



UNITED  
NATIONS

EP

UNEP/MED WG.479/5/Rev.1



UNITED NATIONS  
ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME  
MEDITERRANEAN ACTION PLAN

7 May 2020  
Original: English

21<sup>st</sup> Meeting of the MCSDD Steering Committee

Teleconference, 13-14 May 2020

**Agenda item 4: Specific Issues**

**Draft Summary for Policymakers (SPM) of MedECC First Mediterranean Assessment Report (MAR1)**

**DRAFT**

The draft Summary for Policymakers (SPM) of MedECC First Mediterranean Assessment Report (MAR1) on climate and environmental change in the Mediterranean is for consultation and comments by invited persons and their institutions. As conclusions may still evolve following the review by decision-makers and stakeholders, this draft must not be shared, reproduced nor quoted in any way.

The final versions of the SPM and MAR1 will be published and made accessible to the public in due time.

For environmental and cost-saving reasons, this document is printed in a limited number. Delegates are kindly requested to bring their copies to meetings and not to request additional copies.





Mediterranean Experts on Climate  
and environmental Change

# Climate and Environmental Change in the Mediterranean Basin – Current Situation and Risks for the Future

## First Mediterranean Assessment Report (MAR1)

Edited by

Wolfgang Cramer  
MedECC Coordinator  
CNRS, France

Mediterranean Institute for terrestrial and  
marine Biodiversity and Ecology (IMBE)

Joël Guiot  
MedECC Coordinator  
CNRS, France

Centre Européen de Recherche et  
d'Enseignement des Géosciences de  
l'Environnement (CEREGE)

Katarzyna Marini  
MedECC Science Officer  
MedECC Secretariat  
Plan Bleu



Union for the Mediterranean  
Union pour la Méditerranée  
الاتحاد من أجل المتوسط



Sweden  
Sverige

## MEDECC

18  
19 The Mediterranean Experts on Climate and environmental Change (MedECC) are an independent net-  
20 work of scientists, founded 2015. MedECC assesses the best available scientific knowledge on climate  
21 and environmental change and associated risks in the Mediterranean Basin in order to render it acces-  
22 sible to policymakers, stakeholders and citizens.

23 To date (April 2020), MedECC counts more than 600 scientific members, all contributing in individual  
24 capacity and without financial compensation. MedECC scientists are based in 35 countries, including  
25 19 countries registered as Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection of the Marine En-  
26 vironment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean (Barcelona Convention).

27 The UNEP/MAP – Barcelona Convention Secretariat through its Plan Bleu Regional Activity Center is  
28 working in partnership with the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean to support MedECC,  
29 and to contribute to establish a sound and transparent scientific assessment process.

30 MedECC conclusions are prepared for use of policymakers and a broader audience. They are developed  
31 on the basis of scientific criteria only; their validity is therefore the responsibility of MedECC Report  
32 Authors alone. There are numerous gaps in available knowledge about the risks treated by MedECC –  
33 these have been indicated as clearly as possible. Despite best efforts, errors and omissions are never-  
34 theless not unlikely.

## This report

35  
36 MedECC has prepared a First Mediterranean Assessment Report (MAR1) on the current state of play  
37 and expected risks of climate and environmental change in the Mediterranean Basin. The report in-  
38 cludes a Summary for Policymakers (SPM), which comprises the key messages of the MAR1. A first  
39 draft of MAR1 had been prepared in 2019 and underwent expert peer review. The second draft, ac-  
40 counting for the review comments, and now supplied with a SPM, is now ready for a large consultation  
41 with governments, decision-makers and stakeholders.

42 The particular aim of this present consultation is to ascertain that MAR1 findings, as presented in the  
43 SPM, are fully comprehensible and unambiguous. While chapter drafts are also supplied with the SPM  
44 under review, they serve as background information only and are not part of the review.

45 The MedECC coordinators are very grateful for the expertise, rigor and dedication shown by the vol-  
46 unteer Coordinating Lead Authors and Lead Authors, working across scientific disciplines in each chap-  
47 ter of the report, with essential help by the many Contributing Authors. We express our sincere appre-  
48 ciation to all the expert and government reviewers.

49

50 **This draft is for consultation and comments on its SPM by invited persons and**  
51 **their institutions only. As some conclusions may still evolve through the re-**  
52 **view, the draft must not be shared, reproduced nor quoted in any way.**

53 **The direct references to the underlying chapters and Fig. SMP.1 have been technically updated.**

54 Comments are highly welcomed when used in the format specified in the accompanying letter, with  
55 specific reference to the page and line numbers in this draft. The consultation deadline is set to June  
56 30, 2020.

57 A plenary endorsement session is planned for September 2020 (details to follow later).

58 Final publication of the MAR1 is planned for end of 2020.

59 MedECC Authors and Coordinators want to thank reviewers already today for their time and effort.

60

61 **Climate and Environmental Change in the Mediterranean Basin – Current**  
62 **Situation and Risks for the Future**  
63 **First Mediterranean Assessment Report (MAR1)**



75 **Summary for Policymakers<sup>1</sup>**

76  
77  
78  
79  
80 **Drafting Authors:** Wolfgang Cramer (France), Joël Guiot (France), Katarzyna Marini (France), Brian Az-  
81 zopardi (Malta), Mario V Balzan (Malta), Semia Cherif (Tunisia), Enrique Doblas-Miranda (Spain),  
82 Philippe Drobinski (France), Maria dos Santos (Portugal), Marianela Fader (Germany), Abed El Rahman  
83 Hassoun (Lebanon), Carlo Giupponi (Italy), Vassiliki Koubi (Greece/Switzerland), Manfred Lange (Cy-  
84 prus), Piero Lionello (Italy), Maria Carmen Llasat (Spain), Stefano Moncada (Malta), Rachid Mrabet  
85 (Morocco), Shlomit Paz (Israel), Robert Savé (Spain), Maria Snoussi (Morocco), Andrea Toreti (Italy),  
86 Athanasios T. Vafeidis (Germany/Greece), Elena Xoplaki (Germany)

---

<sup>1</sup> This summary and the underlying MAR1 report remain under development while being reviewed by MedECC stakeholders.

## 87 **Executive Summary: Climate and environmental change in the Mediterranean** 88 **Basin**

89 **Virtually all sub-regions of the Mediterranean Basin, on land and in the sea, are impacted by recent**  
90 **anthropogenic changes in the environment. The main drivers of change include climate (tempera-**  
91 **ture, rainfall, extreme events, sea-level rise, and acidification), but also pollution, unsustainable land**  
92 **use practices and alien invasive species. In most areas, both natural ecosystems and human liveli-**  
93 **hoods are affected. Due to global and regional trends in the drivers, impacts are highly likely to be**  
94 **exacerbated in coming decades, especially if global warming exceeds 1.5-2°C above the pre-indus-**  
95 **trial level. Significantly enhanced efforts are needed for mitigation and adaptation in the region.**

96 Due to anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases, climate is changing in the Mediterranean Basin,  
97 historically and projected by climate models, exceeding global trends. Annual mean temperatures on  
98 land and sea in the Mediterranean Basin are 1.5°C higher than in pre-industrial times and they are  
99 projected to rise until 2100 by additional 3.8-6.5°C for a high greenhouse gas emissions scenario  
100 (RCP8.5) and 0.5-2.0°C for a scenario (RCP2.6) compatible with the UNFCCC Paris Agreement. On land  
101 and in the sea, heat waves will intensify in duration and peak temperatures. Despite strong regional  
102 variation, summer rainfall will likely be reduced by 10-30% in some regions, enhancing existing water  
103 shortages and decreasing agricultural productivity.

104 It is virtually certain that sea surface and deep-water warming will continue during the 21<sup>st</sup> century, by  
105 1-4°C depending on the scenario (low or high greenhouse gas emissions). Sea water acidifies and this  
106 trend will continue. Mean sea level has risen by 6 cm during the last 20 years. This trend is likely to  
107 accelerate (with regional differences) by the global rate of 43-84 cm until 2100, but possibly more than  
108 1 m in the highly likely case of further ice-sheet destabilization in Antarctica.

109 Most impacts of climate change are exacerbated by other environmental challenges such as changing  
110 land use, increasing urbanization and tourism, agricultural intensification, land degradation, and pol-  
111 lution (air, land, rivers and ocean). Tropospheric ozone concentrations increase and high-level epi-  
112 sodes will be more frequent. SO<sub>2</sub> and NO<sub>x</sub> have sharply increased recently, mainly because of shipping  
113 activity, and this trend will likely increase in the future. Due to more intensive atmospheric circulation,  
114 Saharan dust pollution is likely to also increase. The Mediterranean Sea is heavily polluted by multiple  
115 substances including plastic, emerging contaminants, fecal bacteria and viruses, all with expected in-  
116 crease in the future.

117 The Mediterranean Sea is invaded by many non-indigenous species through the Suez Canal. On land,  
118 non-indigenous species are particularly invasive in regions with high infrastructure and commerce de-  
119 velopment, including accidentally introduced phytophagous pests which cause damages to crops and  
120 forests. These trends are expected to continue in the future.

121 Agriculture is the largest user of water in the Mediterranean region. Climate change impacts water  
122 resources in combination with demographic and socio-economic drivers, reducing runoff and ground-  
123 water recharge, water quality, increasing conflicts among users, and risk of ecosystem degradation.  
124 The demand for irrigation is expected to increase by 4-18% by 2100. Demographic change, including  
125 the growth of the large urban centers, could enhance this demand by 22-74%. There is adaptive po-  
126 tential in the improvement of water use efficiency and reuse.

127 Food production from land and the sea is impacted by climate change, more frequent and intense  
128 extreme events, together with higher soil salinization, ocean acidification and land degradation. Crop  
129 yield reductions are projected for the next decades in most current areas of production and for most  
130 crops. This will potentially be worsened by emerging pests and pathogens. There is large adaptation  
131 potential in changing farming practices and management to agroecological methods, providing also  
132 important potential for climate change mitigation by increased carbon storage in soils. Marine food  
133 production is threatened by overfishing, invasive species, warming, acidification and water pollution,  
134 which together may affect species distribution and trigger local extinction of more than 20% of ex-  
135 ploited fish and marine invertebrates around 2050. Adaptation will require more rigorous manage-  
136 ment of fisheries in the Mediterranean. The sustainability of the Mediterranean food sector (from the  
137 land and the ocean) also depends on regional consumer behavior (diet) and the global food markets  
138 which may be affected by environmental crisis elsewhere.

139 Marine ecosystems and their biodiversity are also impacted by overfishing, warming, acidification and  
140 the spread of non-indigenous species from tropical waters. Expected consequences include increased  
141 jellyfish outbreaks, reduced commercial fish stocks, and general biodiversity loss due to altered phys-  
142 iology and ecology of most marine organisms. There is potential for mitigating these impacts through  
143 improved conservation in marine protected areas, more sustainable fishing practices and by reducing  
144 pollution from agriculture, urban areas and industry. In coastal systems, sea level rise will impact most  
145 infrastructures, aquifers, world heritage and other protected sites, notably in river deltas and estuar-  
146 ies. Increasing nutrient flows towards the sea increase the number and frequency of plankton blooms  
147 and jellyfish outbreaks, with negative impacts on fisheries, aquaculture and human health. The multi-  
148 ple levels of land-sea interactions require a new approach of ecosystem-based Integrated Coastal Zone  
149 Management and conservation planning.

150 Land biodiversity changes in multiple ways. In countries of the northern rim, forest area increases at  
151 the expense of extensive agriculture and grazing, while ecosystems in southern countries are still at  
152 risk of fragmentation or disappearance due to clearing and cultivation, overexploitation of firewood  
153 and overgrazing. During the last 40 years, biodiversity changes and species loss have led to homogeni-  
154 zation and a general simplification of biotic interactions. Half of the wetland area has been lost or  
155 degraded, this trend is expected to continue. Dryland extension and an increase in areas burnt during  
156 increasing wildfires are expected. Adaptation options for land biodiversity include preservation of nat-  
157 ural flow variability in Mediterranean rivers and the protection of riparian zones, reduction of water  
158 abstraction, modified silvicultural practices, promotion of climate wise landscape connectivity.

159 Human health is already impacted by high temperatures and air and water pollution in the Mediterra-  
160 nean Basin. The combined impacts of expected environmental change (notably air pollution and cli-  
161 mate) increase risks for human health, from heat waves, food shortages, vector-based, respiratory and  
162 cardio-vascular diseases. These health risks particularly impact disfavored populations, including the  
163 elderly, children and people with low income. Human security faces new risks from extreme events,  
164 particularly in coastal areas. Conflicts for scarce resources and human migration are likely to increase  
165 due to drought and degrading agricultural and fisheries resources, although socio-economic and polit-  
166 ical factors are likely to still play a major role.

