.doc

C5. General and Miscellaneous documents (2006)

- C5a. Financial Report Dec 2006
- C5b. 2006-Q3&Q4 - Half-Annual Progress Report_IISD to ACTS
- C5c. 2006-Q2 - Interim Progress Report_IISD_June 2006 (2006 07 31)

C6. Kenya (2006)

- C6a. Contract with KNAS
- C6b. Contract - draft (2006 01 16)-Kenya
- C6c. Project Document final version-2006-1-11
- C6d. Project Proposal - draft budget (2006 1 12)

C7. Mozambique (2006)

- C7a. Project Budget - Mozambique - draft (2006 03 15)
- C7b. Mission report - GTZ
- C7c. Local Consultation report CBIFM - RelatórioMoçambique
- C7d. Goronsosa consultation Report_06_2006_2
- C7e. CBIFM training TORs - 16-3-06

C8. Rwanda (2006)

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C9. General and miscellaneous Reports (2007)

C9a. 2007-Q1 & Q2 - ACTS Bi annual report Jan-June 07- draft 2
C9b. 2007-Q1 & Q2 - Half-Annual Progress Report_IISD_2007_Q1-Q2_final_submitted to ACTS
C9c. 2007-Q3 & Q4 - ACTS bianual report July- Dec 07
C9d. 2007-Q3 & Q4 - Annex 1-CSTI-July-Dec 07
C9e. 2007-Q3 & Q4 - Annex 2 - IISD_2007_Q3-Q4 final
C9f. 2007-Q3 & Q4 - Annex 3 - Project document draft revised 10-01-08
C9g. Financial Report 31 March 2007
C9h. 2007-Q3 & Q4 - Annex 4- Project Budget_Revised_2008 02 06
C9i. Financial Report 30 September 2007
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C10. Kenya Pilot (2007)

n-a

C11. Mozambique (2007)

C11a. Lusophone countries support for adaptation project in mozambique

C12. Rwanda (2007)

C12a. Workshop on 2007-02-14_draft report_final.doc

C13. General and Miscellaneous Documents (2008)

C13a. 2008 - IISD Report on Rwanda Pilot Project for UNEP (August 2008)
C13b. 2008-Q1 & Q2 -PM-Half-Annual progress Report_ACCESA_2008_Q1Q2_draft
C13c. 2008-Q1&Q2 - Progress Report_ACCESA_2008_Q1Q2_final
C13d. 2008-Q3 & Q4 - Narrative Report for Q4_signed by ACTS
C13e. 2008-Q3&Q4 - Progress Report_ACCESA_2008_Q3Q4_final_UNEP comments
C13f. Financial Report 31 March 2008

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C14. General and miscellaneous reports (2009)

C14a. 2009-Q1&Q2 - Half-Annual progress Report_ACCESA_2009_Q1Q2_final_rev Sept4.doc

C14b. 2009-Q3&Q4 - Half-Annual progress Report_2009_Q3Q4_final.doc

C15. General and miscellaneous reports (2010)

C15a. 2010 - ACCESA Final Narrative Report

D. PIRs

D1. 2752_Southern_Eastern_Africa_SPA_PIR_FY07

D2. 2752_UNEP_PIR_FY08

D3. 2752_ACCESA_PIR09_Final

D4a. PIR 2010 ACCESA PIR_Draft2 from IISD to UNEP

D4b. PIR 2010 ACCESA PIR_responses by IISD to UNEP comments on draft

E. Kenya Pilot Project

E1. Household survey 2010 - Indepth Interviews Sakai

E2. 2010 - Final Report from CSTI_FINAL.doc

E3. LFA for Kenya_indicators_revised during March 2009 Writeshop

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2006 - Q3&Q4 - PROGRESS REPORT- SAKAI 2 (2006 12)

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2007 - Q3&Q4 - Half Yearly Report_2007-12

2008 - Q1&Q2 - Half Yearly Report_2008-06_Annex narrative report_organized

2008 - Q3&Q4 - Attachment 2 - Trainers workshop for micro-credit scheme

2008 - Q3&Q4 - Attachment 3 - ALRMP report on seed bulking

2008 - Q3&Q4 - Attachment 4 - Training on irrigation pumps

2008 - Q3&Q4 - Attachment 5 - Brochure - Short rains weather prediction 2008

2008 - Q3&Q4 - Narrative Report_official_July-Dec 2008

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2009 - Q1&Q2 Reporting - Kenya pilot project/Annex 10b - Biogas energy proposal for Kisau project

2009 - Q1&Q2 Reporting - Kenya pilot project/Annex 10c - Brief on Sakai Biogas project sensitization

2009 - Q1&Q2 Reporting - Kenya pilot project/Annex 11 - Requirements for crops_shortrains2009

2009 - Q1&Q2 Reporting - Kenya pilot project/Annex 2 - Meeting notes - DSG and CSTI project team

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2009 - Q1&Q2 Reporting - Kenya pilot project/Annex 4a - Copy of Farmers' Handbook reviewed

2009 - Q1&Q2 Reporting - Kenya pilot project/Annex 4b - Machakos hand book workshop report

2009 - Q1&Q2 Reporting - Kenya pilot project/Annex 5 - Report on Sand Dam Activity

2009 - Q1&Q2 Reporting - Kenya pilot project/Annex 6a - Micro credit progress report

2009 - Q1&Q2 Reporting - Kenya pilot project/Annex 6b - Micro credit groups financial report

2009 - Q1&Q2 Reporting - Kenya pilot project/Annex 9 - Report-seedbulking and banking group

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 2009 - Q1&Q2 Reporting - Kenya pilot project/GEF Focal Point Field Visit_Evaluation
 2009 - Q1&Q2 Reporting - Kenya pilot project/Half Yearly report 2009 Q1&Q2_from CSTI
 2009 - Q3&Q4 - CSTI Half Yearly Progress Report December 2009
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 PACN_Preparing_climate - outreach brochure prepared for final meetings.pdf
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 Sakai Project Policy Briefing Meeting 2010 for National Senior Government Officers
 Sakai Project Policy Briefing Meeting 2010 for Permanent Secretaries

F. Mozambique Pilot Project

F1. 2005 - Planning Framework for CBFiM project in Sofala
 F2. 2009 - Final Progress report Annex Report 1-15
 F3. 2009 - Final Progress Report PRO-GRC UNEP ACTS IISD 2009 23-07
 F4. 2008-12 - AMBERO-IP Reports 1 to 9 July to Dec 2008 22-01-2009
 F5. 2010 - Warning System Proposal_Exec Sum in Portuguese_final
 F6.2008 - Baseline report translated into English (2009 10 16)
 F7. 2006 - Terminal Report CBFiM - Annex 1
 F8.2008-03 - ACTS _info 01_ AMBERO-IP Mozambique 2008-04-11.pdf

2005 - Report from planning workshop CbFiM Sofala Nov05
 2006 - Terminal Report CBFiM - 2006 06
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 2006 - Terminal Report CBFiM - Annex 3
 2006 - Terminal Report CBFiM - Inventory Outputs&Services.doc
 2006 - Terminal Report CBFiM updated - Inventory Outputs&Services (2006 10 10)
 2006 - Terminal_Report_CBFiM updated (2006-10-10)
 2008 - Baseline report
 2008-06 - Progress Report ACTS AMBERO-IP Mozambique 2008-Q1&Q2
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G. Rwanda Pilot Project

G1. 2007 - Rwanda LFA (2007 05 17).doc
G2a. Financial report from project team - Q1 '08
G2b. Financial report Q2 '08.xls
G2c. Financial Reports from project team - Financial report, Q3 '07
G2d. Financial Reports from team - Financial report, Q4 '07
G2e. Financial Reports from team
G3. Status Report - CC and Hydropower Pilot Project_Final
G5. 2006 - FINAL REPORT Energy baseline
G6. District Level Activities
G6b. ACCESA Pilot Project in Rwanda - Summary of District activities.docx
G6c. Phase 1 - Burera Financial Report to 2009-06-30_Final.xls
G6d. Phase 1 - Burera Financial Report to 2009-06-30_signed.doc
G6e. Phase 1 - Musanze Financial Report to 2009-06-30_FINAL.xls
G6f. Phase 1 - Musanze Financial report to 2009-06-30_signed copy.JPG
G6g. Phase 1 - Progress report_technical_Burera (2009 06 30).doc
G6h. Phase 1 - Progress report_technical_Musanze (2009 06 30).doc
G6i. Phase 2 - Burera second phase budget_final.xls
G6j. Phase 2 - MoU Burera_final.doc
G6k. Phase 2 - MoU Musanze_final.doc
G6l. Phase 2 - Musanze second phase budget_final.xls
G7. Timeline of Activities (2010 02 04)
2005 - Letter from Hajabakiga - 2005-07-15
2005 - Letter to Butare from IISD - 2005-08-16
2005 - Letter to H E HAJABAKIGA (2005 07 01)
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2006 - FINAL REPORT Community vulnerability baseline
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2006-12 - Implementation Plan REVISED for Phase 2 (2006 12 29)
2007 - Workshop on 2007-02-14_report_final_web
2007-04 - Rwanda Pilot Project Narrative Implementation Plan Phase II (DRAFT 2007 04 10)
2008-09 - Hydro project update
2009-04 - Management Performance of KIST
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2009-09 - Revised Detailed Work Plan for the Rwanda CC Project_Final Draft
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Influencing Strategy

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Overall Project - Summary (2005 12 01)
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J. Technical Assistance

J1. Policy Capacity Piece
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J3b. Policy Brief on ASAL development

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J4. Fire in Mozambique - Climate Change and fire paper_TOR_version 2_Final
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J4b. Mozambique fire paper_final_draft.doc
J4c. Book chapter (2008 09 07)_moz_second_draft.pdf

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K1. Paper No. 1-General Concepts.doc
K2a.PaperNo.2Draft.doc
K2b.PaperNo.2-comments.doc
K3a. Paper No. 3 - Vulnerability Adaptation and Poverty Reduction.doc
K3b. Paper No. 3 - Comments.doc
K3c. paper No. 3 Draft 3.doc
K3d. paper No. 3, Tables and Charts.doc
K3e. paper No. 3 - revised.doc
K3f. paper No. 3 - Draft 4.doc
K4a. paper no 4 Draft 2.doc
K4b. Paper No.4-Kimenyi, Nyangito &Kulindwa.doc
K5. Paper_5_UNEP Comments.doc

