



**Final Mid-term Evaluation Report on
UNEP/GEF project GF/4010-07-01 (4960)
Bus Rapid Transit and
Pedestrian Improvements in Jakarta**



Typical TransJakarta Halte

Evaluation Team

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Acknowledgments

The evaluation team conducted many interviews, attended meetings, and met many employees of the busway. The main interviewees are recorded in Annex 8, but the names of many supporting staff and employees are not given. To all those who provided inputs to us in an atmosphere of genuine cooperation, we extend our sincere gratitude. Without them all it would have been impossible to present this report based on rich and detailed information.

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Acronyms

| | |
|-------------------|---|
| <i>BLU</i> | <i>Badan Pelayanan Umum</i> , public service entity |
| BRT | Bus Rapid Transport |
| <i>BUMD</i> | <i>Badan Usaha Milik Daerah</i> , regional government company |
| CEO | Chief Executive Officer |
| CNG | Compressed Natural Gas |
| CSR | Corporate Social Responsibility |
| DGEF | Division of GEF Coordination (in UNEP) |
| <i>DisHub</i> | <i>Dinas Perhubungan</i> , DKI transportation agency |
| <i>DisPU</i> | <i>Dinas Pekerjaan Umum</i> , DKI public works agency |
| <i>DKI</i> | <i>Daerah Khusus Ibukota</i> , special capital region, referring either to Jakarta or to its provincial government |
| <i>DPRD</i> | <i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah</i> , regional parliament, referring to the DKI parliament |
| FY | Financial Year |
| GEF | Global Environment Facility |
| GHG | Greenhouse Gas(es) |
| Gol | Government of Indonesia |
| <i>Halte</i> | Bus Stop |
| ITDP | Institute for Transportation and Development Policy |
| <i>Kemenuh</i> | <i>Kementrian Perhubungan</i> , Ministry of Transportation |
| KPI | Key Performance Indicator |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MoF | Ministry of Finance |
| MoHA | Ministry of Home Affairs |
| MSS | Minimum Service Standard |
| MTE | Mid-term evaluation |
| NGO | Non-government organisation |
| NMT | Non-motorized transport |
| <i>Pergub 123</i> | <i>Peraturan Gubernur nomor 123 tahun 2006</i> , gubernatorial regulation on appointment of busway bus operators in DKI |
| PIR | Project Implementation Report |
| ProDoc | Project Document |
| <i>PT</i> | <i>Perusahaan Terbatas</i> , limited company |
| RPJMN | <i>Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional</i> , national medium term development plan |
| <i>Satpol PP</i> | <i>Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja</i> , regional Law enforcement agency |
| <i>Sekda</i> | <i>Sekretaris Daerah</i> , regional secretary |
| SOP | Standard Operating Procedure |
| TDM | Transport Demand Management |
| TOD | Transport Oriented Development |
| TOR | Terms of Reference |
| UNEP | United Nations Environment Programme |

1 Executive Summary

1.1 The Project

1 This report presents the Mid-term Evaluation (MTE) of the UNEP project entitled “Bus Rapid Transit and Pedestrian Improvements in Jakarta”. The project is funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) under its Strategic Priority 6: Modal Shifts in Urban Transport and Clean Vehicle / Fuel Technologies, within its Operational Programme 11: Promoting Environmentally Sustainable Transport. The global environmental objective of the project is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from urban transportation, by improving a bus rapid transit system and its related facilities.

2 The overall objective of this project is to maximize the effectiveness of Jakarta’s Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) system and use it as a catalyst for urban transport reform in Jakarta and other key Indonesian cities. This is accomplished through two sub-goals / objectives:

- a. Improve Performance of the Jakarta BRT and maximize ridership;
- b. Utilize BRT to build the image of public transport and improve pedestrian facilities, transport demand management, non-motorized transport, and land use options in Jakarta and other Indonesian cities.

3 The project is being implemented by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and executed by the Institute for Transportation and Development Policy (ITDP), an organisation with excellent credentials for such a project. The project is planned for five years, starting in late December 2006, and ending at the end of 2011.

1.2 The Mid-term Evaluation

4 The MTE was conducted in line with the UNEP Evaluation Policy and the UNEP Evaluation Manual. It was carried out by two evaluation consultants, under the overall responsibility of the UNEP Evaluation Office. The Evaluators are both experts in Indonesia, as illustrated in the brief CVs in **Annex 10**. The MTE was prepared between April and August 2010, that is, after the lapse of 70 per cent of project time, when approximately half of the GEF funds had been committed by the project. The MTE has the purpose of assessing the progress of the project, and to make recommendations useful to the continuation and completion of the project.

1.3 Assessment

5 While the Evaluators have rated the project overall as **Moderately Unsatisfactory**, they commend the high degree of political will, managerial skill and advisory competence shown by the Governor of Jakarta and the parliament, the senior government officials involved, and the ITDP project team leader and her staff. The low rating is a reflection of the necessary adaptations to the project that were required to overcome problems of governance and accountability, originating from the period before the project during which the previous Governor launched the BRT in record time.

6 The assessment follows UNEP’s six Project Evaluation Parameters:

- A. **Attainment of objectives and planned results (progress to date):** The Evaluators found that the project is substantially behind the original targets due to an executive decision of the Governor to resolve serious problems he inherited from his predecessor, who had championed speedy development of the first corridors at the sacrifice of good governance and accountability.
- B. **Assessment of sustainability of project outcomes:** The project is considered to be politically and environmentally sustainable, but less so financially or managerially.

There is no question of funds being allocated by the Jakarta government, but the auditor reports that financial reports do not properly record assets, which would be required to determine actual subsidies needed. Management and governance sustainability depends on whether the ongoing reforms are taken further.

- C. **Catalytic role of the project:** The BRT has begun to attract attention of other cities, but needs to show better performance before other cities will wish to emulate it.
- D. **Achievement of outputs and activities:** Performance in each of the nine components of the project is mixed, mainly due to the political decisions referred to above. Most are unsatisfactory.
- E. **Assessment of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems:** The design of the M&E system is weak, but the performance-oriented task manager and project manager produced informative narrative reports that supply the information needed for decision-making.
- F. **Assessment of processes that affected attainment of project results:** The project was well prepared from a technical point of view, but weaker on managerial issues, such as work breakdown, and key performance indicators. Country ownership and provincial ownership is good. UNEP supervision and backstopping is satisfactory, and co-financing is expected to be well over original budgets.

1.4 Recommendations

7 Regrettably, there has been little use of feedback from the planning, design and construction of Corridors 1 to 10; however, with a critical eye much could have been improved. The following technical recommendations are made by the MTE:

Planning and Design Aspects

- a. Future reviews and busway designs should take into account all of the following aspects: (i) optimization of the location of bus stations; (ii) diversions to locations with potential high demand; (iii) provisions for passing lanes at terminals / transit stations; and (iv) adequate attention to the needs of pedestrians / potential bus passengers.
- b. The **designs for Corridors 11 to 14** should be critically reviewed and redesigned, to a higher standard than previous designs. Conceivably, and based on data now available, it might be appropriate to drop and or replace some of the proposed corridors. The design review teams should be multi-disciplinary and include an urban planner / designer.
- c. If **Corridors 9 and 10** are to be ready for operation by early 2011, there is an urgent need to identify what repairs / redesign is required and to tender the required work for quick completion.
- d. Both the Government of Indonesia and the Government of the special capital region (DKI) of Jakarta are currently considering the introduction of an **Electronic Road Pricing** system in Jakarta. The Evaluators firmly support these proposals and suggest that the legal status is quickly clarified and technical proposals developed. A Singapore type system is proposed, however, it might be appropriate to introduce a proven GPS-based system, rather than a gantry controlled system.
- e. The lack of an **Area Traffic Control (ATC) signal system** in Jakarta adversely affects the BRT; it causes delays to buses and the 'bunching' of buses. The main reason for the problems is the excessive cycle times at many signals (> 5 minutes). (The Steering Committee was informed that the proposed ATC system had been

budgeted for next year). It should be designed to facilitate bus priority measures at critical intersections and reduce cycle times to more normal periods (< 3 minutes).

- f. Further work is needed to guarantee 'exclusivity' in some of the corridors, such as the introduction of additional medians, to physically segregate bus and mixed traffic.
- g. Improvements for **pedestrian movement** have only been on protocol roads, and have not been maintained properly. There needs to be a major policy shift to provide safe pathways for pedestrians to reach public transport throughout the city, with an extensive programme to implement that policy.

Problems to be overcome include broken paving, potholes, open drainage and drainage covers, trees and tree stumps, utilities and motor cycles. Additional problems include food stalls, *warung*, touts and beggars.

- h. A **good ticketing system** is needed. DKI¹, including *TransJakarta* with advice from ITDP, should prepare a TOR for the supply of a system, probably similar to the one operating in Seoul. The proposed system must be capable of expansion to cover additional corridors / routes and other transport modes, at reasonable cost. And it must be maintained.

Operational Planning and Maintenance

- i. **Operational Planning** for the bus operators should be based on additional and better analysed data. For example, *TransJakarta* should have accurate data on passenger flows, exiting passengers, multi-corridor trips and bus journey times.
- j. Possibly, and in an attempt to reduce queues and delays, **some routes should be modified**. For example, on Corridor 1 during peak periods it might be appropriate to stop (and reverse) some northbound buses at Bank Indonesia, and southbound buses at HI Roundabout. Conceivably, this might be difficult but it should be tried.
- k. It is difficult to find your way around the BRT Busway network, due to a lack of appropriate signage and passenger information. **Much better audio, visual and signing** is proposed and it is suggested that the onboard 'Passenger Information System' and the LED Display are made better or replaced. (The Steering Committee was advised that the systems were now 95 per cent operational, following the introduction of additional checks.)
- l. The Traffic Police have recently agreed to 'police' the bus lanes; hence, they are currently cooperating. In the same spirit, they should be requested to, at least, **shorten cycle times on signals** that adversely affect the BRT.
- m. The BRT operates both single and articulated buses; possibly it would be more appropriate and efficient to operate the **articulated buses on high demand routes**, and the single buses on low demand routes. If necessary, some bus stations should be modified / extended.
- n. Vehicle maintenance would appear to be relatively good, however, many **air conditioning systems** should be improved and better maintained repaired, and **shock absorber systems** should be replaced, in the interests of passenger comfort.