167 Mediterranean cities grow due to increasing population, notably on the coasts of southern countries.  
168 Due to increasing heat stress, the planning and management of cities around to Mediterranean will

169 need to focus more on human health and resilience to environmental change. Urban impacts of cli-  
170 mate change are expected to be disproportionately high due to a concentration of population and assets  
171 in combination with hazard-amplifying conditions (e.g. increased run-off resulting from soil sealing, or  
172 urban heat island effects). Tourism will likely be affected by climate change through reduced thermal  
173 comfort, degradation of natural resources including freshwater availability, and coastal erosion due to  
174 sea level rise. The net economic effect on tourism will depend on the country and the season.

175 All Mediterranean countries have significant potential to mitigate climate change through an acceler-  
176 ated energy transition, implying the phasing out fossil fuels and accelerated development of renewa-  
177 ble energies. This energy transition, in line with commitments made for the UNFCCC Paris Agreement,  
178 requires a significant transformation of the energy and economic model in the Mediterranean region.  
179 While northern rim countries advance towards this transition by gradually diversifying their energy  
180 mix, improving energy efficiency and enlarging the fraction of renewables, eastern and southern rim  
181 countries still lag behind in these developments. Around 2040, the share of renewables could triple to  
182 reach 13-27% under current transition scenarios. Enhanced regional energy market integration and  
183 cooperation are crucial to unleashing cost-effective climate change mitigation.

184 More effective policy responses to climate and environmental changes will imply both, strengthened  
185 mitigation of the drivers of environmental change such as greenhouse gas emissions, but also en-  
186 hanced adaptation to impacts. Poverty, inequalities and gender imbalances presently hamper the  
187 achievement of sustainable development and climate resilience in Mediterranean countries. Culture  
188 is a key factor to the success of adaptation policies in the highly diverse multicultural setting of the  
189 Mediterranean Basin. Policies for climate adaptation and environmental resilience potentially infringe  
190 on human rights - they need to account for concerns such as justice, equity, poverty alleviation, social  
191 inclusion, and redistribution. To support policies for sustainable development with scientific evidence  
192 about climate and environmental change, a synthesis of current scientific knowledge, covering most  
193 relevant disciplines, sectors and sub-regions is presented by the 1<sup>st</sup> Mediterranean Assessment Report  
194 (MAR1).

195



## 196 Background and key findings of the 1<sup>st</sup> Mediterranean Assessment Report

### 197 1 Background for the assessment

198 1.1 Global environmental change exacerbates existing challenges for the population living around  
199 the Mediterranean Sea, through climate change, land use changes, increasing urbanization and  
200 tourism, agricultural intensification, pollution, declining biodiversity, resource competition, and so-  
201 cioeconomic trends. Environmental, socioeconomic and cultural conditions are highly heterogene-  
202 ous across the Mediterranean Region {section 1.1.1}, resulting in different manifestations of re-  
203 gional environmental change that require specific adaptation measures as well as enhanced capac-  
204 ity building. To account for these specificities, a holistic risk assessment approach encompassing  
205 the entire Mediterranean Basin is needed to provide adequate and timely information and data  
206 needed to design effective mitigation and adaptation strategies by decision-makers. {1.1.1}

207 1.2 Despite a large research effort across many disciplines and regions, there is no comprehensive  
208 assessment of risks posed by climate and environmental changes in the Mediterranean Basin so  
209 far. Most countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are likely to face potentially larger  
210 risks from climate and environmental changes than other parts of the Mediterranean Basin, but  
211 they have limited capacity to monitor important environmental parameters or carry out adequate  
212 risk analyses. Effective mitigation and adaptation require integrative studies that go beyond the  
213 current knowledge. The main challenges for the Mediterranean are to fill data and knowledge gaps  
214 across countries, and to foster development of high-level climate services, including early warning  
215 systems. More research is needed for short- and mid-term projections, large scale programs at the  
216 Mediterranean scale to address pressing challenges. {1.1.2}

217 1.3 The 1<sup>st</sup> Mediterranean Assessment Report (MAR1) has been conceived and drafted in order to  
218 provide science-based guidance to multiple actors involved in devising a response to climate and  
219 environmental changes and to reduce associated risks to communities and natural ecosystems in  
220 the Mediterranean region {1.3.1.4}. The report was developed by the scientific community, based  
221 on publications in scientific journals, for policymakers and other stakeholders through the conclu-  
222 sions in its Summary for Policymakers (SPM), as well as for a broader expert audience through its  
223 detailed technical chapters supporting the SPM. The report is also intended to be communicated  
224 more broadly to the public through additional efforts of communication and participatory actions.  
225 {1.3.2}

226 1.4 The report assesses risks for the entire Mediterranean Basin (land and sea), associated with four  
227 main drivers of environmental change: climate, pollution, land and sea use and non-indigenous  
228 species. Throughout the report, scientific confidence in its findings is indicated based on the con-  
229 sistency of evidence and the degree of agreement of the scientific community, using the terms  
230 “high”, “medium” and “low”. {1.3.3}

### 231 2 Drivers of environmental change in the Mediterranean Basin


#### 232 2.1 Climate change

233 **Anthropogenic climate change has been observed for many variables in the Mediterranean Basin**  
234 **during recent decades. For the future, the region is expected to remain among the most affected**  
235 **regions by climate change, particularly regarding precipitation and the hydrological cycle.**

236 2.1.1 There is robust evidence that the Mediterranean region has significantly warmed. Basin-  
237 wide, annual mean temperatures are now 1.5°C above the 1860-1890 level for land and sea  
238 areas, i.e. 0.4°C more than the global average change (*high confidence*). (Figure SPM.1) {2.2.4.1;  
239 Box 2.2}


240 2.1.2 Multi-model ensembles of climate simulations show that widespread warming will con-  
241 tinue in the Mediterranean during the 21<sup>st</sup> century (*high confidence*). {2.2.4.2, table 2.1}

242 2.1.2.1 Over land, warming will likely be in the range of 0.9-1.5°C or 3.7-5.6°C during the 21<sup>st</sup>  
 243 century, for low (RCP2.6) or high greenhouse gas emissions (RCP8.5), respectively (*high con-*  
 244 *fidence*). Future regional average warming will exceed the global mean value by 20% on an  
 245 annual basis and 50% in summer (*high confidence*). (Figure SPM.2) {2.2.4.2}



246  
 247 **Figure SPM.1 | Observed changes in temperature and rainfall.** Recent trends in tempera-  
 248 ture (a & b, °C decade<sup>-1</sup>) and rainfall (c & d, mm day<sup>-1</sup> decade<sup>-1</sup>) in the Mediterranean Basin.  
 249 Panels a & c average for the period 1950-2018, panels b & d for 1980-2018.

250 2.1.2.2 In the future, warm temperature extremes will increase and heat waves will intensify  
 251 in duration and peak temperatures. For 2°C of global warming, maximum daytime tempera-  
 252 tures in the Mediterranean will likely increase by 3.3°C. With 4°C global warming nearly all  
 253 nights will be tropical (night temperature during at least five days above a location-depend-  
 254 ing threshold) and there will be almost no cold days (below a location-depending threshold)  
 255 (*high confidence*). {2.2.4.2}



256  
 257 **Figure SPM.2 | Projected warming in the Mediterranean Basin.** Projected changes in annual  
 258 temperature relative to the recent past reference period (1980-1999), based on the  
 259 ensemble mean of EURO-CORDEX 0.11°, a: simulations for pathways RCP2.6 and RCP8.5, b:  
 260 temperature at the end of the 21<sup>st</sup> century (2080-2099) for RCP2.6, c: idem for RCP8.5.

261 2.1.3 The sign and magnitude of observed precipitation trends show pronounced spatial varia-  
262 bility, depending on the time period and season considered (*medium confidence*) {2.2.5.1}, so  
263 that the confidence in the detection of anthropogenic trends in rainfall for the historical past is  
264 low.

265 2.1.3.1 The most evident observed trend is a decrease of winter precipitation over the central  
266 and southern portions of the basin since the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (*medium confi-*  
267 *dence*). {2.2.5.1}


268 2.1.4 Models project a consistent decrease of precipitation during the 21<sup>st</sup> century, for the entire  
269 Mediterranean Basin in the warm season (April through September, with largest magnitude in  
270 summer) and in winter for most of Mediterranean, except for the northernmost regions (e.g.,  
271 the Alps) (*medium confidence*). (Figure SPM.3) {2.2.5.2}

272 2.1.4.1 The mean rate of precipitation decrease among models is 4% per each degree of  
273 global warming, which would determine a reduction in the range of 4-22% depending on  
274 scenario at the end of the 21<sup>st</sup> century (*medium confidence*) {2.2.5.2}. The magnitude of this  
275 decrease varies across models, rendering sub-regional projections uncertain.

276 2.1.4.2 Future climate projections indicate a predominant shift towards a precipitation re-  
277 gime of higher interannual variability, higher intensity and greater extremes (especially in  
278 winter, spring and fall, but not in the southern areas, *low confidence*), decreased precipita-  
279 tion frequency and longer dry spells (especially in summer and in the southern countries)  
280 (*medium confidence*). {2.2.5.2}

281 2.1.5 There are no significant trends in the number of observed cyclones during recent decades  
282 (*low/medium confidence*) {2.2.2.3}, most future climate projections indicate a reduction of cy-  
283 clones, especially in winter (*medium confidence*). {2.2.2.3}

284 2.1.5.1 There is insufficient information for assessing past trends of “medicanes” (Mediterranean hurricanes), but projections indicate decreasing frequency and increasing intensity (*medium confidence*). {2.2.2.3}



287  
288 **Figure SPM.3 | Projected rainfall change in the Mediterranean Basin.** Projected changes  
289 in annual rainfall relative to the recent past reference period (1980-1999), based on the  
290 ensemble mean of EURO-CORDEX 0.11°, a: simulations for pathways RCP2.6 and RCP8.5, b:  
291 rainfall anomalies at the end of the 21<sup>st</sup> century (2080-2099) for RCP2.6, c: idem for RCP8.5.

292 2.1.5.2 Projections of future wind speeds converge on a limited wind speed reduction over  
293 most of the Mediterranean Sea, with the exception of an increase over the Aegean Sea and  
294 northeastern land areas (*medium confidence*). {2.2.2.4}

295 2.1.5.3 Projections suggest a general reduction of mean significant wave height and its ex-  
296 tremes over a large part of the Mediterranean Sea, especially in winter, and storm surges at  
297 the coasts (*medium confidence*), but with no consensus on the most extreme events. {2.2.8.2}

298 2.1.6 Surface solar radiation in the Mediterranean Basin has decreased from the 1950s to the  
299 1980s (between  $-3.5$  and  $-5.2$   $\text{W m}^{-2} \text{decade}^{-1}$ ) and recovered thereafter (between  $+0.9$  and  
300  $+4.6$   $\text{W m}^{-2} \text{decade}^{-1}$ ), consistent with global trends (*very high confidence*). {2.2.3.1} In future  
301 climate projections, anthropogenic aerosol loads over the Mediterranean are expected to con-  
302 tinue decreasing (*high confidence*), leading to an increase of surface solar radiation (*medium*  
303 *confidence*). {2.2.3.2}

304 2.1.7 Observations and most model projections indicate a trend towards drier conditions over  
305 the Mediterranean Basin, especially in the warm season and over the southern areas (*me-*  
306 *dium/high confidence*). {2.2.5.3}

307 2.1.7.1 Over the Mediterranean Sea, the net fresh water loss (evaporation minus precipita-  
308 tion and river runoff) has increased since the last decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (*medium con-*  
309 *fidence*) {2.2.5.3}. The main cause is the strong evaporation increase due to local warming  
310 (the estimated rate of evaporation change in relation to the warming is about  
311  $0.7 \text{ mm day}^{-1} \text{ K}^{-1}$  (or  $25\% \text{ K}^{-1}$ ) over the period of 1958-2006).

