



United Nations Environment Programme

**Terminal Evaluation  
of the Project**

**“Capacity Building for  
the Development of the National Biosafety Framework of Macedonia”**

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Project Identification Table .....	iv
Executive Summary .....	vi
1 Introduction.....	1
2 The Evaluation .....	1
3 The Project.....	2
3.1 Context .....	2
3.2 Objectives and components .....	3
3.3 Target areas/groups .....	3
3.4 Milestones/key dates in project design and implementation.....	4
3.5 Implementation arrangements .....	4
3.6 Project financing.....	4
3.7 Project partners.....	4
3.8 Changes in design during implementation.....	4
3.9 Reconstructed Theory Of Change of the project.....	5
4 Evaluation Findings.....	6
4.1 Strategic relevance .....	6
4.1.1 Sub-regional environmental issues and needs.....	6
4.1.2 UNEP mandate and policies .....	6
4.1.3 <i>GEF Biodiversity focal area, strategic priorities and operational programme(s)</i> .....	7
4.1.4 Overall Strategic Relevance.....	7
4.2 Achievement of outputs .....	8
4.3 Effectiveness: Attainment of project objectives and results.....	15
4.3.1 Project outcomes from reconstructed ToC.....	15
4.3.2 Project outcomes from reconstructed ToC .....	15
4.3.3 Likelihood of impact using ROTl and based on reconstructed TOC.....	18
4.4 Sustainability and replication .....	19
4.4.1 Socio-political sustainability .....	19
4.4.2 Financial sustainability.....	19
4.4.3 Institutional sustainability .....	20
4.4.4 Environmental sustainability .....	20

4.4.5	Catalytic role and replication.....	20
4.5	Efficiency.....	21
4.6	Factors affecting performance .....	21
4.6.1	Preparation and readiness.....	21
4.6.2	Project implementation and management .....	21
4.6.3	Stakeholder participation and public awareness .....	23
4.6.4	Country ownership and driven-ness.....	23
4.6.5	Financial planning and management .....	23
4.6.6	UNEP supervision and backstopping .....	23
4.6.7	Monitoring and evaluation.....	24
4.7	Complementarity with UNEP strategies and programmes .....	24
5	Conclusions and Recommendations.....	25
5.1	Conclusions.....	25
5.2	Lessons Learned .....	28
5.3	Recommendations.....	28
	Annexes .....	31

### Project Identification Table

#### Project “Capacity Building for the Development of the National Biosafety Framework of Macedonia”

<b>GEF project ID:</b>	4103	<b>IMIS number:</b>	GFL/2328-2716-4B91
<b>UNEP Focal Area(s):</b>	Environmental governance	<b>Project Type:</b>	MSP
<b>GEF Strategic Priority/Objective:</b>	GEF 4: BD3 –SP6 (Biosafety)	<b>GEF approval date:</b>	09/11/2010
<b>UNEP approval date:</b>	27/04/2011	<b>First Disbursement:</b>	11/07/2011
<b>Actual start date:</b>	28/06/2011	<b>Planned duration:</b>	36 months
<b>Planned completion date:</b>	26/08/2014	<b>Actual or Expected completion date:</b>	26/01/2015(5 m. extension)
<b>Planned project budget at approval:</b>	643,000 USD	<b>Total expenditures reported as of 31/12/2013:</b>	234.603 USD ***
<b>GEF Allocation:</b>	407,000 USD	<b>GEF grant expenditures reported as of 31/12/2013:</b>	94,558.43USD (23%) ***
<b>Expected MSP/FSP Co-financing:</b>	236,000 USD	<b>Secured MSP co-financing</b>	167.655 USD ***
<b>Leveraged extra financing:</b>		<b>No. of Audits (last Audit reported)</b>	1 (last 2013, rep. September 2014)
<b>Mid-term review/eval. (planned date):</b>	June 2012	<b>Mid-term review/eval. (actual date):</b>	Na
<b>No. of revisions:</b>	4	<b>Date of last Revision:</b>	26/08/2014
<b>Date of last Steering Committee meeting</b>	19/12/2013	<b>Terminal Evaluation (actual date):</b>	02/11-06/11/2015
<b>Date of financial closure:</b>	Na		

\*\*\* According to the last signed Financial Report found in AUNBIS (12/2013). Project Team no more in place at the time of the Evaluation.

## List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

ANUBIS	A New UNEP Biosafety Information System
BCH	Biosafety Clearing House
CBD	Convention on Biological Diversity
CPB	Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
EA	Expected Accomplishments (of UNEP)
EO	Evaluation Office (of UNEP)
EU	European Union
FP	Focal Point
GEF	Global Environmental Facility
GMO	Genetically Modified Organism
LMO	Living Modified Organism
MEA	Multilateral Environmental Agreement
MOEPP	Ministry of Environment and Physical Planning
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NEAP	National Environmental Action Plan
NBC	National Biosafety Committee
NBF	National Biosafety Framework
NCA	National Competent Authority
NCC	National Coordinating Committee
NEA	National Executing Agency
NOC	National Operational Coordinator
NPC	National Project Coordinator
MTS	Medium Term Strategies (of UNEP)
PIR	Project Implementation Review
PoW	Programme of Work (of UNEP)
ProDoc	Project Document
PSC	Project Steering Committee
RA	Risk Assessment
RM	Risk Management
ROtI	Review of Outcomes to Impact
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme

## Executive Summary

- 1 This is the final report of the Terminal Evaluation of the Project “Capacity Building for the Development of the National Biosafety Framework of Macedonia” (GFL/2328-2716-4B91), approved by the GEF in 11/2010 for a duration of 3 years (2011-14) and a total budget of USD 643.000, the 63% of which represents the GEF allocation (USD 407.000), with the remaining 37% (USD 236.000) provided in kind by the Government of Macedonia. The National Executing Agency (NEA) is the Min. of Environment and Physical Planning (MOEPP), which is also the focal point of the CPB and the main National Competent Authority (NCA).
- 2 The Evaluation took place in the period between September and November 2015 and included a mission to Macedonia from 02/11/2015 to 06/11/2015. The Evaluation Team consisted of one consultant, a specialist in project evaluation in the environmental sector (See Annex 6), working under the methodological guidance of the Evaluation Office (EO) of UNEP.
- 3 There has been an initial delay between GEF and UNEP approvals, to which in-country delays in the appointment of the project team added on, thus hampering the smooth starting of the activities until 2012, when the project team was fully set at the MOEPP and the Inception Workshop of the Project was finally organised in March 2012. As a consequence, the expected completion date originally planned for the 26/08/2014 was postponed to the 26/01/2015.
- 4 Macedonia participated from 2002 to 2005 in the UNEP/GEF global project on “Development of National Biosafety Frameworks”, ratified the Cartagena Protocol in 2005 and finalized in 2007 the draft of the Law on Genetically Modified Organisms that was finally enacted in September 2008. A national Commission of Management of GMO and the Scientific Committee for GMO were established by Government Decisions in 2009, as well as other secondary acts, namely two Decrees establishing regions and areas not for release of GMOs and two Regulations regarding the deliberate release into the environment (on Risk Assessment and on Emergency measures). Regulation on Contained Use were approved in 2011.
- 5 Unfortunately, after years of sustained economic growth, the country is going through a deep political crisis that is jeopardising previous achievements. EU and European countries’ mediation are on-going, yet, according to the EU Report on Enlargement of 2014 “...the EU accession process is at an impasse...the government’s failure to deliver sufficiently on a number of key issues damaged the sustainability of reforms, with backsliding evident in some areas”. General political elections were held in 2011 and 2014 and are expected to occur again in 2016 to overcome the persisting impasse.
- 6 The difficult socio-political situation the country has been going through for a few years has strongly hampered decision-making processes, amplified politicisation in the public sector and diminished people’s motivation and participation. A weakened institutional framework (e.g. three different Ministries at MOEPP from 2001 to 2014) has hindered solid partnerships and cooperation.
- 7 Project implementation, though oriented by a motivated and dynamic team and supported by a highly qualified group of international consultants (in cooperation with CELS / Center for European Legal Studies), went through that complex socio-political situation, which had inevitable consequences on the institutional framework of the Project and in the decision-making processes necessary to implement the various Outputs produced by the Project. Therefore, the draft Amended Biosafety Law and a number of Regulations and Guidelines were never enacted and the gap analysis and proposal for the upgrading of GMOs Laboratories did not become operational. As a whole, despite a rather satisfactory Outputs delivery, the achievement of Projects Outcomes has been Unsatisfactory. The rate of budget expenditure has also been exceedingly low (20%).

8 The Project has actually fallen into a standstill situation since mid-2014 and has eventually been considered unilaterally and unofficially closed by the NEA (MOEPP), after reaching the expected completion date in January 2015. The Parties did not take any formal step to normalise the situation up to the time of the Evaluation.

9 As requested by the TOR of the Evaluation, twenty-two different evaluation criteria have been rated, as shown in the Table of Chapter 5.1 of the Report (Conclusions). Most of the criteria (nearly 70%) score poorly, with particular concern for the Effectiveness and the Sustainability aspects. The abnormal closure of Project activities is a most regrettable issue. Everything considered, the Project has been rated Unsatisfactory. The summary assessment and the rating of some of the main evaluation criteria are synthesized below.

Criterion	Summary Assessment	Rating
<b>A. Strategic relevance</b>	The Project confirms all its relevance in supporting and enhancing country's capacity to integrate the EU and to comply with country's obligations towards CPB. It has also contributed to fulfil UNEP's mandate and policy, as well as GEF priorities and strategies. However, it is not currently strategically relevant for the NEA.	<b>MS</b>
<b>B. Achievement of outputs</b>	In the context of a discouraging institutional environment, the Project has nonetheless delivered some of the expected Outputs, most of them, however, only partially.	<b>MS</b>
<b>C. Effectiveness: Attainment of project objectives and results</b>	The attainment of main Project Outcomes did not occur at all, in the face of the many conditions not materialized	<b>U</b>
<b>D. Sustainability and replication</b>	Sustainability is overall unlikely to occur: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Evidences exist (see 4.4.2) of the weak attitude of MOEPP to assume financial responsibilities;</li> <li>- Difficult socio-political situation is hampering decision-making processes, amplifying politicisation in the public sector and dissuading people's motivation and participation;</li> <li>- Overall weak institutional framework is hampering solid partnerships and cooperation and hindering the clear definition of responsibilities on Biosafety.</li> </ul>	<b>U</b>
<b>E. Efficiency</b>	Initial delays in the operational start of the activities due to administrative and procedural hindrances (3.4). Institutional impasse leading to the abrupt interruption of operations. Incongruences in the efficient use of the budget allocation for the NPC (3.5). Investments in outstanding Capacity Building activities at risk if no follow-up is given to the Project (weak cost-effectiveness) (see 4.5)	<b>U</b>

10 The main lesson learned is that socio-political context and institutional framework can play a crucial role in the development of the Biosafety agenda and can represent a necessary pre-condition.

11 Taking into account all of the above, the Evaluation has concluded that the Project has been, much regrettably, a lost opportunity for the country and that a clear definition of the future of the Project is imperative. The suitability of any kind of decision in that respect (suspension, termination or transfer of responsibility, according to the Project Cooperation Agreement of 26/04/2011) is discussed in the alternative scenarios presented in the Recommendations.

1. Recommendation 1: to UNEP

**Recommendation 1:**

It is strongly recommended to take urgent, effective and formal steps in order to amend the current situation, at the latest by 31 January 2016. Among the four scenarios outlined here below, the Evaluation recommends the adoption of Scenario 4 (Termination of the Project).

#### Scenario 1: Suspension of the Project

PROS: the most undemanding solution. It permits postponing clear-cut decisions and taking time to wait for more favourable circumstance.

AGAINST: it does not definitely solve the problem and relies on the assumption that the current situation is going to shortly evolve positively, which, however, cannot be taken for granted under current circumstances.

SUITABILITY: Less Suitable

#### Scenario 2: Transfer of Responsibility to FVA (Food and Veterinary Agency)

PROS: It permits the continuation of the Project, probably solving part of the problem. The FVA is governed directly by the Prime Minister and is a focal, influential institution. It has been a partner of the Project for years and knows the situation.

AGAINST: according to the amendment of the Law (not yet approved), FVA only deals with GMOs Food and Feed, not with Release into the Environment, therefore it should anyway liaise with MOEPP. Problems in partnership and cooperation will not be solved. The selection of the reference laboratory (next relevant step foreseen in the Project) can become a controversial issue. The influence of the socio-political context will probably be amplified, due to the institutional setting of the Agency. The scenario implies energy and time consuming preliminary steps (analysis of the partner, definition of a new agreement, etc.).

SUITABILITY: Moderately Unsuitable

#### Scenario 3: Transfer of Management Responsibility to UNDP

PROS: It permits the continuation of the Project probably solving part of the problem. It is a mechanism already in place in other UNEP Projects and its strong and weak points are well known by UNEP. It guarantees financial accountability, most important in absence of a Project Team in loco. It could permit the implementation of part of the activities (laboratories upgrading, some trainings).

AGAINST: it implies anyway some transaction costs for UNEP, e.g. the setting of direct MoUs with the laboratories. It will be circumscribed to solve some technicalities of the Project but not able to provide meaningful proximity support to the implementation of national systems for Handling applications, Risk Assessment and Management, Inspection, Monitoring and Enforcement.

SUITABILITY: Moderately Suitable

#### Scenario 4: Termination of the Project

PROS: It formalises a *de facto* situation. It permits concluding an unfortunate experience avoiding spending supplementary energy and financial resources to implement tentative and partial scenarios. Biodiversity, Food Safety and Biosafety are included in the integration process of Macedonia into EU. Related mechanisms (institutional and financial support) may possibly be taken over through EU support and assistance.

AGAINST: it will leave the Project unfinished (yet with some outputs produced and available, such as the full preparation of the legal framework, the identification of reference laboratories, human resources capacity building).

SUITABILITY: Suitable at this stage and under current circumstances.



## **1 Introduction**

2. In its capacity as an Implementing Agency of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), UNEP has been providing administrative and technical assistance to countries participating in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB) for the development and implementation of National Biosafety Frameworks (NBF). The frameworks are a combination of policy, legal, administrative and technical instruments enabling the countries to manage the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms (LMOs) from modern biotechnology<sup>1</sup>.
3. This is the final report of the Terminal Evaluation of the Project “Capacity Building for the Development of the National Biosafety Framework of Macedonia”<sup>2</sup> (GFL/2328-2716-4B91), approved by the GEF in 11/2010 for a duration of 3 years (2011-14) and a total budget of USD 643.000, the 63% of which represents the GEF allocation (USD 407.000), with the remaining 37% (USD 236.000) provided by the Government of Macedonia.
4. The Evaluation took place in the period between September and November 2015 and included a mission to Macedonia from 02/11/2015 to 06/11/2015. The Evaluation Team consisted of one consultant, a specialist in projects evaluation in the environmental sector (See Annex 6), working under the methodological guidance of the Evaluation Office (EO) of UNEP.

## **2 The Evaluation**

5. In line with the UNEP Evaluation Policy and Evaluation Manual and following the Guidelines for GEF Agencies on Conducting Terminal Evaluations, the Terminal Evaluation has been undertaken closed to the completion of the Project to assess project performance (in terms of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency), and determine outcomes and impacts (actual and potential) stemming from the project, including their sustainability. The evaluation had two primary purposes: (i) to provide evidence of results to meet accountability requirements, and (ii) to promote learning, feedback, and knowledge sharing through results and lessons learned among UNEP, the GEF and their executing partners – the National Executing Agency (Ministry of Environment and Physical Planning, MOEPP) and the national partners.
6. According to the UNEP evaluation methodology, most criteria have been rated on a six-point scale as follows: Highly Satisfactory (HS); Satisfactory (S); Moderately Satisfactory (MS); Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU); Unsatisfactory (U); Highly Unsatisfactory (HU). Sustainability is rated from Highly Likely (HL) down to Highly Unlikely (HU).
7. As requested by the UNEP’s methodology for Terminal Evaluations, an Inception Report was produced at the beginning of the mission, containing a review of the project context, of project design quality, a draft reconstructed Theory of Change of the project, the evaluation framework and a tentative evaluation schedule.
8. According to the TOR received, a participatory approach has been used starting from the preparation of the field mission, through a preliminary exchange of evaluation tools with the National Focal Point for the CPB at the MOEPP and the joint preparation of the agenda for the country visit.
9. The organisation of the country visit was hampered by the lack of any official feedback from the Ministry (except the National Focal Point / NFP) and was in jeopardy until the last moment. A letter was sent by the Director of UNEP Evaluation Office the 16/10/2015, similarly without any formal

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<sup>1</sup> In this Report, the terms LMO (Living Modified Organism) and GMO (Genetically Modified Organism) are considered synonymous and indifferently used.

<sup>2</sup> In this Report, the name used for denominating the country is the abbreviation “Macedonia”, as used in the ProDoc, in GEF Documents and in the country. The complete and official name of the country, used in all UN and EU official documents, is “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (FYROM).

feedback. After phone arrangements between UNEP EO and the MOEPP Chief of Cabinet (30/10/2015), the mission was eventually fielded in Skopje from 03/11 to 05/11/2015.

10. Beside the collaborative NFP, the consultant was not granted any other meeting at MOEPP, including the NPC appointed by MOEPP in July 2011, the CBD focal point (on maternity leave) and the GEF Focal point. That was mostly unfortunate, since meetings with MOEPP representatives at higher level could have permitted to meaningfully discuss the exit strategy of the Project, which has been practically in a standstill since mid-2014 and eventually considered closed by the NEA in January 2015. The project also has a poor record of budget expenditure (around 20%). The evaluator was also informally briefed by the former National Operational Coordinator (NOC), who left the Project at the end of 2014 and had a meeting with one of the partner institution (The Food and Veterinary Agency).
11. Overall, through the collaboration of the NFP of CPB and of the former NOC, as well as the analysis of the relevant information posted in ANUBIS, it was possible to prepare the current report, which evaluates the main Project achievements obtained during the period 2012 - 2014. Recommendations on possible exit strategies are also formulated, though regrettably not discussed with relevant decision-makers of the counterpart, as previously explained.
12. The main methods and tools used in the Evaluation have been:
  - The Desk Review of all project documents and tools the consultant has access to (see Annex 4), including the ANUBIS platform.
  - Exchanges with the Project Management Team at UNEP, namely the Task Manager;
  - The Country Visit (see above).

### 3 The Project

#### 3.1 Context

13. Though being relatively small, Macedonia exhibits a great diversity of landscapes, habitats, flora and fauna and is considered a “European Hotspot”<sup>3</sup> deserving a particular attention for Biodiversity conservation. The current Protected Areas of the country represent around the 8% of its territory, mainly distributed in three National Parks. Approximately one third of its total population (around 2M people) lives in the capital city, Skopje.
14. After its independence in 1991, the Republic of Macedonia and the European Community signed an Association and Stabilization Agreement in 2001, which led to the adoption of the National Strategy for European Integration (2004) that obliges the country to harmonize its legislation with the relevant EU normatives<sup>4</sup>. Consequently, Macedonia has been actively included in the process "Environment for Europe" and has adopted the National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP), as a main strategy for environment protection and which includes the adoption of specific legislation on Genetically Modified Organisms.
15. In that context, Macedonia participated from 2002 to 2005 in the UNEP/GEF global project on “Development of National Biosafety Frameworks”, ratified the Cartagena Protocol in 2005 and finalized in 2007 the draft of the Law on Genetically Modified Organisms that was finally enacted in September 2008. A UNEP/GEF Project on strengthening the capacity and effective participation to the Biosafety Clearing House (BCH) was also implemented.

