



2015 Situation Report on International Migration

Migration, Displacement and Development in a Changing Arab Region



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2015 Situation Report on International Migration

Migration, Displacement and Development in a Changing Arab Region



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Foreword

Migration carries many connotations in the Arab region. Whether undertaken by choice or necessity, it is a journey in search of a new beginning. It is about people's longing to settle in a new country, but at the same time their yearning to return home. In the end, it is about belonging to many places after having felt a foreigner in all of them.

People who choose to migrate do so in the hope of improving their quality of life. In times past, nomads sought out places rich in water and blessed with green pastures. Today's young migrants are tempted abroad to complete their education; scientists seek out research and development centres; creative people are drawn to thriving arts hubs; and workers move to countries where booming economies need their labour. Such migration enriches host countries culturally and economically and, at the same time, stimulates development, alleviates poverty and fosters improved human welfare in countries of origin.

However, there is another aspect to human mobility in our region: people are fleeing their countries in droves to escape internal displacement, repression, and sheer misery. This is the dark side of population movements today: tent cities and shattered houses; the countless faces of displaced children and the elderly; barbed wire and frail boats struggling in rugged seas. This is the displacement caused by the occupation of Palestine and armed conflict and civil wars that are tearing the Arab world apart and casting the shadow of death far and wide.

Since 1948, some 5 million Palestinian refugees, at one time or another forced off their land, have been unable to return home.

Not only has the story of their displacement not come to an end, it continues to this day. Following the Israeli occupation in 1967 of the remaining Palestinian territories, its people were again subject to displacement, some forced abroad and others elsewhere within the country, after seeing their lands seized, their homes razed, their towns renamed and their holy places desecrated.

To their suffering has been added that of others caught up in conflagrations, the latest of which flared up in Yemen in early 2015, that have rocked the region in recent years. As a result, flight has been the unhappy destiny of countless Arabs. With the number of Syrian refugees now above the four million mark, the region has become the greatest source and recipient of displaced persons and refugees worldwide. The ordeals of Iraq, Libya, Palestine, Somalia, the Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic have left many with little choice but to risk all by attempting dangerous sea crossings, often falling victim to and taken advantage of by people smugglers. For some, seeking safety in flight not only was doomed to failure, but has come at the cost of their own lives.

This double-edged nature of migration prompted the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and the International Organization for Migration to join forces with 12 United Nations agencies, members of the Working Group on International Migration in the Arab Region, to study the phenomenon and examine the plight of migrants and refugees in the region in the light of the relevant political and academic considerations. This report is the fruit of their combined efforts.

The report complements existing studies and research and aims to broaden discussion on the nature of migration and its impact on the region. It describes the key migration patterns and trends, and calls for bold and innovative developmental approaches to migration. It further makes a case for policies to promote the free movement of people and greater integration between countries of origin and destination, insofar as such policies are compatible with their interests and contribute to their economic and social well-being. It also covers the effects of migrant remittances and their growing role in driving development.

Faced by consecutive crises, some Arab countries have opened their borders to welcome unprecedented numbers of refugees. As conflicts and political instability in the

region persist, it has become clear that durable human rights-based solutions are needed, and that sharing the benefits of international migration should go hand in hand with shared responsibility. This report calls for greater international cooperation, based on principles of collective responsibility, so that host countries confronted with disasters and crises are not left to face them alone.

As this report is published, waves of migrants continue to flow to and from countries in the region in search of safety and security. It is our duty, following the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, to provide policy guidance and stimulate academic debate that can lead to lasting solutions in which migration is viewed as a matter of rights and life.

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Introduction

The Arab region, lying at the crossroads of Africa, Asia and Europe, has long witnessed the ebb and flow of international migration, one of the main factors driving social and economic changes in the Arab region.

Migration has great potential to positively impact the economic and social development of the region across a number of different areas, including issues such as health, urban development, youth employment and gender relations. To understand and make the most of the positive impacts of migration – and to mitigate its potential negative impacts – an approach based on a wide range of perspectives and expertise is required.

Yet, little research has been done on migration in the Arab region. This report aims to address this knowledge deficit and provide a comprehensive update on the situation in order to facilitate the development of appropriate responses. Drawing on the expertise of the member agencies of the Working Group on International Migration in the Arab Region, the report will provide a multidisciplinary and comprehensive overview of migration trends and their economic and social consequences in the Arab region for policymakers, researchers and practitioners, and highlight the need for coordinated and holistic responses.

Chapter 1 provides an overview of the principal migration patterns in the Arab region. Chapter 2 summarizes international migration trends in the Arab region based on the latest data from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), the World Bank, open-source information and academic literature, discussing trends at the regional, subregional and country levels, and describing

migrant flows to and from Arab countries, migration of specific sociodemographic groups, and remittances. It uses disaggregated data by sex and age wherever they are available.


Chapter 3 presents an overview of developments in migration governance in the Arab region between January 2012 and April 2015. It outlines recent national policy developments by thematic areas such as labour migration, human trafficking and irregular migration, and discusses international cooperation on migration, emphasizing the role of governance in protecting human rights. The work is based on a desk review of legal texts, government sources, information provided by country offices of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and news reports.

The thematic focus of Chapter 4 is the link between development and forced migration. It highlights the need to coordinate holistic responses to forced migration across areas including health, education, environmental sustainability, labour markets, human capital, remittances and social cohesion. The chapter examines the nature and effects of different kinds of forced migration in the Arab region, and looks at ways of mitigating the negative impact on development, promoting peace-building and reconstruction, and encouraging good governance and respect of the rights of refugees and other displaced populations and host communities.

1. Three Main Migration Patterns in the Arab Region



Syrian refugees cross over into the outskirts of Kobani, Turkey, after fleeing their homes.
© UNHCR / I. Prickett



“Men, women and children fleeing war and persecution deserve real support, including asylum. I ask those standing in the way of the rights of refugees to stand in their shoes.”

Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General, United Nations

1. Three Main Migration Patterns in the Arab Region

Today, three interrelated patterns of migration may be observed in the Arab region: regular and irregular labour migration; forced migration; and mixed migration flows.

The Gulf countries are the primary destination for migrant labour from within and beyond the region. Migrant labour also flows from the region to Europe and North America. Aside from the benefits from which migrant workers stand to gain, they can bring needed skills to host communities and contribute to remittance flows that alleviate poverty and support development in their communities of origin.

Forced migration to, from and through the Arab region is largely the result of people fleeing conflict, severe breakdowns in public order, generalized violence or persecution. Forced migration constitutes the second predominant migration pattern in the region. Movements are large scale and sudden in nature. They can result in the temporary or protracted displacement of migrants outside or within countries of origin. Secondary displacement or onward migration are also common. Crises and displacement often involve not only nationals of the affected countries, but also international migrants living and working in Arab countries when conflicts erupt.

The Arab region is also witness to large scale, cross-border, mixed flows of migrants moving irregularly for various reasons. Some may be categorized clearly as forced or voluntary migrants in search of international protection or economic opportunities. Often however, then mixed nature of the flows shows how difficult it is to apply such categories. Human

traffickers and migrant smugglers often play an important role in irregular, mixed migration.

A range of drivers thus shapes population movements to, from and through the Arab region: while refugees flee conflict, persecution, generalized violence and human rights violations, migrants are primarily in search of work, opportunities and livelihoods, and others still move to join family members. Those motives can sometimes combine. Labour market demands and real or perceived employment prospects in destination countries within and beyond the region further exert a significant 'pull' on migration. Although environmental factors may also affect migration, they are usually secondary to economic, social, political and demographic considerations.¹ Extreme events, such as severe floods or droughts, and environmental degradation adversely affecting agricultural production, livestock or water availability contribute to the decision to migrate.²

Migration in the Arab region encompasses a diversity of groups, and people of all ages from a variety of social and economic backgrounds. Their experiences, vulnerabilities and needs differ accordingly. Women make up an important proportion of migrants of all categories in and from the region. Women are more likely to move for family unification and are at greater risk of falling victim to trafficking. Reflecting the demographics of Arab countries, youth and child migration is significant. Unaccompanied minors, or children separated from their families, are found in all three of the predominant migration patterns but are increasingly detected on the move within mixed migration flows. Access to international protection and/or employment

seem to be the main drivers for this migration, with family and informal networks contributing to its facilitation. Those children run a considerable risk of labour, criminal and sexual exploitation.³

A. Labour migration to the Arab region

The countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Libya stand out due to the number of labour migrants they host relative to the local population and the fact that labour migration is a structural part of the economy. In some GCC countries, the number of migrant workers as a proportion of the total population reaches or even exceeds 85 per cent.⁴ The GCC countries and Libya have been the main destinations for millions of migrant workers originating primarily from South Asia, South-East Asia, the Horn of Africa, and other Arab countries. Intraregional labour migration, although it has declined as a share of total labour migration, remains significant.

The reliance of GCC countries and Libya on labour migration has been driven by a rapid influx of capital from natural resource exploitation, enabling the implementation of ambitious development plans. A relatively small local labour force has compelled employers to turn to workers from abroad to fill gaps. The *kafala* (sponsorship) system in the GCC countries has given employers considerable freedom to engage foreign workers. Libya promoted pan-African migration policies, signing agreements with African countries and adopting open-door policies to encourage African immigration until 2007.⁵ Returns from natural resource exploitation have been used to fund large scale public sector employment, meaning that national workers often have higher reservation wages than those offered by private sector employers. The *kafala* system also restricts the mobility of foreign labour in and between GCC countries, making it more attractive for employers.⁶

Many Asian countries have historical links with Libya and the GCC countries and provide a large pool of potential migrants. In countries like Bangladesh and India, for example, poverty, underemployment, a young population, and the higher salaries available in Libya and GCC countries, have contributed to economically motivated migration. Labour migration to Arab countries has become vital to several Asian economies and government policies in countries of origin (such as Bangladesh or the Philippines⁷) have played a central role in initiating and regulating migration to the Gulf. Social networks help link the supply of and demand for international labour. These networks may be informal, involving household and community members, or more formal structures, including recruiters hired by businesses seeking workers.⁸

Despite the institutionalization of labour migration to GCC countries and Libya, migrant workers may still find themselves in an irregular situation. The most common reasons are overstaying and violating work permit conditions. Private sector actors also apply illegally for visas for migrants whose labour they do not need, which they then trade to others, putting migrants into an irregular situation.⁹ Some migrants enter irregularly as part of mixed migration flows. This is the case with many entrants into Saudi Arabia via or from Yemen and, since the 2011 Arab uprisings, with many people entering Libya.¹⁰

The number of people who leave GCC countries under amnesties provides insight into the extent of the population of migrants in an irregular situation. Since the mid-1990s, all six GCC countries have held repeated amnesties. For example, a 2007 amnesty in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) led to about 350,000 people regularizing their status or leaving the country.¹¹ The most recent amnesty in Saudi Arabia, in April - November 2013, enabled 4.7 million migrants to regularize their status. One million migrants, however, had to leave the country.¹²

Low-skilled migrant workers in particular, including those from Asia destined for GCC countries, are often vulnerable to exploitation and can fall victim to human trafficking. Figures suggest that, in addition to sexual exploitation and domestic servitude, forced labour is also a significant element in human trafficking.¹³ Sectors affected include construction, manufacturing and agriculture. Individuals may agree to migrate, but find that their working and living conditions, or the type of work they are expected to undertake, differ from what they had been led to expect and that they are unable to leave due, for instance, to threats or debt bondage. Victims are extremely vulnerable, as they are often in an irregular situation and may be confined to workplaces under the control of their exploiters.

B. Labour migration from the Arab region

The Mashreq, Maghreb, and least developed countries (LDCs) include major countries of origin for migrant workers, many of which have large expatriate communities abroad.

Migrant workers from the Arab region can be found at all skill levels. Their reasons for migrating include the perception of better work and lifestyle options abroad, poor job opportunities at home, or the lack of employment openings commensurate with their skills. The large increase in the working-age population (from ages 15 to 64) in Arab countries unable to absorb the extra labour has contributed to the phenomenon. Restrictive political systems and instability have also encouraged the emigration of skilled migrants from the Arab region, especially to Europe and North America.¹⁴

While many factors pushing workers to migrate are common throughout developing Arab countries, the destinations they choose vary by subregion and skill level. Labour migration from the Maghreb is essentially

directed towards Europe, where migrants have helped meet a growing demand for labour over the past 60 years. Despite the introduction of visa requirements between 1987 and 1991 for nationals of the Maghreb to travel to France, Italy and Spain, migration, especially from Morocco, to those countries generally increased in the following two decades. That was partly due to family reunification policies and growing opportunities for low-skilled workers, particularly in agriculture and construction. The trend continued until the 2008 global financial crisis, when a decrease in aggregate demand in the European Union (EU) led to a fall, followed by a relative stabilization, of migration from the Maghreb to Europe.¹⁵

Many migrants from the Maghreb enter Europe legally, but overstay or otherwise break the terms of their visa, thus entering irregularly. Others enter Europe as part of mixed migration flows. Moroccans have been noted as “one of the main nationalities staying illegally”, with more than 20,000 Moroccans in an irregular situation detected in European countries yearly since 2009.¹⁶ Destination countries, for their part, have introduced policies to attract highly skilled migrants: Arab migrants in certain Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation (OECD) countries are disproportionately highly skilled.¹⁷

For most other Arab countries (particularly the Mashreq, Yemen and the Sudan), the GCC countries are the main destination. In 2010, the Jordanian Ministry of Labour estimated that 350,000 Jordanians worked abroad, 89 per cent of them in the private sector, and mostly in GCC countries.¹⁸ Similarly, 69.5 per cent of migrants registered with the Secretariat of Sudanese Working Abroad in 2010 were working in Saudi Arabia.¹⁹ However, labour migrants go to other countries too, depending on factors such as bilateral links and skill levels. Most Egyptian migrants go to GCC countries, but there are also many in Jordan and Libya, as well as irregular and

regular migrants to Europe.²⁰ Mauritanian migrants are often found in other West African countries, given their proximity and close links.

Migrant workers from the Arab region can be vulnerable to human trafficking and suffer extreme forms of exploitation and abuse in similar circumstances to those of migrant workers arriving in the Arab region. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 31 per cent of victims of trafficking in the region come from within the region. The only region registering a significant number of victims of trafficking from the Arab region is Western and Central Europe, where mostly North Africans account for around 2 per cent of detected victims.²¹ Those migrating irregularly are especially vulnerable as they may feel the need to avoid detection by authorities and therefore be unable to seek legal recourse. Irregular migrants also frequently rely on smugglers and traffickers to cross international borders, which exacerbates their vulnerability en route.

C. Refugee movements and displacement

The Arab region has the largest number of refugees and displaced populations in the world, most of whom are displaced within the region.²² Several countries in recent years have both produced and received refugees and other displaced people – most notably the Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq and Libya. Several countries in the Arab region host refugees and displaced populations from outside the region, particularly from Mali, Central Africa and the Horn of Africa. Given the acute protection needs of the displaced and the strains on host communities and communities of origin, the situation presents great challenges. With no resolution to the various conflicts in sight, these crises and their geopolitical, developmental, humanitarian and migration consequences are set to dominate the region's agenda in the years to come.

Uprisings in the Syrian Arab Republic and Libya have had a major impact on migration patterns. The fighting in Libya in 2011 led to the mass displacement of migrant workers, Libyan nationals and refugees from third countries into neighbouring countries. By the end of 2011, more than 422,000 Libyans²³ and 768,000 migrants had fled the conflict in Libya, primarily to Egypt, Tunisia, Chad, Niger and Algeria. Most comprised nationals of those countries, but 41 per cent came from other countries in the region and beyond, with many requiring assistance to return home.²⁴ Many Libyans returned following 2011, but the escalation of violence and breakdown of public order in 2014 led many to flee to neighbouring countries once more. In addition, an estimated 400,000 people were internally displaced by February 2015.²⁵ Amid the chaos, mixed migration flows through Libya across the Mediterranean have increased (see below), with an estimated 137,631 refugees and migrants arriving in Europe from Libya in 2014.²⁶

The Syrian conflict has had an even greater impact, spilling over into Iraq and creating internal displacement and large refugee flows to countries in the Arab region and beyond. As of March 2015, the crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic had produced 3,932,931 recorded Syrian persons of concern,²⁷ primarily in Lebanon (1,186,125), Turkey (1,718,147), Jordan (626,357), Iraq (244,731) and Egypt (133,516), with 217,724 recorded seeking asylum in Europe.²⁸ Some of those displaced from the Syrian Arab Republic were Palestinian or Iraqi refugees and therefore twice displaced, as well as other migrants, including significant numbers of Lebanese nationals.²⁹ An estimated 7.6 million were internally displaced people (IDPs).³⁰ An estimated 3,276,000 IDPs were in Iraq by January 2015 as a result of the Syrian conflict spilling over into Iraq and prior waves of conflict.³¹

Other conflicts in the region have had an impact on migration patterns, often leading

to situations of protracted displacement. An estimated 711,000 Palestinians were forced to flee Palestine and seek refuge elsewhere in the region when the State of Israel was created in 1948. Between 280,000 and 325,000 were also forced to flee the 1967 war. Palestinians now constitute the largest refugee population in the world, with an estimated five million individuals, most of them second or third generation descendants of the originally displaced.³² At the time of writing there were 1,258,559 Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip, 762,288 in the West Bank,³³ 449,957 in Lebanon, 526,744 in the Syrian Arab Republic, and 2,097,338 in Jordan.³⁴ A further 232,000 were estimated to be internally displaced in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as of November 2014.³⁵

The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 unleashed a flood of refugees from Iraq to neighbouring States, reaching an estimated high of 2.5 million, mostly in the Syrian Arab Republic, Jordan and Lebanon.³⁶ In the Horn of Africa, 965,732 Somalis are registered as refugees, mostly scattered between Kenya (428,947), Ethiopia (244,995) and Yemen (236,803).³⁷ A further 1,107,000 are internally displaced.³⁸ They have been displaced by a mixture of sustained conflict since 2011, and drought and famine. Conflict in the Sudan had produced an estimated 625,870 Sudanese refugees in neighbouring countries by October 2014³⁹ and 3,100,000 Sudanese IDPs as of January 2015.⁴⁰

Several countries also host and are transit points for large refugee and displaced populations originating from outside the Arab region. Conflicts in central Africa in recent years have been among the main sources of forced migration and refugee flows to and through North Africa; particularly the Sudan but also Libya and Egypt. The conflict that broke out in South Sudan in late 2013 forced 470,000 people to flee to neighbouring countries by the end of 2014.⁴¹ More than 130,000 had sought assistance in the Sudan from the Office of the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) by April 2015.⁴² Older conflicts in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Chad have triggered similarly large shifts of population to neighbouring countries. Smaller but significant groups have sought refuge in the Sudan, Libya and other North African Arab countries. Conflicts in Mali and, to a lesser extent, Côte d'Ivoire have sparked irregular migration through Morocco⁴³ and Algeria.

The growing vulnerability of these populations has in some cases led to an increase in human trafficking. The breakdown of traditional support structures and the rule of law can create conditions favourable to organized criminal groups and new opportunities and markets for human traffickers. Populations affected by such crises may undertake risky survival strategies. The Syrian crisis, for example, has fuelled concerns about the trafficking of women and children for sexual exploitation and forced marriage. Less attention, however, is paid to victims of forced labour, who often suffer a plethora of human rights abuses, including human trafficking.⁴⁴

D. Mixed migration flows

People in mixed migration flows in the Arab region may be motivated by: flight from conflict, generalized violence, persecution, breakdowns in public order, famine or drought; the desire to join family members abroad; and escape from economic hardship or the search for a better livelihood and lifestyle opportunities. Mixed migration is therefore commonly defined as complex population movements including refugees and displaced people, asylum-seekers, migrant workers and other migrants. It is a growing global phenomenon that creates difficult situations, and in the context of which granting equal protection to all migrants who may be sharing

means of transport but could be traveling for different reasons is challenging.

Refugees, migrants and other displaced populations share means of transport and routes and are thus studied as one category. Mixed migration flows generally involve persons without the requisite documentation who cross borders and arrive at their destination in an unauthorized manner.⁴⁵ They undertake dangerous journeys across the desert or by sea, often in unsuitable vessels and extremely difficult conditions.

Such refugees and migrants frequently rely on organized criminal networks to move clandestinely, involving transactions beyond any form of regulation, and they are unable to seek recourse through the usual mechanisms of justice.⁴⁶ This leads to high transaction costs and probability of malfeasance, with smugglers and traffickers having full power over such migrants. Smuggling often turns into trafficking and migrants are subjected to abuse (including gender-based violence) and human rights violations. Refugees and migrants may also experience prolonged detention in transit or upon arrival. Migrants and refugees moving in mixed migration flows may become increasingly vulnerable along the journey. They can be stranded en route or in-country, with limited access to livelihoods or essential services.

The means by which refugees and migrants attempt to make clandestine entries also expose them to the risk of death: more than 22,400 people are estimated to have died trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea to Europe by boat since 2000. In 2014, the Mediterranean was the most dangerous crossing in the world: 3,419 people, about 30 per cent of them from the Arab region, died attempting the journey.⁴⁷ In 2015, the death toll stood at 1,770 by the end of April.⁴⁸ The maritime routes to Yemen have also been deadly, with 3,105 fatalities recorded between January 2006 and May 2014. Thousands more have died along desert routes.⁴⁹

E. Europe as the primary destination for migration flows into, through and from North Africa

Europe is a major destination for mixed migration flows into, through and from North Africa, due mainly to its proximity, historic and linguistic links, real and perceived economic and employment opportunities, existing networks, and established asylum systems. Increasingly restrictive immigration regimes and border management in Europe, combined with high migration pressures in the Arab region and real labour market demands in Europe, have contributed to the rise in irregular migration.

The Central Mediterranean route has experienced the largest and fastest growing flows, with more than 170,000 arrivals in Italy alone in 2014 – four times the number recorded in 2013 and the largest number on record.⁵⁰ The number of departures from Tunisia and Libya has risen since the uprisings in 2011, and, from Egypt, since 2013. In 2014, around 90 per cent of arrivals in Europe via the Central Mediterranean route departed from Libya, a large increase fuelled by the deteriorating security situation in the country. The remainder departed from Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey.⁵¹ At the close of 2014, Syrians (42,323) overtook Eritreans (34,329) as the largest group of arrivals detected in Italy. Other nationalities included Malians (9,938), Palestinians (6,082) and Somalis (5,756).⁵² Together, those groups make up 58 per cent of arrivals in Italy, most of whom arrive via the Central Mediterranean route. Other migrants caught up in the same flows are motivated by a mix of humanitarian and economic concerns. They include people from Nigeria, Gambia, Senegal, Cameroon, Niger and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. More than 4,000 Egyptians were also detected arriving via the central Mediterranean route in 2014.⁵³

Refugees and migrants continue to use the Western Mediterranean route, trying to cross from Algeria and Morocco to Spain by sea or

by land, or storming the fences around the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Mellila.⁵⁴ In 2014, 4,755 people, some of them Moroccans and Algerians, were detected on this route.⁵⁵ A smaller proportion of those taking this route are refugees, compared with the Central Mediterranean route.

Other migrants try to enter Greece and Bulgaria by land or sea from Turkey. Arab countries historically were not important transit sites for this route. However, since war erupted in the Syrian Arab Republic in 2011, that country and Iraq have become increasingly important as countries of departure. Of 44,057 irregular arrivals in Europe using the Eastern Mediterranean route in 2014, 27,025 were Syrian nationals.⁵⁶

North African countries are key destinations for mixed migration, but it is difficult to distinguish between refugees and migrants whose final destination is one of those countries, those in transit en route to Europe and those who become stranded there. The tightening of European border controls has resulted in many intended “transit migrants” staying in North African countries for many years. Differentiating between migrants who arrive irregularly and those who arrive regularly but subsequently end up in an irregular situation is equally difficult. The Sudan, primarily as a point of transit but also of origin, lies on mixed migration routes north to Egypt, Libya and Europe, and east to GCC countries. Refugees and migrants from the Horn of Africa, particularly Eritreans, often cross the Sudan before travelling further north to reach Libya, either as a destination or as an embarkation for Europe, or, in the past, Israel.⁵⁷

F. Mixed migration from the Horn of Africa to Yemen and GCC countries

Another major route for mixed migration leads from East Africa and the Horn of


Africa across the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea to Yemen, Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries. Historically, the flow along this route was as significant as, or greater than, those across the Mediterranean from North Africa. Only in recent years have the numbers crossing the Gulf of Aden decreased, while those crossing the Mediterranean have spiked. Djibouti and Somalia are key transit countries on the Gulf of Aden route. Indeed, many Somalis and even Djiboutians themselves make the journey. In Yemen, where they are recognized on a *prima facie* basis, 236,803 Somali refugees are registered.

Yemen has a pivotal position as a country of origin, transit and destination. More than half a million migrants and refugees made “unauthorized crossings across the Gulf of Aden or Red Sea from Eastern Africa to Yemen” between 2006 and 2013 according to UNHCR.⁵⁸ In 2014, 91,592 migrants and refugees arrived in Yemen, the majority of them Ethiopian.⁵⁹ Only a small proportion of Ethiopian arrivals claim asylum. In addition to providing asylum to refugees, Yemen receives migrant workers from the Horn of Africa and beyond. Interviews with migrants from Ethiopia and Somalia indicate that most aim to continue their journey beyond Yemen. However, tightened controls at the border with Saudi Arabia left up to 25,000 migrants stranded in the border town of Haradh in 2013, according to the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat. As a result of the *nitaqat* policy changes described in chapter 3, Saudi Arabia has expelled many irregular migrants, sending 163,000 Ethiopians back to Ethiopia by May 2014⁶⁰ and 613,743 Yemenis to Yemen between June 2013 and November 2014. Expulsions were continuing at the time of writing.⁶¹

2. General Overview of International Migration Trends in the Arab Region



Displaced persons originating from or passing through the Arab region made up a significant portion of migrants attempting to reach Europe via the Mediterranean in 2014.
© Vito Manzari from Martina Franca (TA), Italy



"You cannot launch the Sustainable Development Goals and in parallel deny a safe and legal route to refugees, a life with dignity."

Salil Shetty, Secretary General, Amnesty International

2. General Overview of International Migration Trends in the Arab Region

A. Introduction

Understanding the trends and drivers of migration to and from the Arab countries is a task fraught with difficulty: data have tended to be scattered and fragmentary, produced by different stakeholders, at different times, for different purposes. This reflects the lack of migration research capacity in the region, disagreements about how to define international migration and the wide range of research areas that it affects. It has thus proven difficult to adopt a holistic, regional approach to the issue.

In recent years, however, new sources of data have appeared at the international level, focusing on producing comparable, up-to-date statistics, increasingly disaggregated by factors such as age, sex, origin and destination. Although they have their limitations, these sources enable researchers to better understand the issues at the national, regional and global levels. The aim of this chapter is to use those sources to set out the trends in international migration to and from countries of the Arab region between 1990 and 2014. A number of different data sources covering various time periods and using different methodological approaches is used. Migrant stock data is mostly based on census statistics (country of birth). Depending on the national definition of the resident population (*de jure* or *de facto*), migrants in an irregular situation are included in census data. As for refugees, they are automatically included in estimates of the international migrant stock if they are included in the census count. If they are excluded from the census count, the refugee stock as reported by UNHCR and UNRWA

is added to available census data. For the purpose of estimating the international migrant stock, international migrants are equated either with the foreign born or with foreign citizens.¹ Flow data do not track the nationality or place of birth of people moving and, therefore, return migrants or migrants making onward movements are not distinguishable from other kinds of migrants in this data set. Some migrants may be nationals of the country of destination who have returned. The flow data cover the period between 1990 and 2010, whereas the data for migrant stock are available up to 2013. Small discrepancies between these two data sets can occur. For refugee figures, use is made of the UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database. Remittance flows are analysed using World Bank estimates of the annual remittance data, and bilateral remittance data come from its bilateral remittance matrices. Data from those two sources may vary as they are calculated on slightly different bases. Data from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics is used to analyse migration of internationally mobile students.

To facilitate discussion of these trends, the Arab region has been divided into four subregions:²


Gulf Cooperation Council countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates;

The Maghreb: Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia;

The Mashreq: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, State of Palestine and the Syrian Arab Republic;


Arab LDCs: The Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia, the Sudan and Yemen.

Figure 1. International migrant stock in Arab countries, 1990-2013




Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), Population Division, Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2013 Revision, United Nations Database (POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2013). Available from <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/index.shtml> (accessed 30 January 2015).

Figure 2. Migrants as a percentage of the population, 1990-2013



Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

Figure 3. Top 10 countries of destination in the Arab region, 2013



Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).


Note: Due to data limitations, the figures in this table do not fully reflect the number of Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR since 2011.

B. Migration to Arab countries

The Arab region hosts one of the largest and fastest growing migrant populations in the world. In 2013, the 22 countries of the Arab region hosted 30,308,131 international migrants, more than twice the 14,848,583 migrants in the region in 1990. They made up 8.24 per cent of the total population of the Arab region, compared to 6.5 per cent in 1990. Migrants are spread across the region, with a particular concentration in GCC and countries of the Mashreq (figure 3). There were 20,640,979 male migrants and 9,667,152 female migrants, representing 68 and 32 per cent respectively of the total migrant population.³ Most of them are from Asian countries: migrants from Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and the Philippines alone made up more than 51 per cent (figure 4).


Migration flows to countries in the region rose from 4,042,000 people in 1990-1995 to 7,404,355 in 2005-2010. The proportion coming from Arab countries relative to migrants

Figure 4. Main countries of origin for migrants to the Arab region, 2013



Arab countries 11.5 million	Indonesia 0.9 million
Bangladesh 3.2 million	Pakistan 2.9 million
India 6.8 million	Philippines 1.8 million
Rest of the world 1.8 million	

Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

Figure 5. Inflows of migrants to the Arab region, 1990-2010

Source: Guy J. Abel and Nikola Sander, "Quantifying global international migration flows", *Science*, vol. 343, No. 6178 (March 2014).

from non-Arab countries has decreased. The proportion of migrants from Arab countries rose from 66 per cent in 1990-1995 to 74 per cent in 1995-2000 and then dropped to 36 per cent in 2000-2005 and 21 per cent in 2005-2010 (figure 5).⁴

Destination countries receiving the most migrants have changed since 1990, and the proportion of refugees and migrants arriving from other Arab countries has declined (figure 6):

- Between 1990 and 1995 the Sudan received the largest number (mostly refugees), followed by Saudi Arabia (mostly migrant workers). During that period, 1,198,621 people moved to the Sudan, mostly from Eritrea, Ethiopia and Chad, due to political instability.⁵ Saudi Arabia took in 676,540 migrants, of whom 58 per cent came from Arab countries, over the same period.
- From 1995 to 2000, the United Arab Emirates received 522,431 migrants (71 per cent from the Arab region). Kuwait received the second highest number of migrants during that period (199,447), 78 per cent of them from the Arab region.
- From 2000 to 2005, Saudi Arabia received


the highest number of migrants in the region (1,820,010, of whom only 21 per cent were from Arab countries), followed by the United Arab Emirates, with 884,494 migrants, of whom only 15 per cent were from Arab countries.

- From 2005 to 2010, the number of migrants to the United Arab Emirates increased dramatically – with 3,258,880 migrants, 15 per cent of whom were from the Arab region, it was the top destination country in the region. Saudi Arabia received 1,299,438 migrants, only 7 per cent of whom were from the Arab region.⁶

The origins, destinations and volumes of intraregional migration fluctuated between the years 1990-2010:

- Intraregional migration to Jordan, Lebanon, the Sudan and Yemen peaked in 1990-1995.
- The highest rate of intraregional migration to the Syrian Arab Republic occurred in 2000-2005.
- The years 2005-2010 saw peak flows from Arab countries to Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

Figure 6. Inflows to Arab countries from other Arab countries, 1990-2010



Source: Guy J. Abel and Nikola Sander, 2014 (see figure 5).

These peaks can be mapped to political and economic developments in the region. In 1990-1995, intraregional migration peaked in Jordan⁷ and Lebanon as a result of the 1990-1991 Gulf War, which caused mass displacement, particularly of foreign workers in Iraq and GCC countries.⁸ It peaked in the Sudan and Yemen in the same period. The high number of intraregional migrants and refugees between 2000 and 2005 reflects in large measure the displacement of Iraqis following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Finally, the acceleration of migration to GCC countries between 2005 and 2010 reflects the economic boom in those countries following record-high oil prices.

1. Gulf Cooperation Council

By some estimates, labour migration to

GCC countries represents the third largest migration flow in the contemporary world (behind flows to North America and Europe).⁹ This subregion hosted over 22,357,811 migrants in 2013 (8,856,887 in 1990). Migrants in GCC countries account for almost 10 per cent of migrants in the world. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates respectively host the fourth and fifth largest migrant populations in the world (9,060,433 and 7,826,981 respectively). The GCC subregion is unique for the high proportion of migrants in its population: in 2013, more than 45 per cent of the population of GCC countries was made up of migrants, an increase from over 38 per cent in 1990, and in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, migrants made up the majority of the population (table 1).

Table 1. International migration trends to GCC countries, 1990-2013

International migrant stock at mid-year				
Year	International migrant stock (both sexes)	Migrant stock as percentage of the total population	Percentage of female migrant stock	Top five countries of origin (both sexes)
Bahrain				
1990	173,200	34.9	28.5	India (60,493), Egypt (21,908), Pakistan (20,949), Bangladesh (20,442), Philippines (7,934)
2000	244,937	36.7	30.8	India (90,968), Pakistan (30,372), Bangladesh (29,560), Egypt (26,008), Philippines (12,799)
2010	666,172	53.2	27.8	India (240,084), Bangladesh (91,742), Pakistan (80,278), Egypt (59,923), Philippines (40,162)
2013	729,357	54.7	27.8	India (262,855), Bangladesh (100,444), Pakistan (87,892), Egypt (65,607), Philippines (43,971)
Kuwait				
1990	1,585,280	77	39	India (553,581), Egypt (200,490), Pakistan (191,708), Bangladesh (187,068), Philippines (72,605)
2000	1,500,442	78.7	32.5	India (557,068), Pakistan (185,993), Bangladesh (181,023), Egypt (159,262), Philippines (78,380)
2010	1,871,537	62.6	30	India (674,177), Bangladesh (257,624), Pakistan (225,428), Egypt (168,270), Philippines (112,782)
2013	2,028,053	60.2	30	India (730,558), Bangladesh (279,169), Pakistan (244,281), Egypt (182,342), Philippines (122,214)
Oman				
1990	423,572	23.4	21	India (212,556), Bangladesh (69,724), Pakistan (49,708), Egypt (26,210), Sri Lanka (19,501)
2000	623,608	28.4	20.8	India (333,881), Bangladesh (92,035), Pakistan (66,499), Egypt (28,537), Indonesia (17,275)
2010	1,017,696	36.3	19.9	India (590,012), Bangladesh (135,732), Pakistan (107,265), Egypt (37,856), Indonesia (32,056)
2013	1,112,032	30.6	19	India (644,704), Bangladesh (148,314), Pakistan (117,208), Egypt (41,365), Indonesia (35,027)
Qatar				
1990	369,816	77.6	27.3	India (129,147), Egypt (46,773), Pakistan (4,724), Bangladesh (43,642), Philippines (16,938)
2000	470,731	79.3	28	India (174,783), Pakistan (58,356), Bangladesh (56,799), Egypt (49,969), Philippines (24,592)
2010	1,456,168	83.2	20.1	India (524,614), Bangladesh (200,470), Pakistan (175,418), Egypt (130,941), Philippines (87,761)
2013	1,600,955	73.8	20.8	India (576,776), Bangladesh (220,403), Pakistan (192,860), Egypt (143,960), Philippines (96,487)

Saudi Arabia				
1990	4,998,445	30.8	33.5	India (981,622), Egypt (954,888), Pakistan (622,111), Philippines (360,297), Bangladesh (356,554)
2000	5,263,388	26.1	33.2	India (1,080,171), Egypt (875,627), Pakistan (741,613), Philippines (495,585), Bangladesh (490,436)
2010	8,429,983	30.9	29.6	India (1,639,262), Pakistan (1,227,785), Bangladesh (1,217,920), Egypt (1,208,043), Philippines (957,215)
2013	9,060,433	31.4	29	India (1,761,857), Pakistan (1,319,607), Bangladesh (1,309,004), Egypt (1,298,388), Philippines (1,028,802)
United Arab Emirates				
1990	1,306,574	72.3	28.7	India (458,294), Egypt (165,980), Pakistan (158,710), Bangladesh (154,869), Philippines (60,107)
2000	2,446,675	80.8	28.2	India (915,848), Pakistan (305,782), Bangladesh (297,610), Egypt (261,834), Philippines (128,860)
2010	7,316,611	86.7	25.3	India (1,639,262), Pakistan (1,227,785), Bangladesh (1,217,920), Egypt (1,208,043), Philippines (957,215)
2013	7,826,981	83.7	25.3	India (2,852,207), Bangladesh (1,089,917), Pakistan (953,708), Egypt (711,894), Philippines (477,139)


Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

Of the total number of migrants in GCC countries in 2013, 22.5 per cent (5,026,479) were from other Arab countries, mostly Egypt (2,443,556), Yemen (773,392), the Sudan (483,309), Jordan (398,461) and the State of Palestine (201,567). However, the vast majority of migrants were from Asian countries, with 69.7 per cent coming from five countries: Bangladesh (3,147,251 migrants), India, (6,828,957), Indonesia (911,884), Pakistan (2,915,556) and the Philippines (1,790,282). In 1990, the figures were 32 per cent and 59.3 per cent respectively (figure 7).

Between 2000 and 2010, the number of people moving to GCC countries rose significantly, especially in the case of the United Arab Emirates, which received 884,494 migrants in 2000-2005 and 3,258,880 in 2005-2010, and

Qatar (from 178,398 in 2000-2005 to 857,425 in 2005-2010). Saudi Arabia remains the second highest recipient of migrants in the subregion after the United Arab Emirates, although the number of people moving there decreased from 1,820,010 in 2000-2005 to 1,299,438 in 2005-2010. The number of Indian migrants has increased rapidly since 2000, from 70,898 in 1995-2000 to 779,748 in 2000-2005, and to 1,920,577 in 2005-2010. The number of migrants from Bangladesh has also increased dramatically – from 86,055 in 1995-2000 to 1,548,029 in 2005-2010.¹⁰ The proportion of intraregional migrants has decreased. Although the absolute number of migrants from Arab countries has remained relatively constant, the number from Egypt, the biggest country of origin in 1990-1995, has steadily dropped, from 448,601 to 238,763 in 2005-2010.

Figure 7. Main countries of origin for migrants to GCC countries, 2013



Bangladesh 3.1 million	Indonesia 0.9 million
Egypt 2.4 million	Pakistan 2.9 million
India 6.8 million	Other Arab countries 2.6 million
Rest of the world 3.5 million	


Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

In 1995-2000, migrants to GCC countries from other Arab countries made up as much as 77 per cent of the flow. That share dropped dramatically to 17 per cent in 2000-2005 and 13 per cent in 2005-2010.¹¹

Most migrants in GCC countries are working age males: in 2013 there were 14,365,316 males between the ages of 15 and 64 (64 per cent of the total migrant population), whereas women migrants of working age made up only 19 per cent (4,342,375 migrants). Moreover, the percentage of women migrants has generally been in decline since 1990, most notably in the 15-30 age category (figure 8). Of the main countries of origin, only Indonesia has a roughly equal balance of male and female migrants in GCC countries. As a result, GCC countries have disproportionately large working-age male populations (figure 9).


The numbers of migrants and their age and sex composition reflect the importance of labour in economic sectors traditionally dominated by men, particularly construction, as a driver for migration, as well as the limited

Figure 8. Percentage of women migrants within age groups in the GCC countries, 1990-2013



Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

Figure 9. Age structure of migrants in GCC countries, 2013




Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

opportunities for family reunification in GCC countries. Migrants can be found at all skill levels in the Gulf: for example, Indian migrant workers include professionals (who make up around 30 per cent of workers in the Gulf), such as doctors, engineers, and managers; semi-skilled workers such as craftsmen, drivers and artisans; and low-skilled manual labourers working in construction, rural areas, shops and households.¹² However, the majority of migrants are in occupations at lower skill levels.

2. Maghreb

The Maghreb subregion hosted 1,118,610 migrants in 2013 (829,739 in 1990). Libya and Algeria were the main destination countries, with 755,974 and 270,407 migrants respectively. The natural resource-based rentier economy that has developed in Libya since independence attracts many migrant workers. Migration in the subregion takes various forms, including intraregional and extraregional, voluntary and forced, regular and irregular.¹³ In 2013, migrants made up 1.2 per cent of the total Maghreb population.¹⁴ However, that figure

Figure 10. Main countries of origin for migrants to the Maghreb, 2013



Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

Table 2. International migration trends to the Maghreb, 1990-2013


International migrant stock at mid-year				
Year	International migrant stock (both sexes)	Migrant stock as percentage of the total population	Percentage of female migrant stock	Top five countries or territories of origin (both sexes)
Algeria				
1990	273,954	1	45.2	Western Sahara (167,905), State of Palestine (36,004), Sudan (9,127), Germany (6,544), Russian Federation (6,287)
2000	250,110	0.8	45.2	Western Sahara (165,911), State of Palestine (31,667), Somalia (11,570), Iraq (7,579), Saudi Arabia (3,926)
2010	244,964	0.7	45.2	Western Sahara (91,905), State of Palestine (57,565), Somalia (21,031), Iraq (13,777), Saudi Arabia (7,137)
2013	270,407	0.7	45.0	Western Sahara (101,451), State of Palestine (63,544), Somalia (23,215), Iraq (15,208), Saudi Arabia (7,878)
Libya				
1990	457,482	10.7	35.5	State of Palestine (152,386), Sudan (38,630), Germany (27,696), Russian Federation (26,607), USA (19,083)
2000	558,770	10.8	35.5	State of Palestine (207,308), Somalia (75,738), Iraq (49,611), Saudi Arabia (25,701), Syrian Arab Republic (20,115)
2010	699,144	11.6	34.5	State of Palestine (259,390), Somalia (94,768), Iraq (62,077), Saudi Arabia (32,159), Syrian Arab Republic (25,168)
2013	755,974	12.2	34.1	State of Palestine (280,475), Somalia (102,471), Iraq (67,123), Saudi Arabia (34,773), Syrian Arab Republic (27,214)
Morocco				
1990	57,597	0.2	50.4	Algeria (20,008), France (5,628), Sudan (5,087), Italy (2,359), Libya (1,780)
2000	53,124	0.2	50.1	Algeria (18,454), France (5,191), Sudan (4,692), Italy (2,176), Libya (1,642)
2010	50,113	0.2	48.3	Algeria (17,408), France (4,897), Sudan (4,426), Italy (2,053), Libya (1,549)
2013	50,771	0.2	47.7	Algeria (17,637), France (4,961), South Sudan (2,950), Italy (2,080), Libya (1,569)

Tunisia				
1990	38,018	0.5	50.9	Algeria (13,773), Morocco (7,281), France (3,873), Italy (1,623), Libya (1,225)
2000	36,212	0.4	49.8	Algeria (13,027), Morocco (6,857), France (3,648), Italy (1,528), Libya (1,153)
2010	33,583	0.3	49.7	Algeria (12,160), Morocco (6,419), France (3,414), Italy (1,430), Libya (1,079)
2013	36,526	0.3	49.2	Algeria (11,775), Morocco (6,218), France (3,305), Libya (2,093), Italy (1,384)

Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

Note: Persons from Western Sahara are counted separately in the source used to provide data for this table. The designation of Western Sahara as a territory and its presentation separately in parts of this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations, the International Organization for Migration or any of the organizations engaged in the Working Group on International Migration in the Arab Region on the status of the territory or its authorities, or about the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

Figure 11. Age structure of migrants in the Maghreb, 2013




Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

hides important national differences, given that migrants made up 12.2 per cent of the population of Libya in 2013, compared to 0.7 per cent in Algeria, 0.3 per cent in Tunisia and 0.2 per cent in Morocco (table 2). These figures and those that follow in this section do not account for irregular migrants, who often make

up a large proportion of migrants travelling through the Maghreb.

In 2013, the migrant stock data indicated that most (93 per cent) migrants to the Maghreb were from the Arab region, above all from the State of Palestine (344,057), migrating to

Figure 12. Percentage of women migrants within age groups in the Maghreb, 1990-2013

Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

Algeria and Libya, with large numbers also coming from Somalia (127,047) (figure 10).

Some 81.5 per cent of migrants to the subregion came from Arab countries in 2005-2010, a figure that has remained fairly constant since 1995. In Algeria, the percentage of Arab migrants has remained static at 79 per cent. In 2005-2010, the proportion of Arab migrants was 73 per cent in Tunisia and 72 per cent in Libya. However, the main countries of origin have changed since 1990. In 1990-1995, the largest number of migrants came from Somalia (41,917) and Iraq (22,991); in 1995-2000 Ethiopia was the main country of origin (35,766), followed by Saudi Arabia (27,520), Jordan (25,590) and Algeria (25,087); in 2000-2005 most migrants came from Algeria (85,396) and the State of Palestine (38,482); and in 2005-2010 from Algeria (45,021), followed by Saudi Arabia (17,786), the Syrian Arab Republic (17,322) and Somalia (14,357). Indonesia has been the largest non-Arab country of origin since 2000, with 7,700 migrants per five-year period. Other countries of origin outside the Arab region since 1990 have been Ethiopia and Senegal (table 2).¹⁵

Most migrants are working age (15-64) males: in 2013 there were 574,065 working-age males (51 per cent of the migrant population) in the Maghreb, although there are considerable differences between countries. The 40-55 age group accounts for the highest percentage of male migrants (figure 11). The proportion of women migrants decreased by 1 to 2 per cent between 1990 and 2013 and stood at 38 per cent in 2013 (figure 12).¹⁶ This reflects the mixed nature of migration to Maghreb, including refugees of both sexes and an increasing number of mostly male migrant workers to Libya.