Other Aspects

¹ The acronym DKI either refers to the special capital region of Jakarta or to its government.

- o. Government of Indonesia proposals to increase the **tax on changed ownership papers is NOT supported**, as it will discourage people from making the changes, which will jeopardise the operation of the Electronic Road Pricing system.
- p. **Advertising** is currently not a feature of the BRT, however, most systems of the world include much advertising and receive considerable revenues from it. It is suggested that advertising might be appropriate on the outside and inside of the buses, and the bus stations / halte. **Advertising should be coordinated with the signing proposals.**
- q. Consider transferring **management of on-board security** staff to the bus operators. Change security uniforms to be more conspicuous. (The Steering Committee was informed that there were proposals to adopt the busway orange red as a standard).
- r. *TransJakarta* and performance partners should assure **routine bridge cleaning, and regular footpath maintenance.**

8 Much effort has been placed on overcoming the governance problems left behind by the way the BRT was first organised. However, this has been directed more to the implementation of regulations from the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA), rather than a critical understanding of the principles of modern public management. The following institutional matters have been recommended:

- a. **Institutional set up:** In order to assure successful conversion of *TransJakarta* into a high performing regional government company (BUMD), the Governor should immediately commence a head-hunt for a highly competent performance-oriented Chief Executive Officer of the BUMD, to be responsible for its development and transition. This person should NOT take responsibility for managing the BRT until the conversion to BUMD is complete, when the operations are handed over by the current management.
- b. **Non-BRT Feeders:** In order to assure effective replanning of feeder services, DKI should consider that bus-routing and licensing be undertaken by an ad hoc group, led by someone capable of coordinating vested interests and negotiating settlement of differences. The overall task could be managed by the DKI Regional Development Planning Agency.
- c. **Development of new corridors:** In order to assure maximum long-term benefit from BRT, DKI should immediately adopt a policy that all new roadways must be designed firstly to improve public transport, and secondly to improve private transport. DKI should also prepare its *Rencana Induk Lalu Lintas dan Angkutan Jalan*, Traffic and Transportation Master Plan (RILLAJ) as soon as possible, and amend spatial planning to suit.
- d. **Expansion of Corridors to Neighbouring Cities:** ITDP should study the benefits of cross-border corridors, linking to the existing network, and potential arrangements for interregional cooperation with neighbouring administrations.
- e. **Financial Sustainability:** It is imperative that DKI should immediately transfer assets to *TransJakarta* as called for by the auditors and report the full extent of subsidies provided to it. DKI, with ITDP assistance, should immediately develop policies similar to public service obligation (PSO) for determining appropriate levels of subsidy, based on the value to the community of reducing dependence on private transport and reducing greenhouse gases. Also DKI should hand over authority to *TransJakarta* to gain revenue from advertising.
- f. **Institutional and Governance Sustainability:** DKI should fully implement medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) practices in line with national policy.

DKI should adopt Best Value principles to help introduce continual improvement in all its service agencies, and *TransJakarta* should apply the principles of Best Value in its management. DKI should require that all its programs have Detailed Work Plans (*perincian rencana kerja*, PRK) to complement working budget documents (DPA), as an aid to coordination of implementation of busway activities. *TransJakarta* should immediately prepare for multi-year contracting of all operational contracts.

- g. **Stakeholder Participation and Public Awareness:** In the review of Corridors 11-14, make the most obvious design improvements, then conduct public consultations, in compliance with environmental control legislation, and make final improvements to the design based on the feedback from the public.
- h. **Monitoring and Evaluation:** With the changes planned for the project, the M&E system should be redesigned with improved work breakdown structure and improved indicators of progress and performance in each component.

9 Most of the recommendations above are directed towards DKI, rather than to UNEP or ITDP; many cannot be completed in the remaining time of the project. A no-cost **extension** to the project should only be agreed if DKI and ITDP can illustrate the benefits during immediate replanning of the remaining period.

10 Since the completion of the draft of this report, the BRT has constantly been in the news. In order to assist public debate and help promote advocacy for reforms, this report should be made public by DKI, and a translation published as soon as possible.

2 Introduction and Background

2.1 Introduction

11 This report presents the Mid-term Evaluation (MTE) of the UNEP project entitled “Bus Rapid Transit and Pedestrian Improvements in Jakarta”. The project is funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) under its Strategic Priority 6: Modal Shifts in Urban Transport and Clean Vehicle / Fuel Technologies, within its Operational Programme 11: Promoting Environmentally Sustainable Transport.

12 The project is being implemented by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and executed by the Institute for Transportation and Development Policy (ITDP), an organisation with excellent credentials for such a project. The project is planned for five years, starting in late December 2006, and ending at the end of 2011.

13 The MTE was conducted, in line with the UNEP Evaluation Policy and the UNEP Evaluation Manual, by a 2-person consultants’ team in the period from April to August 2010, under the overall responsibility of the UNEP Evaluation Office. The Evaluators are both experts in Indonesia, as illustrated in the brief CVs in **Annex 10**. The MTE was carried out after the lapse of 70 per cent of the project duration, leaving only one full budget year before the end of the project to carry through the recommendations of the MTE. However, only about 50 per cent of the GEF funding has been committed so far, enabling a greater intensity of effort during the remaining period, or a no-cost extension to the project.

14 The present report covers the period from July 2007 to the end of March 2010, but documents from the preparatory phase from 2005 to 2006 have also been widely used to capture the context in full.

15 The full Terms of Reference (TOR) for the MTE are attached as **Annex 1**.

2.2 Project Background

16 Preliminary planning for the Jakarta BRT System commenced in 2001 but was given a major boost in 2003, after the then Governor of Jakarta visited Bogota and was impressed with the BRT in that city. Following his visit, the Governor instructed his staff to complete the design and to implement the first corridor. In February 2004 the *TransJakarta* Busway began revenue operations along a 12.9 km corridor from Blok M, South Jakarta to Kota Railway Station, North Jakarta. The corridor passes through Jakarta’s city centre and along two of Jakarta’s most congested roads. The BRT was constructed in an unprecedented 9 months, at a cost of some US\$ 2 million / kilometre.

17 Following the success of the BRT in the first corridor, a further two corridors were constructed which became fully operational by April 2006. Corridors 2 and 3 link Pulogadang in East Jakarta with Harmoni, and Kalideres in West Jakarta with Harmoni, Central Jakarta, respectively.

18 Four more operational corridors were added to the Busway network by April 2007. Corridor No. 8, which links Lebuk Bulus in South Jakarta with Harmoni, and passes through Pondok Indah, a relatively exclusive suburb of Jakarta, was introduced in 2008. Two further Corridors, Nos. 9 and 10, were also constructed in 2008 but are still not operational, due to legal constraints and a lack of buses.

19 Most of the buses on Corridor 1, the original Busway corridor, are diesel powered but almost all of the remaining buses are Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) powered, the environmentally preferred option. Currently, the busway fleet includes some 385 single buses and 23 articulated buses. The single buses have a capacity of some 85 persons and the articulated buses some 160 persons. Approximately 90 per cent are operational.

20 The Busway stations provide elevated platforms to ensure quick boarding and alighting. In most cases the stations are connected to the sidewalks, by a pedestrian bridge and ramps, providing relatively easy access to the stations.

21 The number of passengers carried increased from 16 million in 2004 over 39 million in 2006 to 95 million in 2009. The increases were due to a number of factors, the principal one being more city coverage due to new lines, but also due to time efficiency and reliability.

22 ITDP became involved in the Jakarta BRT Busway Project in late December 2006, after most of the corridors had been planned and many of them implemented.

2.3 Project Design

23 The global environmental objective of the project is to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from urban transportation, by improving a bus rapid transit system and its related facilities. The overall objective of this project is to maximize the effectiveness of Jakarta's Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) system and use it as a catalyst for urban transport reform in Jakarta and other key Indonesian cities. This is accomplished through two sub-goals / objectives:

- a. Improve Performance of the Jakarta BRT and maximize ridership;
- b. Utilize BRT to build the image of public transport and improve pedestrian facilities, transport demand management, non-motorized transport, and land use options in Jakarta and other Indonesian cities.

24 Apart from bus rapid transit, the project explicitly supports the development of non-motorized transportation systems and infrastructure, transit oriented development and transportation demand management, to reduce use of private motor vehicles. Improvements in these areas will provide critical complements to BRT development, and together form the tools to achieve a long-term, sustainable shift to less GHG emitting forms of transportation.

25 The design was documented in the Project Document (ProDoc), and agreed between UNEP, the focal point in the Government of Indonesia (GoI) for the GEF, and the government of the special capital region (DKI²) of Jakarta. The design was supplemented by a number of feasibility and supporting studies. ITDP was the executing agency of the project, and appointed a project director to oversee the whole project, and a project manager to manage the UNEP inputs and to work with DKI and GoI on the project's objectives.

26 A Steering Committee (SC) was established to oversee progress and to recommend policy to overcome issues. The SC only deals with matters related to DKI, matters related to GoI are overseen by meetings between the Project Manager and the head of urban transport in the Ministry of Transport (*Kemenhub*).

27 The work is organised in nine components, as indicated in section 4.4, with activities, milestones and indicators identified for each. **Annex 11** provides an analysis of perceived risks.

28 The ProDoc includes a budget for UNEP-GEF funding, and co-financing components, largely the contribution by DKI for developing new corridors and operating and improving the BRT system.

2.4 Project Partners

29 ITDP, as the executing agency of the project for UNEP, works with an array of partners, described in the following paragraphs. *TransJakarta* is the main player, as the BRT operating agency in Jakarta; it is at present an accounting entity of the DKI government.

² The acronym DKI either refers to the special capital region of Jakarta or to its government.

30 DKI is a special autonomous region headed by an elected Governor. Indonesia, as a unitary state, is divided into autonomous regions that have rights of self management of affairs prescribed by laws and government regulations. The Governor and the regional representative council (DPRD) define provincial policy by regional regulation, which the governor implements as head of the regional government. The Governor has an elected Vice Governor, and a number of appointed Deputy Governors covering specific areas, whose authority is defined by the Governor. The Deputy Governor for Industry and Transportation takes a direct interest in the BRT, and has acted as the DKI contact person for this MTE.