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<sup>3</sup> See “Biodiversity Assessment for Macedonia”, USAID, 2001

<sup>4</sup> Countries aspiring to join the European Union must align their national laws, rules and procedures (“approximation of law”) in order to give effect to the entire body of EU law contained in the “*acquis communautaire*”. The *acquis communautaire* includes the directives, regulations, and decisions adopted on the basis of the various Treaties which together make up the primary law of the European Union. (source: <http://www.env-net.org/environmental-acquis>)

16. The Law on GMOs (2008) establishes a mechanism for coordination of competent ministries and relevant institutions with the aim to fully cover the biosafety chain. Direct collaboration and coordination between various competent bodies should be achieved through the Commission of Management of GMO and the Scientific Committee for GMO, set by Government Decisions in 2009. Moreover, in accordance to the Law, other secondary acts entered into force in 2009, namely two Decrees establishing regions and areas not for release of GMOs and two Regulations regarding the deliberate release into the environment (on Risk Assessment and on Emergency measures), as well as a Regulation on Contained Use, in 2011. Therefore, when compared with projects in other countries, the current Project came to be implemented in the context of an already on-going and progressive definition of the legal and institutional frame for Biosafety.
17. Despite these undeniable achievements, the country, according to the ProDoc, continued to face relevant problems to complete the biosafety legislation and to shape and implement a solid and coherent National Biosafety Framework. That was mainly due, on the one hand, to a lack of centralised co-ordination and management of the sector and, on the other hand, to insufficient human and financial resources. Main barriers for establishing an effective national biosafety system were the fragmented stakeholders interventions and regulatory mechanisms in place, as well as the lack of skilled personnel and of institutional capacity, particularly in the area of detection, inspection and information exchange.
18. The current project was therefore conceived to support the country to implement a comprehensive Biosafety Framework, by adopting and operationalising essential regulations, procedures and mechanisms to make the Law on LMOs workable and consistent with country's needs and with European and international obligations. Particular emphasis was given to capacity building aspects. The MOEPP (Minister of Environment and Physical Planning), institutional "home" of the CPB National Focal Point and of the BCH, was also identified as the National Competent Authority (NCA) and the National Executing Agency (NEA) of the Project.
19. After years of sustained economic growth, the country is unfortunately going through a deep political crisis that is jeopardising previous achievements. EU and European countries' mediation are on-going, yet "the EU accession process is at an impasse"<sup>5</sup>. General political elections were held in 2011 and 2014 and are expected to occur again next year (2016) to overcome the persisting impasse.

### **3.2 Objectives and components**

20. According to the ProDoc, the Project aims "To build capacity to Macedonia for the development of a National Biosafety Framework for the safe use of modern biotechnology in line with international obligations, including the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety". The Project was conceived with five (5) components:
  1. Stocktaking report
  2. Regulatory regime
  3. Handling requests for authorization (including administrative processing for risk assessment and informed decision-making)
  4. Follow-up mechanisms (monitoring of environmental effects and enforcement: control and inspections)
  5. Public participation

### **3.3 Target areas/groups**

21. The Project is essentially an Institutional & Capacity Building Project aiming at strengthening national capacities to fulfil the national and international obligations of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB). Main target groups are the national institutions involved in the implementation of the NBF, particularly the Environmental Agency of the MOEPP (National Competent Authority) and the other national institutions involved in Biosafety activities (e.g. Food and Veterinary Agency, University).

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<sup>5</sup> European Commission, October 2014, "2014 Progress Report on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia"

Actually, a programme of capacity building has been conceived to target the national human resources that have the responsibility of decision-making and policy making, detection and inspection tasks, risk assessment and risk monitoring.

### **3.4 Milestones/key dates in project design and implementation**

22. The Project was approved by the GEF on the 09/11/2010 and by UNEP on the 27/04/2011, for a duration of 36 months (3 years). The actual operational starting date was the 28/06/2011 and the first disbursement occurred the 11/07/2011. There has been, therefore, an initial delay between GEF and UNEP approvals, to which in-country delays in the appointment of the project team added on, thus hampering the smooth starting of the activities until 2012, when the project team was fully set at the MOEPP and the Inception Workshop of the Project was finally organised in March 2012. As a consequence, the expected completion date originally planned for the 26/08/2014, was further postponed to the 26/01/2015 (5 months extension).

### **3.5 Implementation arrangements**

23. The National Executing Agency (NEA) is the Min. of Environment and Physical Planning (MOEPP), which is also the focal point of the CPB and the National Competent Authority (NCA). The ProDoc foresees a National Coordinating / Steering Committee with the main responsibility “to advice and guide the implementation of the project” and a National Project Coordinator (NPC) to manage all the operations. It has to be stressed, as already mentioned, that, following the Biosafety Law of 2008, two bodies were formally established in 2009 by Decision of the Government, namely the Commission for management of GMO and the Scientific committee for GMO. However, no management arrangements were foreseen or mentioned in the ProDoc, between these two bodies and with the Project.

### **3.6 Project financing**

24. The Project had an estimated cost of USD 643,000, the 63% of which was represented by the GEF allocation (USD 407,000), while the remaining 37% (USD 236,000) was provided by the Government of Macedonia, in kind. No other sources of funding were foreseen.

### **3.7 Project partners**

25. Beside the NEA (MOEPP), other Ministries and Academic Institutions have been involved in the activities of the Project, particularly regarding the development or revisions of the Legal Framework / Regulatory regime of Biosafety in the country and through a number of activities of Capacity Building, as described further in the Report.

### **3.8 Changes in design during implementation**

26. As already mentioned, the Project has suffered significant delays in its initial phase, making necessary the revision of the work plan and of the budget, without, however, major changes in the Project Design at that time.
27. There has been, nevertheless, the amendment of the Biosafety Law of 2008, not initially foreseen in the ProDoc, since the existing Law presented some relevant inaccuracies regarding the division of responsibilities among the different institutions.
28. The function of Project Coordinator was split in two separate posts, the NPC (National Project Coordinator) and the NOC (National Operational Coordinator), as discussed in chapter 4.6.2.
29. As discussed in the report, the Project, though being granted a five-month extension until January 2015, has been practically in a standstill since June 2014 and definitely, yet not officially, closed by the MOEPP in January 2015. That has, of course, brought about inevitable changes, since only part of the

Project's activities were (partially) completed at that time (rate of expenditure at 20%) and significant components (e.g. laboratory set up, planned trainings, etc.) were not implemented at all.

### 3.9 Reconstructed Theory Of Change of the project

30. In the Inception Report of the mission<sup>6</sup>, the consultant presented a reconstructed Theory of Change (ToC) of the Project, based on the project design, other UNEP-GEF Biosafety Unit documents and the comments received from UNEP Evaluation Office. As a result, the mapping of the possible pathway of change from the projects outputs to the expected outcomes, up to the intended impact, was produced. The reconstructed ToC has contributed to assess the effectiveness and the sustainability of the project's results, as discussed in Chapter 4.3 (Effectiveness) of this report.
31. As mentioned above (see 3.2), the project's objective is "To build capacity to Macedonia for the development of a National Biosafety Framework for the safe use of modern biotechnology in line with international obligations, including the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety". Therefore, "A workable and transparent National Biosafety Framework (NBF)" can be considered the main Project Outcome to be achieved.
32. The National Biosafety Framework (NBF) is a comprehensive institutional instrument that guides the country towards the achievement of the objective of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB), as stated in the art. 1 of the Protocol<sup>7</sup>, and eventually towards the Global Environmental Benefit (GEB) representing the Intended Project Impact: the "Enhanced conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in Macedonia".
33. The exercise of reconstruction of the Theory of Change has permitted to define the overall causal pathway between Outputs and Outcomes. As a result, five (5) clusters of Outputs<sup>8</sup> have been assembled and five Direct Outcomes<sup>9</sup> have been identified, contributing to the main Project Outcome. Chapter 4.3.2 and Diagram 1 describe and illustrate the causal logic of the Project from Outputs to Outcome.
34. The reconstructed ToC also depicted the pathway from Outcomes to Impact and any intermediate change required between them, called intermediate states. It permits to appreciate to what extent the project has to date contributed, and is likely in the future to further contribute, to changes in stakeholders behaviour as a result of the project's direct outcomes, and the likelihood of those changes in turn leading to environmental benefits (impact). However, the analysis and discussion on the pathway from Outcome to Impact has not been carried out by the Evaluation (see chapter 4.3.3) given the modest development of the Project so far.

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<sup>6</sup> Inception Report of the Terminal Evaluation of the Project "Capacity Building for the development of the National Biosafety Framework of Macedonia". C. Risoli, July 2015

<sup>7</sup> Art. 1 of CPB: "Adequate level of protection in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health, and specifically focusing on transboundary movements".

<sup>8</sup> Outputs : the goods and services that the project must deliver in order to achieve the project outcomes ("the ROTI Handbook", GEF, 2009)

<sup>9</sup> Outcomes: the short to medium term behavioural or systemic effects that the project makes a contribution towards, and that are designed to help achieve the project's impacts ("the ROTI Handbook", GEF, 2009)

## 4 Evaluation Findings

### 4.1 Strategic relevance

#### 4.1.1 Sub-regional environmental issues and needs

35. The appropriate management of GMOs and Biosafety is recognized as a relevant area for the future of the Republic of Macedonia, particularly the integration of Biosafety into priority sectors such as Health, Food and Feed Safety, Agriculture and Agri-business, Research and Development, and Trade and Industry. More so, when considering the foreseen European Integration of Macedonia and its harmonization with the so-called “acquis communautaires” (see §13 and foot-note 4), by which different working-groups have been established, among them the Working Group on Environment and, more specifically, the Subgroup on Chemicals and Genetically Modified Organisms. The adoption of the National Law on GMOs (2008), a process triggered with the support of the previous GEF/UNEP Project (2003-2005), is one of the results of that process.
36. The undeniable fact that Biosafety does not currently appear among the priorities of the MOEPP (see 4.4.3), does not reduce the relevance of the issue, since Macedonia is anyway part of a sub-region (Western Balkans) where trading of food and feed largely occurs and is increasing and, notably, is a candidate country for EU accession.

#### 4.1.2 UNEP mandate and policies

37. UNEP has a rich history of assisting governments in advancing national and regional implementation of environmental objectives, enhancing global and regional environmental cooperation, as well as developing and applying national and international environmental law. Biosafety has become an increasingly relevant sector of UNEP intervention since the first group of Pilot Biosafety Enabling Projects started in 1997 in 18 countries. From 2000 onward, UNEP has supported around 140 countries to develop and implement their National Biosafety Framework (NBF) and/or to participate and benefit from the Biosafety Clearing House (BCH).
38. At the time of Project design, Biosafety was one of the main areas where UNEP was playing its strategic role of Implementing Agency of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF). The implementing role was strongly affirmed by the development of the global, GEF-funded initiative to establish National Biosafety Frameworks in more than 120 countries worldwide, starting from 2001. However, biosafety was not formally and explicitly recognized as thematic priority in any of UNEP’s instruments of strategic planning that were, in those years, also in a phase of progressive restructuring.
39. Eventually, Biosafety was contemplated in the Biennial PoW 2010-11, Sub-Programme Environmental Governance, Expected Accomplishment (EA) B: The capacity of States to implement their environmental obligations and achieve their environmental priority goals, targets and objectives through strengthened laws and institutions is enhanced). Namely:
  - Output 2: Legal and policy instruments are developed and applied to achieve synergy between national and international environment and development goals). Biosafety Frameworks are mentioned and targeted as follows: “*Biosafety frameworks are implemented in 50 countries*”.
  - Output 3: Countries’ legislative and judicial capacity to implement their international environmental obligations is enhanced through implementation of policy tools. Biosafety is included as follows: 1) “*The capacities of countries in risk assessment and management of modern biotechnology products under the biosafety programme is enhanced*” and 2) “*Capacity-building and support are provided to developing country Parties to enable their participation in the Cartagena Protocol’s Biosafety Clearing House*”.

- Output 4: Capacity of government officials and other stakeholders for effective participation in multilateral environmental negotiations is enhanced. CPB is contemplated as follows: “*Continued support is provided to developing countries to enable them to meet their planning and reporting obligations under the Convention on Biological diversity, the Cartagena Protocol and the Framework Convention on Climate Change*”.

40. Similarly, in the biennial PoW for 2012–2013, Sub-Programme Environmental Governance, Expected Accomplishments (EA) A, Biosafety is included as one of the priority areas for Output 5: *Priority areas of multilateral environmental agreements are increasingly reflected in policies and actions of bodies, funds, programmes and agencies of the United Nations system, including their strategies and activities in countries (Five Priority Areas)*.
41. The current UNEP Medium Term Strategy (MTS) 2014-17 presents a table comparing the strategic focus and expected accomplishments of the 2014–2017 MTS and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020. In that table, National Biosafety Frameworks appear under Target 17 (National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plans, NBSAPs adopted as policy instrument).
42. Moreover, the Project is absolutely instrumental to the achievement of the five strategic objectives of the Strategic Plan for the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety for the Period 2011-2020: 1. Facilitating the establishment and further development of effective biosafety systems for the implementation of the Protocol; 2. Capacity-building; 3. Compliance and review; 4. Information sharing; 5. Outreach and cooperation.

#### 4.1.3 GEF Biodiversity focal area, strategic priorities and operational programme(s)

43. As the financial mechanism of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the Global Environment Facility (GEF) is also called upon under the Biosafety Protocol to serve as its financial mechanism. At its meeting in November 2000, the GEF adopted the “Initial Strategy for Assisting Countries to Prepare for the Entry into Force of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety”, the main objectives of which are: to assist countries in the establishment of national biosafety frameworks; to promote information sharing and collaboration (in particular at the regional and sub-regional level); and, to promote collaboration with other organizations to assist in capacity building for the Protocol.
44. The Strategy for Financing Biosafety was approved by the GEF Council on an interim basis in December 2006 and became part of the GEF Focal Area Strategies and Strategic Programming for GEF-4 approved by the GEF Council in June 2007 (Focal Area 3: Biodiversity; Strategic Programme 6: Biosafety). Under GEF-5, the strategy for the Biodiversity Focal Area contemplates as its Objective 3: “Build Capacity for the Implementation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB)”. To achieve this Objective, a comprehensive Projects Support structure was established, including three types of Projects: Single-country project, Regional or sub-regional projects, Thematic projects. The Project under current evaluation is therefore strategically relevant to GEF priorities.
45. According to data displayed in the GEF web site, in the last ten years (2005-2015), the Biodiversity portfolio (including Biosafety) represented almost one third of the GEF Portfolio in Macedonia. Main areas of GEF support in Macedonia are energy, cleaning-up of industrial pollution, persistent organic pollutants and biodiversity (protected areas).

#### 4.1.4 Overall Strategic Relevance

46. As discussed above, the Project, in retrospect, confirms all its relevance in addressing challenging issues and needs in:
  - Supporting and enhancing country’s capacity to integrate into the European Union;

- Achieving internationally agreed environmental objectives and goals, in compliance with country's obligations towards Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety;
- Contributing to fulfil UNEP's mandate and policy, as well as GEF priorities and strategies.

The project has also addressed and improved the national capacity to implement regulatory and administrative system for Biosafety management, yet Biosafety is not currently included among the main priorities of the MOEPP. Therefore, as a whole, the strategic Relevance of the Project can just be rated as MS (Moderately Satisfactory).

## 4.2 Achievement of outputs

47. The Evaluation has assessed the delivery of Project Outputs against the planned Outputs of the Results Framework, in close collaboration with the former NOC (National Operational Coordinator) and the CPB Focal Point of the MOEPP. The revision of the outputs produced (e.g. consultants' reports, trainings reports, training material, etc.) and their presence in the ANUBIS permit to confirm the quality of the outputs and the adoption by the Project of an inclusive and participatory approach for their achievement.
48. The document produced by the Project for the Inception Workshop is a very useful reference document to understand the baseline institutional situation and the need to re-define project priorities and work-plans. From the document, the objective difficulty and uneasy position of the Project becomes apparent, in a context characterized by:
  - High dispersion and fragmentation of actions supported by different Ministries and projects (admittedly also under pressure because of the EU integration issue);
  - Evident lack of a recognized leadership / coordination in GMOs / Biosafety sector;
  - Risk of cumulating fragmented secondary legislation (Regulations, Decrees, Decisions) in absence of an agreed national policy/strategy;
  - The need for updating and amending the existing national Law on GMOs (approved in 2008).
49. The muddled situation sketched above absorbed considerable time and energy from the Project since the appointment of the Operational Coordinator in September 2011. Eventually, in March 2012 (i.e. nine months after the formal start date of June 2011), the Project, through the organisation of the Inception Workshop, succeeded in gathering all main stakeholders, in compiling and sharing dispersed information and in raising awareness on the inadequacy of the situation.
50. As a result, gaps and needs were systematised and a comprehensive Plan of Training for all the five main components of the NBF was prepared. Considering the delays accumulated, Outputs and Outcomes related to Biosafety policy and regulatory regime were also re-scheduled and, perhaps optimistically, expected by the end of 2013.
51. As a matter of fact, unfortunately, the institutional environment did not change since 2012, the anchorage of the Project in the MOEPP did not improve. Well on the contrary (as described in other sections of the report), the MOEPP did not in any moment come to play a coordinating/leading role and/or was not recognized as such by the other stakeholders and, definitely, the gaps and problems identified in the inception phase were not institutionally addressed.
52. In that discouraging environment, the Project gave, at any rate, notable steps, by providing high-quality technical assistance for the improvement of the legal/regulatory and administrative systems of Biosafety in the country, hence concretely supporting the national stakeholders in improving their knowledge and their capacities, at least at an individual level. In fact, the institutional up-take, as discussed in the following chapter 4.3, did not occur so far.