3. Mashreq

The Mashreq hosted 5,819,473 migrants in 2013 (3.8 per cent of the area's population), an increase from 2,931,726 in 1990. Data for 2013, however, do not include recent Syrian refugee movements following the start of the Syrian crisis in 2011. By mid-2013, 1,305,145 Syrians had been registered by UNHCR as being refugees or in refugee-like situations in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. The true figure may have been greater still, since some may not

Table 3. International Migration trends to the Mashreq, 1990-2013

International migrant stock at mid-year				
Year	International migrant stock (both sexes)	Migrant stock as percentage of the total population	Percentage of female migrant stock	Top five countries of origin (both sexes)
Egypt				
1990	175,574	0.3	47.1	State of Palestine (56,829), Sudan (14,407), Germany (10,328), Russian Federation (9,922), USA (7,117)
2000	169,149	0.3	46.8	State of Palestine (62,311), Somalia (22,768), Iraq (14,914), Saudi Arabia (7,726), Syrian Arab Republic (6,047)
2010	280,714	0.4	43.8	State of Palestine (90,152), Somalia (40,616), Iraq (26,605), Saudi Arabia (13,782), Syrian Arab Republic (10,787)
2013	297,448	0.4	43.6	State of Palestine (95,528), Somalia (43,038), Iraq (28,192), Saudi Arabia (14,604), Syrian Arab Republic (11,430)
Iraq				
1990	83,638	0.5	33.3	Iran (14,976), State of Palestine (14,347), Egypt (11,075), Jordan (7,970), Syrian Arab Republic (4,778)
2000	146,910	0.6	31.1	Iran (25,182), State of Palestine (24,124), Egypt (18,622), Jordan (13,401), Syrian Arab Republic (8,034)
2010	83,111	0.3	30.1	Iran (13,546), State of Palestine (12,976), Egypt (10,017), Turkey (8,483), Jordan (7,209)
2013	95,780	0.3	29.8	Iran (15,611), State of Palestine (14,954), Egypt (11,544), Turkey (9,776), Jordan (8,308)
Jordan				
1990	1,146,349	34.1	48.8	State of Palestine (851,880), Egypt (171,413), Syrian Arab Republic (51,557), Iraq (25,773), Sri Lanka (11,062)
2000	1,927,845	40.4	49.0	State of Palestine (1,429,681), Egypt (287,677), Syrian Arab Republic (57,684), Iraq (55,942), Sri Lanka (15,163)
2010	2,722,983	42.2	49.2	State of Palestine (1,760,396), Iraq (475,782), Egypt (328,492), Syrian Arab Republic (68,613), Sri Lanka (12,896)
2013	2,925,780	40.2	49.3	State of Palestine (2,114,224), Iraq (401,130), Egypt (276,950), Syrian Arab Republic (57,847), Sri Lanka (10,873)

Lebanon				
1990	523,693	19.4	48.8	State of Palestine (389,171), Egypt (78,308), Syrian Arab Republic (23,553), Iraq (11,774), Sri Lanka (5,054)
2000	692,913	21.4	49.0	State of Palestine (467,005), Egypt (130,459), Syrian Arab Republic (26,159), Iraq (25,369), Sri Lanka (6,876)
2010	820,655	18.9	47.9	State of Palestine (530,550), Iraq (143,391), Egypt (99,001), Syrian Arab Republic (20,679), Sri Lanka (3,887)
2013	849,721	17.6	47.6	State of Palestine (549,341), Iraq (148,470), Egypt (102,507), Syrian Arab Republic (21,411), Sri Lanka (4,025)
State of Palestine				
1990	288,332	13.9	54.2	Israel (98,290), Jordan (55,317), Saudi Arabia (21,258), Egypt (17,920), Kuwait (16,702)
2000	275,202	8.6	54.7	Israel (93,814), Jordan (52,798), Saudi Arabia (20,289), Egypt (17,104), Kuwait (15,942)
2010	258,032	6.4	55.6	Israel (63,515), Jordan (56,259), Saudi Arabia (21,993), Egypt (18,633), Kuwait (17,280)
2013	256,517	5.9	55.6	Israel (63,142), Jordan (55,929), Saudi Arabia (21,864), Egypt (18,524), Kuwait (17,179)
Syrian Arab Republic				
1990	714,140	5.7	49.0	State of Palestine (244,707), Iraq (3,825), Somalia (200)
2000	832,273	5.1	49.0	State of Palestine (294,205), Iraq (1,829), Somalia (443), Afghanistan (172), Sudan (81)
2010	1,661,922	7.7	48.9	Iraq (1,012,300), State of Palestine (254,356), Somalia (2,762), Afghanistan (1,611), Sudan (480)
2013	1,394,227	6.4	48.9	Iraq (759,225), State of Palestine (242,399), Somalia (2,538), Afghanistan (1,791), Sudan (500)


Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

Note: Due to data limitations, the figures in this table do not fully reflect the number of Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR since 2011.

have been registered. Equally, the figure may, or may not, include some of the estimated 95,000 Syrians living in those countries before the crisis who are represented in DESA data (table 3). We may reasonably estimate that the DESA data do not include an additional 1.2 million Syrians present in these countries as of mid-2013. Taking into account DESA and UNHCR data, although some migrants hosted by the Syrian Arab Republic may have fled the

Mashreq, we may conclude that the subregion hosted around 7 million migrants and refugees by mid-2013. The proportion of migrants and refugees relative to the population of some countries is significant. In Jordan, migrants made up 40.2 per cent of the population (48 per cent including Syrian refugees recorded by UNHCR as of mid-2013) and 17.6 per cent in Lebanon (or 26 per cent including Syrian refugees recorded by UNHCR).¹⁷

Figure 13. Main countries of origin for migrants to the Mashreq, 2013




Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).
Note: Due to data limitations, the figures do not fully reflect the number of Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR since 2011.

In 2013, migrant stock data indicate that the vast majority of migrants in the Mashreq came from other Arab countries. In total, 52 per cent (3,016,446) were Palestinian, and 23 per cent (1,337,017) were from Iraq (figure 13).¹⁸ By mid-2013, an additional 1,305,145 refugees had crossed borders from the Syrian Arab Republic to Egypt, Iraq, Jordan or Lebanon. The number of Syrian refugees rose to around 2.1 million by mid-2014,¹⁹ and by May 2015 had reached more than 3.9 million, including some 1.7 million hosted in Turkey.

Prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, Jordan already hosted 2,097,338 Palestine refugees²⁰ and in December 2013 Jordan was still estimated to be hosting 55,509 Iraqi refugees, 20,286 of whom were assisted by UNHCR. By mid-2014, Jordan hosted 605,157 registered refugees from the

Figure 14. Age structure of migrants in countries of the Mashreq, 2013



Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).
Note: Due to data limitations, the figures do not fully reflect the number of Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR since 2011.

Syrian Arab Republic. Lebanon, with 1,111,076 Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR, became the second largest refugee host country in the world.²¹ Lebanon and Jordan host the highest proportion of refugees worldwide, with 257 and 114 refugees per 1,000 inhabitants respectively. Egypt hosts many asylum-seekers, often from sub-Saharan Africa, and transit migrants hoping to reach Europe.²² By mid-2014, the country had also taken in 138,101 Syrian refugees. Iraq hosted 220,210 Syrian refugees by mid-2014, in addition to 9,992 Palestinian refugees (table 4).²³


Migrants to the Mashreq mostly come from other Arab countries, although the proportion has fallen since 1990. In the 20 years to 2010, the Mashreq received the second highest number of migrants from Arab countries

Table 4. Syrian refugees and people in a refugee-like situation (excluding asylum-seekers) of whom UNHCR-assisted, from 2013 to mid-2014

Country of destination	Number of persons, beginning of 2013	Number of persons, mid-2013	Number of persons, end of 2013	Number of persons, mid-2014
Egypt	12,836	69,207	131,659	138,101
Iraq	63,586	152,436	212,809	220,210
Jordan	238,798	512,447	585,304	605,157
Lebanon	126,939	571,055	851,284	1,111,076
Total	442,159	1,305,145	1,781,056	2,074,544

Source: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Statistics and Operational Data (n.d.). Available from www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c4d6.html (accessed 30 January 2015).

Figure 15. Percentage of women migrants within age groups in the Mashreq, 1990-2013



Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

Note: Due to data limitations, the figures do not fully reflect the number of Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR since 2011.

(2,305,627) after the GCC countries (2,868,059). However, if 84.7 per cent of all migrants were from Arab countries in 1990-1995, that figure had fallen to 64.8 per cent in 2005-2010. There was a marked decrease in the Syrian Arab Republic, from 84 per cent in 2000-2005 to 37 per cent in 2005-2010 (although the absolute number of migrants to the country increased), and Jordan (91 per cent in 1990-1995 to 69 per cent in 2005-2010).

The Arab countries of origin sending the most migrants to the Mashreq have changed over the years. In 1990-2000 most came from Egypt (337,205 in 1990-1995 and 206,440 in 1995-2000); in 2000-2005 most came from Iraq (517,786) in the wake of the US-led invasion in 2003. In 2005-2010, 139,895 migrants came from Iraq. Apart from the Islamic Republic of Iran (from which the flow of migrants increased from 565 to 116,446 between 1995

and 2005) and the United States of America (32,636 migrants in 1990-1995) very few come to the Mashreq from outside the Arab region.²⁴

The percentage of female migrants in the Mashreq is slightly under 50 per cent for the majority of age-groups across this time period (figure 15), and the distribution between male and female migrants is fairly even across age groups, in keeping with the demography of a population less subject to gender-selective migration regulations and labour market demands (figure 14). The proportion of female migrants to this subregion varied little between 1990 and 2013. The female share of the migrant population was above 49 per cent in 2013 in Jordan, the State of Palestine and the Syrian Arab Republic, where the majority of foreign-born

populations are refugees; in Lebanon, the figure was around 48 per cent between 1990 and 2000, decreasing to 47.9 per cent in 2010 and 47.6 per cent in 2013. Of these countries, the State of Palestine has the greatest proportion of female migrants, rising from 54.2 per cent in 1990 to 55.6 per cent in 2013.²⁵

4. Arab least developed countries

In the least developed countries (LDCs) in the region there were 1,012,237 migrants in 2013, a decrease from 2,136,353 in 1990. In 2013, migrants made up 1.3 per cent of the total population of the LDCs, with Djibouti having the largest proportion of migrants in its population (14.2 per cent).²⁶ These figures do not include the possibly many irregular migrants in these countries.

Table 5. International migration trends to the Arab LDCs, 1990-2013


International migrant stock at mid-year				
Year	International migrant stock (both sexes)	Migrant stock as percentage of the total population	Percentage of female migrant stock	Top five countries or territories of origin (both sexes)
Comoros				
1990	14,079	3.4	52.3	Madagascar (10,810), Réunion (957), France (543), United Republic of Tanzania (163), Kenya (87)
2000	13,799	2.6	52.8	Madagascar (10,595), Réunion (938), France (532), United Republic of Tanzania (160), Kenya (85)
2010	12,618	1.8	52.0	Madagascar (9,689), Réunion (857), France (486), United Republic of Tanzania (146), Kenya (77)
2013	12,511	1.7	51.7	Madagascar (9,607), Réunion (850), France (482), United Republic of Tanzania (145), Kenya (76)
Djibouti				
1990	122,221	20.7	47.4	Somalia (101,216), Ethiopia (13,405), Yemen (289)
2000	110,201	15.2	47.1	Somalia (91,261), Ethiopia (12,087), Yemen (261)
2010	114,188	13.7	44.9	Somalia (94,563), Ethiopia (12,524), Yemen (270)
2013	123,537	14.2	44.5	Somalia (102,305), Ethiopia (13,549), Yemen (292)

Mauritania				
1990	93,878	4.6	41.8	Senegal (72,878), Mali (7,733), Guinea (3,136), Algeria (1,656), France (1,427)
2000	62,593	2.3	42.0	Senegal (42,013), Mali (7,577), Guinea (3,073), Algeria (1,623), France (1,398)
2010	89,178	2.5	41.6	Senegal (45,253), Mali (16,172), Guinea (6,559), Algeria (3,465), France (2,984)
2013	90,206	2.3	41.4	Senegal (45,775), Mali (16,358), Guinea (6,635), Algeria (3,505), France (3,018)
Somalia ^a				
1990	478,294	7.6	48.9	Ethiopia (460,000)
2000	20,087	0.3	47.1	Ethiopia (555)
2010	23,995	0.2	46.2	Ethiopia (1,882), Eritrea (37)
2013	24,593	0.2	45.8	Ethiopia (2,046), Eritrea (34)
Sudan				
1990	1,402,896	5.4	50.4	Ethiopia (936,739), Chad (195,007), Uganda (73,994), Eritrea (64,408), Nigeria (23,071)
2000	801,883	2.3	49.7	Eritrea (430,509), Ethiopia (122,159), Chad (71,839), Uganda (43,935), Nigeria (23,885)
2010	612,663	1.7	49.1	South Sudan (196,993), Eritrea (150,187), Chad (86,202), Ethiopia (70,677), Democratic Republic of Congo (21,849)
2013	446,707	1.2	49.2	Eritrea (144,170), South Sudan (83,655), Chad (75,799), Ethiopia (62,431), Nigeria (15,275)
Yemen				
1990	118,863	1.0	44.2	Somalia (36,771), the Sudan (16,604), Eritrea (10,535), Egypt (8,579), Ethiopia (5,269)
2000	143,495	0.8	43.8	Somalia (69,016), the Sudan (17,898), Egypt (9,206), Iraq (5,389), State of Palestine (2,794)
2010	285,837	1.3	40.7	Somalia (194,405), the Sudan (20,633), Egypt (10,621), Iraq (194,405), Ethiopia (4,181)
2013	314,683	1.3	40.7	Somalia (219,888), the Sudan (21,518), Egypt (11,086), Iraq (10,327), Ethiopia (4,686)

Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

^a Due to data limitations, not all countries of origin are marked.

Figure 16. Main countries of origin for migrants to the Arab LDCs, 2013




Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

In 2013, 61 per cent of migrants (616,971 people) in the LDCs came from outside the Arab region. The largest group came from Somalia (322,323 migrants, or 31.8 per cent of the total migrant population), followed by Eritrea (145,046, or 14 per cent) (table 5).²⁷

The proportion of migrants from Arab countries has fluctuated over the years. In 1990-1995 and 2005-2010, the majority of migrants to LDCs came from the Arab region, making up 68 per cent and 57 per cent of total migrant flows respectively. However, in 1995-2000 and 2000-2005 the majority of migrants came from outside the Arab region, with Arab migrants accounting for only 19 per cent and 29 per cent of the total respectively. Most LDCs in the region are in or near sub-Saharan Africa, whence they receive many migrants, and are relatively unattractive as destination countries for Arab migrants.²⁸

Figure 17. Age structure of migrants in the Arab LDCs, 2013



Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

The proportion of female migrants, at 45.2 per cent, is below the global average (figure 18). Of the LDCs, Yemen has the highest proportion of male migrants (56.9 per cent, 96 per cent of whom are of working age), largely from Somalia and Ethiopia. Yemen attracts transit migrant workers heading to GCC countries. Djibouti is often used as a hub by people trying to reach Yemen from Ethiopia and Somalia.²⁹


In mid-2013, an estimated 94,427 refugees from Eritrea and 32,350 from Chad were in the Sudan, along with 83,655 citizens from South Sudan.³⁰ Other foreigners include migrants from China, India, the Philippines and Turkey, most of whom work in companies set up by foreign investors.³¹ Irregular migrants transit through the Sudan en route to Libya, Egypt and other destinations.

Growing numbers of irregular migrants transit through Mauritania in an attempt to reach

Europe via the Canary Islands. Most come from neighbouring countries, particularly

Senegal (45,775), Mali (16,358) and Guinea (6,635) (table 5).³²

Figure 18. Percentage of female migrants within age groups in the Arab LDCs, 1990-2013



Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

Table 6. Top 10 countries of destination for migrants from Arab countries, 2013

Country of destination	Number of migrants
France	2,870,855
Jordan	2,864,163
Saudi Arabia	2,672,746
United Arab Emirates	1,446,560
United States of America	1,049,170
Syrian Arab Republic	1,004,662
Spain	835,952
Lebanon	826,528
Italy	742,827
Libya	633,213

Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

Note: Due to data limitations, the figures in this table do not fully reflect the number of Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR since 2011.

Table 7. Top 10 countries of origin in the Arab region, 2013

Country of origin	Number of migrants
State of Palestine	3,640,155
Egypt	3,469,449
Morocco	2,854,502
Iraq	2,318,696
Somalia	1,921,321
Algeria	1,716,202
Sudan	1,158,816
Yemen	923,235
Lebanon	683,061
Syrian Arab Republic	680,959

Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

Note: Due to data limitations, the figures in this table do not fully reflect the number of Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR since 2011 (see table 11) and the number of Palestinian refugees, which exceeds 5.1 million (see table 24).


C. Migration from Arab countries

It is estimated that 21,974,881 people migrated from Arab countries in 2013, almost double the 12,091,398 recorded in 1990.³³ They made up the equivalent of 5.9 per cent of the total population of the Arab region in 2013, compared to 5.3 per cent in 1990. Men accounted for 57.3 per cent (12,594,976) of those migrants, compared to 9,379,905 women (42.7 per cent), a proportion which has remained stable since 1990. The number of women falls well below the global average of 48 per cent. The 1,305,145 Syrian refugees who fled the Syrian Arab Republic by mid-2013 are not fully reflected in DESA data, which, for example, show only 57,847 Syrians in Jordan and 21,411 Syrians in Lebanon. By adding together these figures and data from UNHCR,


it can be assumed that the total number of migrants and refugees from the Arab region exceeded 23 million.

The main countries of destination vary by subregion. For migrants from GCC countries, Saudi Arabia and the United States are the two most popular destinations; migration from the Maghreb is largely directed towards Europe, in particular France. Migrants from the Mashreq emigrate principally to other Arab countries and the United States. The main destinations for emigrants from Arab LDCs include the Gulf, sub-Saharan Africa and the United States. Intraregional migration as a proportion of migration from Arab countries has increased, with the number of migrants in other Arab countries increasing from 48 per cent to 52 per cent of the total stock of

Figure 19. Migration outflows from Arab countries, 1990-2010



Source: Guy J. Abel and Nikola Sander, 2014 (see figure 5).

Figure 20. Migration outflows from Arab countries to other Arab countries, 1990-2010

Source: Guy J. Abel and Nikola Sander, 2014 (see figure 5).

migrants from Arab countries. In other words, the majority of Arab migrants are in other Arab countries. This trend is likely to have been accentuated by the crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic, as most Syrian refugees moved to neighbouring countries.

The largest migrant populations come from middle-income countries and Arab LDCs (table 7). Palestinians, including the historic population of refugees from Palestine, made up the largest migrant population in 2013, followed by Egyptians and Moroccans. Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic were at the same time major countries of origin and destination for Arab migrants. This trend was reversed in the Syrian Arab Republic, which by mid-2014 had become the biggest source country for refugees in the world (table 11).

There were large outflows of migrants from Egypt, Saudi Arabia (possibly migrants returning to their countries of origin) and Somalia and, to a lesser extent, Kuwait, between 1990 and 2000. Since then, migration from those countries has slowed substantially. In contrast, migration from Algeria, Morocco, the Syrian Arab Republic, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen has risen since 2000. In 2005-2010, Morocco registered the largest outflow of migrants in the Arab region.

The proportion of migrants leaving Arab countries for other Arab countries decreased between 1990 and 2010, from 56.4 per cent in 1990-1995 to 41.6 per cent in 2005-2010. Between 1995 and 2000, 58 per cent of migrants went to countries outside the Arab region, an increase from 44 per cent in 1990-

1995. Indeed, between 80 and 100 per cent of migrants leaving the Comoros, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia between 1990 and 2010 went to countries outside the Arab region.

However, periods of peak intraregional migration can be mapped onto geopolitical events. The Gulf countries witnessed a peak of migration to other Arab countries in 1990-1995, with flows reaching more than 1.6 million, almost 70 per cent to other Arab countries. This can probably be explained by the 1990-1991 Gulf War, which triggered a mass return of foreign migrant workers to their home countries. Political unrest and famine in Somalia in the same period led to a peak in migration to other Arab countries. Migration from Iraq peaked in 2000-2005, owing to the mass displacement caused by the US-led invasion of the country in 2003 and its aftermath.

Intraregional migration is increasingly common from the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen: the number of people migrating from these to other Arab countries reached a peak between 2005 and 2010. Some 80 per cent of migrants came from Yemen, 60 per cent from the Syrian Arab Republic, just under 50 per cent from the United Arab Emirates and only 35 per cent from the Sudan. Intraregional migration as a proportion of total migration outflows has been rising steadily in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.³⁴ These trends vary significantly between subregions.


1. Gulf Cooperation Council

In 2013, 823,054 migrants left GCC countries, more than double the number (361,569) in 1990. In both cases, this was equivalent to 1.7 per cent of the subregion's population. Kuwait is the largest country of origin, in real numbers and as a proportion of population; 323,034 people (9.6 per cent of the population)

left in 2013. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have the second and third largest number of emigrants (262,851 and 131,494 respectively), representing only 0.9 per cent and 1.4 per cent of their populations.³⁵

Most migrants leaving GCC countries remained in the Arab region: 134,184 (16 per cent) resided in Saudi Arabia and they, combined with those in the State of Palestine (78,085), the United Arab Emirates (72,581) and the rest of the Arab region (182,586), accounted for 56 per cent of the total expatriate population in 2013. Of the remaining migrants, many live in the United States (106,335) and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (70,111). In total, 61 per cent (475,400) of migrants from GCC countries were male in 2013, a percentage that has remained stable since 1990 (figure 21).³⁶

Figure 21. Main destinations for migrants from GCC countries, 2013



Saudi Arabia 134,184	United Arab Emirates 72,581
United States of America 106,335	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 70,111
State of Palestine 78,085	Other Arab countries 182,586
Rest of the world 211,353	

Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

Table 8. Migration patterns from GCC countries, 1990-2013

International migrant stock at mid-year				
Year	Migrant stock (both sexes)	Migrant stock as percentage of the total population	Percentage of female migrant stock	Top five countries of destination (both sexes)
Bahrain				
1990	15,840	3.2	51.6	State of Palestine (8,351), USA (1,590), UK (1,510), Libya (1,092), Australia (515)
2000	49,692	7.4	35.1	Bangladesh (20,661), Philippines (8,502), State of Palestine (7,971), UK (2,806), USA (2,145),
2010	59,462	4.7	32.3	Bangladesh (28,523), State of Palestine (8,640), UK (5,899), UAE (3,350), USA (2,748)
2013	61,719	4.6	32.3	Bangladesh (29,603), State of Palestine (8,589), UK (6,021), UAE (3,584), USA (2,848), Canada (1,958)
Kuwait				
1990	181,715	8.8	37	Saudi Arabia (98,684), India (16,860), State of Palestine (16,702), UAE (13,095), USA (10,230)
2000	201,437	10.6	38.3	Saudi Arabia (90,493), USA (21,948), UAE (21,687), State of Palestine (15,942), Canada (9,599)
2010	302,119	10.1	37.4	Saudi Arabia (124,847), UAE (56,837), USA (25,474), State of Palestine (17,280), Canada (12,186)
2013	323,034	9.6	37	Saudi Arabia (134,184), UAE (60,802), USA (26,397), State of Palestine (17,179), UK (14,049)
Oman				
1990	14,082	0.8	46.2	State of Palestine (9,110), Libya (1,247), UK (755), USA (719), Jordan (540)
2000	16,119	0.74	46.7	State of Palestine (8,695), UK (1,403), Libya (1,228), USA (970), Jordan (773)
2010	21,241	0.77	45.9	State of Palestine (9,426), UK (2,950), Libya (1,536), USA (1,243), Australia (1,221)
2013	24,029	0.66	46.2	State of Palestine (9,371), UK (5,222), Libya (1,661), Australia (1,318), USA (1,288)
Qatar				
1990	13,644	2.9	47.9	State of Palestine (9,870), USA (1,256), Libya (820), Egypt (306), Canada (269)
2000	15,448	2.6	46.9	State of Palestine (9,420), USA (1,694), Canada (1,099), Libya (1,025), Egypt (308)


2010	19,382	1.1	46.5	State of Palestine (10,211), USA (2,170), Canada (1,537), Libya (1,283), UAE (886)
2013	19,927	0.9	46.4	State of Palestine (10,151), USA (2,249), Canada (1,600), Libya (1,387), UAE (948)
Saudi Arabia				
1990	93,864	0.6	43.4	State of Palestine (21,258), USA (14,538), Libya (12,987), India (6,058), Indonesia (5,544)
2000	141,725	0.7	42.3	Libya (25,701), USA (22,721), State of Palestine (20,289), UK (10,651), Canada (9,929)
2010	243,026	0.9	42.5	USA (61,671), Libya (32,159), UK (27,529), State of Palestine (21,993), Canada (15,215)
2013	262,851	0.9	42.5	USA (63,906), UK (35,511), Libya (34,773), State of Palestine (21,864), Canada (15,842)
United Arab Emirates				
1990	42,424	2.3	53.4	State of Palestine (10,629), India (9,940), Kuwait (7,051), Oman (3,766), USA (1,906)
2000	79,406	2.6	45.6	India (14,662), Kuwait (12,241), State of Palestine (10,145), Oman (10,139), USA (7,268)
2010	125,822	1.5	43.9	Kuwait (21,472), Qatar (16,709), India (12,432), Canada (11,601), State of Palestine (10,996)
2013	131,494	1.4	43.8	Kuwait (23,268), Qatar (18,370), India (12,209), Canada (12,079), State of Palestine (10,931)

Abbreviations: UAE, United Arab Emirates; UK, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; USA, United States of America.

Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

Note: Due to definition issues, some people counted as migrants may in fact be nationals of the country of destination who have returned to their country of nationality.

Figure 22. Percentage of female migrants from GCC countries, 1990-2013



Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

The number of individuals migrating from GCC countries is in decline. A total of 1,167,974 people left the GCC countries between 1990 and 1995, as opposed to 511,405 in 2005-2010. Destination countries vary, which may be a result of non-GCC nationals returning to their countries of origin, or onwards to other countries. Yemen received a disproportionately large influx of migrants (476,738) from GCC States in 1990-1995.³⁷

Pakistan and the Sudan have also received large numbers of migrants, possibly returning workers, from GCC countries.

The largest flows of migrants outside the Arab region are to the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom. Migration to the United States from GCC States spiked in 1995-2000 (413,004) and then fell to 39,685 in 2005-2010. Canada and the United Kingdom recorded a similar, though less pronounced, spike in 1995-2000.³⁸

Female migrants made up 40 per cent of migrants from GCC countries in 2013, a modest decline from 42 per cent in 1990. In 2013, Oman and Qatar had the highest proportion (46 per cent) of women migrants abroad. In Bahrain the proportion dropped from 56.1 per cent to 32.3 per cent, the lowest in the subregion. It also fell in the United Arab Emirates (from 53.4 per cent in 1990 to 43.8 per cent in 2013). It has remained relatively static in Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The proportion of women migrants from Kuwait has been consistently low, at around 37 per cent from 1990 to 2013 (figure 22).


2. Maghreb

Migrants from the Maghreb totalled 5,458,073 in 2013, up from 3,334,922 in 1990. Although it is the second most important subregion in terms of migration outflow in the Arab world, growth in numbers has been slower than in other subregions since 1990. Migrants made up the equivalent of 5.1 per cent of

the Maghreb's population in 1990, and 6.1 per cent in 2013. Morocco's migrant population (2,854,502 in 2013) is the largest in the subregion. Migrants also represent a greater proportion of the total population (8.6 per cent) than elsewhere in the Maghreb. Algeria is next, with 1,716,202 migrants (4.5 per cent of the country's population) living abroad in 2013 (table 9).

Of those migrants, more than 86 per cent were in Europe, mostly France (2,702,348, or 49 per cent of all migrants from the Maghreb), Spain (808,464; 15 per cent), Italy (603,925; 11 per cent), Israel (253,968; 5 per cent) and the Netherlands (182,938; 3 per cent)(figure 23). The Arab region hosted 4 per cent of migrants from the Maghreb (236,666), around half of whom were refugees from Western Sahara³⁹ living in Algeria. Cultural and historical bilateral ties between these Arab countries

Figure 23. Main countries of destination for migrants from the Maghreb, 2013



Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).


Table 9. Migration patterns from the Maghreb, 1990-2013

International migrant stock at mid-year ^a				
Year	International migrant stock (both sexes)	Migrant stock as percentage of the total population	Percentage of female migrant stock	Top five countries or territories of destination (both sexes)
Algeria				
1990	921,909	3.5	43.6	France (788,914), Morocco (20,008), Israel (19,544) ^b , Tunisia (13,773), Spain (11,632)
2000	1,039,439	3.3	44.6	France (839,920), Israel (30,056), Canada (20,757), Spain (19,360), Morocco (18,454)
2010	1,657,306	4.5	45.1	France (1,360,964), Spain (57,143), Israel (45,737), Canada (36,581), UK (20,647)
2013	1,716,202	4.5	48.7	France (1,406,845), Spain (60,110), Israel (46,477), Canada (38,088), Italy (24,601)
Libya				
1990	80,565	1.9	47.0	Israel (19,180), Indonesia (13,860), UK (6,650), Italy (5,450), Côte D'Ivoire (5,379)
2000	85,570	1.7	45.9	Israel (19,423), UK (8,464), Viet Nam (6,511), USA (5,780), Côte D'Ivoire (5,303)
2010	134,704	2.2	47.8	Italy (32,043), UK (24,579), Israel (17,294), Viet Nam (10,199), Egypt (8,161)
2013	142,192	2.3	47.7	Italy (38,548), UK (20,069), Israel (17,574), Viet Nam (11,278), Egypt (8,648)
Morocco				
1990	1,606,762	6.5	42.5	France (713,987), Italy (169,285), Israel (157,029), Belgium (135,196), Spain (134,656)
2000	1,967,149	6.9	45.1	France (760,148), Italy (285,569), Spain (266,206), Israel (166,953), Netherlands (155,284)
2010	2,702,722	8.5	44.7	France (881,334), Spain (717,657), Italy (355,645), Netherlands (168,971), Israel (163,320)
2013	2,854,502	8.6	45.2	France (911,046), Spain (745,674), Italy (425,188), Netherlands (173,489), Israel (165,963)
Tunisia				
1990	463,212	5.7	39.5	France (276,216), Italy (70,813), Israel (40,293), Germany (27,234), Saudi Arabia (8,945)
2000	486,881	5.1	41.7	France (294,250), Italy (75,563), Israel (36,146), Germany (23,332), Saudi Arabia (8,203)
2010	589,410	5.5	42.0	France (369,667), Italy (83,113), Germany (26,510), Israel (23,573), Saudi Arabia (11,317)
2013	643,612	5.9	41.4	France (382,129), Italy (115,588), Germany (26,813), Israel (23,954), Saudi Arabia (12,163)

Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

^a Due to definition issues, some people counted as migrants may in fact be nationals of the country of destination who have returned to their country of nationality.

^b Jewish inhabitants of Arab countries who migrated to Israel after it was created.

Figure 24. Percentage of female migrants from the Maghreb, 1990-2013

Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

and member countries of the OECD play a role in migration patterns. The most striking example is the case of France, where more than 90 per cent of migrants from Algeria reside. Similar bilateral ties link Moroccan migrants to Spain.⁴⁰

Flow data indicate that the number of people leaving the Maghreb for Spain and France increased between 1995-2000 and 2000-2005 from 151,799 to 280,536 and from 247,350 to 328,960 respectively. The numbers heading for Italy rose from 80,257 in 1990-1995 to 122,058 in 2005-2010.

Female migrants made up 44.9 per cent of migrants from the Maghreb in 2013, the highest of all subregions and up from 42.7 per cent in 1990. The largest increase came between 1990 and 2000, and the proportion has been increasing gradually since 2010. The relatively higher share of female migrants compared to other subregions might be explained by the importance of family migration as a means of entering European countries (figure 24).⁴¹

3. Mashreq

There were 11,431,553 migrants⁴² worldwide from the countries of the Mashreq in 2013, nearly double the number in 1990 (6,467,673). That figure, which does not include an accurate estimate of Syrian refugees, represented 7.4 per cent of the population of the subregion in 2013, the highest percentage of all the subregions and a slight increase on the 6.8 per cent recorded in 1990. Egypt (3,469,449), the State of Palestine (3,640,155) and Iraq (2,318,696) accounted for the largest numbers of nationals living abroad in 2013. The number of Palestinians living abroad in 2013 was equivalent to 84.1 per cent of the population of the State of Palestine. By contrast, the number of Egyptians and Iraqis abroad made up only 4.2 and 6.9 per cent of their respective populations (table 10).⁴³

Of all those leaving the Mashreq, the vast majority remain in the Arab region: 77 per cent of all migrants from the Mashreq are in Arab countries, and 41 per cent are in other Mashreq countries, particularly Jordan and Lebanon.

Table 10. Migration patterns from the Mashreq, 1990-2013

International migrant stock at mid-year ^a				
Year	Migrant stock (both sexes)	Migrant stock as a percentage of the total population	Percentage of female migrant stock	Top five countries of destination (both sexes)
Egypt				
1990	2,041,214	3.6	36.8	Saudi Arabia (954,888), Kuwait (200,490), Jordan (171,413), UAE (165,980), Lebanon (78,308)
2000	2,288,586	3.5	34.5	Saudi Arabia (875,627), Jordan (287,677), UAE (261,834), Kuwait (159,262), Lebanon (130,459)
2010	3,296,232	4.2	34.1	Saudi Arabia (1,208,043), UAE (665,474), Jordan (328,492), Kuwait (168,270), USA (165,969)
2013	3,469,449	4.2	33.7	Saudi Arabia (1,298,388), UAE (711,894), Jordan (276,950), Kuwait (182,342), USA (171,985)
Iraq				
1990	1,235,899	7.1	43.0	Iran (961,641), Israel (74,502) ^b , USA (51,693), Sweden (38,795), Jordan (25,773)
2000	1,134,933	4.8	42.4	Iran (520,830), USA (96,873), Israel (75,702), Germany (58,884), Jordan (55,942)
2010	2,594,686	8.4	47.7	Syrian Arab Republic (1,012,300), Jordan (475,782), USA (175,238), Lebanon (143,391), Sweden (121,761)
2013	2,318,696	6.9	47.0	Syrian Arab Republic (759,225), Jordan (401,130), USA (181,590), Lebanon (148,470), Sweden (130,449)
Jordan				
1990	357,731	10.7	40.1	Saudi Arabia (124,163), State of Palestine (55,317), USA (36,679), Kuwait (31,499), UAE (26,078)
2000	395,523	8.3	38.9	Saudi Arabia (113,857), State of Palestine (52,798), USA (50,428), UAE (47,494), Kuwait (28,888)
2010	603,731	9.4	38.1	Saudi Arabia (157,080), UAE (132,264), USA (73,640), State of Palestine (56,259), Kuwait (33,445)
2013	639,233	8.8	37.7	Saudi Arabia (168,827), UAE (141,490), USA (76,309), State of Palestine (55,929), Kuwait (36,242)

Lebanon				
1990	500,895	18.5	42.4	USA (99,401), Australia (72,337), Canada (54,444), Germany (45,648), Saudi Arabia (41, 992)
2000	538,904	16.7	44.2	USA (114,135), Australia (78,563), Canada (68,468), Germany (49,663), France (41,094)
2010	648,517	14.9	44.1	USA (121,935), Australia (89,698), Canada (84,073), Germany (66,274), Saudi Arabia (53,125)
2013	683,061	14.2	44.1	USA (126,355), Australia (96,800), Canada (87,536), Germany (67,031), Saudi Arabia (57,098)
State of Palestine				
1990	1,908,317	91.7	49.1	Jordan (851,880), Lebanon (389,171), Syrian Arab Republic (244,707), Libya (152,386), Saudi Arabia (88,372)
2000	2,688,877	83.9	49.5	Jordan (1,429,681), Lebanon (467,005), Syrian Arab Republic (294,205), Libya (207,308), Saudi Arabia (81,036)
2010	3,229,370	80.5	48.7	Jordan (1,760,396), Lebanon (530,550), Libya (259,390), Syrian Arab Republic (254,356), Saudi Arabia (111,800)
2013	3,640,155	84.1	48.8	Jordan (2,114,224), Lebanon (549,341), Libya (280,475), Syrian Arab Republic (242,399), Saudi Arabia (120,161)
Syrian Arab Republic				
1990	423,617	3.4	39.9	Saudi Arabia (102,548), Jordan (51,557), USA (42,332), Lebanon (23,553), Kuwait (16,262)
2000	488,507	3	40.9	Saudi Arabia (94,036), USA (58,798), Jordan (57,684), Lebanon (26,159), Germany (25,116)
2010	651,012	3	40.1	Saudi Arabia (129,735), USA (73,765), Jordan (68,613), UAE (56,953), Germany (43,843)
2013	680,959 ^c	3.1	39.6	USA (76,439), UAE (60,926), Jordan (57,847), Germany (44,344), Sweden (28,067)

Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

^a Due to definition issues, some people counted as migrants may in fact be nationals of the country of destination who have returned to their country of nationality.

^b Jewish inhabitants of Arab countries who migrated to Israel after it was created.

^c Due to data limitations, the figures in this table do not fully reflect the number of Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR since 2011.

Table 11. Syrian refugees and people in a refugee-like situation (excluding asylum-seekers) of whom UNHCR-assisted, by country of destination, 2013 to mid-2014

Country of destination	Number of persons, beginning of 2013	Number of persons, mid-2013	Number of persons, end of 2013	Number of persons, mid-2014
Egypt	12,836	69,207	131,659	138,101
Iraq	63,586	152,436	212,809	220,210
Jordan	238,798	512,447	585,304	605,157
Lebanon	126,939	571,055	851,284	1,111,076
Libya	3,794	..	16,796	16,796
Turkey	248,466	490,034	585,601	798,046
Total	694,419	1,795,179	2,383,453	2,889,386


Source: UNHCR, n.d. (see table 4).

Almost three million Palestinians live in Jordan and Lebanon. Forced migration (among Iraqis, Palestinians and Syrians) and intraregional labour migration to GCC countries are significant in the subregion. The Syrian Arab Republic was the third destination country, but is now a major country of origin of refugees.

Excluding refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic, Jordan had the largest number of migrants from the Mashreq (2,851,752, or a quarter of the region's expatriate population) in 2013. Next came Saudi Arabia, with 1,783,911 immigrants (16 per cent of the expatriate population), almost 1.3 million of whom are Egyptian. The remaining migrants lived in the United States (676,085, or 6 per cent of the total number of migrants leaving the subregion), or the rest of the world (17 per cent) (figure 25).⁴⁴


The crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic continues to result in the movement of millions of refugees and IDPs in the region. The speed with which the situation evolves has made it increasingly difficult to procure timely and comprehensive statistics. UNHCR statistics,

Figure 25. Main countries of destination for migrants from the Mashreq, 2013



Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

^a See also table 11.

Figure 26. Percentage of women migrants from the Mashreq, 1990-2013

Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

Note: Due to data limitations, the figures in this table do not fully reflect the number of Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR since 2011.

based on online data collection systems, are used as a complement to DESA data to enhance analysis and provide the most up-to-date picture possible (table 11).

Between the onset of the crisis and mid-2014, UNHCR offices registered 2,889,386 refugees (14 per cent of the country's population at the beginning of the conflict) outside the Syrian Arab Republic. By mid-2014, Syrians had overtaken Afghans as the largest refugee population under UNHCR mandate,⁴⁵ and most of them are hosted in neighbouring Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. The flow of migrants from Mashreq countries slowed between 1990 and 2010. In 1990-1995, 1,000,949 migrants left, dropping to 668,179 in 2005-2010. The largest flows were to the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United States. Of those countries, only the United Arab Emirates experienced an increase in immigration, from 103,861 in 1990-1995 to 256,477 in 2005-2010, although the increase was not linear. Migration flows to Saudi Arabia have been particularly volatile, reaching as

high as 310,851 in 1990-1995 and dropping to 15,212 in 2005-2010. Flows to the United States dropped from 277,300 in 1995-2000 to 70,247 in 2005-2010.⁴⁶

Females made up 42.4 per cent of migrants from the Mashreq in 2013. That figure has remained stable since 1990. The State of Palestine has the highest percentage of female migrants abroad (48.8 per cent in 2013, or 1,775,348 migrants) of the Mashreq countries, reflecting the balanced demographic profile of the large Palestinian population. Egypt had the lowest percentage of women emigrating in 2013 (33.7 per cent), reflecting the importance of sex-selective labour migration of Egyptians to GCC countries (figure 26).⁴⁷

4. Arab least developed countries

A total of 4,262,201 people migrated from the Arab LDCs in 2013, more than double the 2,021,404 in 1990. In 2013, migrants made up the equivalent of 5.4 per cent of the population of the Arab LDCs, compared to

Table 12. Migration patterns from the Arab LDCs, 1990-2013

International migrant stock at mid-year ^a				
Year	International migrant stock (both sexes)	Migrant stock as percentage of the total population	Percentage of female migrant stock	Top five countries or territories of destination (both sexes)
Comoros				
1990	39,394	9.5	42.1	France (18,859), Mayotte (10,041), Madagascar (7,407), Libya (1,231), Egypt (459)
2000	65,922	12.5	46.3	Mayotte (31,977), France (20,078), Madagascar (6,702), Libya (3,114), Réunion (1,725)
2010	105,882	15.5	50.5	Mayotte (55,465), France (34,849), Madagascar (5,658), Libya (3,895), Réunion (2,252)
2013	108,901	14.8	50.6	Mayotte (56,791), France (36,024), Madagascar (5,510), Libya (4,212), Réunion (2,375)
Djibouti				
1990	5,638	0.95	44.1	France (3,050), Ethiopia (904), Libya (695), Egypt (259), Russian Federation (223)
2000	9,389	1.3	42.3	Ethiopia (3,530), France (3,247), Libya (1,031), Canada (500), Egypt (310)
2010	12,745	1.5	46.5	France (6,251), Ethiopia (3,094), Libya (1,292), Canada (574), Egypt (554)
2013	14,085	1.6	46.5	France (6,462), Ethiopia (3,827), Libya (1,397), Canada (598), Egypt (587)
Mauritania				
1990	142,578	7	43.8	Senegal (89,862), Mali (16,942), France (11,287), Côte D'Ivoire (9,873), Nigeria (7,572)
2000	120,384	4.4	43.9	Senegal (59,456), Nigeria (20,821), France (12,017), Côte D'Ivoire (10,613), Mali (6,655)
2010	130,996	3.6	42.4	Senegal (41,117), Nigeria (30,804), France (15,846), Mali (14,063), Spain (10,750)
2013	135,803	3.5	42.8	Senegal (40,955), Nigeria (34,196), France (16,380), Mali (14,488), Spain (10,654)

Somalia				
1990	859,047	13.6	46.7	Ethiopia (616,940), Djibouti (101,216), UK (51,716), Yemen (36,771), Canada (20,280)
2000	1,086,803	14.7	49.3	Ethiopia (421,942), Kenya (171,997), Djibouti (91,261), Libya (75,738), Yemen (69,016)
2010	1,602,584	16.6	45.5	Ethiopia (369,822), Kenya (351,773), Yemen (194,405), UK (108,149), USA (95,101)
2013	1,921,361	18.3	45.6	Kenya (517,666), Ethiopia (457,483), Yemen (219,888), Libya (102,471), Djibouti (102,305)
Sudan				
1990	446,014	1.7	39.6	Saudi Arabia (172,508), Ethiopia (53,857), Kuwait (38,759), Libya (38,630), UAE (32,088)
2000	442,569	1.3	38.3	Saudi Arabia (158,189), UAE (54,597), Uganda (44,337), Kuwait (33,209), Ethiopia (19,955)
2010	714,914	2.0	38.5	Saudi Arabia (218,243), UAE (144,863), Chad (102,486), Kuwait (36,630), Qatar (28,503)
2013	1,158,816	3.1	38.9	South Sudan (407,925), Saudi Arabia (234,564), UAE (154,968), Chad (107,385), Kuwait (39,693)
Yemen				
1990	528,733	4.5	34.9	Saudi Arabia (339,069), Kuwait (53,769), UAE (44,514), Israel (36,222) ^b , Qatar (12,544)
2000	551,173	3.1	34.0	Saudi Arabia (310,924), UAE (72,861), Kuwait (44,318), Israel (36,041), USA (20,702)
2010	863,110	3.8	33.9	Saudi Arabia (428,961), UAE (188,315), USA (48,373), Kuwait (47,616), Qatar (37,053)
2013	923,235	3.8	33.4	Saudi Arabia (461,042), UAE (201,451), Kuwait (51,598), USA (50,126), Qatar (40,737)

Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

^a Due to issues with definitions, some people counted as migrants may in fact be nationals of the country of destination who have returned to their country of nationality.

^b Jewish inhabitants of Arab countries who migrated to Israel after it was created.

4.3 per cent in 1990. Somalia has the highest number of migrants abroad (1,921,361) and the highest number in proportion to its population (18.3 per cent). The Sudan has the next highest number of emigrants (1,166,600), representing just 3.5 per cent of the Sudanese population. The 407,925 Sudanese


migrants residing in South Sudan reflect the complications arising from the independence of South Sudan in 2011. A high percentage of the population of the Comoros (14.8 per cent) lives outside the country, although the absolute number of emigrants is relatively small at 108,901 (table 12).

Migrants from the Arab LDCs are spread between Arab countries, sub-Saharan Africa and OECD countries. More than 86 per cent of them remain in less developed regions.

The Arab region, in particular Saudi Arabia (722,314, or 17 per cent of migrants from LDCs) the United Arab Emirates and, to a lesser extent, Yemen and Libya, hosts 45 per cent of migrants from the LDCs. Relatively high numbers are also in the sub-Saharan African countries of Kenya (523,513) and Ethiopia (483,096). The figures reflect forced migration (of Somalis to Kenya, for example) and employment-focused migration (Saudi Arabia) (figure 27).⁴⁸


Overall, the numbers of migrants to the GCC countries, Chad and Kenya are increasing, and decreasing elsewhere. The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Yemen are the three most popular Arab destinations for individuals from the LDCs. Of these, the numbers migrating to the United Arab Emirates have increased most dramatically in recent years - from 37,886 in 2000-2005 to 162,693 in 2005-2010. Saudi Arabia

Figure 27. Main countries of destination for migrants from the Arab LDCs, 2013



Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

Figure 28. Percentage of women migrants from the Arab LDCs, 1990-2013



Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

experienced a sharp increase between 2000 and 2005 (126,650), although the numbers dropped off between 2005 and 2010. Many of these migrants come from the Sudan. Large

numbers of Sudanese probably account for the increasing flows to Chad (61,431 in 2005-2010). Migrant flows to Ethiopia and the Sudan have decreased sharply since 2000.⁴⁹

Table 13. Remittance outflows by country, 2008-2012

Country	Remittance outflows (millions of dollars)				
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
GCC					
Bahrain	1,774	1,391	1,642	2,050	2,074
Kuwait	10,323	11,749	12,126	13,423	15,935
Oman	5,181	5,316	5,704	7,215	8,086
Qatar	10,445	10,842
Saudi Arabia	21,696	26,470	27,069	28,475	29,493
UAE	20,347
Mashreq					
Egypt	241	255	305	293	293
Iraq	31	27	48	78	548
Jordan	472	502	495	439	460
Lebanon	4,366	5,749	4,390	4,227	4,208
State of Palestine	9	8	19	52	50
Syrian Arab Republic	210	211	530
Maghreb					
Algeria	27	46	28	71	41
Libya	964	1,361	1,609	650	1,971
Morocco	54	60	62	71	64
Tunisia	16	13	13	19	18
Arab LDCs					
Comoros
Djibouti	5	6	12	13	12
Mauritania
Somalia
Sudan	2	0	1	2	8
Yemen	337	337	338	333	338

Source: World Bank annual remittances data, April 2014 update.

Notes: For completeness, United Arab Emirates data were added from 2013 World Bank bilateral remittance estimates. Two dots (..) indicate that data are not available.

Females made up 41.2 per cent of migrants from the Arab LDCs in 2013, a slight decrease since 1990 (41.8 per cent). The Comoros had the highest proportion in 2013 (50.6 per cent), while Yemen had the lowest (33.4 per cent). The Comoros recorded an increase in the percentage of female migrants from 42.1 per cent in 1990 to 50.6 per cent in 2013, and Djibouti experienced a more modest rise from 44.5 per cent in 1990 to 46.5 per cent in 2013. The other Arab LDCs recorded decreases or very little change in this period (figure 28).⁵⁰


D. Outflows and inflows of remittances in the Arab region

The high volume of migration to and from Arab countries and the significant proportion of labour migrants mean that flows of remittances are high to and from the region. They represent an important and growing source of foreign funds for developing and middle-income

countries in and beyond the region, as well as being an essential source of income for the families and communities of migrants. Officially recorded remittance outflows from Arab countries, mainly GCC countries, reached \$74.1 billion in 2012, which represented 15.7 per cent of remittances received across the world (figure 29). The Arab region also received one of the largest volumes of remittances in 2014: more than \$50.5 billion.


Those flows are more than four times the official development aid (ODA) received by Arab countries and much higher than foreign direct investment flows to most developing and middle-income countries in the Arab region,⁵¹ making migration-related remittances a decisive agent of economic and social change and an essential source of foreign currency. A recent analysis by the World Bank shows that remittances are less volatile than official aid flows.⁵² As a stable component of receipts in the current account, helping to sustain the balance of payments and smooth fluctuations, the role of remittances is likely to grow in importance.

Figure 29. Remittance outflows, Arab region and subregions (billions of dollars)



Source: World Bank annual remittances data, April 2014 update.