Annex 3. List of people interviewed

OVERALL COORDINATION	
Jo-Ellen Parry (by telephone)	IISD
Ann Hammill (by telephone)	IISD
Rui Brito (by telephone)	Former Pilot project manager, Mozambique
Geordie Colville	UNEP Task manager
Martin Okun	Financial Management Officer, UNEP
Liza Leclerc	Former UNEP Task manager (2005-2009)
KENYA PILOT PROJECT	
Prof. Shem Wandiga	Project Manager (Kenya pilot Project) Centre for Science and Technology Innovations
Dr. James Oduor	Drought management Coordinator, ALRMP Kenya – Acting head of Drought Management Authority
Daniel Mbuvi	Sakai – Drought Management Officer
Frederick Shisia	Mbooni District Commissioner
Joel Mutiso	Drought Management Office
Maurice Mangutu	Drought Management Office
Martin Kamwanza	Drought Management Office
J. Nzingo	District Agricultural Office
Amos Ndunda	District Agricultural Office
Chairwoman of the micro-credit group	Community representatives
Chairman of the sand-dam and irrigation group	Sakai citizens
Chairwoman of the seedbulking group	
Host of the biogas plant	
RWANDA PILOT PROJECT	
Richard MUTABAZI	Deputy Project Manager (April 2007 to March 2009)
Arsene MUKUBWA	Hydro Specialist
John MSHANA	Vice-Rector Academics Kigali Institute of Science and Technology
Rose MUKANKOMEJE	Director General Rwanda Environmental Management Authority (REMA)
Sébastien DUSABEYEUZU	Climate Change Focal Point for Rwanda, Rwanda Development Board Member of the Project Steering Committee
Charles URAMUTSE	Consultant to REMA during life of project; Member of the Project Steering Committee
MOZAMBIQUE PILOT PROJECT	
Rui Brito	Former project manager

Annex 4. Completed evaluation matrix with indicator-based ratings

Key Evaluation Criteria	Sources	Rating
1. Attainment of Objectives and Planned results		MS
1a. Achievement of outputs and activities		
Extent to which programmes activities were delivered	D1, D2, D3, D4a; interviews JEP, AH, RB, DM	MS
Degree of success in achieving expected outputs	D1 to D4, C15a,	MS
		MS
1b. Relevance		
Extent to which the project's objectives and implementation strategies were consistent with national environmental issues and needs	interviews J. Oduor, C15a, Rose M., Rui Brito, IISD,	S
Extent to which the project's objectives and implementation strategies were consistent with UNEP mandate and policies at the time	UNEP mandates, programmes, SPA evaluation	S
Extent to which the project's objectives and implementation strategies were consistent with the relevant GEF focal area strategies, operational policies and strategic priorities	see SPA evaluation; SPA Programme paper; Project review protocol.	S
		S
1c Effectiveness		
extent to which the project has achieved its main objective to mainstream or integrate vulnerability and adaptation to climate change into sustainable development plans and planning processes	C15a	MU

Degree of success in achieving expected outcomes	C 1 to 15, D1 to 4, interviews, field visit, C15a, p.4, 4a., Interview J. Oduor, Interview S.Wandiga	MU
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MU

1d. Efficiency

Extent to which overall project implementation was timely and cost effective	C15a, p.4	U
Evidence of cost-saving or time-saving measures put in place	n-a	U
Extent of project delays affecting execution	C1 to 15, D1 to 4	U
Cost vs. Achievement ratio	A1c	U
Cost vs. Time ratio		MU

U

1e. Review of Outcomes to Impacts

Extent to which the project has contributed to changes in behaviour as regards the mainstreaming of vulnerability and adaptation into sustainable development plans and planning processes	J.Oduor	MS
Extent to which the project has contributed to changes in behaviour as regards improved strategies to manage land and water resources	D4a	MS
Extent to which the project has resulted in changed behaviours as regards established practices for sustainable land use and water resources to adapt to climate change	D4a	MS
Extent to which the project has led to a change in the natural resource base and the benefits derived from the environment (improved ecosystem integrity, reduced ecological and community vulnerability)	C15a.	MS

MS

2. Sustainability, Replication and catalytic role

2a. Socio-political sustainability

social or political factors that may influence positively or negatively the sustenance of project results and progress towards impacts	C15a, p17	N-A
level of ownership by the main national stakeholders	C15a	MS
Level of government and stakeholder awareness, interests, commitment and incentives to execute, enforce and pursue the programmes, plans, agreements, monitoring systems etc. prepared and agreed upon under the project	mission	MS

MS

2b. Financial sustainability

extent to which the continuation of project results and the eventual impact of the project are dependent on continued financial support		MU
likelihood that adequate financial resources[1] will be or will become available to implement the programmes, plans, agreements, monitoring systems etc. prepared and agreed upon under the project		MU
financial risks that may jeopardize sustenance of project results and onward progress towards impact		N-A

MU

2c. Institutional sustainability

extent to which the sustenance of the results and onward progress towards impact dependent on issues relating to institutional frameworks and governance		MS
Degree of robustness of institutional achievements such as governance structures and processes, policies, national agreements, legal and accountability framework		MS

MS

2d. Environmental Sustainability

Environmental factors, positive or negative, that can influence the future flow of project benefits		S
Are any project outputs or higher level results that likely to affect the environment		S

S**2e. Catalysing behavioural changes**

use and application by the relevant stakeholders of technologies and approaches show-cased by the demonstration projects	interview J.Oduor, C10, F2, F4, Rose M., Arsene, Mayor of Burera	MS
use and application by the relevant stakeholders of strategic programmes and plans developed		MU
Use and application by the relevant stakeholders of assessment, monitoring and management systems established at the national level	D4a	MS
Extent to which the project has identified incentives of adaptation or sustainable land and water management		S
Degree of institutional uptake or mainstreaming of project-piloted approaches in the national demonstration projects		MU
Evidence of policy changes as a result of the project		MU
Evidence of sustained follow-on financing	D4a	MS
Extent to which the project has created opportunities for particular individuals or institutions ("champions") to catalyze change (without which the project would not have achieved all of its results).		N-A

MS**2f. Replicability**

Lessons learned are identified and disseminated		HS
A strategy for replication of project results is identified		U
Project results are replicable to other countries, contexts, capacity situations		S
Replication of project outputs has already occurred.		MS

MS**3. Processes affecting attainment of project results****3a. Preparation and readiness**

Extent to which the project's objectives were clear, practicable and feasible within allocated time and resources	A1a, A1b, A5	MU
Extent to which the capacities of executing agencies properly considered when the project was designed	C15a p.7-8	HU
Degree of clarity of the project document, targets, results and responsibilities	A1a, A1b, A5	MU
Degree of clarity of identified implementation arrangements	B1, B2, B3, B4	HS
Extent to which national resources and enabling legislation were assured at start of project		MS
Extent to which the implementation arrangement were appropriate		HU
Evidence of incorporation of lessons learned into project design		HU
Factors influencing quality at entry of project design		n-A
		MU

3b. Implementation approach and adaptive management

Extent to which recommendations from SC meetings were integrated into project approach	minutes of SC 2008	HS
Extent to which the project implementation mechanisms outlined in Project document have been followed		S
Extent to which the planned project implementation mechanisms were effective in delivering project outputs and outcomes	C15a p15,	HU
Assess the role and performance of units and committees established	C15a interviews	p.16, U
Extent of effectiveness of project execution arrangements		HU
Degree of effectiveness and efficiency of Project management by the EA		U
Identify administrative, operational or technical constraints that influenced the implementation of the project		N-A
		MU

3c. Stakeholder Participation and Awareness

the approach(es) used to identify and engage stakeholders in project design and implementation was effective		HS
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degree and effectiveness of collaboration and interactions between the various project partners and stakeholders during the course of implementation of the project		S
degree and effectiveness of any public awareness activities	C15a	S
how the results of the project (strategic programmes and plans, monitoring and management systems, national agreements etc.) engaged key stakeholders		n-a
Extent to which non-governmental stakeholders (CSOs, communities, private sector, NGOs) have been included in the project	mission, interviews, F2, F9, C10a, reports	MS

S

3d. Country Ownership and Driven-ness

Extent to which Governments have assumed responsibility for the project and provided adequate support to project execution		MS
degree of cooperation received from the various contact institutions in the countries involved in the project	C15a p.11	MU
extent to which the political and institutional framework of the participating countries has been conducive to project performance		MS
to what extent the Governments have promoted the participation of communities and their non-governmental organisations in the project		MS
Degree of responsiveness of the Governments to UNEP supervision and the project implementation adjustments		n-a

MS

3e. Financial Planning and Management

Degree of budget variance (original Prodoc vs. Completion revision)		MU
Degree of application of proper standards (clarity, transparency, audit etc.) and timeliness of financial planning, management and reporting		MS
Planned co-financing was mobilised		HS
Effectiveness of administrative processes such as recruitment of staff, procurement of goods and services		S

The project has leveraged additional resources		U
		MS

3f. UNEP Supervision and Backstopping

adequacy of project supervision plans, inputs and processes		S
Degree of emphasis given to outcome monitoring (results-based project management)		S
Degree of realism and candour of project reporting and ratings		HS
quality of documentation of project supervision activities		HS
Financial, administrative and other fiduciary aspects of project implementation supervision		S
		S

3g. Monitoring and Evaluation

quality, application and effectiveness of project monitoring and evaluation plans and tools		S
Quality and effectiveness of the risk management strategy		MU
The project has a sound M&E system at design		S
The project indicators are SMART		MS
Timelines for reporting and M&E activities are clear	C15a p.11	MU
Quality of the project logframe as a planning and monitoring instrument	A1a, A1b, G1, C15a p.15,	MU
Extent of clarity of baseline information on performance indicators	F, G, H	HS
The responsibilities for M&E activities were clearly defined	MOUs	S
the frequency of various monitoring activities was specified and adequate		MS
specific targets were specified for project outputs		MS
support for M&E was budgeted adequately and was funded in a timely fashion during implementation		MU
annual project reports and Progress Implementation Review (PIR) reports were complete, accurate and with well justified ratings		HS

the information provided by the M&E system was used during the project to improve project performance and to adapt to changing needs S

MS

4. Complementarities with UNEP strategies and programmes

4a. Linkage to UNEP's Expected Accomplishments and POW 2010-2011

Extent to which the project makes a tangible contribution to any of the Expected Accomplishments specified in the UNEP MTS HS

Extent to which the project makes a tangible contribution to the Bali Strategic Plan (BSP) HS

Extent to which the project takes gender dimensions into consideration C15a p.14; interview J. Oduor MS

Extent to which the project generates or facilitates South South Cooperation C15a, p.9 U

S

Annex 5. Terms of Reference

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Terminal Evaluation of the Project “Integrating Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change into Sustainable Development Policy Planning and Implementation in Southern and Eastern Africa (ACCESA)”

PROJECT BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW

Project General Information

Table 1. Project summary

GEF project ID:	2752	IMIS number:	GFL / 2328 - 2726 – 4956
Focal Area(s):	Climate Change	GEF OP #:	
GEF Strategic Priority/Objective:	Strategic Priority for Adaptation (SPA)	GEF approval date:	7 February 2006
UNEP Approval date:	23 November 2006	First Disbursement:	30 November 2006
Actual start date:	December 2006	Planned duration:	3 years
Intended completion date:	Sep 2009	Actual or Expected completion date:	June 2010
Project Type:	MSP	GEF Allocation:	US\$1,000,000
PDF GEF cost:	None	PDF co-financing:	N/A
Expected MSP/FSP Co-financing:	US\$1,065,000	Total Cost:	US\$ 2,065,000
Mid-term review/eval. (planned date):	N/A	Terminal Evaluation (actual date):	October 2011
Mid-term review/eval. (actual date):	No MTE	No. of revisions:	3
Date of last Steering Committee meeting:	October 2008	Date of last Revision*:	24 Feb 2011
Disbursement as of 31 Dec 2010 (UNEP):	US\$790,510	Total co-financing realized as of 30 June 2010:	US\$1,173,163

Source: UNEP GEF Project Implementation Report (PIR) Fiscal Year 2010

Project Rationale

Climate change is possibly the most significant environmental challenge of our time and it poses serious threats to sustainable development in the developing countries, Kenya, Mozambique and Rwanda included. It impacts ecosystems, water resources, food, health, coasts, industrial activity and human settlements. In particular, there is a need to reflect on efforts related to the United Nations' environmental conventions to ensure that policies support the maintenance of local adaptations and help retain the resilience of socio-economic and environmental systems.

Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) are required to submit national reports to the Conference of the Parties (COP) on the implementation of the Convention. The required contents of national communications and the timetable for their submission are different for Annex I and non-Annex I Parties. This is in accordance with the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" enshrined in the Convention.

The core elements of the national communications for both Annex I and non-Annex I Parties are information on emissions and removals of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and details of the activities a Party has undertaken to implement the Convention. National communications usually contain information on national circumstances, vulnerability assessment, financial resources and transfer of

technology, and education, training and public awareness; but the ones from Annex I Parties additionally contain information on policies and measures.

The ACCESA project was designed to respond to priorities that have been identified through National Communications and other relevant assessments of the participating countries (Kenya, Mozambique and Rwanda), following the staged approach for adaptation (three stages). Stage I includes planning, such as studies of possible impacts of Climate Change, to identify particularly vulnerable countries or regions and policy options for adaptation and appropriate capacity building. Stage II includes measures such as capacity building, which may be taken to prepare for adaptation. Stage III includes measures to facilitate adequate adaptation, including insurance and other adaptation measures. Decision 2/CP.4, taken at COP 4, permitted Stage II measures to be funded in particularly vulnerable countries and regions identified in Stage I.

Each participating country's National Communication indicate the importance of harmonising climate change with national sustainable development planning through various mechanisms such as increased scientific and analysis capabilities, institutional arrangements, stakeholder involvement, linkages with poverty reduction and over-riding development priorities. None of the National Communications provide detailed descriptions on how to achieve this integration but some point to the need for assistance in this area.

All participating countries have ratified the two relevant Conventions, UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD).

Also, consistent with the staged approach to adaptation, the countries were at various points of undertaking Stages I and II adaptation (V&A assessments) through their National Communications and National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) as well as participating in the GEF supported enabling activity for Assessments of Impacts and Adaptations to Climate Change (AIACC).

This project contributes to the objectives of the UNFCCC and is consistent with the GEF Strategic Priority for Adaptation (SPA) operational guidelines as outlined in GEF/C.23/Inf.8/Rev.1. The activities and process of implementing this project are expected to be instructive on the issue of *how to* mainstream vulnerability and adaptation to climate change into other activities in order to "climate-proof" them. The lessons learned from this project should be useful not only to the adaptation priority but for the GEF Portfolio as a whole. It should provide examples on the ground of integrating climate change considerations into both project and policy level exercises to affect policy changes and reduce vulnerability.

Project objectives and components

The project's **overall development goal** is "*to reduce vulnerability of communities to the impacts of climate change thereby improving their well-being and protecting their livelihoods*". Its **main objective** is "*to promote the mainstreaming or integration of vulnerability and adaptation to climate change into sustainable development plans and planning processes through three pilot demonstration projects*". The project has three components (called "activities" in the Project Document) that are closely aligned to the project outcomes. The components and associated objectives are presented in table 2 below.

Table 2. Project components and component objectives

Components	Component objectives
<u>Component I</u> (Outcome 1) Field Capacity	Generation of capacity in each pilot project country to implement adaptation measures in the field that will reduce their vulnerability to climate change.
<u>Component II</u> (Outcome 2) Policy Capacity	Increased capacity in each country to generate and use information about climate change to effect change in relevant development policies.
<u>Component III</u> (Outcome 3)	Increased knowledge of the linkages between development planning and climate change, including policy process and methodologies.

Lessons learned	
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The planned outputs under each component, as per the Logical Framework Matrix are presented in Annex 1 of the TORs. Component I of the project seeks to design, by national teams, three field level adaptation projects (see Table A1.2 – Annex 1) and implement them collaboratively with relevant stakeholders in the participating countries (Kenya, Mozambique and Rwanda).

Component II of the project is designed to develop and use Information, tools and knowledge to mainstream adaptation to climate change into sustainable development planning in the participating countries.

Component III of the project seeks to document, produce and disseminate, to a broad audience, lessons derived from the implementation of the project in the participating countries and, 2 years after the end of the project, produce lessons learnt to assess the longer-term impacts.

Executing Arrangements

The project was originally designed to be executed through a partnership between an African non-governmental organization, the African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS) with support and capacity building by an international organization that has significant experience in implementing projects in the field, the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD). However, at the second meeting of the Project Steering Committee in October 2008, it was agreed that executing agency responsibility for this project would be transferred from ACTS to IISD. This process was completed in early June 2009.

The implementation of the project would be supervised by a Steering/ Co-ordinating Committee comprising of the representatives of the national governments, the executing and implementing agencies, the GEF Secretariat and participating donors. In addition to email correspondence, the Steering/ Co-ordinating Committee would meet twice during the project cycle: in the planning workshop at the beginning of the project (upon approval of this project) and in the synthesis meeting after the national workshops towards the end of the project. Other meetings might take place on the margins of Scientific Body or Conference of the Parties meetings during the life of the project (COP-14). Additional agencies would be invited to attend the Steering / Co-ordinating Committee on an *ad hoc* basis. A detailed representation of the overall management structure for project execution and implementation can be found in Figure 1 (*Institutional Framework for project Management*) of the Project Document.

Project Cost and Financing

Table 3 presents a summary of expected financing sources for the project as presented in the Project Document. The GEF provides US\$ 1,000,000 of external financing to the project. This puts the project in the Medium-Size Project category. The project is expected to mobilize another US\$ 300,000 in co-financing from the Netherlands and US\$ 765,000 from other sources. Table 3 also summarizes expected costs per component and financing sources.

The most recent Project Implementation Review (PIR) for fiscal year 2010 reports that by 30 June 2010 the project had effectively disbursed US\$ 835,990 of the GEF grant to UNEP – close to 83% percent. By then, the project had mobilized over US\$1,173,176 in co-financing.

Table 3. Total GEF Alternative – Baseline and Incremental Costs (USD)

	GEF Increment	Co-financing (in-kind)		Co-financing (cash) Dutch/UNEP	Total
<i>3 Pilot Projects:</i>					
Activity 3: Field Work	730,000			60,000	790,000
3.1 Rwanda		200,000	UNEP/GEF PDF-B		200,000
3.2 Kenya		unestimated	national gov		
3.3 Mozambique		500,000	GTZ		500,000
Activity 5: Policy Engagement				60,000	60,000
Activity 6: Upscaling/Data Delivery from Field to Policy Level				70,000	70,000
Sub-Total: Pilot Projects	730,000	700,000		190,000	1,620,000
Regional Meetings	30,000	20,000	national gov, bilaterals	25,000	75,000
Technical Support	40,000	20,000	UNEP	25,000	85,000
Lessons Learned	0	0		0	0
Monitoring and Evaluation	40,000				40,000
Project Management	160,000	25,000	IA/EAs	60,000	245,000
TOTAL	1,000,000	765,000		300,000	2,065,000

NOTE: Co-financing: 1,065,000 USD

Source: Project Document for CEO Approval – 7 Feb 2006

Project Implementation Issues

The project was originally designed to be executed through a partnership between ACTS with support and capacity building by IISD. At the second meeting of the Project Steering Committee in October 2008, the executing agency responsibility for the project was transferred from ACTS to IISD. The process was completed in early June 2009 and the transfer of funds to IISD completed in early July 2009.

The logframe was revised in February 2009 and the Project Revision Document was approved in June 2009.

Formal decision to de-emphasize involvement of observer countries (Tanzania and Madagascar) in the project was made during the ACCESA Project Steering Committee held in October 2008.

All activities in Rwanda were suspended between the period October 2008 to April 2009. Because of this and other challenges, it was finally decided to terminate all activities in Rwanda in October 2010.

Scale up of the Mozambique policy to national level has not been possible and the final regional meeting was not organized.

No mid-term evaluation of the project was originally planned however at the Project Steering Committee meeting in 2008, a mid-term evaluation agreed. Following the 2009 PIR, a decision was reached not to undertake a mid-term evaluation.

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EVALUATION

Objective and Scope of the Evaluation

1. In line with the UNEP Evaluation Policy⁵², the UNEP Evaluation Manual⁵³ and the Guidelines for GEF Agencies in Conducting Terminal Evaluations⁵⁴, the terminal evaluation of the Project “Integrating Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change into Sustainable Development Policy Planning and Implementation in Southern and Eastern Africa (ACCESA)” is undertaken at the end of the project to assess project performance (in terms of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency), and determine outcomes and impacts (actual and potential) stemming from the project, including their sustainability. The evaluation has two primary purposes: (i) to provide evidence of results to meet accountability requirements, and (ii) to promote learning, feedback, and knowledge sharing through results and lessons learned among UNEP, IISD, the GEF and their national partners. Therefore, the evaluation will identify lessons of operational relevance for future project formulation and implementation. It will focus on the following sets of **key questions**, based on the project’s intended outcomes, which may be expanded by the consultant as deemed appropriate:

How successful was the project in promoting mainstreaming or integrating vulnerability and adaptation to climate change into sustainable development plans and planning processes in the participating countries (Kenya, Mozambique and Rwanda)?

How successful was the project in generating the required capacity for implementing adaptation measures in the field in the participating countries?

How successful was the project in increasing the capacity of the key stakeholder target group to generate and use information about climate change to drive change in relevant development policies in the participating countries?

To what extent did the project increase knowledge of the linkages between development planning and climate change, including policy process and methodologies in the participating countries?

Overall Approach and Methods

2. The terminal evaluation of the Project “Integrating Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change into Sustainable Development Policy Planning and Implementation in Southern and Eastern Africa (ACCESA)” will be conducted by an independent consultant under the overall responsibility and management of the UNEP Evaluation Office (Nairobi).

3. It will be an in-depth evaluation using a participatory approach whereby key stakeholders are kept informed and consulted throughout the evaluation process. Both quantitative and qualitative evaluation methods will be used to determine project achievements against the expected outputs, outcomes and impacts.