31 The administration of government is headed by a Regional Secretary, through whom all provincial entities report, including *TransJakarta*. The Regional Secretary is assisted by a number of Assistant Secretaries, the Assistant for the Economy being responsible for coordinating transport (including *TransJakarta*), and Assistant for Development and Environment responsible for public works and spatial planning. The Secretariat is divided into bureaus, with the bureau for organisation, bureau for law, and bureau for urban infrastructures and facilities providing services to the project.

32 There are a number of operating entities of DKI who share different aspects of the BRT operations: the transportation agency (*DisHub*) responsible for transportation and traffic, the public works agency (*DisPU*) responsible for roads and other municipal works, the cleaning agency (*Dinas Kebersihan*) for general cleansing services, and the parks and burial grounds agency (*Dinas Pertamanan*) for street greening programs. The regional regulation enforcement agency (*Satpol PP*) works with the national police on traffic control.

33 Development planning of the city is coordinated by the regional development planning agency (*Bappeda*) which has a key role in preparations for multi-year planning and annual budgeting. And the finance agency (*BPKD*) acts as the chief financial officer.

34 The heads of the above offices are represented in the project Steering Committee, along with the chairperson of the Transportation Council, a government-community advisory committee on all matters related to transportation and traffic.

35 The regional tax office (*Dispenda*) currently manages all city advertising.

36 At the national level, the project maintains links with the Ministry of Transportation (*Kemenhub*), particularly the Directorate for Urban Transportation, and the National Planning Board (*Bappenas*), particularly in relation to BRT programs in other cities. It also liaises with the Focal Point for the GEF in Indonesia, within the Ministry for the Environment.

2.5 Project History

37 As quite frequently happens in innovative projects, there were delays in starting the programme. After less than two years, there was a change in ITDP leadership, with the appointment of a new Team Leader with strong commitment to the BRT, and an understanding of the issues at hand. She has assembled a competent and enthusiastic team and works cooperatively yet assertively with project counterparts.

38 The original BRT was established by a Governor with determination to get it up and running. The project inherited a system that had built-in institutional and governance problems. Shortly after commencement, there was a change of Governor in the first ever direct election of a governor of Jakarta. The new Governor is pro-transportation and pro-BRT, but he determined that priority should be given to resolving the governance problems, and delayed expansion of the network, including the procurement of buses for Corridors 9 and 10 where construction of facilities had already been contracted. The key governance problems are almost resolved and the principles set out for the remaining issues. Thus the Evaluators anticipate a decision to return to implementing the full programme.

3 Scope, Objective and Methods of this Evaluation

3.1 Objective and Scope of the MTE

39 The objective of the MTE is to enable the Implementing Agencies, Executing Agencies and other stakeholders to assess the progress in delivery of project outcomes and, based on this assessment, to take decisions on the future orientation and emphasis of the project during its remaining time. The review focuses on progress of implementation of planned project activities and outputs, against actual results to-date and, as far as possible, establishes the initial project outcomes and sustainability. The risks to achievement of project outcomes and sustainability are also appraised.

40 The evaluation has assessed the overall implementation success of the project, focussing on the following six clusters of evaluation parameters:

- A. Attainment of objectives and planned results (progress to date);
- B. Assessment of sustainability of project outcomes;
- C. Catalytic role;
- D. Achievement of outputs and activities;
- E. Assessment of monitoring and evaluation (M & E) systems; and
- G. Assessment of processes that affected attainment of project results.

3.2 Methods and Limitations

41 The MTE was conducted as an in-depth evaluation using a participatory approach. The UNEP / GEF Task Manager was kept informed and regularly consulted throughout the evaluation. The Evaluators made a desk study of a very large number of documents to provide documented evidence, conducted interviews of selected stakeholders and NGOs (as noted in **Annex 8**), made field trips on each of the BRT corridors, and attended Steering Committee meetings.

42 Specifically, the evaluation considered the documents listed in **Annex 9** List of Documents Reviewed, including following documents:

- a. The project documents, outputs, monitoring reports (such as progress and financial reports to UNEP and GEF, annual Project Implementation Review Reports) and relevant correspondence.
- b. Notes from the Steering Committee meetings.
- c. Other project-related material produced by the project staff or partners, including the outcomes of partnership meetings.
- d. Material published on the ITDP web-site (www.itdp-indonesia.org) and other sites.

43 The Evaluators were able to meet with almost all of the persons identified in the TOR as desirable people to meet. The only notable exceptions were the DKI Jakarta Governor and the Head of the City Council Committee overseeing transportation, who were unavailable at the time of field visits. The Evaluators did not have a formal meeting with ORGANDA, the public transport operators association, but met with senior office-holders when meeting bus operators. We deferred a formal meeting with media editors, having excellent information from ITDP and NGOs on the perspective and interests of the press. SwissContact and Walhi Jakarta were two NGOs named in the TOR that did not attend the arranged meeting as they are no longer actively involved with the busway.

44 The Evaluators rode all of the current busways, at various times of day, weekday and weekend, and were able to witness personally many of the benefits, constraints and problems of the system. We were not able to stop over at every station, nor to visit each corridor at all periods (early morning, am peak, daytime off peak, pm peak and night-time).

However, the Evaluators were able to identify many features not previously mentioned in the documents and press clippings.

45 The Evaluators presented their draft findings and recommendations to a specially convened Steering Committee Meeting in late June 2010. This extraordinary meeting allowed for a broad discussion of the main findings and recommendations of the evaluation with key project partners. A week later, the Governor of Jakarta was briefed by the UNEP Task Manager on the findings and recommendations of the MTE. In addition to comments received during these high-level meetings, written feedback was obtained from the UNEP Task Manager and ITDP. The evaluation team has finalized the report taking into account stakeholder comments as appropriate.

4 Project Performance and Impact

4.1 Introduction

46 While the Evaluators have rated the project overall as **Moderately Unsatisfactory**, they commend the high degree of political will, managerial skill or advisory competence shown by the Governor of Jakarta and the parliament, the senior government officials involved, and the ITDP project team leader and her staff. The lower rating is a reflection of the necessary diversion of the project to overcome problems of governance and accountability created when the previous Governor enthusiastically started the BRT in record time. It is even more a reflection of the limitations of the current Indonesian bureaucratic system which is incapable of changing any public service entity into a highly performance-oriented community-responsive one, without the extensive bureaucratic reforms only now being prioritised by the national government.³

47 Most of the leaders, senior managers and advisers who were met during the MTE appear to be eager for change. Indeed the SCM to discuss the draft MTE report broadly accepted the recommendations therein. The minutes of this meeting are reported in **Annex 14**. The greatest challenge now is to institutionalise this eagerness, so that institutions promote continual improvement, supplanting the obsession to have everything defined by a standard or a regulation.

48 Project performance is assessed and discussed under the six Project Evaluation Parameters defined by UNEP and the GEF. Each parameter (in some cases, sub-parameters) is rated on a six-point scale from very satisfactory (6) down to very unsatisfactory (1). Ratings are summarized in Table 5.1, Section 5.

4.2 Attainment of Objectives and Planned Results

49 The following paragraphs refer to the work done by DKI and ITDP as their advisers, and the impact of their efforts towards attainment of planned results.

4.2.1 Overall

50 While the project on paper lags behind in its progress towards its objectives, conditions are being established that can lead to a significant increase in the rate of development. Certain decisions on the BRT that were made prior to the project commencement resulted in accusations of corruption and exposure to sanctions from the national government over procurement and aspects of financial management. There were many changes to the project to support the Governor in addressing these governance issues. Narrative from PIR reports and steering committee meeting minutes indicates these changes were both requested and

³ The Evaluators here refer to the bureaucratic reform programme defined in Chapter 1 of the President's Medium Term Development Plan of January 2010.

agreed. There are some aspects of this agreement that seem not to have been formally approved, as indicated by minor differences in the terminology of Components 1 and 2 and description of milestone between the PIR and ITDP reporting, as mentioned in paragraph 276 below. Baseline indicators on overall performance are given in the project documentation (number of corridors and length of BRT line, numbers of buses and passengers), but key performance indicators on many of the individual components are not so well documented.⁴

51 The indicator of outcome most important to GEF, the impact of the BRT on production of GHG, is still a proxy indicator. As noted in the 2009 PIR, it still does not include any savings from passengers converting from more wasteful public transport modes to the BRT. Outcomes of interest to DKI are more clearly identified, and while progress is evident, much more progress should be anticipated in the coming two years: *TransJakarta* should be strong institutionally, and all citizens should know how to use the BRT. This should lead to more passenger demand on more corridors with more buses. BRT Jakarta should then be a relevant model for other cities in Indonesia.

52 The components of the project described in section 4.4 below are all relevant, but Component 4 on optimising busway operations is far too broad for a single component. It was divided into seven subcomponents to help structure the assessment.

4.2.2 Effectiveness

53 The project to date has been far from effective, if measured on the basis of originally planned outputs and outcomes. The first goal of the project, namely to improve performance of the Jakarta BRT and maximize ridership, is still significantly short of the targets in the ProDoc, but greater than was anticipated without the operation of Corridors 11-14 that still have to be developed. If effectiveness is measured on the basis of its capacity to adapt to unforeseen conditions, then the project to date must be assessed as effective on this first goal, as finding correct institutional arrangements is a prerequisite to a sustained improvement in performance of the Jakarta BRT. There is no doubt that the change of policy requested by the Governor was appropriate. An assessment of long-run effectiveness must be tentative until the performance of new institutional arrangements can be measured.

54 On the second goal, namely to utilize BRT to build the image of public transport and improve pedestrian facilities, transport demand management (TDM), non-motorized transport (NMT), and land use options in Jakarta and other Indonesian cities, the programme has been less effective than it should have been. Partially, this is because of the impact of the problems in reaching the first goal, partially because of the major investment needed on improving road pavements that had not been considered earlier, and partially because of a UNEP decision to limit efforts in other Indonesian cities, while there were serious doubts about the national institutional framework.