Figure 30. Main recipient countries of remittances from Arab countries, 2012 (billions of dollars)



Source: World Bank, Bilateral Remittance Matrix 2012 (May 2013 version, accessed 30 January 2015).

The high costs of transferring remittances are a major obstacle to maximizing their potential contribution to development. The final outcome document of the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals includes a target to reduce to less than 3 per cent the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5 per cent by 2030.

The links between remittances and development are, however, complex and there are inherent risks associated with overreliance on remittances. Some small countries, given the proportion of their economies represented by remittance transfers, can become especially dependent on them, increasing their vulnerability to shocks from remittance-sending countries. The Secretary-General of the United Nations said in 2006: “International migration and remittances can easily masquerade as a substitute for sound development policies and countries can become dependent on remittance flows instead of producing dynamic economies, which, over time, may offer attractive alternatives to migration.”⁵³

1. Remittance outflows from the Arab region


The overall trend in the Arab region shows a steep increase in remittance outflows, especially from GCC countries. In 2012, migrants in Arab countries sent \$74.1 billion in remittances. Remittances from Saudi Arabia (\$29.5 billion) and the United Arab Emirates (\$20.3 billion) were the second and sixth largest outflows in the world in 2012.

Of the remittances sent from Arab countries in 2012, \$24.1 billion – 29 per cent – went to other Arab countries, with \$16.6 billion going to Egypt alone. More than \$54 billion was sent from Arab countries to six Asian countries (Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines and Sri Lanka), and \$32.8 billion to India. Approximately \$63 billion were sent to the top seven receiving countries (India, Egypt, Pakistan, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Jordan), accounting for 79 per cent of the total remittance flow from the region (figure 30).

(a) Gulf Cooperation Council

The outflow of remittances from GCC countries (excluding the United Arab Emirates) in 2012

Figure 31. Main recipient countries of remittances from GCC countries, 2012 (billions of dollars)




Source: World Bank, Bilateral Remittance Matrix 2012 (see figure 30).

was \$66.4 billion, with Saudi Arabia sending the most (\$29.5 billion), followed by Kuwait (\$15.9 billion) and Qatar (\$10.8 billion). In total, 20.1 per cent of remittances from migrants in GCC countries went to Arab countries. The largest single recipient of remittances from GCC countries was India (\$32.7 billion), followed by Egypt (\$9.9 billion), Pakistan (\$6.8 billion), the Philippines (\$5.3 billion), Bangladesh (\$3.6 billion) and Sri Lanka (\$3.2 billion) (figure 31). Similar patterns apply in other Gulf countries, except Qatar, from which the bulk of remittances went to Nepal. Remittances, mostly from the Gulf, form the single largest source of foreign currency revenue in Pakistan. In the Indian state of Kerala, 22 per cent of income is made up of remittances.⁵⁴

(b) Maghreb

Remittance flows from the Maghreb are smaller than from other subregions. Trends, which are largely determined by events in Libya, the main destination for migrant workers and principal source of remittances, are unclear. The uprising in 2011 was accompanied by an exodus of migrant workers and sudden dip in remittances, but recovery came in 2012.

Figure 32. Main recipient countries of remittances from the Mashreq, 2012 (billions of dollars)



Source: World Bank, Bilateral Remittance Matrix 2012 (see figure 30).

Judging by the scant bilateral remittance data for Maghreb countries, more than 98 per cent of remittances go to Arab countries, especially Egypt, which received more than \$2 billion from migrants in Libya alone in 2012.⁵⁵

(c) Mashreq

Remittances from Mashreq countries have been on the increase since 2001, although with intermittent peaks and troughs. A period of stagnation between 2002 and 2007 was

followed by a sharp rise in 2007-2009 and a subsequent drop until 2011. In 2012, migrants sent \$5.6 billion (10 per cent of the total remittance outflow from the Arab region) to the top six recipient countries. Migrants in Lebanon contributed the most with \$4.2

Table 14. Remittance inflows by country, 2008-2014

Country	Remittance inflows (millions of dollars)						
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
GCC							
Bahrain
Kuwait	5	6	3	4	4
Oman	39	39	39	39	39	39	39
Qatar	574	803	574	346
Saudi Arabia	216	214	236	244	246	269	269
UAE
Mashreq							
Egypt	8,694	7,150	12,453	14,324	19,236	17,833	18,000
Iraq	71	152	177	223	271	271	317
Jordan	3,510	3,465	3,517	3,368	3,490	3,643	3,754
Lebanon	7,181	7,558	6,914	6,913	6,918	7,551	7,674
State of Palestine	1,214	1,198	1,509	1,666	2,060	2,520	3,344
Syrian Arab Republic	1,325	1,350	1,623	1,623	1,623	1,623	1,664
Maghreb							
Algeria	2,202	2,059	2,044	1,942	1,942	2,000	2,063
Libya
Morocco	6,894	6,269	6,423	7,256	6,508	6,882	6,819
Tunisia	1,977	1,964	2,063	2,004	2,266	2,291	2,362
Arab LDCs							
Comoros	27	34	38	48	56	59	70
Djibouti	30	32	33	32	33	33	34
Mauritania
Somalia
Sudan	1,591	1,394	1,100	442	401	424	429
Yemen	1,411	1,160	1,526	1,404	3,351	3,343	3,343

Source: World Bank annual remittances data, October 2014 update.

Note: Two dots (..) indicate that data are not available.

billion (75.7 per cent of the flow from the subregion).

The share of remittances sent to Arab countries by migrants in the Mashreq is higher than in the case of the GCC countries. In total, 73.5 per cent of remittances sent from Mashreq countries went to other Arab countries in 2012. Migrants in Iraq, Jordan and the State of Palestine sent the highest proportions of intraregional remittances. The main destination of remittances from the Mashreq was Egypt (\$4.3 billion), followed by Jordan (\$1.6 billion) and Israel (\$0.8 billion) (figure 32). In the latter case, most of the remittances were probably received by Arab citizens of Israel.⁵⁶ Migrants in Egypt send modest amounts of remittances, but to the largest number of destinations, including a mix of Arab, European, African and Southeast Asian countries.

(d) Arab least developed countries


Bilateral remittance data show that 42 per cent of remittances from the Arab LDCs go to other Arab countries, mostly

Egypt and the Sudan. However, the largest single outflow is from the Sudan to Nigeria (\$418 million). Relatively large quantities of remittances also go to other African countries, such as Senegal (\$94 million, from Mauritania) and Ethiopia (\$72 million, from Djibouti and the Sudan).


2. Remittance flows to the Arab region

Remittance inflows are an important source of income for Arab countries and have been growing steadily, with major increases since 2000. It was estimated in 2014 that Arab countries received \$50.5 billion in remittances, 8.7 per cent of total remittances worldwide (figure 33). Remittance flows to Egypt were the seventh highest in the world in 2014, with Lebanon ranked eighteenth and Morocco twenty-first.⁵⁷ Considered as a share of GDP, remittances are particularly important for Lebanon, where they made up 17 per cent of GDP in 2013, Jordan (10.8 per cent), Yemen (9.3 per cent) and the Comoros (9 per cent). Remittances to Egypt and Morocco made up 6.6 per cent of GDP.⁵⁸

Figure 33. Remittances inflows, Arab region and subregions (billions of dollars)



Source: World Bank annual remittances data, October 2014 update.

Figure 34. Main recipient countries of remittances in the Arab region, 2014 (billions of dollars)

Source: World Bank annual remittances data, October 2014 update

Overall, 49 per cent of remittances (\$24.1 billion) received in 2012 (the last year for which data are available) came from migrants in other Arab countries. Saudi Arabia was the top country of origin worldwide in 2012, with \$9.1 billion, almost double the amount sent from France (\$5.1 billion), the second biggest country of origin for remittances. Jordan, Kuwait, Libya and the State of Palestine were among the top countries of origin.

(a) Gulf Cooperation Council

The total inflow of remittances to GCC countries in 2014 was \$658 million, a decrease from \$886 million in 2013. Qatar received the most (\$346 million), followed by Saudi Arabia (\$269 million) (table 14). Remittances formed a negligible share of GDP in GCC countries in 2013: the highest proportion was 0.3 per cent in Qatar.⁵⁹

(b) Maghreb

The Maghreb received \$11.2 billion in remittances in 2014. Morocco received far more (\$6.8 billion) than Algeria (\$2.1

billion) or Tunisia (\$2.4 billion) (table 14). Most remittances received in the Maghreb came from Europe. Migrants in France sent \$4.4 billion in 2012, more than double what was sent by those in Libya (\$1.8 billion) and Germany (\$1.5 billion). Economic uncertainty and high unemployment in Europe are likely to dampen remittances to Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria for some time.

(c) Mashreq

The Mashreq region receives by far the most remittances of all the Arab subregions. The total inflow in 2014 was estimated at \$34.8 billion. Figure 33 indicates that inflows increased suddenly in 2002, but that was largely due to the fact that remittance inflow data from Lebanon are available only for that year. Remittance flows have increased steadily since 2002, with the exception of a 5 per cent dip in 2009, due in all likelihood to the global economic crisis, and a small decrease in 2013.

Egypt received the highest recorded amount of remittances in 2014 (\$18 billion), ahead of

Lebanon (\$7.7 billion) and Jordan (\$3.8 billion). The reasons for the large jump in remittances to Egypt after 2011 are unclear, but Egyptians abroad may have provided financial assistance to vulnerable family members during the Egyptian uprising.⁶⁰ Remittances to Iraq have remained negligible, probably due to the fact that most Iraqis abroad are refugees in vulnerable situations (table 14).

Mashreq countries receive most of their remittances from GCC countries, Jordan, Libya and OECD countries. In 2012, the highest amount (\$7.5 billion) came from Saudi Arabia, followed by Jordan (\$4.5 billion). Those figures tally with the pattern of destination countries for migrants from the Mashreq.

(d) Arab least developed countries

The Arab LDCs received \$3.9 billion in remittances in 2014. As shown in figure 33, remittance inflows have generally followed an upward trend since 1976, although there have been many periods of flux. Yemen is by far the

largest recipient (\$3.3 billion in 2014) (table 14). The Arab LDCs received much of their remittances from Saudi Arabia (\$1.6 billion in 2012). They also received remittances from the United States (\$177 million), the United Arab Emirates (\$160 million) and Uganda (\$149 million).

E. Migration of specific sociodemographic groups


It is worth taking a closer look, using the more abundant than hitherto disaggregated data, at the migration patterns of certain sociodemographic groups and their vulnerabilities: students, family members, women, youth, and skilled and highly skilled migrants. The relation between migration, education and skills acquisition is of particular interest, given the youth bulge that is reshaping the populations of Arab countries. Family reunification is a major migration driver for women migrants.

Table 15. Inbound internationally mobile students in selected Arab countries

Country	Total inbound internationally mobile students, both sexes (number)						
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Algeria	5,863	5,709	..	6,067	6,544	6,529	..
Bahrain	672	8,591	6,633	2,648
Egypt	33,563	35,031	49,011
Jordan	21,509	22,541	26,637	27,683	27,437	25,072	27,931
Lebanon	17,199	22,674	30,436	33,178	27,230
Morocco	6,049	7,029	7,598	7,921	8,604
Oman	210	165	1,387	1,438	1,787	2,108	..
Qatar	4,544	4,798	5,418	6,188	7,154
Saudi Arabia	13,687	17,716	18,725	19,906	26,871	34,922	46,566
Tunisia	2,480	2,404	2,203	2,032	1,901
UAE	34,000	48,653	54,162
Yemen	..	6,423	11,393	..

Source: UNESCO, *Global Education Digest 2012. Opportunities Lost: The Impact of Grade Repetition and Early School Leaving* (Montreal, 2012).

Figure 35. Number of outbound internationally mobile students from top 10 Arab countries, 2010



Source: UNESCO, *Global Education Digest 2012* (see table 15).

1. Student migrants

(a) Migration to the Arab region

The Arab region has traditionally been a hub of international and intraregional student migration, enabling young people to access educational opportunities not available in their countries of origin. The American University in Cairo, Al-Azhar University in Egypt, American University of Beirut and Akhawayn University in Morocco, among others, have been attracting foreign students since the mid-twentieth century.

In 2010 (the year for which data are most complete), 219,389 internationally mobile students were studying in the Arab region,⁶¹ of whom at least 20.5 per cent were from other Arab countries (the origin of students is not always known). The most popular destinations for students in 2010 were Egypt (49,011), United Arab Emirates (34,000), Lebanon (30,436), Jordan (27,437) and Saudi Arabia (26,871).⁶² By 2012, the numbers going to the


United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia had increased dramatically (to 54,162 and 46,566 respectively) (table 15).

Those figures may be a sign of the impact of major reforms undertaken in the higher education systems in GCC countries in recent years. Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have founded and expanded universities such as the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (founded in Saudi Arabia in 2009), and broadened joint initiatives with universities from Asia, Europe, North America and Oceania, such as Education City in Qatar and the Dubai International Academic City, creating new options for internationally mobile students.

(b) Migration from the Arab region

In 2010, 249,277 students from Arab countries were studying abroad, an increase of more than 70,000 over 2004.⁶³ As figure 35 shows, the Maghreb countries show particularly high levels of student migration, with students

Figure 36. Number of outbound internationally mobile students from Arab countries by country of destination, 2010



Source: UNESCO, 2012 (see table 15).

from Morocco (42,800), Algeria (22,456) and Tunisia (19,506) making up three of the top five countries of origin of outbound students. The other main countries of origin were Saudi Arabia (41,532) and the Syrian Arab Republic (12,651).⁶⁴ There are no comprehensive data on the sex breakdown of student migrants, but data from individual schemes suggest that men make up the majority.⁶⁵

The destination countries of student migrants reflect subregional differences: students from the Maghreb are overwhelmingly oriented towards France, while migrants from GCC countries make up the majority of students from Arab countries in the United States. Bilateral agreements exist between specific countries of origin and destination: for example, the comparatively high level of student migration from Jordan to Ukraine can in part be explained by the existence of student mobility agreements.⁶⁶

Most internationally mobile students appear to be drawn to professional fields, such as

science, technology and engineering, with a view to entering high-status professions thereafter. Economics and medicine are also popular. Going abroad opens up opportunities for skills development to students that do not exist in their home countries. The choice of destination is largely conditioned by historic, cultural and linguistic ties between countries, as well as student mobility schemes in the country of origin designed to upgrade workforce skills, or similar schemes in destination countries aimed at attracting gifted migrants. Student mobility programmes to upgrade the skills of the Saudi workforce have a long history, culminating in the creation of the King Abdullah Foundation scholarship, the largest programme of its type in the world.⁶⁷

2. Family migration

(a) Migration to the Arab region

According to scarce available data, migrants in GCC countries classified as “family members” or “accompanying persons” make

Table 16. Stocks of family members of primary migrants in selected GCC countries

Country of destination (year)	Country/region of origin	Male migrants	Female migrants	Total number of migrants
Bahrain (2001)	GCC	911	1,269	2,180
	Other Arabs	2,954	5,063	8,017
	Total	3,865	6,332	10,197
Kuwait (2012)	Algeria	182	327	509
	Egypt	52,375	84,765	137,140
	Iraq	3,545	6,939	10,484
	Jordan	12,220	21,532	33,752
	Lebanon	8,285	15,016	23,301
	Libya	34	74	108
	Morocco	302	1,292	1,594
	Other	2	3	5
	State of Palestine	279	277	556
	Palestinian from Egypt	1,145	2,117	3,262
	Palestinian from Iraq	0	1	1
	Palestinian from Lebanon	140	341	481
	Palestinian from the Syrian Arab Republic	69	125	194
	Saudi Arabia	0	1	1
	Syrian Arab Republic	30,726	45,119	75,845
	Tunisia	340	644	984
Yemen	1,879	3,288	5,167	
Total	111,523	181,861	293,384	

Source: Gulf Labour Markets and Migration data. Available from <http://gulfmigration.eu>.

up a small but not insignificant percentage of the migrant population. In Saudi Arabia, 237,033 “accompanying persons” were recorded in 2010, making up 2.8 per cent of the total migrant population. In Kuwait, the proportion of migrants present through family reunification is higher: in 2012 the total number recorded was 475,688, roughly 23 per cent of the total migrant population. The majority of them were from Arab countries (293,744 or 62 per cent).⁶⁸ In 2013, 100 per cent of “family

member” migrants to Saudi Arabia were women, of whom 42.9 per cent migrated as “homemakers”, underscoring the importance of family reunification as a reason for migrating.⁶⁹

(b) Migration from the Arab region

In the main destination countries for Arab migrants, family reunification accounts for a significant proportion of migrant stocks and flows. Moreover, since the closure of European

Table 17. First permits issued for family reasons to citizens of Arab countries by European countries, 2012

	Both sexes	Females	Percentage of females
All reporting countries	84,877	45,596	53.7
Belgium	8,067	4,420	54.8
Italy	23,277	13,982	60.1
Spain	33,768	17,428	51.6
Sweden	13,012	6,714	51.6

Source: Authors' calculations based on Eurostat statistics on first permits by reason, age, sex and citizenship. Available from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Residence_permits_statistics (accessed 30 January 2015).

Table 18. First permits issued for family reasons by European countries to citizens of selected Arab countries, 2012

	Total	Female	Percentage female
Algeria	3,968	2,012	50.7
Egypt	5,934	2,917	49.2
Iraq	5,022	2,688	53.5
Morocco	51,620	28,463	55.1
Somalia	6,746	3,502	51.9
Syrian Arab Republic	3,245	1,772	54.6
Tunisia	4,937	2,467	50

Source: Eurostat (see table 17).

countries to mass labour migration, it has become one of the main routes for migrants from Arab countries to enter Europe. The little data available in GCC countries on family reunification suggests that the population of family members of migrants from Arab countries is significant due to the relatively privileged labour market situation of many Arab workers. The data in table 16 indicates that more women than men tend to migrate as family members.

In 2013, 24,185 people from Arab countries obtained permanent residence in the United States as family members of permanent residents or US citizens.⁷⁰ In 2012, 22 European countries issued 84,877 first permits to citizens of Arab countries for family reasons. As table 17 shows, Italy and Spain issued the most such permits, 53.7 per cent (and as high as 60.1 per cent in the case of Italy) of which went to women.⁷¹

Table 18 shows that Morocco was by far the leading country of origin of new family member migrants in 2012, followed by Somalia, Egypt, Iraq and Tunisia. Women made up the majority of such migrants, except in the cases of Egypt and Tunisia.

The sex of family members who migrate varies by age group. Table 19 shows that, in the cases of Iraq and Morocco, while most migrant children under the age of 15 are male, adult family migrants are predominantly female. That is because most adults migrating for family reasons are joining primary migrant spouses, most of whom are male. Women do not, however, make up the overwhelming majority of adult family migrants, suggesting that many men also join female spouses already in destination countries.

The main motive and nature of the primary migration varies by country of origin and destination. For example, while most North African family migrants in Italy and Spain are likely to have followed a migrant worker, the relatively large number of Somalis, Iraqis and

Table 19. First permits issued for family reasons by European countries to Moroccan and Iraqi citizens, by age and sex, 2012

	Country of origin	Age 0-14	Age 15-24	Age 25-64	Age 65+
Both sexes	Morocco	26,891	7,986	15,351	1,392
Female	Morocco	12,824	5,820	8,905	914
Percentage female	Morocco	47.7	72.9	58.0	65.7
Both sexes	Iraq	2,434	923	1,633	32
Female	Iraq	1,154	632	885	17
Percentage female	Iraq	47.4	68.5	54.2	53.1

Source: Eurostat (see table 17).

Syrians in Sweden suggests that this family migration follows an initial episode of forced displacement. The similarities in sex and age structure between Moroccan and Iraqi family migrants indicate that this form of forced migration to European countries is also sex- and age-selective.

3. Female migrants

(a) Female migrants in the Arab region

It is estimated that females made up 32 per cent of migrants in the Arab region in 2013.⁷² That figure conceals the variety of types of migration to the Arab region and varying degrees of gender selectivity.⁷³ Table 20 shows the countries of origin with more than 50,000 female migrants in the Arab region, along with the proportion of women in the overall migrant populations from these countries.

Labour migration to the Arab countries is very gender-selective: most migrant workers are male, which reflects the sectors, such as construction, in which most of them work. Certain sectors, however, such as domestic service, are female-dominated. The size of that sector is significant: in 2013, it was estimated that more than 296,000 non-Kuwaitis were

employed in private households in Kuwait, and more than 900,000 non-Saudis in Saudi Arabia.⁷⁴ Given the lack of comprehensive data on the subject, the numbers may well be higher. Migrant stocks from certain countries of origin, such as Indonesia, from which domestic workers tend to migrate, contain a relatively high proportion of women.

Many women migrate to the Arab region because wages for domestic work are higher than in their own countries. Other connected reasons include the desire to get out of debt, buy land and build a home in their home country. Women migrants also cite the need to pay for their children's education, provide dowries for themselves or their daughters, or meet everyday consumption needs.⁷⁵

Women, and in some cases men, undertaking domestic work risk falling victim to human trafficking. The nature of the work and legal regulations under the *kafala* system (see the next chapter) can expose them to the risk of labour exploitation or other forms of abuse. Between November 2013 and April 2014, it was reported that more than 5,000 domestic workers fled from their Saudi Arabian sponsors. It is estimated that 80 to 120 domestic workers leave their sponsors every day, primarily in Riyadh,

Table 20. Female migrant populations in the Arab region by country of origin

Country	Population size	Percentage of female migrants in overall migrant population
Bangladesh	470,953	14.9
Egypt	937,592	32.3
Eritrea	95,883	44.4
Ethiopia	56,764	42.7
India	1,618,661	23.6
Indonesia	478,542	50.6
Iraq	686,040	47.8
Jordan	182,036	36.6
Kuwait	82,305	33.0
Pakistan	700,713	24.0
Philippines	443,453	24.6
Somalia	204,921	37.9
South Sudan	64,401	42.2
Sri Lanka	140,076	41.0
State of Palestine ^a	1,744,356	48.9
Sudan	184,254	34.3
Syrian Arab Republic ^b	131,706	35.4
Turkey	59,056	31.9
Yemen	262,472	32.2

Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

^a DESA data account for refugees registered with UNRWA.

^b Due to data limitations, the figures in this table do not fully reflect the number of Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR since 2011.


Mecca, Medina and the Eastern Province.⁷⁶

Women who fall victim to trafficking may be treated as irregular migrants and are likely to be deported.⁷⁷ Since the mid-2000s, many GCC countries have set up shelters for women and children victims of trafficking. However, they often amount to detention centres to which absconded domestic workers are confined until their deportation.⁷⁸

Refugee movements to neighbouring countries are much less gender-selective than labour

migration. Figure 37 shows fairly even gender distribution across all age groups in the Mashreq, which could be attributed to the extent of forced displacement there. Some 49 per cent of all migrants in the subregion were female in 2013, as opposed to 45 per cent in the Arab LDCs, 38 per cent in the Maghreb and 27 in GCC countries.

In 2013, the demographic composition of refugees and people in refugee-like situations showed that women in countries of asylum/

Figure 37. Percentage of female migrants by age group in Arab subregions, 2013

Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

residence made up 48 per cent of the total population of concern to UNHCR in Egypt, 52 per cent in Jordan, 51 per cent in Lebanon, 51 per cent in the Sudan and 43 per cent in Yemen.⁷⁹ The distribution of women migrants is much more uneven in subregions where migrants are subject to gender-selective labour market requirements and migration policies.

(b) Female migrants from the Arab region

Females made up 42.7 per cent of migrants from the Arab region in 2013, with only slight variations across subregions. The Maghreb had the highest proportion of female emigrants (44.9 per cent) and the GCC countries had the lowest (40 per cent). Bahrain had the lowest proportion of women migrating out of the country (32.3 per cent) followed by Yemen (33.4 per cent) and Egypt (33.7 per cent). The largest female expatriate population from Arab countries came from the State of Palestine (1,775,348), followed by Morocco (1,291,184) and Egypt (1,168,655).⁸⁰

A 2010 survey of young people in Arab countries found that female migrants tended

to be motivated more by quality of life, and the availability of education and healthcare, than employment or job satisfaction.⁸¹ More males (25 per cent) than females (16 per cent) expressed a desire to leave their home countries. The desired destinations for migration do not vary significantly.⁸²

Although not on the same scale as for men, migration for work is an important phenomenon in migration of women. In Kuwait, for which detailed data are available, 42,606 women from Arab countries were registered as workers in 2012, making up 9.6 per cent of the total Arab migrant worker population, and 18.8 per cent of Arab female migrants.⁸³ Of them, 28.5 per cent were registered as “professionals”; the corresponding figure for men was 11.9 per cent.⁸⁴ Of the almost three million female migrants in the OECD countries in 2006, 31.5 per cent were employed. However, more than 54 per cent of highly skilled female migrants from Arab countries were employed.⁸⁵ Females predominate in migration for family reunification purposes from Arab countries (see above).

Table 21. Youth migrants in the Arab region, 2013

Country	Total youth migrants (15-24)	Percentage of total migrant population	Total number of male youth migrants	Males as a percentage of youth migrants	Total number of female youth migrants	Females as a percentage of youth migrants
Algeria	36,240	13.4	20,826	57.5	15,414	42.5
Bahrain	89,154	12.2	58,710	65.9	30,444	34.1
Comoros	2,073	16.5	949	45.8	1,124	54.2
Djibouti	27,179	22	13,673	50.3	13,506	49.7
Egypt	67,989	22.9	38,955	57.3	29,034	42.7
Iraq	19,831	20.7	13,709	69.1	6,122	30.9
Jordan	413,893	14.1	211,705	51.1	202,188	48.9
Kuwait	303,280	15	198,927	65.6	104,353	34.4
Lebanon	124,681	14.7	63,420	50.9	61,261	49.1
Libya	125,445	16.6	67,496	53.8	57,949	46.2
Mauritania	17,924	19.9	9,767	54.5	8,157	45.5
Morocco	8,698	17.1	4,838	55.6	3,860	44.4
Oman	141,173	12.7	105,676	74.9	35,497	25.1
Qatar	143,519	9	97,301	67.8	46,218	32.2
Saudi Arabia	1,219,877	13.5	741,230	60.8	478,647	39.2
Somalia	3,577	14.5	1,752	49	1,825	51
State of Palestine	67,253	26.2	32,842	48.8	34,411	51.2
Sudan	87,360	19.6	44,713	51.2	42,647	48.8
Syrian Arab Republic	184,064	13.2	100,897	54.8	83,167	45.2
Tunisia	4,780	13.1	2,536	53.1	2,244	46.9
United Arab Emirates	1,252,768	16	910,887	72.7	341,881	27.3
Yemen	74,426	23.7	44,062	59.2	30,364	40.8
GCC countries	3,149,771	14.1	2,112,731	67.1	1,037,040	32.9
Mashreq	877,711	15.1	461,528	52.6	416,183	47.4
Maghreb	175,869	15.7	96,089	54.7	79,780	45.4
Arab LDCs	212,539	21	114,916	54.1	97,623	45.9

Source: DESA, 2013 (see figure 1).

It appears that females from Arab countries make up a large proportion of refugees, especially when refugee movements are directed to neighbouring countries. When people seek international protection further abroad, the number of women in the refugee population decreases. For example, of the 110,270 applicants for asylum in the EU-28 countries whose sex was known in 2013, only 32,670 (29.6 per cent) were women.⁸⁶ This implies that, while forced migration to neighbouring countries is not sex-selective, forced migration further afield is.

4. Youth migration

(a) Youth migration to the Arab region

The profile of youth migrants (young people aged 15 to 24) in the region is mixed. Some migrate with their parents and others to follow educational opportunities, but most are likely to be migrant workers. Youth migration is often a life-changing opportunity for young people: it may expand their skills and give them job prospects unavailable in their countries of origin. Although young migrants may legally be adults, they can still be vulnerable to abuse and exploitation.

According to United Nations figures from 2013, youth migration affects different subregions of the Arab region to varying degrees. At 14.1 per cent (3,149,771), the GCC countries had the lowest share of youth out of the total migrant population. Of them, 67 per cent (2,112,731) were male. Those figures reflect the fact that the majority of immigrants are males of working age (15-64). Of the GCC countries, the United Arab Emirates had the highest proportion of youth migrants in 2013 (16 per cent) and Qatar the lowest (9 per cent). The proportions in the Maghreb (15.1 per cent) and Mashreq (15.7 per cent) were similar, but the absolute number of youth migrants in the Mashreq, at 877,711, was much higher than in the Maghreb (175,689). In both cases, females

were more highly represented than in GCC countries, with young women even making up a majority (51.2 per cent) of youth migrants in the State of Palestine, which has the highest share of youth migrants in the region (26.2 per cent). The Arab LDCs have the highest proportion of young migrants (21 per cent), of whom 54.1 per cent are male. Young migrants are particularly prevalent in Yemen (23.7 per cent of the migrant population), Djibouti (22 per cent), Mauritania (19.9 per cent) and the Sudan (19.6 per cent) (table 21).

(b) Youth migration from the Arab region

Poor employment prospects for young people in Arab countries encourage many to consider emigration for work or further study. In a 2010 survey, more than 30 per cent of respondents aged 15-29 expressed a desire to migrate permanently, with labour market considerations being uppermost in their minds.⁸⁷ Young people, especially those with secondary education or higher, are most likely to migrate, and age and education influence their choice of destination country.⁸⁸

Up-to-date, comprehensive statistics on expatriate populations broken down by age and sex are unavailable. However, OECD data from the 2000 round of censuses in 100 countries show that, in 2000, there were more than 630,000 young Arab migrants in OECD member countries, 54.5 per cent of whom were male. The largest single country of origin was Morocco, with more than 200,000 young migrants, followed by the Sudan (table 22). In total, 398,739 were found in Europe alone, with 81,839 in Africa and 53,227 in Asia. More up-to-date data are available from specific destination countries. In Kuwait, 13.4 per cent (148,717 people) of the Arab immigrant population were young people in December 2013. By contrast, Asian youth made up only 5.4 per cent of the Asian migrant population. Of the Arab youth total, 84,546 (56.8 per cent) were male and 64,171 were female. The gender balance in the 15-19 age group was roughly equal, but there

Table 22. Tertiary education of youth migrants from selected Arab countries by sex, circa 2000

Morocco					
All youth (both sexes)	Male	Female	Tertiary-educated (both sexes)	tertiary-educated male	tertiary-educated female
206,100	110,692	95,408	11,108	5,608	5,500
Sudan					
All youth (both sexes)	Male	Female	Tertiary-educated (both sexes)	Tertiary-educated male	Tertiary-educated female
76,119	40,496	35,623	1,284	675	609
Iraq					
All youth (both sexes)	Male	Female	Tertiary-educated (both sexes)	Tertiary-educated male	Tertiary-educated female
57,940	36,241	21,699	3,013	1,523	1,490
Algeria					
All youth (both sexes)	Male	Female	Tertiary-educated (both sexes)	Tertiary-educated male	Tertiary-educated female
56,676	29,410	27,266	4,899	2,087	2,812
Somalia					
All youth (both sexes)	Male	Female	Tertiary-educated (both sexes)	Tertiary-educated male	Tertiary-educated female
47,041	24,296	22,745	1,079	524	555

Source: Authors' calculations based on the OECD Database on Immigrants in OECD and non-OECD Countries. Available from <http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/dioc.htm> (accessed 30 January 2015).

were significantly more males in the 20-24 age group,⁸⁹ suggesting that many of the latter were migrant workers, while the former were young people migrating with their parents.

5. Skilled migrants

(a) Skilled migration to the Arab region

Labour migration to Arab countries tends to be low-skilled, reflecting the job opportunities available to migrants in destination countries.

For instance, although the proportion of highly skilled migrants (defined as those with a tertiary education and above) differs between countries in the GCC subregion, it is relatively low in all of them. Saudi Arabia has the highest proportion of highly skilled migrants out of the three countries with available data – 18.9 per cent of the immigrant population. Of those, 86,618 migrants have postgraduate and 55,336 have doctoral degrees. The proportion of male migrants with tertiary education is slightly higher than

Table 23. Skilled migrants in GCC countries

Country	Year	Above secondary	BSC or BA	High diploma	Masters	Doctorate	Total	Percentage of migrant population
Bahrain	2010	55,704	34,487	9,967	4,219	1,172	105,549	15.8
Male		39,658	24,739	7,206	3,217	915	75,735	15.7
Female		16,046	9,748	2,761	1,002	257	29,814	16.1
Kuwait	2013		119,891		5,453		125,344	6.2
Male			76,387		4,099		80,486	5.7
Female			43,504		1,354		44,858	7.4
Qatar	2012	63,161	247,036				310,197	
Male		54,224	180,992				235,216	
Female		8,937	66,044				74,981	
Saudi Arabia	2013	300,615	1,267,103		86,618	55,336	1,709,672	18.9
Male		219,565	918,178		70,186	47,086	1,255,015	19.5
Female		81,050	348,925		16,432	8,250	454,657	17.3

Sources: Bahrain, Central Informatics Organization (CIO); Kuwait, Public Authority for Civil Information (PACI); Qatar, Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics; Saudi Arabia, Central Department for Statistics and Information (CDSI).

female migrants (19.5 per cent compared to 17.3 per cent). In Bahrain, 15.8 per cent of the immigrant population is highly skilled. However, 48.5 per cent of female migrants have tertiary degrees, far more than in any other GCC country and outstripping the number of highly skilled male migrants (15.7 per cent). In Kuwait, only 6.2 per cent of the migrant population is highly skilled (7.4 per cent of female migrants and 5.7 per cent of male migrants) (table 23).

The migrant profile in GCC countries has changed over the past century. Following initial immigration of a skilled entrepreneurial class of South Asians, the 1970s oil boom triggered labour shortages and attracted highly skilled and low-skilled migrants. By the end of the twentieth century, the majority of migrants were low-skilled labourers.⁹⁰ Skilled immigration continues nonetheless: in 2012, more than 35 per cent of Indian migrants were white-collar workers and an Indian managerial class was emerging in the private sector.⁹¹

Highly skilled Indians are also employed by the public sector in GCC countries. Countries like Qatar are actively seeking more highly skilled migrants.

As refugee flows to neighbouring countries are not selective, the skill profile of refugees is varied. In general, however, displaced populations to the Arab countries are likely to have limited skills. According to one report, only 13 per cent of Syrian refugees working in Lebanon were in skilled occupations.⁹²

(b) Skilled migration from the Arab region

Skilled migration from the Arab countries is a growing phenomenon. OECD countries are increasingly seeking to attract highly skilled migrants in order to improve competitiveness and innovation. As a result, between 1990 and 2000 the number of skilled people migrating to Europe rose by 2.5 per cent from the Sudan, 1.7 per cent from Libya and Morocco, 1.6 per cent from the Syrian Arab Republic

and Tunisia, and 1.4 per cent from Egypt and Lebanon.⁹³ By 2006, there were 1,399,055 migrants from Arab countries with tertiary degrees in OECD countries, 40.5 per cent of whom were women. More than 900,000 of them were employed, including more than 300,000 women (making up 54.3 per cent of the highly skilled female expatriate population).⁹⁴ Prior to the Arab uprisings in 2010-2011, migration of tertiary degree-holders from the region made up a third of all highly skilled migration from developing countries.⁹⁵ Almost half of Egyptian migrants to OECD countries in 2005-2006 had a tertiary degree.⁹⁶

In 2008, it was estimated that highly skilled migration accounted for one quarter of annual Palestinian emigration. Migration from Palestine has been motivated by the pursuit of education, employment and better living standards, with increasing numbers migrating to GCC countries, North America, Europe and Australia for that purpose.⁹⁷ More than half of Jordanian emigrants are engaged in skilled occupations.⁹⁸ In 2009, the Bureau of the Sudanese Working Abroad estimated that 19.3 per cent of Sudanese migrants leaving the country had tertiary education. Skilled migrants tended to seek jobs abroad in the absence of employment opportunities in the Sudan. However, only a small proportion of skilled Sudanese emigrants were able to find skilled positions matching their education.⁹⁹

There is a link between migration patterns of highly skilled workers, the transfer of knowledge and skills back to a country of origin, and development in the country of origin. Graduates are flooding the labour markets in Arab countries. In Egypt, for instance, unemployment is higher among people holding a tertiary degree than among those without higher education. 'Brain drain' effects on Arab countries are therefore limited; Arab countries do not lack skilled workers, but rather the capacity to use their skills.¹⁰⁰

F. Summary of findings

Common themes emerge with regard to migration and the Arab region, for all the differences there may be between countries and subregions.

1. Despite improvements in the collection and quality of migration statistics, such as the availability of data disaggregated by demographic factors including gender and age, weaknesses of statistical systems in the region, a lack of data-gathering capacity, and the absence of complete data sets from some countries hampers the accurate and timely analysis of migration trends.
2. Since 1990, the region has witnessed a hefty increase in the number of international migrants. Their proportion of the region's total population has grown. Labour migration, followed by forced displacement, are the most distinctive patterns of population movements.
3. Migrants in the region are predominantly Asian, in particular from Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and the Philippines. Migrants from the Arab region represented 40 per cent of the migrant stock in 2013.
4. Migrant flows between Arab countries have decreased since 1995, reflecting shrinking intraregional labour migration. That progressive decline has recently been reversed by an upsurge in forced displacement to neighbouring countries, especially as a result of the Syrian crisis.
5. The main destination countries for migrants from the Arab region vary. Saudi Arabia and the United States are the most popular among GCC migrants. Migrants from the Maghreb mainly head for Europe, those from the Mashreq to other Arab countries, and those from LDCs mostly remain in less developed regions.
6. The Syrian crisis has had a major impact on migrant and refugee flows. By mid-2014, Syrians constituted the largest group of refugees in the world.


7. Of remittances sent from Arab countries, \$24.1 billion (29 per cent) went to other Arab countries, with Egypt being the biggest recipient. More than \$54 billion was sent from Arab countries to six Asian countries alone. Arab countries received a total of \$50.5 billion in remittances; with Egypt receiving \$18 billion, Lebanon \$7.7 billion, Morocco \$6.8 and Jordan \$3.8 billion. Those inflows represent a larger proportion of GDP in smaller economies such as in Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen and the Comoros.
8. Female migrants as a proportion of the stock of international migrants to the region represented only 32 per cent. Major subregional differences exist. The lowest proportion of female immigrants is in the GCC countries, where migrants are subject to gender-specific labour market demands. The majority (57.3 per cent) of migrants from the region are also men. Women migrants represented 42.7 per cent of migrants from the region, well below the global average of 48 per cent.

3. Developments in Migration Governance in the Arab Region since 2012



Some groups of migrant workers, most notably migrant domestic workers, are excluded from the protections granted under the provisions of labour law. Most labour regulations in the region do not meet international standards, further feeding into the exploitation of domestic workers.

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“Migration is not only inevitable, but also necessary and desirable.”

William Lacy Swing, Director General, International Organization for Migration

3. Developments in Migration Governance in the Arab Region since 2012

A. Introduction

The governance of international migration has been defined as all “policies and programmes of individual countries, inter-State discussions and agreements [at bilateral, regional and international level], multilateral forums and consultative processes, the activities of international organizations, as well as relevant laws and norms” that affect migration directly or indirectly.¹ How migration is managed has particular implications for the rights of migrants and can influence the impact migration has on their human development and the development of countries of origin and destination.

The General Assembly has recognized that good migration governance should result in “safe, orderly and regular migration”; respect the human rights of all migrants and benefit societies of origin, transit and destination.² In the Arab countries, it must address all forms of regular and irregular migration, such as labour migration, family reunification, human trafficking and migrant smuggling, and refugee movements. It must also take into account human rights and refugee protection, development and growth goals, public health requirements, and questions of nationality, to name a few.

Governance is the sum of laws and regulations enacted and policies pursued by States; bilateral, regional and international consultations and cooperation; bilateral agreements and regional and international conventions. In terms of migration, it has an impact on who is entitled to move or reside abroad and how people may do so; the status, rights and responsibilities of

migrants in countries of first asylum, transit and destination; the work or studies they may undertake; the relationship of migrants with their countries of origin, and the conditions under which they may return home. Aside from policies that affect migrants directly, others in areas such as human rights, labour, health or housing may have an indirect impact and influence the success or failure of migration policy.³ There is widespread recognition of the need to involve civil society in finding solutions for migration challenges.⁴

This chapter considers the main developments in migration governance in the Arab region between January 2012 and April 2015, including in the areas of nationality and statelessness, labour migration, irregular migration, human trafficking and migrant smuggling, labour force nationalization, forced migration and refugee movements, expatriate engagement, development, health, and international cooperation.

B. National policies on international migration

1. Nationality and statelessness

Most Arab countries attribute nationality through *jus sanguinis*, nationality by descent, and many countries specify that nationality is passed down primarily by fathers. With the exception of Qatar, all countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region allow, in principle, women to confer nationality on children under certain limited circumstances, such as when the father is unknown or stateless. However, in practice

those exceptions are applied infrequently.⁵ Acquiring the nationality of Arab countries through naturalization is difficult, and the region does not feature *jus soli* nationality provisions granting nationality to children by virtue of birth in the territory of the State.⁶ Children of migrants born in Arab countries are thus generally considered foreigners, while people born outside the country of origin to parents with the nationality of an Arab country generally acquire their parents' nationality automatically. Depending on the status of nationality laws in their country of birth and Arab country of nationality, they may also be entitled to dual nationality.

In GCC countries, nationality often brings with it access to substantial welfare benefits and other advantages such as preferential access to public sector employment, which imposes significant costs on the State.⁷ Access to nationality is therefore strictly guarded, especially in the context of large migrant populations,⁸ and dual nationality is generally restricted or prohibited.

Recently there have been moves to liberalize access to dual nationality in GCC States. In 2014, Bahrain passed Act No. 21 amending the 1963 Nationality Act, thereby allowing Bahraini citizens to acquire another nationality with prior approval from the Ministry of the Interior and Cabinet. Dual nationals are now given six months to renounce their other nationality or apply for approval to keep it. Holders of another GCC nationality can keep it with the permission of the Ministry. Citizens who do not regularize their situation within the given period or who acquire another Gulf nationality without approval of the Ministry can be fined 3,000 to 10,000 Bahraini Dinars.⁹

Under article 5 of the Nationality Act of Oman (Act No. 38 of 2014), an Omani national must obtain permission by royal decree in order to hold another nationality. Although the act introduced several openings for acquiring nationality (such as allowing non-Omani

women widowed or divorced from Omani men, and minors born to an Omani mother and non-Omani father, to apply for nationality), it tightens the overall rules. An applicant must have been residing in the country for more than 20 years or 15 years if married to an Omani woman and having a child from her (as compared to 15 years or 7 years respectively under the previous act of 1983).¹⁰

In Yemen, the Civil Status Authority issued a decree in March 2014 with regards to *muwaladeen* (persons with one Yemeni and one non-Yemeni parent), which prohibits the granting of identity cards to *muwaladeen* born outside Yemen and not having proof of Yemeni nationality. *Muwaladeen* born in European, Asian or GCC countries are exempted if their parents were born in Yemen.¹¹

State secession and border changes have an impact on nationality. After the secession of South Sudan in 2011, more than half a million people living in the Sudan were threatened with the loss of their nationality if they were eligible to vote in South Sudan's self-determination referendum. Starting on 9 July 2011, the day of independence of South Sudan, the Government of the Sudan granted those concerned a nine-month regularization period in which to acquire necessary documentation and identification to prove that they were ineligible to vote in South Sudan's referendum and thus protect their Sudanese nationality. When that period expired, many people were still residing in the Sudan with no legal status, leading to many arrests, detentions and deportations. Negotiations between the two countries broke off and each started to enact laws and regulations separately to determine the status of people. In August 2011, the Sudan amended the Nationality Act of 1994 to the effect that individuals acquiring South Sudanese citizenship, either "de jure or de facto," shall automatically lose their Sudanese nationality and prohibiting dual nationality with South Sudan. It is further stipulated that a foreign national must reside in the Sudan for

more than 10 years (an increase of five years) to be granted nationality. The amendments are largely considered to be “in violation of international norms of non-discrimination on grounds of national origin.”¹² Starting in February 2015 and as a result of an agreement with UNHCR, the Sudan started to register South Sudanese living in its territory and to give those over the age of 5 identity cards that would allow them to work and access basic services during their stay. More than 54,000 South Sudanese were registered between 1 February and 3 March, and around 37,000 ID cards were issued.¹³

Since 2004, various States in the region have amended legislation to grant women greater nationality rights, particularly by recognizing their right to confer nationality on children on an equal basis with men, in line with article 9, paragraph 2, of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. The right of women to confer citizenship automatically on their children at birth has been recognized in Egypt (2004), Algeria (2005), Iraq (partial reform, 2006), Morocco (2007), Tunisia (2010) and Yemen (2010). Those States have also withdrawn reservations to article 9. Other States are undertaking incremental reforms. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia introduced measures, in 2011 and 2014 respectively, to allow children to apply for nationality on the basis of maternal descent through a discretionary procedure.

In December 2012, the Ministry of Labour and the General Directorate of Passports in Saudi Arabia issued Decision No. 406 on children of Saudi women married to non-Saudi men. The decision granted Saudi women the right to sponsor the residence of their children and spouses. Under the provision, they are thus entitled to be treated as Saudi nationals in terms of education and medical care, and for the purposes of the *nitaqat* employment preference programme (see the section on labour force nationalization) which sets the

goal of increased Saudi employment in the country’s private sector. The new decision also specifies that the State will bear the residence fees of such sponsored children, allowing them to work in the private sector with no need to transfer their sponsorship from their Saudi mothers, which was previously required for non-national children upon reaching the age of majority. In September 2013, Saudi Arabia allowed non-Saudi mothers of Saudi children permanent residence without a sponsor, and the right to access education and health services.¹⁴ The reforms thus include practical steps to enable families with mixed nationalities to be united.

In December 2014, the Civil Status and Passports Department in Jordan announced that it would issue identification documents for children of Jordanian women married to non-Jordanian men.¹⁵

The GCC countries face issues related to stateless communities. Article 1A (2) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees ensures international protection of specific persons “not having a nationality”. In most countries, while the prevention and reduction of statelessness is dealt with under nationality laws, the protection of stateless persons is mostly addressed under migration laws.¹⁶ Stateless communities in some Arab countries are considered to be “illegal residents”,¹⁷ and are thus sometimes treated as foreign nationals.¹⁸

Kuwait has a large stateless community, estimated at over 105,000 persons, known as the *Bedoon* (from the Arabic phrase “*bedoon jinsiyya*”, meaning “without nationality”).¹⁹ People from this community are categorized as “illegal residents”.²⁰ They face restrictions on their freedom of movement and their right to vote, and are deprived of documentation, including travel documents and marriage, birth and death certificates. They may not take up formal employment, and children cannot attend free public schools unless they hold

security cards.²¹ The parliament of Kuwait passed a bill in 2013 to naturalize up to 4,000 *Bedoon*.²²

Similarly to a previous practice in 1965, Saudi Arabia started issuing special cards for stateless persons in August 2014 in order to help them through administrative procedures. The cards are issued by the General Directorate of Passports of the Ministry of Labour and are similar to residency permits issued to migrants; however, they allow bearers to study and work on an equal basis with Saudi nationals.²³ Saudi Arabia is host to a sizable stateless population of migrants from South East Asia known as the “Rohingya”

Nationality plays an important role for countries of origin in maintaining links with expatriate populations. By allowing dual nationality, countries of origin can enable migrants who have settled abroad to engage with their countries of origin without risking the loss of their acquired benefits in the host country. In Tunisia, the Constitution of 2014 allows for dual nationals to stand for president, on condition that a winning candidate renounces his/her non-Tunisian nationality.²⁴ This disposition recognizes the legitimacy of and facilitates political engagement by long-term Tunisian expatriates.

Arab destination countries have made at least some progress on family unity for mixed families and regularizing the situation of stateless persons. However, more needs to be done to further reduce statelessness, widen access to nationality and allow women to pass on nationality to their children. Although all GCC countries have acceded to or ratified the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, they have all expressed reservations to article 9, paragraph 2.