4. The findings of the evaluation will be based on the following:

⁵²

<http://www.unep.org/eou/StandardsPolicyandPractices/UNEPEvaluationPolicy/tabid/3050/language/en-US/Default.aspx>

⁵³

<http://www.unep.org/eou/StandardsPolicyandPractices/UNEPEvaluationManual/tabid/2314/language/en-US/Default.aspx>

⁵⁴

http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/TE_guidelines7-31.pdf

A **desk review** of project documents⁵⁵ including, but not limited to:

- Relevant background documentation, inter alia UNEP and GEF policies, strategies and programmes pertaining to Climate Change with relevance to managing land degradation, establishing sustainable land use and management practices as well as sustainable energy sources based on natural resources such as water resources, soils and biomass; GEF-SPA operational guidelines as outlined in GEF/C.23/Inf.8/Rev.1.
- Project design documents; Annual Work Plans and Budgets or equivalent, revisions to the logical framework and project financing;
- Project reports such as progress and financial reports from countries to IISD and from IISD to UNEP; Steering Committee meeting minutes; annual Project Implementation Reviews and relevant correspondence;
- National Communications of the participating countries;
- Documentation related to project outputs such as: Kenya's draft/final National Disaster Management Policy that incorporates Climate Change, revised Arid Lands Management Policy for Kenya that incorporates Lessons from project, Strategy for a coordinated information and communication warning system between Ministries, universities and sub-national governments in Mozambique to support implementation of *Action Plan for Prevention and Control of Wildfires*. Please go to <http://www.iisd.org/climate/vulnerability/adaptation.asp>, for relevant documents.

Interviews⁵⁶ with:

- Project management and execution support;
- UNEP Task Manager and Fund Management Officer (Nairobi);
- Country lead execution partners and other relevant partners;
- Relevant staff of GEF Secretariat;
- Representatives of other multilateral agencies (e.g. WMO, FAO, UNDP) and other relevant organisations that may be involved in similar and/or related projects.

Country visits. The consultant will visit the capitals of Kenya, Mozambique and Rwanda, and, as relevant, demonstration project sites.

Key Evaluation principles

5. Evaluation findings and judgements should be based on **sound evidence and analysis**, clearly documented in the evaluation report. Information will be triangulated (i.e. verified from different sources) to the extent possible, and when verification was not possible, the single source will be mentioned⁵⁷. Analysis leading to evaluative judgements should always be clearly spelled out.

6. The evaluation will assess the project with respect to **a minimum set of evaluation criteria** grouped in **four categories**: (1) Attainment of objectives and planned results, which comprises the assessment of outputs achieved, relevance, effectiveness and efficiency and the review of outcomes towards impacts; (2) Sustainability and catalytic role, which focuses on financial, socio-political, institutional and ecological factors conditioning sustainability of project outcomes, and also assesses efforts and achievements in terms of replication and up-scaling of project lessons and good practices; (3) Processes affecting attainment of project results, which covers project preparation and readiness, implementation approach and management, stakeholder participation and public awareness, country ownership/driven-ness, project finance, UNEP supervision and backstopping, and project monitoring and evaluation systems; and (4) Complementarity with the UNEP strategies and programmes. The consultant can propose other evaluation criteria as deemed appropriate.

⁵⁵ Documents to be provided by the UNEP are listed in Annex 7.

⁵⁶ Face-to-face or through any other appropriate means of communication

⁵⁷ Individuals should not be mentioned by name if anonymity needs to be preserved.

7. **Ratings.** All evaluation criteria will be rated on a six-point scale. However, complementarity of the project with the UNEP strategies and programmes is not rated. Annex 3 provides detailed guidance on how the different criteria should be rated and how ratings should be aggregated for the different evaluation criterion categories.

8. In attempting to attribute any outcomes and impacts to the project, the evaluator should consider the difference between **what has happened with** and **what would have happened without** the project. This implies that there should be consideration of the baseline conditions and trends in relation to the intended project outcomes and impacts. This also means that there should be plausible evidence to attribute such outcomes and impacts to the actions of the project. Sometimes, adequate information on baseline conditions and trends is lacking. In such cases this should be clearly highlighted by the evaluator, along with any simplifying assumptions that were taken to enable the evaluator to make informed judgements about project performance.

9. As this is a terminal evaluation, particular attention should be given to learning from the experience. Therefore, **the “why?” question** should be at the front of the consultant’s mind all through the evaluation exercise. This means that the consultant needs to go beyond the assessment of “what” the project performance was, and make a serious effort to provide a deeper understanding of “why” the performance was as it was, i.e. of structures, processes and other factors affecting attainment of project results (criteria under category 3). This should provide the basis for the lessons that can be drawn from the project. In fact, the usefulness of the evaluation will be determined to a large extent by the capacity of the consultant to explain “why things happened as they happened” and are likely to evolve in this or that direction, which goes well beyond the mere assessment of “where things stand today”.

Evaluation criteria

Attainment of Objectives and Planned Results

10. The evaluation should assess the relevance of the project’s objectives and the extent to which these were effectively and efficiently achieved or are expected to be achieved.

Achievement of Outputs and Activities: Assess, for each component, the project’s success in producing the programmed outputs both in quantity and quality, as well as their usefulness and timeliness. Briefly explain the degree of success of the project in achieving its different outputs, cross-referencing as needed to more detailed explanations provided under Section 3 (which covers the processes affecting attainment of project objectives). The achievements under the three national demonstration projects will receive particular attention.

Relevance: Assess, in retrospect, whether the project’s objectives and implementation strategies were consistent with: i) national environmental issues and needs; ii) the UNEP mandate and policies at the time of design and implementation; and iii) the relevant GEF focal areas, strategic priorities and operational programme(s).

Effectiveness: Appreciate to what extent the project has achieved its main objective **to mainstream or integrate vulnerability and adaptation to climate change into sustainable development plans and planning processes** and its component objectives as presented in Table 2 above. To measure achievement, use as much as appropriate the indicators for achievement proposed in the Logical Framework Matrix (Logframe) of the project, adding other relevant indicators as appropriate. Briefly explain what factors affected the project’s success in achieving its objectives, cross-referencing as needed to more detailed explanations provided under Section 3.

Efficiency: Assess the cost-effectiveness and timeliness of project execution. Describe any cost- or time-saving measures put in place in attempting to bring the project to a successful conclusion within its programmed budget and (extended) time. Analyse how delays, if any, have affected project

execution, costs and effectiveness. Wherever possible, compare the cost and time over results ratios of the project with that of other similar projects. Give special attention to efforts by the project teams to make use of / build upon pre-existing institutions, agreements and partnerships, data sources, synergies and complementarities with other initiatives, programmes and projects etc. to increase project efficiency.

Review of Outcomes to Impacts (ROtI): Reconstruct the logical pathways from project outputs (services and goods delivered by the project) over outcomes (changes in stakeholder behaviour) towards impacts (environmental benefits), taking into account performance and impact drivers, assumptions and the roles and capacities of key actors and stakeholders, using the methodology presented in the GEF Evaluation Office's ROtI Practitioner's Handbook⁵⁸ (summarized in Annex 8 of the TORs). Appreciate to what extent the project has to date contributed, and is likely in the future to further contribute to:

- i) **outcomes**, that is changes in stakeholder behaviour as regards: i) the mainstreaming or integration of vulnerability and adaptation to climate change into sustainable development plans and planning processes; ii) improved strategies to manage land degradation, water resources; and iii) established practices for sustainable land use and water resources management to adapt to Climate Change, and the likelihood of those leading to
- ii) **impact**, that is changes in the natural resource base and the benefits derived from the environment, in particular: a) improved ecosystem integrity and reduced ecosystem vulnerability to the impacts of climate change; and, as a possible result, b) reducing vulnerability of the communities around them to the impacts of climate change.

Sustainability and catalytic role

11. **Sustainability** is understood as the probability of continued long-term project-derived results and impacts after the external project funding and assistance ends. The evaluation will identify and assess the key conditions or factors that are likely to undermine or contribute to the persistence of benefits. Some of these factors might be direct results of the project while others will include contextual circumstances or developments that are not under control of the project but that may condition sustainability of benefits. The evaluation should ascertain to what extent follow-up work has been initiated and how project results will be sustained and enhanced over time. Application of the ROtI method will assist in the evaluation of sustainability.

12. Four aspects of sustainability will be addressed:

Socio-political sustainability. Are there any social or political factors that may influence positively or negatively the sustenance of project results and progress towards impacts? Is the level of ownership by the main national stakeholders sufficient to allow for the project results to be sustained? Are there sufficient government and stakeholder awareness, interests, commitment and incentives to execute, enforce and pursue the programmes, plans, agreements, monitoring systems etc. prepared and agreed upon under the project?

Financial resources. To what extent are the continuation of project results and the eventual impact of the project dependent on continued financial support? What is the likelihood that adequate financial resources⁵⁹ will be or will become available to implement the programmes, plans, agreements,

⁵⁸ http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/Impact_Eval-Review_of_Outcomes_to_Impacts-RotI_handbook.pdf

⁵⁹ Those resources can be from multiple sources, such as the public and private sectors, income generating activities, other development projects etc.

monitoring systems etc. prepared and agreed upon under the project? Are there any financial risks that may jeopardize sustenance of project results and onward progress towards impact?

Institutional framework. To what extent is the sustenance of the results and onward progress towards impact dependent on issues relating to institutional frameworks and governance? How robust are the institutional achievements such as governance structures and processes, policies, national agreements, legal and accountability frameworks etc. required to sustaining project results and to lead those to impact on human behaviour and environmental resources?

Environmental sustainability. Are there any environmental factors, positive or negative, that can influence the future flow of project benefits? Are there any project outputs or higher level results that are likely to affect the environment, which, in turn, might affect sustainability of project benefits?

13. **Catalytic Role and Replication.** The *catalytic role* of GEF-funded interventions is embodied in their approach of supporting the creation of an enabling environment and of investing in pilot activities which are innovative and showing how new approaches can work. UNEP and the GEF also aim to support activities that upscale new approaches to a national, regional or global level, with a view to achieve sustainable global environmental benefits. The evaluation will assess the catalytic role played by this project, namely to what extent the project has:

catalyzed behavioural changes in terms of use and application by the relevant stakeholders of: i) technologies and approaches show-cased by the demonstration projects; ii) strategic programmes and plans developed; and iii) assessment, monitoring and management systems established at the national level;

provided *incentives* (social, economic, market based, competencies etc.) to contribute to catalyzing changes in stakeholder behaviour;

contributed to *institutional changes*. An important aspect of the catalytic role of the project is its contribution to institutional uptake or mainstreaming of project-piloted approaches in the national demonstration projects;

contributed to *policy changes* (on paper and in implementation of policy);

contributed to sustained follow-on financing (*catalytic financing*) from Governments, the GEF or other donors;

created opportunities for particular individuals or institutions ("*champions*") to catalyze change (without which the project would not have achieved all of its results).

14. *Replication*, in the context of GEF projects, is defined as lessons and experiences coming out of the project that are replicated (experiences are repeated and lessons applied in different geographic areas) or scaled up (experiences are repeated and lessons applied in the same geographic area but on a much larger scale and funded by other sources). The evaluation will assess the approach adopted by the project to promote replication effects and appreciate to what extent actual replication has already occurred or is likely to occur in the near future. What are the factors that may influence replication and scaling up of project experiences and lessons?