55 It is encouraging to see that commercially available maps of Jakarta⁵ show the BRT, but disappointing that DKI's new draft spatial plan does not consider land use implications as considered important under this goal.

Assessment and rating on effectiveness

56 If the Evaluators based the assessment of effectiveness merely on technical improvement of performance of the BRT, as defined in the ProDoc, a rating of moderately unsatisfactory would reflect both the modest achievements made, and the many shortcomings. But considering the responsiveness of the project to help DKI resolve

⁴ The Evaluators' comments on the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) in ProDoc are to be found in the section on Monitoring and Evaluation.

⁵ For example <http://www.streetdirectory.co.id/indonesia/jakarta/>

governance issues, to the point that now the project is capable of significant improvement, a rating of **Moderately Satisfactory** is given.

4.2.3 Relevance

57 The project is highly relevant to the people of Jakarta. All alternative options for transportation improvements in Jakarta have narrower impact, are far more expensive than the Busway, and will be slower to implement.

58 It has been critically relevant to the DKI government, which has been dependent on the project to resolve its BRT governance problems, and produce solutions to a wide range of technical problems.

59 The project remains highly relevant to GEF strategic programming. It was designed during the GEF-3 replenishment period (2002-2006), under Strategic Priority 6: Modal Shifts in Urban Transport and Clean Vehicle / Fuel Technologies, corresponding to Operational Programme 11: Promoting Environmentally Sustainable Transport. Currently, under the GEF-IV replenishment period, the project fits under the Climate Change Focal Area, and is in particular aligned with Strategic Long-term Objective 8: To facilitate market transformation for sustainable mobility in urban areas leading to reduced GHG emissions and the corresponding Strategic Programme 5: Promoting sustainable innovative systems for urban transport. All alternative options for transportation improvements in Jakarta have narrower impact and are far more expensive than the Busway, making the project potentially one of the most relevant climate change initiative in Jakarta. The Jakarta BRT project contributes to the GEF Programme, as one of its basic aims is to attract passengers to the BRT, which on seven (7) out of eight (8) corridors uses compressed natural gas (CNG), rather than oil-based fuels. In particular, it is expected to attract passengers that are currently using private vehicles (cars and motor cycles) or traditional buses, many of which are slower, inefficient, old and polluting.

60 The project is also relevant to the UNEP in general. Indonesia, with its extensive forests, problems of forest burning, large coal extraction, and opportunities to develop alternative energy, is a major partner with UNEP in many ways. Support for making the BRT, being urban-based, gives the overall UNEP effort in Indonesia a more direct impact on people.

Assessment and rating on relevance

61 The project is highly relevant to responding congestion in Jakarta, and thus to climate change. It is rated **Highly Satisfactory**.

4.2.4 Efficiency

62 On the basis of the efficiency of BRT over all alternative options for transportation improvements, the project should be considered highly efficient.

63 The UNEP contribution now stands at slightly over US \$ 2.5 million, while the overall BRT programme in Jakarta is almost US \$ 200 million, a ratio of slightly over 1 per cent. For an entity making significant improvements in performance, this is a relatively small amount to spend on R&D.

64 The project has engaged good national consultants, so that international consultants can be utilised only on focussed inputs, again proving to be efficient. However, a few components and activities have required slow and persistent effort, and others that have had more effort expended on them than potentially necessary. Higher expenditure caused by delays cannot be assessed as inefficiency, as effort has been redirected to other activities to improve effectiveness.

Assessment and rating on efficiency

65 The Evaluators find that the project has been reasonably cost-effective, finding no less-cost alternatives to most activities. The extensive goodwill and project knowledge in the project team makes continuation of the project as it is organised the least cost option for the future. A rating of **Satisfactory** is given.

66 The efficiency of operations of the BRT is a different story. The original directly-appointed bus operators are highly inefficient, and there are few built-in systems in *TransJakarta* to improve its efficiency. Recommendations in this report address this issue.

Overall assessment and rating on Attainment of Objectives and Planned Results

67 While the evaluators have given a high rating for relevance and satisfactory rating for efficiency, the Evaluators considered the negative factors behind the Moderately Satisfactory rating for effectiveness too significant to raise the overall rating for Attainment of Objectives and Planned Results above **Moderately Satisfactory**.

68 While the project on paper lags behind in its progress towards its objectives, conditions are being established that can lead to a significant increase in progress towards objectives in the final 18 months of the project.

4.3 Sustainability

69 The following paragraphs identify variables affecting sustainability of BRT in Indonesia and barriers to sustaining the intended outcomes.

4.3.1 Financial Sustainability

70 DKI has greatly increased its planned investment in the BRT, such that by the end of 2009 it had almost reached its co-financing target in the original plan, despite having not proceeded with Corridors 11-14. This is mainly due to pavement improvements, and to a lesser degree *Halte* improvements on Corridor 1.

71 The BRT obtains finances from a number of sources. *TransJakarta* as the operating entity is funded from ticket sales and DKI subsidy. The DKI transportation agency (*DisHub*) obtains funds from the DKI budget for (i) the purchase of buses and design and building of facilities, (ii) purchase and operation of traffic signals and signs, (iii) traffic control personnel, and (iv) maintenance of bridges and ramps. The DKI public works agency (*DisPU*) also obtains funds from the DKI budget, for construction and maintenance of bus-lanes. The regional regulation police force (*Satpol PP*) obtains funds from the DKI budget for traffic control personnel, and the national traffic police obtain funds from the national budget and other sources. The DKI cleansing agency funds cleaning of bridges but not *Halte*. Smaller contributions are made by a range of co-financing partners as discussed elsewhere.

72 *TransJakarta* is managed in a financially unsustainable way. It does not have control over the resources needed to be performance-oriented (see also comments in 4.2.3), and hence cannot make economic and financial decisions on asset management.

73 Fare increases depend on decisions of the provincial parliament (DPRD), which has not agreed to increase fares for some years. However, it has accepted to subsidise the BRT. ITDP currently projects that the subsidy may reduce to zero within a few years, on the basis of



TransJakarta bus passing slower private vehicles

certain assumptions. These are (a) a reasonable increase in the number of passengers on all corridors, (b) a 40 per cent increase in the standard fare (from Rp 3,500 to Rp 5,000 per trip) and elimination of the cheaper fare (Rp 2,000) in the early morning, and (c) a decrease in expenditures as the expensive contracts of directly-appointed consortium bus-operators expire, and are replaced by cheaper contracts based on open tenders.

74 BRT receives several other subsidies in addition to the *TransJakarta* budget subsidy, but are not recorded, and not included in the ITDP projection. These are capital items procured by other agencies for *TransJakarta*, and include the procurement of buses (for the operators of corridors 1, 9 and 10), bus stops, terminals (including ramps and overpasses), and road works (which in 2009 represent about 30 per cent of total expenditure). The value of these subsidies will be exposed once the BRT implements financial management reforms required by law.

75 *TransJakarta* does not have control over advertising, which could generate substantial income. There is no advertising on or in buses, and the limited advertising on and in *Halte* and terminals are controlled by the DKI revenue agency, who do not consult with *TransJakarta*.

Assessment and rating on financial sustainability

76 ITDP-prepared projections indicate financial sustainability, but these do not take into account full disclosure of assets and subsidies, potential revenue from advertising, unsatisfied demand and the need for additional investment. Despite potentials for improved revenue-generation, there is a risk that the DPRD will raise objections when the full extent of subsidies is revealed. However, a well prepared study of the public benefits from eased

congestion and reduction in GHG can justify substantial subsidy to motivate travellers to change from private to public transportation. The Evaluators therefore consider that financial sustainability of the BRT should be rated **Moderately Likely**.

77 The Evaluators were unable to assess financial sustainability of BRT outside of Jakarta.

4.3.2 Socio-political Sustainability

78 In the first few years, there was considerable public resistance to the Busway in Jakarta, especially by private vehicle users. Anticipating political resistance, the Governor at the time avoided parliamentary approval by using emergency funds. It is this decision that is the root of most of the governance problems the new Governor has had to address in the past two years.

79 Now there is a clear high level of public acceptance, despite a mediocre performance which generates much criticism. Surveys indicate a willingness to pay a significantly higher fare. The increased efforts in public relations are critically important, not directly to attract more passengers, but to provide better value in the service provided. The most important action for increasing the number of passengers is to increase capacity – more buses, more articulated buses, more corridors, and faster service.

80 There is also high political acceptance. The current Governor is openly supportive; he has made transportation his priority for his remaining term of office, and requests ITDP to keep him informed of progress of the project. DPRD is perhaps reluctantly supportive, approving a subsidy each year, but aware that the BRT is more efficient than other public transport options. The national police also now officially support the BRT by keeping the bus-lane clear of other traffic.

81 The DKI bureaucracy does not yet willingly accept changes needed for an effective BRT. The recently-drafted town plan for the next 20 years makes little reference to it (as reported later). Resistance to governance and public management reform for the BRT is reported in 4.2.3 below.

82 National policy on BRT is weak. The recently-passed national medium-term development plan (RPJMN) makes no direct mention of it, referring to a transportation plan yet to be made available. Thus there is no clear compulsion yet on larger cities to provide BRT. However, the national government is working with ten urban areas to promote integrated transportation, and a number of these (particularly Tangerang and Pekanbaru) are working towards dedicated busways. These cities have formed a common forum for mutual help. Several other donors support BRT, particularly GTZ (*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit*, aid organisation of the Republic of Germany) and IndII-AusAID (Indonesia Infrastructure Initiative of the Australian Agency for International Development), and ITDP plays a leading role in a donor forum on urban transportation.

83 The Evaluators are informed that policy is being introduced to require regional governments to prepare Transportation Master Plans (RILLAJ), that are to include plans for pedestrian links to improved public transport. These plans will need to relate to spatial plans. Nationwide, local government spatial plans are in the final stages of approval, and these new plans most likely will need to be updated when RILLAJ have been completed.

84 The traffic and transport law only permits the national government to provide exclusive busway lanes and pedestrian facilities on national roads. This affects corridors 9 and 10 in Jakarta, which have been built by DKI, not the central government, without formal agreement.