2. Labour migration

Migrant workers dominate migration flows in the Arab region due to the nature of

the economy in its countries of origin and destination. Booms driven by natural resources in the oil-rich Gulf countries and countries like Libya since the 1960s have spurred demand for labour.²⁵ Migrant workers thus outnumber nationals in many GCC countries, such as Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.²⁶ Labour migration from Arab countries, mostly from the Maghreb to Europe, but also, to a lesser extent, from the Mashreq and Yemen to other Arab countries, is also significant.

GCC countries, Jordan and Lebanon manage labour migration through the *kafala* (sponsorship) system, whereby migrants can obtain work permits and visas only if sponsored by a local citizen, a migrant authorized to sponsor other migrants, or a company (the *kafeel*). The system makes migrant workers dependent on their *kafeel* (sponsor) to determine their working and living conditions, and so leaves them open to exploitation and abuse.²⁷ Labour regulations often remain under- or unenforced. Some migrant workers, especially those in domestic service, are not protected by labour law (see box 1). Most labour regulations in the region fail to meet international standards.

Most recent labour migration policy reform in the Arab region has occurred in Gulf States, although some countries in other subregions have also been active, especially with regard to domestic labour.

In July 2012, Bahrain enacted the Labour Law for the Private Sector (Law No. 36), repealing earlier legislation. Article 39 prohibits discriminatory practices, especially in the payment of wages and the termination of contracts, on the basis of sex, ethnicity, language, religion and beliefs. This is important, as wages in Bahrain are often determined by factors such as nationality rather than skills.²⁸ The new law provides for increased paid annual leave and maternity leave, unpaid leave, more days of sick leave, indemnities for the summary dismissal of

employees, new procedures for settling labour disputes, including the creation of a Labour Case Administration Office, tougher penalties for employers who do not apply the new law, and fines on employers for delays in salary payments.²⁹ The law also takes domestic workers into account. In 2013, Bahrain introduced new regulations regarding the operation of recruitment offices and the capacity of migrant business-owners to work in other professional services, and extending the period for renewing work visas. The new rules include a definition of domestic work and set forth the conditions for receiving work permits.³⁰

In response to mounting criticism over the treatment of migrant workers in its preparations for the 2022 World Cup football tournament, Qatar introduced measures in 2014 to improve the working conditions and treatment of migrant workers, whereby companies were ordered to set up bank accounts for workers and pay in their wages electronically, midday outdoor work in summer was banned, and an electronic complaints system for migrant workers was set up. The system has been made available in several languages, including Arabic, English, Hindi, Urdu, Tamil, Bengali and Nepali. Officials promised to enforce timely payment of wages, improve accommodation and increase the number of safety inspectors at construction sites.³¹

In March 2013, the Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy (www.sc.qa), a parastatal organization with a mandate to ensure that World Cup preparations (construction of stadiums and other infrastructure) are in line with Qatar's development projects, published a workers' welfare charter, which in turn led to publication of the Workers' Welfare Standards in February 2014, setting forth binding health and safety rules for contractors on construction sites and in worker accommodation. The Qatar Foundation, another quasi-governmental non-profit organization, took a similar approach

with its Mandatory Standards of Migrant Workers' Welfare, published in April 2013. These initiatives illustrate the role played by private entities in the development of labour standards in Qatar. However, only workers under the mandate of the Committee and Foundation benefit. The standards do not apply to those working on wider infrastructure projects that underpin the World Cup, projects for Qatar Vision 2030, or in other sectors and/or projects.³²

In May 2014, Qatar announced plans to relax the sponsorship and exit permit system by introducing employer-employee contracts under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior. Migrant workers would no longer require approval from employers to leave the country and would be able to change jobs upon expiry of their contracts. In the case of indefinite contracts, they would be able to change jobs five years from the beginning of the initial work contract without approval from the previous employer. Fines of up to \$15,000 would be imposed on employers who confiscate migrant workers' passports. There is, however, no time frame for implementing these measures.

In 2013, Saudi Arabia rolled out its Wage Protection System (WPS), which requires employers to register details of their employees' wages with the Ministry of Labour and to deposit wages directly into their bank accounts. The initiative was launched in order to improve the management of claims of non-payment of wages and to allow monitoring of differences in wages between local and migrant workers.³³ The following year, it announced a ban on outdoor work between noon and 3 p.m. from June to mid-September. Companies failing to comply are subject to fines. However, the ban does not apply to certain categories of work and some workers fear pay cuts in return for lost working hours.³⁴

Under new regulations on the recruitment of migrant workers in the public and private

Box 1: Labour migration governance in the Arab region – the case of domestic workers

The unregulated nature of domestic work renders those employed in the sector vulnerable to abuse and exploitation, given that they often work with no defined terms of employment and are mostly excluded from the scope of labour laws.

In many Arab countries, the *kafala* (sponsorship) system regulates the living and working conditions of migrant labour, including foreign domestic workers. The system, under which the employer assumes full economic and legal responsibility for the migrant worker, leaves domestic workers vulnerable to exploitation, abuse and forced labour. This is exacerbated by the difficulties in regulating work undertaken in homes, considered part of the private sphere, and the gender and racial discrimination faced by the migrant women who make up the vast majority of this workforce. Many migrant domestic workers are denied basic rights, such as remuneration, leave, rest days and freedom of association. Their passport and identity documents may be held by their employer.

Since the adoption by the International Labour Organization (ILO) of its landmark Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189) and the ILO Domestic Workers Recommendation, 2011 (No. 201), some Arab States have taken action to protect domestic workers, addressing issues such as the timely payment of wages, social security, minimum wages, labour dispute settlement, and health insurance.

In Bahrain, the 2012 Labour Law for the Private Sector sets a precedent for the Gulf subregion by addressing issues affecting domestic workers, providing for annual leave and codifying access to dispute settlement mechanisms. The reform is considered the second of its kind in recent Arab history after Jordan passed labour legislation in 2008 that also covered domestic workers. However, human rights groups say that the legislation in Bahrain fails to tackle crucial issues, such as rest days, defined working hours, a minimum wage, and the ability to change jobs.^a

In 2012, Jordan introduced regulations to limit the working day of domestic workers to a maximum of eight hours, and stipulating that workers do not need their employers' permission to leave the home outside working hours. However, those procedures have not been properly enforced and domestic workers are still not free to change employers even when their contracts end.^b Since July 2014, proof of health and life insurance for domestic workers is required in Jordan in order to obtain work permits. Since August of that year, employers have been required to open bank accounts for such workers. Regulation No. 12 of 2015 on private recruitment offices sets forth licensing procedures, the conditions in which they may carry out their activities, and procedures and penalties that apply for violations of the Regulation.

In Saudi Arabia, Decision No. 310 of July 2013 on the Household Regulation on Service Workers and Similar Categories stipulates that employers must pay domestic workers their monthly salary without delay, and give them one day off a week, at least nine hours of rest per day and proper accommodation. It also states that domestic workers must respect Islam and respect Saudi norms and culture. In March 2014, the Ministry of Labour launched a programme, *Musaned*, to address domestic work issues. The website provides domestic workers and employers with information on their rights and obligations and access to complaint and dispute resolution mechanisms. In 2013, the employment of domestic workers from Ethiopia was banned pending the outcome of investigations into alleged crimes against children by Ethiopian nationals.^c As of January 2015, the ban had not yet been lifted.^d

In Kuwait, a shelter was opened in 2014 for runaway female domestic workers. According to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, a shelter for male migrant workers is also planned. However, human rights

groups have labelled the shelters “detention centres”, since domestic workers may only leave them upon their deportation.^e

In the United Arab Emirates, draft legislation establishes a standard work contract for domestic labour and sets forth the right of domestic workers to one day off a week, and paid annual leave and sick leave.^f It defines the nature of their work, required qualifications and remuneration, and details the obligations of employers.^g

Under a bill before parliament in Morocco, domestic workers would be registered with the Ministry of Labour. The bill contains provisions to ensure the safety of domestic workers, guarantee them one day off a week and annual leave, and ban uncertified recruitment agencies. Nevertheless, it falls short of compliance with ILO Convention No. 189.^h

^a International Domestic Workers' Network, International Trade Union Confederation and Human Rights Watch, 2013.

^b 2013، هيومن رايتس واتش.

^c AFP, 2013a.

^d Mohammed, 2015.

^e Lageman, 2014.

^f International Domestic Workers' Network, International Trade Union Confederation and Human Rights Watch, 2013.

^g Salama, 2014.

^h International Domestic Workers' Network, International Trade Union Confederation and Human Rights Watch, 2013; Menara, 2015; Benezha, 2013.

sectors issued in December 2013 by the Ministry of Labour, Saudi companies must hire workers through legal recruitment offices for contracts lasting at least one week. They also make employers responsible for providing proper accommodation. In addition, only private individuals may sponsor migrant domestic workers.³⁵ The Ministry has also regulated the licensing and operations of recruitment agencies, partly in an effort to improve competition between agencies and the quality of their services. Recruitment agencies are obliged to inform migrant workers about the nature of their job, their rights and responsibilities, and matters such as public behaviour, customs and living conditions.³⁶ In January 2015, the Ministry of Labour set up call centres in six main construction sites to deal with labour disputes.³⁷

3. Irregular migration

People who migrate in an irregular fashion do so for many reasons and in different ways. The search for work or educational opportunities, family reunification, the fear of persecution can all push people to take such a decision if they

are unable to migrate legally, have no access to asylum or protection mechanisms or do not wish to apply for asylum in the country in which they find themselves. Some go it alone, while others use the services of smugglers or fall into the hands of traffickers. Migrants can also find themselves in an irregular situation if they become stranded in a transit country en route to another destination. Some people may enter a country regularly, for instance on a tourist visa, but then overstay the visa or take up employment without the necessary permission. Whatever the reason, refugees and migrants in an irregular situation are vulnerable to violations of their basic rights: they are often denied access to essential services and social protection and are afraid to seek support.

(a) Regularization

Some countries in the Arab region have recently launched campaigns to legalize the situation of irregular migrants.

In Morocco, a policy was launched in 2013 to better protect immigrants. Throughout

2014, a campaign was run to regularize the situation of migrants. A total of 27,330 applications were received from people of 115 nationalities; 17,918 persons were granted one-year residence permits. An office for refugees and stateless persons (Bureau des Réfugiés et des Apatrides) began to examine cases in March 2015. Four subcommittees (on the 2014 regularization campaign, regularizing refugees, updating the legal and institutional framework regarding immigration, asylum and combating trafficking, and on regional and international cooperation on migration) were set up to implement recommendations by the country's National Human Rights Council (NHRC). In September 2014, a four-pronged, three-year strategy was launched with a view to integrating regularized migrants, reviewing and adapting the legal, procedural and institutional framework in connection with migration and basing migration management on human rights principles.³⁸ Draft legislation on asylum, immigration and human trafficking awaits enactment at the time of writing. The Government has established procedures for reviewing the situation of irregular migrants on a case-by-case basis. Although much has been done to adopt a rights-based approach to immigration matters, some of the criteria for regularization, including the requirement to have work contracts, are very difficult to meet, given that most irregular migrants work in the informal sector.

In recognition of its large population of irregular migrants, and in order to pave the way for the implementation of the *nitaqat* programme (see the section on labour force nationalization), Saudi Arabia launched a seven-month grace period in April 2013 to enable irregular migrants to correct their status. The amnesty, however, applied only to migrant workers who had absconded from their place of work (*huroob*) and to those whose work and residency permits had expired, thereby allowing them to return to their employment or transfer to another job

without needing their previous employer's permission. Migrants who failed to regularize their situation before the deadline faced up to two years of imprisonment, along with deportation and fines of up to 100,000 Saudi riyals. Irregular migrants who left the country during the grace period were exempt from residence fees, work permit fees and other fines related to previous violations. The procedures did not prevent migrants from returning to Saudi Arabia later if they obtained a new visa.³⁹

(b) Forced return

When the grace period in Saudi Arabia ended in early November 2013, inspection teams from the ministries of Labour and the Interior began detaining and deporting irregular migrants, mainly from Ethiopia and Yemen, but also from Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka and the Sudan. They also began to fine persons employing such workers without being their sponsors. Those measures were still in place at the time of writing. Hundreds of thousands of migrants have been deported, in some cases to situations of conflict, violence and human rights abuse without a determination of whether they were in need of international protection. Figure 38 shows Ministry of Labour data on the numbers of persons deported from November 2012 to February 2014.⁴⁰ The mass deportations were accompanied by abuses of the rights of migrants and created new burdens for countries of origin. According to IOM, more than 600,000 Yemenis were forcibly returned from Saudi Arabia between June 2013 and November 2014. Of the migrants interviewed during the first three quarters of 2014, 70 per cent reported abuses, including physical abuse and deprivation of food and water.⁴¹ In early March 2015, a new crackdown began against migrants violating labour or residency laws and nationals employing or sheltering them. Irregular migrants

faced fines of up to 100,000 Saudi riyals, imprisonment and deportation.⁴²

The Ministry of Manpower in Oman also conducted a deportation campaign in 2013. During the first nine months of 2013, the authorities arrested 10,226 irregular migrants, according to the Director-General for Labour Welfare at the Ministry of Manpower. The Ministry urged employers to stop hiring irregular migrants in order to avoid fines of 1,000-2,000 Omani riyals.⁴³


A campaign in Qatar in 2012 to identify irregular migrants led to many arrests and deportations. The Ministry of the Interior identified hundreds of migrants in an irregular situation and in breach of Law No. 4 of 2009 regulating the entry, exit, residence and sponsorship of expatriates, under which they could face up to 3 years' imprisonment and fines of 10,000 Qatari riyals.⁴⁴

(c) Institutional and legal reforms

In Libya, the Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration is an independent agency reporting to the Ministry of the Interior under Council of Ministers decree 386/2014. Under the current circumstances, it is difficult to judge what results the creation of the department might have.

In Egypt, the National Coordinating Committee on Preventing and Combating Illegal Migration, created in March 2014 under Decree No. 380, is responsible for drafting an action plan and legislation on irregular migration, monitoring progress on tackling the issue, in the light of international standards, capacity-building, and international cooperation. It works within the framework of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, (Protocol on human trafficking) and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (Protocol on migrant smuggling), both supplementing the United Nations Convention

Figure 38. Number of deported persons from Saudi Arabia, November 2012 - February 2014



Source: Command, Containment and Control Centre of the Ministry of the Interior in Saudi Arabia.

against Transnational Organized Crime. It aims to improve the status of victims of trafficking in Egypt and, with the support of IOM, is drafting legislation on migrant smuggling.⁴⁵

In May 2012, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Mauritania issued a circular requiring migrants to hold a residence card, which can be obtained for a fee and is more easily obtained by "privileged"⁴⁶ migrants.⁴⁷

In the Syrian Arab Republic, Law No. 2 of 2014 allows the Department of Migration and Passports to deport foreigners without residence permits and provides for the prosecution of those involved in people smuggling. The law is unlikely to have much impact under the present circumstances in the country.

(d) Conclusion

Most Arab countries of origin and destination have taken measures to address the causes and consequences of irregular migration.

Arab countries should follow the lead taken by Morocco in its regularization campaign and adopt a rights-based approach to irregular migration. In many cases, irregular migrants are still primarily considered and treated as “criminals.” Scant regard tends to be shown for the rights of migrants during arrest, detention and deportation and policy tends to reflect that.

4. Human trafficking and migrant smuggling

Human trafficking and migrant smuggling, which are commonly accompanied by grave human rights violations, are crimes under international law. The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols require States parties to criminalize and prevent human trafficking and migrant smuggling, protect and assist victims, and promote international cooperation in order to combat those phenomena. The protocols contain a “saving clause” providing that nothing in them shall affect the rights, obligations and responsibilities of States and individuals under international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law and, in particular, where applicable, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, and the principle of *non-refoulement* as contained therein. The Sudan became the most recent Arab country to ratify the Protocol on human trafficking in 2014 (annex II).

Because the consent of migrants distinguishes cases of smuggling from trafficking, the former is considered not to involve exploitation, abuse, coercion or human rights violations. In reality, smuggling is frequently accompanied by abusive and exploitative practices that turn refugees and migrants into victims of crime. In the absence of legal admission channels, refugees and migrants often have no option other than to resort to smuggling networks.

(a) Legal reforms

Most Arab countries have ratified the Protocols on human trafficking and migrant smuggling and enacted human trafficking and migrant smuggling legislation in line with them.⁴⁸

In February 2012, the Council of Representatives of Iraq passed Law No. 28 on combating human trafficking. The law provides for the creation of various mechanisms, such as the Higher Committee to Combat Human Trafficking. The Committee is responsible for planning efforts to combat and limit human trafficking, coordinating with relevant stakeholders to help victims and protect witnesses, and lobbying for the adoption of international agreements on trafficking. The law provides for fines and prison terms for trafficking offences. Although it has helped prosecutors in terms of defining crimes as human trafficking and limited the ability of perpetrators to escape punishment,⁴⁹ the law does not prohibit all forms of human trafficking. It does not cover the act of facilitating child prostitution, and it stipulates that an act has to involve a financial transaction in order to constitute human trafficking.⁵⁰

In March 2013, Law No. 91 on Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants was passed in Kuwait. Although it provides for prison terms of 15 years to life for perpetrators, it does not establish mechanisms for victim protection or for prosecuting and convicting perpetrators.

A new Labour Code (Law No. 12-2012/AU) including provisions on human trafficking was adopted in the Comoros in 2012. Article 2 (1) of the Code prohibits forced or compulsory labour and article 131 prohibits trafficking in children, but they do not provide for penalties for such acts.

In May 2014, the Sudan promulgated the Human Trafficking Act. It provides for prison

terms of 3 to 20 years for trafficking offences, and the death penalty in cases where the victim dies.

In 2013, the United Arab Emirates Federal National Council began considering amendments to Law No. 51/2006, which, if approved, would provide a framework for victim compensation and assistance to victims of human trafficking.⁵¹

(b) Institutional developments and action plans

Countries in the Arab region have established various institutions and agencies as part of their efforts to identify victims of human trafficking.

In January 2012, Jordan formed the National Screening Team, comprised of members of the National Committee to Combat Human Trafficking, the police and representatives from the ministries of Justice, the Interior and Labour. The team was set up to determine whether vulnerable people identified by embassies are victims of trafficking.

In Sudan, the National Committee for Combating Human Trafficking has been set up under the 2014 Human Trafficking Act. Headed by the Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Justice, the Committee has been entrusted with developing a national strategy to combat human trafficking.⁵²

In Bahrain, the Labour Market Regulatory Authority, a governmental body working on labour reform, set up an anti-trafficking team in 2013. It works with the Office of the Public Prosecutor in order to identify and refer alleged trafficking cases to the courts.⁵³

The inter-ministerial National Technical Committee for Combating Human Trafficking was established in Yemen in 2012 under Decree No. 46. It is headed by the Minister for Human Rights and mandated to report and analyse trafficking data and trends, and develop a

national anti-human trafficking strategy. In 2013, the Committee drafted an anti-trafficking law that was approved by Cabinet but was pending parliamentary endorsement at the time of writing.⁵⁴

In Egypt, the National Coordinating Committee for Combating and Preventing Trafficking in Persons, established in 2007, put together a two-year national action plan in January 2011 to implement anti-trafficking legislation passed in 2010. The plan addressed capacity-building of law enforcement officials and the judicial system in order to prosecute offenders, protection and assistance for victims, and the involvement of other stakeholders and cooperation with regional and international actors. Because of the political tension in the country, not all the objectives could be achieved by 2013 and so a second action plan was launched in January 2013 to cover the period until December 2015. Outstanding issues included the creation of victim support units, training for personnel to prosecute corporate perpetrators, and activities related to the role of the private sector. Emerging priorities include homeless children and African irregular migrants at Egypt's borders.⁵⁵

An action plan adopted by the Comoros in May 2013 was devised to bolster implementation of national laws to investigate, prosecute and punish trafficking offenders. It also aimed at protecting victims and providing them with appropriate care, establishing an anti-trafficking commission, and reiterating the importance of conducting awareness-raising campaigns for officials and the public.⁵⁶

(c) Conclusion

In order to develop anti-trafficking and anti-smuggling legislation in compliance with international standards, Arab countries must consider trafficked and smuggled persons as victims and adopt a gender-sensitive approach to guaranteeing them their rights and protection, including the right

to information, safety, legal representation, fair trial, compensation, medical and social assistance, and return.⁵⁷ Cooperation between Governments should be enhanced in order to find a common approach to the challenges posed by human trafficking and migrant smuggling in the region.

5. Labour force nationalization

The combination of an increase in the youth and working-age population of nationals in GCC countries with policies of fiscal retrenchment in the face of volatile oil prices has eroded public sector capacity to ensure full employment of nationals. At the same time, structural barriers have prevented them from seeking or obtaining jobs in the private sector. Generous pay and working conditions in the public sector mean that reservation wages of nationals are higher than those offered by the private sector and their skills do not meet the needs of private sector employers. Employers are reluctant to hire national workers due to their relatively strong bargaining power compared with migrant workers. That is noticeable in their labour market mobility, while the *kafala* system limits the capacity of migrants to change jobs.⁵⁸

The result has been high unemployment and inactivity among nationals, particularly among youth and women. In 2013, unemployment in Saudi Arabia for nationals stood at 12.2 per cent overall, 28.4 per cent for people aged 15-29 and 60.3 per cent for young women.⁵⁹ GCC Governments have been working to boost employment among nationals, especially in the private sector, since the 1980s. Labour force nationalization policies have taken various forms, including the creation of quotas at different levels to ensure employment of a certain number of nationals, the imposition of fees for hiring foreign workers and the development of training programmes for national workers. Such policies have had mixed success, partly because they have not tackled the

fundamental differences that make migrants more attractive employees than nationals. Some countries, such as Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, have therefore refined their approach, focusing on market-based changes, including allowing migrant workers to change employers.⁶⁰

In recent years, there have been two notable policy changes in relation to labour force nationalization in the region.

In Oman, the Ministry of Manpower banned the hiring of migrant workers by companies in the construction and housekeeping sectors for a 12-month period from November 2013, except for small-medium enterprises and companies working on Government projects. The ban was part of an overall plan to reduce the share of migrants in the private sector workforce to 33 per cent from 39 per cent.⁶¹ The ministry also announced that, from March 2014, it would refuse to deal with companies without any Omani staff,⁶² and that, from 1 July 2014, it would enforce a rule preventing migrant workers who had previously worked in Oman from changing jobs unless they had spent two years outside Oman.⁶³ Those measures reflect a traditional, decree-based approach to workforce nationalization, using restrictions on migrants and government fiat to impose overall targets.

The *nitaqat* (bands) programme in Saudi Arabia is an example of a more comprehensive and flexible approach to workforce nationalization. Adopted in 2011, with implementation beginning in 2012-2013, the *nitaqat* programme's employment targets for nationals are considered at a company level, based on considerations such as the size of the company, the nature of its work, its ability to employ Saudi nationals and the existence of relevant human resources. A business can fall into one of 205 categories that determine targets for the employment of Saudis. There are also four bands into which a company can be classified, based on whether it meets

or exceeds the required number of Saudi employees. Quotas are also affected by the nature of the employment (part-time or full-time) or the type of person employed (persons with “special needs” are considered as four Saudi employees).⁶⁴ Recent reforms mean that children born of Saudi mothers without Saudi nationality and foreign husbands of Saudi women are considered to be Saudi nationals for the purposes of the *nitaqat* programme.

The *nitaqat* programme is significantly more flexible than previous quota-based systems implemented in Saudi Arabia and other countries of the region, and is based on a realistic understanding of employment trends.⁶⁵ It makes use of more innovative, incentive-based tools, such as facilitating a degree of labour market mobility for migrant workers as well as penalizing entities that do not comply with the regulations. It is also part of a broader employment strategy. Alongside the *nitaqat*, a system of unemployment benefits, job search assistance and training for Saudi nationals has been put in place, along with a programme of job fairs across the country.⁶⁶ At the same time, there has been a crackdown on foreign workers in an irregular situation and an “unprecedented monitoring and sanctioning campaign”⁶⁷

Initial results suggest that the programme has been successful in increasing the employment of Saudi nationals, including women.⁶⁸ Since the programme took effect in October 2014, the number of firms in partial or full compliance has increased from 50 to 86 per cent.⁶⁹ However, there has been evasion, including “phantom employment” (adding Saudi employees to company payrolls for fictitious jobs), especially of women (as one Saudi woman counts as two Saudi employees under the programme). Moreover, the *nitaqat* provides no incentive to exceed the minimum requirements. Although it sets wages for Saudi employees at a relatively low level, it still fails to address the gap between the wages of nationals and migrant workers,

which continues to make the latter more attractive to employers.⁷⁰

The measures taken to promote the employment of nationals in Oman and Saudi Arabia, although somewhat successful, are unlikely to change fundamental aspects of labour market segmentation in these countries, largely due to the continued existence of a two-tier labour market in which migrant workers are a source of cheap, easily controlled labour compared to nationals. A reform package that gives migrant and national workers equal rights in the labour market, addresses educational shortcomings and economic diversification, and promotes active labour market policies is more likely to create a level playing field that would enable nationals to compete for jobs with migrants.⁷¹

6. Forced migration and refugee movements

The turmoil of conflict and political crises that has engulfed the Arab region since 2010 has led to large-scale displacement and refugee movements, on top of earlier displacement resulting from conflicts in countries such as Palestine, the Sudan and Iraq, as well as countries of the Horn of Africa. The people affected have been forced to move within their country, find refuge in neighbouring (Arab and non-Arab) countries or, in smaller numbers, leave the region. Nine States in the Arab region are signatories to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which have a total of 146 States parties (annex II). The Convention and Protocol are the key legal documents in defining who is a refugee, their rights and the legal obligations of States.

(a) Legal reforms

Arab countries have shown great solidarity in hosting refugees in large numbers and for long periods, taking pragmatic approaches to their presence. However, major challenges remain. Few Arab States, especially in the

Mashreq and GCC, have ratified founding documents of international refugee law. Where they have been ratified, little has been done to implement them.⁷² Most countries receiving refugees are developing and affected by conflict, which limits their ability to provide services to refugees and leads them to restrict access where capacities have reached their limit.

Reflecting the increase in forced migration, refugee movements and displacement in the region, Egypt introduced provisions on refugees and asylum in its 2012 and 2014 constitutions. Article 57 of the 2012 Constitution and article 91 of the 2014 Constitution enshrine the principle of *non-refoulement* and guarantee the provision of protection to refugees and asylum-seekers. It is, however, unclear how such commitments will be implemented.⁷³

The Government of Morocco, reacting to calls by the Moroccan National Human Rights Council for recognition of refugee status and the issue of residence documents to refugees, announced a new migration policy in September 2013. The policy aims, among other things, to address human rights abuses, bring systems for examining asylum requests into line with international standards and make them “respectful of the Kingdom’s commitments to promote and protect human rights.”⁷⁴

In March 2015, Mauritania launched its National Migration Management Strategy, which was drafted in 2010 and adopted in 2012. It involves seven ministries and focuses on three sector-specific areas (migration and development, migration and vulnerable groups, and border control and protection of migrants) and two cross-cutting areas (knowledge of migration phenomena and the legal framework for migration management). The strategy addresses migrants’ rights, expatriate engagement, human trafficking and migrant smuggling, asylum management,

irregular migration and border management. In the light of the strategy, Mauritania is drafting new asylum legislation.⁷⁵

In the Sudan, the Asylum Act of 2014 sets forth the conditions for refusal of asylum, the loss of refugee status, and the rights and duties of refugees. The act has been criticized for restricting refugees’ freedom of movement.⁷⁶ The Commissioner for Refugees, an office created after the act was passed, works with UNHCR to assess and rule on asylum requests. The Commissioner is also responsible for related issues, such as movement, legal aid in camps, education and health care.

Yemen has formed a committee to draft an asylum law under the leadership of the Minister of Human Rights.⁷⁷

(b) Refugee camps

At the end of April 2014, the Jordanian Government and United Nations agencies opened the sixth official camp for Syrian refugees. Located 20 kilometres west of Azraq, it is equipped with 5,000 movable shelters to receive around 25,000 people and an infrastructure capacity for 50,000. There is capacity to expand Azraq camp to receive 130,000 refugees. Various services have been developed around a village concept and there are child-friendly spaces. The camp was built to take pressure off Zaatari camp, which hosts more than 80,000 refugees and has reached capacity. The new camp has been described by UNHCR’s Jordan Representative as “one of the best planned refugee camps in the world.”⁷⁸ However, some 85 per cent of refugees in Jordan reside outside camps, in urban, peri-urban, and rural parts of the country, often in sub-standard dwellings and in conditions of extreme poverty.

Until July 2014, all Syrian refugees in Jordan, including those who informally left refugee camps, were able to register for UNHCR

and Ministry of the Interior services, such as food vouchers, health care, education for children and special aid packages. Since July 2014, the Jordanian authorities have required that Syrian refugees in urban areas obtain permission documents from Jordanian sponsors in order to continue receiving humanitarian services.⁷⁹ In February 2015, the Ministry of the Interior (Mol) started an “urban verification exercise” to check the identity and numbers of Syrians residing outside camps through biometric screenings and provide them with new service cards (also called Mol Cards).⁸⁰

(c) Development plans

In order to mitigate the impact of the massive influx of refugees on the local community, Jordan launched a response plan in 2015 to consolidate national and international efforts, and the national development strategy, in order to bring a more coordinated approach to humanitarian efforts. The plan includes joint initiatives by United Nations agencies and the Government for development projects in areas such as education, health, energy, social security, justice, housing, environment, water and transport.⁸¹

With the support of the United Nations, the Government of Lebanon launched a response plan for 2015-2016 with three strategic priorities: ensuring humanitarian assistance and protection for poor Lebanese communities and vulnerable Syrian refugees; improving access to and quality of services; and reinforcing stability in the country. The plan includes three response areas based on needs, potential impact on stability and capacity of implementation. The first response area focuses on fundamental coping mechanisms, the second on capacity-building for recovery, and the third on sustaining investment in national capacities. The plan is to be carried out in two phases, the first covering the first six months of 2015 and the second from mid-2015 to the end of 2016.⁸²

(d) Education and employment policies

Arab countries have also been developing policies on education and employment opportunities for Syrian refugees. In Lebanon, under Resolution No. 1/19, of February 2013, sectors such as construction, electrical trades and sales, which had previously been restricted to Lebanese nationals, were opened to refugees.⁸³ However, in December 2014, the Ministry of Labour issued a decision to confine more than 60 professions to Lebanese nationals only due to growing competition in the labour market.⁸⁴ Exemptions are made for Palestinians born in Lebanon, provided that they are not free contractors, and for Syrians working in the agriculture, hygiene and construction sectors.

In Iraq, the Kurdistan regional government introduced a curriculum in 2013 for Syrian refugee children. The Arabic version of the Kurdish curriculum was adopted in around 70 per cent of primary schools and was being taught by Syrian teachers contracted by the Kurdish Ministry of Education. However, in January 2014, the Ministry replaced it with the Kurdish curriculum to better facilitate examination and certification, while maintaining Arabic as the language of instruction in order to take into account the language barrier faced by Syrian refugees. The ministry also offered training to 549 Syrian refugee teachers in primary education for a period of one month in June 2014. The training focused on six areas, mainly teaching methodologies, classroom management, lesson preparation, positive discipline, psychological and social support, and peacebuilding. The main objectives of the training were to sustain education and foster participation of refugees in their communities.⁸⁵

7. Migration and development

Migration offers opportunities and challenges for the development of countries of origin,

countries of destination and migrants themselves. There is growing recognition that, given appropriate policies, migration can have a substantial positive impact on development, for instance through the contribution of migrants to labour markets and innovation, access to opportunities and higher incomes for migrants, the impact of remittances on poverty reduction, or via the engagement of expatriate populations in political and development processes (see the section on expatriate engagement).

On that understanding, Tunisia embarked on a programme in 2014 to mainstream migration into its national development planning. With the support of international actors through the United Nations country team in Tunisia, the Government has set up a working group on migration and development and is drafting a national action plan involving government institutions, civil society and the private sector. The aim is to take migration into account in sectoral development policies and national development policy, and to create institutional mechanisms to “promote coherence in the elaboration of migration and development strategies.”⁸⁶ The State Secretariat on Migration and Social Integration was established under the aegis of the Ministry of Social Affairs in February 2015. Morocco is planning to engage in a similar process.⁸⁷

Libya set up an interministerial migration policy task force in 2014 to develop a comprehensive migration management system. The task force, with representatives from the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, the Interior, Labour, and Planning, was charged with looking at how to manage migration to Libya in the interests of good governance and the country’s socioeconomic development. It was looking, for example, at encouraging highly skilled expatriates to return and highly skilled individuals to migrate to Libya. It also aimed to develop “appropriate standards of protection for all

mobile populations”⁸⁸ and engage in dialogue on migration. The ministries of Justice and the Interior have more representation on the task force than the other ministries,⁸⁹ suggesting that migration control is its main priority. In any event, the political fragmentation in Libya is likely to curtail the ability of the task force to influence migration policy.

While development is in some cases merely incidental to migration policy, policies are also being implemented with the explicit aim of increasing the development potential of international migration. The mobility partnerships signed between the European Union and Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, for instance, include chapters on enabling migrants from those countries who reside in the European Union to participate in development activities in their countries of origin. Measures include initiatives to improve skills that could be useful to migrants on return to their countries of origin, reduce the cost of sending remittances and support the financial education of remittance recipients, promote circular migration and facilitate the reintegration of return migrants.

In the case of Morocco, those undertakings are underpinned by a detailed annex of activities to implement them, including projects funded by and policy changes in European countries. In Germany, Moroccan holders of permanent residence will be guaranteed the right to leave Germany for up to two years without forfeiting their status in Germany in order to facilitate circular migration.⁹⁰

Around the world, various countries have taken steps to attract remittances, channel them towards formal financial institutions, and promote their use in productive activities as well as consumption. Few such initiatives have been taken by Arab Governments, which to some extent reflects the fact that financial institutions in many Arab countries already have mechanisms to attract remittances: for example, the Banque Populaire du Maroc has

a longstanding outreach scheme that allows Moroccan emigrants to have bank accounts in Moroccan dirhams and send money to Morocco at low cost.

8. Expatriate engagement

Policymakers are taking a growing interest in expatriate populations, whose presence raises questions about the understanding of citizenship, the potential of migrants to support development in their countries of origin through the transfer of their financial, human and social capital in the form of remittances, skills and knowledge, and the use of their networks to develop social, intellectual, commercial and other transnational links. This is as true in Arab countries as elsewhere, especially as the size of the Arab expatriate population grows, migrants become more integrated in destination countries, and the opportunities to engage in transnational activities grow. Many Arab countries have taken steps, including legislative and institutional, to reach out to their expatriate populations, support their links to the country of origin, extend rights to them, afford them recognition and involve them in social, economic and political processes.⁹¹

(a) Constitutional recognition and legal reforms

Several Arab countries have used the opportunity of constitutional reform in recent years to recognize the importance and role of their expatriate populations abroad.

For example, article 88 of Egypt's 2014 Constitution stipulates that the State shall safeguard the interests of Egyptians living abroad, protect them and protect their rights and freedoms, enable them to perform their public duties towards the State and society, and encourage their contribution to the development of the nation. It further states that the law shall regulate the participation of Egyptians living abroad in elections and

referendums in a manner consistent with their particular circumstances. Article 244 stipulates that the State shall endeavour that Egyptians living abroad be appropriately represented in the first House of Representatives to be elected after the entry into force of the Constitution. Article 23 sets forth that the State shall ensure the participation of Egyptian expatriates in the progress of scientific research.⁹² The Constitution also provides a framework for outreach to the Egyptian community abroad, including their participation in social and economic development and political processes, but it does not provide for the institutional mechanisms referred to in the Moroccan Constitution.

The 2014 Constitution of Tunisia includes a commitment to ensure that electoral law guarantees the right to vote of Tunisians abroad in the representative assembly, and the right of dual nationals to run for the presidency, provided that they renounce their second nationality in case of victory.⁹³

Other Arab countries have addressed issues regarding their expatriate populations through legal reforms. In Yemen, Decree No. 169 (2012) abolished fees that had been unlawfully levied on expatriates; decrees No. 69 (2012) and No. 82 (2013) assigned technical attachés from the Ministry of Expatriate Affairs to Yemeni embassies; and Decree No. 210 (2012) made the Ministry of Expatriate Affairs responsible for regulating migration and Yemeni labour movement abroad. However, according to the ministry, implementation of the decrees has been hindered by other government agencies.⁹⁴ In Algeria, Law No. 12-01 (2012) reaffirms the right of expatriates to vote. It also includes compulsory quotas for expatriate communities to ensure their representation in elected assemblies.⁹⁵

(b) Out-of-country voting

Out-of-country voting is another means of engaging expatriates. In 2011, Tunisia

allowed its nationals living abroad to vote in the elections for the national constituent assembly. In the 2014 legislative elections, 18 of the 217 seats were assigned to represent Tunisians living abroad and a registration campaign was launched resulting in almost 360,000 Tunisians abroad registering to vote.⁹⁶ Egypt made it possible for its nationals living abroad to vote through Egyptian diplomatic missions in parliamentary elections, referendums and presidential elections in 2013. However, the 2014 Constitution limits representation of Egyptians abroad in the House of Representatives. Libya allowed its expatriates to vote in elections for the General National Congress in 2012, and the Syrian Arab Republic followed suit in its presidential elections of 2014. In Egypt and Libya, the changes came in response to demands by civil society, as had been the case in Morocco.⁹⁷

(c) Expatriate population outreach institutions

In 2013, Egypt, Mauritania, Tunisia and Yemen organized conferences for their expatriate populations to promote ongoing initiatives and discuss potential avenues of cooperation. Lebanon and the Sudan held similar events the following year.

Algeria, the Comoros, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, the Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen all report having government institutions that deal with expatriate relations. In Tunisia, in addition to the longstanding Office of Tunisians Abroad, the State Secretariat for Immigration and Tunisians Living Abroad was created in 2012 under Decree No. 634. It oversees and coordinates government activities on migration and expatriate issues, and develops proposals for outreach to emigrants.⁹⁸ In 2014, the Government established the National Migration Observatory under Decree No. 1930. It acts as a research and coordination body on issues affecting the Tunisian community abroad and migrants in Tunisia.⁹⁹

In Yemen, the Yemeni Communities Supreme Council is elected by Yemeni community leaders and “follows the interests and needs” of Yemeni expatriates.¹⁰⁰

The success of such outreach initiatives will depend on the ability of States and their expatriate populations to ensure continuous and effective dialogue. That is best done through capacity development and institutionalization of representative bodies such as consultative councils for expatriate populations.

9. Migration and health

The right to health is recognized in human rights law as equally applicable to citizens and migrants. Resolution WHA61.17, adopted at the sixty-first World Health Assembly in 2008, recognizes the need for health policies and practices that are sensitive to the needs of migrants. The process of migration, including the conditions under which migrants move, work and live, and the rights they are afforded, in particular with regard to accessing health care, not only affects the health of migrants, but can influence the quality of public health and progress towards universal health care. Migration has an impact on health-care systems in terms of the populations those systems serve and how they are staffed.

In the Arab region, the health of migrants is not seen as a priority. Social protection and health-care systems often exclude those who work in the informal sector.¹⁰¹ In most GCC countries, for instance, health care for nationals is provided free of charge by public services, whereas migrants generally depend on their employers to provide private health insurance.¹⁰² The types of work undertaken by many migrant workers (notably in construction and domestic work) expose them to health risks such as occupational accidents and physical and sexual abuse.¹⁰³ Entry restrictions in GCC countries for migrants with illnesses like tuberculosis and HIV and the practice of

deporting such people may hamper reporting on health conditions.¹⁰⁴

At the same time, the health-care systems of GCC countries rely greatly on non-national health workers, many of them from other Arab countries. Health workers from Arab countries also migrate to North America and Europe.¹⁰⁵

(a) Health of refugees and other displaced persons

In addition to regular health-care concerns, refugees and other displaced persons have particular health needs linked to war-related injuries; mental health issues arising from trauma, violence and stress related to the experience of being a refugee; specific sexual and reproductive health needs; and illnesses resulting from the living conditions of refugees, particularly outbreaks of infectious diseases in situations where shelter and sanitation are inadequate.

Countries that have absorbed large influxes of refugees in recent years have adopted pragmatic approaches to health-care access in already weak health-care systems. Initially, Jordan allowed Syrians residing in official refugee camps access to health care.¹⁰⁶ However, in November 2014, it was decided to confine access of registered Syrian refugees to free health services at Ministry of Health facilities.

In Lebanon's highly privatized health system, UNHCR, IOM and other international organizations initially covered the health-care fees of Syrians registered with UNHCR. As the crisis dragged on and funding dropped, UNHCR was forced to cut back assistance.¹⁰⁷

Syrian refugees in Egypt reported using public health facilities¹⁰⁸ and the Ministry of Health in Iraq has been running health clinics in and outside camps for Syrian refugees.¹⁰⁹ Further support from the international community is however essential in ensuring that these services can continue.¹¹⁰ A more detailed

analysis on the health of refugees and other displaced persons appears in chapter 4.

(b) Health of irregular migrants

As part of its overall policy of regularizing the situation of migrants, Morocco has developed an action plan to promote the health of migrants in an irregular situation by raising the awareness of migrants of their health-care rights, and building the capacity of all stakeholders, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), in the health-care system to respond to their particular health needs.¹¹¹ Since 2011, Moroccan hospitals have been obliged to admit non-Moroccans on the same basis as nationals, regardless of their legal status.¹¹² It remains to be seen to what extent the action plan can be implemented, given the difficulties faced by the health-care system in treating nationals alone.¹¹³

(c) Health-related restrictions on migration

In GCC countries, restrictions relating to health conditions and access to health care have been tightened in recent years. In line with a GCC-wide agreement designed to protect the health of nationals of the Gulf countries by ensuring that migrants do not have contagious diseases and are fit for the work for which they are recruited,¹¹⁴ the United Arab Emirates introduced health tests for migrants from numerous countries. Most recently, Ethiopia was added to the list of such countries in May 2012. The tests are extensive and include screening for tuberculosis and HIV. After undergoing the tests, intending migrant workers have to obtain a health certificate and present it to the United Arab Emirates Embassy in their country in order to obtain a visa. Once in the United Arab Emirates, they must undergo more medical tests whenever they need to renew their visa.¹¹⁵

From a public health point of view, the tests are unjustifiably broad. Rather than dealing with highly infectious diseases that pose

an immediate public health risk, as is their purported aim,¹¹⁶ the health conditions for which potential migrants are tested and ruled “unfit to work/reside in GCC countries” if they test positive are infectious but controllable diseases such as HIV; non-communicable conditions such as cancer; and even pregnancy.¹¹⁷ Moreover, the tests have “a limiting effect” on the human rights of migrants.¹¹⁸ Refusing entry to people living with HIV is widely recognized as producing no public health benefits.¹¹⁹ Barring women from migrating on the grounds of pregnancy is a form of gender discrimination.¹²⁰

In contrast, discrimination on the grounds of HIV status and testing prospective employees for HIV by employers were banned in the Comoros under Law No. 12-2012/AU. In 2014, entry restrictions for people living with HIV were also scrapped.¹²¹

(d) Health insurance reforms

In GCC countries, nationals are covered by free public health, while migrants are enrolled in private health schemes. Health insurance law in some of those countries has been reformed in recent years.

In Saudi Arabia, new rules under health insurance law require private businesses to extend health insurance coverage to all employees and their families, including migrant workers.¹²²

Although mandatory health insurance was already in place in other emirates of the United Arab Emirates, a health insurance law only entered into force in Dubai in February 2014. The law stipulates that migrant workers (including domestic workers) must have health insurance, to be provided by their employers. However, there is no obligation for employers to cover members of migrants’ families. The costs of health insurance may not be deducted from workers’ wages. Foreign workers are not issued visas until they are registered as having health insurance. Implementation of the law is

being staggered, with large companies being required to provide insurance first, followed by medium-sized firms in mid-2015. Employees of small companies, spouses and family members, and domestic workers will all have to be covered by the end of 2016.¹²³

In Qatar, the aim of Law No. 7 of 2013 is to extend health insurance to migrants by the end of 2015, with similar provisions to those in Dubai for migrants and citizens.¹²⁴ Kuwait is establishing a private company, the Kuwait Health Assurance Company, to provide health care to most migrant workers in the private sector, in line with overall privatization policies.¹²⁵

Although in Qatar and Dubai, for instance, the law bars employers from recovering private health insurance costs from employees, the effectiveness of that provision will depend on implementation: the cost of health care could thus conceivably be imposed on migrants. In Qatar, the package of health services provided to Qataris is broader than that reserved for foreign nationals.¹²⁶ In the United Arab Emirates, the fact that employers are not obliged to provide health-care cover for family members of migrants may result in increased costs for family reunification of migrants.

(e) Conclusion

Arab countries continue to struggle with the consequences of migration for health. Countries with large refugee populations have attempted to maintain access to health care for refugees, but their capacity is overstretched and donor support has been insufficient. Some countries have moved to relax unnecessary travel restrictions and extend health insurance coverage to migrants, but others have introduced discriminatory procedures that run counter to international law and best practice and may infringe the right of migrants to access health care. In some cases, health insurance systems are discriminatory and may de facto impose costs on migrants.

C. International cooperation on migration

The admission of foreign nationals is a matter of State sovereignty, regulated in accordance with international law and principles. However, it is increasingly being recognized that managing international migration requires dialogue, coordination and cooperation between States of origin, first asylum, destination and transit in order to ensure the best possible outcomes for all. This is particularly true for Arab countries given the complexity of migration flows in the region and the present scale of displacement.

Cooperation needs to be framed with reference to international and regional human rights, refugee, labour and criminal law conventions ratified by Arab States, as well as to relevant provisions of customary international law. International human rights conventions apply to all migrants and refugees, regardless of

their status. However, the level of ratification by Arab States of international instruments specifically relating to migration remains low. Exceptions are the Protocols on human trafficking and migrant smuggling, the ILO Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) and Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105).

1. Global processes

The Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) is “a forum led by member States” that “offer[s] them a venue to informally discuss challenges and opportunities offered by the migration and development nexus” and thereby to create trust and identify areas for practical cooperation.¹²⁷

The GFMD grew out of the first High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development of 2006, the first formal

Box 2: Declaration of the second High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development

Member States represented at the second High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development unanimously approved a declaration that was adopted as a General Assembly resolution (A/RES/68/4).

In the Declaration, they recognized that international migration was a multidimensional reality of major relevance for the development of countries of origin, transit and destination, and a cross-cutting phenomenon that should be addressed in a coherent, comprehensive and balanced manner, integrating development with due regard for social, economic and environmental considerations and the respect of human rights, and that migrants played an important role in the development of origin, transit and destination countries.

They stressed the importance of maximizing the development benefits of international migration; “promot[ing] and protect[ing] the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all migrants, regardless of their migration status”; and promoting cooperation between States, civil society, the private sector, international organizations and migrants at all levels to manage international migration.

They agreed on the importance of focusing on the needs and rights of vulnerable groups, such as migrant women, youth and children, and stranded migrants; improving public perceptions of migrants; and “prevent[ing] and combat[ing] trafficking in persons”. They called on “Member States to cooperate on mobility programmes that facilitate safe, orderly and regular migration, including through labour mobility”.

Finally, in the context of further discussions of the post-2015 development agenda, Member States also recognized that “human mobility is a key factor for sustainable development which should be adequately considered in the elaboration of the post-2015 development agenda”.

discussion of international migration at the United Nations. The second High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development (High-level Dialogue) in 2013 broke new ground: if previous discussions had been seen as divisive, there was now “a significant convergence of views between Member States, the United Nations system, other international organizations and civil society”. That was due in part to the GFMD.¹²⁸ A declaration adopted by the Member States set out a vision of the importance and nature of international migration, its relationship to development, and its management (box 2).