Processes affecting attainment of project results

15. **Preparation and Readiness.** Were the project's objectives and components clear, practicable and feasible within its timeframe? Were the capacities of executing agencies properly considered when the project was designed? Was the project document clear and realistic to enable effective and efficient implementation? Were the partnership arrangements properly identified and the roles and responsibilities negotiated prior to project implementation? Were national resources (funding, staff,

and facilities) and enabling legislation assured? Were adequate project management arrangements in place? Were lessons from other relevant projects properly incorporated in the project design? Were lessons learned and recommendations from Steering Committee meetings adequately integrated in the project approach? What factors influenced the quality-at-entry of the project design, choice of partners, allocation of financial resources etc.?

16. Implementation Approach and Adaptive Management. This includes an analysis of approaches used by the project, its management framework, the project's adaptation to changing conditions (adaptive management), the performance of the implementation arrangements and partnerships, relevance of changes in project design, and overall performance of project management. The evaluation will:

Ascertain to what extent the project implementation mechanisms outlined in the project document have been followed and were effective in delivering project outputs and outcomes. Were pertinent adaptations made to the approaches originally proposed?

Assess the role and performance of the units and committees established and the project execution arrangements at all levels;

Evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of project management by the EA and how well the management was able to adapt to changes during the life of the project;

Assess the extent to which project management responded to direction and guidance provided by the Steering Committee and IA supervision recommendations;

Identify administrative, operational and/or technical problems and constraints that influenced the effective implementation of the project, and how the project partners tried to overcome these problems;

17. Stakeholder⁶⁰ Participation and Public Awareness. The term stakeholder should be considered in the broadest sense, encompassing project partners, government institutions, private interest groups, local communities etc. The assessment will look at three related and often overlapping processes: (1) information dissemination between stakeholders, (2) consultation between stakeholders, and (3) active engagement of stakeholders in project decision making and activities. The evaluation will specifically assess:

the approach(es) used to identify and engage stakeholders in project design and implementation. What were the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches with respect to the project's objectives and the stakeholders' motivations and capacities? What was the achieved degree and effectiveness of collaboration and interactions between the various project partners and stakeholders during the course of implementation of the project?

the degree and effectiveness of any public awareness activities that were undertaken during the course of implementation of the project; or that are built into the assessment methods so that public awareness can be raised at the time the assessments will be conducted;

how the results of the project (strategic programmes and plans, monitoring and management systems, national agreements etc.) engaged key stakeholders in managing land degradation, establishing sustainable land use and management practices as well as sustainable use and management of water resources in order to reduce vulnerability to and adapt to Climate Change.

⁶⁰ Stakeholders are the individuals, groups, institutions, or other bodies that have an interest or stake in the outcome of the project. The term also applies to those potentially adversely affected by the project.

18. The ROI analysis should assist the consultant in identifying the key stakeholders and their respective roles, capabilities and motivations in each step of the causal pathway from activities to achievement of outputs and objectives to impact.

19. **Country Ownership and Driven-ness.** The evaluation will assess the performance of the Governments of the countries involved in the project, namely:

in how the Governments have assumed responsibility for the project and provided adequate support to project execution, including the degree of cooperation received from the various contact institutions in the countries involved in the project and the timeliness of provision of counter-part funding to project activities;

to what extent the political and institutional framework of the participating countries has been conducive to project performance. Look, in particular, at the extent of the political commitment to enforce national agreements promoted under the project;

to what extent the Governments have promoted the participation of communities and their non-governmental organisations in the project; and

how responsive the Governments were to UNEP supervision and the project implementation adjustments.

20. **Financial Planning and Management.** Evaluation of financial planning requires assessment of the quality and effectiveness of financial planning and control of financial resources throughout the project's lifetime. The assessment will look at actual project costs by activities compared to budget (variances), financial management (including disbursement issues), and co-financing. The evaluation will:

Verify the application of proper standards (clarity, transparency, audit etc.) and timeliness of financial planning, management and reporting to ensure that sufficient and timely financial resources were available to the project and its partners;

Appreciate other administrative processes such as recruitment of staff, procurement of goods and services (including consultants), preparation and negotiation of cooperation agreements etc. to the extent that these might have influenced project performance;

Present to what extent co-financing has materialized as expected at project approval (see Table 1). Report country co-financing to the project overall, and to support project activities at the national level in particular. The evaluation will provide a breakdown of final actual costs and co-financing for the different project components (see tables in Annex 4).

Describe the resources the project has leveraged since inception and indicate how these resources are contributing to the project's ultimate objective. Leveraged resources are additional resources—beyond those committed to the project itself at the time of approval—that are mobilized later as a direct result of the project. Leveraged resources can be financial or in-kind and they may be from other donors, NGO's, foundations, governments, communities or the private sector.

21. Analyse the effects on project performance of any irregularities in procurement, use of financial resources and human resource management, and the measures taken by the EA or IA to prevent such irregularities in the future. Appreciate whether the measures taken were adequate.

22. **UNEP Supervision and Backstopping.** The purpose of supervision is to verify the quality and timeliness of project execution in terms of finances, administration and achievement of outputs and outcomes, in order to identify and recommend ways to deal with problems which arise during project execution. Such problems may be related to project management but may also involve technical/institutional substantive issues in which UNEP has a major contribution to make. The

evaluator should assess the effectiveness of supervision and administrative and financial support provided by UNEP including:

The adequacy of project supervision plans, inputs and processes;

The emphasis given to outcome monitoring (results-based project management);

The realism and candour of project reporting and ratings (i.e. are PIR ratings an accurate reflection of the project realities and risks);

The quality of documentation of project supervision activities; and

Financial, administrative and other fiduciary aspects of project implementation supervision.

23. Monitoring and Evaluation. The evaluation will include an assessment of the quality, application and effectiveness of project monitoring and evaluation plans and tools, including an assessment of risk management based on the assumptions and risks identified in the project document. The evaluation will appreciate how information generated by the M&E system during project implementation was used to adapt and improve project execution, achievement of outcomes and ensuring sustainability. M&E is assessed on three levels:

M&E Design. Projects should have sound M&E plans to monitor results and track progress towards achieving project objectives. An M&E plan should include a baseline (including data, methodology, etc.), SMART indicators and data analysis systems, and evaluation studies at specific times to assess results. The time frame for various M&E activities and standards for outputs should have been specified. The evaluator should use the following questions to help assess the M&E design aspects:

- Quality of the project logframe as a planning and monitoring instrument; analyse/compare logframe in Project Document, revised logframe (2008) and logframe used in Project Implementation Review reports to report progress towards achieving project objectives;
- SMART-ness of indicators: Are there specific indicators in the logframe for each of the project objectives? Are the indicators measurable, attainable (realistic) and relevant to the objectives? Are the indicators time-bound?
- Adequacy of baseline information: To what extent has baseline information on performance indicators been collected and presented in a clear manner? Was the methodology for the baseline data collection explicit and reliable?
- Arrangements for monitoring: Have the responsibilities for M&E activities been clearly defined? Were the data sources and data collection instruments appropriate? Was the frequency of various monitoring activities specified and adequate? In how far were project users involved in monitoring?
- Arrangements for evaluation: Have specific targets been specified for project outputs? Has the desired level of achievement been specified for all indicators of objectives and outcomes? Were there adequate provisions in the legal instruments binding project partners to fully collaborate in evaluations?
- Budgeting and funding for M&E activities: Determine whether support for M&E was budgeted adequately and was funded in a timely fashion during implementation.

M&E Plan Implementation. The evaluation will verify that:

- the M&E system was operational and facilitated timely tracking of results and progress towards projects objectives throughout the project implementation period;

- annual project reports and Progress Implementation Review (PIR) reports were complete, accurate and with well justified ratings;
- the information provided by the M&E system was used during the project to improve project performance and to adapt to changing needs;
- projects had an M&E system in place with proper training, instruments and resources for parties responsible for M&E.

Complementarities with UNEP strategies and programmes

24. UNEP aims to undertake GEF funded projects that are aligned with its own strategies. The evaluation should present a brief narrative on the following issues:

Linkage to UNEP's Expected Accomplishments and POW 2010-2011. The UNEP MTS specifies desired results in six thematic focal areas. The desired results are termed Expected Accomplishments. Using the completed ROI analysis, the evaluation should comment on whether the project makes a tangible contribution to any of the Expected Accomplishments specified in the UNEP MTS. The magnitude and extent of any contributions and the causal linkages should be fully described. Whilst it is recognised that UNEP GEF projects designed prior to the production of the UNEP Medium Term Strategy (MTS)⁶¹/ Programme of Work (POW) 2010/11 would not necessarily be aligned with the Expected Accomplishments articulated in those documents, complementarities may still exist.

*Alignment with the Bali Strategic Plan (BSP)*⁶². The outcomes and achievements of the project should be briefly discussed in relation to the objectives of the UNEP BSP.

Gender. Ascertain to what extent project design, implementation and monitoring have taken into consideration: (i) possible gender inequalities in access to and the control over natural resources; (ii) specific vulnerabilities of women and children to environmental degradation or disasters; and (iii) the role of women in mitigating or adapting to environmental changes and engaging in environmental protection and rehabilitation. Appreciate whether the intervention is likely to have any lasting differential impacts on gender equality and the relationship between women and the environment. To what extent do unresolved gender inequalities affect sustainability of project benefits?

South-South Cooperation. This is regarded as the exchange of resources, technology, and knowledge between developing countries. Briefly describe any aspects of the project that could be considered as examples of South-South Cooperation.

The Consultant

25. For this evaluation one (1) independent consultant will be hired. The evaluator will have the following expertise and experience:

Evaluation of environmental projects

Expertise in land and/or integrated water resources management, with a focus on small holder farming, pastoralism and forestry.

Extensive knowledge of Climate Change and Community Adaptation, institutional capacity building and policy analysis especially that relates to mainstreaming into planning processes in Eastern and Southern Africa.

⁶¹ <http://www.unep.org/PDF/FinalMTSGCSS-X-8.pdf>

⁶² <http://www.unep.org/GC/GC23/documents/GC23-6-add-1.pdf>

26. *By undersigning the service contract with UNEP/UNON, the consultant certify that (s)he has not been associated with the design and implementation of the project in any way which may jeopardize (her)his independence and impartiality towards project achievements and project partner performance. In addition, (s)he will not have any future interests (within six months after completion of their contract) with the project's executing or implementing units.*

Evaluation Deliverables and Review Procedures

27. The Consultant will prepare an **inception report** containing a thorough review of the project design quality and the evaluation framework. The review of design quality will cover the following aspects:

- Project relevance (see paragraph 20 (b));
- A desk-based Theory of Change of the project (see Annex 8 - ROTI analysis);
- Sustainability considerations (see paragraphs 21-22) and measures planned to promote replication and upscaling (see paragraph 23);
- Preparation and readiness (see paragraph 25);
- Financial planning (see paragraph 30);
- M&E design (see paragraph 33(a));
- Complementarities with UNEP strategies and programmes (see paragraph 34);

The evaluation framework will present in further detail the evaluation questions under each criterion with their respective indicators and data sources. The inception report will be submitted for review by the Evaluation Office before the evaluator conducts any field visits.