53. Table 1, produced by the National Operational Coordinator <sup>10</sup>, discussed and revised during the country visit, synthesises the main findings on Outputs delivery, under each of the expected Outcomes of the Results Framework. As clearly showed by the Table, some of the expected Outputs have been produced, but most of them only partially, namely:
- Stocktaking report and definition of a draft policy on Biosafety;
  - Analysis and amendment of the existing Law on Biosafety, not yet approved at Governmental level;
  - Systematization and listing of the issues in need to be regulated by Secondary Acts (Rulebooks);
  - Draft guidelines on Risk Assessment (RA) and Risk Management (RM);
  - Legal training on Biosafety Law amendment and Rulebooks, as well as on RA and RM;
  - Gap analysis of existing national capacities for GMOs laboratories setting and implementation.
54. On the one hand, the progressive fading and standstill of the Project in mid-2014 have not permitted to implement further activities leading to the full achievement of certain Outputs. On the other hand, most importantly, the political conditions were not in place to complete the institutional steps for advancing in the definition of the Biosafety legal framework.
55. The absence of a clear legal framework has hampered the implementation of subsequent components of the National Biosafety Framework, such as the setting of Administrative Systems for handling applications and for monitoring and enforcement, as well as for public participation, which are depending on a regulatory regime clearly defined and operational, as shown in Diagram 1 (Theory of Change from Outputs to Outcome in 4.3.2).
56. The main **drivers** for Outputs delivery have been the Project Team effectively in place (NOC and Financial Assistant), the National Focal Point for CPB and the UNEP Biosafety Unit (See Diagram 1 in 4.3.2). International Consultants from universally highly-recognized international institutes in the area of Biosafety, have also played a key-role, though their support did not produce the expected effects, due to the constraints described above.
57. When considering the strong external limitations, the achievement of Outputs until 2014 is amazingly positive, thanks to the commitment and resilience of the key-drivers. However, when compared with the expected end-of-project targets, it can only be rated as Moderately Satisfactory (MS).

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<sup>10</sup> Based on a format that the Consultant had shared with the CPB FP before the country visit. The NOC was no more in place at the time of the Evaluation, yet she kindly prepared the Table at the best of her knowledge.

**Table 1: Assessment of Outcomes / Outputs Achievement** (based on Ann. A, App.4 / Results Framework and App.7 / M&E Framework)<sup>11</sup> **Project “Capacity Building for the Development of the National Biosafety Framework of Macedonia”**

Outcome	Baseline Conditions	Expected Outputs at end of the Project	Outputs delivered (evidence-based) by November 2015 <sup>12</sup>	Comments
<b>Outcome 1:</b> Assessment of the status of modern biotechnology and biosafety and national capacity needs assessment and preparation of biosafety strategy	a) Information is contained in draft NBF, but no comprehensive information available b) Some elements of biosafety is contained on food safety policy, and policy for environment protection but needs updating and no elements of biosafety are included in the agricultural (phytosanitary and veterinary) policy	(a) Stocktaking report is produced, containing an assessment of current resources, infrastructure, legislation in place, as well as analysis of existing gaps.  (b) Biosafety policy drafted / agreed / adopted, other policies amended	a) Stocktaking report completed and reflected in the Inception workshop report (March 2012) b) By September 2012 all relevant policies were analysed and gaps identified  a) Policies have been planned for amendment and three working groups of national consultants have been defined.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Preliminary work at Project Steering Committee level</li> <li>· No formal adoption of the Policy at institutional level</li> </ul>
	<b>Outcome 2:</b> Legislative system for risk assessment/ risk management, handling of LMO applications in place	a) Primary act was adopted in 2008, but it is lacking secondary legislation.  b) Ministry of Environment nominated CA for GMOs.  c) SAC are lacking the work plan	a) Secondary legislation prepared, amended and discussed with stakeholders representatives and approved  Through legal support provided to MOEPP (sector of European Affairs) by Int. Consultant:  a) Amendment of the Law prepared and approved at Ministerial level (2014), submitted to Inter-Ministerial (Governmental) body for approval (before transmitting to the Parliament). Not yet approved at Governmental level.  b) Eleven (11) Rulebooks	

<sup>11</sup> The first three columns reflect the content of the M&E Framework of the ProDoc (App. 7) , the last (forth) column reports the findings of the Evaluation

<sup>12</sup> Actually, the Outputs delivery reflects the situation at mid 2014 because, since then, the Project had a standstill and practically ceased its operations.

			(Secondary Law) prepared and transmitted to the Government for approval in 2014.  c) Workshop on Law's amendment also carried out	standards such as the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, and specifically EU standards.  Obs: Law amendment was not foreseen in the ProDoc, but it is consensually in need of amendment to identify responsibilities and procedures. (Not yet approved).
		b) A multi-sectoral working group is set up to provide assistance and guidance to the development of the regulatory regime	b) Workplans for the Commission of Management of the GMOs and for the Scientific Advisory Committee drafted	These two bodies, created by Governmental Decision in 2009, are practically ineffective
<b>Outcome 3:</b> Safe use of modern biotechnology is possible through full compliance of Macedonian biosafety legislation with the CPB and the corresponding regulations of the EU, administrative system for handling of applications, RA/RM is in place	a) No manuals available in local language.	a) Creation of technical guidelines for handling of requests (including Risk Assessment-RA and Risk Management-RM guidelines)	a) Draft guidelines for RA and RM prepared (2014) and check-list for assessors prepared	
	b) Personnel are not trained in regard of RA/RM.  c) No internet portal available	b) Training for risk assessment and risk management for personnel from CAs and scientific institutions organized	b) Trainings to relevant personnel carried out in second quarter of 2014 with support of Int. Consultant (training workshop)	By International Consultant (Environment Agency of Austria), 23 participants

		c) Maintenance of functional national biosafety portal BCH for collection of data, input and analysis for risk management and risk communication purposes	c) An Internet Portal has been created since 2012	Also called National BCH Not updated and not operational (the server has not been paid for)
		d)Preparation of national procedures required in order to use the BCH mechanism and provide information to the BCH		
<b>Outcome 4:</b> Macedonia has public confidence in biosafety regulatory system enhanced due to effective monitoring and surveillance of intentional and non-intentional LMO presence and use	a) Republic of Macedonia has only one laboratory for testing and identification of GMOs in food. In 2006, the Ministry for Health, Directorate for food, had granted authorization for testing, control of GMO in food to the Laboratory for Biochemistry and Molecular Biology at the Faculty of Agriculture and Food. Second Laboratory is within the Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Art as part of the Research Institute for Genetic Engineering relevant for GMO detection in plants. Both laboratories have only started with process of establishing of	a) detailed outline of the laboratory necessary for complementing the existing laboratory at the selected institution in order to become compliant with CP and technical requirements for the functioning of an LMO laboratory.	a) Gap analysis conducted by International Consultant (March 2014): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assessment of the situation of biosafety-related cooperation in public and private sector</li> <li>• Analysis of laboratories capacities for detection of GMOs</li> <li>• Identification of areas of further development</li> <li>• Indication of preferred laboratories for possible future upgrading.</li> </ul> b) Due to the lack of legal basis for national reference laboratory/ies (foreseen in the amended Law not yet approved), equipment identification and purchase is not possible	From Technisch Laboratorium Rotterdam BV (TLR), the Netherlands  Eight (8) national laboratories in Skopje were visited and thoroughly assessed in their current capacities and the investments needed to undertake GMO analysis  <u>Obs.of the Evaluation:</u> the selection of one lab and the purchase of equipment could have been done even in absence of a reference laboratory

	quality system (ISO 17025) and accreditation of laboratory.	b) Organization of national and international training workshops for immediate stakeholders on monitoring, producing training reports;	b) Three trainings for monitoring staff scheduled for the third quarter of 2014	Not implemented
	b)No staff trained for monitoring and evaluation			
	c)No technical guidelines available	c) Relevant staff of responsible agencies are trained on monitoring and evaluation and have been issued respective certification	c)Technical guidelines scheduled in the National Programme for Approximation of legislation for drafting in third quarter of 2014	Not implemented
	d) No registration system	d) Technical guidelines for monitoring developed and distributed to responsible personnel	d) Registration system drafted following the amendments of the Law on GMO 35/08 (early 2014)	Not implemented (Amendment not approved)
		e) Establishment of registration system with unique identifiers to trace back LMOs established.		
		f) Monitoring and inspection are included in work plan and strategies of relevant enforcement agencies		
<b>Outcome 5:</b> Macedonia has a functional system for public awareness and participation established for biosafety	a)Public awareness plan and campaign strategy was drafted in 2003-2005, but need updating	a) Public awareness action plan and public service campaign strategy	a)Awareness plan and campaign strategy scheduled following the amendments of the Law on GMO	Not implemented in absence of the Amended Law
	b)General public awareness of biosafety and participation currently are on very low level	b) Number of nationals accessing the nBCH.	b)Training of staff from Office for public relation on biosafety scheduled for fourth quarter of 2014	Not implemented
	c) Lack of institution responsible for public relations on biosafety	c) Number of records on the nBCH.	c) National BCH functional for sharing information to public until mid-2014	Actually not operational (the server was not paid for, by MOEPP).

	<p>d)Currently, only general information available on national BCH</p> <p>e) Lack of consultation with public for views on biosafety.</p>	<p>d)Number of people trained to continue tasks; workshop reports</p>	<p>d) Developed media coverage by preparation of written and video material on biosafety scheduled for end of 2014 following adoption of amendments of GMO Law</p>	<p>Not implemented in absence of the amended Law</p>
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### 4.3 Effectiveness: Attainment of project objectives and results

#### 4.3.1 *Project outcomes from reconstructed ToC*

58. The Evaluation has assessed to what extent the delivery of the Outputs (Table 1) has produced the short to medium term institutional changes and systemic effects (Outcomes) designed to achieve higher level of results (Impact). The following sub-chapter 4.3.2 presents a qualitative analysis and interpretation of the Outcomes achieved in the light of the reconstructed Theory of Change (ToC) from Outputs to Outcomes, depicted in Diagram 1.


#### 4.3.2 *Project outcomes from reconstructed ToC*

59. As mentioned in chapter 3.9, the exercise of reconstruction of the Theory of Change has permitted to streamline the results framework of the Project, by grouping Outputs in five clusters and identifying five Immediate/Direct Outcomes that have been appropriately reformulated without changing their substance and that contribute to the main Project Outcome, as shown in Diagram 1 that follows.
60. The expected Immediate Outcome 1 “Baseline established and biosafety policy / strategy in place” has been partially achieved. The baseline situation has been defined through a careful and comprehensive stocktaking analysis that was shared and discussed, as mentioned, in the Inception Workshop of the Project. Subsequently, existing policies or strategies were analysed and their gaps were identified and addressed through the work of three informal working groups. Their preliminary conclusions have been discussed and endorsed by the Project Steering Committee. Unfortunately, the process did not progress further, since no institutional uptake came about. Therefore, Immediate Outcome 1 has been only partially achieved.
61. The expected Immediate Outcome 2 “A fully functional and responsive regulatory regime established” is not yet in place. The Project has carried out a meticulous and scientifically sound preparatory work with the support of the CELS (Center for European Legal Studies). Relevant outputs have been produced, as outlined in Table 1 (Chapter 4.2), among them, remarkably, the Amendment of the Biosafety Law, which was approved at Ministerial level (MOEPP) in August 2014, yet not approved at Governmental level (preliminary approval before going to the Parliament for definitive approval and entry into force). A complete list of Rulebooks (secondary legislation) has been eventually compiled and approved by the Legislation Department within the Government during the first quarter of 2014.
62. Substantive issues remain to be put in place and made operational through the legal framework (yet not approved) implementation, particularly the definition of responsibilities among the NCAs, the RA and RM responsibilities, the monitoring and enforcement functions. A clear and strong institutional anchorage and up-taking by all the actors involved is desperately needed, before any further administrative system is put in place. The main Assumptions to be fulfilled are outlined here below and visualized in Diagram 1 that follows. Therefore, Immediate Outcome 2 cannot be considered as achieved.
63. Immediate Outcome 3 “An administrative system for handling applications, Risk Assessment (RA) and Risk Management (RM) in place” and Immediate Outcome 4 “A follow-up system in place able for monitoring, inspection and enforcement” are not in place at all, given the lack of a Legal Framework. However, the preparatory work of the Project has to be surely underscored. Training and guidelines have been produced in the area of RA and RM (support of the Austrian Environmental Agency). A comprehensive technical and institutional survey, leading to the identification of the main gaps and measures to be adopted for the implementation of GMOs Reference Laboratories in the country has been equally implemented. The conclusions and recommendations of the consultancy (by the Rotterdam Laboratory of Netherlands) are absolutely relevant, a pivotal tool for the country to set up a national detection and referral system for GMOs, when needed.

64. Equally, Immediate Outcome 5 “Improved Public awareness and participation” has not been reached, as there is a lack of a clear institutional framework for public actions. The national website (called national BCH), has been kept functional by the Project until mid-2014 and then made unavailable to the public, as the contract with the service provider was not renewed (server) by MOEPP. The country’s page in the global BCH is not updated at all.
65. The promotion and supporting role of the main **drivers** (see 4.2 and Diagram 1 below) has bumped into an “impassable rubber-wall” that has jeopardised efforts of the project’s drivers.
66. Main **assumptions** which are hindering Immediate and Main Outcomes achievements, are outlined as follows (see diagram 1):
- Approval of the Law Amendments and subsequent entry into force of the eleven specific Rule Books (Secondary Acts), all of them prepared with the support of the Project ;
  - Full and smooth operationalisation of the specific responsibilities regarding Art. 7 (deliberate release, under the responsibility of MOEPP according to the Law Amendment) and art 11 (GMOs for Food and Feed, under the responsibility of the national Food and Veterinary Agency, FVA, according to the Law Amendment);
  - Entry into force and amendment of the current Law on Food (2010) and of its three Rulebooks (on GMOs for Food, on GMOs for Feed and for placing GMOs into the market), all of them under the enforcement responsibility of the FVA recently created (2011) by the fusion of the Food Agency and the Veterinary Agencies and which responds directly to Prime Minister’s Cabinet;
  - Smooth operationalisation of the functional separation of competencies between the two would-be NCAs (MOEPP and FVA), as well as the setting of specific rules on GMOs for Processing and for Placing into the market, which are in need of further harmonisation with EU normative;
  - Identification of responsibility on the overall coordination of the Biosafety agenda in the country, particularly regarding the functioning of Inter-Institutional bodies (see point below);
  - Full empowerment and operationalisation of the two national bodies created in 2009, i.e. the National Commission on GMOs Management and the Scientific Advisory Committee;
  - Meaningful institutional up-take by MOEPP of the responsibilities and obligations stemming from art. 7 of CPB, so far disappointingly elusive;
  - Application of RA and RM technical guidelines prepared with the support of the Project;
  - Preparation of technical guidelines on GMOs monitoring and enforcement;
  - Selection of the would-be national reference laboratory(es) and their upgrading, initially foreseen through the support of the Project and not implemented due to the institutional impasse and subsequent interruption of Project’s implementation;
  - Reactivation of the National Biosafety Website, not operational since June 2014;
  - Reactivation and updating of the country’s page on BCH;
  - Preparation and implementation of the National Public Awareness Action Plan and subsequent activities.
67. Despite a reasonable delivery of Project Outputs (see 4.2), the attainment of Project Immediate Outcomes did not occur at all, in the face of the many conditions listed above that did not materialize. As a consequence, the achievement of the main Project Outcome (A workable and transparent National Biosafety Framework (NBF) has been Unsatisfactory (U).



**Diagram 1: Theory of Change of the Project “Capacity Building for the Development of the National Biosafety Framework of Macedonia”: From OUTPUTS TO OUTCOMES**



4.3.3 *Likelihood of impact using ROtI and based on reconstructed TOC*

68. Given the modest development of the Project that is far from achieving the expected Outcomes, the Evaluation has considered too premature and of scarce interest to undertake a thorough analysis of the pathway from the Project Outcome (a fully operational NBP) to the intended Impact, as usually done in all UNEP terminal evaluations.
69. Nonetheless, the Evaluation has, according to its TOR, assessed the likelihood of the Project to achieve the expected Impact, by using the rating scales of Table 3 and 4 that follow. Based on the analysis presented in this Chapter, particularly considering that virtually all the Immediate Outcomes and the main Project Outcome have not been attained, the Evaluation deems that the Project deserves a “D” Outcome rating. Equally, the progress towards Intermediate States has obviously not started (Rate “D”). As a result, the aggregate rating is “DD”.

**Table 3. Rating scale for outcomes and progress towards ‘intermediate states’**

<b>Outcome Rating</b>	<b>Rating on progress toward Intermediate States</b>
D: The project’s intended outcomes were not delivered	D: No measures taken to move towards intermediate states.
C: The project’s intended outcomes were delivered, but were not designed to feed into a continuing process after project funding	C: The measures designed to move towards intermediate states have started, but have not produced results.
B: The project’s intended outcomes were delivered, and were designed to feed into a continuing process, but with no prior allocation of responsibilities after project funding	B: The measures designed to move towards intermediate states have started and have produced results, which give no indication that they can progress towards the intended long term impact.
A: The project’s intended outcomes were delivered, and were designed to feed into a continuing process, with specific allocation of responsibilities after project funding.	A: The measures designed to move towards intermediate states have started and have produced results, which clearly indicate that they can progress towards the intended long term impact.

70. According to the methodology, the rating obtained is translated onto the usual six point rating scale used in all UNEP project evaluations, as follows, resulting that the Project can be considered “Highly Unlikely” to achieve the expected Impact.

**Table 4. ‘Overall likelihood of impact achievement’ on a six point scale.**

Highly Likely	Likely	Moderately Likely	Moderately Unlikely	Unlikely	Highly Unlikely
AA AB BA CA BB+ CB+ DA+ DB+	BB CB DA DB AC+ BC+	AC BC CC+ DC+	CC DC AD+ BD+	AD BD CD+ DD+	CD <b>DD</b>

#### 4.4 Sustainability and replication

71. The evaluations has analysed to what extent follow-up work has been initiated and how project results could be sustained and enhanced over time. The reconstructed ToC presented in the previous chapter has assisted in the evaluation of sustainability, by identifying the main driving forces and assumptions influencing Project's achievements. Four aspects of sustainability have been addressed: a) Socio-political sustainability, b) Financial sustainability, c) Institutional sustainability, d) Environmental sustainability.

##### 4.4.1 *Socio-political sustainability*

72. The short time country visit and the impossibility of having a frank discussion with main decision-makers at Ministry level, makes it difficult to deeply understand the complex overall socio-political context of the country and, more specifically, of the Project under evaluation. It is, nevertheless, evident that the country is going through a very difficult moment, as showed by the recurrent political elections (2011, 2014 and, expectedly, 2016) and as related in all main international media and analyses from different sources.

73. The starting words of the conclusions of the EU Progress Report on Enlargement 2014<sup>13</sup> are, at any rate, enlightening: *“The EU accession process for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is at an impasse. Failure to act on the Commission’s recommendation to the Council means that accession negotiations have still not been opened. At the same time, the government’s failure to deliver sufficiently on a number of key issues damaged the sustainability of reforms, with backsliding evident in some areas”*.

74. As far as the Project is concerned, the change of three Ministers at the MOEPP since the early start of the Project (2011) up to date (change of Minister in 2012 and 2014) can be considered as an indicator of weak socio-political sustainability, particularly considering that the changes bring about some replacement of top-advisors and chiefs of departments. Overall, the socio-political sustainability of the Project can be rated Unlikely (U).

##### 4.4.2 *Financial sustainability*

75. Financial sustainability is deeply linked to and depending on Socio-political and Institutional Sustainability. Moreover, some specific and unambiguous evidence exists of the weak interest of the MOEPP in granting financial sustainability to the activities of the Project, such as:

- a) MOEPP did not pursue any activity on Biosafety after its “unilateral” decision of stopping Project activities;
- b) the Project’s office and its equipment (five computers and one printer, according to ANUBIS inventory of 2014) were given another use without consulting UNEP;
- c) the NOC was not paid by MOEPP from June 2014 to December 2014 (after which the NOC left the job);
- d) the closure of the Biosafety website for not having renewed the contract of the service provider (server).