Assessment and rating on socio-political sustainability

85 The BRT has overcome substantial negative political opinion, and is now an accepted feature of Jakarta transport. The Evaluators would have given a higher rating of “Satisfactory” if DKI had paid greater attention to passenger demand, passenger complaints, community advocacy and continual improvement, and if it had been more consistent on BRT in its own planning documents. The Evaluators thus only give a **Moderately Likely** rating.

86 The leadership of DKI intends to improve and expand the BRT, with political and community support. But sustainability depends on the BRT being included in the transportation master plan (in preparation) and the town plan currently being debated by the DPRD.

87 Progress is slow on developing BRT outside of Jakarta. The Evaluators expect the government to introduce policies shortly to help promote BRT in ten selected cities. ITDP is well-placed to expand its efforts outside of Jakarta, with good links with the Ministry of Transportation and the regional governments of the ten cities considering BRT.

88 There is a risk of legal problems and bureaucratic obstruction to BRT along national roads, as long as there is no specific guideline on how to share planning and management.

4.3.3 Institutional and Governance Sustainability

89 Jakarta BRT started with very little institutional sustainability in 2003. The Governor declared an emergency, so that he could use emergency conditions to access available funds and to directly appoint contractors. He avoided DPRD budget approvals and did a deal with bus operators plying Corridor 1. These actions were taken before a new national institutional framework for public service enterprises (BLU) was introduced from 2006-2008. Much of the effort of ITDP over the past three years has been directed towards advising DKI on making BRT institutionally sustainable, using this new framework. DKI has decided now to incorporate the BLU into a provincial publicly-owned company (BUMD), and is setting up a committee of senior public servants to manage the transition. As a BUMD *TransJakarta* will be able to employ professionally qualified management and staff, rather than be bound by the rules of the civil service.⁶

90 DKI and *TransJakarta* management practices are not consistent with evolving public management policy in Indonesia. To accord with this evolving policy, the head of the transportation agency (*DisHub*), as the official responsible to the governor for public transport, should regulate the BRT, but this role is not yet defined. His agency still makes decisions that limit the performance of the BRT, especially regarding investment. *TransJakarta* does not have control over the resources needed to be performance oriented (as reported in 4.2.2). Other agencies make many decisions that limit performance. Thus it is not clear who is responsible for BRT performance.

91 There is no DKI reporting on the implementation of the project. Each agency reports their own element of the work but these reports are not consolidated into a report on the performance of the BRT and efforts to improve it.

92 The regional development planning agency (Bappeda) is responsible for coordinating planning. The planning and budget framework inadequately identifies the work that supporting agencies perform for the BRT. The provincial secretariat is responsible for coordinating implementation, but there is no requirement for agencies to prepare detailed work plans that can be used as the basis for such coordination. DKI has adopted multi-year budgeting, without yet adopting the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) approach that is constructed to drive continual improvement.

⁶ While many positions are currently filled by people without appropriate qualification, it is noteworthy that those responsible for financial management are qualified accountants, a rare finding in Indonesian regional government.

93 *DisHub* has returned to purchasing BRT buses from the DKI budget, contrary to international public management principles, due to an inappropriate diagnosis of the problems of private operators buying them. It maintains a regulation on procurement of bus-operator services (Pergub 123) that is contrary to national procurement policy. It provides “annual contracts” for ticketing and security services, tendering each year after budgets are approved, and ending contracts before the end of each financial year; thus several thousand employees are employed on short term contracts for about seven months a year, and directly by *TransJakarta* for five. ITDP has given appropriate advice on all these matters, but has not yet found a means of communicating the fundamental need for reform.

94 It would appear that the planning of *TransJakarta* uses some of scientific models and findings produced by the project, but prefers to “learn by doing”. Learning by doing is the most sustainable way, but in the case of BRT Jakarta, this has been slow and inefficient, due to a reluctance or inability to identify past mistakes and avoid repeating them.

Assessment and rating on institutional and governance sustainability

95 While the basic governance structure being adopted for the BRT complies with national policy and some best international practice, many other practices are unsustainable. With disbursed responsibility over BRT decisions, there is no clear accountability for performance. The head of *TransJakarta* needs to be responsible and accountable for all aspects of performance. The head, senior managers and critical officers need to be professionally competent.

96 The head of *DisHub*, as the chief operating officer responsibility for transportation, should clearly be responsible and accountable for regulating the BRT on behalf of the governor, without interfering with operations.

97 DKI should prepare a regular consolidated report to the Governor (to present to the DPRD) on the overall progress of the project, covering the contributions of all participating agencies.

98 DKI has not yet fully implemented budgetary reforms, in particular the medium term expenditure framework (MTEF) that helps to drive performance. The management style of *TransJakarta* is rule-bound, rather than performance-oriented. Planning, budgeting and procurement practices need to assure continual improvement of performance.

99 Activities related to the BRT that cannot be transferred to *TransJakarta* need to be identified in the budget structure as a separate sub-programme to enable effective coordination and deliberation of the draft budget by DPRD. Each agency contributing to the performance of BRT needs prepare a detailed work plan that can be used by the Secretariat as the basis of coordination.

100 Many aspects of improving public enterprises are bound by wider bureaucratic inertia. Success depends on recognition for reform and change of work culture. These factors were recognised in the project document, but were given inadequate attention.

101 The change in culture is from “following regulations” to “serving in accordance with regulations”, and is well-summarised in the principles of Best Value in **Annex 12**. Improvement of public services, as indicated in the fourth principles, requires the ability to compare cost and performance standards in order to assure that the best value of service is provided to the community.

102 The sustainability of current institutional framework and governance deserves to be rated as “Unlikely.” But DKI has laid the foundations for institutional sustainability, and the Governor is committed to reforms based on modern public management principles. The difficulty of introducing such reforms has to be recognized, and thus the Evaluators give a **Moderately Likely** rating only.

4.3.4 Environmental Sustainability

103 The BRT is justified because of its inherent environmental sustainability, by shifting of daily trips from private motor vehicles to BRT, by reducing congestion, and reducing energy consumption that will result in reduced emissions of GHG. This positive impact of BRT is curtailed, because most buses currently travel far and queue long hours for gas supply, and because of regular and sporadic congestion. The Evaluators, without the benefit of scientific analysis, anticipate that as much as 20 per cent of energy consumed may be wasted.

104 The BRT also has failed to improve pedestrian access to public transport, necessary to assure safety of passengers between the BRT and their origin / destination.

Assessment and rating on environmental sustainability

105 Although the project is essentially environmentally sustainable, the wastage caused by gas refuelling problems and traffic congestion, and lack of attention to safety of passengers between BRT and origin / destination, has resulted in a rating of **Moderately Likely**.

Overall rating on Sustainability

106 An overall rating of **Moderately Likely** is given for sustainability.

4.4 Catalytic Role

107 Being catalytic in an extremely bureaucratic environment is not easy. The project has had little catalytic effect so far, but in several small ways has set an example to others. *TransJakarta* and ITDP consultants have become models for BRT in Indonesia, with ITDP gaining the respect of other larger donors and consultants. ITDP is to be commended in the way in which they communicate their professionalism and enthusiasm. The public relations team have successfully created a small following of businesses that support BRT and NMT as part of their corporate public responsibility programs. The work-ethic of ITDP staff has been an example to *TransJakarta* that several interviewees referred to. ITDP's legal adviser has now been hired directly by *TransJakarta* to assist on a range of legal issues.

108 Unfortunately, improvement to Plaza Fatahillah, which is a model of well-designed pedestrian space, has not been replicated, although widely appreciated. A new approach to piloting pedestrian accesses to the busway is proposed in this report.

4.5 Achievement of Outputs and Activities

109 The following assessment of achievement of outputs and activities is organised according to the nine components of the project. Activities of *TransJakarta*, DKI and ITDP are included to the extent that they are relevant to the objectives of this MTE.

110 As a summary observation, the Evaluators have found the quality of the inputs of ITDP good by international standards and excellent by Indonesian standards. Also the competence and receptiveness to change of the officials of *TransJakarta* and DKI in general is commendable. They work in a government system that is highly resistant to change. Any criticism in the following pages should be considered as the contribution of the Evaluators to help DKI with ITDP support under the project, to make these most difficult reforms.

Rating on Achievement of Outputs and Activities

111 The assessment of achievement in each component concludes with a rating. Despite ITDP's good performance, the rating given to most of the components is unsatisfactory, leading to an **Unsatisfactory** rating for parameter D.

4.5.1 Develop BRT Corridors 4-14 (Component 1)

112 **Scope of component:** In ITDP reports this component is entitled “Optimize route selection for Corridors 7-14”, though milestones are set for implementation of Corridors 4-7, 8-11 and 11-14.

113 According to a Technical Report by Pedro Alvaro Szasz in December 2008,⁷ the Jakarta BRT has been established faster than almost any other BRT in the world, both in terms of length and number of corridors. However, in terms of the passengers carried and capacity of the system, the same report is less complimentary.

114 Corridor 1 was developed first, followed by Corridors 2 and 3, with the innovations of 1½ doors and CNG fuel. These were developed prior to the design of the project. Corridors 4 to 7 were developed between 2004 and 2006, basically on schedule. They were included in the design of the project, but had commenced operation before the project had been established. The designs are very consistent and, except for changing bus lane construction type, these corridors learnt little from the earlier designs and construction. The problems of the designs, and limited effort to optimise the design, are discussed in section 4.4.4 below.

115 Corridors 8, 9 and 10 infrastructure was completed in 2008. Again the designs are very similar to the earlier corridors. Corridors 9 and 10 are still not operating, partly because of a lack of buses. The Evaluators found significant vandalism of the idle facilities, and there is an urgent need to identify what repairs are required to Corridors 9 and 10, and to arrange for the repairs to be undertaken.

116 The design of buses to be introduced for the opening of Corridors 9 and 10 are based on a new design and specification prepared by ITDP, in association with *TransJakarta*. As such, it is expected that the buses will incorporate good features from previous buses and not include less desirable features. Which buses should operate on which routes needs to be reviewed analytically and carefully. The introduction of articulated buses on relatively low demand routes is counter-productive. Whereas, the introduction of articulated buses on a high demand route, such as Corridor 1, would increase capacity considerably. The number of buses being procured does not comply with ITDP recommendations, as ITDP recommended more articulated buses.