312 2.1.7.2 The net water loss from the sea is expected to increase in the future due to a decrease  
313 in precipitation and river runoff and an increase in evaporation (*high confidence*). {2.2.5.3}

314 2.1.8 In the 20<sup>th</sup> century a large reduction in the area and volume of glaciers across high moun-  
315 tains of the Mediterranean has occurred. Deglaciation has generally accelerated in recent dec-  
316 ades (*high confidence*). {2.2.6.1}

317 2.1.8.1 Warming has shifted the occurrence of periglacial processes to higher elevations and  
318 degraded permafrost in high mountain environments. Glaciers in the Mediterranean region  
319 are projected to continue losing mass in the 21<sup>st</sup> century until complete disappearance of  
320 most mountain glaciers by the end of the century (*very high confidence*). {2.2.6.2}

321 2.1.8.2 At lower elevation, the water mass of the snow cover is projected to decline by 25%  
322 (10-40%) from 1986-2005 to 2031-2050, regardless the scenario. This will continue with a  
323 reduction of 30% at the end of the 21<sup>st</sup> century for a low emission scenario to 80% for high  
324 emission scenario. {2.2.6.2}

325 2.1.9 Mediterranean Sea surface waters are warming and their salinity increases (*high confi-*  
326 *dence*). {2.2.7.1}

327 2.1.9.1 Since the beginning of the 1980s, average Mediterranean Sea surface temperatures  
328 have increased throughout the basin, but with large sub-regional differences in the range  
329 between  $+0.29$  and  $+0.44^\circ\text{C}$  per decade, with stronger trends in the eastern basins (Adriatic,  
330 Aegean, Levantine and north-east Ionian Sea), marine heat waves have become longer and  
331 more intense (*high confidence*). {2.2.7.1}

332 2.1.9.2 The water mass temperature and salinity changes of the water outflowing from the  
333 Mediterranean Sea through the Strait of Gibraltar are  $0.077^\circ\text{C decade}^{-1}$  and  $0.063 \text{ psu de-}$   
334  $\text{cade}^{-1}$ , respectively, compared to 2004 (*high confidence*). {2.2.7.1}

335 2.1.10 Widespread sea surface temperature increase will continue in the 21<sup>st</sup> century (*very high*  
336 *confidence*).

337 2.1.10.1 During the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the basin mean sea surface temperature is expected to  
338 warm 2.7-3.8°C and 1.1-2.1°C under the RCP8.5 and the RCP4.5 scenarios, respectively (*very*  
339 *high confidence*). The sign of future basin average sea surface salinity change remains largely  
340 uncertain and its changes will likely be spatially and temporally heterogeneous (*medium con-*  
341 *fidence*). {2.2.7.2}

342 2.1.10.2 Marine heat waves will very likely increase in spatial extent, become longer, more  
343 intense and more severe than today (*medium confidence*). Under the high emission scenario,  
344 the 2003 marine heat wave may become a regular event for the period 2021-2050 and a  
345 weak event at the end of the 21<sup>st</sup> century (*medium confidence*). {2.2.7.2}

346 2.1.10.3 A long-term weakening of the open-sea deep convection, the winter deep water  
347 formation and the related branch of the thermohaline circulation for the western Mediter-  
348 ranean Sea in the high emission scenario are expected (*medium confidence*). {2.2.7.2}

349 2.1.11 Mediterranean Sea waters have acidified and will continue to acidify in line with the  
350 global ocean (*medium confidence*). The Mediterranean Sea is able to absorb relatively more an-  
351 thropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> per unit area than the global ocean because it is more alkaline and because  
352 deep waters are ventilated on shorter timescales (*medium confidence*). {2.2.9}

353 2.1.11.1 Sea water pH has decreased by -0.08 units since the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century  
354 (*medium confidence*). {2.2.9.1}

355 2.1.11.2 In 2100, reduction of pH might reach 0.462 and 0.457 units for the western and for  
356 the eastern basins, respectively (*medium confidence*). {2.2.9.2}

357 2.1.12 Mediterranean sea level is rising, similar to global trends, with strong spatial and tem-  
358 poral variation and expected acceleration (*medium confidence*). {2.2.8.1}

359 2.1.12.1 Averaged across the Mediterranean Basin, mean sea level has risen by 1.4 mm yr<sup>-1</sup>  
360 during the 20<sup>th</sup> century and has accelerated to 2.8 mm yr<sup>-1</sup> recently (1993–2013) (*high confi-*  
361 *cence*). {2.2.8.1}

362 2.1.12.2 Mostly due to global ocean and ice-sheet dynamics, Mediterranean mean sea level  
363 rise is projected to accelerate further throughout the 21<sup>st</sup> century (*high confidence*). Around  
364 2100, depending on the scenario, the basin mean sea level will likely be 37-90 cm higher than  
365 at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, with a small possibility to be above 110 cm (*medium confi-*  
366 *cence*). {2.2.8.2}

367 2.1.12.3 Sea level rise will increase the frequency and intensity of coastal floods (*high confi-*  
368 *cence*). {2.2.8.2}

## 369 2.2 Pollution


370 2.2.1 Across the Mediterranean Basin, ocean and inland pollution are ubiquitous, diverse and  
371 increasing in both quantity and in the number of pollutants, due to demographic pressure, en-  
372 hanced industrial and agricultural activities, and climate change (*high confidence*). {2.3.1}

### 373 2.2.2 Pollution of sea water

374 2.2.2.1 Mediterranean waters are generally oligotrophic (low nutrient), with decreasing lev-  
375 els from Gibraltar eastwards to the Levantine Sea. Several coastal regions are hotspots of  
376 human-induced nutrient inputs (Lagoons of Venice and Bizerte, Gulfs of Lion and Gabès, east-  
377 ern Adriatic and western Tyrrhenian Sea, North Lake of Tunis, Algerian-Provençal Basin and  
378 the Gibraltar Strait) (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.4). {2.3.3.1}

379 2.2.2.2 Nutrient enrichment causes eutrophication and may provoke harmful and toxic algal  
380 blooms, trends which will likely increase. Harmful algal blooms may cause negative impacts  
381 on ecosystems (red-tide, mucilage production, anoxia) and may represent serious economic

382 threats for fisheries, aquaculture and tourism. They may also harm human health, since 40%  
 383 of blooming microalgae are able to produce toxins responsible of different human intoxica-  
 384 tions. Harmful algal blooms can also occur in freshwater environments. {2.3.4}



385  
 386 **Figure SPM.4 | Fertilizer use and nitrogen release in Mediterranean Sea** (UNEP/MAP/MED  
 387 POL, 2013)

388 2.2.2.3 Emerging contaminants (related to recently discovered chemicals or materials) are  
 389 well spread in the Mediterranean Basin, and enhanced by increasing inflow of untreated  
 390 wastewater. These substances may cause disorders of the nervous, hormonal and reproduc-  
 391 tive system (*high confidence*). {2.3.3.5}

392 2.2.2.4 The increasing frequency of extreme precipitation events in the north of the Medi-  
 393 terranean increases the supply of faecal bacteria and viruses to the coastal zone (*medium*  
 394 *confidence*). {2.3.4}

395 2.2.2.5 The Mediterranean Sea is one of the most polluted large water bodies globally in  
 396 terms of plastic; the level of this pollution is expected to increase in the future (*medium con-*  
 397 *confidence*). {2.3.2.3}

398 2.2.2.6 The average density of plastic particles (1 item per 4 m<sup>2</sup>), as well as the frequency of  
 399 occurrence (100% of the sampled sites in a comprehensive study), are comparable to the  
 400 accumulation zones described for the five subtropical ocean gyres. Plastic debris in the Med-  
 401 iterranean surface waters is dominated by mm-sized fragments (up to 5 kg km<sup>-2</sup> in marine  
 402 waters and up to 25 kg km<sup>-2</sup> in coastal waters), with a higher proportion of large objects as  
 403 compared to open oceanic gyres, likely due to the proximity of pollution sources (*medium*  
 404 *confidence*). {2.3.2.3}

405 2.2.2.7 Even with rigorous reduction of use, plastic debris and their dissolved derivatives will  
 406 remain a problem since they can take 50 or more years to fully decompose (*medium confi-*  
 407 *idence*) {2.3.2.3}.

408 2.2.3 Air pollution

409 2.2.3.1 The Mediterranean Basin is among the regions in the world with the highest concen-  
 410 trations of gaseous air pollutants (NO<sub>2</sub>, SO<sub>2</sub> and O<sub>3</sub>); its dry and sunny climate, and also spe-  
 411 cific atmospheric circulation patterns enhance air pollution levels (*high confidence*). {2.3.3.2}  
 412 Emissions of aerosols and particulate matter (PM) into the atmosphere arise from a variety  
 413 of anthropogenic activities (transport, industry, biomass burning, etc.), but also from natural  
 414 sources (volcanic eruptions, sea salt, soil dust suspension, natural forest fires, etc.). {2.3.2.1}

415 2.2.3.2 Ships are the major emitters of SO<sub>2</sub> and NO<sub>x</sub>, their contribution to transport sector  
416 emissions and general air pollution in the Mediterranean Basin is increasing (*medium confi-*  
417 *dence*). {2.3.3.2}

418 2.2.3.3 Tropospheric ozone (O<sub>3</sub>) concentrations observed in the summer over this region are  
419 among the highest over the northern Hemisphere and still increasing in average and with  
420 more frequent high-level episodes. This trend will be likely be enhanced by future warming  
421 (*medium confidence*). {2.3.3.2}

422 2.2.3.4 Particular meteorological conditions and natural sources including the proximity of  
423 the Sahara Desert create specific patterns of aerosol concentrations that may influence the  
424 particulate matter (PM) concentrations. The occurrence of critically high PM concentrations  
425 associated with dust outbreaks is higher in the southern Mediterranean (>30 % of the annual  
426 days) than in the northern area (<20% of the annual days) (*high confidence*). {2.3.2.1}

## 427 2.3 Land and sea use change

428 2.3.1 Landscapes and their use have changed over millennia in the Mediterranean Basin, how-  
429 ever the rate of change has increased substantially since the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (*high*  
430 *confidence*). {2.4.1.1}

431 2.3.1.1 Urban and peri-urban areas are growing rapidly all over the Mediterranean, especially  
432 along the coasts. Urbanization is a major driving force of biodiversity loss and biological ho-  
433 mogenization causing landscape fragmentation, loss of open habitats and of the land use  
434 gradient, replacing as agricultural systems and natural vegetation (*high confidence*). {2.4.1.2}

435 2.3.1.2 Outside urban areas and areas with intensive agriculture, reforestation, as a conse-  
436 quence of abandoned agro-pastoralism, mainly affects marginal lands, arid and mountain  
437 regions, primarily in the north (*high confidence*). {2.4.1.1}

438 2.3.1.3 In many regions of North Africa and the Middle East (but also in Greece and Crete),  
439 the dominant land use change process is forest degradation caused by land overexploitation.  
440 From the 1980's to the 1990's deforestation has increased by 160% (*high confidence*).  
441 {2.4.1.1, 2.4.1.2}

442 2.3.1.4 Future land use trends depend strongly on regional policies for urbanization, agricul-  
443 ture, forestry and nature conservation. Grassland and pastures will likely continue to de-  
444 crease further in extension due to rural abandonment, often due to lacking job opportunities  
445 and public service in marginal areas (*medium confidence*). {2.4.1.3}

446 2.3.2 Marine resource overexploitation, notably overfishing, is the main driver of marine species  
447 population decline. {2.4.2}

448 2.3.2.1 Fishing effort has increased over long periods, but particularly so since the 1990's due  
449 to new technologies and higher capacity vessels (*high confidence*). {2.4.2.1}

450 2.3.2.2 In 2010, the cumulative percentage of collapsed and overexploited stocks exceeded  
451 60% across the Mediterranean Sea (*medium confidence*). The eastern Mediterranean is the  
452 most overexploited sub-basin with the highest number of collapsed species (*medium confi-*  
453 *dence*). {2.4.2.2}

454 2.3.2.3 Sustainable management of marine resources requires reduction of fishing pressure.  
455 Application of an ecosystem-based approach may ensure that both high and low trophic lev-  
456 els may recover and support both ecosystem health and resilience against sea warming (*high*  
457 *confidence*). {2.4.2.3}

## 458 2.4 Non-indigenous species

459 2.4.1 The Mediterranean Sea (and particularly the Levantine Basin) is a hotspot for invasions by  
460 many non-indigenous species (*high confidence*). {2.5.1}

461 2.4.1.1 Among marine non-indigenous species introduced during the last 30 years, inverte-  
462 brates dominate with >58% (mostly mollusks and decapods), primary producers follow with  
463 approx. 23% and vertebrates with 18% (mostly fishes). {2.5.1.1}

464 2.4.1.2 Most marine non-indigenous species arrive through the Suez Canal, but the highest  
465 impact is given by those introduced by ships and aquaculture (*high confidence*). {2.5.1.2}