76. Regarding financial sustainability, the issue of the “shadow” NPC also has to be considered, as described in 4.6.2. Overall, Financial Sustainability of the Project is Highly Unlikely (HU).

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<sup>13</sup> Conclusions and recommendations on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia / Communication “Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2014-15”, COM(2014)700 final of 8.10.2014

#### 4.4.3 *Institutional sustainability*

77. The Evaluation can confirm that Biosafety is not at the top of the agenda of the MOEPP. Waste management, Air, Soil and Water Pollution seem to be current priorities, as also shown by the number of Projects (included GEF funded) in those areas. Biodiversity (Protected Areas) is still an area of intervention in the country's GEF portfolio, yet the link with Biosafety, except for the personal relations between the CPB and CBD Focal Points, is absent.
78. The recent EU report of 2014 mentioned above (see foot note 13), in its chapter regarding the advance in the Environmental sector, states "*Little progress was made in the areas of environment and climate change. Administrative capacity needs to be strengthened in all areas and the government needs to cooperate more with civil society and other stakeholders. Strategic planning and significant efforts are needed in order to ensure that national legislation is in line with the acquis, and that this legislation is implemented*".
79. Overall, the conclusions quoted above can, *mutatis mutandis*, apply to the institutional sustainability and follow-up of the Project's results. Actually, the manifold assumptions listed in 4.3.2 and the objective difficulty in being satisfied under the current situation, do not leave room to optimism, as far as Institutional Sustainability is concerned.
80. The possibility of shifting to another national counterpart, namely the Food and Veterinary Agency (FVA)<sup>14</sup> has been considered, though not in a sufficiently exhaustive manner to be deemed as a strong alternative to the current institutional framework. The alternative could be, at any rate, assessed more in depth, depending on the overall decision regarding the future of the Project (see Recommendations). It is evident, however, that the Agency, organically responding to the Prime Minister's Cabinet, may be strongly conditioned by the political environment, hence not immune from the overall instability discussed above.
81. In sum, it is not very realistic, under current circumstances, that the Project's results could have a meaningful possibility of being sustained, at least in the short-term, until the overall picture is improved. The rating for Institutional Sustainability is Unlikely (U).

#### 4.4.4 *Environmental sustainability*

82. The overall concept of the Project is based on the application of the CPB and is guided by the Precautionary Principle. The drafted amendment of the Biosafety Law, in wait of formal approval, responds to that principle and, once entered into force, would surely represent a relevant tool for its application. Moreover, the process of EU integration, if hopefully put forward, will lead the country to adhere to EU environmental legislation, which strongly adheres to the Precautionary Principle. This process is still on-going and considering the limitations mentioned under 4.4.1. as well as the current weakness of the socio-political and institutional context, the Environmental Sustainability of the Project can be considered Moderately Unlikely (MU).

#### 4.4.5 *Catalytic role and replication*

83. The Project has been actively catalysing and championing the Biosafety agenda in the country, by specifically supporting the participatory elaboration of the Biosafety Law amendment and of the Secondary Legislation (Rulebooks). It also has largely contributed to implement thorough assessments of existing legal, procedural and technical gaps and needs and subsequently carried out the participatory planning and implementation of several Capacity Building actions.

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<sup>14</sup> The Evaluation Mission entertained a meeting with the responsible for the Unit for GMOs in EVA, also Focal Point for the GMOs network of EFSA (European Food Safety Agency, in which Macedonia as the status of Observer) and for the FAO GMOs Food Platform. She was also a member of the PSC of the Project.

84. The Project has also promoted the establishment and working of a Steering Committee, characterised by a large membership (18 members), where the presence of the Academic and Scientific institutions has been remarkably high, as well as through the establishment of some working groups on specific aspects regarding Biosafety legislation. Overall, Catalytic role of the Project has been Satisfactory (S).
85. However, due to the strong limitations of the overall institutional framework, the pursuing and replication of the activities is in jeopardy and only possible under the assumption that a more conducive institutional environment is in place. Overall, Replication is, under the current conditions, Unlikely (U) to occur.

#### **4.5 Efficiency**

86. Initial delays in the operational start of the activities have been registered (see 3.4) due to administrative and procedural hindrances. Once started, the activities have been implemented for approximately two years and half in quite an efficient way, until the institutional impasse registered during 2014 has definitely led to the abrupt interruption of Project operations.
87. Incongruences have been observed in the efficient use of the budget allocation for the NPC (see 4.6.2).
88. Moreover, the Project has invested a large part of its budget (almost 50% of its actual expenditures) in remarkable Capacity Building activities, among them a Study Tour to Prague in 2013 (9 participants) and the recruitment of highly specialised International Consultants that have played a key-role in the definition of the Biosafety Legal Framework, in the Laboratory Gap Analysis and in the definition of RA and RM systems. Though it can be argued that national assets (human resources) have been built-up, the cost-effectiveness of these investments is at risk if no follow-up is given to the Project by the country. Overall, Project Efficiency can be considered Unsatisfactory (U).

#### **4.6 Factors affecting performance**

##### *4.6.1 Preparation and readiness*

89. The quality of project design was assessed in the Inception Report and overall rated Unsatisfactory. The project document was found too generic, with little concrete information and few meaningful elements of analysis. It was therefore deemed unlikely to be an effective instrument of guidance and orientation for the implementation of the Project, particularly regarding crucial issues such as Sustainability, Risk identification, Governance, Management, Execution and Partnership Arrangements, all of them rated Unsatisfactory in the Inception Report.
90. Unfortunately, all these aspects have come to play a major role during Project implementation, being the main reasons for the Project failure to achieve its main expected Outcomes. Preparation and readiness should be considered Unsatisfactory (U).

##### *4.6.2 Project implementation and management*

91. In line with the ProDoc, the National Executing Agency (NEA) has been the Ministry of Environment and Physical Planning (MOEPP), namely its Environment Agency, with the responsibility to appoint the National Project Coordinator (NPC), establish the National Committee and provide the necessary support for its work.
92. As a matter of fact, the NPC post has been split in two, by Ministerial decision. There has been a National Project Coordinator, appointed by the Ministry (see letter of the Ministry of MOEPP to UNEP, July 2011 in ANUBIS) and, following a suggestion of UNEP, the nomination of a National Project Operational and Financial Coordinator (NOC), actually the former coordinator of the previous GEF-UNEP Project on NBF Development, in September 2011 (see letter of nomination, also in ANUBIS).

93. In practical terms, all the activities mandated for the overall coordination of the Project were positively carried out by the sole NOC with the support of a Financial Assistant (e.g. preparation of work plans and budgets, communication with authorities and stakeholders, organization and supervision of the external technical assistance, implementation of Project activities, monitoring and reporting to UNEP).
94. The Evaluation did not find any evidence of activities carried out by the NPC, except the signature of the Financial Reports. All the communications between UNEP and the Project, including the progress reports and the financial reports, occurred through the NOC. The NPC only appears in the Financial Expenditure Sheets of the Project, being regularly granted the NPC salary paid through GEF budget from 01/2012 to 02/2014.
95. As already mentioned in the Sustainability chapter, there have been two changes of Ministers at MOEPP, in 2012 and in 2014, bringing about some replacements of relevant top advisors, directors and managerial staff, which has contributed to weaken the institutional anchorage of the Project within the National Executing Agency (MOEPP) and to hamper the establishment of solid linkages with national officers and decision-makers in the Ministry.
96. The liaison between the Project and the MOEPP has been carried out, positively yet faintly, mainly through the collaboration with the CPB National Focal Point placed in the GMOs Unit of the Nature Department of the Environment Agency.
97. Actually, the MOEPP has scarcely assumed its pivotal role of National Executing Agency and the main cooperation between the Project and the National Stakeholders have been through the Coordinating/Steering Committee set by the Project, either through formal meetings (last meeting reported in December 2013) or through the establishment of “ad hoc” collaborations between the Project and some of the PSC’s members on specific activities (e.g. working groups).
98. The composition of the Project Coordinating/Steering Committee was discussed and agreed upon in the Inception Workshop (March 2012), and included eighteen (18) members, representative of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Economy (4), Min. of Economy (1), Min. of Finance/Customs Directorate (1), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1), the MOEPP (1), the Food and Veterinary Agency (1), the Institute for Public Health (1), seven (7) University members including the Academy of Science and one NGO representative (Consumer Protection).
99. As discussed in 4.3.2 (Project Outcomes), the Project has indeed partially delivered some relevant Outputs, but a number of conditions, mainly at institutional level, have not been satisfied, particularly in terms of establishment of a functional legal framework for Biosafety in the country and this has greatly hampered the Project’s effectiveness. Nonetheless, the Project Team did not desist from promoting and developing institution and capacity building activities, with the qualified support of International Consultants.
100. At the approximation of the expiration date of the Project (planned completion date 26/08/2014), the Project was granted a 5-month extension until January 2015, but the salary of the NOC was not paid anymore by MOEPP. As a consequence the NOC eventually decided to terminate her collaboration with the Project in December 2014, after not being paid from June to December. Since then, no official communication from MOEPP has been addressed to UNEP to formalise the closure of the Project, though, as described under Financial Sustainability (4.4.2), MOEPP practically acted as the Project was definitely over.
101. On the other side, UNEP equally did not take any official step to clarify the situation, despite the fact that the NOC was no more in place, that Progress and Financial Reports were not being produced and that no expenditures were registered in ANUBIS since the first quarter of 2014. As a whole, the Evaluation has to remark that the abnormal situation was not appropriately and timely addressed by all parties involved. Some substantive decisions and official steps are now due, in order to definitely settle

the abnormal situation, either with an official closure of the Project or through alternative scenarios (see Recommendations).

102. As a whole, though no particular responsibilities can be ascribed to the Project Team in the field, the overall Project Implementation and Management was not handled at the suitable level and has to be rated Unsatisfactory (U).

#### *4.6.3 Stakeholder participation and public awareness*

103. The assiduous efforts of the NOC have catalysed a good partnership with some of the national stakeholders that have actively participated in multi-sectoral working groups for the discussion and elaboration of the amendments of the Law and of the Secondary Legislation (Rulebooks), for the preparation of the technical guidelines and for the gap analysis to identify the reference Laboratory. All the main stakeholders participated in the Project's trainings.

104. Public awareness has been left behind, due to the lack of a clear institutional responsibility on the messages to be disseminated. All the same, Stakeholders participation and public awareness has to be rated Moderately Satisfactory (MS).

#### *4.6.4 Country ownership and driven-ness*

105. The issue is at the core of the problems experienced by the Project during its life-time, as largely discussed in the previous chapters. Overall, Country ownership and driven-ness is rated Unsatisfactory (U).

#### *4.6.5 Financial planning and management*

106. The Project has reviewed its Work Plan and proposed Budget Revisions, since the Inception Workshop of 2012. The overall financial planning and reporting has been implemented following UNEP procedures.

107. The ANUBIS platform has been appropriately used until the Project standstill in 2014. However, the last signed Financial Report posted in ANUBIS is of December 2013. There has been only one initial instalment transferred to the Project, since the successive advances have been spent directly by UNEP for International Consultancies and the Study Tour in Czech Republic.

108. The Project Team was no more in place at the time of the Evaluation. According to the last signed Financial Report in ANUBIS (12/2013), the total amount of the expenditures is 94.558 USD, which corresponds to around 23% of GEF allocated budget. Co-financing of the Government is reported to be at 70% (in kind) of what initially foreseen. Incongruences have been detected on the management of the post of the National Project Coordinator (see 4.6.2).

109. The table in Annexe 5 summarises co-finance information and a statement of project expenditure. Overall, Financial planning and management by the Project is rated Unsatisfactory (U).

#### *4.6.6 UNEP supervision and backstopping*

110. The NOC and the National CPB provided a positive assessment of UNEP supervision and backstopping, for three main reasons:

- The technical and administrative backstopping of the Biosafety Unit, which has been constant and effective, delivered prompt replies (through skype and email) to any doubt or question on financial issues, on the use of the platform ANUBIS, as well as provided technical advice on substantive issues related to project execution as long as the Project was actually on-going.
- The organization of the periodic meetings of the National Project Coordinators (Istanbul, 2011 and Amman, 2013), which are considered a valuable moment of exchange and horizontal learning, technical

and administrative updating, and of general “empowerment” of the project coordinators. Unfortunately, the NOC was not able to be present in the last sub-regional meeting (Tirana, 2014).

- The very high quality of the technical assistance received by UNEP international consultants, on recommendation and liaison from the UNEP team.

111. Notwithstanding the above, it could be argued that a mid-term review, possibly at the time of the Project standstill, i.e. in 2014, could have been carried out and addressed the standstill situation. At the same time, the financial situation could have also been assessed and the incongruences discussed. In fact, repeated attempts by UNEP Task manager and the NOC to address the situation with the NEA, did not receive any feed-back. At that time, the Ministry was in a phase of deep change (nomination of a new Minister and subsequent direction staff turnover), which also lead UNEP Task Manager to postpone the decision of visiting Macedonia, in occasion of the NPC meeting of Tirana (2014).

112. When approaching the planned completion date (January 2015), attempts to establish a formal communication (official emails) with the NEA were renewed, again without any result. A more proactive role of UNEP after the completion date (January 2015) could have been suitable by formally approaching the Government through the appropriate channels, so that a clear position on Project’s development and/or on its suspension / termination could have been made. Overall, everything considered, UNEP supervision and backstopping has to be rated Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU).

#### 4.6.7 Monitoring and evaluation

113. The quality of the Logical Framework of the Project, as well as Monitoring issue were both considered Unsatisfactory in the assessment of the Project Design presented in the Inception Report. The main reasons for the poor scoring were the following:

- the absence of a solid baseline and gaps analysis;
- many of the Outputs were generic and not quantified (e.g. “Guidelines, methodologies and manuals”);
- confusion between Outputs and Activities;
- the indicators were in many cases just a reformulation of the Outputs;
- overall inconsistency of its structure and content.

114. In the face of that, it is obvious that, at the moment of its implementation, the Project could not rely on an adequate instrument for guidance. In retrospect, that may not have been the major problem for Project’s implementation, yet it may have contributed to the exacerbate the Project’s challenges. The Evaluation remarks that, in UNEP Progress Reports (PIR), there is a generalised trend (not only for this particular case) to underscore results achievements and underrate problems and constraints. Overall, Monitoring and Evaluation scores Unsatisfactory (U).

### 4.7 **Complementarity with UNEP strategies and programmes**

As discussed under 4.1.2, the Project relates to Sub-Programme Environmental Governance, PoW 2010-11, particularly its Expected Accomplishment (EA) b : “The capacity of States to implement their environmental obligations and achieve their environmental priority goals, targets and objectives through strengthened laws and institutions is enhanced”. More specifically, Project’s expected results are related to Outputs 2 and 3 of EA b, as showed in the following comparative table:

Expected Accomplishment b, Output 2	Project contribution (how)
-------------------------------------	----------------------------



Legal and policy instruments are developed and applied to achieve synergy between national and international environment and development goals	Stocktaking report and definition of a draft policy on Biosafety
Expected Accomplishment b, Output 3	Project contribution (how)
<p>Countries' legislative and judicial capacity to implement their international environmental obligations is enhanced through implementation of policy tools:</p> <p>...</p> <p>...The capacities of countries in risk assessment and management of modern biotechnology products under the biosafety programme is enhanced...</p> <p>...Capacity-building and support are provided to developing country Parties to enable their participation in the Cartagena Protocol's Biosafety Clearing House....</p>	<p>Through the analysis and amendment of the existing Law on Biosafety and the preparation of eleven Secondary Acts (Rulebooks)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Through draft guidelines on Risk Assessment (RA) and Risk Management (RM);</li> <li>• Through legal training on Biosafety Law amendment and Rulebooks, as well as on RA and RM;</li> <li>• Through Gap analysis of existing national capacities for GMOs laboratories</li> </ul>

115. Given its focus on Capacity Building and, to some extent, on Technology Support (for instance training in Risk Assessment, Risk Monitoring, Laboratory upgrading) the Project is surely aligned with Bali Strategic Plan (BSP). Actually, the project has been active in addressing at least one of the cross-cutting issues listed in Section D of the Plan, i.e. the Development of national law and regulations. The Project was not conceived to address any particular gender issue.

## 5 Conclusions and Recommendations

### 5.1 Conclusions

116. The UNEP-GEF funded Project "Capacity Building for the Development of the National Biosafety Framework of Macedonia" has suffered from the standstill of its activities since mid-2014 and has eventually been considered unilaterally and unofficially closed by the NEA (MOEPP), after reaching the expected completion date in January 2015. The Parties did not give any formal step to normalise the situation up to date.

117. Main reasons for the impasse can be identified as follows:

- The difficult socio-political situation the country has been going through for few years now, which hampers decision-making processes, amplifies politicisation in the public sector and diminishes people's motivation and participation;
- Stemming from the above, a weakened institutional framework that hampers solid partnerships and cooperation. As far as Biosafety is concerned, it hindered the clear definition of responsibilities among the stakeholders and their coordination, particularly regarding the functioning of crucial Inter-Institutional bodies (the National Commission on GMOs Management and the Scientific Advisory Committee);
- The amendment of the Biosafety Law and of the subsequent Secondary Acts (Rule Books), all of them prepared with the support of the Project, are still lacking approval at Governmental and Parliamentary level;
- Derived from the above, non-formalisation of the division of competencies between the two would-be NCAs (MOEPP and FVA), as defined by the amendments mentioned above;

- The specific situation of the NEA (MOEPP) that does not seem to consider Biosafety as a priority and did not provide a meaningful institutional up-taking of Biosafety agenda;
118. In the context outlined above, the Project has nevertheless delivered some relevant Outputs, such as:
- Stocktaking report and definition of a draft policy on Biosafety;
  - Analysis and amendment of the existing Law on Biosafety;
  - Systematization and preparation of the Secondary Acts (Rulebooks);
  - Draft guidelines on Risk Assessment (RA) and Risk Management (RM);
  - Legal training on Biosafety Law amendment and Rulebooks, as well as on RA and RM;
  - Gap analysis of existing national capacities for GMOs laboratories setting and implementation.
119. The Project has been very active and successful in catalysing and championing the Biosafety agenda in the country, by largely contributing to high-quality assessments of existing legal, procedural and technical gaps, by implementing several Capacity Building actions and by delivering the above significant Outputs. However, it failed to satisfy many key-assumptions (listed in 4.3.2), mainly related to the institutional framework. Therefore the Project did not succeed in achieving its Immediate Outcomes and its main Project Outcome, a workable and transparent National Biosafety Framework.
120. Accordingly, Socio-political, Institutional and Financial Sustainability are considered unlikely to be achieved under the current conditions.
121. Project implementation has suffered from the lack of a solid anchorage within the NEA (MOEPP) and some incongruence has been detected on the management of the post of the National Project Coordinator (see 4.6.2). The rate of expenditures has been so far of 23% of GEF allocation.
122. Taking into account all of the above, the Evaluation has concluded that the Project has been, much regrettably, a lost opportunity for the country and that a clear definition of the future of the Project is imperative. The suitability of any kind of decision in that respect (suspension, termination or transfer of responsibility, according to § 51 and following of the Project Cooperation Agreement of 26/04/2011) is discussed in the alternative scenarios presented in the following chapter (Recommendations).
123. As requested by the ToR of the Evaluation, the overall ratings table for the different evaluation criteria is presented hereafter. Most of the criteria (nearly 70%) score poorly, with particular concern for the Effectiveness and the Sustainability aspects. Some important criteria score well (Relevance) or moderately well (Achievement of Outputs), while the Factors affecting Project Performance present an uneven picture with, nevertheless, unsatisfactory levels on relevant issues such as Project Implementation and management (see 4.6.2). The abnormal closure of Project activities is a most concerning and regrettable issue. Everything considered, the Project has been rated Unsatisfactory.