117 It is understood that *DisHub* have recently tendered for these buses and that agreement in principle has been reached with respect to the single buses, and that the articulated buses have been retendered (*the first tender included insufficient bidders*). Hence, it should be possible to commence operations on these routes in early 2011.

118 Facilities for Corridors 11 to 14 have also already been designed; the designs would seem to be similar to existing designs, and the same problems as exist on the current corridors can be anticipated on the new ones.

Special Problem: Future BRT Corridors

119 The project was not designed to consider any new corridors. The project focuses only on corridors planned in 2003, and there has been no review of them or examination of potential new corridors.

120 The Governor has recently submitted a draft town plan to DPRD for approval. This includes some Transport Oriented Development (TOD), but none of it is BRT-oriented. In addition, it does not include expansion of the BRT, although BRT-related TOD and extension of the busway into surrounding regions were specifically mentioned in the ProDoc. The Governor’s transportation policy includes BRT, and he maintains personal interest in it, but

⁷ Szasz, Pedro Alvaro. Jakarta report (following April 2008 visit and modelling results). December 2008.

the priority is for rail, MRT, monorail and private vehicles, all shown in the draft spatial plan.

121 Two new elevated roads have been planned. As they are reputedly planned, each misses an excellent opportunity for improving the BRT. One proposed elevated road goes from the end of Jl Sudirman to Blok A, and for about 1/3 of this distance, it follows BRT Corridor 1, where it could be designed to extend Corridor 1, and avoid the congestion at the Trunojoyo / Sisingamangaraja intersection. The other goes from Tanah Abang to Matraman, crossing Corridors 1, 6, 7, 10 and 14, and leading into Corridor 11, and with a short extension would connect to the Harmoni terminal. It is thus an ideal location for BRT a new corridor that would improve the interconnectivity with other Corridors.

122 The spatial planning agency defers such matters to *DisHub* which has not yet started to prepare an update to its transportation master-plan.⁸ There are large sections of the city beyond the service area of BRT. Only about one third of the major arteries bringing traffic over the city boundary have a BRT corridor leading to the boundary.

123 The only cross-boundary BRT corridor that can possibly be completed in the time remaining for the project is one proposed by the city of Tangerang leading to Kalideres terminal. ITDP and the Ministry of Transport (Kemenhub) have assisted in discussions between Tangerang and DKI, but no agreement has been reached on integrating the two systems. Many other cross-boundary corridors can be planned in the remaining time, linking with existing Corridors 4 and 6, 7, 9, 11 and 13.

Assessment and rating on Component 1

124 It would appear that *DisHub* has largely ignored the recommendations of ITDP in the design of corridors, while accepting input on bus design. The failure to learn from experience in design of facilities, and the failure to look at the need for new corridors, results in an **Unsatisfactory** rating from the Evaluators.

125 If considerably more planning is undertaken prior to completion of the design drawings of Corridors 11-14, learning from past experience, and if changes can be made to the two proposed viaducts mentioned above, some real improvements to the overall BRT system might still be possible during the remainder of the project.

4.5.2 Optimize Fare System for Corridors 1-14 (Component 2)

126 **Scope of component:** In ITDP reporting, this component is entitled “Estimate Demand and Design Needs for Corridors 7-14” and it is divided into the following milestones:

- *TransJakarta* becomes a legal entity able to control fare revenue in Year 2;
- Fare system control mechanisms implemented in Year 3; and
- Competitive tender for fare system and bus operations implemented in Year 4.

127 The Evaluators retain the same scope as the ProDoc, that is, Optimize Fare System for Corridors 1-14. This section 4.4.2 examines the fare system and also the management of the existing ticketing system and cash collection. (The problems of legal entity and contracting of ticketing services are reviewed in section 4.4.4.)

128 Currently, there are three ticketing systems operating on the BRT. The reason that there are three systems is complex and involves historical decisions that were not necessarily well researched and or transparent. On Corridor 1, for example, passengers pay the fare and are given a blank plastic (non-specific and un-numbered) ‘ticket’, which they insert into a turnstile at the entry to the station. The ‘ticket’ is then returned to the ticket sales locket and

⁸ The government regulation on transportation master planning should be released in coming months.

reused for a later passenger. On some other corridors, passengers by a paper ticket, from the locket, or even from a ticket sales person standing on the platform.

129 *TransJakarta* would like to introduce a new system covering all current corridors and be capable of expansion to cover any added corridors. In March 2010 staff from DKI, *TransJakarta* and ITDP visited Seoul, South Korea, to attend a 'United Nations Forum on Climate Change, Mitigation, Fuel Efficiency and Sustainable Urban Transport'. While in Seoul the staff visited the Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) to meet and discuss with the SMG their electronic ticketing system, and related transport issues. Also at the meeting was T-Money, the brand name of the Korea SMART Card Co. Ltd (KSCC), the company which owns and operates the ticketing system. In summary, the staff was impressed with the system and believes that something similar is required for the BRT.

130 When a new system is introduced, it will need better management than *TransJakarta* provides for the existing ticketing system. Turn-stiles at the Harmoni terminal have not been repaired for many months; such failure in management of an electronic ticketing system could lead to collapse of the system.

131 The Evaluators were provided two versions of cash collection practices and were not able to verify which one is correct. In both versions, money is collected at each *Halte* in a cash tray and put into a money bag at the end of each shift, which is tagged with respect to the station where the money was collected, and how much is in the bag is identified on a separate manifest. Twice a day the money is collected by a security van company hired by *TransJakarta's* Bank, Bank DKI. The security company guards open each bag, count the money, and inform *TransJakarta* of how much was found in each bag. They then reclose the bag and transport the cash to the Bank. What happens if there are differences between the cashier and bank records is not known.

132 In the first version, the security van goes round the circuit of each corridor starting at one point at the end of the first shift, and at a different point at the end of the second shift, collecting the money from each *Halte*. This version, from one of the consultants, would have the security guards driving outside of the busway in slower traffic, and parking at the side of the road at each *Halte*, to walk over the bridge to collect funds, a slow and vulnerable process.

133 In the second version, the security van only goes to two nominated *Halte* at the end of each shift. The cashiers from the other stations transport their cash to these designated collection points, using an in-operation bus. This version, from one of the *TransJakarta* managers, does not appear to be a reliable or safe way to collect and transport the cash received. It is not known if there have been any burglaries related to this mode of collection.

134 In an attempt to ensure that honesty prevails at the ticketing points, *TransJakarta* have introduced CCTV cameras at most stations, so that they can observe the number of passengers using the Busway, which they then check off against the number of tickets issued / money collected over the same period. Observations using the CCTV are reputedly random and the ticketing staff is unaware of when they are being observed. Discrepancies between revenues collected and passengers entering the system are highlighted and, according to *TransJakarta*, the ticketing Sub-contractor is fined. Staff who repeatedly under-record the numbers of passengers entering the system are dismissed.

135 As mentioned elsewhere in this report, *TransJakarta* and project partners (*for example, YKLI*) have undertaken a variety of public opinion and socio-economic surveys with respect to the BRT. In addition, *TransJakarta* and ITDP collect media reports and articles. A common compliant in surveys and the press relates to possible corruption and or misappropriation of cash received from ticket sales. The system lacks transparency and the public's fears are

understood. Interestingly, one of the public's concerns with respect to the Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) proposals is also 'what are the Government going to do with the revenues collected'.

Assessment and rating on Component 2

136 The existence of three different and relatively simple ticketing systems on the BRT is undesirable. The project has already studied possible systems in detail, and has identified what is required. It is envisaged that the new system will reduce the potential for corruption and will provide *TransJakarta* with some of the data required to make better operational plans. Priority should be given to agreeing to, and introducing, the most appropriate system for the BRT. If DKI waits to introduce a common rail-bus ticketing system, there is a risk of long delays. Conceivably, the new system might be introduced on Corridors 9 and 10.

137 Irrespective of the system adopted, there will be a need to have a cash collection system, and there is a need to develop a much better and more secure system than currently prevails.

138 The effort put into research and design on ticketing systems is commendable, making this an exceptional component to receive an evaluation of **satisfactory**.

4.5.3 Improve Intersection Performance for BRT (Component 3)

139 In the 1980's DKI Jakarta had a state of the art Area Traffic Control (ATC) system for the central area; however, that system was incapable of expansion to cover a bigger area and two other ATC systems were acquired, to cover areas outside of the central area. Such systems require continuous maintenance and repair, which for a variety of reasons was not available, and, ultimately, all of the systems fell into disrepair and no longer function as Area Traffic Control (ATC) systems. Now traffic signals operate as stand alone signal sets and do not link with, or relate to, adjacent signals. That is, there is no coordination.

140 According to convention, traffic signal cycle times have a maximum length of about 180 seconds, normally the cycle time is about 140 seconds, which is divided up proportional to traffic flows on the various links. Originally, when the ATC systems were working, that was the norm in DKI Jakarta. Today, this norm no longer applies and most traffic signals are manually adjusted and the cycle time on many critical intersections exceeds 5 minutes (300 seconds), with the green times heavily in favour of the main road. Hence, traffic on any less important road often has to wait a relatively long time, before it can enter the main road. There are many examples, but an especially critical one is the Sisingamangaraja-Trunojoyo junction, where traffic from Trunojoyo has to wait 5 minutes or more, and up to five buses from the Blok M terminal, where the proposed headway is slightly more than 1 minute, are forced to wait, forming a bunch of buses.

141 Nominally, the bus lanes give maximum priority to buses, as the lanes are taken up to the intersection, thereby passing queuing traffic. However, currently, there are few bus priority measures, and everybody is forced to wait. Under the present circumstances, *TransJakarta* and apparently *DisHub* can do nothing technically to improve the prevailing situation, and they need again to plead with the Traffic Police to reduce the cycle time and to agree to give priority to BRT buses, when they are observed to be waiting. The Traffic Police have recently indicated that they are prepared to enforce the banning of mixed traffic, maybe they would also be prepared to assist buses at intersections?

142 *DisHub* has prepared a new ATC system for DKI Jakarta but, to date, budgeting has not been approved to implement the system. Reputedly, bus priority measures have been included in this system. (The June Steering Committee was informed that budget is expected to be available for 2011).