466 2.4.1.3 The increase in non-indigenous species can be linked to decrease or collapse in pop-  
467 ulations of native species, and to other ecological changes of the marine ecosystem. {2.5.1.2}

468 2.4.1.4 The number and spread of non-indigenous species will likely increase further with  
469 increasing shipping activity and ocean warming (*medium evidence*). Forecasting future estab-  
470 lishment of non-indigenous species using species distribution models is challenging. {2.5.1.3}

471 2.4.2 On land, there is a high level of invasions by non-indigenous species in human-modified  
472 ecosystems and in regions with high infrastructure development (*high confidence*). {2.5.2.1}

473 2.4.2.1 On land, most non-indigenous species in the region are plants (introduced intention-  
474 ally as ornamentals), followed by invertebrates. Phytophagous pests dominate non-indige-  
475 nous species all over the Mediterranean Basin, accounting for more than a half of the inver-  
476 tebrate species; they cause damages to crops and forests. The main pathways of introduction  
477 for vertebrates are accidental escapes (*medium evidence*). {2.5.2.1}

478 2.4.2.2 With warming, current major invasive species are predicted to shift northwards by  
479 37-55 km decade<sup>-1</sup>, leaving a window of opportunity for new non-indigenous species adapted  
480 to xeric conditions. The trend has recently shifted towards increasing numbers of introduced  
481 invertebrates and vertebrates. This pattern will very likely continue in the near future, due  
482 to increasing air and maritime cargo, where these taxa can be easily transported as stowa-  
483 ways (*medium confidence*). {2.5.2.3}

## 484 3 Resources

### 485 3.1 Water

486 3.1.1 Water resources in the Mediterranean are scarce: resources are limited, unevenly distrib-  
487 uted and often mismatching human and environmental needs. {3.1.1}

488 3.1.1.1 Renewable water resources are unevenly distributed among Mediterranean regions  
489 (72-74% are located in the northern Mediterranean) and so is the spatial distribution of water  
490 needs, but with opposite trends. As a consequence, 180 million people in the southern and  
491 eastern Mediterranean countries suffer from water scarcity (<1000 m<sup>3</sup> capita<sup>-1</sup> yr<sup>-1</sup>) and 80  
492 million people from extreme water shortage (<500 m<sup>3</sup> capita<sup>-1</sup> yr<sup>-1</sup>) (*high confidence*).  
493 {3.1.1.1}

494 3.1.1.2 River discharge is characterized by high temporal - seasonal and inter-annual - varia-  
495 bility and groundwater is the main source of freshwater for some Mediterranean countries  
496 (Libya, Malta, Palestine, Israel) {3.1.1.2}. In several cases in southern Mediterranean coun-  
497 tries, groundwater resources are drawn from fossil aquifers, i.e. non-renewable resources  
498 (*high confidence*). {3.1.1.3}


499 3.1.1.3 Sustainable water management is complicated by the transboundary nature of many  
500 river basins and aquifers, common in Mediterranean countries (18% of total renewable water



501 resources originate outside the country in southern, 27% in eastern Mediterranean countries  
502 (*high confidence*). {3.1.1.1}

503 3.1.2 Due to the general scarcity of water resources, conflicts arise from different sectors of  
504 water use (agriculture, tourism, industry, people, also biodiversity conservation) (*medium con-*  
505 *fidence*). {3.1.2}

506 3.1.2.1 The spatial distribution of water use per sector in the Mediterranean area is hetero-  
507 geneous. In the southern and eastern countries, agricultural consumption dominates with  
508 76-79%. In the northern part, the four sectors are much more equilibrated (18-36%, Figure  
509 SPM.5). {3.1.2.1}



510  
511 **Figure SPM.5 | Proportion of the total water consumption** for four main sectors and three  
512 sub-regions (data source: AQUASTAT).

513 3.1.2.2 The percentage of irrigated land of the total cultivated area in the Mediterranean is  
514 about 25% (but more than 70% in Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Greece), with a strong increase  
515 (21%) over the last years {3.1.2.2}. The trend towards more efficient irrigation systems gener-  
516 erates not always absolute water savings due to the introduction of more water demanding  
517 crops (e.g., vegetables) (*medium confidence*). {3.1.2.2}

518 3.1.2.3 Tourism activity is at its highest in summer, coinciding with peak demands by irrigated  
519 agriculture, creating tensions for water – this will likely be exacerbated in the future due to  
520 climate change (*medium confidence*). {3.1.2.3 }

521 3.1.2.4 Municipal water use is already constrained in several Mediterranean countries af-  
522 fected by water scarcity, exacerbated by demographic and migratory phenomena, as well as  
523 by the limits and obsolescence of water distribution infrastructures (*medium confidence*).  
524 Several northern countries have managed to reduce their municipal withdrawal in absolute  
525 values while several southern and eastern countries have the opposite trend (*medium confi-*  
526 *dence*). {3.1.2.5}

527 3.1.2.5 Water related between-sector conflicts are likely to be exacerbated in the future be-  
528 cause of the interactions between climate change (increasing droughts) and ongoing socio-  
529 economic and demographic trends (*medium/high confidence*). {3.1.5.2}

530 3.1.3 Disastrous flash floods are frequent in many countries including Italy, France or Spain, af-  
531 fecting mainly the coastal areas, where population and urban settlements are growing in flood-  
532 prone areas, these will likely become more frequent and/or intensive due to climate change and  
533 surface-sealing (*medium confidence*). {3.1.3.3}

534 3.1.4 Climate change, in interaction with other drivers (mainly demographic and socio-economic  
535 developments), is likely to impact most of the Mediterranean Basin, through reduced runoff and

536 groundwater recharge, increased crop water requirements, increased conflicts among users,  
537 and increased risk of overexploitation and degradation (*high confidence*). {3.1.4.1}

538 3.1.4.1 Impacts of even moderate (1.5-2°C) global warming and associated socio-economic  
539 pathways are expected to come from reduced precipitation associated with increased evap-  
540 oration, leading to a decline of runoff {3.1.4.1}. In many regions, this will likely increase low  
541 flow periods in summer and an increased frequency of no-flow events, and higher drought  
542 risks {3.1.4.1}. More urban populations are likely to be exposed to severe droughts, and the  
543 number of the affected people will essentially scale with the temperature increase (*high con-  
544 fidence*). {3.1.4.1}

545 3.1.4.2 Aquifer recharge will be strongly impacted by warming and reduced rainfall, particu-  
546 larly in semi-arid areas. At current extraction rates, overexploitation of groundwater is likely  
547 to continue to be more important in lowering of groundwater levels than climate change  
548 (*high confidence*). {3.1.4.1}

549 3.1.4.3 Important challenges to groundwater quality in coastal areas are likely to arise from  
550 salt-water intrusion driven by enhanced extraction of coastal groundwater aquifers and sea-  
551 level rise, as well as from increasing water pollution in the southern and eastern Mediterra-  
552 nean (*medium confidence*). {3.1.4.1}

553 3.1.4.4 Impacts of higher end global warming on water resources by the end of the 21<sup>st</sup> cen-  
554 tury will be significantly stronger than those of 1.5-2°C global warming, generating substan-  
555 tially increased risks in the Mediterranean region {3.1.4.2}. The probability of more extreme  
556 and frequent meteorological, hydrological and agricultural droughts will likely increase sub-  
557 stantially, with 5 to 10 times more frequent droughts in many Mediterranean regions (*high  
558 confidence*). {3.1.4.2}

559 3.1.5 The combined dynamics of climate and socio-economic changes suggest that despite an  
560 important potential for adaptation to reduce freshwater vulnerability, climate change exposure  
561 cannot be fully and uniformly counterbalanced. In many regions, socio-economic developments  
562 will have greater impact on water availability compared to climate-induced changes (*low confi-  
563 dence*). {3.1.4.2}

564 3.1.5.1 Strategies and policies for water management and climate change adaptation are  
565 strongly interconnected with all other sectors (e.g., the water-energy-food nexus). Most ad-  
566 aptation and water management strategies rely on the principles of Integrated Water Re-  
567 sources Management (IWRM) which is based on economic efficiency, equity and environ-  
568 mental sustainability, considering also the nexus with agriculture (food production in partic-  
569 ular) and energy for building the resilience needed to adapt to climate change. {3.1.5.1}

570 3.1.5.2 Technical solutions are available to improve water availability and efficiency. Sea-  
571 water desalination is increasingly used to reduce (potable) water scarcity in arid and semi-  
572 arid Mediterranean countries, despite known drawbacks in terms of environmental impacts  
573 on near-coastal marine ecosystems and energy requirements with associated CO<sub>2</sub> emissions.  
574 Promising new (solar) technologies are under development, potentially reducing both green-  
575 house gas emissions and costs (*medium confidence*). {3.1.5.2}

576 3.1.5.3 Technology is also expected to contribute significantly to the reduction of wastewater  
577 volume, its reclamation and reuse and the reduction of impacts on sea water quality. Agri-  
578 cultural, industrial and watering activities present together approx. 70% water reuse poten-  
579 tial. It has been proposed to recharge aquifers with treated wastewater, but critical issues in  
580 terms of water quality remain to be resolved (*medium confidence*). {3.1.5.2}

581 3.1.5.4 Inter-basin transfer of water has been implemented in several large-scale schemes,  
582 with high social and environmental costs, and risks for conflict (*low confidence*). {3.1.5.2}

583 3.1.5.5 Dams for water storage or hydropower exist in most countries, and rivers are diverted  
584 for water management in some countries. Large dams often generate social and environ-  
585 mental impacts, such as the destruction of river and wetland ecosystems and the loss of  
586 aquatic biodiversity, forced relocation of people and loss of cultural resources. Reductions of  
587 these impacts are possible, for example through constructed wetland habitats, and manage-  
588 ment of fishing and other recreational opportunities (*low confidence*) {3.1.5.2}. Technological  
589 developments allow also for the use of underground- or subsurface dams, to contribute to  
590 sustainable management of groundwater. {3.1.5.2}

591 3.1.5.6 The strategy of trading commodities (in particular from agriculture) that cannot be  
592 produced due to lacking water (virtual water trade) can be considered a form of adaptation.  
593 Most Mediterranean countries (e.g., Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Israel, Turkey) have very  
594 footprints in terms of national consumption (above 2000 m<sup>3</sup> yr<sup>-1</sup> capita<sup>-1</sup>) (*low confidence*).  
595 {3.1.5.1}

596 3.1.5.7 Water demand management, i.e. methods that allow to save (high quality) water,  
597 may reduce water consumption or water losses. This includes technical, economic, adminis-  
598 trative, financial and/or social measures, with priority for increases in water use efficiency,  
599 in particular in the tourism and food sectors and with case-specific solutions integrating tra-  
600 ditional knowledge with modern technical achievements (*high confidence*). {3.1.5.1}

601 3.1.5.8 The reduction of water losses in all sectors of water use in the Mediterranean is cru-  
602 cial for sustainable management and adaptation strategies. Leakage in urban distribution  
603 networks and inefficient irrigation technologies are in urgent need to be addressed (*high*  
604 *confidence*). {3.1.5.1}

605 3.1.5.9 Maintaining the traditional Mediterranean diet and shifting back to a locally produced  
606 Mediterranean food in conjunction with a reduction of food waste, could generate water  
607 savings in comparison to the present increasingly meat-based diet: 753 l for locally produced  
608 diet and 116 l for lessening waste of water capita<sup>-1</sup> day<sup>-1</sup>, in addition to nutritional benefits  
609 (*high confidence*). {Box 3.2}

## 610 **3.2 Food**

611 3.2.1 Warmer and drier climate conditions, with more frequent and intense extreme events, in  
612 combination with higher soil salinization, ocean acidification and land degradation pose a threat  
613 to most elements of the food production system in the Mediterranean Basin (*high confidence*).

614 3.2.1.1 Climate extremes pose a threat to the entire agriculture sector. Crop yield reductions  
615 are projected for the next decades in most current areas of production and for most crops if  
616 no adaptation will take place. {3.2.2.1}

617 3.2.1.2 Maize is the crop most affected by climate change, projected to decline in yield by up  
618 to 17% in some countries at about 2050 (*medium confidence*); it could become infeasible in  
619 regions with limited access to irrigation water (*medium confidence*) {3.2.2.1}. Wheat yield  
620 losses are also projected because of higher inter-annual variability. Other water demanding  
621 crops, e.g., tomatoes, are also at risk. The production of some currently rainfed crops, such  
622 as olives, could become infeasible without irrigation (*medium confidence*). {3.2.2.1}

623 3.2.1.3 Increasing atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations may help offset yield losses for some  
624 crops, such as wheat and barley, but this effect could impact nutritional quality. Beneficial  
625 effects of CO<sub>2</sub> are likely limited by water stress conditions as well as by nutrient availability  
626 (*low confidence*). {3.2.2.1}

627 3.2.1.4 Climate extremes, such as heat stress, droughts but also floods, can cause crop yield  
628 losses/failures, crop quality reduction and impacts on livestock (*high confidence*) {3.2.1.4}.