<b>Criterion</b>	<b>Summary Assessment</b>	<b>Rating</b>
<b>A. Strategic relevance</b>	The Project confirms all its relevance in supporting and enhancing country's capacity to integrate the EU and to comply with country's obligations towards CPB. It has also contributed to fulfil UNEP's mandate and policy, as well as GEF priorities and strategies. However, it is not currently strategically relevant for the NEA (see 4.1).	<b>MS</b>
<b>B. Achievement of outputs</b>	In the context of a discouraging institutional environment, the Project has nonetheless delivered some of the expected Outputs, most of them, however, only partially (see 4.2 and Table 1).	<b>MS</b>
<b>C. Effectiveness: Attainment of project objectives and results</b>	The attainment of main Project Outcomes did not occur at all, in the face of the many conditions not materialized (see 4.3.2)	<b>U</b>
1. Achievement of direct outcomes	Not achieved (4.3.2)	<b>U</b>
2. Likelihood of impact	Highly Unlikely to occur due to the absence of Outcomes so far. (see 4.3.3)	<b>HU</b>

<b>D. Sustainability and replication</b>	Sustainability is overall unlikely to occur.	<b>U</b>
1. Financial	Evidences exist (see 4.4.2) of the weak attitude of MOEPP to assume financial responsibilities.	<b>HU</b>
2. Socio-political	Difficult socio-political situation of the country hampering decision-making processes, amplifying politicisation in the public sector and dissuading people's motivation and participation. (see 4.4.1)	<b>U</b>
3. Institutional framework	Overall weak institutional framework hampering solid partnerships and cooperation and hindering the clear definition of responsibilities on Biosafety. A number of key-assumptions not satisfied (4.3.2 and 4.4.3)	<b>U</b>
4. Environmental	Conditioned by the current weakness of socio-political and institutional context (4.4.4)	<b>MU</b>
5. Catalytic role	The Project has been actively catalysing and championing the Biosafety agenda, by supporting the participatory elaboration of the Biosafety Law amendment and of the Secondary Legislation (not yet approved). Though the effects are limited by the weak institutional up-taking, the Project has played an undeniable catalytic role (4.4.5).	<b>S</b>
6. Replication	Pursuing and replication of the activities is in jeopardy and only possible under the assumption that a more conducive institutional environment is in place.	<b>U</b>
<b>E. Efficiency</b>	Initial delays in the operational start of the activities due to administrative and procedural hindrances (3.4). Institutional impasse leading to the abrupt interruption of operations. Incongruences in the efficient use of the budget allocation for the NPC (3.5). Investments in outstanding Capacity Building activities at risk if no follow-up is given to the Project (weak cost-effectiveness) (see 4.5)	<b>U</b>
<b>F. Factors affecting project performance</b>		<b>U</b>
1. Preparation and readiness	Project Design too generic, with little useful information and few meaningful elements of analysis, unlikely to be an effective instrument of guidance and orientation for the implementation of the Project. Crucial issues such as Sustainability, Risk identification, Governance, Management, Execution and Partnership Arrangements were rated Unsatisfactory. (see 4.6.1)	<b>U</b>
2. Project implementation and management	Though no particular responsibilities can be ascribed to the Project Team, the Project was not implemented and managed at the suitable level. The situation generated in mid-2014 was not appropriately and timely addressed by all parties involved. (see 4.6.2)	<b>U</b>
3. Stakeholders participation and public awareness	Assiduous endeavour of the NOC has promoted opportunities of partnership and multi-sectoral working groups. Public awareness has been left behind, due to the lack of a clear institutional responsibility on the messages to be disseminated.	<b>MS</b>
4. Country ownership and drivenness	Poor institutional up-taking (see 4.6.4)	<b>U</b>
5. Financial planning and management	Rate of expenditure of GEF allocation at 23%. Last signed Financial Report found in Anubis is of December 2013. Incongruences have been detected on the management of the post of the National Project Coordinator (see 4.6.5)	<b>U</b>
6. UNEP supervision and backstopping	Constant coaching, NPC meetings and high quality of international are positive elements. Yet, UNEP was not fully effective in timely addressing the deteriorating institutional framework and the financial management (see 4.6.6)	<b>MU</b>
7. Monitoring and evaluation	Due to inconsistencies in the Logical Framework, the Project could not rely on an adequate instrument of guidance and piloting. (see 4.6.7)	<b>U</b>
a. M&E Design	Absence of a solid baseline and gaps analysis; many Outputs not quantified, confusion between Outputs and Activities, indicators ill-defined	<b>U</b>
b. Budgeting and funding for M&E activities	Foreseen and sufficient	<b>S</b>
c. M&E Plan Implementation	See above	<b>MU</b>
<b>Overall Project Rating</b>		<b>U</b>

## 5.2 Lessons Learned

124. Socio-political context and institutional framework play a crucial role in the development of the Biosafety agenda and can represent an inaccessible conditionality.

## 5.3 Recommendations

125. Based on the main Conclusions and Lessons Learned, the evaluation mission presents some possible scenarios for the future of the Project, outlines main “pros and against” of each scenario and suggests a scale of suitability of them.
126. Recommendation 1: to UNEP

**Findings / Conclusions (§116, §117, §120, §121, §122) and chapters 4.6.2 and 4.6.5:**

The Project has suffered from the standstill of its activities since mid-2014 and has eventually been considered unilaterally and unofficially closed by the NEA (MOEPP), after reaching the expected completion date in January 2015. The Parties did not give any formal step to normalise the situation up to date.

The difficult socio-political situation of the country and the weak institutional framework have hampered stakeholders setting solid partnerships and cooperation. Project implementation has suffered from the lack of a firm anchorage within the NEA (MOEPP) and some incongruences have been detected on the management of the post of the National Project Coordinator by the NEA.

Some Outputs have been partially delivered, but Outcomes have not been achieved at all. The rate of expenditures has been very low (23%).

The Evaluation has concluded that the Project has been, much regrettably, a lost opportunity for the country and a clear definition of the future of the Project is imperative.

The suitability of any kind of decision on that respect (suspension, termination or transfer of responsibility, according to § 51 and following of the Project Cooperation Agreement of 26/04/2011) is discussed in the following alternative scenarios and the Evaluation recommends the Termination Scenario (Scenario 4).

**Recommendation 1:**

It is strongly recommended to take urgent, effective and formal steps in order to amend the current situation, at the latest by 31 January 2016. Among the four scenarios outlined here below, the Evaluation would recommend the adoption of Scenario 4 (Termination of the Project).

Scenario 1: Suspension of the Project

PROS: the most undemanding solution. It permits postponing clear-cut decisions and taking time to wait for more favourable circumstance.

AGAINST: it does not definitely solve the problem and relies on the assumption that the current situation is going to shortly evolve positively, which, however, cannot be taken for granted under current circumstances.

SUITABILITY: Less Suitable

Scenario 2: Transfer of Responsibility to FVA (Food and Veterinary Agency)

PROS: It permits the continuation of the Project, probably solving part of the problem. The FVA is governed directly by the Prime Minister and is a focal, influential institution. It has been a partner of the Project for years and knows the situation.

AGAINST: according to the amendment of the Law (not yet approved), FVA only deals with GMOs Food and Feed, not with Release into the Environment, therefore it should anyway liaise with MOEPP. Problems in partnership and cooperation will not be solved. The selection of the reference laboratory (next relevant step foreseen in the Project) can become a controversial issue. The influence of the socio-political context will probably be amplified, due to the institutional setting of the Agency. The scenario implies energy and time consuming preliminary steps (analysis of the partner, definition of a new agreement, etc.).

SUITABILITY: Moderately Unsuitable

### Scenario 3: Transfer of Management Responsibility to UNDP

PROS: It permits the continuation of the Project probably solving part of the problem. It is a mechanism already in place in other UNEP Projects and its strong and weak points are well known by UNEP. It guarantees financial accountability, most important in absence of a Project Team in loco. It could permit the implementation of part of the activities (laboratories upgrading, some trainings).

AGAINST: it implies anyway some transaction costs for UNEP, e.g. the setting of direct MoUs with the laboratories. It will be circumscribed to solve some technicalities of the Project but not able to provide meaningful proximity support to the implementation of national systems for Handling applications, Risk Assessment and Management, Inspection, Monitoring and Enforcement.

SUITABILITY: Moderately Suitable

#### Scenario 4: Termination of the Project

PROS: It formalises a *de facto* situation. It permits concluding an unfortunate experience avoiding spending supplementary energy and financial resources to implement tentative and partial scenarios. Biodiversity, Food Safety and Biosafety are included in the integration process of Macedonia into EU. Related mechanisms (institutional and financial support) may possibly be taken over through EU support and assistance.

AGAINST: it will leave the Project unfinished (yet with some outputs produced and available, such as the full preparation of the legal framework, the identification of reference laboratories, human resources capacity building).

SUITABILITY: Suitable at this stage and under current circumstances.

## **Annexes**

1. Response to stakeholder comments received but not (fully) accepted by the evaluators
2. Evaluation TORs (without annexes)
3. List of people met
4. Bibliography
5. Summary co-finance information and a statement of project expenditure by activity
6. Brief CV of the consultant

**ANNEXE 1**

**Response to stakeholder comments received but not (fully) accepted by the evaluators**

**NA**



TERMS OF REFERENCE<sup>15</sup>**Terminal Evaluation of the UNEP/GEF projects**

- Capacity building for the Implementation of the National Biosafety Framework of Albania
- Capacity Building for the Development of the National Biosafety Framework of Macedonia
- Support for Implementation of the National Biosafety Framework for Egypt

### 1. PROJECT BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW

#### (a) Project General Information

Table 1. Project summary

<b>UNEP PIMS ID:</b>		<b>IMIS number:</b>	GFL/2328-2716-4B76 GFL/2328-2716-4954 egypt GFL/2328-2716-4B91 macedonia
<b>Sub-programme:</b>	Environmental governance <sup>16</sup>	<b>Expected Accomplishment(s):</b>	
<b>UNEP approval date:</b>	03/02/2011 27/04/2011 30/10/2006	<b>PoW Output(s):</b>	
<b>GEF project ID:</b>	3895 4103 2824	<b>Project Type:</b>	MSP
<b>GEF OP #:</b>	Biodiversity 5 (for Egypt, prior to 2007)	<b>Focal Area(s):</b>	SP6
<b>GEF approval date:</b>	27/05/2010 09/11/2010	<b>GEF Strategic Priority/Objective:</b>	SO3
<b>Expected Start Date:</b>	November 2010 February 2011 October 2006	<b>Actual start date:</b>	25/07/2011 28/06/2011 01/07/2007
<b>Planned completion date:</b>	02/05/2015 27/08/2014 29/10/2010	<b>Actual completion date:</b>	02/12/2015 26/01/2015 29/09/2015
<b>Planned project budget at approval:</b>	863,800 USD 643,000 USD 2,297,100 USD	<b>Total expenditures reported as of [date]:</b>	
<b>GEF Allocation:</b>	557,200 USD 407,000 USD	<b>GEF grant expenditures reported as of [date]:</b>	499,746.00 134,161.02

<sup>15</sup> TOR template version of February 11 2015

Legend: yellow=GEF only; green=UNEP only; purple=MTE only; Blue=TE only; Red=Info to be added

<sup>16</sup> Not specified for Egypt as it was a 2006 project, but stated in the other two ProDocs

	908,100 USD		475,920.37
<b>PDF GEF cost:</b>		<b>PDF co-financing:</b>	
<b>Expected MSP co-financing:</b>	306,600 USD 236,000 USD 1,389,000 USD	<b>Secured MSP co-financing:</b>	
<b>First Disbursement:</b>	27/07/2011 11/07/2011 02/07/2007	<b>Date of financial closure:</b>	tbc
<b>No. of revisions:</b>	5 4 13	<b>Date of last revision:</b>	16/04/2015 26/08/2014 01/01/2015
<b>Date of last Steering Committee meeting:</b>			
<b>Mid-term review/ evaluation (planned date):</b>	September 2013 January 2013	<b>Mid-term review/ evaluation (actual date):</b>	20/10/2009 (E)
<b>Terminal Evaluation (actual date):</b>	August – November 2015		

**(b) Projects rationale**

**Albania** - At the time of the preparation of the project document, Albania was importing foods and seeds mainly from European countries, especially from neighboring ones that did not produce LMOs or have restrictions towards LMOs. However, the extent to which unregulated or unauthorised LMOs could have been present in seed and foodstuffs entering Albania was unknown. Being a small country and having a noticeably high biodiversity, Albania intended to put in place all necessary means to protect its biodiversity. Additionally, Albania has been a party to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety since 2005 and thus has international obligations to put in place a regulatory system that ensures, as much as possible, the safe use of the products of modern biotechnology, especially in relation to transboundary movements. At the time of project development, Albania lacked the capacity to either detect or regulate movements of LMOs into or use within the country. At the time of approval of this project, the draft law on biosafety prepared during the previous biosafety project was still going through the process of consultation with main stakeholders and public representatives, as well as review by the scientific and international community.

This implementation project intended to help Albania put in place a stand-alone biosafety policy, a completed regulatory regime on biosafety, including the approved draft law, and establish mechanisms for risk assessment and management by putting in place a competent national authority and respective institutions. It also intended to create a sustainable mechanism to fulfill obligations of the Cartagena Protocol regarding public awareness and information, specifically through the use of the BCH. In addition, the setting up of a laboratory on LMO detection, as well as training of key experts on LMO expertise, was meant to be one of the activities that would have the most impact on the setting up of a functional infrastructure to deal with LMO's.

**Macedonia** – Even though Macedonia's land area is relatively small, it exhibits a great biodiversity and agricultural varieties and is not exempt from the global, regional and national processes which cause the loss of biodiversity. The inclusion of modern biotechnology in the overall national development policy has required the country to agree on measures that ensure the safe handling and use of LMOs.

The Republic of Macedonia ratified the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in 2005. However, after signing the CPB, Macedonia lacked any legislative, administrative, institutional and technical procedures on biosafety and would not be able to take any decisions on use of modern biotechnology, even for a field trial. The previous biosafety project developed a policy, a regulatory regime, a system to handle notifications of requests for authorisations, mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement and for promoting public awareness. A draft law on GMOs was also prepared. This project intended to finalise the NBF and to operationalize it.

**Egypt** - Egypt hosts one of the oldest agricultural communities in the world and is among the centres of origin/diversity for important crop plants. In its quest for increasing food production, overcoming significant constraints of agricultural productivity and releasing pressure on natural ecosystems, the country embarked on the

development and application of relevant biotechnologies as well as acquisition of biotechnologies and biotechnology products developed elsewhere.

A Law was formulated under the GEF-funded enabling activity "National Biosafety Framework for Egypt" in 1999. The Draft Biosafety Law sets out basic rules as well as implementing structures and broad outlines of procedures in relation to LMOs, details of which will be elaborated in Executive Directive Regulations to be decreed by the Prime Minister. The Draft Biosafety Law sets out basic rules as well as implementing structures and broad outlines of procedures in relation to LMOs. Egypt subsequently ratified the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in December 2003 and was in need to develop a workable and transparent biosafety framework to comply with international standards. This project intended to support the establishment of a fully functional biosafety framework.

### (c) Project objectives and components

**7. Albania:** This project has the objective to complete the development, and prepare for implementation of the National Biosafety Framework in line with national priorities and obligations under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. The project will contribute to the finalisation of the biosafety policy, the elaboration of the regulatory regime, the completion and pilot testing of the administrative system and put in place systems for monitoring and enforcement, as well as raising public awareness of biosafety and improving public participation in biosafety decision-making.

**Macedonia:** This project had the objective to build capacity to Macedonia for the development of a National Biosafety Framework for the safe use of modern biotechnology in line with international obligations, including the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.