143 The project has worked on a number of proposals for the redesign of specific intersections, including proposals for BRT-only over-passes or under-passes.

Assessment and rating on Component 3

144 The failure to make any progress for over three years on this component, despite serious efforts, results in a rating of **Unsatisfactory**. The only solution, pending the arrival of a new ATC system, is to plead with the Traffic Police for shorter cycle lengths.

145 While the Evaluators were unable to review the actual ATC proposals, it is assumed that the proposed system will be based on conventional practice and the basic aims of the system will be to optimize traffic movements and minimize delays to all road users. It is also assumed that the system will be based on real time traffic data and that it will be possible to introduce bus priority measures, which can give priority to busway traffic.

146 As stated elsewhere in this Report, the current traffic control system does not even coordinate / integrate adjacent traffic signals and many are manually controlled by the police, who tend to give unrealistic priority to selected roads, and ignore other road and or public transport needs. It is also possible to manually override most ATC systems, but a little more difficult, and it is hoped that those that would interfere can be convinced that in the interests of the overall system they should not attempt to control individual traffic signal sets. For sure, it will be possible to identify / monitor controllers that are interfered with in the Central Control room.

4.5.4 Optimize Busway Operation (Component 4)

147 In the documentation, there is no work breakdown structure (WBS) of what constituted busway operation. The performance outcomes defined for this component are (i) increased average speed, (ii) reduction of fleet downtime to reduce operating costs, and (iii) reduction in fuel consumption. In order for the assessment to cover the full range of activities undertaken, this section is organised under the following subheadings:

- Optimise design
- Optimise operational planning and operations management
- Optimise maintenance
- Optimise financial management
- Optimise governance
- Special problem: natural gas supply

Optimize Design

148 **BRT System.** The design of the BRT system has changed little since the introduction of the first corridor in 2003, and the agencies involved in design are also the same. Agencies and include the Transportation Agency (*DisHub*) which is responsible for *Halte* planning and design, including pedestrian overbridges and ramps, bus terminal design, and bus design; and the Public Works agency (*DisPU*) which is responsible for the planning, design and construction of the bus lanes, adjacent roadways and footpaths. The parks and cemeteries agency (*Dinas Pertamanan*) plays a minor role in the design, sometimes being responsible for footpaths and the 'greening' of the bus station environs.

149 The original concept for the BRT was developed following a visit to similar systems in South America. Initially, three corridors were planned, but the plan for fifteen corridors was developed soon after construction of Corridor 1.

150 Many Local Consultant firms have been involved in the planning and design of the BRT, however, their briefs would appear to have been very similar and the designs are consistent. Regrettably, it would appear that little has been learnt by examining the initial designs, other than increasing the number of doors on buses and *Halte*, and providing a new *Halte* at Merdeka Barat that has improved bus transfer considerably. For example, it would appear that optimization of the location of a bus station (*Halte*) is often not given a high priority, diversions to locations with potential high demand are not considered, no provision

is made for passing lanes and there is still a lack of attention to the needs of pedestrians. In addition, the potential for Transport Orientated Development (TOD) has not been incorporated into the plans, nor have facilities and priorities for adjusting feeder buses and routes.

151 Examples of the above include the following :

- a. On **Corridor 1**, there is no *Halte* adjacent to the Dukuh Atas Rail Station, so that people from the station have to walk a long way, needlessly.
- b. On **Corridor 4**, the *Halte* at Gambir lacks integration with the rail station; the current *Halte* could be considered temporary while the BRT persists with the rail company for a better interchange. The interchange between the rail and BRT systems at Senin requires a very long walk.
- c. Roadworks in the vicinity of Pulogadung are incomplete, which causes long delays, and neither Corridors 2 nor 4 have a spur to Kelapa Gading (*a major shopping centre and a potential link to the rail loop*).
- d. On **Corridor 3**, there is no *Halte* at Roxy (*a major shopping and commercial centre*); within this corridor, there are long sections without *Halte*, e.g. the elevated road near Dispenda.
- e. On **Corridor 6** there is no connection from Latuharhari to Corridor 1 and the railway network at Dukuh Atas;
- f. On **Corridor 8** the route does not follow the line of greatest demand, i.e. from Pondok Indah to Blok M and Jalan Sudirman, but diverts to what could be part of a separate corridor for Kebun Jeruk, and has a somewhat odd diversion to Tomang; it also has considerable unnecessary mixed traffic. Positively, it does include a fine example of TOD, at Pondok Indah Mall.
- g. On **Corridors 9 and 10**, speeds on the off-ramps and the long ramps when crossing the toll road and or at interchanges is a cause for concern.
- h. On **Corridors 11 to 14**, the design drawings do not appear to be always based on on-site conditions, some of the roads are relatively narrow, and no attempt appears to have been made to resolve the issue of exclusivity of the bus lane or provision of footpaths.

152 ***Halte and Pedestrian Overbridge Planning and Design:*** Another 'planning' problem is the design of *Halte* with respect to current and forecast passenger flows. Related are the widths of ramps to the *Halte* and between terminals at interchanges, and the need to accommodate queues within the *Halte* during peak periods. Reputedly, *Halte* designs are based on a transport model, which forecasts traffic flows. However, the Evaluator's experience suggests that either the model is not particularly accurate and the results cannot be relied upon, or *Halte* have been designed according to standards ignoring the data provided. Modelling of such flows is not easy, especially when there is no historical data, and while attempts should be made to improve the model, it is critical that when the facilities are greatly under-capacity, wider ramps and larger platforms are introduced.

153 Many *Halte* are too narrow, due normally to the restricted width of the central median in which they are located. At such locations, consideration should be given to reducing lane widths or acquiring land.

154 Any works to improve *Halte* should consider that the BRT has become an icon in Jakarta, and would appear to have considerable tourist and showcase potential, if marketed appropriately.

155 **Terminals and Transit Halte:** Regrettably, a feature of many terminals and transit *Halte* is long and sometimes narrow ramps, linking *Halte* that are located far apart. Transport Oriented Design (TOD) should also be a feature of all busier *Halte*, to respond to the demands of passengers for convenience shopping and food. Unfortunately, very few *Halte* have been designed for such demand.

156 Dukuh Atas is expected to become a major transportation hub with the Mass Rapid Transit (MRT), Rail Loop and airport lines, Monorail and the BRT all meeting at this location. If the proposed design, which was designed in a national competition, had properly catered for the busway, three corridors (1, 4 and 6) would have been incorporated in the single building complex. The design merely utilised existing long links to existing *Halte* of these corridors.

157 The Harmoni Terminal is a major hub of the BRT; however, there are faults in the layout of the *Halte* and the exiting arrangements (where bridges are narrow and the staircase is dangerous). These provide opportunities to improve the layout, potentially built by public-private partnership, if TOD is introduced at the same time.

158 The Senin and Matraman transit stations need a design review, including a review of the traffic signal arrangements at these locations. Conceivably, it would be possible to put Corridors 5 and 6 buses on the respective overpasses and develop elevated *Halte*. With respect to queuing, every possible attempt should be made to avoid having the same doors used for more than one bus route (*as currently prevails at Matraman*).

159 The Semanggi transit station should also be reviewed, with a view to reducing ramp lengths. Consideration should be given to creating a single two-level *Halte* right at the bridge for transiting passengers.

160 **Bus Lanes and Adjacent Roadways:** The design and construction of bus lanes has been changed following completion of Corridors 1, 2 and 3, when experience showed that the buses destroyed the flexible pavement relatively quickly. On later corridors, the flexible pavement is replaced with a reinforced concrete pavement, which has proved to be much stronger and capable of withstanding the buses travelling and repeatedly braking on the same alignment. Bus lanes on Corridors 1, 2 and 3 are now being replaced with reinforced concrete. Unfortunately, reconstruction of the bus lanes has created new problems, especially where the levels of the bus lanes have been changed, and different levels prevail either side of the station platforms.

161 The bus lanes are separated from the adjacent roadways by a variety of systems, some permanent and some less permanent. Irrespective, the basic aim is to separate the busway and roadway traffic, thereby creating 'exclusivity' in the bus lane. Exclusivity is the key to the successful operation of the BRT, as it assures much higher capacities and much faster travel speeds. Accordingly, 'exclusivity' is the basic aim, such that the bus lane should be physically separated from the adjacent roadway wherever possible. Some of the current bus lanes have medians that are not continuous, with sections of road with gaps in the median. Unless a gap is necessary, say to accommodate vehicles wishing to turn right, it should be blocked, so as to increase the exclusivity of the bus lane.

162 Another problem is a lack of overtaking lanes. Any *Halte* providing an overtaking lane will significantly increase the capacity of that corridor.

163 **Bus Design:** Initially, the BRT buses only had one door on each side of the bus, and this was quickly found to be a design fault. Subsequently, most of the buses were converted to include 1½ doors on each side but this layout did not work well. The norm now is two (2) doors on single buses and three doors on articulated buses. This lesson was relatively slowly learnt. The latest BRT buses, those for Corridors 9 and 10, are based on a new design and specification prepared by ITDP, in association with *TransJakarta*. As such, it is expected that

the buses will incorporate good features from previous buses and not include less desirable features; for example, they will include folding doors, as sliding doors take longer to close and reduce the width of aisles close to the door. The Evaluators did not review the design to determine whether or not the 'passenger information system', the LED Display and the air conditioning have been improved, or whether there is better signing outside of the bus.

164 The BRT bus fleet includes a large number of single buses and a small number of articulated buses. The buses that are already ordered for Corridors 9 and 10 total 139 vehicles, 25 of which are articulated buses. Which buses should operate on which routes needs to be reviewed analytically and carefully. The introduction of articulated buses on relatively low demand routes is counter-productive. Whereas, the introduction of articulated buses on a high demand corridor, such as Corridor 1, would increase capacity considerably.

165 **Brand imaging:** The original buses on the BRT have already created an image; with most people a good image. Brand imaging is important and some thought should be given as to whether a variety of colour schemes is appropriate or one colour is preferred. It is understood that at a recent YLKI Workshop, the participants favoured one colour, the original red colour currently mainly operating on Corridor 1.