28. **The main evaluation report** should be brief (no longer than 35 pages – excluding the executive summary and annexes), to the point and written in plain English. The report will follow the annotated Table of Contents outlined in Annex 2. It must explain the purpose of the evaluation, exactly what was evaluated and the methods used (with their limitations). The report will present evidence-based and balanced findings, consequent conclusions, lessons and recommendations, which will be cross-referenced to each other. The report should be presented in a way that makes the information accessible and comprehensible. Any dissident views in response to evaluation findings will be appended in footnote or annex as appropriate.

29. **Report summary.** The Consultant will prepare a 15-slide presentation summarizing the key findings, lessons learned and recommendations of the evaluation.

30. **Review of the draft evaluation report.** The Consultant will submit the zero draft report latest by 15 December 2011 to the UNEP EO and revise the draft following the comments and suggestions made by the EO. The EO will then share the first draft report with the UNEP GEF Coordination Office (Nairobi) and DTIE. The UNEP Task Manager will forward the draft report to the other project stakeholders, in particular IISD, Kigali Institute for Science and Technology, Rwanda, Centre for Science and Technology Innovations, Kenya, AMBERO-IP Consult with Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) for review and comments. Stakeholders may provide feedback on any errors of fact and may highlight the significance of such errors in any conclusions. Comments would be expected within two weeks after the draft report has been shared. Any comments or responses to the draft report will be sent to the UNEP EO for collation. The EO will provide the comments to the Consultant for consideration in preparing the final draft report. The Consultant will submit the final draft report no later than 2 weeks after reception of stakeholder comments. The Consultant will prepare a **response to comments, explaining how stakeholder comments have been received and possibly incorporated in the final report.** This response will be shared by the EO with stakeholders to ensure full transparency.

31. Consultations will be held between the consultant, EO staff, the UNEP/GEF, UNEP/DTIE, and key members of the project execution team. These consultations will seek feedback on the proposed recommendations and lessons.

32. **Submission of the final Terminal Evaluation report.** The final report shall be submitted by Email to:

Segbedzi Norgbey, Head
UNEP Evaluation Office
P.O. Box 30552-00100
Nairobi, Kenya
Email: segbedzi.norgbey@unep.org

33. The Head of Evaluation will share the report with the following persons:

Maryam Niamir-Fuller, Director
UNEP/GEF Coordination Office
Email: maryam.niamir-fuller@unep.org

Sylvie Lemett, Director
UNEP/ DTIE
Email : sylvie.lemett@unep.org

34. The final evaluation report will be published on the UNEP Evaluation Office web-site www.unep.org/eou and may be printed in hard copy. Subsequently, the report will be sent to the GEF Office of Evaluation for their review, appraisal and inclusion on the GEF website.

35. As per usual practice, the UNEP EO will prepare a **quality assessment** of the zero draft and final draft report, which is a tool for providing structured feedback to the evaluation consultant. The quality of the report will be assessed and rated against both GEF and UNEP criteria as presented in Annex 5.

36. The UNEP Evaluation Office will also prepare a **commentary** on the final evaluation report, which presents the EO ratings of the project based on a careful review of the evidence collated by the evaluation consultant and the internal consistency of the report. These ratings are the final ratings that the UNEP Evaluation Office will submit to the GEF Office of Evaluation.

Resources and Schedule of the Evaluation

37. This Terminal Evaluation will be undertaken by one (1) independent evaluation consultant contracted by the UNEP Evaluation Office. The consultant will work under the overall responsibility of the UNEP Evaluation Office and will consult with the EO on any procedural and methodological matters related to the evaluation. It is, however, the consultant's individual responsibility to arrange for (her)his travel, obtain documentary evidence, meetings with stakeholders, field visits, and any other logistical matters related to their assignment. The UNEP Task Manager and national project staff will provide logistical support (introductions, meetings, transport, lodging etc.) for the country visits where necessary, allowing the consultant to conduct the evaluation as efficiently and independently as possible.

38. The **Consultant** will be hired for 35 days. (S)He will travel to Kenya, Mozambique and Rwanda

Schedule of Payment

39. The consultant will be hired under an individual Special Service Agreement (SSA). The fee will be estimated as a lumpsum, inclusive of all expenses such as travel, accommodation and incidental expenses.
40. The consultant will receive an initial payment covering the travel costs upon signature of the contract.
41. The Consultant will receive 40% of the honorarium portion of his/her fee upon acceptance of a draft report deemed complete and of acceptable quality by the EO. The remainder will be paid upon satisfactory completion of the work.
42. In case the consultant is not able to provide the deliverables in accordance with these TORs, in line with the expected quality standards by the UNEP Evaluation Office, payment may be withheld at the discretion of the Head of the Evaluation Office until the consultant has improved the deliverables to meet UNEP's quality standards.
43. If the consultant fails to submit a satisfactory final product to UNEP in a timely manner, i.e. within one month after the end date of their contract, the Evaluation Office reserves the right to employ additional human resources to finalize the report, and to reduce the consultant's fees by an amount equal to the additional costs borne by the Evaluation Office to bring the report up to standard.

Annex 1. Project outputs and demonstration projects

Table A1.1. Project components and outputs

Component	Outputs
<u>Component I</u> Field Capacity	Output 1.1: Three field level adaptation projects are designed by national implementation teams and implemented collaboratively with relevant stakeholders.
<u>Component II</u> Policy Capacity	Output 2.1: Information, tools and knowledge developed to support mainstreaming.
	Output 2.2: Policy and decision-makers engaged in adaptation to climate change.
	Output 2.3: Production of plan or strategy for mainstreaming adaptation to climate change into sustainable development planning at the national level.
<u>Component III</u> Lessons learned	Output 3.1: Lessons derived from implementation of project and products disseminated to a broad audience.
	Output 3.2: Lessons learned for GEF Adaptation project are produced two years after the end of the project to assess longer-term impacts.

Table A1.2. Demonstration projects under the project

Demonstration project	Scope	Component
1. Designing and putting in place improved strategy to manage land degradation and establish sustainable land use and management practices in Kenya	National	Component I
2. Designing and putting in place strategy for improving management of carbon sinks and ecosystem integrity to reduced vulnerability to climate change-induced forest fires in Mozambique	National	Component I
3. improving management of micro-hydro potential to increase resilience of clean energy in Rwanda	National	Component I
4. Developing and using Information, tools and knowledge to mainstream adaptation to climate change into sustainable development planning in the three participating countries (Kenya, Mozambique and Rwanda)	National	Component II
5.		

Annex 2. Annotated Table of Contents of the Main Report

Project Identification Table	An updated version of the table in Section I.A. of these TORs
Executive Summary	Overview of the main findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation. It should encapsulate the essence of the information contained in the report to facilitate dissemination and distillation of lessons. The main points for each evaluation parameter should be presented here (with a summary ratings table), as well as the most important lessons and recommendations. Maximum 4 pages.
I. Evaluation Background	
A. Context	A. Overview of the broader institutional and country context, in relation to the project's objectives.
B. The Project	B. Presentation of the project: rationale, objectives, components, intervention areas and target groups, milestones in design, implementation and completion, implementation arrangements and main partners, financing (amounts and sources), modifications to design before or during implementation.
C. Evaluation objectives, scope and methodology	C. Presentation of the evaluation's purpose, evaluation criteria and key questions, evaluation timeframe, data collection and analysis instruments used, places visited, types of stakeholders interviewed, and limitations of the evaluation.
II. Project Performance and Impact	
A. Attainment of objectives and planned results B. Sustainability and catalytic role C. Processes affecting attainment of project results D. Complementarity with UNEP programmes and strategies	This section is organized according to the 4 categories of evaluation criteria (see section D of these TORs) and provides factual evidence relevant to the questions asked and sound analysis and interpretations of such evidence. This is the main substantive section of the report. Ratings are provided at the end of the assessment of each evaluation criterion.
III. Conclusions and Recommendations	
A. Conclusions	This section should summarize the main findings of the evaluation, told in a logical sequence from cause to effect. It is suggested to start with the positive achievements and a short explanation why these could be achieved, and, then, to present the less successful aspects of the project with a short explanation why. The conclusions section should end with the overall assessment of the project. Findings should be cross-referenced to the main text of the report (using the paragraph numbering). The overall ratings table should be inserted here (see Annex 3).
B. Lessons Learned	Lessons learned should be anchored in the main findings of the evaluation. In fact, no lessons

	<p>should appear which are not based upon a conclusion of the evaluation. The number of lessons learned should be limited. Lessons learned are rooted in real project experiences, i.e. based on good practices and successes which could be replicated or derived from problems encountered and mistakes made which should be avoided in the future. Lessons learned must have the potential for wider application and use. Lessons should briefly describe the context from which they are derived and specify the contexts in which they may be useful.</p>
C. Recommendations	<p>As for the lessons learned, all recommendations should be anchored in the conclusions of the report, with proper cross-referencing, and their number should be limited to 3 or 4. Recommendations are actionable proposals on how to resolve concrete problems affecting the project or the sustainability of its results. They should be feasible to implement within the timeframe and resources available (including local capacities), specific in terms of who would do what and when, and set a measurable performance target. In some cases, it might be useful to propose options, and briefly analyze the pros and cons of each option.</p>
Annexes	<p>These may include additional material deemed relevant by the evaluator but must include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Evaluation TORs 2. The evaluation framework (second part of the inception report) 3. Evaluation program, containing the names of locations visited and the names (or functions) of people met 4. Bibliography 5. Summary co-finance information and a statement of project expenditure by activity (See annex of these TORs) 6. The review of project design (first part of the inception report) 7. Technical working paper 8. Brief CVs of the consultant <p>TE reports will also include any formal response/ comments from the project management team and/ or the country focal point regarding the evaluation findings or conclusions as an annex to the report, however, such will be appended to the report by UNEP Evaluation Office.</p>

Examples of UNEP GEF Terminal Evaluation Reports are available at www.unep.org/eou.

ANNEX 3. EVALUATION RATINGS

The evaluation will provide individual ratings for the evaluation criteria described in section II.D. of these TORs. Some criteria contain sub-criteria which require separate ratings (i.e. sustainability and M&E). Furthermore, an aggregated rating will be provided for Relevance, effectiveness and efficiency under the category “Attainment of project objectives and results”.

Most criteria will be rated on a six-point scale as follows: Highly Satisfactory (HS); Satisfactory (S); Moderately Satisfactory (MS); Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU); Unsatisfactory (U); Highly Unsatisfactory (HU). Sustainability is rated from Highly Likely (HL) down to Highly Unlikely (HU).

In the conclusions section of the report, ratings will be presented together in a table, with a brief justification cross-referenced to the findings in the main body of the report. Please note that the order of the evaluation criteria in the table will be slightly different from the order these are treated in the main report; this is to facilitate comparison and aggregation of ratings across GEF project evaluation reports.