**Egypt:** The project objective was that by 2009 (then postponed to 2011, 2014 and now 2015) Egypt has a workable and transparent national biosafety framework, in line with its national development priorities and international obligations. In Albania, the project is structured around 6 components (plus monitoring and evaluation), in Egypt the project comprises 4 outcomes and in Macedonia the projects has 5 components. The following tables summarise the structures of the three projects

**Table 2 – Projects components/outcomes and outputs – Albania**

Project component	Outputs
Stocktaking Assessment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A stocktaking report which analyses the current status of biotechnology and biosafety in Albania, strengths and weaknesses in existing capacities is conducted</li> </ul>
Integration and incorporation of biosafety into national plans and policies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A stand-alone biosafety policy is developed with the help and guidance of a multisectorial working group, published and distributed</li> <li>Biosafety priorities deriving from the newly developed biosafety policy are integrated into other national policies, i.e. National Environmental Strategy, National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan , Agricultural Development Strategy, National Strategy for Development and Integration</li> <li>Existing capacities and gaps identified through the stocktaking assessment are addressed by the biosafety policy</li> </ul>
A full regulatory regime for biosafety is designed and approved	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Draft law is finalized and approved by the Parliament</li> <li>Secondary legislation prepared, amended and discussed through stakeholders representatives and approved</li> </ul>
Consolidation of a functional national system for handling requests, perform risk assessment, decision-making, perform administrative tasks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The competent national authority for LMO's, the National Biosafety Committee (or other as defined by regulations) is created and is functional</li> <li>Creation of technical guidelines for handling of requests (including Risk Assessment/Risk Management guidelines)</li> <li>Organization of national and international training workshops for immediate stakeholders on RA/RM, decision-making regarding LMO's, and handling administrative tasks</li> <li>Creating the necessary infrastructure and facilitating the equipping, set up and certification of a LMO laboratory which will enable the fulfillment of obligations of CPB in regards to handling requests and performing risk assessment and</li> </ul>

	management
Monitoring and enforcement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Establishment of mechanisms for sectorial monitoring, enforcement and emergency responses.</li> <li>Technical guidelines for monitoring developed</li> <li>Emergency response plans established</li> </ul>
Public awareness and participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Organization of several workshops on different issues, such as legislative framework on LMO's, RA/RM, law enforcement, monitoring and emergency response</li> <li>Defining the best means to involve wider stakeholder representatives in biosafety issues, through the preparation of a public awareness guidance document</li> <li>Identify responsible government body to serve as a structure to promote public participation in decision-making, through receiving comments, complaints, etc.</li> <li>Enable the use of national BCH and continuous update on LMO's for transport and release on the market.</li> </ul>

**Table 3 – Projects outcomes and outputs – Egypt**

Project outcome	Outputs
Egypt has a fully functional and responsive regulatory regime in line with CP and national needs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Survey of the status of relevant existing laws and regulations, research and trials and release of LMOs and products thereof in Egypt carried out;</li> <li>Legal translation of the Biosafety Law into English carried out;</li> <li>One four-day workshop organised for 24 technical, administrative and legal experts to examine the Biosafety Law and provide draft Executive Directive Regulations based on an outline of options;</li> <li>One four-day consultative workshop carried out for 25 government stakeholders (representatives of the nine ministries involved in biosafety, legal experts) to discuss the first draft Executive Directive Regulations of the Biosafety Law and the revision of the existing ministerial decrees;</li> <li>One four day-workshop organised for 25 legal, technical and trade specialists, legislators, managers and administrators to discuss, advise and provide inputs to the second draft Executive Directive Regulations and its administrative structure;</li> <li>Finalisation of the Executive Directive Regulations and its administrative structure and the revision to the existing ministerial decrees relating to biosafety for presentation to Prime Minister for approval and translation into English;</li> <li>Four day training workshop carried out for 24 legal officers/experts on the application and implementation of the biosafety law and the executive directive regulations;</li> <li>Analysis on the legal steps to be taken to regulate the interaction of the Biosafety Law with the contained use and confined release of potentially hazardous genetically modified related organisms is carried out and steps for legal actions indicated.</li> </ul>
Egypt has a functional national system for handling request for permits for LMOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A five-day technical workshop for 8 specialists carried out to draft and finalise implementation procedures for risk assessment and risk management for LMOs organised; technical guidelines on methodologies for RA/RM protocols drafted and published; an internal "Manual on procedures for handling requests of LMOs in Egypt prepared;</li> <li>Two five-day training courses organised for 30 participants/course (members of the NBC, Ministries, including representatives of civil society and private sector) on handling requests for permits, including RA/RM;</li> <li>Two five-day training courses organised for 30 administrative officers/course from the biosafety office and relevant Ministries, on the administrative processing related to the handling of requests (including administrative aspects related to monitoring and inspections, a training manual is published)</li> </ul>
Egypt has a functional national system for "follow-up", namely monitoring of environmental effects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Manual on procedures/ methodologies for monitoring of environmental effects and inspections prepared finalised and published;</li> <li>Survey of existing facilities at universities and research centres for designation of</li> </ul>

and inspections	<p>operational reference laboratories carried out; Criteria/procedure for the selection and certification of two reference laboratories established; additional equipment purchased for the laboratories certified for LMOs detection, including post-release monitoring and enforcement, a training guide for LMOs detection in laboratories, including sampling and analysis drafted finalised and published;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Two senior scientist trained for 10 days at a well established laboratory in procedures for analysis and detection;</li> <li>• Two training programs (2 weeks each) for 10 selected staff of the two reference laboratories in LMO detection carried out;</li> <li>• A five-day training course organised for 40 custom officials and inspectors on LMOs investigation and inspection techniques; a guide for legal personnel on enforcement, settlement of disputes and handling of court cases is produced;</li> <li>• Two - day training workshops for 8 selected judges held.</li> </ul>
Egypt has a functional national system for public awareness, education, participation and access to information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Public education and involvement plan prepared and approved;</li> <li>• Materials on biosafety prepared and disseminated;</li> <li>• The biosafety committee web site set up and data entry protocols formulated and operational;</li> <li>• Two two-day information workshops organised for 40 local administrators on public awareness education and involvement in biosafety;</li> <li>• Two one-day workshops organised for 35 participants, including parliamentarians, media and NGO representatives on the Legislation and its implementing Directives.</li> </ul>

**Table 4 – Projects components, outcomes and outputs – Macedonia**

Project component	Outcomes	Outputs
Stocktaking report	The project design and execution fills gaps and completes the NBF thus allowing decisions on the safe use of modern biotechnology to be taken in line with CBP.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A stocktaking assessment which analyses the current status of biotechnology and biosafety in Macedonia, in order to improve project design and targeting of project activities.</li> <li>• Amended national policies connencted to biosafety and prepared biosafety policy/strategy</li> </ul>
Regulatory regime	Legislative system for risk assessment/ risk management, handling of LMO applications in place	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Biosafety regulations approved Competent authorities (CA) and Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC) mandated</li> </ul>
Handling requests for authorization (including administrative processing for risk assessment and informed decision-making)	Safe use of modern biotechnology is possible through full compliance of Macedonian biosafety legislation with the CPB and the corresponding regulations of the EU, administrative system for handling of applications, RA/RM is in place	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Guidelines, methodologies and manuals on risk assessment and risk management prepared</li> <li>• Training on procedures for risk assessment and risk management</li> <li>• Internet portal functional for data collection, input and analysis for risk management and risk communication purposes.</li> <li>• National procedures required in order to use the Biosafety Clearing- House Mechanism and provide information to the Biosafety Clearing House in force</li> </ul>
Follow-up mechanisms (monitoring of environmental effects and enforcement: control and inspections)	Macedonia has public confidence in biosafety regulatory system enhanced due to effective monitoring and surveillance of intentional and non-intentional LMO presence and use	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Laboratory equipment purchased and reference laboratories equipped to carry out LMO detection and monitoring</li> <li>• Monitoring and inspection system for LMOs established, human resources for monitoring, inspections, border controls, compliance to</li> <li>• Biosafety Law and the Protocol and</li> </ul>

		<p>emergency response improved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Guidelines, methodologies and manuals on monitoring, inspections and emergency response prepared</li> <li>• Registration system with unique identifiers to trace back LMOs established</li> </ul>
Public participation and awareness	Macedonia has a functional system for public awareness and participation established for biosafety such that the level of public awareness on biosafety and participation in implementation of NBFs improved	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Public awareness action plan of NBF updated</li> <li>• National BCH strengthened</li> <li>• Increased raising public awareness through newsletters, videos, brochures, website and ensuring that the public are consulted for their views.</li> <li>• Best practices and lessons learnt disseminated.</li> </ul>

Source: project documents

#### (d) Executing Arrangements

The **Implementing Agency** for the three projects was the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). In this capacity, UNEP had overall responsibility for the implementation of the projects, project oversight, technical support and co-ordination with other GEF projects.

In Albania, the executing agency was the Ministry of Environment, Forestry and Water Administration, in Egypt, the Egyptian Environment Affairs Agency, part of the Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs, in Macedonia, the Agency of Environment of the Ministry of Environment and Physical planning. In Albania, the project was implemented through UNDP Albania, which served as implementation partner, with the purpose of facilitating the procurement and financial actions of the project.

The three countries established a **National Co-ordinating Committee (NCC)**. These bodies were established by the National Executing Agencies (NEAs) to advise and guide the implementation of the projects. These committees should have included representations of all government agencies with mandates relevant to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and representations from the private and public sectors. They were intended to be multi-disciplinary and multi-sectoral, covering all fields relevant to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.

The **National Project Coordinators** were responsible for the overall co-ordination, management and supervision of all aspects of the National Project. He/she had to report to the National Co-ordinating Committee and UNEP, and liaise closely with the chair and members of the National Coordinating Committee and National Executing Agency in order to coordinate the work plan for the National Project. He/she was responsible for all substantive, managerial and financial reports from the National Project. He/she had to provide overall supervision for any staff in the NBF Team as well as guiding and supervising all other staff appointed for the execution of the various National Project components. Bhutan and Mongolia also appointed a National Project Director, a government employee with the responsibility to provide policy advice and overall direction to the project, as well as coordinating project activities with relevant government agencies.

#### (e) Project Cost and Financing

The three projects fall into the medium-size project category. They were expected to mobilise 306,600 USD (100,000 in cash, 206,600 in kind - Albania), 1,389,000 USD (in kind – Egypt) and 236,000 USD (in kind – Macedonia) respectively. The estimated projects costs at design stage and associated funding sources are presented in Table 5, 6 and 7.

**Table 5. Estimated project cost in Albania (USD)**

Financing source	Amount	Agency fee	Total
GEF	558,000	55,800	613,800
Cofinancing	306,600		306,000
Total			864,600

**Table 5. Estimated project cost in Egypt (USD)<sup>17</sup>**

Financing source	Amount
GEF	908,000
Cofinancing	1,308,900
Total	2,297,100

**Table 5. Estimated project cost in Macedonia (USD)**

Financing source	Amount
GEF	407,000
Cofinancing	236,000
Total	643,000

**(f) Implementation Issues**

**Albania:** the project activities are being completed as planned. A short extension was required, but no major challenges or delays have been observed. The elections in 2013 did not appear to have slowed down the rate of implementation. No mid-term review was carried out due to the size of the project and smooth implementation of activities. **Egypt:** the project was severely delayed, partially due to the political instability of the country in the wake of the Arab Spring. It should however be noted that even prior to the Arab Spring, the mid-term review (2009) noted that the passage of the Biosafety Law was being delayed and proposed an alternative interim measure in case of further delays. According to the recent PIR, the pace of implementation has picked up again, but the project is now in its eight year of implementation, compared to the initial duration of four years. **Macedonia:** according to the latest PIR, the project suffered delays due to election activity in 2014. A leadership change seems to be posing major obstacles in the implementation of the project. The evaluation should consider the extent to which it is possible to propose alternative courses of action and the use of adaptive management in order to overcome the impasse and close the project.

**2. TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EVALUATION****(a) Objective and Scope of the Evaluation**

In line with the UNEP Evaluation Policy<sup>18</sup> and the UNEP Programme Manual<sup>19</sup>, the Terminal Evaluations are undertaken at completion of the project to assess project performance (in terms of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency), and determine outcomes and impacts (actual and potential) stemming from the project, including their sustainability. The evaluation has two primary purposes: (i) to provide evidence of results to meet accountability requirements, and (ii) to promote operational improvement, learning and knowledge sharing through results and lessons learned among UNEP and the main project partners in each country. Therefore, the evaluation will identify lessons of operational relevance for future project formulation and implementation, especially for the additional phases of the biosafety projects, if applicable.

<sup>17</sup> Annexes 2a and 2b suggest that total budget was actually 908,000 USD

<sup>18</sup> <http://www.unep.org/eou/StandardsPolicyandPractices/UNEPEvaluationPolicy/tabid/3050/language/en-US/Default.aspx>

<sup>19</sup> [http://www.unep.org/QAS/Documents/UNEP\\_Programme\\_Manual\\_May\\_2013.pdf](http://www.unep.org/QAS/Documents/UNEP_Programme_Manual_May_2013.pdf)

It will focus on the following sets of **key questions**, based on the projects' intended outcomes, which may be expanded by the consultants as deemed appropriate:

1. To what extent were the projects able to support Albania, Macedonia and Egypt in establishing a national biosafety framework in accordance with national development priorities and international obligations?
2. To what extent were the projects able to assist Albania, Macedonia and Egypt to establish and consolidate a fully functional and responsive regulatory regime in line with the Cartagena Protocol and national needs and priorities?
3. To what extent were the projects able to assist Albania, Macedonia and Egypt to establish and consolidate a functional national system for handling requests, perform risk assessments, testing of GMOs, decision-making and performing administrative tasks?
4. To what extent were the projects able to assist Albania, Macedonia and Egypt to establish and consolidate a functional national system for "follow-up", namely monitoring of environmental effects and enforcement?
5. To what extent were the projects able to assist Albania, Macedonia and Egypt to establish and consolidate a functional national system for public awareness, education, participation and access to information?

**(b) Overall Approach and Methods**

The Terminal Evaluation of the Project will be conducted by independent consultants under the overall responsibility and management of the UNEP Evaluation Office in consultation with the UNEP Task Manager and the Sub-programme Coordinators of the Environmental Governance and Ecosystem Management.

It will be an in-depth evaluation using a participatory approach whereby key stakeholders are kept informed and consulted throughout the evaluation process. Both quantitative and qualitative evaluation methods will be used to determine project achievements against the expected outputs, outcomes and impacts. It is highly recommended that the consultant(s) maintains close communication with the project team and promotes information exchange throughout the evaluation implementation phase in order to increase their (and other stakeholder) ownership of the evaluation findings.

The findings of the evaluation will be based on the following:

**(a) A desk review of:**

- Relevant background documentation, inter alia inter alia UNEP and GEF-3 and GEF-4 policies, strategies and programmes pertaining to biosafety at the time of the project's approval
- Project design documents (including minutes of the project design review meeting at approval); Annual Work Plans and Budgets or equivalent, revisions to the project (Project Document Supplement), the logical framework and its budget;
- Project reports such as six-monthly progress and financial reports, progress reports from collaborating partners, meeting minutes, relevant correspondence etc.;
- Project outputs
- MTR in the case of the project implemented in Egypt
- Evaluations/reviews of similar projects

A.

**Interviews (individual or in group) with:**

- UNEP-GEF Task Manager
- Project management team
- UNEP Fund Management Officer;
- Project partners, including national executing agencies, project coordinators, members of the NCCs;
- Relevant resource persons;

**Field visits** of 4-5 days in each country to be scheduled in September in the following order: Albania, Macedonia and Egypt.

B.



## (c) Key Evaluation principles

Evaluation findings and judgements should be based on **sound evidence and analysis**, clearly documented in the evaluation report. Information will be triangulated (i.e. verified from different sources) to the extent possible, and when verification was not possible, the single source will be mentioned. Analysis leading to evaluative judgements should always be clearly spelled out.

The evaluation will assess the project with respect to a **minimum set of evaluation criteria** grouped in six categories: (1) Strategic Relevance; (2) Attainment of objectives and planned result, which comprises the assessment of outputs achieved, effectiveness and likelihood of impact; (3) Sustainability and replication; (4) Efficiency; (5) Factors and processes affecting project performance, including preparation and readiness, implementation and management, stakeholder participation and public awareness, country ownership and driven-ness, financial planning and management, UNEP supervision and backstopping, and project monitoring and evaluation; and (6) Complementarity with the UNEP strategies and programmes. The evaluation consultants can propose other evaluation criteria as deemed appropriate.

**Ratings.** All evaluation criteria will be rated on a six-point scale. Annex 3 provides guidance on how the different criteria should be rated and how ratings should be aggregated for the different evaluation criterion categories.

**Baselines and counterfactuals.** In attempting to attribute any outcomes and impacts to the project intervention, the evaluators should consider the difference between *what has happened with, and what would have happened without, the project*. This implies that there should be consideration of the baseline conditions, trends and counterfactuals in relation to the intended project outcomes and impacts. It also means that there should be plausible evidence to attribute such outcomes and impacts to the actions of the project. Sometimes, adequate information on baseline conditions, trends or counterfactuals is lacking. In such cases this should be clearly highlighted by the evaluators, along with any simplifying assumptions that were taken to enable the evaluator to make informed judgements about project performance.

**The “Why?” Question.** As this is a terminal evaluation and a follow-up project is likely or similar interventions are envisaged for the future, particular attention should be given to learning from the experience. Therefore, the “Why?” question should be at the front of the consultants’ minds all through the evaluation exercise. This means that the consultants need to go beyond the assessment of “*what*” the project performance was, and make a serious effort to provide a deeper understanding of “*why*” the performance was as it was, i.e. of processes affecting attainment of project results (criteria under category F – see below). This should provide the basis for the lessons that can be drawn from the project. In fact, the usefulness of the evaluation will be determined to a large extent by the capacity of the consultants to explain “*why things happened*” as they happened and are likely to evolve in this or that direction, which goes well beyond the mere review of “*where things stand*” at the time of evaluation.

(d) A key aim of the evaluation is to encourage reflection and learning by UNEP staff and key project stakeholders. The consultant should consider how reflection and learning can be promoted, both through the evaluation process and in the communication of evaluation findings and key lessons.

(e) **Communicating evaluation results.** Once the consultant(s) has obtained evaluation findings, lessons and results, the Evaluation Office will share the findings and lessons with the key stakeholders. Evaluation results should be communicated to the key stakeholders in a brief and concise manner that encapsulates the evaluation exercise in its entirety. There may, however, be several intended audiences, each with different interests and preferences regarding the report. The Evaluation Manager will plan with the consultant(s) which audiences to target and the easiest and clearest way to communicate the key evaluation findings and lessons to them. This may include some or all of the following; a webinar, conference calls with relevant stakeholders, the preparation of an evaluation brief or interactive presentation.

## (f) Evaluation criteria

### 3. Strategic relevance

The evaluation will assess, in retrospect, whether the project’s objectives and implementation strategies were consistent with global, regional and national environmental issues and needs.

The evaluation will assess whether the project was in-line with the GEF Biodiversity focal area's strategic priorities and operational programme(s).

The evaluation will also assess the project's relevance in relation to UNEP's mandate and its alignment with UNEP's policies and strategies at the time of project approval. UNEP's Medium Term Strategy (MTS) is a document that guides UNEP's programme planning over a four-year period. It identifies UNEP's thematic priorities, known as Subprogrammes (SP), and sets out the desired outcomes [known as Expected Accomplishments (EAs)] of the SubProgrammes. The evaluation will assess whether the project makes a tangible/plausible contribution to any of the EAs specified in the MTS 2010-2013 and 2014-2017. The magnitude and extent of any contributions and the causal linkages should be fully described.

The evaluation should assess the project's alignment / compliance with UNEP's policies and strategies. The evaluation should provide a brief narrative of the following:

6. *Alignment with the Bali Strategic Plan (BSP)*<sup>20</sup>. The outcomes and achievements of the project should be briefly discussed in relation to the objectives of the UNEP BSP.
7. *Gender balance*. Ascertain to what extent project design, implementation and monitoring have taken into consideration: (i) possible gender inequalities in access to and the control over natural resources; (ii) specific vulnerabilities of women and children to environmental degradation or disasters; and (iii) the role of women in mitigating or adapting to environmental changes and engaging in environmental protection and rehabilitation. Are the project intended results contributing to the realization of international GE (Gender Equality) norms and agreements as reflected in the UNEP Gender Policy and Strategy, as well as to regional, national and local strategies to advance HR & GE?
8. *Human rights based approach (HRBA) and inclusion of indigenous peoples issues, needs and concerns*. Ascertain to what extent the project has applied the UN Common Understanding on HRBA. Ascertain if the project is in line with the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, and pursued the concept of free, prior and informed consent.
9. *South-South Cooperation*. This is regarded as the exchange of resources, technology, and knowledge between developing countries. Briefly describe any aspects of the project that could be considered as examples of South-South Cooperation.

Based on an analysis of project stakeholders, the evaluation should assess the relevance of the project intervention to key stakeholder groups.

#### **4. Achievement of Outputs**

The evaluation will assess, for each component, the project's success in producing the programmed outputs and milestones as presented in Table 2,3,4 above, both in quantity and quality, as well as their usefulness and timeliness.

Briefly explain the reasons behind the success (or failure) of the project in producing its different outputs and meeting expected quality standards, cross-referencing as needed to more detailed explanations provided under Section F (which covers the processes affecting attainment of project results). Were key stakeholders appropriately involved in producing the programmed outputs?