629 These events can also induce long-term socio-economic and landscape changes (*medium*  
630 *confidence*). {3.2.1.4}

631 3.2.1.5 Sea level rise will likely impact the agriculture sector by direct impact on (or loss of)  
632 agricultural areas in coastal zones, along with up to three-fold increase in salinity of irrigation  
633 water and soil; rice production in Egypt and Spain could be the most affected (*high confi-*  
634 *dence*). {3.2.2.1}

635 3.2.1.6 New and/or re-emerging pests and pathogens may contribute to larger than esti-  
636 mated losses in the agriculture sector. Food quality and security may be also affected by  
637 mycotoxigenic fungal pathogens and higher level of contamination (*medium confidence*).  
638 {3.2.2.1}

639 3.2.1.7 Total landings from Mediterranean fisheries have declined by 28% from 1994 to 2017  
640 {3.2.1.3, Figure 3.22}. Climate change is projected to heavily affect marine resources in the  
641 next decades. Warming, acidification and water pollution are likely to reduce marine produc-  
642 tivity, affect species distribution and trigger local extinction of more than 20% of exploited  
643 fish and marine invertebrates around 2050 (*high confidence*). {3.2.2.2}

644 3.2.1.8 Perturbations in global markets for agricultural and marine products, potentially  
645 caused by environmental change elsewhere, may exacerbate the local impacts of climate  
646 change, especially because most Mediterranean countries are net importers of cereal and  
647 fodder/feeding products (*high confidence*). {3.2.1.5}

648 3.2.2 Adaptation to environmental change will be of key importance to limit and partially offset  
649 the impacts of climate change in the food sector (*high confidence*).

650 3.2.2.1 Projected yield losses in most of crops may be reduced by targeted adaptation strat-  
651 egies, such as dynamic sowing and use of new varieties adapted to the evolving climate con-  
652 ditions. Strategies based on increased irrigation will have limited applicability in the region;  
653 thus, adapted production of crops such as maize will depend on more drought-resistant va-  
654 rieties (*medium confidence*). {3.2.3.1}

655 3.2.2.2 Successful adaptation strategies are based on combining different approaches, i.e. on  
656 farming practices (e.g., varieties, rotational patterns, and crop diversity) and management  
657 (e.g., diversification of income). Sectorial co-designed climate services may help reduce risks  
658 linked to unfavorable climate conditions and extremes (*medium confidence*). {3.2.3.1}

659 3.2.3 The food production system on land has the capacity to contribute to greenhouse gas mit-  
660 igation strategies by nitrogen fertilization optimization, improved water management, better  
661 storage of soil organic carbon and carbon sequestration, management of crop residues and  
662 agroindustry by-products (*high confidence*). {3.2.3.2}

663 3.2.3.1 The potential to mitigate N<sub>2</sub>O emissions in Mediterranean agro-ecosystems, through  
664 adjusted fertilization (rate and timing) is 30-50%. Replacing mineral nitrogen with organic  
665 fertilization provides not only nitrogen, phosphorus, potassium and micronutrients to the  
666 soil and crop, but also enhances organic carbon when using solid fertilizers (i.e., solid manure,  
667 compost, etc.), this would be beneficial in many Mediterranean soils with low organic carbon  
668 contents (*medium confidence*). {3.2.3.2}

669 3.2.3.2 Optimized irrigation techniques may decrease greenhouse gas emissions from Medi-  
670 terranean regions in perennial crops and intensive vegetable cropping systems on paddy soils  
671 (water table management) (*medium confidence*). {3.2.3.2}

672 3.2.3.3 Soil organic carbon content in Mediterranean croplands is responsive to management  
673 changes such as organic amendments, cover crops and tillage reductions. There is high po-  
674 tential to enhance soil organic carbon storage through land restoration (as proposed by the  
675 "4‰ initiative"). Organic fertilizers, tillage reduction and residue retention are effective

676 practices in herbaceous systems. Woody systems, in which the carbon storage potential is  
677 higher, can benefit from maintaining a soil cover and use of agro-industry byproducts, such  
678 as composted olive mill waste, as a source of organic matter (*medium confidence*). {3.2.3.3}

### 679 3.3 Energy

680 3.3.1 From 1980 to 2016, primary energy consumption in the Mediterranean Basin steadily in-  
681 creased by approx. 1.7% yr<sup>-1</sup>, mostly due to changing demographic, socioeconomic (lifestyle and  
682 consumption) and climatic conditions (*high confidence*). {3.3.2.1: Fig.3.25}

683 3.3.1.1 The current level of Mediterranean greenhouse gas emissions is approx. 6% of global  
684 emissions, close to its proportion of the world population. International climate policy agree-  
685 ments demand an accelerated energy transition in the countries of this region to enable a  
686 secure, sustainable and inclusive development. {3.3.1}

687 3.3.1.2 The contribution of oil to energy production has remained stable between 1995 and  
688 2016, while that of coal has gradually decreased. Primary energy production from natural gas  
689 has doubled, while the contribution of nuclear power and renewable energy sources contri-  
690 bution has risen by about 40% (*high confidence*). {3.3.2.1, Figure 3.28}

691 3.3.1.3 While northern rim countries advance to gradually diversify their energy mix, improve  
692 energy efficiency and increase the fraction of renewables, eastern and southern rim coun-  
693 tries lag behind in these developments (*high confidence*). {3.3.3.2}

694 3.3.2 Projected trajectories for energy demand during the next few decades in the Mediterr-  
695 anean Basin differ significantly between the northern and the eastern/southern rim countries  
696 (*high confidence*). {3.3.3.2}

697 3.3.2.1 Energy demand in the north has decreased by 4% since 2010, due to moderate pop-  
698 ulation growth, increasing efficiency and a stable economy, and is expected to continue to  
699 decrease. In 2040, north Mediterranean energy demand would be 22%, 12% and 22% lower  
700 than current levels of 2013, for three stylized scenarios of energy policy (“transition” - TS,  
701 “reference” – RS, and “proactive” - PS), respectively (*low confidence*). {3.3.3.2}

702 3.3.2.2 Countries of the south Mediterranean have undergone sustained economic and pop-  
703 ulation growth over the past decades. Energy demand is thus expected to continue increase  
704 and reach in 2040 55% (TS), 110% (RS) and 75% (PS) compared to 2013 (*medium confidence*).  
705 {3.3.3.2}

706 3.3.3 Climate change in the Mediterranean is expected to impact energy production (due to  
707 impacts on infrastructure) and energy use (by decreased heating demand and increased cooling  
708 needs). {3.3.2.3}

709 3.3.3.1 Losses in power generation are projected due to warming in the region, with only  
710 marginal impact if global warming does not exceed 2°C (<5%), but rapid deterioration beyond  
711 2°C (>5% reaching 10% at specific locations) (*low confidence*). {3.3.3.5}

712 3.3.3.2 Hydropower and thermoelectric power usable capacity is expected to decline, due to  
713 decreased streamflow and increased water temperature, leading to a 2.5-7% decrease in hy-  
714 dropower in 2050 and 10-15% decrease in thermopower in 2050 (ranges indicate RCP2.6 vs.  
715 RCP8.5 estimates) (*high confidence*). {3.3.3.5}

716 3.3.3.3 Weather and climate variability, as well as extreme events, cause significant impacts  
717 on the availability and magnitude of renewable energy generation. With the increase of the  
718 share of renewables, the electricity transmission system will be more exposed to weather  
719 variations and may be threatened by specific weather conditions that are usually not consid-  
720 ered as extremes (*medium confidence*). {3.3.2.3}

721 3.3.3.4 With warming, all Mediterranean countries will experience a net increase in energy  
722 demand for cooling. The change in average daily peak electric load from 2006–2012 to 2080–  
723 2099 under RCP4.5 climate change scenarios is up to 4–6% (Balkan) and 8–10% under RCP8.5  
724 (Balkan, Spain, Portugal) (*high confidence*). {3.3.3.6, Fig. 3.51}

725 3.3.4 The Mediterranean Basin has significant potential for additional renewable energy produc-  
726 tion, on land and in the ocean. These include wind, solar, hydro, geothermal and bioenergy as  
727 well as energy generation by waves and currents (*high confidence*) {3.3.2.2}. There also is po-  
728 tential for high energy efficiency gains (*high confidence*). {3.3.3.2}

729 3.3.4.1 Thermal energy from biomass (wood residues and waste) currently exceeds use of all  
730 other renewables, mainly for the production of heat or fuel (less for electricity). Overall pro-  
731 duction of energy from solid biomass is currently 1.56 PW, varying considerably between  
732 countries and mainly concentrated on the northern rim. The production of firewood has in-  
733 creased by about 90% in north Africa over the last 60 years and has recently returned to its  
734 1960's level in southern Europe, after a large reduction from 1973 to 2009 (*medium confi-*  
735 *idence*). {3.3.2.2}

736 3.3.4.2 Although fossil fuels are expected to remain the dominant component of the energy  
737 mix until 2040, renewables will overtake natural gas and coal and become the second most  
738 used energy source in the Mediterranean Basin. In 2040, the share of renewables would tri-  
739 ple to reach 27% in TS, 13% in the RS and 24% in PS (scenarios “transition” - TS, “reference”  
740 – RS, and “proactive” - PS) (*high confidence*). {3.3.3.3}

741 3.3.4.3 Among the various renewable energy technologies, solar is expected to grow at the  
742 fastest pace in both sub-regions. End usage of solar thermal energy, in particular solar water  
743 heaters, has high potential in the south and is efficient with a good return on investment  
744 (*medium confidence*). {3.3.3.3}

745 3.3.4.4 The potential for energy efficiency enhancements is substantial in the Mediterranean  
746 Basin, particularly in the south (*high confidence*). Overall, energy intensity is decreasing in  
747 the region, largely related to shifts in the buildings, industry and transport sector (*high con-*  
748 *ference*). {3.3.3.2}

749 3.3.5 By further improving energy efficiency and deploying renewables on a large scale, the en-  
750 tire Mediterranean region can reduce tensions on energy security for importing countries, im-  
751 prove opportunities for exporting ones and reduce energy costs and environmental damages  
752 for the whole region. Embarking on an energy transition path will also help improve social wel-  
753 fare in the region and contribute to job creation, among other positive externalities (*medium*  
754 *confidence*). {3.3.3}

755 3.3.5.1 Given socio-economic development and climate change, an important gap between  
756 energy supply and demand is expected, particularly in southern and eastern rim countries.  
757 This challenge can be met by rapid restructuring of the energy sector, particularly further  
758 accelerated integration of renewable energies (*medium confidence*). {3.3.4.2}

759 3.3.5.2 Advantages/measures of the energy transition include: per capita greenhouse gas  
760 emissions will be drastically reduced; the return on investment in renewable energies may  
761 lead to savings of up to 54% in energy costs of a given country, and the establishment of a  
762 CO<sub>2</sub> emissions trading market will provide economic incentives for investments in renewable  
763 energies (*medium confidence*). {3.3.4.2}

764 3.3.5.3 Despite electrification rates of almost 100% in southern and eastern rim countries,  
765 the energy dynamics of these countries are largely unsustainable in the long term, as a result  
766 of a highly subsidized electricity market leading to a systemic misallocation of resources, a  
767 population growth, an increasing urbanization and expected socioeconomic changes in the  
768 region, and global warming (*high confidence*). {3.3.4.3}

769 3.3.5.4 A change in domestic energy policies, including reforming the energy pricing mecha-  
770 nisms, and/or the introduction of tax and regulatory incentives may be needed in southern  
771 and eastern rim countries to reduce the cost disadvantage of renewable energies compared  
772 to fossil fuels (*medium confidence*). {3.3.4.2}

773 3.3.5.5 Regional energy market integration and cooperation are needed to unleashing cost-  
774 effective climate change mitigation. {3.3.4.5}. Cross-border regulations require the conver-  
775 gence of national regulations to allow interconnections to work effectively. Investment reg-  
776 ulation requires the design and develop infrastructure that will be needed for promoting in-  
777 ternational complementarities and technical standards (*high confidence*). {3.3.4.5}