Criterion	Summary Assessment	Rating
A. Attainment of project objectives and results		HS → HU
1. Effectiveness		HS → HU
2. Relevance		HS → HU
3. Efficiency		HS → HU
B. Sustainability of project outcomes		HL → HU
1. Financial		HL → HU
2. Socio-political		HL → HU
3. Institutional framework		HL → HU
4. Environmental		HL → HU
C. Catalytic role		HS → HU
D. Stakeholders involvement		HS → HU
E. Country ownership / driven-ness		HS → HU
F. Achievement of outputs and activities		HS → HU
G. Preparation and readiness		HS → HU
H. Implementation approach		HS → HU
I. Financial planning and management		HS → HU
J. Monitoring and Evaluation		HS → HU
1. M&E Design		HS → HU
2. M&E Plan Implementation		HS → HU
3. Budgeting and funding for M&E activities		HS → HU
K. UNEP Supervision and backstopping		HS → HU
1. UNEP		HS → HU
2. UNDP		HS → HU

Rating of Attainment of project objectives and results. A compound rating is given to the category based on the assessment of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency. This aggregated rating is not a simple average of the separate ratings given to the evaluation criteria, but an overall judgement by the consultant. Relevance and effectiveness, however, will be considered as critical criteria. This means that the aggregated rating for Attainment of objectives and results may not be higher than the lowest rating on either of these two criteria.

Ratings on sustainability. According to the GEF Office of Evaluation, all the dimensions of sustainability are deemed critical. Therefore, the overall rating for sustainability will not be higher than the lowest rating on the separate dimensions.

Ratings of monitoring and evaluation. The M&E system will be rated on M&E design, M&E plan implementation, and budgeting and funding for M&E activities (the latter sub-criterion is covered in the main report under M&E design) as follows:

Highly Satisfactory (HS): There were no shortcomings in the project M&E system.

Satisfactory(S): There were minor shortcomings in the project M&E system.

Moderately Satisfactory (MS): There were moderate shortcomings in the project M&E system.

Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU): There were significant shortcomings in the project M&E system.

Unsatisfactory (U): There were major shortcomings in the project M&E system.

Highly Unsatisfactory (HU): The Project had no M&E system.

M&E plan implementation will be considered critical for the overall assessment of the M&E system. Thus, the overall rating for M&E will not be higher than the rating on M&E plan implementation.

Annex 4. Project costs and co-financing tables

Project Costs

Component/sub-component	Estimated cost at design	Actual Cost	Expenditure (actual/planned) ratio

Co-financing

Co financing (Type/Source)	IA own Financing (mill US\$)		Government (mill US\$)		Other* (mill US\$)		Total (mill US\$)		Total Disbursed (mill US\$)
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	
- Grants									
- Loans									
- Credits									
- Equity investments									
- In-kind support									
- Other (*)									
-									
-									
Totals									

* This refers to contributions mobilized for the project from other multilateral agencies, bilateral development cooperation agencies, NGOs, the private sector and beneficiaries.

Annex 5. Quality Assessment of the Evaluation Report

All UNEP evaluation reports are subject to a quality assessment by the Evaluation Office. The quality assessment is used as a tool for providing structured feedback to the evaluation consultant. The quality of the draft evaluation report is assessed and rated against the following criteria:

GEF Report Quality Criteria	UNEP EO Assessment	Rating
A. Did the report present an assessment of relevant outcomes and achievement of project objectives in the context of the focal area program indicators if applicable?		
B. Was the report consistent and the evidence complete and convincing and were the ratings substantiated when used?		
C. Did the report present a sound assessment of sustainability of outcomes?		
D. Were the lessons and recommendations supported by the evidence presented?		
E. Did the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used?		
F. Did the report include an assessment of the quality of the project M&E system and its use for project management?		
UNEP additional Report Quality Criteria		
G. Quality of the lessons: Were lessons readily applicable in other contexts? Did they suggest prescriptive action?		
H. Quality of the recommendations: Did recommendations specify the actions necessary to correct existing conditions or improve operations ('who?' 'what?' 'where?' 'when?'). Can they be implemented? Did the recommendations specify a goal and an associated performance indicator?		
I. Was the report well written? (clear English language and grammar)		
J. Did the report structure follow EOU guidelines, were all requested Annexes included?		
K. Were all evaluation aspects specified in the TORs adequately addressed?		
L. Was the report delivered in a timely manner		

$\text{Quality} = (2*(0.3*(A + B) + 0.1*(C+D+E+F)) + 0.3*(G + H) + 0.1*(I+J+K+L))/3$
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The Totals are rounded and converted to the scale of HS to HU

Rating system for quality of Terminal Evaluation reports: A number rating between 1 and 6 is used for each criterion: Highly Satisfactory = 6, Satisfactory = 5, Moderately Satisfactory = 4, Moderately Unsatisfactory = 3, Unsatisfactory = 2, Highly Unsatisfactory = 1.

Annex 6 – Detailed breakdown of the responsibilities and tasks for the evaluation consultant

Evaluation Criteria	
Attainment of Objectives and Planned Results	Achievement of Outputs and Activities
	Relevance
	Effectiveness
	Achievement of main objective
	Achievement of component objectives:
	o Component I
	o Component II
	o Component III
	Efficiency
Sustainability and catalytic role	Review of Outcomes to Impacts (ROI)
	Socio-political sustainability
	Financial resources
	Institutional framework
	Environmental sustainability
Processes affecting attainment of project results	Catalytic Role and Replication
	Preparation and Readiness
	Implementation Approach and Adaptive Management
	Stakeholder Participation and Public Awareness
	Country Ownership and Driven-ness
	Financial Planning and Management
	UNEP Supervision and Backstopping
Monitoring and Evaluation	
Complementarities with the UNEP Medium Term Strategy and Programme of Work	Linkage to UNEP's EAs and POW 2010-2011
	Alignment with the Bali Strategic Plan (BSP)
	South-South Cooperation

	Achievement of Outputs and Activities
Component I Field Capacity	Output 1.1: Three field level adaptation projects are designed by national implementation teams and implemented collaboratively with relevant stakeholders.
Component II Policy Capacity	Output 2.1: Information, tools and knowledge developed to support mainstreaming.
	Output 2.2: Policy and decision-makers engaged in adaptation to climate change.
	Output 2.3: Production of plan or strategy for mainstreaming adaptation to climate change into sustainable development planning at the national level.
Component III Lessons Learned	Output 3.1: Lessons derived from implementation of project and products disseminated to a broad audience.
	Output 3.2: Lessons learned for GEF Adaptation project are produced two years after the end of the project to assess longer-term impacts.

Annex 7. Documentation list for the evaluation to be provided by the UNEP Task Manager

- Project design documents
- Project supervision plan, with associated budget
- Correspondence related to project
- Supervision mission reports
- Steering Committee meeting documents, including agendas, meeting minutes, and any summary reports
- Project progress reports, including financial reports submitted
- Cash advance requests documenting disbursements
- Annual Project Implementation Reports (PIRs)
- Management memos related to project
- Other documentation of supervision feedback on project outputs and processes (e.g. comments on draft progress reports, etc.).
- Extension documentation. Has a project extension occurred?
- Project revision documentation.
- Budget revision documentation.
- Project Terminal Report (draft if final version not available)

Annex 8. Introduction to Theory of Change / Impact pathways, the ROI Method and the ROI Results Score sheet


Terminal evaluations of projects are conducted at, or shortly after, project completion. At this stage it is normally possible to assess the achievement of the project's outputs. However, the possibilities for evaluation of the project's outcomes are often more limited and the feasibility of assessing project **impacts** at this time is usually severely constrained. Full impacts often accrue only after considerable time-lags, and it is common for there to be a lack of long-term baseline and monitoring information to aid their evaluation. Consequently, substantial resources are often needed to support the extensive primary field data collection required for assessing impact and there are concomitant practical difficulties because project resources are seldom available to support the assessment of such impacts when they have accrued – often several years after completion of activities and closure of the project.

Despite these difficulties, it is possible to enhance the scope and depth of information available from Terminal Evaluations on the achievement of results **through rigorous review of project progress along the pathways from outcome to impact**. Such reviews identify the sequence of conditions and factors deemed necessary for project outcomes to yield impact and assess the current status of and future prospects for results. In evaluation literature these relationships can be variously described as 'Theories of Change', Impact 'Pathways', 'Results Chains', 'Intervention logic', and 'Causal Pathways' (to name only some!).

Theory of Change (ToC) / impact pathways


Figure 1 shows a generic impact pathway which links the standard elements of project logical frameworks in a graphical representation of causal linkages. When specified with more detail, for example including the key users of outputs, the processes (the arrows) that lead to outcomes and with details of performance indicators, analysis of impact pathways can be invaluable as a tool for both project planning and evaluation.

Figure 1. A generic results chain, which can also be termed an 'Impact Pathway' or Theory of Change.



The pathways summarise casual relationships and help identify or clarify the assumptions in the intervention logic of the project. For example, in the Figure 2 below the eventual impact depends upon the behaviour of the farmers in using the new agricultural techniques they have learnt from the training. The project design for the intervention might be based on the upper pathway assuming that the farmers can now meet their needs from more efficient management of a given area therefore reducing the need for an expansion of cultivated area and ultimately reducing pressure on nearby forest habitat, whereas the evidence gathered in the evaluation may in some locations follow the lower of the two pathways; the improved farming methods offer the possibility for increased profits and create an incentive for farmers to cultivate more land resulting in clearance or degradation of the nearby forest habitat.

Figure 2. An impact pathway / TOC for a training intervention intended to aid forest conservation.



The GEF Evaluation Office has recently developed an approach that builds on the concepts of theory of change / causal chains / impact pathways. The method is known as Review of Outcomes to Impacts (ROtI)⁶³ and has three distinct stages:

- a. Identifying the project's intended impacts
- b. Review of the project's logical framework
- c. Analysis and modelling of the project's outcomes-impact pathways

The **identification of the projects intended impacts** should be possible from the 'objectives' statements specified in the official project document. The next stage is to **review the project's logical framework** to assess whether the design of the project is consistent with, and appropriate for, the delivery of the intended impact. The method requires verification of the causal logic between the different hierarchical levels of the logical framework moving 'backwards' from impacts through outcomes to the outputs; the activities level is not formally considered in the ROtI method⁶⁴. The aim of this stage is to develop an understanding of the causal logic of the project intervention and to identify the key 'impact pathways'. In reality such process are often complex; they often involve multiple actors and decision-processes and are subject to time-lags, meaning that project impact often accrue long after the completion of project activities.

The third stage involves analysis of the 'impact pathways' that link project outcomes to impacts. The pathways are analysed in terms of the '**assumptions**' and '**impact drivers**' that underpin the processes involved in the transformation of outcomes to impacts via **intermediate states** (see Figure 3). Project outcomes are the direct intended results stemming from the outputs, and they are likely to occur either towards the end of the project or in the short term following project completion. **Intermediate states** are the transitional conditions between the project's immediate outcomes and the intended impact. They are necessary conditions for the achievement of the intended impacts and there may be more than one intermediate state between the immediate project outcome and the eventual impact.