One result of those global discussions has been the inclusion of migration in the final outcome document of the Open Working Group on the Sustainable Development Goals, which is likely to form the basis of the United Nations development agenda beyond 2015. Migration is considered under the proposed goal 10, which aims to “[r]educe inequality within and among countries”, as target number seven: “Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies.”¹²⁹ Remittances are also seen as a means of implementing the goals, and so goal 10 contains a call to reduce to less than 3 per cent the transaction costs of migrant remittances by 2030 and to eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5 per cent. The proposal also calls for the elimination of trafficking, the protection of migrant workers’ rights, and the retention of health workers in developing countries. If adopted by the General Assembly in September 2015 as the final set of goals, the proposal will give considerable impetus to efforts to promote the adoption of rights-based and development-friendly migration policies.

Within these international frameworks of cooperation, Arab countries have been engaged in activities at the interregional, regional, subregional and bilateral levels to manage migration through partnerships.

2. Interregional processes

The interregional Ministerial Consultations on Overseas Employment and Contractual Labour for Countries of Origin and Destination in Asia, also known as the Abu Dhabi Dialogue, bring together GCC countries with Asian countries of origin. The latter are members of the Ministerial Consultations on Overseas Employment and Contractual Labour (the Colombo Process). The second ministerial consultation was held in Manila in April 2012 to address Asian-GCC labour migration. The participating countries agreed on a framework to guide voluntary bilateral and multilateral initiatives aimed at enhancing cooperation throughout the labour migration cycle, thereby maximizing the benefits of labour migration for all stakeholders and ensuring the protection of migrant workers. The framework focused on the employability and skills of migrant workers, recruitment costs and contracts, labour market information systems, pre-departure orientation, responses to violations of labour laws and the return of workers. The framework also included a call for attention to be paid to women workers in employment where they are vulnerable, such as domestic work.

Civil society groups involved in a parallel dialogue welcomed the framework and progress in involving civil society in the Abu Dhabi Dialogue. However, they stated that the framework must be rights-based and involve all stakeholders, particularly civil society and trade unions, and called on Governments to consider issues such as reform of the *kafala* system and social protection of migrants.¹³⁰

The third ministerial meeting of the Abu Dhabi Dialogue, held in November 2014 in Kuwait, led to the adoption of the Kuwait Declaration, in which participating States backed a pilot project on the development, documentation and mutual recognition of skills in countries of origin and destination. They also pledged

to develop a comprehensive information and orientation programme for migrant workers in order to raise their awareness of migration processes, their rights and available grievance resolution mechanisms, so that the decision to migrate might be based on informed consent. Member States also committed themselves to further dialogue, research and the sharing of experiences on issues such as the recruitment industry and migration costs. A coalition of 90 civil society groups, however, criticized the meeting for its exclusion of NGOs and called for broader labour law reforms in GCC countries.¹³¹

North African and European countries have come together through processes such as: the 5+5 dialogue, which addresses international migration issues involving Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, and which held a Heads of State summit in 2012; the Mediterranean Transit Migration dialogue, including Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the Syrian Arab Republic and Tunisia; and the EU-Africa Summit, which in 2014 focused on migration and mobility. Political declarations from these summits (notably the 2012 5+5 Dialogue Summit and the EU-Africa Summit) have emphasized the mutual benefits of migration and the need for greater cooperation in order to manage it in the best interests of all, meaning *inter alia* by opening up more legal migration opportunities and addressing the “root causes” of migration. They have also noted the need to tackle irregular migration and human trafficking, better protect migrants and engage expatriate populations in development.¹³² The EU-African Summit established a three-year action plan for 2014-2017 to guide cooperation on migration and mobility. However, those initiatives have been criticized for focusing more on European concerns, such as irregular migration, than those of partner countries, including Arab North African countries.¹³³

A conference in October 2014 in Khartoum on human trafficking and people smuggling in

the Horn of Africa was held under the auspices of the African Union (AU) and attended by Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, South Sudan, the Sudan and Tunisia. In the resulting Khartoum Declaration on the AU-Horn of Africa Initiative on Human Trafficking and Smuggling of Migrants, the participating States recommended ratification of international instruments on human trafficking and migrant smuggling; measures to prevent trafficking and smuggling; capacity-building to prosecute perpetrators, protect and support victims, and ensure that persons in need of international protection are treated in line with relevant regional and global conventions; and strengthened international cooperation and coordination to combat trafficking and smuggling. The States also agreed on a joint strategy resting on three main pillars: prevention, victim protection and assistance, and enforcement of laws and prosecution of traffickers and smugglers. The following month, another ministerial conference was held in Rome to launch the Khartoum Process (EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative) involving Djibouti, Egypt, Somalia, the Sudan, Tunisia and other European and African countries. That process will focus on areas of cooperation between the European Union and the African Union, including human trafficking and migrant smuggling.

3. Regional and subregional processes

In 2013, Arab States participated in intergovernmental meetings to review progress in the implementation of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development and in preparation for the second High-level Dialogue.¹³⁴ During these meetings, they affirmed the positive development role played by migrants, and called for the inclusion of migration in the post-2015 development agenda, the ratification of international instruments on migration, the protection of victims of human trafficking and cooperation on migration management.

The League of Arab States, ESCWA and IOM organized a regional consultative meeting in June 2013 in Cairo on international migration and development for government officials. In the final declaration, participants emphasized “the importance of establishing a regional consultative process on migration in the Arab region within the framework of the League of Arab States.” In September 2014, the Council of the League issued a resolution establishing the Arab Regional Consultative Process (ARCP). At its first meeting in April 2015, the ARCP issued a declaration on irregular migration across the Mediterranean, calling for stepped up efforts, particularly by the European Union, to facilitate access to regular migration and for a rights-based development policy addressing the root causes of irregular migration and not only focusing on legal matters. Two documents were also issued on the GFMD and the European Neighbourhood Policy.

The League has launched numerous initiatives to combat human trafficking. For instance, the 2006 Model Law to Combat the Crime of Trafficking in Persons, which was adopted by the councils of Arab Ministers of Justice and of the Interior, was amended in 2012 to provide principles and support to help Arab States to develop anti-trafficking legislation based on the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its additional Protocols on human trafficking and migrant smuggling. The Council of Arab Ministers of Justice adopted the Comprehensive Arab Strategy for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings in February 2012. The strategy lists eight focus areas and strategic goals for each.¹³⁵ In March 2014, the Council of Arab Ministers of Health endorsed the Arab Strategic Framework for the Response to HIV and AIDS (2014-2020). The strategy includes provisions to ensure that migrants have access to HIV prevention, treatment, care and support services.

The issue of mixed migration from the Horn of Africa to Yemen was addressed by

the Regional Conference on Asylum and Migration, held from 11 to 13 November 2013 and attended by representatives of Bahrain, Djibouti, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and African countries of origin. The resultant Sana’a Declaration calls for regional cooperation and capacity-building on issues such as conflict prevention, law enforcement, voluntary return of migrants, employment opportunities, awareness-raising of the risks of irregular migration, strengthening the refugee protection system in line with the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and improving data collection and analysis. National focal points were designated to coordinate efforts and a review mechanism was established “to assess progress and to identify obstacles and find solutions to overcome them.”¹³⁶

4. Bilateral cooperation

Arab States have engaged in several forms of bilateral cooperation on international migration. In terms of labour migration, this may be effective in ensuring that migration takes place via formal channels and according to established principles. Bilateral agreements generally outline procedures for the recruitment, reception, employment and return of migrants. They require significant coordination and resources, and evaluation mechanisms to ensure that their objectives are met. They tend to be more successful when accompanied by concrete initiatives and underpinned by up-to-date labour market data.¹³⁷ The ILO Migration for Employment Recommendation, 1949 (No. 86) provides a model for memorandums of understanding, outlining 29 areas that such memorandums may address with regard to migration, the rights of migrants to social protection and means of settling disputes.

In March 2012, Kuwait and the Philippines concluded a non-binding memorandum of understanding on labour cooperation and

workers' welfare, which stipulates that a joint working group between the two countries should be created to ensure implementation and revision of the Memorandum, development of a standard employment contract, and measures for technical cooperation. The Memorandum states that the employment contract should be in English and Arabic, with a clear definition of working conditions and the rights and duties of the employer and employee. The agreement does not cover domestic workers.¹³⁸

Many Arab States have concluded Memorandums of Understanding with countries of origin of migrant domestic workers:

- The United Arab Emirates renewed its 2007 Memorandum of Understanding with the Philippines in September 2012; however, the text did not set clear standards on the terms and conditions of domestic work, stipulating rather that they would be defined by a labour contract between domestic workers and employers,¹³⁹ thus allowing employers and recruitment agencies the ability to set terms and conditions of work that might not meet worker protection standards. In November 2012, Ethiopia agreed to lift a ban imposed in July 2012 on the recruitment of domestic workers by the United Arab Emirates in order to combat trafficking, exploitation and abuse of workers by recruitment agencies. The new arrangements between the two countries provide minimum wage and insurance guarantees for Ethiopian domestic workers.¹⁴⁰
- Lebanon signed the Memorandum of Understanding on Labour Cooperation and the Protocol on Regulating the Recruitment and Employment of Domestic Workers with the Philippines in 2012 to protect the rights of Filipino domestic workers in Lebanon. Those agreements came after the deployment ban imposed by the Philippines in 2007 due to the limited protection then available for Filipino domestic workers.

The agreements outline measures to make sure that the rights, welfare and protection of domestic workers in Lebanon are respected and enhanced. They include a minimum wage requirement, the payment of wages into workers' bank accounts, the issuing of a standard contract, and access to dispute resolution mechanisms and complaints procedures. The agreements lay the foundation for a joint action committee composed of officials from Lebanon and the Philippines to discuss issues arising from implementation of the Protocol.¹⁴¹

- Having concluded a memorandum of understanding on labour cooperation in 2010, Jordan and the Philippines signed a set of principles and controls in 2012 "for regulating deployment and employment of Filipino domestic workers" for three years. The agreement provides for a minimum wage and a minimum age for such workers, as well as requirements related to insurance, contract verification, working hours and rest days, skill certification, dispute settlement, and transparency with regard to recruitment fees.¹⁴²
- In 2013-2015, Saudi Arabia signed memorandums of understanding on domestic workers with the Philippines (2013); Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia, Viet Nam (2014); and Bangladesh (2015). The Memorandum of Understanding with Bangladesh lifts a seven-year ban on the employment of Bangladeshi domestic workers in Saudi Arabia and sets a minimum wage requirement.¹⁴³ The other agreements share common features, especially with regard to standard employment contracts for domestic workers, payment of their wages directly into bank accounts and establishing mechanisms for 24-hour assistance. However, many of those agreements lack clear enforcement mechanisms, resulting in a significant gap between official policy and practice.¹⁴⁴

Arab countries have also concluded cooperation agreements, especially with

the European Union, to address migration issues and manage migration flows from and through the Arab region to European countries. Those agreements outline a number of policy objectives, such as simplifying visa procedures; informing citizens of the countries of origin about job opportunities and legal procedures in the European Union; strengthening readmission measures for irregular migrants; supporting border management and addressing irregular migration; providing assistance to refugees and victims of trafficking; supporting migration and development linkages through reduced remittance costs and fostering the involvement of expatriates in development activities; investing in regions of origin; and building capacity of the authorities in countries of origin.

The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States and the Republic of Iraq was signed in 2012 with a view to preventing irregular migration, facilitating the return and readmission of irregular migrants under humane conditions, and effectively controlling and managing borders through training, organization and other operational procedures.¹⁴⁵ The Agreement includes provision for a dialogue on human trafficking and migrant smuggling and calls for the creation of effective mechanisms to combat smuggling and trafficking networks and protect victims. Article 105 reiterates the need for cooperation on displacement, the development and implementation of national legislation on international protection, and measures to fight racism and xenophobia, especially among host communities.

The Mobility Partnership signed by Jordan with the European Union in 2014 contemplates European support for institutional and legislative frameworks for asylum in Jordan, and technical support to develop capacity, especially in refugee status determination.¹⁴⁶

Objectives of the Mobility Partnership signed by Morocco and the European Union in 2013

include better informing Moroccans about legal options for migration to the European Union and supporting Moroccan efforts, including with capacity-building, to prevent irregular migration and combat trafficking and smuggling networks. It aims to improve the exchange of information between Morocco and the European Union and cooperation on the administrative, operational and technical levels to identify and dismantle such networks. The agreement also provides for cooperation to support “the socioeconomic development of regions with high migration potential”; and information exchange and technical cooperation on border management. Under the agreement, effort will be put into strengthening asylum authorities in Morocco, developing asylum legislation and protecting refugees.¹⁴⁷

A similar partnership between the European Union and Tunisia, which was not yet in force at the time of writing, also focuses on combating irregular migration by reinforcing border management. The European Union has also pledged to help Tunisia to develop a framework for the protection of asylum-seekers and refugees. It will work on building the capacity of Tunisian officials to identify migrants eligible for protection and process their asylum requests, the application of the principle of *non-refoulement*, and the provision of an adequate protection system.¹⁴⁸

Tunisia signed a similar cooperation agreement with Switzerland in 2012. It covers the conditions of entry and stay in Switzerland of specific categories (including highly skilled persons, family members of Tunisian migrants, students, and migrants engaged in development activities in either country); voluntary and involuntary readmission of migrants in an irregular situation while respecting human rights and with support for their reintegration; and technical cooperation and financial support to combat irregular migration and promoting the return of irregular migrants.¹⁴⁹ Under a 2012 agreement on exchanges for young professionals, the

possibility was opened up for 150 young Tunisian professionals to work in Switzerland for up to 18 months to acquire professional and language skills.¹⁵⁰

In April 2012, Italy signed a memorandum of understanding with Libya on security, aimed at combating irregular migration and departures from Libya. It highlights the need to facilitate and promote the voluntary return of irregular migrants back to Libya and recommends construction of a detention centre for irregular migrants, border management and control training for Libyan police, and the exchange of information between both parties. However, the agreement was not implemented due to political instability, and has been criticized for its focus on return and prevention of migration to Europe without regard for the rights of migrants.¹⁵¹

Libya signed border security agreements with Algeria (2012), Chad (2012), Egypt (2013), the Sudan (2013) and Tunisia (2012), which provide for joint border patrols, information-sharing and capacity-building in order to prevent, inter alia, organized irregular migration to Libya. A further agreement between Libya, Egypt and the Sudan, signed in 2013, focuses on the creation of free trade zones that would facilitate the flow of people across borders.¹⁵² Given the situation in Libya, it is unclear to what extent any of those agreements have been implemented.

In the absence of comprehensive multilateral governance of international migration, interregional, regional, subregional and bilateral agreements may well be a practical means of regulating migration and protecting migrant workers.

Memorandums of understanding are easier to enter into with destination countries than formal agreements on migration. However, their informal nature undermines their capacity to protect migrant workers.¹⁵³ Moreover, they contain few specifics on

implementation, often reaffirming commitment to existing rules (with little to no reference to international frameworks), without accompanying time frames or action plans.¹⁵⁴ Although joint committees should meet regularly to monitor the implementation of such agreements, in practice this is rare.¹⁵⁵ Some agreements address domestic work but pay little heed to the specific concerns of female migrants, even though they represent the bulk of domestic workers.¹⁵⁶ The model memorandum of understanding contained in ILO Recommendation No. 86 does not address important measures related to social protection, equality of treatment of migrant workers and prevention of involuntary return.¹⁵⁷ Differences in the wording of agreements may create inequalities among migrant workers themselves: the Memorandum of Understanding between Saudi Arabia and Indonesia contains protective provisions (such as facilitating the provision of consular assistance to domestic workers in detention) not contained in the Memorandum of Understanding between Saudi Arabia and the Philippines.

Mobility partnerships with Europe have been criticized for the scant involvement of civil society in their drafting, the lack of provision for legislative and institutional instruments that protect migrants' rights, and the focus on irregular migration.¹⁵⁸ In the cases of Tunisia and Libya, it is unclear whether the interim authorities were mandated to enter into such agreements. References in those agreements to addressing the root causes of irregular migration have been criticized as being unclear, for their apparent misunderstanding of the relationship between development and migration (development tends to increase migration flows by boosting people's ability to migrate), for ignoring the importance of context-specific factors in stimulating migration, and for their failure to focus on human rights.¹⁵⁹

Cooperation on migration in the Arab region is mixed. To manage migration for the benefit

of all, more must be done to foster dialogue and cooperation at all levels, based on international instruments, especially those relating to human rights.

D. Conclusions and recommendations

Since the beginning of 2012, significant changes and reforms in migration governance have taken place throughout the Arab region. Reforms at the national and subnational levels have touched on aspects of migration ranging from nationality and expatriate engagement to migration and development. Arab States have also engaged in bilateral, regional and global cooperation on migration.

The reforms have come at a time marked by the continuing influx of labour migrants to GCC countries, mass refugee flows in the Mashreq, and the transformation of North African countries into de facto countries of destination. They reflect other developments in the region, such as the changing conceptions of political community brought about by the Arab uprisings, civil society pressure in some countries, and concerns about the employment of nationals in GCC countries.

It is too early to assess the effectiveness of many of the measures taken, but the following conclusions can be drawn:

Nationality and statelessness: Although Arab States have in many cases taken pragmatic measures to open residence to non-national family members of nationals and to permit dual nationality, access to nationality remains highly restricted. In many countries the ability to pass on nationality to family members is determined by gender.

Labour migration: Arab States have taken some positive steps towards ensuring greater mobility for migrants in the labour market, and engaging in bilateral and interregional cooperation on labour

migration, in particular with regard to domestic workers. However, the fundamental aspects of the *kafala* system remain in place in most countries, exposing migrants to potential abuse and restricting their ability to participate effectively in destination country labour markets. Many bilateral agreements do not mention the rights of migrants as stipulated in international human rights law.

Irregular migration: The growth of irregular migration has prompted Arab States to act, either by offering amnesties or engaging in mass deportation. Morocco has led the way in adopting a rights-based approach, and other States in the region should follow suit. Some policy changes have been abrupt, leaving migrants with limited choices and adversely affecting countries of origin.

Labour force nationalization: Bahrain alone has significantly liberalized the *kafala* system, making it a tool for improving the competitiveness of national workers. The *nitaqat* system in Saudi Arabia, alongside quota-based tools, reflects a more flexible policy approach to preparing nationals for entry into a competitive labour market. Its impact is likely to be limited, however, because the fundamental issues making migrant labour more attractive to employers have not been addressed. Moreover, implementation of the policy has led to violations of migrants' rights.

Displacement and refugee movements: Arab countries have reacted with solidarity to the needs of refugees, given the limited resources in some countries and the scale of the challenges. However, the generous international support received by host countries continues to be outpaced by the scope and scale of displacement and the lack of immediate prospects for solutions to their plight.

Migration and development: The efforts of Tunisia and Morocco to mainstream international migration into national development strategies are promising. Other

destination countries in the region could consider undertaking similar exercises.

Expatriate engagement: Upheaval in some Arab countries has led to a change in attitude to the role of expatriate populations. Expatriates have been afforded new possibilities for involvement in political life by voting and standing for election. Institutions for dialogue have emerged and more has been done to engage expatriates in discussions about their role in home countries and involvement in development. More efforts will be required to foster those institutions and the participation of expatriates in national debates.

Migration and health: Positive steps have been taken by Morocco (opening health care to irregular migrants), the Comoros (dismantling restrictions on migrants living with HIV), and countries hosting large refugee populations from the Syrian Arab Republic (guaranteeing at least some health coverage for refugees). However, in other countries, retrograde steps have been taken with regard to health tests for migrants and discriminatory terms of their inclusion in national health insurance schemes. Many Arab countries need support to enable their health-care systems to cover migrants, and especially displaced populations, including refugees.

International cooperation on migration: Arab States have engaged in global, interregional, regional and bilateral processes of cooperation on international migration in relation to development, labour migration, mixed migration flows and in some cases international protection, and they have brought some tangible results. However, more regional dialogue and cooperation are needed. Many agreements entered into by Arab States pay little attention to the rights of migrants. Moreover, few Arab States have ratified international migration and refugee conventions, except for the Protocols on human trafficking and migrant smuggling and ILO Conventions No. 29 and No. 105.

In order to continue improving migration governance, Arab States are encouraged to:


1. Foster consistency between different policy domains relevant to migration. Migration policies should support national development strategies and uphold internationally agreed human rights, regardless of the sex, origin or legal status of refugees and migrants;
2. Guarantee the human rights of refugees and migrants and ratify international conventions relating to migration, including the following:
 - a. 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol;
 - b. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families;
 - c. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime;
 - d. Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime;
 - e. 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness;
 - f. ILO Migration for Employment Convention, 1949 (No. 97);
 - g. ILO Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143);
 - h. ILO Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181);
 - i. ILO Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189);
 - j. ILO Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29).
3. Lift reservations on other core human rights treaties, such as those on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women that prevent women from being able to pass on their nationality to their children;
4. Act to limit statelessness, including by considering claims of stateless persons to

- the nationality of countries in which they have resided and worked for long periods, and by registering all births;
5. Reform the *kafala* system in order to allow labour mobility in destination countries, rationalize the employment of migrant workers, make national employees competitive and prevent the exploitation of migrants;
 6. Include migrant domestic workers in labour law and, in cooperation with countries of origin and in line with international standards, adopt a rights-based and gender-sensitive approach to issues regarding domestic workers, including monitoring of the implementation of agreements;
 7. Ensure that measures to limit irregular migration are rights-based, do not infringe the fundamental rights of refugees and migrants, including the principle of non-refoulement, and tackle its root causes, including informal labour markets, inflexible labour migration regulations and the lack of legal avenues to international protection;
 8. Help host countries to adopt a development approach to forced migration and refugee movements that takes into account the interests of refugee and host communities alike, and to promote partnership and cooperation at the local level;
 9. Consider the recognition of refugees, migrants and expatriate populations in legal texts, especially when amending constitutions;
 10. Broaden the mandate of national institutions and ministries in countries of origin to engage in dialogue with expatriate communities and guarantee their independence, legitimacy and representativeness;
 11. Revise health-related travel and residence restrictions in destination countries so as to protect public health without discrimination and ensure that health care is available to all residents on an equal basis and regardless of nationality, sex or legal status, in line with Resolution WHA61.17;
 12. Continue to engage in dialogue and cooperation at all levels, in line with international human rights instruments and the outcome declaration of the second High-level Dialogue;
 13. Advocate for the inclusion of migration-related indicators in the post-2015 development agenda;
 14. Engage more in regional dialogue on international migration in order to maximize the benefits and minimize the adverse effects of intraregional migration;
 15. Allow civil society, including groups representing migrants, and other stakeholders, such as the private sector, to contribute to policymaking and cooperation processes on international migration.

4. Forced Migration, Displacement and Development



Palestinian Refugees in Beddawi Camp in Lebanon. It has been said that play is children's work. In Beddawi camp, children play, learn and express themselves as they rebuild their lives.
@ UNICEF_Lebanon/Sandra Chehab 2015



“A key element of response to humanitarian crises should be a much closer link between humanitarian and development interventions, going beyond the traditional concept of ‘bridging the gap’.”

António Guterres, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

4. Forced Migration, Displacement and Development

A. Introduction

More than 50 million people around the world had been forcibly displaced as a result of persecution, conflict, generalized violence and human rights violations by the end of 2013, according to UNHCR. Never since the end of the Second World War had the number of refugees, IDPs and other forcibly displaced persons exceeded that grim marker. Many of the displaced are in the Arab region.¹

The causes of this growing humanitarian tragedy are multiple and complex. Conflict, for example, can intersect with environmental triggers, political and economic instability, and structural inequality. Individuals with a variety of reasons for flight may travel on the same routes and by the same means. When examining mixed flows of refugees, asylum-seekers and other migrants, it is important not to lose sight of the severity of the original “push factor” – life-threatening situations – or the vulnerability and threats migrants experience on clandestine land and sea routes, regardless of the initial triggers of movement.

Different stages of displacement may be discerned in the Arab region. Some displaced populations are still in the acute emergency phase, as has been witnessed with recent movements from and within Yemen. For others, displacement is protracted, as is the case with refugees from Palestine, Somalia and the Sudan. Repatriation is another phase, for example in the case of the return of refugees, asylum-seekers and migrant workers from Libya and the Syrian Arab Republic. Resettlement of refugees from Arab to third countries, such as the United States of America, Canada, Australia and countries in Europe, is another phase.

Solutions to the root causes of such complex movements remain elusive, resulting in prolonged or recurring episodes of displacement, with far-reaching consequences at the local, national and regional levels.

In this chapter, we examine the relationship between development and displacement induced by conflict, persecution, generalized violence and human rights violations in the Arab region. We look at ways of integrating responses to such displacement and development initiatives, with a view to mitigating adverse consequences for development, strengthening peace-building and reconstruction, encouraging good governance, and promoting respect for the fundamental rights of refugees, asylum-seekers, IDPs and displaced populations, as well as of host communities.

The broad definition of forced population movements to include refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations in no way lessens the importance of each individual category. Rather, it reflects the fact that people, including persons already outside their countries of origin, flee often life-threatening situations for varied reasons. The definition of development is equally broad to encompass economic, social, environmental and human ramifications of displacement for the countries of origin, transit and destination.

The chapter draws on academic, policy and field-based sources regarding the situation in the Arab region in recent years.² An overview of forced population movements is followed by a review of the different groups (refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations) and drivers of movements. The focus then

shifts to the impact of forced population movements on countries of destination, transit and origin, as well as the implications for displaced populations themselves. We then look at developmental approaches to forced population movements and mainstreaming issues relating to forced migration into development initiatives.

The remainder of the chapter is devoted to an examination of the relationship between forced population movements and five key areas of development: health; education and opportunities for young people; labour markets, human capital and remittances; environmental sustainability; and social cohesion and stability.

The chapter concludes with general and sector-specific responses regarding: the prevention of adverse consequences of forced population movements in situations of acute and protracted displacement; the realization of the positive contributions of refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations; and the conditions for lasting peace and prosperity throughout the region. Meeting such goals will require timely, adequate and sustained support from the international community in the coming years and a political resolution of the crises that have generated such mass displacement and suffering. These objectives must also be consistent with and supported by the sustainable development goals to be adopted by the international community in September 2015.

B. What are forced population movements?

The terms “displacement” and “forced population movements” are descriptive and include many categories. In its 2010 *Mainstreaming Migration into Development Planning* handbook, the Global Migration Group describes forced migration as “a migratory movement in which an element of

coercion exists, including fear of persecution and threats to life and livelihood - whether arising from human-made or natural causes (e.g., movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects)”.

C. Who are the people concerned?

Refugees, asylum-seekers and IDPs are recognized as specific groups in international legal instruments. A fourth group, migrants in countries in crisis, is defined in operational, but not legal terms. Each is described more fully below:

Refugees: The status of refugee is enshrined in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. A refugee is defined therein as an individual, who, “owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country”.

Other persons may be designated as refugees by regional conventions such as the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, which defines refugees as “every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality”. Under UNHCR’s mandate, persons outside their country of origin who are unable to return owing to

Table 24. Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA and UNHCR

Jordan	Syrian Arab Republic	State of Palestine	Lebanon	Other (UNHCR)	Total
2,097,338	480,000	2,020,847	449,957	102,757	5,150,899

Sources: Data were retrieved from the UNRWA website: www.unrwa.org/where-we-work and www.unrwa.org/syria-crisis/syria4thanniversary (accessed 24 April 2015); and UNHCR, *UNHCR Global Trends 2013: War's Human Cost* (2014).

Note: Numbers may not reflect all movements of Palestinian refugees, due to the Syrian crisis.

Table 25. Five Arab countries with the greatest number of IDPs due to conflict and violence

Syrian Arab Republic	7,600,000
Iraq	3,276,000
Sudan	3,100,000
Somalia	1,106,800
Yemen	334,100

Source: Norwegian Refugee Council and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, *Global Overview 2015: People Internally Displaced by Conflict and Violence* (Geneva, 2015).

Note: All figures are minimum estimates and likely to be higher due to continued conflict and violence in these countries in early 2015.

serious and indiscriminate threats to life, physical integrity or freedom resulting from generalized violence or events seriously disturbing public order may qualify for refugee status.³

A third definition applies to Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and the State of Palestine (West Bank and Gaza). They are defined operationally by UNRWA as persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948, who lost both their homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict. More than 60 years after it was established,

UNRWA continues to operate under a renewable three-year mandate to assist Palestinian refugees but, unlike UNHCR, remains without a clearly stated protection mandate to provide legal assistance.⁴ Refugees outside the area of operations of UNRWA are covered by the 1951 Refugee Convention and thus entitled to assistance and protection from UNHCR.⁵

Asylum-seekers: An asylum-seeker is a person seeking international protection in a country of which they are not a national. A person who submits such a request is considered an asylum-seeker until a definitive ruling is made. Not every asylum-seeker is ultimately recognized as a refugee, but every refugee is initially an asylum-seeker.⁶

Internally displaced persons (IDPs): The refugee definition does not extend to those who are displaced within their own borders. In the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, a non-binding soft law framework, IDPs are described as: "Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular, as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural and human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border." The AU regional convention on IDPs uses a similar definition. The IDP definition is broader than the refugee

definition in that it includes natural and human-made disasters.

Migrants in Countries in Crisis: A category that has received attention recently, largely because of events in the Arab region, are international migrants caught up in conflict or natural and human-made disasters in the country in which they reside. They may become stranded or displaced in the country in crisis, return to their country of origin, or seek safety in a third country. There is no convention or soft law framework defining this group, but the Migrants in Countries in Crisis working group, chaired by the United States of America and the Philippines, is seeking to develop guidance for States and other actors addressing such situations.⁷

The aforementioned categories can be fluid. For example, many Iraqi refugees in the Syrian Arab Republic were unable to remain there because of the conflict in their country of asylum. Upon return to Iraq, many were also unable to return to their home communities because of continued insecurity, and thus became IDPs.⁸ Another example is that of the unknown number of migrant workers from Asia, Africa and the Arab region thought to have become internally displaced amid the crisis in Libya.⁹

Other persons do not fall within existing legal and operational frameworks, but may be displaced under conditions of severe duress in the context of socioeconomic collapse, food scarcity and famine. Although beyond the scope of this report, population movements in the Arab region are also increasingly being triggered by drought and water scarcity, desertification, flooding and other acute and slow-onset natural disasters attributed to climate and environmental change.¹⁰

The 10-Point Plan of Action on Refugee Protection and Mixed Migration produced by UNHCR in 2007 states that refugees

and asylum-seekers “increasingly move from one country or continent to another alongside other people whose reasons for moving are different and not protection-related.” These mixed migration flows are common in situations of conflict and political instability, epitomized by the boats crossing the Mediterranean and Gulf of Aden with asylum-seekers and other people seeking greater security or economic opportunities. The array of countries, many of them affected by conflict and violence, from which most people crossing the Mediterranean in early 2015 came (Eritrea, Somalia, the Syrian Arab Republic, countries in sub-Saharan Africa) illustrates the complexity of distinguishing asylum-seekers from economic migrants.¹¹

D. Legal frameworks

In the Arab region, ratification of international and regional legal frameworks on refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations is low. Of the 22 members comprising the League of Arab States, 9 are party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Among the top five host countries in the region – Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Yemen – only Yemen and Egypt have ratified the Convention, the latter with significant reservations.¹² Algeria, the Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, the Sudan and Tunisia have ratified the 1969 OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. In 1994, the League of Arab States adopted the Arab Convention on Regulating the Status of Refugees in the Arab Countries. Although that Convention broadens the definition of refugee to include conflicts and natural disasters, it does not mention generalized violence, internal conflicts or massive violations of human rights and has yet to be ratified by a sufficient number of States to enter into force. The Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia and Tunisia have signed the African Union

Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention), but they have not yet ratified it. For an overview of regional and international legal frameworks and signatories among Arab States, see annex II.

Few States in the region have adopted and implemented domestic asylum policies.¹³ A number of States have entered into memorandums of understanding with UNHCR, but Governments do not perceive them to amount to a recognition of the right to seek and enjoy asylum.¹⁴ Nevertheless, while the parameters of such agreements vary considerably and can change, they do create a valuable space for UNHCR to afford certain protection and assistance to refugees, asylum-seekers and other persons of concern.

E. Recent trends in the Arab region

Forced population movements from, within and to the Arab region have many causes. In all the following cases, however, conflict, political instability, and human rights violations are prevalent.

Iraq: Recurrent outbreaks of conflict have led to displacement within and from Iraq. In the years since the 2003 US-led invasion, violence has compelled millions to flee their homes.¹⁵ Between February 2006 and April 2008 alone, 1.5 million people were internally displaced, while hundreds of thousands fled to Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic, and other countries in the region.¹⁶ Between December 2013 and January 2015, more than 2.1 million people were internally displaced due to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as the Islamic State) insurgency and renewed fighting in parts of the country.¹⁷ That was in addition to an estimated 254,215 Iraqi refugees and at least 1.1 million IDPs who are thought to

remain displaced by previous wars, political persecution and forced relocation dating to the 1980s, under the reign of Saddam Hussein.¹⁸ Also affected by renewed violence in Iraq are more than 246,000 Syrian refugees and tens of thousands of Iraqi returnees, who had sought relative safety from the war in the Syrian Arab Republic.¹⁹ Such circular movements and multiple displacements are indicative of the challenges faced by humanitarian and development actors in planning for and responding to displacement at a time of intractable conflict and insecurity.

Libya: Widespread violence followed the civil uprising-turned-conflict and, according to IOM, forced more than 800,000 individuals (mostly international migrants, including migrant workers, refugees and asylum-seekers) into neighbouring countries in 2011-2012.²⁰ According to UNHCR, 550,000 individuals were displaced inside the country in 2011, although this number excludes unknown numbers of international migrants who may have become internally displaced.²¹ Since then, violence and political turmoil have triggered renewed displacement. In November 2014, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) reported that some 454,000 people had been internally displaced by violence in and around the cities of Benghazi and Tripoli, and amid tribal clashes in southern Libya.²² For many forced to flee amid recent violence, including 2,500 Tawerghan IDPs displaced from their camp in Benghazi in October 2014,²³ it is not the first time they have been forced to flee, due to recurring attacks by groups and individuals who accuse them of supporting the Gadhafi regime.²⁴ Aside from intermittent reports of disappearances, killings and targeted attacks, little is known about those migrant workers who may be trapped, internally displaced or forced to cross land and sea borders, unable and/or unwilling to

return home from Libya.²⁵ In early 2015, an estimated 150,000 migrant workers were still in Libya, of whom 5,000 may be vulnerable and in need of assistance.²⁶

Mixed migration flows, driven partly by the continuing insecurity and the closure of borders and migration routes in other parts of the region, are causing mounting concern. The IOM reported, for example, the evacuation of close to 800 stranded migrants, mostly from Tripoli, in early 2015.²⁷ Additionally, an unprecedented 10,000 migrants were rescued in the waters between Libya and Italy by the Italian authorities in a one-week period in April 2015.²⁸ More than 1,700 people are estimated to have lost their lives during the sea crossing in the first four months of 2015, compared with 96 deaths during the same period in 2014.²⁹ According to the Italian Ministry of the Interior, 170,000 migrants arrived in Italy by sea in 2014, most of them on boats from Libya. By June 2015, some 102,000 migrants had arrived by sea in Europe. According to statistics compiled by IOM in the Mediterranean, 54,660 migrants reached Italy, after departing almost exclusively from Libya, while 46,150 migrants reached Greece, departing mainly from Turkey.³⁰

Palestine: In 1948, *al-nakba*, the forced exodus of more than 700,000 Palestinians from their homes upon the creation of Israel, marked the first large-scale displacement since the Second World War.³¹ Most fled to Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, and smaller numbers were displaced to Egypt and Iraq.³² Others moved within the borders drawn in 1948, and to what is known today as the State of Palestine. Forced to flee due to subsequent wars, 5 million Palestinian refugees are registered with UNRWA in Jordan, Lebanon, the State of Palestine and the Syrian Arab Republic.³³ Still more, including 102,757 persons of

concern under the mandate of UNHCR, live elsewhere in and beyond the Arab region.³⁴ Time and again, repeat displacement of Palestinian refugees has occurred, precipitated by cycles of conflict and regional instability. Most recently, at the height of hostilities in Gaza during summer 2014, 485,000 individuals (28 per cent of the population in Gaza) became internally displaced.³⁵ Since 2011, 280,000 Palestinian refugees are known to have become displaced inside the Syrian Arab Republic as a result of the conflict there, and 18,000 individuals remain trapped inside Yarmouk Camp in Damascus amid heavy fighting.³⁶ UNRWA has reported that 44,000 Palestinian refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic have registered in Lebanon and 13,836 in Jordan. Unknown numbers are reported to have fled elsewhere.³⁷

Somalia: Refugees from Somalia are scattered throughout the Arab region, although the majority live in camps and cities in East Africa. Out of a total population of 10 million, it is estimated that 970,000 Somalis live as refugees in neighbouring countries, including Yemen.³⁸ Similar numbers of IDPs (more than 1.1 million) have been reported, mostly living in urban areas, such as Mogadishu.³⁹ Since before the outbreak of conflict in the early 1990s, drought and violence exacerbated by a lack of effective government and economic hardship have repeatedly triggered widespread displacement and disruption for millions of Somalis. In 2011, famine was declared after years of violence and the absence of a functioning State had made it impossible to prepare for emergencies, recover from earlier droughts or deal with earlier displacement. The famine led to the displacement of around a quarter of the population, in Somalia and abroad.⁴⁰ Between January and August 2011, UNHCR reported double the number of arrivals (60,000) to Yemen from the Horn of Africa in comparison with the previous year.⁴¹

Although the 2011 famine has abated and efforts to rebuild the State are evident, displacement continues due to ongoing insecurity. UNHCR reported in late 2014 that 100,000 persons had been newly displaced as a result of drought, conflict, forced evictions and lack of livelihood opportunities. Some 80 per cent were internally displaced.⁴²

The Sudan: The country continues to endure large-scale internal displacement amid prolonged conflict, instability and natural disasters. Moreover, more than 670,000 refugees from the Sudan are reportedly living in countries such as Chad, Egypt and Kenya.⁴³ The Sudan was among the top 15 countries of origin for detected boat arrivals to Italy in 2014.⁴⁴ As of early 2015, 3.1 million people were internally displaced due to conflict, spillover violence from South Sudan and recurrent sudden and slow-onset natural disasters, including flooding and drought.⁴⁵ IDMC estimates that, in 2013 alone, at least 319,700 were internally displaced due to flooding across several states. In spite of insecurity and reports of abuse of refugees and other displaced populations by criminal elements, the Sudan is a transit route for mixed flows of refugees and migrants from Eritrea and other countries in the Horn of Africa.⁴⁶ In 2014, the Sudan also received close to 2,000 returning Sudanese migrants in need of assistance after they were forced to flee crises in the Central African Republic, Libya and the Syrian Arab Republic, or expelled following clashes in the case of Chad.⁴⁷

The Syrian Arab Republic: The number of people forcibly displaced by the ongoing crisis exceeded 11 million (more than half of the total population) between March 2011 and March 2015. Economic development has been set back four decades. In 2014, 12.2 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance inside the Syrian

Arab Republic,⁴⁸ and four in every five Syrians were living in poverty.⁴⁹ Although tens of thousands of refugees have made it further to North Africa and Europe since 2011, the vast majority have been forced to flee inside the country (at least 7.6 million) or into Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt (3.9 million).⁵⁰ By mid-2014, Syrian refugees in Jordan constituted between 10 and 20 per cent of people residing in the country, while Syrians in Lebanon made up more than a quarter of that country's total population – the equivalent of 80 million people seeking refuge in the United States over four years.⁵¹ Since then, as fighting has intensified, humanitarian aid has been outpaced by refugee flows beyond absorption capacity. The largest ever humanitarian appeals have been launched to address the needs of Syrian refugees and displaced persons and, while the response from the international community has been generous, more is needed to support host countries and communities that have limited natural and financial resources.

Yemen: In early 2015, Yemen was experiencing a new wave of conflict that had already displaced 150,000 people inside the country⁵² and prompted thousands to flee to Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia.⁵³ Prior to 2015, some 334,100 IDPs were reported in Yemen, mostly in the north, which has since endured widespread devastation.⁵⁴ In addition to Yemenis forced to flee by recent violence, refugees (mostly from Somalia), asylum-seekers and migrant workers from various countries have been displaced within and outside the country.⁵⁵ Since the 1990s, Yemen has also increasingly become a transit hub for refugees, asylum-seekers and other displaced populations – mostly Somalis and Ethiopians fleeing conflict, food insecurity, and environmental and economic collapse. Between 2006 and 2012, more than 447,000 individuals are reported to have set off from Djibouti and

Somalia to Yemen.⁵⁶ In 2014, the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat reported that 91,592 migrants from the Horn of Africa had travelled across the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea to Yemen – a 40 per cent increase from the 65,319 arrivals in 2013.⁵⁷ UNHCR reports the presence of 245,801 registered refugees (the majority from Somalia) and 9,397 asylum-seekers (mostly from Ethiopia), and smaller numbers from Eritrea, Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic.⁵⁸

F. Impact of refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations on development

Development and displacement have a two-way relationship. Development has an impact on movements of people and displacement on development for households, communities and States. A lack of development produces some of the stressors - such as poverty, weak governance, and political instability - that increase people's vulnerability during humanitarian crises and can prompt them to move to seek safety. At the same time, when people are displaced, host communities may experience changes that can impede their economic, social and human development. There is therefore a need for new approaches that recognize the development consequences of displacement and the impact of displacement on refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations themselves, as well as on countries of destination, first asylum, transit and origin.

1. Impact on destination and transit countries

Countries in the Arab region face significant challenges as destination, first asylum and transit points for refugees, migrants, IDPs and other displaced populations. The impact of such movements varies depending on factors such as the size of the population in absolute numbers and as a proportion of the destination or transit country's population;

the wealth of that country and the areas in which the displaced live; whether or not they are in camps; the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of those forced to move; the degree of their need for basic services such as emergency or sustained health care, food assistance, cash support, education, and psychosocial services; the prevalence of protection problems, such as sexual and gender-based violence; the rate of displacement and how long displaced populations stay; and the combination of government and civil society agencies responding to the crisis and the cost thereof. The impact of those factors may also vary according to the phase of displacement: the emergency phase, protracted displacement and return pose different problems.

Burdens may be defined by the mix of refugees, migrants and other displaced populations with which a country is contending. A recent report from the Lebanese Ministry of Environment and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) noted that, as of May 2014, Lebanon was dealing with officially registered Syrian refugees, "unregistered Syrian refugees residing in Lebanon, Palestinian refugees from Syria and Lebanese returnees from Syria". The total affected population constituted 28.9 per cent of the country's pre-conflict population.⁵⁹

Many of those factors create extraordinary demands on Arab States. The countries hosting most refugees and asylum-seekers are developing countries, with scarce resources to assist the displaced (table 26). Per capita income in Mauritania, Yemen and the Sudan, for instance, is \$3, \$4 and \$5 a day respectively.⁶⁰

Principal destination, first asylum and transit countries of refugees from Arab countries who have moved outside the region include: Kenya (423,153 Somali refugees), Ethiopia (246,603 Somali refugees), Chad (about 450,000 refugees, primarily from the Sudan), and

Table 26. Countries hosting 20,000 or more persons of concern to UNHCR in mid-2014 (in order of total population of concern as a percentage of total population)

	Country/ territory of asylum	Total refugees and people in refugee- like situations	Asylum- seekers (pending cases)	Returned refugees	IDPs protected/ assisted by UNHCR, including people in IDP-like situations	Persons under stateless- ness mandate of UNHCR	Total population of concern to UNHCR	Total population of concern as a percentage of total population	Annual Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita
1	Syrian Arab Republic	149,377	2,512		6,520,800	160,000	6,832,691	29.9	-
2	Lebanon	1,115,988	2,423				1,122,874	25.1	\$9,928
3	Jordan	736,579	10,466				747,045	11.6	\$5,214
4	Somalia	2,502	9,587	9,944	1,133,000		1,165,505	11.1	-
5	Iraq	254,215	7,053	8,354	1,903,943	120,000	2,329,610	7	\$6,683
6	Sudan	240,703	4,900	13,129	2,089,100		2,479,885	6.5	\$1,753
7	Djibouti	20,695	3,814				24,509	2.8	\$1,668
8	Kuwait	614	1,038			93,000	94,652	2.8	\$52,197
9	Yemen	245,801	9,397		334,512		589,710	2.4	-
10	Mauritania	79,961	598				80,559	2.1	\$1,069
11	Libya	25,561	6,608		63,985		108,594	1.8	\$11,965
12	Egypt	237,117	25,194			22	262,333	0.3	\$3,315
13	Algeria	94,144	3,894				98,038	0.25	\$5,361
14	Saudi Arabia	565	99			70,000	70,664	0.25	\$29,962

Sources: UNHCR, UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2014 (Annexes). Available from www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c4d6.html (accessed 30 January 2015); and World Bank, World Development Indicators Database. Available from <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators> (accessed 30 January 2015).

Note: Total population of concern excludes 4,375,050 registered Palestinian refugees in the area of operations of UNRWA in Jordan, Lebanon and the State of Palestine.

Turkey (more than 1.75 million, primarily from the Syrian Arab Republic). With the exception of Turkey, these countries have very low per capita GDP (from a low of \$505 annually in Ethiopia, to a high of \$1,246 in Kenya).⁶¹

More than half the world's refugees now live outside camps.⁶² Most of those displaced in the Arab region reside in cities and towns. Refugee camps established decades ago to accommodate Palestinian refugees have

since become embedded in the towns and cities that surround them.⁶³ Most refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations in the region have sought relative safety in the cities of Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Mogadishu and Khartoum, among others. Their numbers have grown in recent years due to the crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic: in the past four years, emerging towns and cities in Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon have undergone immense socioeconomic transformation, absorbing large numbers of Syrian refugees. As of September 2013, the World Bank reported that the cost of the Syrian conflict for Lebanon amounted to \$2.6 billion.⁶⁴

A large influx of refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations has reportedly affected housing markets and can exacerbate an already acute lack of housing in towns and cities. With rising demand come rising prices, which weigh heavily on the displaced and urban poor who struggle to afford the cost of food, utilities and housing. In Jordan, most Syrian refugees live in substandard dwellings and increasingly below the poverty line. In Lebanon, thousands of Syrian refugees live in informal tented settlements scattered across the country.

Although some perceive mass displacement to have a detrimental impact on receiving countries, benefits can accrue with proper management. Refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations often bring skills with them: among them are medical personnel, teachers, business people and others with much to offer to destination, first asylum and transit countries if given the opportunity. Humanitarian aid operations reacting to large-scale displacement can bring employment to host communities. Aid agencies often help to restore infrastructure, provide services, and otherwise contribute to host communities. Too often, however, such potential benefits are not realized. Funding may be too inflexible to permit comprehensive programmes for

the displaced populations and local host communities alike: the latter may view the former as competitors for limited jobs and resources, leading Governments to limit access to the labour market even for those with needed skills.

2. Impact on countries of origin

Large-scale internal displacement clearly poses challenges for such countries, many of which have little capacity to address their needs.

The adverse impact on affected communities in countries hosting refugees and IDPs is worsened when humanitarian aid for refugees and IDPs is offered with little reference to the needs of the host populations or the country's development needs. Resources allocated by the international community are often inadequate to meet all needs in acute or protracted crises. In some instances, it is easier to obtain resources to aid refugees than for IDPs, persons without formal legal status, self-settled persons, and others similarly affected by conflict. The funding for humanitarian assistance is usually short-term and geared towards life-saving interventions, whereas development programmes require longer-term investments and a more holistic approach to the needs of the entire population in a given location. However, short-term humanitarian aid funding cycles persist even when the displacement becomes protracted, with many programmes funded on annual and sometimes shorter time frames. At times, development actors are not even present. Internal displacement, in particular, usually occurs in situations of instability and, sometimes, State failure, making it difficult for development institutions to operate effectively. The very circumstances that lead to displacement mean that achievement of development goals, even in contexts of return and reconstruction, often appear out of reach.