778 3.3.6 Mediterranean islands experience specific threats, challenges and opportunities in the  
779 context of global change and energy transition. Geographical and socioeconomic singularities of  
780 Mediterranean Islands put additional pressure on water and energy, leading to resource deple-  
781 tion and degraded environment, threatening sustainable development, especially during the  
782 high touristic season when population doubles for some of them (*high confidence*). {Box 3.3.2}

783 3.3.6.1 In most islands, energy demand is set to increase, due to socio-economic trends in-  
784 cluding tourism, but also due to expected increase in the use of energy-intensive desalination  
785 techniques (*medium confidence*). {Box 3.3.2}

786 3.3.6.2 Enhancement of hydropower is limited in most Mediterranean islands, but there is  
787 important potential for wind power (*medium confidence*). {Box 3.3.2}

## 788 4 Ecosystems

### 789 4.1 Marine ecosystems

790 4.1.1 Mediterranean marine ecosystems are unique due to their high number of endemic spe-  
791 cies, but they are also highly vulnerable to local and global pressures including environmental  
792 change. {4.1.1.1}

793 4.1.1.1 The Mediterranean Sea represents the highest proportion of threatened marine hab-  
794 itats in Europe (32%, 15 habitats) with 21% being listed as vulnerable and 11% as endangered.  
795 This threat includes several valuable and unique habitats (e.g., seagrasses and coralligenous),  
796 supporting an extensive repository of biodiversity. Despite covering only 0.82% of the  
797 planet's ocean surface, the Mediterranean Sea hosts 18% of all known marine species (*high*  
798 *confidence*). {4.1.1.1}

799 4.1.1.2 Over millennial time-scales, productivity in the overall oligotrophic Mediterranean  
800 Sea responds rapidly to short and long-term changes in nutrient input, either from rivers,  
801 winds or upwelling activity, all of which modify the benthic-pelagic ecosystems by extending  
802 in the entire food chain (*high confidence*). {4.1.1.2}

803 4.1.1.3 Tropical invasive non-indigenous species spread in the Mediterranean, mostly arriv-  
804 ing through the Suez Canal, supported by current warming trends, causing "tropicalization"  
805 of marine fauna and flora (*medium confidence*). {4.1.1.1}

806 4.1.1.4 Acidification in the Mediterranean waters will likely impact the marine trophic chain  
807 from its primary producers (i.e. coccolithophores and foraminifera) to corals and coralline  
808 red algae (*medium confidence*). {4.1.1.1}


809 4.1.1.5 Climate change and direct human activities impact the integrity of marine ecosystems  
810 by perturbations in plankton ecology, increasing jellyfish outbreaks, reduction in fish stocks,  
811 and more generally modifications of physiology, growth, reproduction, recruitment and be-  
812 havior in marine organisms (*medium confidence*). {4.1.1.1}

813 4.1.2 The combination of various ongoing drivers of climate change (e.g., sea warming, ocean  
814 acidification, and sea level rise) has numerous detectable effects on marine organisms acting at  
815 individual, population, and ecosystem scales. Expected future impacts include major reorgani-  
816 zations of the biota distribution, species loss, marine productivity, increase of non-indigenous  
817 species, and potential species extinctions (*medium confidence*) (Figure SPM.6). {4.1.2.1}

818 4.1.2.1 Projections for high emission scenarios show that endemic assemblages will be mod-  
819 ified by 2041-2060; among 75 Mediterranean endemic fish species, 31 are likely to become  
820 extinct, 44 will likely reduce their geographical range (*medium confidence*).

821 4.1.2.2 Alterations of natural habitats for commercially valuable species are likely to occur  
822 implying many repercussions on marine ecosystem services such as tourism, fisheries, cli-  
823 mate regulation, and ultimately on human health (*medium confidence*). {4.1.2.2}

824 4.1.2.3 In general, small pelagic species, thermophilic and/or exotic species, of smaller size  
825 and of low trophic levels, could benefit from environmental change. Large-sized species, of-  
826 ten with commercial interest may find conditions for survival being reduced (*medium confi-  
827 dence*). {4.1.2.1}



828 **Figure SPM.6 | Climate change drivers potentially affecting marine pelagos and benthos**  
829 **in the Mediterranean Sea.**  
830

831 4.1.3 Adaptation strategies to reduce environmental change impacts on marine ecosystems  
832 need to occur in conjunction with climate mitigation and pollution reduction policies and ac-  
833 tions. {4.1.3.4}

834 4.1.3.1 Due to the diversity of marine community responses to climate change and other  
835 stressors in different sub-basins, wider monitoring coverage is needed to strengthen  
836 knowledge of the different processes of adaptation that characterize and best suit each zone  
837 (*high confidence*). {4.1.3.1}

838 4.1.3.2 All measures that improve marine ecosystem health, resilience or biodiversity have  
839 the potential to delay and reduce adverse effects of climate drivers. These include more sus-  
840 tainable fishing practices, reducing pollution from agricultural activity, sustainable tourism  
841 and more effective waste management (*high confidence*). {4.1.3.4}



842 4.1.3.3 Marine protected areas provide an “insurance” role for biodiversity if they are placed  
843 in locations with limited vulnerability for ocean acidification and climate change (*medium*  
844 *confidence*) {4.1.3.4}. While marine protected areas cannot halt climate change and its con-  
845 sequences such as ocean acidification, they are an important tool for enhancing the resilience  
846 and adaptive capacity of ecosystems (*high confidence*). {4.1.3.2}

847 4.1.3.4 Developing practical management actions that take into consideration the unique-  
848 ness of each species and their responses towards different drivers is crucial to increase their  
849 resilience and plasticity in the context of climate change (*high confidence*). {4.1.3.3}

## 850 4.2 Coastal ecosystems

851 4.2.1 The coastal zone, i.e. the area in which the interaction between marine systems and the  
852 land dominate ecological and resource systems, is a hotspot of risks, especially in the south-  
853 eastern Mediterranean region (*high confidence*). {4.2.1.1}

854 4.2.1.1 Alterations of coastal ecosystem regimes (lagoons, deltas, salt marshes, etc.) due to  
855 climate change and human activities affect the nutrients flow towards the sea, the magni-  
856 tude, timing and composition of plankton blooms, significantly increase the number and fre-  
857 quency of jellyfish outbreaks, and could have negative impacts on fisheries (*high confidence*).  
858 {4.2.1.1}

859 4.2.1.2 In addition of hosting high biodiversity of wild faunal and floral species, coastal eco-  
860 systems are also often used as aquaculture platforms (i.e. fish, shellfish cultures, etc.), and  
861 the pressures on them may have significant consequences on their usages (*medium confi-*  
862 *idence*). {4.2.1.1}

863 4.2.1.3 Seagrass meadows in the Mediterranean Sea represent 1.35 to 5 million hectares,  
864 between 5 and 17% of the worldwide seagrass habitat. The current loss rate of seagrass is  
865 approx. 5% in the Mediterranean. Even in the remaining *Posidonia* meadows, almost half of  
866 the surveyed sites have suffered net losses of density above 20% in 10 years (*medium confi-*  
867 *idence*). {4.2.1.1}

868 4.2.1.4 The rapid spread of invasive fish species represents a serious problem for trophic  
869 networks and fisheries in coastal areas, due to the local extinction of species that are preys  
870 of these generalist fishes (*high confidence*). {4.2.1.1}

871 4.2.2 In the future, environmental change, particularly warming, decreasing nutrient replenish-  
872 ment, and ocean acidification, are expected to cause changes in plankton communities at dif-  
873 ferent levels from phenology and biomass to community structure (*medium confidence*)  
874 {4.2.2.1}. Negative impacts are expected also on fishes, corals, seagrass meadows and invasive  
875 species are expected to be favored (*medium confidence*). {4.2.2.1}

876 4.2.2.1 Sea level rise impacts coastal wetlands and estuaries, while reduced precipitation and  
877 prolonged droughts will reduce the water discharge of Mediterranean rivers and catchments.  
878 Mobile coastlines are likely to retreat or disappear because of the effects of erosion due to  
879 the accelerated rise in sea level, with most severe impacts the least mobile species (*medium*  
880 *confidence*). {4.2.1.1; 4.2.2.2}

881 4.2.2.2 Mediterranean coasts are expected to suffer further severe disturbance due to inten-  
882 sive urbanization, which could worsen as land availabilities are decreasing and population  
883 growth continues. In the future, coastal storms and floods, probably more frequent and in-  
884 tense, will have adverse impacts on the ecological balances as well as on human health and  
885 wellbeing, particularly in the coastal Mediterranean cities (*medium confidence*). {4.2.2.3}

886 4.2.3 Developing more integrated approaches would support adaptation policies for the entire  
887 Mediterranean, involving ecosystem-based management, synergies and conflicts, as well as lo-  
888 cal knowledge and institutions. {4.2.3.6}

889 4.2.3.1 Suitable adaptation policies include reducing pollution from runoff, both from agri-  
890 culture, industry and waste management, policies to limit or prevent acidification and mov-  
891 ing aquaculture operations to areas protected from critical acidification levels (*high confi-*  
892 *cence*). {4.2.3.1}

893 4.2.3.2 Early Detection and Rapid Response (EDRR) has been recognized as a key aspect for  
894 invasive species management. Efficient public awareness campaigns disseminating infor-  
895 mation to the local communities may help to promptly detect unwanted invasive species,  
896 together with formalized early warning systems (*medium confidence*). {4.2.3.3}

## 897 4.3 Terrestrial ecosystems

898 4.3.1 Biodiversity changes in the Mediterranean Basin over the past 40 years have been faster  
899 and greater than in most other regions in the world. Urbanization and the loss of grasslands are  
900 key factors of ecosystem degradation across the region. Since 1990, agricultural abandonment  
901 has led to a general increase in forested area of 0.67% yr<sup>-1</sup> across the basin, with large variations  
902 between northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. {4.3.1.2}

903 4.3.1.1 Since about 1980, changes of biodiversity are faster and greater in different Mediter-  
904 ranean species groups and habitats than before. Species loss is marked by a general trend of  
905 homogenization (loss of vulnerable and rare species) recorded in several species groups and  
906 also by a general simplification of biotic interactions (loss of specialized relationships) (*high*  
907 *confidence*) {4.3.1.2}.

908 4.3.1.2 In all Mediterranean mountain regions, subalpine species move to higher altitudes  
909 wherever this is possible (*medium confidence*). {4.3.1.2}


910 4.3.1.3 Almost all countries in the northern sub-region undergo increase in forest area due  
911 to the decline of extensive agriculture and agro-pastoral systems, with rates around 1% yr<sup>-1</sup>  
912 in Italy, France and Spain. In the southern, semi-natural ecosystems are smore at risk of frag-  
913 mentation or disappearance due to human pressure from clearing and cultivation, overex-  
914 ploitation of firewood and overgrazing (*high confidence*). {4.3.1.2}

915 4.3.1.4 Agro-system biodiversity has declined dramatically since the early 1950s due to the  
916 intensification of agriculture, leading to an increase of highly modified agroecosystems and  
917 simplified and agricultural landscapes (*high confidence*). Traditional and extensive, agricul-  
918 tural practices, including agro-ecological methods, generally help maintain high biodiversity  
919 levels (*medium confidence*). {4.3.1.2}

920 4.3.1.5 Over the last five decades, agricultural production has increasingly been impacted by  
921 loss of pollinators, with an increase by a factor of three in the number of crops requiring the  
922 intervention of pollinators (*medium confidence*). {4.3.1.2}

923 4.3.1.6 Mediterranean drylands have a large and specific biodiversity value, with much of  
924 plants and animals highly adapted to water limited conditions. {4.3.1.2: Drylands & shrub-  
925 lands}. European Mediterranean drylands are undergoing an overall increase in the percent  
926 of arid area in response to climate change and extensive land abandonment; almost 15%  
927 (from 64% to 78%) of the humid Mediterranean domain have been replaced by more arid  
928 area since the 60s, while arid area has remained stable (*medium confidence*). {4.3.1.2}

929 4.3.1.7 Freshwater ecosystems offer many important ecosystem services (e.g., water supply  
930 for drinking, agriculture and industries, water purification, erosion control, recreation, tour-  
931 ism and flood mitigation) {4.3.1.2: freshwater ecosystems}. 48% of the Mediterranean wet-  
932 lands have been lost between 1970 and 2013, with 36% of wetland dependent animals in the  
933 Mediterranean threatened with extinction (*high confidence*). {4.3.1.2}