Impact drivers are defined as the significant factors that if present are expected to contribute to the realization of the intended impacts and **can be influenced** by the project / project partners & stakeholders. **Assumptions** are the significant factors that if present are expected to contribute to

⁶³ GEF Evaluation Office (2009). ROtI: Review of Outcomes to Impacts Practitioners Handbook. http://www.gefweb.org/uploadedFiles/Evaluation_Office/OPS4/Roti%20Practitioners%20Handbook%2015%20June%202009.pdf


⁶⁴ Evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness in the use of resources to generate outputs is already a major focus within UNEP Terminal Evaluations.

the realization of the intended impacts but are largely **beyond the control of the project** / project partners & stakeholders. The impact drivers and assumptions are ordinarily considered in Terminal Evaluations when assessing the sustainability of the project.

Since project logical frameworks do not often provide comprehensive information on the processes by which project outputs yield outcomes and eventually lead, via ‘intermediate states’ to impacts, the impact pathways need to be carefully examined and the following questions addressed:


- Are there other causal pathways that would stem from the use of project outputs by other potential user groups?
- Is (each) impact pathway complete? Are there any missing intermediate states between project outcomes and impacts?
- Have the key impact drivers and assumptions been identified for each ‘step’ in the impact pathway.

Figure 3. A schematic ‘impact pathway’ showing intermediate states, assumptions and impact drivers (adapted from GEF EO 2009).



The process of identifying the impact pathways and specifying the impact drivers and assumptions can be done as a desk exercise by the evaluator or, preferably, as a group exercise, led by the evaluator with a cross-section of project stakeholders as part of an evaluation field mission or both. Ideally, the evaluator would have done a desk-based assessment of the project’s theory of change and then use this understanding to facilitate a group exercise. The group exercise is best done through collective discussions to develop a visual model of the impact pathways using a card exercise. The component elements (outputs, outcomes, impact drivers, assumptions intended impacts etc.) of the impact pathways are written on individual cards and arranged and discussed as a group activity. Figure 4 below shows the suggested sequence of the group discussions needed to develop the ToC for the project.

Figure 4. Suggested sequencing of group discussions (from GEF EO 2009)



Once the theory of change model for the project is complete the evaluator can assess the design of the project intervention and collate evidence that will inform judgments on the extent and effectiveness of implementation, through the evaluation process. Performance judgments are made always noting that project contexts can change and that adaptive management is required during project implementation.

The ROTI method requires ratings for outcomes achieved by the project and the progress made towards the ‘intermediate states’ at the time of the evaluation. According to the GEF guidance on the method; *“The rating system is intended to recognize project preparation and conceptualization that considers its own assumptions, and that seeks to remove barriers to future scaling up and out. Projects that are a part of a long-term process need not at all be “penalized” for not achieving impacts in the lifetime of the project: the system recognizes projects’ forward thinking to eventual impacts, even if those impacts are eventually achieved by other partners and stakeholders, albeit with achievements based on present day, present project building blocks.”* For example, a project receiving an “AA” rating appears likely to deliver impacts, while for a project receiving a “DD” this would seem unlikely, due to low achievement in outcomes and the limited likelihood of achieving the intermediate states needed for eventual impact (see Table 1).

Table 1. Rating scale for outcomes and progress towards ‘intermediate states’

Outcome Rating	Rating on progress toward Intermediate States
D: The project’s intended outcomes were not delivered	D: No measures taken to move towards intermediate states.
C: The project’s intended outcomes were delivered, but were not designed to feed into a continuing process after project funding	C: The measures designed to move towards intermediate states have started, but have not produced results.
B: The project’s intended outcomes were delivered, and were designed to feed into a continuing process, but with no prior allocation of responsibilities after project funding	B: The measures designed to move towards intermediate states have started and have produced results, which give no indication that they can progress towards the intended long term impact.
A: The project’s intended outcomes were delivered, and were designed to feed into a continuing process, with specific allocation of responsibilities after project funding.	A: The measures designed to move towards intermediate states have started and have produced results, which clearly indicate that they can progress towards the intended long term impact.

Thus a project will end up with a two letter rating e.g. AB, CD, BB etc. In addition the rating is given a ‘+’ notation if there is evidence of impacts accruing within the life of the project. The

possible rating permutations are then translated onto the usual six point rating scale used in all UNEP project evaluations in the following way.

Table 2. Shows how the ratings for ‘achievement of outcomes’ and ‘progress towards intermediate states translate to ratings for the ‘Overall likelihood of impact achievement’ on a six point scale.

Highly Likely	Likely	Moderately Likely	Moderately Unlikely	Unlikely	Highly Unlikely
AA AB BA CA BB+ CB+ DA+ DB+	BB CB DA DB AC+ BC+	AC BC CC+ DC+	CC DC AD+ BD+	AD BD CD+ DD+	CD DD

In addition, projects that achieve documented changes in environmental status during the project’s lifetime receive a positive impact rating, indicated by a “+”. The overall likelihood of achieving impacts is shown in Table 11 below (a + score above moves the double letter rating up one space in the 6-point scale).

The ROI method provides a basis for comparisons across projects through application of a rating system that can indicate the expected impact. However it should be noted that whilst this will provide a relative scoring for all projects assessed, it does not imply that the results from projects can necessarily be aggregated. Nevertheless, since the approach yields greater clarity in the ‘results metrics’ for a project, opportunities where aggregation of project results might be possible can more readily be identified.

Results rating of project entitled:							
		Rating (D – A)		Rating (D – A)		Rating (+)	Overall
Outputs	Outcomes		Intermediary		Impact (GEBs)		
1.	1.		1.		1.		
2.	2.		2.		2.		
3.	3.		3.		3.		
	Rating justification:		Rating justification:		Rating justification:		

Scoring Guidelines

The achievement of **Outputs** is largely assumed. Outputs are such concrete things as training courses held, numbers of persons trained, studies conducted, networks established, websites developed, and many others. Outputs reflect where and for what project funds were used. These were not rated: projects generally succeed in spending their funding.

Outcomes, on the other hand, are the first level of intended results stemming from the outputs. Not so much the number of persons trained; but how many persons who then demonstrated that they have gained the intended knowledge or skills. Not a study conducted; but one that could change the evolution or development of the project. Not so much a network of NGOs established; but that the network showed potential for functioning as intended. A sound outcome might be genuinely improved strategic planning in SLM stemming from workshops, training courses, and networking.

Examples

Funds were spent, outputs were produced, but nothing in terms of outcomes was achieved. People attended training courses but there is no evidence of increased capacity. A website was developed, but no one used it. (Score – D)

Outcomes achieved but are dead ends; no forward linkages to intermediary stages in the future. People attended training courses, increased their capacities, but all left for other jobs shortly after; or were not given opportunities to apply their new skills. A website was developed and was used, but achieved little or nothing of what was intended because users had no resources or incentives to apply the tools and methods proposed on the website in their job. (Score – C)

Outcomes plus implicit linkages forward. Outcomes achieved and have *implicit forward linkages* to intermediary stages and impacts. Collaboration as evidenced by meetings and decisions made among a loose network is documented that should lead to better planning. Improved capacity is in place and should lead to desired intermediate outcomes. Providing implicit linkages to intermediary stages is probably the most common case when outcomes have been achieved. (Score - B)

Outcomes plus explicit linkages forward. Outcomes have *definite and explicit forward linkages* to intermediary stages and impacts. An alternative energy project may result in solar panels installed that reduced reliance on local wood fuels, with the outcome quantified in terms of reduced C emissions. Explicit forward linkages are easy to recognize in being concrete, but are relatively uncommon. (Score A)

Intermediary stages:

The **intermediate stage** indicates achievements that lead to Global Environmental Benefits, especially if the potential for scaling up is established.

“Outcomes” scored C or D. If the outcomes above scored C or D, there is no need to continue forward to score intermediate stages given that achievement of such is then not possible.

In spite of outcomes and implicit linkages, and follow-up actions, the project dead-ends. Although outcomes achieved have *implicit forward linkages* to intermediary stages and impacts, the project dead-ends. Outcomes turn out to be insufficient to move the project towards intermediate stages and to the eventual achievement of GEBs. Collaboration as evidenced by meetings and among participants in a network never progresses further. The implicit linkage based on follow-up never materializes. Although outcomes involve, for example, further participation and discussion, such actions do not take the project forward towards intended intermediate impacts. People have fun getting together and talking more, but nothing, based on the implicit forwards linkages, actually eventuates. **(Score = D)**

The measures designed to move towards intermediate states have started, but have not produced result, barriers and/or unmet assumptions may still exist. In spite of sound outputs and in spite of explicit forward linkages, there is limited possibility of intermediary stage achievement due to barriers not removed or unmet assumptions. This may be the fate of several policy related, capacity building, and networking projects: people work together, but fail to develop a way forward towards concrete results, or fail to successfully address inherent barriers. The project may increase ground cover and or carbon stocks, may reduce grazing or GHG emissions; and may have project level recommendations regarding scaling up; but barrier removal or the addressing of fatal assumptions means that scaling up remains limited and unlikely to be achieved at larger scales. Barriers can be policy and institutional limitations; (mis-) assumptions may have to do with markets or public – private sector relationships. **(Score = C)**

Barriers and assumptions are successfully addressed. Intermediary stage(s) planned or conceived have feasible direct and explicit forward linkages to impact achievement; barriers and assumptions are successfully addressed. The project achieves measurable intermediate impacts, and works to scale up and out, but falls well short of scaling up to global levels such that achievement of GEBs still lies in doubt. **(Score = B)**

Scaling up and out over time is possible. Measurable intermediary stage impacts achieved, scaling up to global levels and the achievement of GEBs appears to be well in reach over time. **(Score = A)**

Impact: Actual changes in environmental status

“Intermediary stages” scored B to A.

Measurable impacts achieved at a globally significant level within the project life-span. .
(Score = ‘+’)

Annex 6. Consultant's Short CV

This evaluation was completed by Joana Talafré acting as consultant to the UNEP Evaluation Office.

Joana Talafré holds a M.Sc in Environmental Sciences from Université du Quebec à Montreal. Before she became a consultant she occupied various posts in the Canadian public service. Her areas of expertise include sustainable land and water management, adaptation to climate change, conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, and coastal zone management. She has been working as an expert on numerous project designs, project management and evaluation with governments and international organizations. She is a lead author in the Third and Fourth World Water Reports, and speaks french, english and spanish.

Ms Talafre has extensive experience the design and development of adaptation projects for GEF and other international Agencies (UNEP, World Bank, UNDP). She has designed and developed adaptation projects in countries such as Djibouti, Tanzania, Angola, Sao Tome, Gabon, Tunisia, Morocco, Madagascar, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, The Gambia, and Uganda.

Key assignments in project and programme evaluation include:

- Terminal Evaluation of the NAPAs delivered through UNEP (2008)
- Mid-Term evaluation and review of UNDP's Country Programme in Algeria, (team member in charge of environmental portfolio review) (2010)
- Final Independent Evaluation of the GEF-UNDP Project "Conservation and Sustainable Use of globally-relevant biodiversity in the Ahaggar and Tassili national parks (2010)
- Terminal Evaluation of the Strategic Priority for Adaptation for the GEF Evaluation Office (2011)

Joana Talafré is the co-founder of Okapi Environmental Consulting.