Cross-border movements also affect origin countries. When professionals and business

people, in particular, leave en masse, the economies of the countries of origin can suffer greatly. Countries to which refugees return also face difficulties, particularly when they have suffered decades of conflict. In Iraq, for example, conflict resulted in substandard housing, inadequate water and sanitation treatment, power outages, damaged roads and transport, a lack of recreation spaces, and weaknesses in public food distribution in towns and cities.⁶⁵ Refugee and IDP returnees have often been unable to return to their homes and been forced to reside in camps or so-called “squatter settlements”, such as former military camps, public buildings and disused land, often without recourse to justice or access to basic services and at risk of eviction.⁶⁶ Reintegration programmes run by organizations such as UNHCR often need to address contested property rights for destroyed homes or ones that have been occupied by other people.

The abrupt return of migrants to countries of origin from countries experiencing crisis may also create challenges, particularly in cases of large-scale return, when remittances from abroad make up a large part of the economy, and returning migrants need urgent financial, medical and other humanitarian aid. In Egypt, the largest recipient of remittances in the Arab region, hundreds of thousands of migrants working in Libya have been forced by violence to return in recent years, prompting the Government to make provisions for their return, in spite of ongoing socioeconomic difficulties at home.⁶⁷ The return of 150,000 Chadian migrants from Libya in 2011 posed considerable reintegration challenges for them and receiving communities. Many returning migrants had long ago left the country and had had limited communication with their home communities. Almost all returned empty-handed. Those still in touch with their families had been the main providers of material support in the form of remittances.⁶⁸

3. Impact on refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations

The forced movement of people has profound effects on those who must flee their homes. The effects are felt in camps and non-camp settings.

Refugees and IDPs outside camps tend to live in underserved areas, exacerbating pre-existing vulnerabilities related to displacement, social and legal discrimination, and poverty. Interspersed among other marginalized groups, including rural-urban migrants, foreign migrant workers and the urban poor, refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations often have similar needs and experiences to those of the local communities where they reside. Shared sources of human insecurity include: overstretched infrastructure and limited access to essential services; food insecurity; scarce employment opportunities; poor transportation; legal and social discrimination; criminality; limited access to justice; and a lack of urban planning or coherent development.⁶⁹ Displaced populations may experience greater challenges due to their lack of social safety nets; xenophobia; exploitation; illegality or a lack of documentation; restrictions on freedom of movement; and the trauma of events that led to their displacement. However, as UNHCR noted in its 2014 Policy on Alternatives to Camps, living away from camps can have advantages, including increased opportunities for self-reliance and “greater dignity, independence and normality as members of a community, either from the beginning of displacement or as soon as possible thereafter”.

The main problems associated with camps for refugees and IDPs are the haste in which they are frequently established (often in remote areas with limited natural resources), lack of basic infrastructure and planning and, at times, limitations on the rights and freedoms of individuals.⁷⁰ Such circumstances can lead to overcrowding, insecurity (particularly for women and girls), malnutrition and outbreaks

of communicable disease. In the months following the establishment of Zaatari camp in Jordan, outbreaks of measles, scabies, diarrhoea, hepatitis A and other diseases were reported, attributed to poor sanitation and overcrowding.⁷¹ Additionally, instances of harassment and sexual and gender-based violence created high levels of insecurity.⁷² Conditions have since improved. Camps may adversely affect the local environment and fuel social tensions, through deforestation and subsequent soil erosion, loss of habitat and wildlife, air pollution, water depletion and contamination, as well as energy and transport problems.⁷³

The needs and capacities of refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations depend largely on how vulnerable or resilient they were beforehand. At the height of some crises everyone in the vicinity may be vulnerable due to the widespread chaos and lack of resources. Such was the case during the 2011 famine in southern Somalia, when 3.7 million people needed humanitarian assistance.⁷⁴ In other cases, such as that of IDPs in the Sudan and Yemen, an individual's resilience can be eroded by the duration of displacement or its recurrence.⁷⁵ The ability to cope can be related to demographic and socioeconomic factors: some groups, such as young children, the elderly and disabled, are inherently vulnerable. Others, such as women heads of households, ethnic and religious minorities, the poor, and trafficked persons, may have more acute needs because they lack support systems. Sometimes people may be vulnerable because of their status, in particular individuals residing in a country as migrants in an irregular situation, such as sub-Saharan Africans in Libya.⁷⁶ Gender and sexual orientation can also contribute to vulnerability. Crises affect people in different ways. In times of conflict, women and girls can be more exposed to sexual violence. Men and boys run a greater risk of forcible recruitment into armed groups, although they are by no means exempt from sexual violence.⁷⁷ Crises and displacement can be conducive to human

trafficking, as traditional support structures and the rule of law break down and people resort to risky coping strategies.⁷⁸ The use of irregular means of transport, border closures and deportations can exacerbate the vulnerability of refugees, migrants, and other displaced populations across the region.

Bridging the divide between displacement and development planning would help displaced populations and host communities. The following sections look first at adopting a development approach in responses to displacement and, secondly, how to mainstream displacement into development planning.

G. Developmental approaches to displacement

Since the 1980s, there have been repeated calls to bridge the gap between humanitarian and development responses to refugee crises, especially in cases of protracted displacement with no significant change in circumstances or alternative solutions in sight. Development-oriented projects in such situations generally take one of two forms. The first are small-scale projects that address a variety of needs – such as health care, employment and education – with particular attention paid to enhancing self-reliance. For example, with greater capacity to provide for themselves, refugees are better prepared to integrate into local society if settlement becomes an option in the country of asylum. This in turn can reduce the costs of assisting refugees in protracted crises. If local integration is not possible, repatriation or integration following resettlement in a third country might be facilitated by skills and resources acquired by the refugees. The hope is that host countries and communities will, in turn, benefit from the contributions of refugees.

The second type of project are programmes to improve infrastructure in the destination/ first asylum or transit country and the quality

of essential services for local host populations, who are often among the poorest in their own countries. Such programmes seek to provide access to livelihoods for the displaced and host populations - a tall order in many places.

Development-oriented programmes for refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations must avoid overburdening what are often scarce facilities like schools and health services that cannot grow quickly enough to meet the needs of new beneficiaries. The displaced are too often integrated into existing programmes without adequate financial or human resources to prevent a deterioration in service quality for existing beneficiaries. By contrast, dedicated refugee services may expand access for all if they open to the surrounding population. They may also provide employment for local communities.

Recent research shows mixed though, in some cases, promising benefits to local host populations in situations where refugees have access to labour markets and other livelihoods. Well educated refugees contribute to local communities when they are employed in health services, schools and other enterprises and expand services. In Jordan, for example, Iraqi physicians with certain areas of expertise have been employed in local health services. Those with access to remittances from the expatriate community spend them in the local economy, as witnessed in the case of the Somali expatriate community in Yemen.⁷⁹


Often, however, the results are uneven. In Tanzania, refugees have provided cheap labour in sectors such as agriculture, construction, housekeeping and catering. The presence of refugees has affected the wages of local non-skilled workers and benefited local entrepreneurs. An increase in demand for rental housing from well-to-do refugees or expatriate aid personnel in Peshawar, Pakistan, during the 1980s and 1990s particularly benefitted local property owners to the detriment of Pakistanis looking for rental

housing. Thus, people in host communities with resources, education or power are better positioned to benefit from the refugee presence, while those without can become further marginalized.⁸⁰

Access to work can change gender dynamics among the displaced and between them and local hosts. Often displaced women can enter the labour market more readily than their male counterparts. They often work in private, informal and less regulated settings, especially as domestic workers, than the more formal occupations more likely to be occupied by men. While such employment may lead to greater vulnerability to abusive working conditions, it can also protect women against sexual exploitation resulting from power relationships that often exist when refugees depend greatly on humanitarian assistance.⁸¹

Development-oriented assistance can also play an important role in the reintegration of return refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations in communities of origin as well as in their integration into new communities, including after resettlement to third countries. (Re-)Integration is a two-way process, in which initiatives must address not only the needs of returnees but also those of the communities they are joining. People who remained in place during a conflict may resent those who return after the fighting ceases. They may also be suspicious of their political affiliations. Even when returnees are welcomed back, receiving communities may be ill-equipped to assist them. Housing, schools, health centres and workplaces may have been destroyed by fighting or natural hazards. For instance, the remnants of weapons or landmines may lie in fields previously used to grow crops. Additionally, Governments are likely to be in transition and lacking in financial resources or expertise, and the rule of law may not have been re-established. The arrival of large numbers of returnees puts additional pressures on fragile systems. In such situations, particular attention must be

Figure 39. Total funding for the Syria crisis 2015, as of 30 March 2015



* This funding includes donor commitments and contributions towards the Syria Response Plan 2015 and the Syria regional refugee and resilience plan (3RP) 2015, as well as contributions outside these frameworks (to United Nations agencies, NGOs or the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement) in Syria and neighbouring countries, as reported to FTS and UNHCR.

**The \$4.5bn represents agency requirements in support of activities for refugees and resilience. It excludes the amount required by the Governments of Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon through the 3RP.

Source: Financial Tracking Service of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Available from <http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=special-syriancrisis> (accessed 3 June 2015).

paid to issues important to returnees and host communities, including: property rights; the restoration of livelihoods; delivery of services such as health and education; security; accountable and responsive government, and the rule of law.⁸² Addressing those issues is essential to ensuring that returnees are able to contribute to the quest for peace and sustainable development.

In response to the Syrian crisis, 200 partner organizations coordinated by UNHCR and UNDP – in partnership with Egypt, Iraq,

Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey – have developed the Regional Refugee Resilience Plan (3RP) for 2015-2016, which incorporates existing and emerging national plans of neighbouring host countries. It adopts “an innovative, integrated approach that combines protection and humanitarian relief efforts with more focus on supporting national plans and development interventions to build resilience among individuals, communities and institutions across sectors”,⁸³ especially in middle-income countries. Assistance targets include Syrian refugees, Palestinian refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic (and in the case of Lebanon, Lebanese returnees from the Syrian Arab Republic), and members of local communities in the neighbouring host countries, which includes Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The idea of the 3RP is to take into account the needs of refugees and host communities in planning from the outset. Success is contingent on sufficient funding being received and continued cooperation among national and international actors.

H. Mainstreaming displacement into development planning

In its *Mainstreaming Migration into Development Planning* handbook, the Global Migration Group notes that mainstreaming requires “assessing the implications of migration on any action (or goals) planned in a development and poverty reduction strategy”, which means mainstreaming migration and development concerns into legislation, policies and programmes at all levels (local, national and, if applicable, regional) and at all stages of development planning. It is particularly important now, as Governments focus on the post-2015 development agenda, which will set priorities and indicators for the coming decades. It requires the involvement of ministries concerned with development, finance, urban planning, employment, education, health care, the environment, and those responsible for

policies and programmes on refugees, IDPs, returnees, asylum-seekers and migrants. Civil society, including humanitarian organizations assisting such people, should also be involved. The participation of municipal representatives and others with knowledge of the impact on development of displacement at the local level is essential.

Poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) and national development plans provide an opportunity to assess the impact of displacement on future development and how to counteract its adverse effects. Several Arab countries refer to displacement issue in their PRSPs and national development plans.

Refugees are cited in the chapter on challenges and opportunities in Jordan's PRSP, but little is said thereafter on how to address that challenge.⁸⁴

Mauritania's 2013 PRSP includes strategies for helping to reintegrate returning refugees. Support initiatives include: the conversion for agricultural use of 369 hectares of land by the National Agency to Support the Integration of Refugees (ANAIR); agricultural inputs and the allocation of 204 hectares of irrigated land; efforts to increase personal income; and sustainable integration of repatriated persons through the creation of community stores and support for income-generating activities. The PRSP sets forth steps to be taken to guarantee full rights to returnees and recognizes the importance of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the need for more robust measures to protect migrants passing through Mauritania.⁸⁵

In its PRSP, the Sudan states the need "to foster national reconciliation, integrate the internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees into viable communities and sustainable livelihood, and adopt inclusive governance institutions" which are "essential for building peace, security and shared economic growth". It indicates that local integration may be an option for long-standing

refugee populations: "Formal local integration, with its legal and sociocultural dimensions, will need to be an option as many of these refugees are unlikely to be willing to return to their countries of origin after decades of living in Sudan, and many were born in Sudan by refugee parents." With regard to IDPs, consultations with IDPs and the communities into which they would be integrated are proposed, as well as partnerships with international relief and development agencies for reintegration, under a strong government-led coordinating mechanism.⁸⁶

A barrier to mainstreaming displacement into development plans is their timeline, which is typically four or five years. Donors also define priorities in multi-year increments. For example, the European Union's Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument with Lebanon for 2007-2013 outlined steps needed to improve living conditions for Palestinian refugees but, not surprisingly, did not anticipate the influx of Syrian refugees.⁸⁷ The 2014-2019 strategy did note the challenges presented by the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic and the emerging refugee crisis. Most of the focus, however, was on the humanitarian needs of the refugees in the short term, with less discussion of ways to address the potential impact on Lebanon's development or longer-term needs.⁸⁸ When mass movements of people occur during the period covered by such plans, development actors are often unprepared to incorporate the new reality into planning processes established years before the crisis. This is less of an issue in situations of protracted displacement.

I. Five key areas of focus for a development approach to displacement in the Arab region

Mainstreaming of forced population movements into development initiatives is necessary in order to: (a) mitigate the

adverse effects of displacement and prevent a slowdown in the attainment of development goals in countries of origin, first asylum, transit and destination (which may be typified by a lack of access to rights for displaced populations, scarcity of resources available to them and host populations, long-term dependency on host State services and outside aid, onward irregular migration, and brain drain in countries of origin); and (b) harness the development opportunities provided by those movements (e.g. the import of labour, skills, and trade and industry capacity, and the greater availability of financial and technical assistance to expand essential services and infrastructure). To achieve that, all stakeholders, including refugees, IDPs, other displaced populations, host communities, local and national governments in countries of origin, first asylum, transit and destination, and donors, must be involved in all phases of displacement.⁸⁹

The remainder of this chapter examines the challenges and opportunities in five key areas: health; education and opportunities for young people; environmental sustainability; labour markets, human capital and remittances; and social cohesion and stability. A number of human rights enshrined in international law are of particular relevance to those areas and should underpin the consideration of displacement issues in development planning in Arab countries. They include: the prohibition of discrimination; the right to education; the right to an adequate standard of living; the right to work; the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health; the right to liberty and security of the person; the right to freedom of movement subject to certain limited restrictions; and the right to freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. These rights are interdependent, meaning that the absence of one may impact individuals' enjoyment of other rights. With some exceptions, they are also universal in that they apply to all persons regardless of their legal status.

The aforementioned rights are articulated in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and other international treaties. The latter include: the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel and Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.

The following subsections reveal the linkages between displacement and key areas of development and discuss relevant legal and policy frameworks. They look at challenges and promising practices for addressing the needs of refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations, reducing the burden on host communities, and helping to achieve broader development aims.

1. Health

The fundamental right to health warrants an inclusive and equitable approach to ensure the provision of quality and timely health care, as well as to safe and potable water, safe food, adequate nutrition and housing, healthy working and environmental conditions, health-related education, and gender equality. Health services, goods and facilities must be available, accessible and of good quality, and care must be provided without discrimination on any grounds.⁹⁰

Accordingly, refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations with physical and mental health needs should be provided with immediate access to quality health-care services to address those needs, without adversely affecting the broader population. Boosting

health service capacity is essential to achieving sustainable development.

Overall health indicators in the Arab region have improved significantly since 1970, with a decline in infant mortality and an average rise in life expectancy of 19 years – the largest increase of any region in the world.⁹¹ Premature death and disability induced by communicable diseases has decreased,⁹² although non-communicable illnesses, such as ischemic heart disease, diabetes, chronic kidney disease and mental disorders have increased.⁹³ Average life expectancy varies significantly across the Arab region, from 50 and 57.1 years in Somalia and the Sudan, to 78.2 and 81.5 years in Qatar and Lebanon, respectively. The region's LDCs (the Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia, the Sudan and Yemen) face the toughest health-related challenges. All but the Comoros host 20,000 or more persons of concern to UNHCR (see table 26). They face a "double disease burden," due to lingering problems of infectious disease, maternal and child health issues, malnutrition and related disorders, and chronic health ailments that require more advanced care.⁹⁴

(a) Displacement and health

The health of refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations is intrinsic to the health and well-being of the overall population. During emergencies, the timely provision of health care in camps and non-camp settings may prevent the outbreak and spread of communicable disease within displaced and host populations. In situations of prolonged displacement, access to quality health care for forced migrant and host communities is a key to achieving development goals - healthy populations live longer, possess greater capabilities, and contribute more to society and the economy. In post-conflict situations, when mental health disorders are often more prevalent, the provision of mental health and psychosocial support is of particular importance, in order to ensure that the

individual and collective healing indispensable for sustainable recovery and growth takes place.⁹⁵

General Comment No. 14 on the Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, adopted by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 2000, states that public health policies should be adopted to address the health concerns of the whole population, paying particular attention to vulnerable or marginalized groups, including refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations.⁹⁶ In certain instances – particularly at the onset of displacement - those fleeing from countries with underdeveloped or severely damaged health infrastructure may require more care.⁹⁷ They may have specific needs, such as treatment for wounds and mental health problems arising from displacement – especially in the context of conflict and generalized violence.⁹⁸ As crisis situations become protracted, the health concerns of refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations become fairly similar to those of host communities, which underlines the need for similar or equitable access to quality health care for all.⁹⁹

It is especially important to build upon the capacity of existing health systems in countries that host refugee, IDPs and other displaced populations. Resources should be allocated so as to reduce suffering and promote well-being, without harming those at the lower end of the welfare scale. Governments may be obliged to seek international cooperation, and the international community has a duty to respond with sustained assistance to build upon existing capacity.¹⁰⁰

Existing health infrastructure may also be supplemented with parallel services, provided that they operate in coordination with local and national governments and meet minimum health standards. The private sector, including through the provision of technical expertise and partnerships with the public sector,

NGOs and other civil society entities, such as religious charities, can all contribute to the provision of high quality universal health care. Refugees, IDPs and other displaced persons with health sector experience can be hired to ensure continuity of care - particularly in times of emergency. In post-emergency settings, expatriates may play a critical role in rebuilding and strengthening health systems in countries of origin, either through remittances or offers of technical assistance.¹⁰¹

(b) Legal and policy landscape

The 1946 Constitution of the World Health Organization (WHO) enshrines the highest attainable standard of health as a fundamental right of every human being. Several international legal instruments have since recognized or referred to the right to health, and every State has ratified at least one human rights treaty acknowledging the right to health.¹⁰² In the Arab region, the 2012 Riyadh Declaration outlines an 18-point “Commitment for National Action” on non-communicable diseases. For the provision of health services in times of acute and protracted humanitarian crises, the *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response* developed by the Sphere Project provides guidelines for donors and service providers. In the chapter on Minimum Standards in Health Action, it is underlined that health initiatives should be designed to close the gap between existing living standards and the Sphere minimum standards. UNHCR has published *Ensuring Access to Health Care: Operational Guidance on Refugee Protection and Solutions in Urban Areas*, the underlying premise of which is the promotion of a multisectoral, multi-stakeholder approach that achieves equity in health access for refugees and the urban poor alike.

The Minimum Initial Service Package for Reproductive Health in Crisis Situations, developed by the Inter-Agency Working

Group of Reproductive Health in Crises, covers gender-based violence, maternal and newborn care, and prevention and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases; it offers standards for humanitarian actors designed to prevent death and disability among women and girls (displaced or otherwise affected by crises), while emphasizing the delivery of comprehensive reproductive health care for all.¹⁰³

Goal 3 of the Open Working Group proposal for Sustainable Development Goals, “Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages”, includes as a target achieving “universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, access to quality essential health-care services, and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all.”¹⁰⁴

(c) Existing challenges

Short- and long-term challenges affect the displaced, local host populations and the capacity of health-care systems to meet their needs in contexts of conflict and violence.

Acute emergencies can lead to a sharp rise in the number of injuries and deaths due to violence; large-scale population displacement; and the weakening of public health systems, which are among the first casualties of crises triggered by conflict and violence. Health infrastructure may be targeted and health-care personnel - including expatriate health workers - forced to flee, leaving health systems in countries of origin severely under-equipped to respond to the increased need among the population, as has been witnessed in recent years in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic.¹⁰⁵

Mortality may increase in situations of mass movement to areas with poor resources, where overcrowding, inadequate food and water, poor hygiene, lack of shelter and exposure to the elements can lead to outbreaks of disease. In such emergency situations, priorities

include securing a healthy environment, providing life-saving and maternal health care, and preventing outbreaks of communicable disease through mass immunization of children and other vulnerable populations against epidemics such as polio and measles.¹⁰⁶ It is crucial for the international community to offer adequate support from the outset of an emergency, in order to avoid placing an unmanageable burden on local host populations and Governments.

Women face a growing array of barriers (social, cultural, administrative, logistical, legal, or financial) to routine and emergency reproductive and maternal health care during conflicts and disasters, and during displacement, when their needs may be greatest. According to Médecins Sans Frontières, caesarean section is the most common major surgery undertaken following conflict and natural disasters, surpassing surgery for the wounded. Lack of access to care puts women and their babies at risk of life-threatening complications; and children whose mothers die are more likely to die within 1-2 years of their mothers' death.¹⁰⁷ Somalia (850 deaths per 100,000 live births), followed by the Sudan (360), has the highest maternal mortality rates in the region according to data recorded between 1990 and 2013.¹⁰⁸ A lack of adequate healthcare facilities, chronic conflict, recurring natural disasters and mass displacement are all contributing factors, in addition to the prevalence of female genital mutilation (FGM), which gives rise to a range of health complications.¹⁰⁹ UNFPA estimates that 97.9 per cent of women in Somalia and 88 per cent in the Sudan are affected by FGM, although the practice is now illegal in the Sudan and was outlawed in the provisional constitution of Somalia. UNFPA also indicates that FGM is less common among girls aged 15-19 than among women aged 19-45.¹¹⁰ Just as lack of access to care may have life-threatening consequences for IDPs, lack of knowledge and sensitivity among healthcare providers in host countries

unfamiliar with the practice may also compound the suffering of women refugees and other displaced populations.¹¹¹

Mental health challenges occur in the wake of acute and protracted crises. Every individual may react to the same events differently and adopt positive and negative coping strategies.¹¹² Children in family units are often remarkably resilient, but adults, particularly the elderly, may struggle more to adapt to upheaval.¹¹³ Displacement and the events leading to it can exacerbate existing mental health issues. Individuals may have ideas about mental health problems and treatment that differ from those of local, national and international healthcare providers and healers. The continuation, aggravation or surfacing of severe mental health disorders in times of crisis often requires more intensive and individualized treatment. Psychosocial support in the form of community-based programming can be most cost-effective and conducive to the rehabilitation and well-being of refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations.¹¹⁴

Refugees, IDPs, other displaced populations and local host communities residing in rural areas often face greater difficulty in accessing care, due to the cost of transport and distance to health-care centres.¹¹⁵ Other obstacles can be linked to matters of age, gender, ethnicity, race, nationality, religion, education and wealth. In addition, forced migrant communities may experience greater or additional barriers, including language, lack of documentation, discrimination, and unfamiliarity with health rights and entitlements.¹¹⁶ The availability of health care for refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations may diminish over time, if host Governments do not receive adequate support to provide quality health services for all.¹¹⁷

Transit and destination countries tend to address the health-care needs of refugees and other displaced populations either by

establishing parallel systems, or including those needing medical attention in existing public health-care systems.

In camp situations, parallel health systems are the norm. Erecting and managing such facilities is the principal challenge. Often, international agencies and civil society organizations with experience in working with refugees and IDPs run them. They also provide parallel health services to non-camp populations in many countries. Absorbing large numbers of the displaced into public health systems, as is occurring in a number of Arab countries, presents different challenges for host countries. In Jordan, for example, a joint 2013 report issued by the Government and the United Nations estimated that “in Irbid and in Mafraq, Syrian patients represent 10.45 per cent and 9.59 per cent of total patients, respectively, with the percentage as high as 18 per cent in some locations”. The ratio of health specialists had thus decreased in all categories, as had the ratio of hospital beds per habitant. The report further noted that the Ministry of Health had already incurred \$53 million in additional costs to cover the health needs of Syrian refugees during 2012 and the first quarter of 2013.¹¹⁸ Often, public health systems have limited capacity to meet the health-care needs of the host population and are overwhelmed by the arrival of refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations. National and local governments may legitimately fear that incorporating displaced populations into the country’s public health system will entail cost-shifting from international donors and their parallel systems to their own budgets.

In post-conflict environments, IDPs, returnees and local host populations in countries of origin face barriers to accessing quality health care. Hospitals and clinics may have been destroyed, preventing access to needed services. Health-care professionals who emigrated during the conflict may not have returned, and as a result, there may be gaps

in service provision. Although the overall conflict may have ended, additional health problems linked to war may remain: pollutants from chemical weapons and other remnants of warfare such as landmines can continue to pose serious health risks, along with lingering violence that leads to injuries and deaths. In Iraq, for example, more than 1.6 million Iraqis across the country were thought to be affected by unexploded ordinance by 2013; of these, nearly one million children were affected by the presence of landmines, with hundreds wounded or killed by exploding cluster bombs since 1991.¹¹⁹

At the regional level, mass population displacement has had a significant impact on health care in recent years.¹²⁰ Increasingly, people living in countries affected by conflict are compelled to travel temporarily to neighbouring countries for treatment of wounds and chronic ailments.¹²¹ However, the majority cannot afford the costs involved and this can deepen the disparity between those who can and cannot access health care in countries affected by crises.

As the situation improves, more investment in adequate and affordable health care is needed, along with nurturing of present and future medical professionals and health-care workers in order to convince them to stay or return to work in countries recovering from conflict.

(d) Promising practices

Confronted by numerous challenges, Governments, with support by various stakeholders, have shown generosity and flexibility in adapting to changing circumstances and responding to the health needs of populations residing in their territories. Obstacles remain - and more needs to be done to increase services available to women and girls in particular - but the following practices offer useful examples and lessons for future improvements to sustainable health-care provision in the region.

i. Inclusion of refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations in public health services

Mainstreaming provides an opportunity to make access to health care more equitable for refugees, IDPs, other displaced populations and local host populations. Provided that the international community allots adequate financial and technical support to host Governments, health mainstreaming may also help to improve health infrastructure in transit and destination countries. Yemen and Jordan have already demonstrated foresight in their efforts to provide equal access to health care by including refugees and asylum-seekers.

In 2011, the Ministry of Public Health and Population in Yemen and UNHCR signed a memorandum of understanding under which refugees and asylum-seekers have access to national health services, including the HIV/AIDS prevention, care and treatment programme, on a similar basis as nationals, with financial support from UNHCR. Refugees and asylum-seekers have since been provided with primary, emergency, maternal, nutritional, preventative, specialist and pharmacy services through the public health system or, when necessary, specialist non-public health-care services. A further memorandum of understanding was signed in February 2015 and UNHCR was planning to continue expansion of primary health-care mainstreaming of refugees alongside members of the host community in 2015.¹²² However, lasting political stability and security, alongside increased funding from donors, are prerequisites for sustained improvements in public health service provision.

In Jordan, refugees registered with UNHCR have access to free primary and subsidized secondary and tertiary health care. At the height of the Iraqi influx, the Government granted registered refugees access to primary care on the same basis as

Jordanians; secondary care was provided on the same basis as for uninsured Jordanians. Refugees were treated as uninsured non-nationals for tertiary care. Those unable to afford needed tertiary services, such as surgery, applied to the UNHCR Exceptional Care Committee of health professionals for coverage. The United States supported mainstreaming of Iraqi refugees with two programmes: one to deploy Iraqi refugee volunteers to local clinics to help other refugees navigate the Jordanian health-care system; the other to help the Jordanian Ministry of Health to refurbish emergency rooms in hospitals taking in more refugee patients.¹²³

Since late 2014, Syrian refugees have been treated as uninsured Jordanians and are thus entitled to subsidized health care, paying 35-60 per cent of what non-Jordanians pay in medical fees.¹²⁴ The Global Fund has financed a programme, run by IOM, to reduce drug-susceptible and resistant tuberculosis (TB) transmission, morbidity and mortality among refugees and local host populations.¹²⁵

ii. Non-camp parallel health service provision

The “parallel” health sector of non-profit, non-State providers has grown as the role of the public health sector has declined and the presence of national and international aid providers amid recurring crises has expanded, and in the context of the emphasis on religious charity in the region. Although their capacity to serve large numbers is often limited, such non-State actors can provide essential health services - and at times other forms of aid and welfare - to poor and other marginalized groups (including displaced persons), who have heightened needs or face barriers in accessing public or private for-profit medical care. The Jordan Health Aid Society (JHAS) developed its capacity to respond to humanitarian crises with the International Medical Corps,

which provided technical assistance and training, allowing it to help new refugee and local host communities in Jordan living in remote areas (including refugees not registered with UNHCR), as well as providing assistance during humanitarian emergencies elsewhere in the region.¹²⁶

Religious charitable organizations have become prominent providers of health care to refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations.¹²⁷ For example, Islamic charities and church-based organizations have provided health care and water and sanitation services to Somali refugees in Kenya and Ethiopia¹²⁸, refugees and other vulnerable migrants in Egypt,¹²⁹ and Syrian refugees throughout the region. Grass-roots providers may be more attuned to local health needs and better placed to reach people living in remote areas who may otherwise receive no attention. Provided there is close coordination between Governments, parallel service providers can play a key role in host countries such as Lebanon, which relies on decentralized, privatized health-care provision.¹³⁰ Since the crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic began, international agencies in Lebanon have joined local service providers – including faith-based community organizations¹³¹ - to strengthen primary and secondary health-care facilities for refugee and host communities.¹³² In other instances, local religious charities and/or political movements have worked independently to fill gaps in basic health-care provision for displaced populations and other vulnerable groups. More oversight is required to ensure equity and quality of care, but these community-based efforts have been important in expanding access to health care for displaced and host populations.¹³³

iii. Camp-based health service provision

Camp-based health services operate during acute and protracted emergencies

and vary considerably in capacity. The most notable - and durable - example of camp-based health-care provision is embodied by UNRWA, which offers essential health services to all Palestinian refugees residing in its five areas of operation (Gaza Strip, Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and the West Bank) across a network of 128 primary care facilities.¹³⁴ UNRWA works with the public and private sectors to provide care for people with tertiary illnesses and those in need of inpatient care, through referral and reimbursement or subsidy.¹³⁵ Over the years, this health-care provision has proved vital to the health and well-being of Palestinian refugees, and has taken a significant financial burden away from host Governments.

The UNRWA model of employing refugees as health workers or community health volunteers has been replicated in other refugee camps, such as Dadaab (Kenya), Domiz (Iraq), Zaatari (Jordan) and M'bera (Mauritania), and non-camp settings.¹³⁶ Refugees can be involved in health care through participation in public health education campaigns as students, educators and community health facilitators. Displaced persons with health-care expertise may be able to work with local and foreign medical providers to bolster operational capacity, break down cultural and/or language barriers, and build trust between providers and camp residents.

In an effort to improve health coordination inside and outside camps, UNHCR and partners have developed a standardized health information system (HIS) in several countries in the Arab region and beyond to monitor health conditions, needs and programming in camps. The HIS, which is updated regularly, is aligned with national reporting requirements and integrated into health ministry reporting formats, thereby obviating the need to create wholly

separate systems and, in some instances, helping to improve data collection and monitoring by host Governments.¹³⁷

iv. Women's health

Services specific to the needs of refugee and displaced women may be found throughout the region but there has been little systematic assessment of them. In Yemen, Marie Stopes International, in partnership with the Government, UNHCR and UNFPA, operates reproductive and family planning centres for Yemeni and Somali refugee women throughout the country. Health services are offered according to a sliding scale of charges for Yemeni and refugee customers, so as to promote sustainability and ensure that no one is ever denied care because of limited funds.¹³⁸ In northern Iraq, the Department of Health and UNFPA have established reproductive health clinics in camps, distributed reproductive health kits to refugees, and made efforts to recruit medical staff among the refugees.¹³⁹ In the Sudan, UNFPA is working with the Ministry of Health and Midwifery Association to improve midwifery services and access to reproductive health across the country, including among IDP and host communities in Darfur. Efforts have been made to increase the midwifery workforce, develop curricula, and renovate schools throughout the country.¹⁴⁰

v. Mental health

Considerable progress has been made in developing mental health and psychosocial services for the displaced. People have commonly preferred to avoid the stigma traditionally attached to mental illness in the region by seeking care, including "biomedicalized" care, outside the mainstream health-care system, which may or may not be conducive to recovery.¹⁴¹

In Iraq, mental health services prior to 2003 were limited to two mental hospitals

in Baghdad and basic outpatient services elsewhere, and there was no legislative protection for people with mental disorders. In the aftermath of the 2003 invasion, the mental health needs of millions of refugees, IDPs and others affected by violence spurred action to develop mental health and psychosocial services across the country. Since 2004, a more integrated and decentralized system has been built up around much of the country, with 25 mental health units offering inpatient and outpatient services, and 34 outpatient-only units catering to the needs of specific population groups, including four for children and adolescents, one for maternal mental health, one for geriatric mental health, eight for trauma counselling, and one for substance abuse and rehabilitation. Mental health services continue to be integrated into the primary health-care system. Simultaneously, the experience of Iraqi refugees in Jordan encouraged the authorities in Iraq to rethink their approach to mental health for displaced persons and local populations, an indication that displacement can provide opportunities to "build back better" in countries of displacement and refuge.¹⁴²

Progress has also been made, albeit hampered by a lack of financial and human resources in countries enduring chronic conflict and displacement. In Somalia, where millions have been displaced and an estimated one million persons suffer from mental health problems, the Chain-Free Initiative has led to the removal of chains from 1,700 patients in one of four mental health facilities, and is to be expanded elsewhere in the country.¹⁴³

(e) Conclusion

Ensuring the fundamental right to health for all refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations in the region not only benefits the persons concerned, but can also have

a broader, positive impact on the host population. From a development standpoint, contributing to good physical and mental health among the displaced can increase their resilience and better enable them to contribute to the communities in which they reside. Approaches may differ according to context, but initiatives should aim to promote equity, quality and sustainability in the delivery of health care.

2. Education and opportunities for young people

In recent years, progress in broadening access to education has been made across the region. The number of children not attending primary school fell from 6.8 million in 2002 to 4.8 million in 2011, and the number of adolescents out of school dwindled from 4.9 million to 3.8 million.¹⁴⁴ Given the extent to which crises have disrupted schooling, these gains are promising.¹⁴⁵

Access to good quality education is critical for refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations, and for development in the Arab region. This is especially so given the number of children and youth, many with learning gaps, fleeing conflict and violence.¹⁴⁶ In 2013, 47 per cent of refugees in the Middle East and North Africa, and 60 per cent in East Africa and the Horn of Africa, were children, according to UNHCR data.¹⁴⁷ Of those living in Arab countries, one third are under the age of 15 and one fifth are aged 15-24.¹⁴⁸

The impact of conflict on education is illustrated by the case of the Syrian Arab Republic, where literacy rates before the war were above 90 per cent and education spending was almost 5 per cent of GDP. Four years into the conflict, the country had the second worst school enrolment rate in the world, with almost 3 million school-aged children not in school.¹⁴⁹ Failure to address the education needs of refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations will not only hurt individuals but, in the longer term, threaten

regional stability and prosperity if future generations do not acquire the knowledge and capabilities needed to take part in development.

(a) Displacement and education

Education contributes to the formation of human capital, strengthens resilience and well-being, and allows people to participate fully in development. In its general comment No. 13, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights noted in 1999: “Education is both a right in itself and an indispensable means of realizing other human rights. As an empowerment right, education is the primary vehicle by which economically and socially marginalized adults and children can lift themselves out of poverty and obtain the means to participate fully in their communities.”

Since the 1990s, there has been growing recognition that the right of displaced people to education should not be sidelined during emergency response, but must rather be seen as part of the package of priority humanitarian assistance.¹⁵⁰ Education can function as a protection mechanism, a means of imparting survival skills, and a catalyst for personal, social and economic development in emergencies. Schools often serve as safe havens in otherwise insecure environments, offering a semblance of normalcy, structure, stability and hope.¹⁵¹ Given the protracted nature of displacement in the Arab region, it is unrealistic to postpone education until displaced persons return to their countries or communities of origin.

Four components are integral to achieving universal learning: availability, accessibility, acceptability and adaptability. Educational institutions should be *available* to allow displaced people and host communities to learn effectively and in safety. Education should be *accessible* to refugees, IDPs, other displaced populations and local

host communities at all levels of learning, without discrimination or physical and financial barriers for more vulnerable groups. Integrating the gender-specific needs of learners into approaches to education - as well as those of parents, teachers and other education personnel - is crucial to the provision of appropriate, good quality and protective education.¹⁵² The form and substance of education, including curricula and teaching methods, should be *acceptable* and meet minimum education standards approved by States, while taking into consideration the previous learning experiences of displaced populations in countries of origin; and education must be *adaptable*, with sufficient flexibility to accommodate the changing needs and capabilities of societies and communities affected – both directly and indirectly - by forced population movements.¹⁵³ Sustained cooperation and support from the international community is vital to ensuring that those four components are taken into consideration, and that development targets are thereby realized.

Additional stakeholders, including local government, the private sector, NGOs and other civil society actors may have key roles to play in opening access to education to refugees and displaced persons with minimal disruption to the education system in the destination or transit country. Refugees and displaced persons, particularly those with experience in education, and expatriates can help to meet increased demand and facilitate the transition for students from forced migrant communities.

(b) Legal and policy landscape

The responsibility for promoting children's access to quality education rests primarily with national Governments, as stipulated in international human rights and refugee law. The Convention on the Rights of the Child - which all countries in the region have ratified - requires Governments to promote free and compulsory primary schooling for all children,

including those seeking refugee status, in addition to access to secondary education, and tertiary education on the basis of capacity. In some cases, international cooperation may be necessary to share the burden and build capacity. The right to education for all is enshrined in article 26 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, and in provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (articles 4 and 22), and the Convention against Discrimination in Education (article 4) stipulate that all refugees, IDPs and other forced migrant children have the right to education.

Key soft law instruments include the 1990 World Declaration on Education for All, the 2000 Dakar Framework for Action, the 2000 United Nations Millennium Declaration (A/RES/55/2), and the 2005 World Summit Outcome (A/RES/60/1). Education is an integral component of the Open Working Group proposal for Sustainable Development Goals (Goal 4). Targets to be met under that goal by 2030 include: ensuring “that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education leading to relevant and effective learning outcomes”; that they “have access to quality early childhood development, care and pre-primary education so that they are ready for primary education”; and “equal access for all women and men to affordable and quality technical, vocational and tertiary education, including university”.

(c) Existing challenges

At times of acute crisis, displaced populations often settle in poor urban areas, which may lead to efforts to accommodate children and youth in public schools. Governments can experience an influx as a heavy burden on the education system and overcrowding can disrupt learning, reducing the quality

and accessibility of public education. In Lebanon, tens of thousands of children are not attending school, in spite of double shift systems operating in many public schools and other efforts by the Government to increase capacity.¹⁵⁴ In December 2014, UNHCR estimated that half of 387,000 school-age Syrian refugee children were excluded from education, although some of them may be enrolled in private schools.¹⁵⁵

In other instances, the education of refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations may be coordinated by NGOs in camps or urban settings where the local school system cannot accommodate additional pupils. Education can contribute to poverty reduction, stability and economic growth, and help to “restore hope and dignity to people driven from their homes,”¹⁵⁶ but funding from the international community is often inadequate. Thus, education for displaced communities can be of low quality, limited in scope and unevenly accessible. Often schools are seen mostly as a safe haven allowing agencies to identify protection issues, with less focus on learning.¹⁵⁷

In acute and protracted crises, not only schools but often families have limited resources. The disruption to everyday life caused by displacement is the primary cause for the gaps in the education of school-age children, which can be difficult to remediate. They can, however, also result from financial and other difficulties compelling families to withdraw their children from school. Instead, they may have to contribute to the household livelihood through paid or unpaid work, begging in the streets, or taking care of younger siblings or sick relatives.¹⁵⁸ In less developed countries, such challenges linked to poverty may be widespread and affect host communities to a similar degree, as is the case for refugees in M’bera Camp and the local host population.¹⁵⁹

Where refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations flee to areas affected by conflict

and violence, damage to school facilities and internal displacement can result in overcrowding in schools and the use of facilities as shelters.¹⁶⁰ In Gaza, many schools were damaged or transformed into shelters in 2014 for those displaced by hostilities, truncating the education of thousands of refugee children. Nine tenths of 252 UNRWA schools were run on a double or triple shift basis.¹⁶¹

Often, refugees and other displaced populations residing in urban areas face legal and policy barriers that render access to education difficult. In certain instances, refugees and asylum-seekers do not have the legal right to live outside camps or settlements or to access mainstream services. In other cases, they are in States that are not signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and face daily threats of arrest or detention, making it difficult to travel freely to and from schools.¹⁶² In yet other instances, policies in destination, transit and origin countries do not allow for children to join the public education system if they have missed a certain amount of schooling. Additional barriers to education include: lack of documentation, limited opportunities for accreditation, differences between curricula of home and host countries, language barriers, lack of school transport, expenses such as uniforms or textbooks, and unaffordable tuition fees in the case of tertiary institutions.¹⁶³ Even where there are no fees, pupils may lack appropriate clothes, lunch or textbooks, all examples of ‘otherness’ that can hamper cohesion between pupils from local and displaced communities and, consequently, classroom learning. Higher education opportunities for refugees and other displaced people are often limited, and individuals face barriers similar to those at primary and secondary levels, such as nationality restrictions, lack of documentation or accreditation, and unaffordable tuition fees.

Discrimination may prevent displaced children and youth from accessing education. Displaced

children, sometimes ethnically, religiously, linguistically or otherwise different from the local community, may face harassment by other pupils, parents or teachers. Schools can offer a protective environment, but can also be the scene of bullying, gender discrimination, sexual exploitation and corporal punishment.¹⁶⁴ School staff and teachers too seldom have the resources or training to prevent and respond to violence and insecurity, or to meet the heightened needs of displaced children.¹⁶⁵

When displacement lasts for several years, the lack of education, illiteracy and innumeracy adversely affect not only refugees, IDPs and other displaced people, but also local populations and the economy.¹⁶⁶ For Governments in transit and destination countries, maintaining an uneducated population can increase its dependence on State welfare services, exacerbate crime and violence, and result in the underdevelopment of areas settled by such poor populations without basic education and skills. Countries of origin may miss out on remittances from such refugees and displaced people.

In cases of repatriation, the return of an uneducated generation can be detrimental to post-crisis rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts, and may make returnees more vulnerable to exploitative labour. Reintegration of returnee children into the education systems of countries of origin also poses challenges. The schooling of many such children may have been interrupted for months or years. They may have been studying a different curriculum or in a different language before their return.¹⁶⁷ For example, among Iraqi refugees forced to return to Iraq due to the crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic, IOM reported that only 50 per cent of school-aged children among 1,126 assessed returnees were attending full-time education. Particular difficulties were experienced by Arab returnees in northern Iraq, due to the long distances required to reach Arabic-speaking schools, rather than Kurdish speaking schools.¹⁶⁸

(d) Promising practices

Several promising models in education can be seen in various countries of the region, with commendable efforts made in camps and non-camp environments focusing on different modalities of learning. Certain initiatives are focused on children, while others target adolescents and youth. The examples below illustrate the involvement of a broad range of stakeholders – Governments, United Nations agencies, NGOs and community-based organizations, expatriates, refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations. The first Regional Conference on the Protection of Refugee Children in MENA, held in Sharjah in October 2014, highlighted and documented many such practices.

i. Inclusion of refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations in public school education

Accommodating refugees and other displaced populations in public education systems in countries of destination and transit is one way of educating displaced communities without creating parallel systems. If existing infrastructure receives adequate resources, the inclusion of displaced populations in public schools can also have a positive impact on the education received by local pupils. This requires willingness on the part of Governments and considerable technical and financial resources from the international community to shore up and expand existing systems. Yemen, Iraq and Jordan provide examples of accommodating refugees and IDPs in their education systems, and valuable lessons for improving future mainstreaming efforts throughout the Arab region.

Despite its socioeconomic and political difficulties, Yemen has granted refugees free access to public primary and secondary education, including them in its national education programme and

providing schoolbooks. Using their letter of recognition of refugee status, children living outside camps may enrol in public schools and special schools for refugees where the Government covers all expenses, such as teachers' salaries, building maintenance and services.¹⁶⁹ Such documentation may also afford young people - particularly those residing outside camps - an added sense of legitimacy and security. Additional support from the international community in promoting peace and security and strengthening Yemen's national education system could increase enrolment among host communities and refugees, who may not always be able to access schools for safety or logistical reasons.

In northern Iraq, where resources and infrastructure are particularly overstretched due to the influx of Syrian refugees and Iraqi IDPs, the Government has been compelled to meet demand by building new schools and hiring new teachers. Civil society organizations have taken steps to mitigate difficulties in accessing schools encountered by Syrian refugee children, through language training and financial assistance for uniforms, books, food and transport.¹⁷⁰

Upon their arrival in Jordan, Iraqi refugees faced difficulties in accessing education: in the 2006-2007 academic year, approximately 14,000 of an estimated 64,000 displaced Iraqi children in Jordan went to school. Following advocacy from humanitarian groups and the issue of a royal decree in 2007, an additional 24,650 Iraqi children enrolled in 2007-2008. Registration fees and mistrust of public institutions initially impeded access for some children to education, although tuition costs were later subsidized by international organizations and later waived by the Government, resulting in the enrolment of approximately 26,890 more Iraqi children in public schools. In order to support a public school system

overcrowded with Iraqi pupils, UNHCR partnered with the Ministry of Education to fund salaries for 2,000 more teachers and to refit 30 classrooms.¹⁷¹ This model proved relatively successful due to the Government's receptiveness to partnerships and the support given to public schools. On the basis of its experience with Iraqi refugees, the Jordanian Government generously waived tuition fees for Syrian refugees. To the extent that resources allow, humanitarian actors have embarked upon campaigns to encourage children and their families to enrol in formal education.¹⁷² As of September 2013, 96 schools in Jordan had received support to operate multiple shift systems and reduce overcrowding through refurbishment and the addition of prefabricated classrooms.¹⁷³

Teachers from displaced communities can play a constructive role in the classroom. All school staff, whether from forced migrant or host communities, can benefit from training and support on teaching and helping children who have been through war.¹⁷⁴

The destruction of schools poses a major challenge in the wake of conflict. A project in Iraq aimed at reintegrating returnee children in Al-Anbar province "involved returnees as well as the local communities who had stayed in the prioritization of needs. Students, teachers and parents participated in small focus groups and shared their priorities. Most of the families insisted on the need to rehabilitate the water and sanitation systems in the five schools targeted and the priority of preparing the classes for the coming winter."¹⁷⁵ This process was particularly useful in overcoming reticence regarding the enrolment of girls and fears for their well-being.

The policy of offering refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations full and free

access to schools in the face of adversity can be bolstered by increased technical and financial assistance from the international community. Such policies avoid duplicating structures and services, help to minimize tensions between refugees and host communities and can push aid towards developing the country's services to the benefit of displaced and local populations.

ii. Camp-based primary and secondary education

There are some advantages to education in camps. First, in sparsely populated areas with limited access to essential services, the establishment of schools in refugee camps can benefit refugees and the local population, as has been the case in Mauritania.¹⁷⁶ Secondly, it is much easier to measure indicators and conduct assessments in camps, where services are centralized and accessible, than in urban settings, where refugee, IDPs and other displaced populations are often invisible to authorities and agencies. Separate school systems mean that teachers can be recruited more easily from the displaced population, unlike in the national school system, and that the language of instruction and curriculum can be selected to fit the needs of the displaced. Education facilities in camps, particularly where freedom of movement is restricted, can offer structure in the face of adversity and the lack of alternatives, such as finding work. Palestinian refugee camps run by UNRWA offer well established models for camp-based education.