Distribution of dryland changes in the Mediterranean

934  
935  
936  
937  
938  
939  
940  
941  
942

**Figure SPM.7 | Distribution of drylands and their subtypes** based on observations for the period 1981-2010. Areal cover of drylands per subtype is estimated within the boundaries of the Mediterranean SREX region (dashed line). (b, c, d) Distribution of projected drylands transitions for three Global Warming Levels (GWLs: +1.5°C, +2°C and +4°C above preindustrial), relative to the baseline period. Grey shaded areas in (b), (c) and (d) are drylands of the baseline period. Chord diagrams denote the areal extent of projected transitions in each dryland subtype for each GWL (proportional to the total extent of land changing to drier types) (see 4.3.2.4, Fig. 4.15)

943  
944  
945

4.3.2 Drier climate and increased human pressure are expected to cause significant impacts on terrestrial biodiversity, forest productivity, burnt area, freshwater ecosystems and agro-systems during the 21<sup>st</sup> century (*medium confidence*). {4.3.2}

946  
947  
948  
949

4.3.2.2 All factors considered, a general reduction of forest productivity at the mid- and long-term is likely, associated with higher mortality and dieback, particularly for species or populations growing in water-limited environments, which constitute the majority of Mediterranean forests (*medium confidence*). {4.3.2.1}

950 4.3.2.3 An increase in forest fires, and hence burnt area is projected in Mediterranean Europe  
951 under most global warming scenarios. Burnt area could increase across the region up to 40%  
952 for 1.5°C warming and up to 100% of current levels for 3°C warming at the end of the 21<sup>st</sup>  
953 century (*high confidence*). {4.3.2.1}

954 4.3.2.4 Most Mediterranean drylands will likely become drier and their extent is expected to  
955 increase across the region. Global warming projections of 1.5°C, 2°C and 4°C correspond to  
956 dryland areas extension of 12%, 20% and 41% respectively (*medium confidence*) (Figure  
957 SPM.7). {4.3.2.3}

958 4.3.2.5 For freshwater systems, projections suggest decreased hydrological connectivity, in-  
959 creased concentration of pollutants during droughts, changes in biological communities as a  
960 result of harsher environmental conditions, and a decrease of biological processes like nutri-  
961 ent uptake, primary production, or decomposition. Increased pressure by users on the  
962 shrinking water resources will likely aggravate impacts on river ecosystems (*medium confi-*  
963 *dence*). {4.3.2.5}

964 4.3.3 For most ecosystems, management options exist that can enhance resilience under envi-  
965 ronmental change. {4.3.3}

966 4.3.3.1 Promotion of ‘climate wise connectivity’ through permeability of landscapes, conser-  
967 vation or creation of dispersal corridors and habitat networks may all facilitate upward mi-  
968 grations to mountains of lowland species in order to adapt to novel climate change condi-  
969 tions (*medium confidence*). {4.3.3.2}

970 4.3.3.2 Promotion of mixed-species forest stands and silvicultural practices such as thinning,  
971 and management of understory can promote the adaptation of Mediterranean forests to  
972 warmer climates. The management of spatial heterogeneity in landscapes can help reduce  
973 fire extent under climate warming (*low confidence*). {4.3.3.1}

974 4.3.3.3 The preservation of natural flow variability of Mediterranean rivers and streams and  
975 wide riparian zones, along with reductions in water demand may assist adaptation of fresh-  
976 water ecosystems to future environmental change (*medium confidence*). {4.3.3.5}

## 977 5 Society

### 978 5.1 Development

979 5.1.1 Sustainable development seeks to address the needs of current and future generations,  
980 utilizing natural resources in ways that preserve and sustain them, and ensure equitable access  
981 to them in the present and the future. If losses in wellbeing are to be avoided for future gener-  
982 ations, sustainability strategies will need to improve wellbeing and environmental sustainability  
983 at the same time (*medium confidence*). {5.1.1.1}

984 5.1.2 Due to the growing impact of climate change on population, institutional response is in-  
985 creasingly needed, both at national and international level. This is reinforced by the necessity to  
986 mitigate and regulate the action of business and other multinational enterprises against climate.  
987 {5.1.1.2}

988 5.1.2.1 Climate proofing infrastructure in the whole Mediterranean Region is necessary to  
989 withstand present and future climate change impacts in the coming decades. Investments in  
990 research and development greatly reduce the costs of adaptation (*high confidence*). {5.1.1.3}

991 5.1.2.2 The Mediterranean has a rich history as well as exceptional natural and cultural land-  
992 scapes, which have attracted more than 360 million tourists in 2017. In the past 20 years the  
993 gross domestic product contribution from the tourism sector has steadily increased by 60%  
994 in Mediterranean countries. Climate change will likely impact thermal comfort of tourists

995 during the main season. Sea-level rise will likely affect beaches and cultural heritage sites  
996 (high confidence) {5.1.1.3}

997 5.1.2.3 A significant part of the Mediterranean tourism is oriented to outdoor activities,  
998 which if unmitigated are at risk to further degrade natural resources, including freshwater  
999 availability (*high confidence*). {5.1.1.3}

1000 5.1.2.4 Mediterranean tourism has a major role for employment throughout the region, and  
1001 has the potential to become more resilient to climate change than the overall economy. Sus-  
1002 tainable tourism can secure significant employment and help offset the negative economic  
1003 impact of climate change (*medium confidence*). {5.1.1.3}

1004 5.1.3 Poverty, inequalities and gender imbalances relate both directly and indirectly to the  
1005 achievement of sustainable development in Mediterranean countries. The presence of these  
1006 imbalances, both relative and absolute, hampers economic development, de facto blocking  
1007 parts of society from the benefits of higher standards of living {5.1.1.3}.

1008 5.1.3.1 The loss to human development due to inequality over the past few years (2010 to  
1009 2017) is consistently larger in southern Mediterranean countries than northern Mediterr-  
1010 nean countries (*high confidence*). {5.1.1.3; Box 5.1.1}

1011 5.1.3.2 Gender inequalities are important in the Mediterranean countries, situated between  
1012 the 18<sup>th</sup> position and the 159<sup>th</sup> (of 164) in the global ranking of the Gender Development  
1013 Index (*high confidence*). {5.1.1.3; Box 5.1.2}

1014 5.1.3.3 Climate change education means an active participation of the community, especially  
1015 children and youth, as agents of change and enhanced linkages between education policy-  
1016 makers and climate researchers to ground educational policy and actions in scientific  
1017 knowledge and expertise (*medium confidence*). {5.1.1.4}

1018 5.1.4 The expected more extreme climate conditions and the pollution of the Mediterranean  
1019 Basin are likely to result in economic vulnerabilities and risks of higher intensity than other Eu-  
1020 ropean regions. {5.1.2}

1021 5.1.4.1 Higher intensity and more recurrent flash-floods with higher mortality in eastern  
1022 Mediterranean affect directly agriculture, commerce, tourism and industry (*medium confi-*  
1023 *dence*). {5.1.2}

1024 5.1.4.2 The effect of sea level rise, together with changes in storm features is likely to seri-  
1025 ously affect port operations, slowing down trade operations and productivity levels (*medium*  
1026 *confidence*). {5.1.2}

1027 5.1.4.3 The economic effect on tourism depends on the country and the season. Some adap-  
1028 tation to warming can be achieved by spreading out tourism offers towards spring and au-  
1029 tumn. North Mediterranean regions could experience climate induced tourism revenues de-  
1030 crease up to -0.45% of gross domestic product per year by 2100 (*medium confidence*). {5.1.2}

1031 5.1.4.4 Economic costs due to droughts may exceed those caused by earthquakes or floods  
1032 (*low confidence*). {section 5.1.1.3}

1033 5.1.5 The success of adaptation strategies will involve consideration of the specific regional cli-  
1034 matic conditions, in sectoral, political and socioeconomic contexts by ensuring dialogue be-  
1035 tween stakeholders, through cooperative structures, knowledge transfer and monitoring pro-  
1036 gress to support regular reviews of policy objectives and the inclusion of new scientific infor-  
1037 mation when it becomes available. {5.1.3}


1038 5.1.5.1 The variants of sustainable urban growth represented by sustainable cities, resilient  
1039 cities, green cities or low carbon cities bring opportunities to create pathways for transform-  
1040 ative and sustainable urban development (*high confidence*). {5.1.3.1}

1041 5.1.5.2 Stronger pollution and greenhouse gas emissions control instruments can be de-  
 1042 ployed. Institutional approaches may facilitate internalization of externalities. Command and  
 1043 control instruments may have an action on production inputs, emission outputs, location or  
 1044 production techniques. Economic incentive (market-based) instruments include taxes, liabi-  
 1045 lity payments, emission permits, subsidies etc. {5.1.3.2, Table 5.3}

1046 **5.2 Human health**

1047 5.2.1 Environmental change has led to a wide range of impacts on human health in the Mediter-  
 1048 ranean countries already, and most trends are likely to continue. {5.2.1.1}

1049 5.2.1.1 Direct impacts are related to exposure to extreme events as heat waves and cold  
 1050 spells, floods and storms. Interaction with environmental systems lead to indirect impacts as  
 1051 changes in water availability and quality, in food availability and quality, rising air pollution  
 1052 including pollution from forest fires, and changing patterns of vector-, food- and water-borne  
 1053 diseases (*high confidence*). {5.2.1.1}



1054 **Figure SPM.8 | Attributable fraction of heat-related deaths during summer with different**  
 1055 **climate scenarios** by country in Europe. a) RCP 4.5 in 2050; b) RCP 8.5 in 2050, c) RCP 4.5 in  
 1056 2085 and d) RCP 8.5 in 2085 (Kendrovski et al., 2017).  
 1057

1058 5.2.1.2 Population vulnerability to the impacts of environmental and climate change is  
 1059 strongly influenced by population density, level of economic development, food availability,  
 1060 income level and distribution, local environmental conditions, pre-existing health status, and  
 1061 the quality and availability of public health care (*high confidence*). {5.2.2}

1062 5.2.1.3 Vulnerable Mediterranean populations include the elderly, the poor, and people with  
 1063 pre-existing or chronic medical conditions, displaced people, pregnant women and babies.  
 1064 People who are disadvantaged due to lacking shelter, clean water, energy or food are more  
 1065 at risk from extreme events (*high confidence*). {5.2.2}

1066 5.2.2 Heat waves are responsible for high mortality rates causing tens of thousands of prema-  
1067 ture deaths, especially in large cities and among aged people. A part of the heat-related mor-  
1068 bidity and mortality has been reduced during recent years by more efficient protection of people  
1069 (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.8). {5.2.3.1}

1070 5.2.2.1 Most Mediterranean cities are compact and densely populated and have experienced  
1071 strong impacts of extremely high temperatures on their population (*medium confidence*).  
1072 {5.2.3.1}

1073 5.2.2.2 In recent decades, mortality rates due to heat stress have been achieved through  
1074 national plans and alert systems that have raised risk awareness and avoidance among the  
1075 population (*high confidence*). {5.2.3.1}

1076 5.2.2.3 The European population at risk for thermic stress is expected to be in constant in-  
1077 crease over the upcoming years and could increase to 20-48% in 2050, depending on differ-  
1078 ent combinations of socioeconomic scenarios. Vulnerability varies between regions and the  
1079 Mediterranean region will be among the most affected. Annual heat attributable mortality  
1080 in the Mediterranean Europe will increase by a factor 1.8 and 2.6 for moderate (RCP 4.5) or  
1081 high (RCP 8.5) global warming levels, respectively, in the middle of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, while at  
1082 the end of the century the increase with by a factor of 3 and 7 respectively (*high confidence*).  
1083 {5.2.5.2}

1084 5.2.2.4 The impact of heat on mortality will be more influenced by socioeconomic factors  
1085 due the impacts on vulnerability than by the exposure to high temperatures (*medium confi-*  
1086 *dence*). {5.2.5.2}

1087 5.2.3 Despite the rise in mean temperature, cold waves are not likely to disappear (*high confi-*  
1088 *dence*). Moderate cold-related risk will remain a temperature-related risks throughout the 21<sup>st</sup>  
1089 century, in combination with infection risks, due to the presence or absence of a pathogenic  
1090 agent (*low confidence*). {5.2.5.3}

1091 5.2.4 Environmental changes in the Mediterranean Basin will likely exacerbate risks for vector-  
1092 borne disease outbreaks in the Mediterranean region since warmer climate and changing rain-  
1093 fall patterns, together with landscape management may create hospitable environments for  
1094 mosquitoes, ticks, and other climate-sensitive vectors, particularly for the West Nile Virus,  
1095 Chikungunya and Leishmaniasis (*medium confidence*). {5.2.3.3}