#### **5. Effectiveness: Attainment of Objectives and Planned Results**

The evaluation will assess the extent to which the project's objectives were effectively achieved or are expected to be achieved.

The **Theory of Change** (ToC) of a project depicts the causal pathways from project outputs (goods and services delivered by the project) through outcomes (changes resulting from the use made by key stakeholders of project outputs) towards impact (long term changes in environmental benefits and living conditions). The ToC will also depict any intermediate changes required between project outcomes and impact, called 'intermediate states'. The ToC

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<sup>20</sup> <http://www.unep.org/GC/GC23/documents/GC23-6-add-1.pdf>

further defines the external factors that influence change along the major pathways; i.e. factors that affect whether one result can lead to the next. These external factors are either drivers (when the project has a certain level of control) or assumptions (when the project has no control). The ToC also clearly identifies the main stakeholders involved in the change processes.

The evaluation will reconstruct the ToC of the projects based on a review of project documentation and stakeholder interviews. The evaluator will be expected to discuss the reconstructed TOC with the stakeholders during evaluation missions and/or interviews in order to ascertain the causal pathways identified and the validity of impact drivers and assumptions described in the TOC. This exercise will also enable the consultant to address some of the key evaluation questions and make adjustments to the TOC as appropriate (the ToC of the intervention may have been modified / adapted from the original design during project implementation).

The assessment of effectiveness will be structured in three sub-sections:

- (a) Evaluation of the **achievement of outcomes as defined in the reconstructed ToC**. These are the first-level outcomes expected to be achieved as an immediate result of project outputs. For these projects, the main question will be to what extent the projects have contributed to the immediate outcomes (see tables 2,3,4). Additional questions would be to what extent the projects were able to successfully use available drivers to ensure progress towards the adoption of the relevant regulatory systems, even in the wake of political changes.
- (b) Assessment of the **likelihood of impact** using a Review of Outcomes to Impacts (ROtI) approach<sup>21</sup>. The evaluation will assess to what extent the projects have to date contributed, and are likely in the future to further contribute, to intermediate states, and the likelihood that those changes in turn to lead to positive changes in the natural resource base, benefits derived from the environment and human well-being. The evaluation will also consider the likelihood that the intervention may lead to unintended negative effects .

Evaluation of the **achievement of the formal project overall objective, overall purpose, goals and component outcomes** using the project's own results statements as presented in the Project Document<sup>22</sup>. This sub-section will refer back where applicable to the preceding sub-sections (a) and (b) to avoid repetition in the report. To measure achievement, the evaluation will use as much as appropriate the indicators for achievement proposed in the Logical Framework (Logframe) of the project, adding other relevant indicators as appropriate. Briefly explain what factors affected the project's success in achieving its objectives, cross-referencing as needed to more detailed explanations provided under Section F. Most commonly, the overall objective is a higher level result to which the project is intended to contribute. The section will describe the actual or likely **contribution** of the project to the objective.

The evaluation should, where possible, disaggregate outcomes and impacts for the key project stakeholders. It should also assess the extent to which HR and GE were integrated in the Theory of Change and results framework of the intervention and to what degree participating institutions/organizations changed their policies or practices thereby leading to the fulfilment of HR and GE principles (e.g. new services, greater responsiveness, resource re-allocation, etc.)

## ***6. Sustainability and replication***

Sustainability is understood as the probability of continued long-term project-derived results and impacts after the external project funding and assistance ends. The evaluation will identify and assess the key conditions or factors that are likely to undermine or contribute to the persistence of benefits. Some of these factors might be direct results of the project while others will include contextual circumstances or developments that are not under control of the project but that may condition the sustainability of benefits. The evaluation will ascertain that the project has put in place an appropriate exit strategy and measures to mitigate risks to sustainability. The reconstructed ToC will assist in

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<sup>21</sup> Guidance material on Theory of Change and the ROtI approach is available from the Evaluation Office.

<sup>22</sup> Or any subsequent **formally approved** revision of the project document or logical framework.

the evaluation of sustainability, as the drivers and assumptions required to achieve higher-level results are often similar to the factors affecting sustainability of these changes.

Four aspects of sustainability will be addressed:

- (a) *Socio-political sustainability.* Are there any social or political factors that may influence positively or negatively the sustenance of projects' results and progress towards impacts? Is the level of ownership by the main stakeholders sufficient to allow for the projects' results to be sustained? Are there sufficient government and other key stakeholder awareness, interests, commitment and incentives to implement biosafety frameworks in each country? Did the projects conduct 'succession planning' and implement this during the life of the project? Was capacity building conducted for key stakeholders? Did the interventions' activities aim to promote (and did they promote) positive sustainable changes in attitudes, behaviours and power relations between the different stakeholders? To what extent has the integration of HR and GE led to an increase in the likelihood of sustainability of projects' results?

*Financial resources.* To what extent are the continuation of projects' results and the eventual impact of the project dependent on financial resources? What is the likelihood that adequate financial resources<sup>23</sup> will be or will become available to use capacities built by the projects? Are there any financial risks that may jeopardize sustenance of projects' results and onward progress towards impact?

*Institutional framework.* To what extent is the sustenance of the results and onward progress towards impact dependent on issues relating to institutional frameworks and governance? How robust are the institutional achievements such as governance structures and processes, policies, sub-regional agreements, legal and accountability frameworks etc. required to sustaining project results and to lead those to impact on human behaviour and environmental resources, goods or services?

*Environmental sustainability.* Are there any environmental factors, positive or negative, that can influence the future flow of projects' benefits? Are there any projects' outputs or higher level results that are likely to affect the environment, which, in turn, might affect sustainability of project benefits? Are there any foreseeable negative environmental impacts that may occur as the project results are being up-scaled?

**Catalytic role and replication.** The *catalytic role* of UNEP interventions is embodied in their approach of supporting the creation of an enabling environment and of investing in pilot activities which are innovative and showing how new approaches can work. UNEP also aims to support activities that upscale new approaches to a national, regional or global level, with a view to achieve sustainable global environmental benefits. The evaluation will assess the catalytic role played by this project, namely to what extent the project has:

- (a) *catalyzed behavioural changes* in terms of use and application, by the relevant stakeholders, of capacities developed;  
provided *incentives* (social, economic, market based, competencies etc.) to contribute to catalyzing changes in stakeholder behaviour;  
contributed to *institutional changes*, for instance institutional uptake of project-demonstrated technologies, practices or management approaches;  
contributed to *policy changes* (on paper and in implementation of policy);  
contributed to sustained follow-on financing (*catalytic financing*) from Governments, private sector, donors etc.;  
created opportunities for particular individuals or institutions ("*champions*") to catalyze change (without which the project would not have achieved all of its results).

*Replication* is defined as lessons and experiences coming out of the project that are replicated (experiences are repeated and lessons applied in different geographic areas) or scaled up (experiences are repeated and lessons applied in the same geographic area but on a much larger scale and funded by other sources). The evaluation will assess the approach adopted by the project to promote replication effects and determine to what extent actual

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<sup>23</sup>

Those resources can be from multiple sources, such as the national budget, public and private sectors, development assistance etc.

replication has already occurred, or is likely to occur in the near future. What are the factors that may influence replication and scaling up of project experiences and lessons?

### ***7. Efficiency***

The evaluation will assess the cost-effectiveness and timeliness of project execution. It will describe any cost- or time-saving measures put in place in attempting to bring the project as far as possible in achieving its results within its (severely constrained) secured budget and (extended) time. It will also analyse how delays, if any, have affected project execution, costs and effectiveness. Wherever possible, costs and time over results ratios of the project will be compared with that of other similar interventions. The evaluation will also assess the extent to which HR and GE were allocated specific and adequate budget in relation to the results achieved.

The evaluation will give special attention to efforts by the project teams to make use of/build upon pre-existing institutions, agreements and partnerships, data sources, synergies and complementarities with other initiatives, programmes and projects etc. to increase project efficiency. For instance, the previous phases of biosafety support received by the countries.

### ***8. Factors and processes affecting project performance***

**Preparation and readiness.** This criterion focusses on the quality of project design and preparation. Were project stakeholders<sup>24</sup> adequately identified and were they sufficiently involved in project development and ground truthing e.g. of proposed timeframe and budget? Were the projects' objectives and components clear, practicable and feasible within its timeframe? Are potentially negative environmental, economic and social impacts of the projects identified? Were the capacities of executing agencies properly considered when the project was designed? Was the project document clear and realistic to enable effective and efficient implementation? Were the partnership arrangements properly identified and the roles and responsibilities negotiated prior to project implementation? Were counterpart resources (funding, staff, and facilities) and enabling legislation assured? Were adequate project management arrangements in place? Were lessons from other relevant projects properly incorporated in the project design? What factors influenced the quality-at-entry of the project design, choice of partners, allocation of financial resources etc.? Were any design weaknesses mentioned in the Project Review Committee minutes at the time of project approval adequately addressed?

**Project implementation and management.** This includes an analysis of implementation approaches used by the project, its management framework, the project's adaptation to changing conditions and responses to changing risks including safeguard issues (adaptive management), the performance of the implementation arrangements and partnerships, relevance of changes in project design, and overall performance of project management. The evaluation will:

- (a) Ascertain to what extent the project implementation mechanisms outlined in the project document have been followed and were effective in delivering project milestones, outputs and outcomes. Were pertinent adaptations made to the approaches originally proposed?  
Evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of project management and how well the management was able to adapt to changes during the life of the project.  
Assess the role and performance of the teams and working groups established and the project execution arrangements at all levels.  
Assess the extent to which project management responded to direction and guidance provided by the UNEP Task Manager and project steering bodies including the NCCs.  
Identify operational and political / institutional problems and constraints that influenced the effective implementation of the project, and how the project tried to overcome these problems.

**Stakeholder participation, cooperation and partnerships.** The Evaluation will assess the effectiveness of mechanisms for information sharing and cooperation with other UNEP projects and programmes, external stakeholders and

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<sup>24</sup> Stakeholders are the individuals, groups, institutions, or other bodies that have an interest or 'stake' in the outcome of the project. The term also applies to those potentially adversely affected by the project.

partners. The term stakeholder should be considered in the broadest sense, encompassing both project partners and target users of project products. The TOC and stakeholder analysis should assist the evaluators in identifying the key stakeholders and their respective roles, capabilities and motivations in each step of the causal pathways from activities to achievement of outputs, outcomes and intermediate states towards impact. The assessment will look at three related and often overlapping processes: (1) information dissemination to and between stakeholders, (2) consultation with and between stakeholders, and (3) active engagement of stakeholders in project decision making and activities. The evaluation will specifically assess:

- (a) the approach(es) and mechanisms used to identify and engage stakeholders (within and outside UNEP) in project design and at critical stages of project implementation. What were the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches with respect to the projects' objectives and the stakeholders' motivations and capacities?
- (b) How was the overall collaboration between different functional units of UNEP involved in the project? What coordination mechanisms were in place? Were the incentives for internal collaboration in UNEP adequate?
- (c) Was the level of involvement of the Regional, Liaison and Out-posted Offices in project design, planning, decision-making and implementation of activities appropriate?
- (d) Has the project made full use of opportunities for collaboration with other projects and programmes including opportunities not mentioned in the Project Document<sup>25</sup>? Have complementarities been sought, synergies been optimized and duplications avoided?
- (e) What was the achieved degree and effectiveness of collaboration and interactions between the various project partners and stakeholders during design and implementation of the project? This should be disaggregated for the main stakeholder groups identified in the inception report.
- (f) To what extent has the project been able to take up opportunities for joint activities, pooling of resources and mutual learning with other organizations and networks? In particular, how useful are partnership mechanisms and initiatives to build stronger coherence and collaboration between participating organisations?
- (g) How did the relationship between the projects and the collaborating partners (institutions and individual experts) develop? Which benefits stemmed from their involvement for project performance, for UNEP and for the stakeholders and partners themselves? Do the results of the projects (strategic programmes and plans, monitoring and management systems, sub-regional agreements etc.) promote participation of stakeholders, including users, in environmental decision making?

**Communication and public awareness.** The evaluation will assess the effectiveness of any public awareness activities that were undertaken during the course of implementation of the project to communicate the project's objective, progress, outcomes and lessons. This should be disaggregated for the main stakeholder groups identified in the inception report. Did the project identify and make use of existing communication channels and networks used by key stakeholders? Did the project provide feedback channels?

**Country ownership and driven-ness.** The evaluation will assess the degree and effectiveness of involvement of government / public sector agencies in the project, in particular those involved in project execution and those participating in NCCs:

- (a) To what extent have Governments assumed responsibility for the projects and provided adequate support to project execution, including the degree of cooperation received from the various public institutions involved in the project?

How and how well did the project stimulate country ownership of project outputs and outcomes?

[Any other project-specific questions]

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<sup>25</sup> [If the ProDoc mentions any opportunities for collaboration with other projects and programmes, present these here in the footnote]

**Financial planning and management.** Evaluation of financial planning requires assessment of the quality and effectiveness of financial planning and control of financial resources throughout the project's lifetime. The assessment will look at actual project costs by activities compared to budget (variances), financial management (including disbursement issues), and co-financing. The evaluation will:

- (a) Verify the application of proper standards (clarity, transparency, audit etc.) and timeliness of financial planning, management and reporting to ensure that sufficient and timely financial resources were available to the project and its partners;
- (b) Assess other administrative processes such as recruitment of staff, procurement of goods and services (including consultants), preparation and negotiation of cooperation agreements etc. to the extent that these might have influenced project performance;

Present the extent to which co-financing has materialized as expected at project approval (see Table 1). Report country co-financing to the project overall, and to support project activities at the national level in particular. The evaluation will provide a breakdown of final actual costs and co-financing for the different project components (see tables in Annex 4).

Describe the resources the project has leveraged since inception and indicate how these resources are contributing to the project's ultimate objective. Leveraged resources are additional resources—beyond those committed to the project itself at the time of approval—that are mobilized later as a direct result of the project. Leveraged resources can be financial or in-kind and they may be from other donors, NGO's, foundations, governments, communities or the private sector.

Analyse the effects on project performance of any irregularities in procurement, use of financial resources and human resource management, and the measures taken by UNEP to prevent such irregularities in the future. Determine whether the measures taken were adequate.

**Supervision, guidance and technical backstopping.** The purpose of supervision is to verify the quality and timeliness of project execution in terms of finances, administration and achievement of outputs and outcomes, in order to identify and recommend ways to deal with problems which arise during project execution. Such problems may be related to project management but may also involve technical/institutional substantive issues in which UNEP has a major contribution to make.

The evaluator should assess the effectiveness of supervision, guidance and technical support provided by the different supervising/supporting bodies including:

- (a) The adequacy of project supervision plans, inputs and processes;  
The realism and candour of project reporting and the emphasis given to outcome monitoring (results-based project management);  
How well did the different guidance and backstopping bodies play their role and how well did the guidance and backstopping mechanisms work? What were the strengths in guidance and backstopping and what were the limiting factors?

**Monitoring and evaluation.** The evaluation will include an assessment of the quality, application and effectiveness of project monitoring and evaluation plans and tools, including an assessment of risk management based on the assumptions and risks identified in the project document. The evaluation will assess how information generated by the M&E system during project implementation was used to adapt and improve project execution, achievement of outcomes and ensuring sustainability. M&E is assessed on three levels:

- (a) *M&E Design.* The evaluators should use the following questions to help assess the M&E design aspects:  
Arrangements for monitoring: Did the project have a sound M&E plan to monitor results and track progress towards achieving project objectives? Have the responsibilities for M&E activities been clearly defined? Were the data sources and data collection instruments appropriate? Was the time frame for various M&E activities specified? Was the frequency of various monitoring activities specified and adequate?  
How well was the project logical framework (original and possible updates) designed as a planning and monitoring instrument?

SMART-ness of indicators: Are there specific indicators in the logframe for each of the project objectives? Are the indicators measurable, attainable (realistic) and relevant to the objectives? Are the indicators time-bound?

Adequacy of baseline information: To what extent has baseline information on performance indicators been collected and presented in a clear manner? Was the methodology for the baseline data collection explicit and reliable? For instance, was there adequate baseline information on pre-existing accessible information on global and regional environmental status and trends, and on the costs and benefits of different policy options for the different target audiences? Was there sufficient information about the assessment capacity of collaborating institutions and experts etc. to determine their training and technical support needs?

To what extent did the project engage key stakeholders in the design and implementation of monitoring? Which stakeholders (from groups identified in the inception report) were involved? If any stakeholders were excluded, what was the reason for this? Was sufficient information collected on specific indicators to measure progress on HR and GE (including sex-disaggregated data)?

Did the project appropriately plan to monitor risks associated with Environmental Economic and Social Safeguards?

Arrangements for evaluation: Have specific targets been specified for project outputs? Has the desired level of achievement been specified for all indicators of objectives and outcomes? Were there adequate provisions in the legal instruments binding project partners to fully collaborate in evaluations?

Budgeting and funding for M&E activities: Determine whether support for M&E was budgeted adequately and was funded in a timely fashion during implementation.

*M&E Plan Implementation.* The evaluation will verify that:

the M&E system was operational and facilitated timely tracking of results and progress towards projects objectives throughout the project implementation period;

PIR reports were prepared (the realism of the Task Manager's assessments will be reviewed)

Half-yearly Progress & Financial Reports were complete and accurate;

Risk monitoring (including safeguard issues) was regularly documented

the information provided by the M&E system was used during the project to improve project performance and to adapt to changing needs.

## **9. The Consultants' Team**

For this evaluation, the evaluation team will consist of one consultant. The consultant should have experience in project evaluation. A Master's degree or higher in the area of environmental sciences or a related field and at least 15 years' experience in environmental management, with a preference for specific expertise in the area of biosafety and biodiversity is required.

By undersigning the service contract with UNEP/UNON, the consultants certify that they have not been associated with the design and implementation of the project in any way which may jeopardize their independence and impartiality towards project achievements and project partner performance. In addition, they will not have any future interests (within six months after completion of the contract) with the project's executing or implementing units.

## **10. Evaluation Deliverables and Review Procedures**

The evaluation team will prepare an **inception report** (see Annex 2(a) of TORs for Inception Report outline) containing a thorough review of the project context, project design quality, a draft reconstructed Theory of Change of the project, the evaluation framework and a tentative evaluation schedule.

It is expected that a large portion of the desk review will be conducted during the inception phase. It will be important to acquire a good understanding of the project context, design and process at this stage. The review of design quality will cover the following aspects (see Annex 7 for the detailed project design assessment matrix):

Strategic relevance of the project  
Preparation and readiness;



Financial planning;  
M&E design;  
Complementarity with UNEP strategies and programmes;  
Sustainability considerations and measures planned to promote replication and up-scaling.

The inception report will present a draft, desk-based reconstructed Theory of Change of the project. It is vital to reconstruct the ToC *before* most of the data collection (review of progress reports, in-depth interviews, surveys etc.) is done, because the ToC will define which direct outcomes, drivers and assumptions of the project need to be assessed and measured – based on which indicators – to allow adequate data collection for the evaluation of project effectiveness, likelihood of impact and sustainability.