There are 58 Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, the State of Palestine and the Syrian Arab Republic, hosting one third of the registered 1.5 million Palestinian refugees. UNRWA operates 703 schools, 9 vocational colleges, 2 educational science faculties and 2 teacher-training institutes, educating 479,519 pupils and employing 22,646 educational staff.¹⁷⁷ Like the camps themselves, UNRWA-operated schools have

been known to suffer from overcrowding and infrastructure problems.¹⁷⁸ However, a 2014 World Bank Group study observed that pupils attending UNRWA schools in the West Bank, Jordan and the Gaza Strip have achieved higher-than-average results in international assessments, outperforming their peers in public schools. UNRWA teachers reported significantly higher job satisfaction rates than public school teachers, and parental support for and involvement in pupil achievements and activities at UNRWA schools was higher. Although the cost per pupil in UNRWA schools is 20 per cent less than in public schools in Jordan, for example, pupils in UNRWA schools outperformed other pupils in exams. Partially because schools are staffed by and cater to Palestinian refugees, relations between staff and families extend beyond the school campus, creating multiple support networks for pupils through community participation in the school system. The report also found that UNRWA schools, in addition to using the same curriculum and textbooks as host authorities' schools, offer enrichment and remedial classes.¹⁷⁹

iii. Other parallel systems of primary and secondary education

In addition to integration into the national public education system and construction of schools in camps, informal and non-formal school systems are often created by NGOs or refugees in non-camp settings.¹⁸⁰ UNHCR recommends that "setting up parallel education services for refugees should be avoided if possible"¹⁸¹ However, for refugee and other displaced populations to whom the public education system is inaccessible, alternative schooling structures are often the sole option. Usually run by local community-based groups and NGOs with the support of international donors, or by leaders from the displaced communities, they are meant as a stopgap measure until displaced populations

can return to their countries of origin or as a bridge to formal education for children who are out of school. Informal education activities that focus on life skills and vocational training often suffer, however, from a lack of consistent funding, absence of work permits, and difficulties issuing certification, resulting in reduced motivation to pursue studies that may not be recognized by employers.

In Egypt, Sudanese community organizations and charities have opened their own schools and educational programmes. Churches have become prominent service providers for the Sudanese population, with many opening refugee schools (albeit without formal accreditation).¹⁸² Although Sudanese children in such schools cannot obtain certificates recognized by the Egyptian or Sudanese Governments, they may sit a final examination in Egyptian public schools, set by the Ministry of Education. However, the registration process can be difficult for many Sudanese given documentary requirements and the fees necessary to obtain the obligatory residence permit (*iqama*). Many Sudanese children thus cannot enter higher education and face barriers to professional development.¹⁸³ Since 2009, some learning centres in Egypt have adopted the Sudanese curriculum so that children can receive the Sudanese Certificate of Graduation, which allows them to continue their schooling in the Sudan, where Egyptian certificates are not recognized, or in Egyptian universities. All refugee children from African countries studying this curriculum, regardless of nationality, are eligible for certification and to sit for Sudanese Eighth Grade and High School certificates.¹⁸⁴

In Jordan and Lebanon, where the sheer volume of Syrian refugee children and youth has been overwhelming, informal education and accelerated learning courses

have targeted children with learning gaps or who had been unable or ineligible to attend school. Such courses follow an approved curriculum so that children who complete them may enrol in public school or achieve equivalency diplomas. In Lebanon, among Syrian youth for whom formal education is not an option, informal vocational training initiatives in mechanics, electronics repair and maintenance, hairdressing, and computers present opportunities to learn transferable skills that can be used in the Syrian Arab Republic when conditions permit their return.¹⁸⁵

In Turkey, Syrian refugee teachers have led the way to build a string of unofficial schools along the country's southern border, where most refugees live. Volunteer teachers offer a modified Syrian curriculum. Most children in the 25 refugee camps in Turkey, which host 229,000 Syrian refugees,¹⁸⁶ are enrolled in schools. In what may become a promising model for major host countries of Syrian refugees in the Arab region, Turkey's Ministry of National Education is regulating those unofficial schools, and in September 2014 published a directive on refugees' education to the effect that a Turkish school supervisor must be present at every such institution in order to ensure compliance with Turkish educational standards.¹⁸⁷

iv. Tertiary education

Since 1992, UNHCR has supported higher education for refugees predominantly through the Albert Einstein German Academic Refugee Initiative (DAFI), which provides scholarships to higher education institutions in host countries. However, demand for scholarships is far higher than availability: UNHCR usually receives between 10 and 30 applications for each scholarship.¹⁸⁸ In addition, application procedures for DAFI and similar international higher education scholarships are often complex and, at times, mean that

only the highly qualified elite are eligible or able to apply. Other solutions such as distance learning are sometimes available, but higher education remains low on the agenda for most donors, especially in contexts where refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations do not have adequate access to primary and secondary education. Another strategy to increase access to tertiary education for displaced populations is that designed to help refugee students from Western Sahara to pursue secondary and tertiary education abroad, including at universities in Algeria, Cuba, Libya and the Syrian Arab Republic, resulting in waves of education migration from the camps.¹⁸⁹ More recently, an effort launched by Syrian expatriates to facilitate access to primary, secondary and tertiary education abroad for Syrian refugee students has demonstrated the value of expatriate engagement in developing the educational trajectories of fellow nationals.¹⁹⁰

Another promising initiative is Jesuit Commons: Higher Education at the Margins (JC:HEM), which was established in partnership with the Jesuit Refugee Service in 1992 to cater for Sudanese and Somali refugees in Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya. Since then, the programme has grown to serve hundreds of students in Malawi, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic (currently suspended), with plans for further expansion in the future. Students from the refugee and local host communities may complete an online diploma in Liberal Studies awarded by Regis University, and certificate courses in Community Service Learning. There is no requirement to provide certification of previous schooling. Instead, prospective students sit a placement test. Online learning is supplemented by regular class tutorial sessions and field trips.¹⁹¹ Although not yet formally recognized by ministries of higher education, the accessibility of the

course and buy-in from universities around the world constitutes a promising model for the future.

(e) Conclusion

Timely action to ensure universal access to education is an investment that will yield significant returns for development in countries of origin, destination and transit. Substantial international support will be needed to help host countries in the region, some of which are grappling with their own development concerns, to provide good quality education for displaced and host populations alike.

3. Labour markets, human capital and remittances

Displacement threatens livelihood opportunities, often compelling refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations to rely on humanitarian assistance. Dependency on others to meet basic needs can further expose individuals to risk and diminish existing savings, skills and capabilities, forcing individuals to live in destitution. Loss of livelihoods can be a heavy psychological blow to the displaced, who may have long held jobs and enjoyed successful careers prior to their displacement.

For local host populations and Governments in countries of origin, destination and transit in the Arab region, forced population movements can put additional pressure on labour markets and create fears over increased competition, rising prices and depression of wages. Governments are reticent to open up employment for refugees and other displaced populations in the absence of economic opportunities for their own citizens, and progress is often contingent on overall development and growth in transit and destination countries. In countries of origin, the loss of skilled labour and manpower through displacement can be devastating.

Where migrant workers are caught in countries in crisis, the abrupt loss of remittances associated with displacement and return can disrupt household incomes and development plans in countries of origin, unless timely solutions are found to integrate returnees into labour markets at home or abroad.

The inability to overcome such immediate obstacles to self-reliance risks creating economically inactive populations in the long term, which could, in turn, lead to a slowdown in economic growth and other negative development outcomes in countries of origin, first asylum, transit and destination.

(a) Displacement and livelihoods

Labour market access, remittances and other livelihood opportunities offer people ways to endure the shock of displacement, rebuild their lives, and contribute to the production of human capital in origin, transit, first asylum and destination countries.¹⁹² Helping refugees, IDPs and other displaced people to pursue their livelihoods contributes to their survival, safety and dignity.¹⁹³ Sensitivity to gender differences in livelihood programme-planning and labour market regulation is also important, in order to enhance the protection of all displaced populations, and to foster equitable and sustainable access to employment.¹⁹⁴

Granting refugees the right to formal employment may prevent them from entering informal markets and allows the destination or transit country to regulate employment, ensuring that it reflects labour market needs and broader development plans. The State may also harness valuable expertise, increase the size of the domestic market for consumption of goods and services, and benefit from tax revenues, which in turn can be used to develop host and displaced communities.¹⁹⁵ It can reduce dependence on the State's welfare services or outside assistance, make people less vulnerable to exploitation and abuse, and enable them to contribute to the production

of human capital. Refugees can bring and acquire knowledge, skills and training that can increase available resources in the economies of their origin and host communities. They are more likely to return home voluntarily if they are financially able to do so.¹⁹⁶ Humanitarian and development agencies can help refugees, other displaced people and members of host communities to enter or return to the labour market through training and by facilitating access to financial services in order to establish businesses.

Investors and private sector employers, including refugees, IDPs and other displaced people with capital, can play a crucial role in job creation and economic growth for an increased pool of skills and labour – particularly if they perceive favourable investment conditions. A number of Syrian businesses in the catering, textiles and manufacturing industries, for instance, have relocated to Jordan since 2011, creating jobs and investments there. In 2012, the Jordan Investment Board registered JOD114 million of Syrian investment in the country, up from JOD3 million the previous year. A further JOD49 million of investment was registered in the first half of 2013.¹⁹⁷ While the scale of investment is small in comparison to the estimated cost of Syrian refugees to Jordan (an estimated \$625 million in 2013 alone),¹⁹⁸ more aid from the international community could ensure that countries like Jordan hosting Syrian refugees are able to widen the space available legislatively and administratively to encourage investment in infrastructure and the business sector through Syrian and other investors.

Microfinance and access to commercial banking services can foster economic self-reliance among refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations.¹⁹⁹ Safe and reliable sources of credit can contribute to planning and business expansion, and reduce vulnerability to risky borrowing practices and insecure financial schemes among

low-income or unemployed populations.²⁰⁰ Microfinance schemes, provided they include an insurance component to protect borrowers, are an important stepping stone towards achieving sustainable livelihoods for women and youth, who tend to be most affected by unemployment or under-employment in the region.²⁰¹ More informal community lending mechanisms initiated by refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations can also generate the start-up capital needed to establish small and medium-sized enterprises.²⁰²

Remittances play an important role in minimizing shocks and increasing the resilience of households in times of acute crisis. They can ensure the well-being of people left behind in countries of origin and provide support to household members forced to flee elsewhere.²⁰³ Refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations are remitters and recipients of remittances. For example, Somali refugees in the Dadaab refugee camps receive remittances from Somalis resettled abroad while sending their own remittances to less fortunate family members still in Somalia. Such aid is crucial not only to their families, but also to origin country development and prospects of return.²⁰⁴ Iraqi expatriate philanthropic organizations have supported Iraqi refugees in Jordan through partnerships with humanitarian actors and direct financial support in the form of cash assistance and emergency funding.²⁰⁵ For countries of origin in post-conflict transition, money transfers from abroad are vital to facilitating a timely transition toward early recovery.²⁰⁶

When migrants return amid acute crises abroad - as in the cases of Iraqi refugees and Lebanese migrants returning from the Syrian Arab Republic and Egyptian migrants returning from Libya – coordinated efforts by countries of origin to facilitate the timely reintegration of returnees into the local labour market contributes not only to the well-being of households and local communities, but also to sustained economic growth and development

at the national level.²⁰⁷ Responses to the arrival of returnees could include: debt alleviation; financial assistance, income generation projects and labour market insertion; psychosocial assistance; and community development projects. Where the skills and aspirations of returnees are not met by local labour market conditions and needs, facilitated mobility can contribute to restoring migrants' livelihoods and recovery of a crisis-affected area, provided it becomes safe to return to the previous destination country.

(b) Legal and policy landscape

The right to work is recognized in international legal instruments, most comprehensively in article 23 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It is a basic and enabling right, allowing people to live with dignity and contribute to development.

The 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol stipulate that refugees should be afforded "the most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country in the same circumstances, as regards the right to engage in wage-earning employment". Regional conventions include the Declaration on the Protection of Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Arab World, which was adopted in November 1992, and the Arab Convention on Regulating the Status of Refugees in the Arab Countries, adopted by the League of Arab States in 1994. Few Arab countries have national asylum laws on the status of refugees and their right to earn a living. Djibouti, Mauritania, Morocco, the Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen have developed or are drafting such domestic legislation, although in practice, financial and bureaucratic obstacles to accessing formal employment remain. The Kampala Convention specifies that parties will "promote self-reliance and sustainable livelihoods amongst internally displaced persons, provided that such measures shall

not be used as a basis for neglecting the protection of and assistance to internally displaced persons, without prejudice to other means of assistance”.

The UNHCR Global Strategy for Livelihoods for 2014-2018 reaffirms the commitment of the international community to promote the right of refugees to work and self-reliance in order to enjoy economic rights and dignity, while enhancing local markets. Meeting proposed sustainable development goals to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls (Goal 5); promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full productive employment and decent work for all (Goal 8); build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation (Goal 9); and reduce inequality within and among countries (Goal 10) could enhance access to labour markets and build on human capital among refugees, IDPs, and other displaced and host populations.

Members of the Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC) initiative are developing guidelines and practices to augment the protection of international migrants at all phases of a crisis, in countries of origin, transit and destination. Steps to be taken in countries of origin in the post-crisis phase could include:

- Seeking innovative sources of funding to mitigate the repercussions of the loss of income and remittances for returning migrants and their families, such as concessional World Bank International Development Assistance (IDA) financing.
- Requiring recruiters, employers and/or migrants to contribute to migrant welfare funds before departing abroad, in order to aid return migrants in need of assistance.
- Recognizing that many migrants are eager to re-establish employment and income flows, explore alternative means of improving livelihoods, such as microcredit loans to start small businesses, skills training suitable to the local (country of origin) job market, and job matching.²⁰⁸

(c) Existing challenges

A 2010 study on job creation in Arab economies revealed that, while the regional unemployment rate was around 13 per cent in 2010, unemployment was 21 per cent in LDCs and 31 per cent in conflict-affected countries.²⁰⁹ All origin, transit, first asylum and destination countries in the region lack resources and face high unemployment that disproportionately affects women and youth.²¹⁰

Forced population movement results in the loss of material assets, and the breakdown of family and social networks.²¹¹ The savings that some refugees, IDPs and other displaced people bring dwindle over time in the absence of other household income. Individuals may incur debt when fleeing from areas of origin due to travel and smuggling costs, compounding their economic plight.²¹² Individuals lacking income to meet basic needs may resort to prostitution, early and forced marriage, begging, child labour, theft and other criminal acts.²¹³ This, in turn, can expose refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations to considerable protection risks and exacerbate tensions with host communities.²¹⁴

Governments in transit and destination countries have legitimate fears about opening employment to refugees and other displaced populations, particularly in times of acute crisis. Often they are concerned that legalizing work for them will attract more migrants, or discourage those already in the country from returning to their countries of origin. This is especially true when displaced communities arrive in large numbers. Governments often face pressure from nationals who fear increased competition for jobs and lower wages, particularly where unemployment is already high.²¹⁵ However, the effect of increased labour supply on wages depends “on whether the displaced populations complement or substitute the skills of local workers ... If migrants bring new

skills and additional sources of financing, and increase trade and domestic demand,” growth can be enhanced.²¹⁶

Without proper regulation or legal access to employment, individuals affected by displacement are compelled to enter the informal sector, pushing down wages and reducing consumption. When large numbers of refugees and other displaced populations enter a country, the flow of international aid and remittances from family members abroad can be of some benefit to host communities, especially where aid targets the displaced, host communities and sustainable development of infrastructure.²¹⁷

The loss of human capital that stems from the displacement of nationals and migrant workers can be disastrous for countries in the throes of conflict. Forced population movements disrupt the economy and public services, hinder early recovery efforts and, in the longer term, may lead to “brain drain” and economic decline.²¹⁸ Barriers to return after conflicts can include: unemployment, infrastructure damage, housing shortages, bureaucratic obstacles, and political and economic uncertainty. Refugees and other displaced populations may have acquired skills and experience in destination, first asylum and transit countries that cannot be used to earn a living in countries of origin.²¹⁹

Access to livelihoods is a particular problem for migrant workers forced to leave their countries of employment because of conflict or other life-threatening situations. Their loss of work and the capacity to send remittances home can have serious consequences for entire families, communities and even countries. The departure en masse of migrant workers from Libya increased pressure on labour markets in neighbouring countries like Chad, Egypt and Niger and more distant countries such as Bangladesh, the Philippines and Sri Lanka. A survey of 1,283 Egyptian migrants who returned from Libya in 2011

showed that most were from rural areas in Egypt and had been working in construction before being forced to leave. Many had lost savings, assets, documents and personal belongings.²²⁰ The return of some 90,000 migrants to Niger, mostly to poor rural areas prone to food insecurity, increased pressure on already impoverished host communities that had depended on remittances.²²¹

(d) Promising practices

Consensus is growing on the need to focus on ways of putting to good use the self-reliance, skills and capabilities of refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations, and to avoid unsustainable models based on aid-giving and charity.²²² Humanitarian assistance may still be necessary, particularly during crises and instances of large-scale return, but livelihood strategies more in line with the capabilities and aspirations of individuals, labour market needs and development trajectories hold greater promise in the long term.

- i. Vocational training and livelihood opportunities*
Livelihood strategies that take into account existing skills; demographic and gender sensitivities; the safety of refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations; the regulatory environment; and labour market needs can contribute effectively to economic development and the building of human capital.

Access to the formal labour market for refugees is limited in the Arab region. However, in the Sudan, the Government’s Commission on Refugees, UNHCR, Kassala State and the Ministry of Finance of Kassala signed an agreement in late 2013 granting work permits to 30,000 (mostly) Eritrean refugees in that state in eastern Sudan. In that context, UNHCR agreed to work with the Labour Office, under the Ministry of Finance, to inform refugees about workers’ rights, streamline procedures for issuing them with work

permits, and enhance its ability to gather information about the labour market.²²³ In Turkey, the Government has enacted legislation to facilitate access to the formal labour market for Syrian refugees.²²⁴

Less formal programmes that target individuals from refugee and host communities promote equality and social cohesion. In Jordan, for example, Iraqi refugee and Jordanian women have been trained to establish small home-based enterprises selling food products, enabling them to work in the safety of their homes while generating income for their families without the need for childcare.²²⁵ One NGO in Cairo ran a domestic work training programme for refugee women and subsequently placed them in Egyptian homes. The women were accompanied on their first day at work and support was provided for the women and their employers. A private sector initiative in Egypt trained and hired refugee and Egyptian women to work in highly skilled embroidery, and covered their transport and meal costs.²²⁶ In Yemen, Somali refugees and Yemenis have participated in vocational training programmes.²²⁷ A similar programme established in Morocco by UNHCR and local organizations in 2011 has equipped refugees with skills to find informal jobs or establish businesses in the absence of access to the formal labour market.²²⁸ In Djibouti, IOM has worked to build capacity among young refugees in Ali Addeh Camp and local youth, coordinating vocational and on-the-job training with the private sector.²²⁹ Such small-scale programmes could be broadened and replicated elsewhere and would contribute to social cohesion by including nationals.

In Lebanon, the Casual Labour Initiative engaged 8,000 Syrian refugees and Lebanese nationals to carry out public works in informal tented settlements and

surrounding areas between November 2013 and January 2014. Over 10 days, the workers were paid to renovate community infrastructure, with the dual purpose of providing a chance to generate income and encouraging social cohesion between refugee and host communities. By solving teething problems with the pilot study (e.g. longer working periods, closer consultation with municipalities, and broader target areas), such an initiative could be scaled up.²³⁰

By using technology and tapping into existing skills, opportunities could be created in computer programming, web-based remote employment and mobile telephone repair that help to reduce unemployment among young people from displaced and local populations.²³¹

Innovative projects such as the “Self-Reliance Strategy” (SRS), implemented by Uganda and UNHCR, could serve as a model. Starting in 1999, the Government of Uganda provided Sudanese refugees with plots of land so that they could grow or buy their own food, access and pay for basic services, and maintain self-sustaining community structures. In order to eliminate parallel structures formed by NGOs to assist refugees, refugee services were written into district development plans, which were implemented as part of the wider administration and service delivery.²³² The project was limited to camp settlements and criticized by some for the quality of the land offered to the refugees, but such initiatives offer lessons for future programming and demonstrate the need for further research and innovative thinking on the problem of aid dependence livelihood opportunities for the displaced.²³³

Given the wealth of skills and experience that can exist among the displaced and their knowledge of and connections to the community in which they reside,

employment in camps has proven to be mutually beneficial for humanitarian actors and camp populations – particularly in protracted situations. Employment affords refugees the opportunity to realize economic and professional aspirations, is economically sustainable, and allows humanitarian actors to work more efficiently and accountably. In UNRWA, Palestinians, most of them refugees and/or camp-dwellers, constitute 99 per cent of staff: “Teachers, nurses, social workers, cleaning and maintenance staff, technicians, management and administrative staff acted as a common denominator or the mediators between UNRWA and refugees.”²³⁴

With the exception of camps housing refugees from Western Sahara, there are no formal models for refugee employment in camps in the region. Income generation in camps revolves largely around camp-based enterprises and informal trade.²³⁵ Offering more opportunities for formal camp-based employment to refugees and the surrounding local population could present an opportunity for livelihood sustainability.

ii. Access to remittances and other financial services

Remittances and access to other financial services can help to safeguard assets, build financial capital and increase economic opportunities. There are many barriers, however, to sending remittances to countries in conflict, as well as to refugees and IDPs in destination and transit countries. They have been particularly severe in the case of Somalia, where the formal banking system is limited. In response, specialized agencies known as *Xawaala* or *Hawala* companies emerged to enable remittance transfers. Questions about their security were raised after the attacks on the New York World Trade Center in 2001, after which they were obliged to abide by new anti-money laundering

regulations. Those regulations created serious obstacles for the informal banking system and the disbursal of crucial funds to recipients in Somalia, although *Hawala* companies are still among the most widely used services to circulate money.²³⁶

Microfinance services in the State of Palestine are well established and loans are disbursed to thousands of individuals to develop or expand small businesses, build household assets and meet basic needs. In 2012, 38 per cent of customers in Gaza were women and 23 per cent young people. Most customers (77 per cent) were considered low-income, making it a good example of how microfinance can help the unemployed or underemployed to generate income.²³⁷ Similar schemes operate elsewhere in the Arab region. In Somalia, a microfinance programme targeting youth was announced in 2013, to provide microloans, voluntary savings accounts and business development services via an existing network of service agents.²³⁸ In destination and transit countries, where refugees and other displaced persons face legal barriers to accessing such schemes, Somalis, among others, have initiated informal lending and insurance mechanisms in their communities. For example, in Kampala, small groups of Somali refugee women pool resources by making weekly or monthly contributions to a group fund (*ayuto*). Once a sufficient amount is collected, it is given to the *ayuto* member deemed most vulnerable in order to help them start a business.²³⁹

Microfinance can provide start-up funds to cultivate small enterprises but possibilities for further growth are often limited because of the lack of access to larger loans and credit from commercial banks. Lessons can be learned from Costa Rica, where the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court ruled that the rejection of a Colombian refugee’s loan

application to start a furniture business was discriminatory and that refugees are entitled to receive credit from national banks. The court noted that refugees are considered temporary residents in Costa Rica under the country's migration law.²⁴⁰

Until more services are made available in the region, expatriate investors can play a critical role in providing larger sums of start-up capital to refugees, IDPs and other displaced persons. In Somalia, for example, expatriates who have secured a solid income abroad are involved in private sector investment in the country; an estimated 80 per cent of all business investment financing in Somalia comes from expatriates. Specific amounts invested vary, but larger business investments typically involve contributions to a partnership of between \$40,000 and \$100,000.²⁴¹

iii. *Return and reintegration into the labour market*

The repatriation and reintegration of low- and highly skilled returnees can contribute to development in countries of origin. The transferability of education and skills learned by them in destination and transit countries can prepare them for return and contribute to “brain circulation” rather than “brain drain”.²⁴² The Iraqi Government, for example, launched a campaign in recent years to encourage the return of refugees, acknowledging the value of skilled expatriates in particular, and promising jobs and financial incentives.²⁴³ In Somalia, IOM’s Migration and Development in Africa (MIDA) programme has enabled highly skilled expatriates – particularly female expatriate health professionals - to engage in short-term capacity-building efforts in local health institutions in Somaliland and Puntland. Although temporary, the programme is helping to institutionalize the role of expatriates in the reconstruction of basic infrastructure and the private sector in

their country of origin.²⁴⁴ Additionally, in March 2015, IOM and the Government of Italy launched MIDA Women Somalia II, which aims to use the expertise of Somali expatriates to support IDP women in Somalia to develop social enterprises.²⁴⁵

The forced return of migrant workers to countries of origin due to crises abroad creates additional barriers to reintegration. To assist in the process and in order to maintain stability in recipient communities, the Egyptian Government, with support from IOM, established “information hubs” to advise returnees about employment opportunities and essential services. Prior to the killing of Egyptian migrant workers in Libya in 2015, the Egyptian Ministry of Manpower and Migration was working with the Libyan authorities to provide compensation and alternative work opportunities for tens of thousands of returnees.²⁴⁶ With support from the international community, similar programmes to facilitate the return and reintegration into the labour market of Lebanese migrants from the Syrian Arab Republic could be replicated in Lebanon.²⁴⁷

(e) Conclusion

Pre-existing labour market challenges are often exacerbated by the arrival of refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations. They need to be tackled in the host communities, and the skills that displaced people bring with them and their right to a livelihood as a means of achieving self-reliance and human dignity should be considered. In spite of the scale of forced population movements in the region and the challenges they pose, the influx of skills, manpower, remittances, other forms of capital and new markets constituted by displaced populations can present opportunities for cultivating expertise and generating investment and short- and long-term economic growth for the displaced and the countries in which they reside.

4. Environmental sustainability

Conflict, violence and recurring natural disasters impede efforts by States to mitigate the effects of climate and environmental change. Protracted crises, often aggravated by limited access to resources, can erode the resilience of refugees, IDPs, other displaced populations and host communities. The environment should be integrated as a matter of priority into development planning, and flexible, holistic approaches are required to help mitigate any adverse effects of displacement.

In the Arab region, drought, desertification and the depletion of natural resources are gathering pace, placing fresh water and finite energy sources at risk of exhaustion. Rising sea levels, coupled with the growing frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, demonstrate the impact of climate change.²⁴⁸ Rapid urban expansion threatens to encroach on agricultural, arable and ecologically significant land.²⁴⁹

Increased financial and technical assistance can help transform crises into opportunities for creating lasting change, and maximize the participation of refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations in meeting development goals on environmental sustainability.²⁵⁰

(a) Displacement and environmental sustainability

Poor environmental management in refugee contexts leads to several undesirable results. First is degradation of renewable natural resources such as forests, soil and water resources, and irreversible impact on watersheds, biological diversity, endangered species and ecosystems. Secondly, there can be repercussions for health and nutrition, for example, when a shortage of firewood results in food not being properly cooked, overcrowding in refugee camps leads to disease transmission, or inadequate sanitation causes groundwater pollution. Thirdly, there are social considerations for refugees and host

communities. Women may be at greater risk of attack if they must go far afield to gather firewood. Competition for scarce resources can unleash conflict between locals and refugees. Finally, poor environmental management can hurt the livelihoods of local people through soil erosion, a decline in soil fertility and pollution of water sources.²⁵¹

The impact of displacement on the environment may vary according to the size of the population, duration of flow, the regions to which people move, and how they settle. Larger flows can correlate with increased environmental degradation, although the level of impact may have more to do with overall population density (of displaced and host communities) and the extent to which natural resources can withstand demand. Serious long-term environmental change is arguably more likely to occur in cases of protracted displacement. Whether refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations settle in or outside camps may also shape their impact. A large concentration of people inside camps can put considerable pressure on the environment and accelerate degradation. The collection of firewood and other fuels from local sources, for example, can greatly accelerate deforestation and desertification. While the dispersal of individuals across larger areas of land may lessen the severity of the impact, the consumption and livelihood practices of the displaced may create other pressures on the environment.²⁵² Given the protracted nature of displacement in the Arab region, strategies focusing on inclusivity and sustainability would be most effective in tackling scarce resources, strengthening capacity to adapt, reducing environmental degradation, and meeting sustainable development goals.

Recognizing the environmental harm that can be caused by large concentrations of refugees and internally displaced persons, UNHCR advocates “four principles of action:

- Integration - ensuring that the environment features in related programmes or

activities such as site planning or sanitation.

- Prevention before cure - taking action as early as possible to minimize potentially large-scale challenges and irreversible effects.
- Cost-effectiveness - with limited resources at its disposal, UNHCR must always strive to maximize the efficiency of its assistance programmes.
- Local participation — involving refugee and local communities in the development and management of environmental activities is fundamental to managing natural resources in a sustainable manner.²⁵³

The final point is particularly important. Local governments, in partnership with civil society and technical experts such as urban planners and developers, can help to mitigate the harm by identifying needs among forced migrant and host populations, and tailoring approaches to suit local conditions.

Communities with basic rights and awareness of environmental best practices can become agents of positive change. Refugees, IDPs, other displaced populations and marginalized communities within the local host population must have the tools to shore up resilience and adaptive capacity, and awareness of climate change mitigation. Particular attention should be given to women, who are often responsible for the collection of water and fuel in households.²⁵⁴

At the national and global levels, mainstreaming displacement into sustainable development, climate change, and disaster risk reduction (DRR) plans is crucial to their long-term success. Displacement may affect or be affected by sustainable development goals 2 (end hunger, achieve food security and promote sustainable agriculture); 11 (make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable); 12 (ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns); 13 (take urgent action

to combat climate change and its impacts): 14 (conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development); and 15 (protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss).²⁵⁵

(b) Legal and policy landscape

Initial progress has been made in strengthening environmental institutions and legislation across the region, although ratification of international agreements on the environment varies by country.²⁵⁶ The explicit mention of refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations is thus far absent from any of the major strategies relating to DRR and sustainable development in the Arab region.

Arab States pledged their commitment to sustainable development goals at the 1992 and 2012 United Nations Conferences on Environment and Development (the Rio and Rio+20 conferences), and all States have ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) was widely adopted in 2005, demonstrating awareness in the region of the importance of DRR and environmental sustainability. In 2012, the League of Arab States adopted the Arab Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 2020.²⁵⁷ Since then, two Arab States have convened national consultations and developed recommendations for the post-2015 DRR Framework (HFA2), and 13 have drafted progress reports on HFA implementation. Participants at the First Arab Conference for Disaster Risk Reduction adopted the Aqaba Declaration on Disaster Risk Reduction in Cities, in which they resolved to allocate 1-5 per cent of city budgets for DRR and establish systems to monitor the enforcement of building regulations and land-use planning by 2017.²⁵⁸ By early 2013, 300 Arab cities and municipalities had joined the Making Cities Resilient campaign, and a

mayors' handbook, *How to Make Cities more Resilient*, has been translated and disseminated throughout the region.²⁵⁹

UNHCR and CARE International have developed the Framework for Assessing, Monitoring and Evaluating the Environment in refugee-related operations (FRAME), with tools and guidelines to help humanitarian workers to tackle environmental issues arising from the creation of refugee, from contingency planning to camp closure and rehabilitation.²⁶⁰

(c) Existing challenges

Rapid urban growth has come unplanned in many of the region's cities, resulting in a proliferation of substandard housing and unsafe slums, where residents may be without secure land tenure and at risk of eviction. Such settlements - many of them unregulated and densely populated - are vulnerable to acute and slow-onset natural disasters, such as sandstorms, flooding, earthquakes and rising sea levels.²⁶¹ In formal camps for refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations, eviction and land tenure problems are generally not an issue. However, they are often overcrowded, expand over time, lack planning, and face problems of resource depletion and land sustainability.²⁶² Flooding and tent fires are typical problems.²⁶³

Environmental degradation and the lack of resources become most apparent in acute emergencies, before a coherent response has been launched. In such situations, host communities in particular often complain of inadequate waste collection, deteriorating health and safety conditions, the appearance of makeshift shelters, and illegal occupation of land.²⁶⁴ The Lebanese Ministry of the Environment and UNDP recently reported "that the incremental annual waste generated by refugees is equivalent to 15.7 per cent of the solid waste generated by Lebanese citizens prior to the crisis". As crises become more protracted, waste disposal and access to

adequate shelter may improve, but resource scarcity for displaced and host communities remains a serious problem. If water and/or energy become scarcer still with the arrival of the displaced, tension and competition between them and the surrounding population for natural resources can escalate. At the same time, local ecosystems may suffer.²⁶⁵

In many Arab countries, energy production and usage presents a daunting environmental challenge. Several countries hosting refugees and displaced persons suffer energy shortages,²⁶⁶ and access to energy is not always prioritized in humanitarian responses. Camps are often built in remote areas with little or no energy access. Camp households need energy mainly for cooking, heating and lighting.²⁶⁷ Wood is often the only available source of energy, and household wood-fuel consumption, at around 3 kilograms per person per day, often leads to deforestation.²⁶⁸ Large-scale deforestation has occurred around camps for Somali refugees in Kenya.²⁶⁹ As early as 1995 (about three years after those camps were established), UNHCR reported a "halo of nearly absolute degradation" that continues to worry host communities.²⁷⁰

Many of the protracted refugee crises in the Arab region take place in arid areas with scant water supplies most of the year and floods in the rainy season. The presence of large refugee populations in camps over long periods adversely affects the availability and quality of already strained water supplies, creating environmental and health hazards. A 2008 overview of water and sanitation in refugee camps across Chad, Kenya, the Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and other countries demonstrated that poor management of water resources is having a profoundly harmful effect on refugee camps and local communities, with more cases of diarrhoea and acute malnutrition, and increased morbidity.²⁷¹ In such situations people resort to negative coping mechanisms, such as drinking unclean water or using one source of water for multiple purposes.

The agricultural practices of the displaced may also contribute to environmental degradation. They and other marginalized communities may be forced into areas where the scarcity of good land and harmful agricultural practice can damage the environment. Individuals may use more aggressive farming techniques than host communities due to the abrupt loss of their livelihood and because they are less concerned about long-term investment in soil fertility or fallow periods.²⁷²

(d) Promising practices

Tackling environmental change and its impacts requires long-term thinking, which can seem to run counter to the usual short-term logic of responses to displacement. There is evidence, however, of positive practices in the region and beyond that incorporate forced population movements and environmental sustainability.

i. Disaster risk reduction (DRR)

Some progress on DRR is being made in the region. In 2004, the Algerian Ministry of Housing and Urban Development issued new seismic building regulations and passed the Law on Prevention of Major Risks and Disaster Management, which was amended in 2010 to incorporate urban planning provisions.²⁷³ Parts of the Yemeni city of Taiz, a transit hub for refugees and asylum-seekers from Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia, and site of severe rain-induced flash flooding in recent years, have been transformed into flood-secure neighbourhoods under a World Bank-financed municipal development and flood protection project.²⁷⁴ The IKEA Foundation and UNHCR are testing 'flatpack' shelters in several refugee camps as a more weather-resistant housing solution. Tested in camps in Iraq and Ethiopia, IKEA's durable refugee housing units have a lifespan of three years (long outliving canvas tents), are portable, and can be dismantled and reassembled if necessary.²⁷⁵

ii. Sanitation and conservation

Repairing and building infrastructure is particularly beneficial to displaced and host populations. Education and awareness campaigns can also help to prevent outbreaks of disease and reduce land degradation.

Training workshops for Somali refugees on environmental degradation and sanitation have been built into the curriculum of self-reliance and capacity-building programmes in Dadaab camp in Kenya.²⁷⁶ In Lebanon, clean-up campaigns involving Syrian refugees and Lebanese nationals have been directed at preserving the environment around informal tent settlements and mitigating the impact of unsanitary waste disposal, while providing opportunities for refugees and people of host communities to work together.²⁷⁷ In Yemen, UNICEF and the local authorities in Basateen have worked to chlorinate wells in areas inhabited by Somali refugees and the urban poor.²⁷⁸ NGOs in northern Iraq have launched a project to provide simple, plastic, unisex urinals to Syrian refugee families that can be used in tents. The urinal collects and stores urine in holding tanks, which is then reused after 90 days in agriculture, tree nursery production and kitchen gardens for the refugees.²⁷⁹

iii. Energy

Public-private energy partnerships have been particularly beneficial in camps and settlements, where infrastructure and fuel provision have generally been an afterthought.²⁸⁰ Solar technology is being increasingly used in camps, as it becomes more reliable and affordable. For example, a private sector fundraising initiative in 2014 brought 11,000 Syrian refugees in Jordan's Azraq camp renewable energy solutions such as solar-powered street lights and lanterns and fuel-efficient stoves.²⁸¹ In Somalia, solar-powered stoves and lanterns have been distributed to 20,000 IDPs, which has led to a reduction not only in the demand for firewood, but also in instances of sexual violence. Opening hours of shops and small businesses have also been extended.²⁸² In the Sudan, scientists have designed a cooking stove tailored to the conditions in Darfur; it requires less than half the fuel of traditional cooking methods and thereby has helped to reduce the exposure of women to violence when collecting firewood, and the need to trade food rations for firewood.²⁸³ UNHCR has worked on reducing air pollution and land degradation linked to the collection of firewood around camps housing Somali refugees in Kenya. Initiatives include planting seedlings, distributing fuel-efficient stoves, and monitoring the environmental impact on firewood harvesting zones, in compliance with national regulations.²⁸⁴

The Women's Refugee Commission has been pushing to put clean cooking fuel on the humanitarian agenda since 2005, through the Beyond Firewood and Safe Access to Fuel Energy (SAFE) programmes. It has also led a global effort to establish United Nations guidelines on safe access to cooking fuel in humanitarian settings, spearheading the creation of an Inter-Agency Standing Committee taskforce to respond effectively to cooking fuel needs.²⁸⁵

iv. *Water*

More must be done to restore infrastructure and promote good water usage practices and conservation management in times of crisis. Increased investment in water infrastructure in and around Dadaab in Kenya since the arrival of Somali refugees is showing promise. A 2011 joint assessment by Denmark, Kenya and Norway showed that access to water for people and livestock had improved since the beginning of the humanitarian operation. More than 90 per cent of people living in host villages reported now having access to borehole water within close walking distance. Overall, access to potable water for host communities was above the average for arid areas in Kenya.²⁸⁶ Water pumps have been built in Sudanese refugee camps and nearby towns in Chad.²⁸⁷

In water-poor Jordan, NGOs have been working at the household and community levels in northern Jordan - the area most hit by the water crisis - to rehabilitate aging water infrastructure in areas inhabited by refugees and host communities.²⁸⁸ Efforts have included well-drilling in Zaatari camp, rehabilitation of the Zabdah reservoir, the laying of new water pipelines, and the provision of spare parts to local utilities to ensure quick responses to network breaks and maintenance needs.²⁸⁹ Programmes of this type not only help the refugees but contribute to the development of sustainable water infrastructure.

v. *Sustainable agriculture*

Civil society organizations have launched projects on the West Bank to introduce more efficient and sustainable agriculture to the Dheisha and Aida Palestinian refugee camps.²⁹⁰ Rooftop greenhouses allow refugees to use their farming skills to grow fresh produce for their families and camp communities.²⁹¹ Somali refugees in Kenya have developed innovative agricultural practices to save water, such as channelling wastewater from tap-stands into small vegetable gardens; digging micro-catchments to contain rainwater and lining them with plastic sheeting, soil and compost to grow vegetables; and making multistorey container gardens out of polyethene sacks provided by the World Food Programme.²⁹²

(e) *Conclusion*

Efforts to mitigate the impact of displacement and adapt to climate and environmental change have thus far been on a small scale, but many of the practices outlined above could be implemented more widely. To achieve development goals, environmental sustainability should be prioritized and better integrated into local, national and regional responses to acute and protracted crises. Technical and financial assistance is critical to diminishing the potentially harmful effects of population displacement on the environment, and to ensuring that refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations are among the agents working towards greater and more sustainable development in the communities where they reside.

5. **Social cohesion and stability**

Social cohesion can affect the rate, quality and sustainability of growth and, conversely, growth and development help to maintain social cohesion and stability.²⁹³ Taking the need for social cohesion into account at all phases of response to displacement crises is critical

for fostering stability, recovery and sustainable growth. During acute crises, minimizing disruption and scaling up essential services can forestall tension among the displaced and between them and host communities. In times of protracted crisis, it is particularly beneficial to focus on policies of non-discrimination and to make sure that displaced people enjoy their fundamental rights.

(a) Displacement and social cohesion

Social inclusion - the reduction of disparities, inequalities and exclusion, and the strengthening of social relations, interactions and bonds (also known as social capital) - is intrinsic to social cohesion and stability.²⁹⁴ A failure to achieve social inclusion can lead to violence, conflict and other forms of instability, which can precipitate forced population movements, disrupting planning and thwarting the achievement of sustainable development goals.

Refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations can experience discrimination based on ethnicity, gender, culture or religion. Other forms of exclusion, such as poverty or “horizontal inequalities” (political, economic, social and cultural) between and among forced migrant and host communities may also provide fertile ground for violence and instability – particularly where people are competing for scarce resources.²⁹⁵ The promotion of social inclusion thus requires a deep understanding of power relations and the root causes and perceptions of difference. Only then can appropriate policies be devised to deal with tensions between forced migrant and host communities, and fragmentation within those populations.²⁹⁶

Equally important are practices to foster the social capital that holds people together, even in times of upheaval or change. Social capital can take the form of “bonding” (building networks among refugees, IDPs and other displaced people from the same communities

or countries of origin), “bridging” (reducing differences and tensions between refugees, IDPs, other displaced populations and host communities)²⁹⁷ and “linking” (“vertical relations that may help individuals gain access to resources from formal institutions for social and economic development”).²⁹⁸ The dislocation that is characteristic of displacement and the fact that the right of displaced people to resources and services is frequently not acknowledged makes this a complicated matter.²⁹⁹ Cohesion can be encouraged at any stage of a crisis by focusing on shared visions, developing a shared sense of belonging, fostering equality and respect for diversity, and increasing the responsiveness of Governments to the needs of people residing in their jurisdictions, including through formal recognition of their rights under applicable international and national law.³⁰⁰ Initiatives that are gender- and age-sensitive can help to reinforce human security.³⁰¹

Governments at all levels have a responsibility to promote equality and non-discrimination, and to reduce barriers to the exercise of basic rights by refugees, IDPs, other displaced populations and vulnerable or underserved groups in the local population. Local governments and community leaders in particular can play a key role in identifying basic needs and developing plans to minimize disruption within communities hosting large numbers of displaced people. Community-based associations, humanitarian and development agencies and other civil society organizations can assist Governments in addressing particular needs, and fostering dialogue and cooperation on development projects among the displaced and host communities. Donors also have their part to play, by rendering funding conditions sufficiently flexible so as to avoid creating differences or inequality between various groups. The media have a duty to promote tolerance and avoid divisive discourse.³⁰²

(b) Legal and policy landscape

Recognition of rights and legal status is a prerequisite for social cohesion and stability. In many countries, refugees and other displaced populations cannot exercise basic rights because they are in an irregular situation and without access to a procedure that would enable them to be recognized as being in need of international or other forms of protection.

All laws and policies aimed at enhancing human rights promote social cohesion and stability. International human rights instruments such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination enshrine the right to equality.

Under the AU Convention on Internal Displacement, States parties agree to “prevent political, social, cultural and economic exclusion and marginalisation that are likely to cause displacement of populations or persons by virtue of their social identity, religion or political opinion”. They also agree to prevent “discrimination against [IDPs] in the enjoyment of any rights or freedoms on the grounds that they are internally displaced persons” or permit discriminatory treatment for other reasons. Stateless persons are vulnerable to displacement given the absence, or ambiguity, of their legal status. Given that few Arab States have acceded to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, forced movement of populations can fuel statelessness, particularly for people born into displacement and without the possibility of obtaining citizenship in countries of origin, transit, first asylum or destination.

(c) Existing challenges

In resettlement countries, where resources are generally greater and the arrival of refugees is managed on the basis of pre-

agreed quotas, the main policy issue is how to permanently integrate newcomers into a society that is unfamiliar to them. Signs of successful integration include a sense of acceptance by the wider community of newcomers, as well as positive education and employment outcomes.³⁰³

States in the Arab region, often countries of first asylum or transit hubs, cannot plan in advance for or manage the arrival of refugees and other displaced populations. In times of great uncertainty and often faced with threats to national security, destination, first asylum and transit countries attempt to grapple with the needs of refugee and other displaced populations, and of their own people, until safe return or other permanent solutions are found. The spontaneous nature of such movements and scarcity of resources make it difficult to minimize disruption in the host community.

In times of crisis, threats to stability emerge where outdated infrastructure, limited resources and insufficient provision of welfare make it impossible to keep pace with increased demand. Indicators of tension include: “Socioeconomic hardships, the amount and quality of intergroup contact, the perceived fairness of international aid organizations, the perception of corruption of various powerful actors (e.g. landlords) as well as mutual inter-community perceptions of economic and existential threats, or threats to honour and dignity.”³⁰⁴ If conditions are left to deteriorate, tension can rise – most often expressed by the targeting of refugees and other displaced populations. Discord can also spread within refugee, IDPs and other displaced populations themselves. Divisions over limited resources and rising prices, and competition for jobs and housing may be exacerbated along sociopolitical lines, particularly when government policies give rise to discrimination, detention and abuse of refugees and other displaced people,³⁰⁵ who as a result can be left more vulnerable.

Rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence can erode social cohesion and the resilience of individuals, and a breakdown in social cohesion fuels the risk of violence and exploitation. For example, sex trafficking often intensifies when military forces are deployed as combatants or peacekeepers and new brothels are established to cater to their demands.³⁰⁶ Instances of sexual violence may occur in and outside camps; women and girls may be exposed to particular risk when gathering firewood, collecting water, or even remaining alone inside their tents.³⁰⁷ Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons are particularly vulnerable to discrimination, violence and exploitation.³⁰⁸ In countries of first asylum, transit and refuge, the perpetrators and victims of sexual and gender-based violence can come from local and displaced communities. Traffickers, smugglers and even local law enforcement officers may be perpetrators and/or work in collusion with each other.³⁰⁹ Survivors must deal not only with the health consequences of such violence, but also repercussions such as stigmatization, harassment and exclusion from families and communities.³¹⁰ Sexual violence against men and boys and forced recruitment into armed groups can have a lasting impact on individuals and the communities in which they reside.³¹¹ Conflict and displacement can put tremendous strain on families. The frustration experienced by men who have abruptly lost their livelihoods and/or breadwinner or power status, may lead to domestic violence.³¹² Women and girls can be exposed to early and forced marriage if the heads of households consider marriage a way to solve financial difficulties, protect the honour of female family members and ensure their safety.³¹³

The birth of children in displacement poses the risk of the emergence of a stateless generation. A lack of documentation can preclude access to fundamental rights in host and origin countries. In some Arab countries, nationality is passed down to children only

through the father. When he is absent, or marriages have not been registered, children may be unable to obtain a birth certificate or proof of nationality, as has been the case among Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries.³¹⁴ The risk of statelessness represents a major obstacle to the return of refugees and other displaced people.³¹⁵

In countries of origin, where large-scale return of refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations has taken place, social cohesion depends on the timely reintegration of returnees. They are often bereft of their possessions and the social fabric of their communities may have undergone dramatic change in their absence. Failure to provide adequate support for returnees and the communities in which they reside can lead to renewed violence and displacement.