1096 5.2.4.1 Projections for 2025 show an elevated risk for vector-borne diseases in the Mediter-  
1097 ranean. For 2050 the West Nile Virus high-risk areas are expected to expand further and the  
1098 transmission seasons will extend significantly (*medium confidence*). {5.2.5.4}

1099 5.2.4.2 Future changes in the habitability of the Mediterranean Basin for vector-based dis-  
1100 ease vectors and pathogens vary geographically and will modify significantly the extent and  
1101 transmission patterns in the area. A significant reduction of habitat suitability for the tiger  
1102 mosquito *Aedes albopictus* (vector for chikungunya and dengue) is projected for the mid of  
1103 21<sup>st</sup> century in southern Europe and the Mediterranean related to significant increase of sum-  
1104 mer temperature (*high confidence*). {5.2.5.4}

1105 5.2.4.3 With rising average temperatures and increasing frequency and length of heat waves,  
1106 a rising number of cases of food-borne illness must be expected for business-as-usual sce-  
1107 narios, unless education, epidemiological surveillance and enforcement (related to food  
1108 safety) are intensified (*high confidence*). {5.2.5.4}

1109 5.2.5 Every year, around one million fatalities are attributed to outdoor and indoor air pollution  
1110 in the European and eastern Mediterranean regions. {5.2.4.1}

1111 5.2.5.1 Synergistic effects are observed between ozone levels, particulate matter concentra-  
1112 tions and climate, especially during heat wave days, with high temporal and spatial variability

1113 with an increase in mortality of 1.66% for each 1°C temperature increase on low ozone level  
1114 days and an increase of up to 2.1% in days of high ozone levels. Reducing the exposure to  
1115 particulate matter improves the life expectancy of Europeans of about 8 months (*high confi-*  
1116 *dence*). {5.2.4.1}

1117 5.2.5.2 Exposure to forest fires smoke and pollutants of natural origin, such as Saharan dust,  
1118 is related to increased mortality, respiratory and cardiovascular diseases with variable im-  
1119 pacts depending on age (*medium confidence*). {5.2.4.2}

1120 5.2.5.3 Ozone-related morbidity and mortality is expected to increase by 10-14% from 2021  
1121 to 2050 in several Mediterranean countries. The combined influence of O<sub>3</sub> and PM<sub>2.5</sub> (par-  
1122 ticulate matter with diameter less than 2.5 µm) will increase European mortality by 8-11% in  
1123 2050 and by 15-16% in 2080 (*medium confidence*). {5.2.5.5}

1124 5.2.6 Climate change and extreme events have a negative impact on mental health for people  
1125 who experienced loss of homes, destruction of settlements and damage to community infra-  
1126 structure (*medium confidence*) {5.2.4.3}. Displacement may lead to adverse health outcomes,  
1127 especially for vulnerable population groups as well as those who are suffering from chronic dis-  
1128 eases (*medium confidence*). {5.2.4.4}

1129 5.2.7 Prevention plans related to human health should be developed further by specifically con-  
1130 sidering climate change risks. Most mitigation and adaptation measures for climate change offer  
1131 synergies with other public health issues, notably air pollution. Mediterranean countries need  
1132 to enhance cross-border collaboration, as adaptation to many of the health risks (e.g., vector-  
1133 borne diseases, droughts, migration) requires collaboration across borders and also across the  
1134 different parts of the basin (*low confidence*). {5.2.6.2}

### 1135 5.3 Human security

1136 5.3.1 Human security is a condition that exists when the vital core of human lives is protected,  
1137 and where people have the freedom and capacity to live with dignity. {5.3.1.1}

1138 5.3.1.1 Environmental and climate change constitutes a threat to the enjoyment of eco-  
1139 nomic, social and cultural rights, acting as a risk multiplier and a key crosscutting issue for  
1140 multiple aspects of human rights and international justice. {5.3.2.2}

1141 5.3.1.2 There is a substantial divide between Mediterranean countries regarding individual  
1142 circumstances and the specific impacts of environmental change on security, which depend  
1143 on climate but also the geographical, social, cultural, economic and political conditions.  
1144 {5.3.1.1}

1145 5.3.2 Recent human migration (mostly within southern and eastern countries of the Mediterra-  
1146 nean Basin but also between the South and the North) can partially be attributed to environ-  
1147 mental change, but other drivers such as economic and political factors are usually more im-  
1148 portant. While slow-onset environmental and climatic events have significantly affected human  
1149 well-being in some areas, adaptation is usually possible reducing the need for human migration.  
1150 In contrast, fast-onset events with associated environmental degradation (such as storms and  
1151 floods) have likely led to migration, mostly over short-distance and temporary (*medium confi-*  
1152 *dence*). {5.3.2.3}

1153 5.3.3 Climate fluctuations have likely played a role in the decline, or collapse, of ancient civiliza-  
1154 tions, probably involving situations of increased violent conflicts. For the Syrian war several stud-  
1155 ies indicate a link between armed conflict and environmental change, but other scholars disa-  
1156 gree (*low confidence*). {5.3.2.4; Box 5.3.1}

1157 5.3.3.1 Negative weather shocks such as dry spells occurring during the crop growing season  
1158 by reducing agricultural production and income may increase the continuation and intensity  
1159 rather than the outbreak of civil conflicts, especially in regions with agriculturally dependent



1160 and politically excluded groups. Several recent studies identify a link between higher food  
1161 prices caused by climatic changes and urban social unrest in Africa. Rising food prices are  
1162 considered to have played a significant role in the Arab Spring unrest across North Africa and  
1163 the Middle East in 2011, although that such forms of violence are mostly triggered by a com-  
1164 plex set of political and economic factors rather than only by higher food prices caused by  
1165 climatic change (*low confidence*). {5.3.2.4}

1166 5.3.3.2 For conflict, the impact of expected future environmental change must remain spec-  
1167 ulative, however the recent historical experience makes it likely that severe and rapid climate  
1168 change could further exacerbate political instability in the poorest parts of the Mediterra-  
1169 nean Basin (*medium confidence*). {5.3.3.2}

1170 5.3.3.3 Knowledge is limited regarding how natural disasters interact with and/or are condi-  
1171 tioned by socio-economic, political, and demographic settings to cause conflict. Future re-  
1172 search remains necessary (*medium confidence*). {5.3.5}

1173 5.3.4 Parts of the rich Mediterranean cultural heritage, notably many UNESCO World Heritage  
1174 Sites, are threatened directly by sea-level rise or other aspects of environmental change. There  
1175 is an urgent need for mitigation and adaptation as a large number of world heritage sites are  
1176 already at risk today. Until 2100, flood risk may increase by 50% and erosion risk by 13% across  
1177 the Mediterranean region (*high confidence*). {5.3.3.1}

1178 5.3.5 Culture is a key factor to the success of adaptation policies to environmental change in the  
1179 highly diverse multicultural setting of the Mediterranean Basin. Climate adaptation policies have  
1180 the potential to infringe on human rights in the Mediterranean region if they are disconnected  
1181 from concerns such as justice, equity, poverty alleviation, social inclusion, and redistribution  
1182 (*high confidence*). {5.3.4.1}

## 1183 **6 Managing future risks and building socio-ecological resilience in the** 1184 **Mediterranean**

1185 6.1 Although national governments have an important role to play in the reduction of burden of  
1186 climate change on human health, it is at the local scale that most actions and measures are taken.  
1187 These measures include (but are not limited to) the improvement of housing and infrastructure,  
1188 the education and awareness-raising of the most vulnerable communities, the implementation of  
1189 early warning systems, the strengthening of local emergency and healthcare services, and the gen-  
1190 eral strengthening the adaptive capacity of the community and of the local institutions (*high confi-*  
1191 *dence*). {6.2.2}

1192 6.2 Sustainable water security measures require integrated approaches which includes water sav-  
1193 ing technologies, such as new equipment in irrigation agriculture and households, often comple-  
1194 mented by improved water efficiency, multi-scale storages, use of unconventional water sources  
1195 stemming from recharging wastewater or sea water desalination. Some of these measures may  
1196 cause environmental impacts due to soil contamination, energy consumption or coastal ecosystems  
1197 degradation (*high confidence*). {6.3.3}

1198 6.3 Adaptation of Mediterranean agriculture to water scarcity will benefit from more sustainable  
1199 approaches. Many studies on no tillage and agroforestry in the Mediterranean show that these  
1200 practices may have positive effects on the soil by keeping more water, therefore enhancing yields  
1201 especially in water-stressed years {6.4.3}. These strategies also have benefits for climate mitigation,  
1202 since conservation agriculture emits less greenhouse gases and enhances soil carbon sequestration  
1203 and storage (*medium confidence*). {6.4.2}

1204 6.4 Anticipated changes in fire regimes can have significant impacts on natural and social systems.  
1205 These impacts can be exacerbated by current suppression policies, such as deployment of pre-  
1206 scribed fire over large tracts of land {6.5.3}. Transformative changes in fire management practices

1207 in the Mediterranean countries are necessary for reducing risk and vulnerability and increasing natural and societal resilience, e.g., development of socio-economic sustainable activities that ensure  
1208 low overall landscape risk (*medium confidence*). {6.5.4}  
1209

1210 6.5 Land Degradation Neutrality is a conceptual framework to halt the loss of land due to unsustainable management and land use changes. Its purpose is to maintain the land resource base so  
1211 that it can continue to supply ecosystem services while enhancing the resilience of the communities  
1212 that depend on the land. This concept just starts to be applied, but not yet really in the Mediterranean  
1213 countries (*low confidence*). {6.6.4}  
1214

1215 6.6 Interconnections between hazards may result in consecutive and compound events that can  
1216 lead to non-linear increases in the magnitude of individual events, thus challenging the resilience  
1217 of population living in floodplains. Good practices in flood management are development of dedicated  
1218 early warning systems, construction of check dams and reforestation in upstream areas, floodplain  
1219 restoration and bank erosion protection, adequate agricultural practices to retain water, improvement  
1220 of drainage systems in urbanized areas, emergency management plans in addition to urban planning  
1221 for resilience and strategic retreat (*medium confidence*). {6.8.2}

1222 6.7 Sea-level rise will lead to increases in coastal-flood and erosion risk along the entire Mediterranean  
1223 coast. Proactive adaptation to these hazards is essential for maintaining functioning coastal  
1224 zones. Coastal adaptation practices can be classified in the following broad categories: Protect, accommodate,  
1225 advance, and retreat. ‘Soft-protection’, i.e. beach and shore nourishment as well as dune or wetland  
1226 restoration, is becoming a more common alternative to hard structures. Flood fatalities are reduced  
1227 as societies are learning to live with flood hazards (*medium confidence*). {6.9.2}  
1228

1229 6.8 Tourism and recreation, red coral extraction, and fisheries (both capture and aquaculture production)  
1230 are the most vulnerable sectors to sea acidification {6.11.1}. Recruitment and seed production present  
1231 possible bottlenecks for shellfish aquaculture in the future since early life stages are vulnerable to  
1232 acidification and warming {6.11.1}. As a possible solution, seagrasses may provide “refugia” from  
1233 ocean acidification to the associated calcifying organisms, as their photosynthetic activity may raise  
1234 pH above the thresholds for impacts on calcification and/or limit the time spent below some critical  
1235 pH threshold (*medium confidence*). {6.11.4}

1236 6.9 Although the level of non-indigenous species invasions will likely remain high in northern countries  
1237 in the next decades, these invasions will likely increase substantially in southern and eastern countries  
1238 where biodiversity may be high but capacity to manage invasions is low. In such places, unmanaged  
1239 non-indigenous species may threaten human livelihoods {6.12.1}. Only few non-native species succeed  
1240 in establishing in their new locations and become invasive, but those that do can result in billions  
1241 of dollars in costs (*medium confidence*). {6.12.2}

1242 6.10 Only few Mediterranean cities have local climate plans that consider mitigation and adaptation  
1243 in a joint manner. There is an urgent need for more integrated local climate plans. Cities, in particular,  
1244 need to become more resilient to environmental change as impacts will be disproportionately high in  
1245 these locations due to a concentration of population and assets in combination with hazard-amplifying  
1246 conditions (e.g., increased runoff through soil sealing, urban heat island effect). This implies  
1247 knowledge exchange and promotion of ambitious action against climate and environmental  
1248 change (*medium confidence*). {6.13}