The inception report will also include a stakeholder analysis identifying key stakeholders, networks and channels of communication. This information should be gathered from the Project document and discussion with the project team. See annex 2 for template.

The evaluation framework will present in further detail the overall evaluation approach. It will specify for each evaluation question under the various criteria what the respective indicators and data sources will be. The evaluation framework should summarize the information available from project documentation against each of the main evaluation parameters. Any gaps in information should be identified and methods for additional data collection, verification and analysis should be specified. Evaluations/reviews of other large assessments can provide ideas about the most appropriate evaluation methods to be used.

Effective communication strategies help stakeholders understand the results and use the information for organisational learning and improvement. While the evaluation is expected to result in a comprehensive document, content is not always best shared in a long and detailed report; this is best presented in a synthesised form using any of a variety of creative and innovative methods. The evaluator is encouraged to make use of multimedia formats in the gathering of information eg. video, photos, sound recordings. Together with the full report, the evaluator will be expected to produce a 2-page summary of key findings and lessons.

The inception report will also present a tentative schedule for the overall evaluation process, including a draft programme for the country visit and tentative list of people/institutions to be interviewed.

The inception report will be submitted for review and approval by the Evaluation Office before the any further data collection and analysis is undertaken.

**The main evaluation report** should be brief (no longer than 40 pages – excluding the executive summary and annexes), to the point and written in plain English. The report will follow the annotated Table of Contents outlined in Annex 2. It must explain the purpose of the evaluation, exactly what was evaluated and the methods used (with their limitations). The report will present evidence-based and balanced findings, consequent conclusions, lessons and recommendations, which will be cross-referenced to each other. The report should be presented in a way that makes the information accessible and comprehensible. Any dissident views in response to evaluation findings will be appended in footnote or annex as appropriate. To avoid repetitions in the report, the authors will use numbered paragraphs and make cross-references where possible.

**Review of the draft evaluation report.** The evaluation team will submit a zero draft report to the UNEP EO and revise the draft following the comments and suggestions made by the EO. Once a draft of adequate quality has been accepted, the EO will share this first draft report with the Task Manager, who will alert the EO in case the report would contain any blatant factual errors. The Evaluation Office will then forward the first draft report to the other project stakeholders for their review and comments. Stakeholders may provide feedback on any errors of fact and may highlight the significance of such errors in any conclusions. It is also very important that stakeholders provide feedback on the proposed recommendations and lessons. Comments would be expected within two weeks after the draft report has been shared. Any comments or responses to the draft report will be sent to the UNEP EO for collation. The EO will provide the comments to the evaluation team for consideration in preparing the final draft report, along with its own views.

The evaluation team will submit the final draft report no later than 2 weeks after reception of stakeholder comments. The team will prepare a **response to comments**, listing those comments not or only partially accepted by them that could therefore not or only partially be accommodated in the final report. They will explain why those comments have

not or only partially been accepted, providing evidence as required. This response to comments will be shared by the EO with the interested stakeholders to ensure full transparency.

**Submission of the final evaluation report.** The final report shall be submitted by Email to the Head of the Evaluation Office. The Evaluation Office will finalize the report and share it with the interested Divisions and Sub-programme Coordinators in UNEP. The final evaluation report will be published on the UNEP Evaluation Office web-site [www.unep.org/eou](http://www.unep.org/eou).

As per usual practice, the UNEP EO will prepare a **quality assessment** of the zero draft and final draft report, which is a tool for providing structured feedback to the evaluation consultants. The quality of the report will be assessed and rated against the criteria specified in Annex 3.

The UNEP Evaluation Office will assess the ratings in the final evaluation report based on a careful review of the evidence collated by the evaluation consultants and the internal consistency of the report. Where there are differences of opinion between the evaluator and UNEP Evaluation Office on project ratings, both viewpoints will be clearly presented in the final report. The UNEP Evaluation Office ratings will be considered the final ratings for the project.

At the end of the evaluation process, the Evaluation Office will prepare a Recommendations Implementation Plan in the format of a table to be completed and updated at regular intervals by the Task Manager. After reception of the Recommendations Implementation Plan, the Task Manager is expected to complete it and return it to the EO within one month. (S)he is expected to update the plan every six month until the end of the tracking period. As this is a Terminal Evaluation, the tracking period for implementation of recommendations will be 18 months, unless it is agreed to make this period shorter or longer as required for realistic implementation of all evaluation recommendations. Tracking points will be every six months after completion of the implementation plan.

### **11. Logistical arrangements**

This Terminal Evaluation will be undertaken by two independent evaluation consultants contracted by the UNEP Evaluation Office. The consultants will work under the overall responsibility of the UNEP Evaluation Office and will consult with the EO on any procedural and methodological matters related to the evaluation. It is, however, the consultants' individual responsibility to arrange for their travel, visa, obtain documentary evidence, plan meetings with stakeholders, organize online surveys, and any other logistical matters related to the assignment. The UNEP Task Manager and project team will, where possible, provide logistical support (introductions, meetings etc.) allowing the consultants to conduct the evaluation as efficiently and independently as possible.

### **12. Schedule of the evaluation**

Table 7 below presents the tentative schedule for the evaluation.

**Table 7. Tentative schedule for the evaluation**

<b>Milestone</b>	<b>Deadline</b>
Inception Reports	7 August 2015
Evaluation Missions – Tirana, Skopje, Cairo	September 2015
Telephone interviews, surveys etc.	1 September 2015
Zero draft report	5 October 2015
Draft Report shared with UNEP Task Manager	9 October 2015
Draft Report shared with stakeholders	16 October 2015
Final Report	6 November 2015

## MACEDONIA – LIST of PEOPLE MET (04-05-06/11/2015)

NAME	POSITION & INSTITUTION
Ms Marija Calovska	CPB Focal Point, Biosafety Unit of Env. Agency of MOEPP m.caloska@moepp.gov.mk <a href="mailto:marija.caloska@yahoo.com">marija.caloska@yahoo.com</a>
Ms Jasmina Jinovska	Former NOC (2011-2014) <a href="mailto:jasmina.ginovska@gmail.com">jasmina.ginovska@gmail.com</a>
Ms Suzana Popovska	Senior Associate at Food & Vet. Agency (FAV) <a href="mailto:spopovska@fva.gov.mk">spopovska@fva.gov.mk</a>

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Documents consulted during the main evaluation phase:

Macedonia

- Terms of Reference of the Terminal Evaluation
- ROTI - Review of Outcomes to Impact: Practitioners Handbook, 2009, GEF
- UNEP Programme Manual, May 2013
- Project “Capacity Building for the Development of the National Biosafety Framework of Macedonia” (GFL/2328-2716-4B91) and Appendices
- “Biodiversity Assessment for Macedonia”, USAID, 2001
- “National Biosafety Framework”, MNE, GEF, UNEP, 2005
- “FYR Macedonia and the GEF”, from GEF Website, 2012
- GEF website (Macedonia page) <http://www.gefonline.org/Country/CountryProfile.cfm>
- National BCH <https://bch.cbd.int/about/countryprofile.shtml?country=mk>
- European Commission, October 2014, “2014 Progress Report on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”
- Conclusions and recommendations on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia / Communication “Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2014-15”, COM(2014)700 final of 8.10.2014

Global:

- Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB)
- Nagoya – Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
- Bali Strategic Plan for Technology Support and Capacity- building
- Status of capacity-building activities, UNEP/CBD/BS/COP-MOP/5/INF/9, September 2010
- Environment Fund budgets: proposed biennial programme and support budget for 2008–2009, UNEP
- Proposed biennial programme and support budgets for 2010-2011, UNEP
- UNEP Medium-term Strategy 2010–2013, “Environment for Development”
- Proposed biennial programme of work and budget for 2012–2013
- Strategic plan of CPB 2011-20
- A Comparative Analysis of Experiences and Lessons from the UNEP-GEF Biosafety Projects, 2006, UNEP-GEF Biosafety Unit
- Guidance towards Implementation of National Biosafety Frameworks: Lessons Learned from the UNEP Demonstration Projects, 2008, UNEP-GEF Biosafety Unit
- Learning from experience, the global UNEP-GEF BCH Capacity building project, 2008, UNEP-GEF
- Public Participation and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, A review for DfID and UNEP-GEF (IDS)
- An Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, IUCN, 2003
- “Legal Aspects of Implementing the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety “, Cordonier Segger, Perron-Welch, C. Frison, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013

### Project costs and co-financing tables

(last signed Financial Report d in ANUBIS, 12/2013).

#### Project Costs (USD)

Component/sub-component	Estimated cost at design	Actual Cost	Expenditure ratio (actual/planned)
<b>Total</b>	<b>407,000 USD</b>	<b>94,558 USD</b>	<b>23%</b>

#### Co-financing (at 31/12/2013, last financial report in ANUBIS)

Co financing (Type/Source)	IA own Financing		Government		Other		Total		Total Disbursed
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	
- Grants									
- Loans									
- Credits									
- Equity investments									
- In-kind support			236,000	167,655			236,000	167,655	167,655
- Other									
<b>Totals</b>			<b>236,000</b>	<b>167,655</b>			<b>236,000</b>	<b>167,655</b>	<b>167,655</b>

### CV profile Camillo Risoli

Camillo Risoli (Italy, 1953) is a seasoned international expert in rural development and environmental management. He has a long experience (more than 30 years) in the implementation, coordination and management of projects and programs in Africa and Latin America, with different donors and agencies. Capacity and Institution Building for Rural Development is his main area of expertise.

Camillo has worked as an expert, a chief technical adviser and an independent consultant for UN agencies (FAO, UNEP), Bi-lateral Cooperations (SDC – Swiss Cooperation, Italian cooperation, EC Delegations) and for International NGOs. He has been Team Leader in Long-Term Missions in Nicaragua (1980-82), Cape Verde (1986-96), Mozambique (1996-99) and Zimbabwe (2003-2005).

Food Security and Poverty Reduction have been at the core of his professional commitment, through Community-based projects and participatory actions, Organization & training of rural associations, Sustainable land use and agriculture, Partnership strengthening and networking (Public, Private, Civil Society) for decentralised and participatory local development.

Mainstreaming Environmental issues in Pro-Poor Strategies has been a main component of his action, through Soil & water conservation projects, Reforestation and agro-forestry initiatives, Watershed management and land use planning, Sustainable management of natural resources (soil, water, forests and bio-diversity).

Camillo has acquired a robust experience in advising on national policies and strategic planning for rural development, a solid background in PCM (Programme Cycle Management) and strong skills in Project Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E).

Since 2005, he works as an Independent Consultant and has carried out and led relevant Evaluation missions, such as the Mozambique National Action Plan for Food Security (FAO), the LADA Project - Land Degradation Assessment in Drylands - (FAO/UNEP-GEF) in Argentina and China, the Post-Conflict Rural Development in Ivory Coast (FAO/ADB), the setting of the M&E System for FAO/CLCPRO Program (Commission for Locust Control in Western Africa and Maghreb Region), the Biosafety National Frameworks Evaluation (UNEP-GEF) in Kenya, Namibia, Poland, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Mongolia, Bhutan, Lao PDR, the terminal evaluation of the FAO Programme of Food Security through Commercialization in West Africa (Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Senegal, Sierra Leone), the Evaluation of FAO's Decentralization in Latin America & the Caribbean.

Camillo has a graduate degree in Agricultural Sciences, a Post-Graduate Diploma in Environmental Management at London University and a PhD in Adult Education. He has published with FAO training manuals and methodological guides for trainers and extensionists.

## Annex 7: UNEP Evaluation Quality Assessment

Evaluation Title:

Evaluation of three Projects: Capacity Building for the Development of the National Biosafety Frameworks of Albania, Macedonia, Egypt

All UNEP evaluations are subject to a quality assessment by the Evaluation Office. The quality assessment is used as a tool for providing structured feedback to the evaluation consultants.

The quality of both the draft and final evaluation report is assessed and rated against the following criteria:

	UNEP Evaluation Office Comments	Draft Report Rating	Final Report Rating
<b>Substantive report quality criteria</b>			
A. <b>Quality of the Executive Summary:</b> Does the executive summary present the main findings of the report for each evaluation criterion and a good summary of recommendations and lessons learned? (Executive Summary not required for zero draft)	<b>Final report:</b> Good summary		6
B. <b>Project context and project description:</b> Does the report present an up-to-date description of the socio-economic, political, institutional and environmental context of the project, including the issues that the project is trying to address, their root causes and consequences on the environment and human well-being? Are any changes since the time of project design highlighted? Is all essential information about the project clearly presented in the report (objectives, target groups, institutional arrangements, budget, changes in design since approval etc.)?	<b>Draft report:</b> Good overview, changes described and precise presentation of key points. <b>Final report:</b> Same as above	5	5
C. <b>Strategic relevance:</b> Does the report present a well-reasoned, complete and evidence-based assessment of strategic relevance of the intervention in terms of relevance of the project to global, regional and national environmental issues and needs, and UNEP strategies and programmes?	<b>Draft report:</b> Very good and detailed analysis <b>Final report:</b> Same as above	5	5
D. <b>Achievement of outputs:</b> Does the report present a well-reasoned, complete and evidence-based assessment of outputs delivered by the intervention (including their quality)?	<b>Draft report:</b> Detailed assessment <b>Final report:</b> Same as above	5	5
E. <b>Presentation of Theory of Change:</b> Is the Theory of Change of the intervention clearly presented? Are	<b>Draft report:</b> ToC reconstruction of very good quality <b>Final report:</b>	6	6

causal pathways logical and complete (including drivers, assumptions and key actors)?	Same as above		
F. <b>Effectiveness - Attainment of project objectives and results:</b> Does the report present a well-reasoned, complete and evidence-based assessment of the achievement of the relevant outcomes and project objectives?	<b>Draft report:</b> Yes, good assessment <b>Final report:</b> Same as above	5	5
G. <b>Sustainability and replication:</b> Does the report present a well-reasoned and evidence-based assessment of sustainability of outcomes and replication / catalytic effects?	<b>Draft report:</b> Yes all dimensions considered <b>Final report:</b> Same as above	5	5
H. <b>Efficiency:</b> Does the report present a well-reasoned, complete and evidence-based assessment of efficiency? Does the report present any comparison with similar interventions?	<b>Draft report:</b> Yes, but no comparisons <b>Final report:</b> Same as above	5	5
I. <b>Factors affecting project performance:</b> Does the report present a well-reasoned, complete and evidence-based assessment of all factors affecting project performance? In particular, does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used; and an assessment of the quality of the project M&E system and its use for project management?	<b>Draft report:</b> Good analysis <b>Final report:</b>	5	5
J. <b>Quality of the conclusions:</b> Do the conclusions highlight the main strengths and weaknesses of the project, and connect those in a compelling story line?	<b>Draft report:</b> Conclusions highlight key points <b>Final report:</b> Extensive effort to verify possible way forwards in Macedonia and Egypt as both projects presented specific and rather complex challenges	5	6
K. <b>Quality and utility of the recommendations:</b> Are recommendations based on explicit evaluation findings? Do recommendations specify the actions necessary to correct existing conditions or improve operations ('who?' 'what?' 'where?' 'when?'). Can they be implemented?	<b>Draft report:</b> R are targeted and useful and in two case aim at resolving a stalling situation <b>Final report:</b> Same as above	6	6
L. <b>Quality and utility of the lessons:</b> Are lessons based on explicit evaluation findings? Do they suggest prescriptive action? Do they specify in which contexts they are applicable?	<b>Draft report:</b> Lessons are useful and will contribute to the ongoing evaluation of entire biosafety portfolio as well. <b>Final report:</b> Same as above	6	6
<b>Report structure quality criteria</b>			
M. <b>Structure and clarity of the report:</b> Does	<b>Draft report:</b>	5	5



the report structure follow EO guidelines? Are all requested Annexes included?	Very good structure <b>Final report:</b> Same as above		
N. <b>Evaluation methods and information sources:</b> Are evaluation methods and information sources clearly described? Are data collection methods, the triangulation / verification approach, details of stakeholder consultations provided? Are the limitations of evaluation methods and information sources described?	<b>Draft report:</b> Yes good description <b>Final report:</b> Same as above	5	5
O. <b>Quality of writing:</b> Was the report well written? (clear English language and grammar)	<b>Draft report:</b> Good writing style, could increase cross-referencing <b>Final report:</b> Same as above	5	5
P. <b>Report formatting:</b> Does the report follow EO guidelines using headings, numbered paragraphs etc.	<b>Draft report:</b> Good formatting for draft stage <b>Final report:</b> Good formatting overall	5	5
<b>OVERALL REPORT QUALITY RATING</b>		5.2	5.3

The quality of the evaluation process is assessed at the end of the evaluation and rated against the following criteria:

	UNEP Evaluation Office Comments		Rating
<b>Evaluation process quality criteria</b>			
Q. <b>Preparation:</b> Was the evaluation budget agreed and approved by the EO? Was inception report delivered and approved prior to commencing any travel?	Yes, except budget allocation seems to have encountered problems beyond the control of the Evaluation Office which remain unresolved after more than three months, not allowing any payment to the consultant		5
R. <b>Timeliness:</b> Was a TE initiated within the period of six months before or after project completion? Was an MTE initiated within a six month period prior to the project's mid-point? Were all deadlines set in the ToR respected?	Yes, except one country (Egypt) requested a significant extension due to very low rate of expenditure and minimal implementation after 9 years of project activity. This means that the project will now terminate in 6-9 months. A review of the Egypt report will be conducted then.		5
S. <b>Project's support:</b> Did the project make available all required documents? Was adequate support provided to the evaluator(s) in planning and conducting evaluation missions?	Yes		5
T. <b>Recommendations:</b> Was an implementation plan for the evaluation recommendations prepared? Was the implementation plan adequately communicated to the project?	Yes, including several discussions in the case of Egypt and Macedonia		6
U. <b>Quality assurance:</b> Was the evaluation peer-reviewed? Was the quality of the	Yes		5

draft report checked by the evaluation manager and peer reviewer prior to dissemination to stakeholders for comments? Did EO complete an assessment of the quality of the final report?			
V. <b>Transparency:</b> Were the draft ToR and evaluation report circulated to all key stakeholders for comments? Was the draft evaluation report sent directly to EO? Were all comments to the draft evaluation report sent directly to the EO and did EO share all comments with the commentators? Did the evaluator(s) prepare a response to all comments?	Yes		5
W. <b>Participatory approach:</b> Was close communication to the EO and project maintained throughout the evaluation? Were evaluation findings, lessons and recommendations adequately communicated?	Yes		6
X. <b>Independence:</b> Was the final selection of the evaluator(s) made by EO? Were possible conflicts of interest of the selected evaluator(s) appraised?	Yes		5
<b>OVERALL PROCESS RATING: 5.2</b>			

Rating system for quality of evaluation reports

A number rating 1-6 is used for each criterion: Highly Satisfactory = 6, Satisfactory = 5, Moderately Satisfactory = 4, Moderately Unsatisfactory = 3, Unsatisfactory = 2, Highly Unsatisfactory = 1

The overall quality of the evaluation report is calculated by taking the mean score of all rated quality criteria.