(d) Promising practices

Several Arab countries have shown remarkable solidarity and commitment to host refugees and other displaced populations, and to shoulder that responsibility until lasting solutions are found. A variety of promising practices has emerged at the local and national levels.

i. Community cohesion

Municipalities and local groups are often best placed to understand community needs and sensitivities, and devise short- and long-term solutions in times of crisis. External humanitarian and development agencies need to develop strong partnerships with them in order to respond to crises effectively and efficiently, involving communities in the promotion of social cohesion.

Municipalities around Lebanon, in spite of insufficient funding by the central Government, have developed initiatives to manage the large-scale presence of Syrian refugees. A survey of 12 vulnerable

municipalities found that 85 per cent of Lebanese surveyed felt a moral obligation to host Syrian refugees and that all 12 municipalities were assisting refugees with housing, while 89 per cent of them were providing other assistance. In addition, 78 per cent of municipalities had stepped up security with more staff in the community, and 78 per cent were providing dispute resolution between refugees and host communities.³¹⁶ There have been moves to decentralize the response to the refugee situation in Lebanon, with a view to increasing the fiscal and administrative capacity of municipalities to tackle the situation.³¹⁷ Such an approach could pave the way for more sustainable development. Municipalities around the country have implemented Community Impact Projects (CIPs) and Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), under which public gardens, playgrounds, libraries, medical dispensaries, youth centres, mosques, community halls and other public installations have been created or renovated. Support has also been given to local agricultural cooperatives run by refugees and members of the host community.³¹⁸

In Jordan, initiatives to foster dialogue and social cohesion include community infrastructure projects involving Syrian refugees and Jordanians,³¹⁹ a youth journalism project aimed at highlighting reporting of good relations between Syrians and Jordanians in the media, and a Syrian radio programme with information on life in Jordan for refugees.³²⁰

ii. Treatment and prevention of sexual and gender-based violence

Sexual and gender-based violence is a symptom and cause of social fragmentation and instability.³²¹ In 2013, countries in the region issued the Rabat Declaration, Towards an Effective Partnership for the Implementation of the UNFPA Regional Strategy on Prevention and Response

to Gender-based Violence in the Arab States. The strategy aims to enable women and girls to exercise their sexual and reproductive health rights in an environment free of violence. In the Sudan, a Women's Protection Network has been established to raise awareness of women's rights, reduce sexual and gender-based violence and foster dialogue between women, United Nations agencies and government institutions.³²² In Lebanon, UNRWA set up six community-based support groups in 2014 for Palestinian women and girls in refugee camps in the south of the country. The groups have a specialist in sexual and gender-based violence and are run by UNRWA community development workers and protection staff. They are designed to represent women's interests, identify and protect those most vulnerable to violence, and to obtain feedback on the delivery of camp services.³²³

There is a need to work more with men and boys in the region to tackle sexual and gender-based violence, as well as identifying and responding to the needs of men and boys who survive violence.

iii. National strategies to enhance access to rights-based protection

Recognizing the rights of refugees and promoting the inclusion of refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations, through legislation, policies, training and awareness-raising campaigns, can improve protection mechanisms and contribute to social cohesion and stability. No Arab State has developed comprehensive legislation, but there has been progress in granting more rights to refugees and other displaced populations in Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan.

In Morocco, the Government has introduced legislation aimed at regularizing the status of refugees residing in its territory. Between late 2013 and early 2015,

913 asylum-seekers were interviewed and/or granted refugee status. They were the first individuals determined as persons of concern by UNHCR to be recognized as such in the country.³²⁴ Many asylum-seekers continue to be in an irregular situation, but those granted refugee status have received refugee identity cards and are due to get residence permits that will allow them to work and afford them a degree of access to essential services.

The Government of Tunisia is also developing national asylum legislation. In the face of growing instability in Libya, the United Nations country team, led by UNHCR, has developed a contingency plan to deal with several tens of thousands of refugees and other displaced people from Libya should the situation deteriorate. Under the plan, a registration centre is to be set up close to the Libyan border in order to determine who requires international protection. Measures have been taken to ensure that Libyans fleeing their country can stay without visas in Tunisia for several months, and enjoy many of the same rights as Tunisians. Non-Libyan migrants fleeing Libya have been met at the Tunisian border with demands to present travel documents and an air ticket for travel to their countries of origin in order to enter Tunisia.³²⁵

In Jordan, NGOs set up a programme to train Syrian lawyers living in refugee communities in Jordanian family and marriage law. The Government has also established a civil registry office and a religious law court in Zaatari Camp, aimed at formalizing marriages and increasing access to documentation for Syrian refugees.³²⁶

Throughout the region, UNHCR is urging destination, first asylum and transit country Governments to increase birth and marriage registration. In Jordan, it is carrying out a campaign at community

centres to raise awareness among refugees about the importance of registration. Legal aid initiatives have been launched in Iraq and Lebanon to assist people to complete the process.³²⁷

iv. Return and rehabilitation

Adopted in 2008, Iraq's National Policy on Displacement places emphasis on the provision of long-term security, restitution of or compensation for lost property, and "an environment that sustains the life of former displaced persons under normal economic and social conditions."³²⁸ It contains recommendations on the provision of shelter for the displaced, including protection against eviction, rent control, and the development of a "social housing policy."³²⁹ The 2010 National Housing Policy also emphasizes the needs of displaced persons and refugees, in addition to the poor.³³⁰ Crucially for people with limited resources, the notion of "upgrading" or "redevelopment" is an integral part of the policy. Before a settlement is considered for upgrading or redevelopment, the community must first demonstrate that it wishes "to participate actively in an upgrading activity or to be relocated to another site in the case of redevelopment."³³¹ A local assistance programme was established in Baghdad to provide financial support for those once displaced to buy materials to repair or reconstruct their homes or businesses as necessary.³³²

Beyond the Arab region, the Government of Bangladesh requested a \$40 million loan from the World Bank, in part to provide one-time cash grants of \$650 to thousands of returnees from Libya and thereby facilitate their reintegration.³³³ The Philippines Overseas Worker's Welfare Administration (OWWA) is mandated to maintain an emergency repatriation fund for evacuation of Filipino nationals in times of crisis.³³⁴ The Philippines has

involved its migrant communities abroad in preparing for such crises through a system of “wardenships” that connects Filipino migrants in the same location among each other and with diplomatic and consular services. They help to identify migrants who cannot access diplomatic and consular services, provide information in times of crisis, and facilitate access to humanitarian assistance. A Filipino NGO, the Kanlungan Centre Foundation, believes that organized groups of migrants can assist each other in times of crisis. Part of its strategy is a support network for migrant domestic workers known as *Balabal* (shawl or cloak).³³⁵

(e) Conclusion

Amid the dislocation caused by displacement, social inclusion and the existence of social capital within and across communities may provide individuals with the initial support and resources they need to shore up resilience, enhance capabilities and subsequently broaden the impact of their contributions to the communities in which they live. Fostering social cohesion is thus self-sustaining and economical, and relies on individuals, who, over time, may themselves have an increasingly vested interest in maintaining lasting stability in host, origin and transit countries, for the sake of future development and prosperity.

J. Conclusion

Forced population movements are a stark reality in the Arab region. They present great burdens and challenges for destination, first asylum, transit and origin countries, as well as the affected populations. They can also present opportunities for development. Throughout the region, promising practices may help Governments and civil society to respond to the needs of refugees, IDPs, other

displaced populations and host communities in a rights-based way that provides for long-term development and prosperity. Addressing the impact of displacement in development planning and initiatives could lead to improved access to education, health care and livelihoods, while reducing environmental harm and building social cohesion. Countries, especially those with low incomes and widespread poverty, cannot meet those challenges alone. Only a concerted effort by the international community will help to make reality the development potential of displaced and host communities.

1. General conclusions

- Forced population movements in the Arab region will not cease until the underlying causes are resolved. Arab States should, with input from the international community where warranted, continue to seek just political solutions to conflict. Only then will people be able to return home, exercise their rights, and thereby contribute to sustainable development.
- The League of Arab States affirmed at the First Session of Intergovernmental Negotiations on the Post-2015 Development Agenda in January 2015 that displacement in the context of war, conflicts, the Israeli occupation of Palestine and other Arab territories, and terrorism had long been an impediment to development in Arab countries. The growth in refugee flows had put considerable pressure on basic infrastructure in host countries.
- The Secretary-General of the United Nations recognized that the inclusion of refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations in the post-2015 development agenda was essential to ensuring the achievement of sustainable development goals.
- In order to maximize potentially productive linkages and synergies between forced population movements and development initiatives, there must be timely, adequate

and sustained financial support from the international community for developing countries in the region that host the vast majority of refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations.

- With due respect to relevant institutional mandates, addressing displacement within national development plans will help to ensure that the needs of displaced populations and host communities are taken into account in establishing policies and programmes of benefit to all. A development approach is needed early in displacement in order to avoid some of the most pressing and long-term problems described in this report.
- All responses to displacement need to be gender and age sensitive, as well as appropriate for refugees, IDPs and other displaced persons with disabilities.
- Access to education, health care, security, shelter and other services for refugee and displaced children and youth is crucial.

2. Observations and recommendations for key areas of development

Promising practices in the specific sectors discussed in this report provide benefits to refugees, IDPs, other displaced populations and local host communities. Such benefits generally accrue when there is concerted effort by national and local governments, the international community, civil society and the displaced populations themselves.

(a) Health

Equitable access to treatment and preventive care for communicable and non-communicable diseases among refugee, IDPs, other displaced populations and local host communities – including maternal and reproductive health and mental health services – can be achieved either by opening existing health-care services to displaced populations or by setting up parallel systems. In non-camp contexts, the tendency is to absorb displaced populations

into existing health infrastructure, while in camps parallel systems are more common.

- It is preferable to expand the capacity of the existing health-care system (clinics, hospitals, staff, etc.) in destination and transit countries in order to accommodate the displaced. Improvements to existing infrastructure may leave a lasting legacy of development for local host communities long after more permanent solutions are found for the displaced.
- Community-based and/or specialized services could be set up to meet the mental health and psychosocial needs of refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations where such services in the host country are unavailable to the displaced.
- Engaging qualified refugees, IDPs and other displaced persons to deliver health care can strengthen health systems in destination, transit, first asylum and origin countries.

(b) Education

Equitable access to high quality education can be achieved either by admitting refugees, IDPs and other displaced persons of school age to local schools or by developing parallel school systems. Admission to the public education system is more common among displaced people who do not live in camps, whereas parallel systems are more common in camps. The latter may also be appropriate when addressing the needs of targeted groups, such as adolescents with large gaps in their formal education.

- It is preferable to strengthen the existing education system (buildings, teachers, books, etc.) so as to allow public schools to accommodate refugees, IDPs and other displaced persons of school age.
- Offering alternatives (informal and non-formal education) to support people in displaced and host communities without access to formal education can improve overall education outcomes.

- Making vocational training and tertiary education available to refugees, IDPs and other displaced persons at institutions in and beyond the Arab region can help to reduce dependence on long-term assistance and contribute to their successful reintegration in home countries or resettlement in third countries.
- Employing qualified refugees, IDPs and other displaced persons in education systems in host countries can mitigate the impact of displacement on the school system.

(c) Labour markets, human capital and remittances

Promoting the self-reliance of refugees, IDPs and other displaced people by facilitating access to formal labour markets, microfinance and other income generation opportunities can reduce the economic burden on host countries if accompanied by similar measures to reduce unemployment among their own nationals. Focusing measures on young people and women, who are disproportionately affected by unemployment, can be particularly beneficial. Remittances provide support to refugee, IDP and other displaced households and can also stimulate development of host communities, through the purchase of locally made goods and services and investment in small businesses. Specific steps to take could include:

- Adopting and enforcing appropriate legislation to reduce exploitation of refugees, IDPs and other displaced populations.
- Harnessing the expertise and capabilities of refugees, IDPs and other displaced people to facilitate development and fill gaps in essential services.
- Encouraging commercial banks and insurance companies to extend services to refugees, IDPs and other displaced people for business development.
- Conducting research on the economic impact of displaced populations on host communities to help States and other stakeholders to formulate livelihood strategies in times of crisis.

(d) Environmental sustainability

Sustainable environment practices can improve the lives of refugees, IDPs, other displaced populations and host communities, which are often affected by problems such as deforestation and poor water management. States hosting large displaced populations should factor their presence into sustainable development planning and disaster risk reduction strategies. Initiatives could include:

- Consideration of environmental sustainability issues from the outset of camp planning in order to reduce environmental degradation at later stages.
- Providing refugees, IDPs, other displaced populations and host communities with financial and technical assistance to conserve water, adopt sustainable farming techniques, and access renewable sources of energy in order to reduce tensions caused by the scarcity of resources, and to help States to meet sustainable development goals.
- Raising awareness of environmental sustainability among refugees, IDPs, other displaced populations and host communities.

(e) Social cohesion and stability

Social cohesion and stability are essential for the protection of refugees, IDPs and other displaced persons. A concerted effort must be made to foster good relations between displaced populations and host communities and deal with tensions that may arise. Specific actions could include:

- Providing international assistance to offset burdens shouldered by host countries so that they might keep their borders open to refugees and other displaced populations.
- Implementing policies based on the principle of non-discrimination in order to foster social inclusion, build social capital, and avoid disparities between displaced and host communities.
- Incorporating gender-based considerations

into development planning with a view to preventing sexual and gender-based violence in the context of forced population movements.

- Promoting decentralized, community-based responses to acute and protracted emergencies that help to build local capacity, take into account community needs and development plans, increase resilience, and alleviate tensions between displaced and host communities.

Annexes



Syrian refugees who fled fighting near the Syrian city of Kobani wait in a holding area before boarding buses in Turkey.
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Annexes

I. Glossary of Terms

Asylum	A form of protection given by a State on its territory based on the principle of <i>non-refoulement</i> and internationally or nationally recognized refugee rights. It is granted to a person who is unable to seek protection in his or her country of nationality and/or residence in particular for fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
Asylum-seeker	A person who seeks safety from persecution or serious harm in a country other than his or her own and awaits a decision on the application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments. In case of a negative decision, the person must leave the country and may be expelled, as may any non-national in an irregular or unlawful situation, unless permission to stay is provided on humanitarian or other related grounds.
Brain drain	Emigration of trained and talented individuals from the country of origin to another country resulting in a depletion of skills resources in the former.
Displacement	A forced removal of a person from his or her home or country, often due to armed conflict or natural disasters.
Expatriate	One who lives in a foreign country.
Family migration	A general concept covering family reunification and the migration of a family unit as a whole.
Forced migration	A migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes (e.g. movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects).
Forced return	The compulsory return of an individual to the country of origin, transit or third country, on the basis of an administrative or judicial act.
Health	According to the preamble of the World Health Organization Constitution (1946), health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.
Highly skilled/qualified migrant	While there is no internationally agreed definition, two overlapping meanings are often intended. In very general terms a highly skilled migrant is considered to be a person with tertiary education, typically an adult who has completed at least two years of post-secondary education. In a more specific sense, a highly skilled migrant is a person who has earned, either by tertiary level education or occupational experience, the level of qualifications typically needed to practice a profession.

Internally displaced persons (IDPs)	Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border (Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2.).
International migration	Movement of persons who leave their country of origin, or the country of habitual residence, to establish themselves either permanently or temporarily in another country. An international frontier is therefore crossed.
Irregular migrant	A person who, owing to unauthorized entry, breach of a condition of entry, or the expiry of his or her visa, lacks legal status in a transit or host country. The definition covers inter alia those persons who have entered a transit or host country lawfully but have stayed for a longer period than authorized or subsequently taken up unauthorized employment (also called clandestine/ undocumented migrant or migrant in an irregular situation). The term “irregular” is preferable to “illegal” because the latter carries a criminal connotation and is seen as denying migrants’ humanity.
Irregular migration	Movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries. There is no clear or universally accepted definition of irregular migration. From the perspective of destination countries it is entry, stay or work in a country without the necessary authorization or documents required under immigration regulations. From the perspective of the sending country, the irregularity is for example seen in cases in which a person crosses an international boundary without a valid passport or travel document or does not fulfil the administrative requirements for leaving the country. There is, however, a tendency to restrict the use of the term “illegal migration” to cases of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons.
Labour migration	Movement of persons from one State to another, or within their own country of residence, for the purpose of employment. Labour migration is addressed by most States in their migration laws. In addition, some States take an active role in regulating outward labour migration and seeking opportunities for their nationals abroad.
Less/low skilled and semi-skilled migrant worker	There is no internationally agreed definition of a less or low skilled and semi-skilled migrant worker. In broad terms, a semi-skilled worker is considered to be a person who requires a degree of training or familiarization with the job before being able to operate at maximum/optimal efficiency, although this training is not of the length or intensity required for designation as a skilled (or craft) worker, being measured in weeks or days rather than years, nor is it normally at the tertiary level. Many so-called “manual workers” (e.g. production, construction workers) should therefore be classified as semi-skilled. A less or low-skilled worker, on the other hand, is considered to be a person who has received less training than a semi-skilled worker or, having not received any training, has still acquired his or her competence on the job.

Migrant	<p>At the international level, no universally accepted definition for “migrant” exists. The term migrant was usually understood to cover all cases where the decision to migrate was taken freely by the individual concerned for reasons of “personal convenience” and without intervention of an external compelling factor; it therefore applied to persons, and family members, moving to another country or region to better their material or social conditions and improve the prospect for themselves or their family.</p> <p>The United Nations defines migrant as an individual who has resided in a foreign country for more than one year irrespective of the causes, voluntary or involuntary, and the means, regular or irregular, used to migrate. Under such a definition, those travelling for shorter periods as tourists and businesspersons would not be considered migrants. However, common usage includes certain kinds of shorter-term migrants, such as seasonal farm-workers who travel for short periods to work planting or harvesting farm products.</p>
Migrant flow	<p>The number of migrants counted as moving or being authorized to move, to or from a given location in a defined period of time.</p>
Migrant stock	<p>The number of migrants residing in a country at a particular point in time.</p>
Migrant worker	<p>“A person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national” (Art. 2 (1), International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990).</p>
Migration	<p>The movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification.</p>
Nationality	<p>Legal bond between an individual and a State.</p> <p>The International Court of Justice defined nationality in the <i>Nottebohm</i> case, 1955, as “...a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties...the individual upon whom it is conferred, either directly by law or as a result of the act of the authorities, is in fact more closely connected with the population of the State conferring the nationality than with any other State.” According to Art. 1, Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, 1930 “it is for each State to determine under its own laws who are its nationals. This law shall be recognized by other States in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, international custom, and the principles of law generally recognized with regard to nationality.” The tie of nationality confers individual rights and imposes obligations that a State reserves for its population. Founded on the principle of personal jurisdiction of a State, nationality carries with it certain consequences as regards migration such as the right of a State to protect its nationals against violations of their individual rights committed by foreign authorities (particularly by means of diplomatic protection), the duty to accept its nationals onto its territory, and the prohibition to expel them.</p>

Non-refoulement	Principle of international refugee law that prohibits States from returning refugees in any manner whatsoever to countries or territories in which their lives or freedom may be threatened. The principle of <i>non-refoulement</i> is considered by many authors as part of customary international law, while for others the two requirements for the existence of a customary norm are not met.
Refugee	<p>A person who, “owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. (Art. 1(A) (2), Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 1A(2), 1951 as modified by the 1967 Protocol).</p> <p>In addition to the refugee definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention, Art. 1(2), 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention defines a refugee as any person compelled to leave his or her country “owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country or origin or nationality.”</p> <p>Similarly, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration states that refugees also include persons who flee their country “because their lives, security or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.”</p>
Regular migration	Migration that occurs through recognized, authorized channels.
Regularisation	Any process or programme by which the authorities in a State allow non-nationals in an irregular or undocumented situation to stay lawfully in the country. Typical practices include the granting of an amnesty (also known as ‘legalization’) to non-nationals who have resided in the country in an irregular situation for a given length of time and are not otherwise found inadmissible.
Reintegration	Re-inclusion or re-incorporation of a person into a group or a process, e.g. of a migrant into the society of his or her country of origin or habitual residence.
Remittances	Monies earned or acquired by non-nationals that are transferred back to their country of origin.
Resettlement	The relocation and integration of people (refugees, internally displaced persons, etc.) into another geographical area and environment, usually in a third country. In the refugee context, the transfer of refugees from the country in which they have sought refuge to another State that has agreed to admit them. The refugees will usually be granted asylum or some other form of long-term resident rights and, in many cases, will have the opportunity to become naturalized.
Return	In a general sense, the act or process of going back to the point of departure. This could be within the territorial boundaries of a country, as in the case of returning internally displaced persons (IDPs) and demobilized combatants; or between a host country (either transit or destination) and a country of origin, as in the case of migrant workers, refugees, asylum-seekers, and qualified nationals. There are sub-categories of return which can describe the way the return is implemented, e.g. voluntary, forced, assisted and spontaneous return; as well as sub-categories which describe who is participating in the return, e.g. repatriation (for refugees).

Return migration	The movement of a person returning to his or her country of origin or habitual residence usually after spending at least one year in another country. This return may or may not be voluntary. Return migration includes voluntary repatriation.
Smuggling	“The procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident” (Art. 3(a), United Nations Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000). Smuggling, contrary to trafficking, does not require an element of exploitation, coercion, or violation of human rights.
Sponsorship	The act of promising support, in particular financial support, for a non-national who seeks to enter and stay in the State, generally for a defined period of time. Some States require either sponsorship or proof of adequate income as a condition of entry for certain categories of migrants as well as visitors.
Stateless person	“A person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law” (Art. 1, United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 1954). As such, a stateless person lacks those rights attributable to nationality: the diplomatic protection of a State, no inherent right of sojourn in the State of residence and no right of return in case he or she travels.
Statelessness	The condition of an individual who is not considered as a national by any State under its domestic law. Statelessness may result from a number of causes including conflict of laws, the transfer of territory, marriage laws, administrative practices, discrimination, lack of birth registration, denationalization (when a State rescinds an individual’s nationality) and renunciation (when an individual refuses the protection of the State).
Trafficking in persons	“The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation” (Art. 3(a), United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000). Trafficking in persons can take place within the borders of one State or may have a transnational character.
Voluntary return	The assisted or independent return to the country of origin, transit or another third country based on the free will of the returnee.

Source: IOM, *Glossary on Migration, Second edition* (Geneva, 2011).

II. International Legal Instruments Related to International Migration: Ratification Status of Arab States as of March 2015

	International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (1990)	Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951)	Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967)	Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (2000), supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Crime	Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (2000), supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Crime	
Algeria	2005 (a)*	1963 (d)	1967 (a)	2001 (s) 2004 (r)*	2001 (s) 2004 (r)*	
Bahrain	-	-	-	2004 (a)*	2004 (a)*	
Comoros	2000 (s)	-	-	-	-	
Djibouti	-	1977 (d)	1977 (d)	2005 (a)	2005 (a)	
Egypt	1993 (a)*	1981 (a)*	1981 (a)	2002 (s) 2004 (r)	2005 (a)	
Iraq	-	-	-	2009 (a)	2009 (a)	
Jordan	-	-	-	2009 (a)	-	
Kuwait	-	-	-	2006 (a)	2006 (a)	
Lebanon	-	-	-	2002 (s) 2005 (r)	2002 (s) 2005 (r)	
Libya	2004 (a)	-	-	2001 (s) 2004 (r)	2001 (s) 2004 (r)	
Mauritania	2007 (a)	1987 (a)	1987 (a)	2005 (a)	2005 (a)	
Morocco	1991 (s) 1993 (r)*	1956 (d)	1971 (a)	2011 (a)	-	
Oman	-	-	-	2005 (a)	2005 (a)	
State of Palestine	-	-	-	-	-	
Qatar	-	-	-	2009 (a)*	-	
Saudi Arabia	-	-	-	2002 (s) 2007(r)*	2002 (s) 2007 (r)	
Somalia	-	1978 (a)	1978 (a)	-	-	
Sudan	-	1974 (a)*	1974 (a)	2014 (a)	-	
Syrian Arab Republic	2005 (a)	-	-	2000 (s) 2009 (r)*	2000 (s) 2009 (r)*	
Tunisia	-	1957 (d)	1968 (a)	2000 (s) 2003 (r)*	2000 (s) 2003 (r)*	
United Arab Emirates	-	-	-	2009 (a)*	-	
Yemen	-	1980 (a)	1980 (a)	-	-	

Sources: United Nations Treaty Collection, "Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General" (see <https://treaties.un.org/pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx> for follow-up on ratification status); International Labour Organization, "Ratification by Convention" (see <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12001:0::NO::> for follow-up on ratification status). Accessed on 27 March 2015.

	Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961)	ILO Convention 29 on Forced Labour (1930)	ILO Protocol 29 to the Forced Labour Convention (2014)	ILO Convention 97 on Migration for Employment (1949)	ILO Convention 105 on the Abolition of Forced Labour (1957)	ILO Convention 143 on Migrant Workers (1975)	ILO Convention 181 on Private Employment Agencies (1997)	ILO Convention 189 on Domestic Workers (2011)
	-	1962	-	1962*	1969	-	2006	-
	-	1981	-	-	1998	-	-	-
	-	1978	-	-	1978	-	-	-
	-	1978	-	-	1978	-	-	-
	-	1955	-	-	1958	-	-	-
	-	1962	-	-	1959	-	-	-
	-	1966	-	-	1958	-	-	-
	-	1968	-	-	1961	-	-	-
	-	1977	-	-	1977	-	-	-
	1989 (a)	1961	-	-	1961	-	-	-
	-	1961	-	-	1997	-	-	-
	-	1957	-	-	1966	-	1999	-
	-	1998	-	-	2005	-	-	-
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	-	1998	-	-	2007	-	-	-
	-	1978	-	-	1978	-	-	-
	-	1960	-	-	1961	-	-	-
	-	1957	-	-	1970	-	-	-
	-	1960	-	-	1958	-	-	-
	2000 (a)*	1962	-	-	1959	-	-	-
	-	1982	-	-	1997	-	-	-
	-	1969	-	-	1969	-	-	-

Note: * With reservations

■ Signature (s); ■ Accession (a); ■ Succession (d); ■ Ratification (r)

Endnotes

Chapter 1

1. IOM, 2014e.
2. Wodon and others, 2014.
3. Frontex, 2010.
4. IOM, 2013f.
5. Abdelfattah, 2011.
6. Hertog, 2014.
7. IOM, 2011a.
8. Gaur and Saxena, 2005.
9. Shah, 2009.
10. Altai Consulting, 2013; Fargues, 2009.
11. Shah, 2009.
12. De Bel-Air, 2013.
13. UNODC, 2014; IOM, 2012b.
14. Fakhoury, 2012; Shalabi, 2010; Ahmed-Salem, 2010.
15. Natter, 2014; United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2013; World Bank, 2015b; Abel and Sander, 2014.
16. Frontex, 2014b.
17. Migration Policy Centre, 2013a and 2013d.
18. Olwan, 2010; Sensenig-Dabbous and Hourani, 2011.
19. IOM, 2011b.
20. Awad, 2006.
21. UNODC, 2014.
22. UNHCR, 2015g.
23. See IOM, n.d.a, overall cross-border movements on 8 June, 2011.
24. See IOM, n.d.a, overall cross-border movements on 3 November, 2011.
25. United Nations, Security Council, 2015.
26. Altai Consulting, 2015.
27. Registered refugees or those awaiting registration.
28. UNHCR, n.d.h.
29. IOM, 2014g.
30. OCHA, n.d.a.
31. IDMC, n.d.a.
32. UNHCR, 2015g.
33. These figures, according to UNRWA, refer to those Palestinians who have sought refuge in the Gaza Strip and West Bank and are classed as refugees.
34. See <http://unrwa.org/where-we-work>.
35. Data retrieved from the IDMC website (www.internal-displacement.org), accessed on 18 March 2015.
36. IRIN, 2010.
37. UNHCR, n.d.e.
38. Data retrieved from the IDMC website (www.internal-displacement.org), accessed on 18 March 2015.

39. OCHA, 2014c.
40. OCHA, 2015b.
41. OCHA, 2015a.
42. UNHCR, n.d.f.
43. Cherti and Grant, 2013.
44. IOM, forthcoming.
45. IOM, 2009.
46. North, 1990 and 1991; Granovetter, 1985.
47. See www.unhcr.org/seadialogue.
48. See www.iom.int/news/iom-call-international-investigation-mediterranean-shipwreck-deaths.
49. Horwood, 2014; Horwood and Malakooti, 2014.
50. IOM, 2015h; Italy, Ministry of Interior, 2006; Altai Consulting, 2015.
51. Frontex, 2014a; Altai Consulting, 2015.
52. IOM, 2015h; Italy, Ministry of Interior, 2006.
53. Italy, Ministry of Interior, 2006.
54. Frontex, 2014a and b.
55. Altai Consulting, 2015.
56. Ibid.
57. Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, 2014a.
58. Ayad, 2013.
59. Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, 2014.
60. IOM, 2014a.
61. Human Rights Watch, 2015.

Chapter 2

1. See http://esa.un.org/unmigration/documents/worldmigration/2013/Full_Document_final.pdf#page=11.
2. This classification is adopted to facilitate discussion of international migration trends and patterns.
3. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2013.
4. Abel and Sander, 2014.
5. IOM, 2011b.
6. Abel and Sander, 2014.
7. Jordan received about 300,000 Palestinians, who were either expelled from a liberated Kuwait and other Gulf States, or had left Iraq due to limited economic opportunities. They were joined by up to 100,000 Iraqi refugees. Jordan also provided transit to half a million foreign workers, including Egyptians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Sri Lankans, Indians and Filipinos.
8. Miller, 1991.
9. Gardner, 2012.
10. Abel and Sander, 2014.

11. Ibid.
12. Khadria, 2010.
13. Ennaji, 2010.
14. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2013.
15. Abel and Sander, 2014.
16. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2013.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. UNHCR, 2015g.
20. See <http://unrwa.org/where-we-work>.
21. UNHCR, 2015g.
22. United Nations Alliance of Civilizations, 2010.
23. UNHCR, 2015g.
24. Abel and Sander, 2014.
25. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2013.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Abel and Sander, 2014.
29. IRIN, 2012a.
30. UNHCR, 2014k.
31. IOM, 2011b.
32. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2013.
33. Figures in this section include both migrants returning to their countries of origin and migrating nationals.
34. Abel and Sander, 2014.
35. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2013.
36. Ibid.
37. Abel and Sander, 2014.
38. Ibid.
39. The designation of Western Sahara as a territory does not imply expression of any opinion on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations, the International Organization for Migration or any of the organizations engaged in the Working Group on International Migration in the Arab Region on the status of the territory or its authorities, or about the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
40. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2013.
41. Ibid.
42. DESA data do not provide an accurate number of Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR. UNHCR data are presented separately in table 11 to provide an up-to-date picture of refugee movements.

43. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2013.
 44. Ibid.
 45. UNHCR, 2015g.
 46. Abel and Sander, 2014.
 47. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2013.
 48. Ibid.
 49. Abel and Sander, 2014.
 50. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2013.
 51. World Bank, n.d.
 52. World Bank, 2015a.
 53. United Nations, General Assembly, 2006.
 54. Gardner, 2011.
 55. World Bank, 2013a.
 56. Bilateral remittance data for Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic are unavailable.
 57. World Bank calculations based on data from the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics database and data releases from central banks (October 2014 update). Remittance figures were available from fewer countries until recently, so the data may be less accurate for earlier years.
 58. Calculations based on the World Bank Development Indicators database, accessed 30 March 2015.
 59. World Bank calculations based on data from the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics database and data releases from central banks (October 2014 update).
 60. Abdelfattah, 2011.
 61. UNESCO, 2012. The UNESCO definition of the Arab region does not include the Comoros and Somalia.
 62. Ibid.
 63. Authors' calculations based on UNESCO, 2012.
 64. UNESCO, 2012.
 65. Arab News, 2013; Conférence des Grandes Ecoles, 2011, p. 40.
 66. Embassy of Ukraine in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, n.d.
 67. Al-Mousa, 2010.
 68. Data for Kuwait were retrieved from the website of the Ministry of Interior, www.moi.gov.kw, accessed in January 2015. Data for Saudi Arabia were obtained from the Central Department of Statistics and Information, the Ministry of Economy and Planning and the Gulf Labour Markets and Migration Programme.
 69. Data were obtained from the 2007 demographic survey undertaken by the Central Department of Statistics and Information of Saudi Arabia.
 70. Based on United States Department of Homeland Security, 2014, table 10 on persons obtaining lawful permanent resident status by broad class of admission and region and country of birth: fiscal year 2013.
 71. See also <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/population-demography-migration-projections/population-data>.
 72. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2013.
 73. Female migrants, particularly domestic workers isolated in the homes where they work, can remain hidden from official data counts.
 74. Gulf Labor Markets and Migration, n.d.
 75. Gamburd, 2010.
 76. Migrant Rights, 2014.
 77. Theuermann, 2005.
 78. Shah, 2009.
 79. UNHCR, 2014k.
 80. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2013.
 81. Silatech and Gallup, 2010.
 82. Esipova, Ray and Srinivasan, 2010.
 83. Gulf Labor Markets and Migration, n.d.
 84. Authors' calculations based on Gulf Labor Markets and Migration, n.d.
 85. Authors' calculations based on OECD, n.d.
 86. Authors' calculations based on Eurostat, n.d.
 87. Silatech and Gallup, 2010.
 88. Esipova, Ray and Srinivasan, 2010.
 89. Gulf Labor Markets and Migration, n.d.
 90. Gardner, 2011.
 91. Kohli, 2013.
 92. International Labour Organization, 2014.
 93. Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk, 2009.
 94. OECD, n.d.
 95. European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 2010.
 96. Nassar, 2010.
 97. Shalabi, 2010.
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139. Liboon, 2012.
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146. Joint declaration establishing a mobility partnership between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the European Union and its participating Member States, 2014.
147. Joint declaration establishing a mobility partnership between the Kingdom of Morocco and the European Union and its Member States, 2013.
148. Joint declaration establishing a mobility partnership between Tunisia and the European Union and its participating Member States, 2014.
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150. Accord entre la Confédération suisse et la République tunisienne relatif à l'échange de jeunes professionnels, 2012.
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159. Haas, 2007 ; Migration Policy Centre, 2013b.

Chapter 4

1. UNHCR, 2014k ; IDMC and NRC, 2015.
2. Where possible, the latest UNHCR data for numbers of refugees, asylum-seekers, IDPs, returnees (refugees and IDPs), stateless persons and others of concern to UNHCR are used. In most cases, data were last updated in mid-2014, although there is some more recent data, for instance on the Syrian crisis. For IDPs, data from IDMC, as of 30 March 2015, are also used. Other sources include IOM, United Nations agencies, government sources and the Regional Mixed-Migration Secretariat, of which IOM and UNHCR are among the core steering committee members.
3. Koser and Martin, eds., 2011.
4. Bocco, 2009.
5. The authority of UNHCR does not extend to refugees who were under the mandate of another United Nations agency at the time of its founding. See UNHCR, 2002c.
6. Global Migration Group, 2010.
7. IOM, 2014f.
8. IOM, 2015f.
9. Koser, 2011.
10. UNISDR, 2013a; World Bank, 2014d.
11. IOM, 2015i.
12. Egypt ratified the Convention with reservations to articles 12 (1), 20, 22 (1), 23 and 24. For details, consult Chapter V of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General online at <https://treaties.un.org/pages/participationstatus.aspx>.
13. Mauritania adopted its National Migration Management Strategy in 2012, and is

- working to amend the law on foreign nationals to include provisions on refugees and asylum-seekers. Morocco adopted its draft strategy on migration and asylum in December 2014. In the Sudan, the new Asylum Act and the Anti-Trafficking Act were passed in 2014.
14. Kagan, 2012.
 15. IDMC, n.d.a.
 16. UNHCR, 2008.
 17. IDMC, n.d.a.
 18. UNHCR, 2015a; Sassoon, 2009.
 19. UNHCR, n.d.h; IOM, 2013b.
 20. UNHCR, 2012a. IOM (2012a) estimated that out of 1.8 million migrant workers present in Libya before 2011, more than 800,000 individuals were displaced across the Libyan border in 2011/2012; 45 per cent out of this number were third-country nationals. Also see Kelly and Jawadurovna Wadud, 2012.
 21. UNHCR, 2012a.
 22. IDMC, n.d.b.
 23. UNHCR, 2014c.
 24. IRIN, 2011b.
 25. UNHCR, 2014c and 2014m; IOM, 2014d.
 26. IOM, 2015c.
 27. IOM, 2015d.
 28. IOM, 2015i.
 29. IOM, 2015e.
 30. See www.iom.int/news/number-migrants-landing-europe-2015-passes-100000.
 31. Feldman, 2008.
 32. El-Abed, 2009; and Alfaro, 2006.
 33. See <http://www.unrwa.org>.
 34. UNHCR, 2014k.
 35. OCHA, 2014b.
 36. UNRWA, n.d.d.
 37. UNRWA, n.d.c; UNRWA, 2015b.
 38. UNHCR, n.d.e.
 39. UNHCR, 2015a; Hammond, 2014a.
 40. Lindley, 2014a.
 41. IRIN, 2011a.
 42. UNHCR, 2014f.
 43. UNHCR (2015a) notes that this figure may include citizens of South Sudan.
 44. Italy, Department of Public Security, 2014.
 45. IDMC, n.d.c; IDMC, n.d.d.
 46. IOM, 2014b.
 47. IOM, n.d.c.
 48. OCHA, n.d.a; Syrian Center for Policy and Research, 2014.
 49. Syrian Center for Policy and Research, 2015.
 50. OCHA, n.d.a.
 51. Lebanon, Ministry of Environment, European Union and UNDP, 2014; UNHCR, n.d.h. The Government of Jordan estimates the number of Syrian refugees in Jordan at more than 1 million, which differs from UNHCR registration figures.
 52. OCHA, n.d.b.
 53. IOM, 2015j.
 54. IDMC, n.d.e.
 55. IOM, 2015j; UNHCR, 2015h.
 56. Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, 2013a.
 57. IOM, 2015g.
 58. UNHCR, 2015a.
 59. Lebanon, Ministry of Environment, European Union and UNDP, 2014.
 60. Authors' calculations based on data from World Bank, n.d.
 61. UNHCR, n.d.e, n.d.h and 2015a.
 62. UNHCR, n.d.i.
 63. Knudsen and Hanafi eds., 2010; Peteet, 2005.
 64. World Bank, 2013b.
 65. Chatelard, 2011.
 66. IOM, 2012a.
 67. Sanz, 2011.
 68. IOM, 2013d.
 69. Weiss Fagen, 2014.
 70. Jacobsen, 1997.
 71. WHO, 2013a.
 72. UNICEF, 2013.
 73. UNHCR, 1998.
 74. Ferris, Petz and Stark, 2013.
 75. Ibid.
 76. UNHCR, 2011d.
 77. United Nations, Security Council, 2014.
 78. IOM, forthcoming.
 79. World Bank, 2010.
 80. Ibid.
 81. Martin, 2004.
 82. Harild and Christensen, 2010.
 83. UNDP and UNHCR, n.d.
 84. UNDP, 2013.
 85. IMF, 2013.
 86. IMF, 2012.
 87. European Union, European External Action Service, n.d.a.
 88. European Union, European External Action Service, n.d.b.
 89. Betts, 2009.
 90. OHCHR and WHO, n.d.
 91. Batniji and others, 2014.
 92. The incidence of communicable diseases, except HIV/AIDS, has decreased.
 93. Mokdad and others, 2014.
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 97. Dewachi and others, 2014.
 98. Mowafi, 2011.
 99. Leaning, Spiegel and Crisp, 2011.
 100. Ibid.
 101. Médecins Sans Frontières, 2014b.
 102. OHCHR and WHO, n.d.
 103. Women's Refugee Commission, 2006.
 104. United Nations, General Assembly, 2014a.
 105. Dewachi and others, 2014.
 106. Médecins Sans Frontières, n.d.
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 109. WHO, n.d.a.
 110. UNFPA, n.d.a.
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 115. Kronfol, 2012.
 116. Martin and Taylor, 2012.
 117. Ibid.
 118. Jordan, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, and United Nations, 2013.
 119. United Nations Iraq, 2013.
 120. Dewachi and others, 2014.
 121. Ibid.
 122. UNHCR, 2015j.
 123. Martin and Taylor, 2012.
 124. UNHCR, 2014e.
 125. IOM, 2015a.
 126. See <http://www.jordanhealthaid.org>.
 127. UNHCR, 2014h.
 128. Islamic Relief USA, n.d.
 129. Kani Edward, 2007.
 130. World Bank, n.d.
 131. UNHCR, 2014h.
 132. IOM, n.d.b; Dagher, n.d.
 133. Jabbour and others, 2012.
 134. See www.unrwa.org.
 135. UNRWA, 2014a.
 136. UNHCR, 2012c; International Medical Corps, 2012; UNHCR, n.d.a; UNHCR, n.d.d.
 137. Haskew and others, 2010.
 138. Jaffer, Guy and Niewczasin, 2004.
 139. UNFPA, 2013a.
 140. UNFPA, n.d.b.
 141. Mowafi, 2011.
 142. WHO, 2013b.
 143. Ibid.; WHO, 2011.
 144. The figures exclude the Comoros and Somalia, for which limited data is available. See Steer, Ghanem and Jalbout, 2014.
 145. For more information on education in the Arab region, see UNDP, 2003.
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 147. Ibid.
 148. Mirkin, 2013.
 149. Save the Children, 2014.
 150. Dryden-Peterson, 2011.
 151. Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies, 2004.
 152. UNESCO, 2014.
 153. United Nations, Economic and Social Council, 1999.
 154. UNHCR, 2013b.
 155. UNHCR Lebanon, 2014.
 156. UNHCR, n.d.b.
 157. Dryden-Peterson, 2011.
 158. Sinclair, 2007.
 159. UNICEF, 2014.
 160. OCHA, 2014a.
 161. UNRWA, 2015a.
 162. Dryden-Peterson, 2011.

163. Save the Children, 2014.
164. Dryden-Peterson, 2011.
165. Crisp, Talbot and Cipollone, 2001.
166. UNICEF and others, 2013.
167. IOM, 2013e; Bak Riiskjaer and Nielsson, 2008.
168. IOM, 2013b.
169. UNHCR, 2013g.
170. Ahmadzadeh and others, 2014.
171. Dryden-Peterson, 2011.
172. UNHCR, 2014g.
173. UNHCR, 2013b.
174. UNICEF is running a teacher-training programme for Syrian teachers in Turkish refugee camps (see Guler, 2013).
175. Inter-Agency Network on Education in Emergencies, n.d.
176. UNICEF, 2014.
177. See www.unrwa.org.
178. Peteet, 2005.
179. World Bank, 2014a.
180. Formal education refers to structured learning systems, provided or overseen by a government body and accredited by State institutions, most often in schools. Non-formal and informal education is learning that occurs outside such a system. Non-formal education is usually structured as well, although often not accredited and run independently from State institutions. Informal education is the least structured form of learning, including life and work experience, or any activity involving the pursuit of knowledge or skills that occurs without externally imposed curricular criteria (see Zaki Dib, 1988).
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182. African Hope Learning Centre, n.d.
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186. WHO, 2015.
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191. Jesuit Commons-Higher Education at the Margins International, n.d.
192. Betts and others, 2014.
193. United Nations, Economic and Social Council, 2006.
194. ESCWA, 2012; Women's Refugee Commission, 2014.
195. UNHCR, 2014d.
196. Arnold-Fernández and Pollock, 2013.
197. The Economist, 2013.
198. Nasser and Symansky, 2014.
199. UNHCR, 2011c.
200. UNHCR, 2014d.
201. McConaghy, 2013.
202. Betts and others, 2014.
203. Weiss Fagen and Bump, 2006.
204. Lindley, 2007.
205. Blayney, 2011.
206. Weiss Fagen and Bump, 2006.
207. Koser and Kuschminder, 2015; Hammond, 2014b.
208. Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative, forthcoming.
209. Chaaban, 2010.
210. World Bank, n.d.
211. Jacobsen, 2014.
212. Jacobsen, Ayoub and Johnson, 2012; REACH, 2014.
213. UN Women, 2013a ; De Vriese, 2006.
214. Walton, 2012.
215. Arnold-Fernández and Pollock, 2013.
216. World Bank, 2014c.
217. Mercy Corps, 2012.
218. Sassoon, 2009.
219. Ensor, 2013.
220. Sanz, 2011.
221. IOM, 2012c.
222. Feinstein International Center, 2012.
223. UNHCR, 2013e.
224. IOM, 2013c.
225. Buscher, 2014.
226. Buscher and Heller, 2010.
227. See <http://www.unhcr.org/4d78a8989.pdf>.
228. Association marocaine d'appui à la promotion de la petite entreprise, n.d.
229. IOM, 2013c.
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232. Kaiser, 2005.
233. Betts, 2009.
234. Farah, 2010.
235. Ibid.; Perouse de Montclos and Mwangi Kagwanja, 2000.
236. Hassan and Chalmers, 2008.
237. UNRWA, n.d.a.
238. LeBlanc, 2013.
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241. Hammond and others, 2011.
242. Koppenberg, 2012.
243. IOM, 2013a; 2013 , العراق.
244. Lothar Weiss, 2009.
245. IOM, 2015b.
246. Al-Tawy, 2014.
247. IOM, 2014g.
248. World Bank, 2014d.
249. UN-Habitat, 2012.
250. Jacobsen, 1997.
251. UNHCR, 2005b.
252. Black, 1994.
253. UNHCR, n.d.k.
254. Women's Refugee Commission, 2010.
255. United Nations, General Assembly, 2014c.
256. Dibia, 2014.
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260. UNHCR, n.d.g.
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273. UNISDR, 2013b.
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277. Lebanon, Ministry of Environment, European Union and UNDP, 2014; Harb and Saab, 2014.
278. IRIN, 2009.
279. CEWAS Middle East, n.d.
280. UNHCR, 2002a.
281. McFadden, 2015.
282. IOM, 2014h.
283. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, n.d.
284. UNHCR and WFP, 2014.
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289. Oxfam, 2014.
290. UNRWA, 2012.
291. Refutrees, n.d.
292. UNHCR, 2002b.
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296. UNDP, 2009.
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298. Cheong and others, 2007.
299. Malkki, 1992.
300. UNDP, 2009.
301. United Nations, Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, 2001.
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303. Saggat and others, 2012.
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305. UNHCR, 2013c.
306. Martin, 2004.

307. Women's Refugee Commission, 2010; UN Women, 2014.
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309. Freedman and Jamal, 2008; Danish Refugee Council and the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, 2012.
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311. UNHCR, 2012d; Davis, Taylor and Murphy, 2014.
312. WHO, 1997.
313. ESCWA, 2013b.
314. UNHCR, 2014b.
315. UNHCR, 2014a.
316. OCHA and REACH, 2014.
317. Shibli, 2014; Mercy Corps, n.d.
318. UNHCR Lebanon, 2013.
319. Mercy Corps, 2013a.
320. UNESCO, n.d.
321. UNHCR, 2011a.
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323. UNRWA, 2014b.
324. UNHCR, 2015e.
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While international migration is one of the main factors driving economic and social change in the Arab region, the continuing displacement of populations occurring in several countries of the region remains one of the most pressing issues of today. In order to understand and make the most of the positive effects of migration – and to mitigate its potential downsides – a new approach, underpinned by good practice, human rights and a long-term development perspective, is needed.

This report aims to provide exactly this. It also fills gaps in knowledge by providing a multidisciplinary and comprehensive overview of trends and patterns in international migration and displacement, and their economic and social consequences for the Arab region. The report draws on the expertise of the member agencies of the Working Group on International Migration in the Arab Region and highlights the need for coordinated and holistic responses to current challenges associated with human mobility.