Assessment and rating on optimize design

166 There are a small number of positive improvements in existing Corridors, for example Corridor 1 *halte* have been refitted for articulated buses, and stronger pavements are being laid. The decision to provide stronger pavements was relatively easy; the BRT system was heading for failure unless firm action was taken.

167 But on the whole, as reported under section 4.4.1, planning, design and construction of the BRT system have been consistent, and looks similar, irrespective of location, and little has been done to optimise the design of existing Corridors or facilities.

168 Given that the failure to improve existing facilities reflects insensitivity to the public who are being served, the Evaluators provide an **Unsatisfactory** rating to this aspect of optimizing busway operation.



Brand image of TransJakarta, Page 26

Optimise Operational Planning and Operations Management

169 *TransJakarta* produce an Operational Plan for all corridors / routes on a monthly basis, sometimes on a bi-weekly basis, that includes data on proposed number of buses and headways throughout the day (05.00 to 22.00 hours). The Plans are distributed to bus operators no later than 5 days before the start date. A sample is included in **Annex 13**.

170 Operational Plans are based on knowledge of the total number of buses available and journey times on all corridors, and occasional surveys. The Plans look reasonable on paper, however, in reality they are difficult to prepare because of the variability in the system, especially since the time taken to travel from the starting terminal to the end terminal can vary by a factor of 2 x or more. The fact that the number of buses available is also fixed and insufficient to meet demand also causes some problems in optimizing the Plans.

171 In addition, and according to some of the operators, *TransJakarta* staff does not release buses according to Plan, which can make it difficult for them to plan their operations.

172 *TransJakarta* also plans with respect to security at the stations (*Halte*) and on the buses, and ticketing at stations. *TransJakarta* have appointed contractors under separate contracts, to provide 'security' personnel and 'ticketing' personnel, on a two shift basis. Both 'security' staff and 'ticketing' staff would appear to operate adequately, despite the irregular nature of the contracts reported elsewhere.

173 With respect to the onboard bus 'security' staff, the Evaluators question the need for the staff to be contracted separately from the bus / bus driver, and suggest that maybe it would be simpler to have a packet that includes the bus, the bus driver and the 'security'. Working as a team with the driver, 'security' can help guide drivers to stop closer to the platform, and drivers can support 'security' with difficult problems. With respect to both the 'security' and 'ticketing' staff, and in the interests of both conspicuousness and brand imaging, it is thought that staff uniforms should be smarter and brighter, so that such staff can easily be identified.

174 The gap between the bus platforms at *Halte* and the buses is a very undesirable feature of the BRT system. The reason for the gap is simple: the bus driver has not located the bus close enough to the platform. A vertical gap, where the bus station platform is not at the same level as the bus floor, is a design fault.

175 The gap is both a psychological and physical barrier and is potentially very dangerous; the gap can be as wide as 80 centimetres. At many stations, the onboard security is required to assist people that have to cross the gap. According to the records, the gap or people falling or stumbling into the gap, is not a problem. This is hard to believe and suggests that many 'incidents' go unrecorded.

176 How can the situation be improved? Bus driver training is an obvious first step, but conceivably methods have been developed elsewhere to place the bus in the most appropriate location. For example, it might be possible to locate channels in the bus lane, in the vicinity of the *Halte*? The simplest means for improving the situation is for the on-board 'security' officer to be transferred to the bus operator company, and made responsible to the operator for guiding the driver to stop close to the platform.

177 *TransJakarta* also contracts security personnel to enforce exclusivity of the bus-lane at intersections, together with Police, *DisHub* officers and DKI's law enforcement agency (*Satpol PP*). *Satpol PP* is responsible for enforcement of regional regulations which cover security of the road system, overhead bridges and access ramps. The Evaluators experience, based on visits to a limited number of locations, suggests that the agencies work plans and oversight measures could be better. Many of the bridges and related infrastructure are 'occupied' by street vendors, beggars and touts, blocking the passage of pedestrians and passengers and

persons wishing to cross the road, especially during peak periods. They also tend to create an untidy and insecure environment for users of the facilities. Relatedly, passengers interviewed in social surveys of bus passengers identified such persons as an undesirable feature of busway travel.

Assessment and rating on optimise operational planning and operations management

178 The existing operational planning and operations management is rated **Unsatisfactory**. The preparation of good quality realistic Operational Plans is critical to the smooth and efficient operation of the BRT. While the Plans are based on historical data collected with respect to the how the system works (*and the number of buses available for deployment*), the following comments are appropriate:

- More realistic operational plans could be prepared, if additional and more reliable data was collected and analysed. Specifically, there is a need for better data on passenger flows, passenger transfers and queuing. Conceivably, peak hour start / finish times should be modified, headways varied, and, possibly, some routes terminated early to free up buses for other tasks. For example, on Corridor 1 during the evening peak period, it might be desirable to terminate some buses southbound from Blok M at Bank Indonesia, after which they can turn at the roundabout to return to Blok M, picking up passengers from *Halte* that now have excessively long queues.
- In the interests of efficiency and better team work, the drivers and onboard security staff should be employed by the bus operator. In the interests of brand imaging and on board security, the onboard security should be smartly dressed in more conspicuous uniforms. Station security and ticketing staff should also be considered when talking brand imaging, uniforms and conspicuousness.

179 The practice of stopping buses far from *Halte* platforms should be addressed by better driver training, forming teams with 'on-board' security officers, and looking for ways to locate channels in the bus lane.

Optimise Maintenance

180 Maintenance of the BRT is, in its widest sense, divided up between a number of agencies, the main actors being *TransJakarta*, its selected 'Operators', and DKI agencies *DisPU* and *DisHub*. Other agencies providing supporting services include the DKI cleaning agency (*Dinas Kebersihan*) for cleansing services, and the parks and burial grounds agency (*Dinas Pertamanan*) for greening. The division of tasks relates to the division of functions prior to the creation of the BRT, with the agency that constructs a particular aspect normally responsible for its maintenance.

181 ***TransJakarta and its Operators:*** *TransJakarta* is responsible for the BRT *Halte* and the access ramps from the overhead footbridges to the stations. Buses purchased by the DKI Government on Corridor 1 are maintained by the operator for that corridor, ie *PT. JET*.

182 It would appear that most *Halte* and the related access ramps have been maintained satisfactorily and no major structural maintenance problems exist. (A problem of ticket equipment maintenance is referred to in the section on ticketing above). However, while the Evaluators travelled each corridor, they did not inspect every station. The facilities at each *Halte* vary, depending on the support provided by private groups, such as Coca Cola.

183 Buses purchased by DKI, but maintained by PT JET, and the buses provided and operated by other operators are generally in reasonable condition, however, there are some problems including :

- The passenger information system (Voice Announcement System) is not operational. In the samples from the Evaluator's field trips on all corridors, more than 50 per cent of the systems do not function. The LED Display which identifies upcoming *Halte* also did not work on more than 50 per cent of the buses. The buses on Corridor 8 do not even have such a system, because the buses were originally contracted to operate on a different route. This route was introduced about two years ago but no attempt has been made to introduce a passenger information system.
- BRT buses have an integrated air conditioning system, however, it would appear that many do not work well or are incapable of creating an appropriate environment, especially when the buses are handling heavy passenger flows.
- While most of the buses operating on the busway network are reputedly mechanically in good condition, it would appear that many shock absorbers should be replaced, especially on buses that operate in Corridors 1, 2 and 3, where road conditions on the busway are, in some areas, not good.

184 **DisPU:** *DisPU* is responsible for the design and maintenance of the busway tracks. Despite the fact that the tracks are, reputedly, inspected every three weeks by local consultants contracted by *DisPU*, many of the corridors include bad sections of road and or potholes that are not repaired in the interval between inspections. Again Corridors 1, 2 and 3 are the worst affected, partly because of the pavement designs adopted for these routes. An improved design was adopted for later corridors. Poor road conditions, together with poor shock absorbers, often make for uncomfortable BRT rides, especially for standing passengers.

185 *DisPU* is also responsible for the footpaths (or roads where no footpath is provided) that provide access to the *Halte*. Maintenance of the footpaths is very limited.

186 **DisHub:** *DisHub* is responsible for the design and construction of the *Halte*, the overhead footbridges and the access ramps to the *Halte*. Management and maintenance of the *Halte* and the ramp to the footbridge is taken over by *TransJakarta* on completion of construction, but the assets continue to be held by *DisHub*.

187 *DisHub* is responsible for the maintenance of the overhead bridges and the ramps from the bridge to the adjacent footpaths. Most of the overhead bridges and ramps would appear to have been maintained satisfactorily, however, there are problems with the bridges, in terms of cleanliness, and in the form of street vendors, beggars and touts.

188 *DisHub* are also responsible for terminals in which BRT *Halte* are located. These terminals are critical to the smooth operation of the BRT, however, poor maintenance and poor operating conditions are relatively common at some of these terminals. For example, the terminal at Pulogadung is not well organized, and includes a number of potholes that have not been repaired for many months, which negatively affects bus operations. Similarly, the bus terminal at Kalideres does not operate well, is overcrowded and passengers often alight from the buses in inappropriate locations.

189 **Dinas Kebersihan:** This agency is responsible for street cleaning, including cleaning of the overhead bridges and related access ramps. Experience, based on visiting a limited number of overhead bridges, suggests that cleanliness has not been given high priority and monitoring of their work plans limited. On one particular bridge, garbage was not collected once over a period of several weeks.

190 **Dinas Pertamanan:** This agency is responsible for some footpaths that access the busway stations and the 'greening' of some of the central medians in the vicinity of the busway stations. The footpaths are those that were constructed as part of a 'Footpath Beautification Plan', for example, for Jalan Sudirman and Jalan Thamrin. Regrettably, it would appear that no further 'beautification' plans are in the pipeline and no or very limited

funds are available for maintaining the existing schemes. In FY 2010, this agency does plan to 'green' the busway stations in Corridors 9 and 10.

Assessment and rating on optimise maintenance

191 Maintenance of the BRT Busway system involves many agencies. Some maintenance is well managed, and others not. As some important aspects of maintenance are badly neglected, and are resistant to efforts of the project to improvement, an overall rating of **Moderately Unsatisfactory** is given to this aspect of Optimising BRT Operations.

Optimise Financial Management

192 When the project started, *TransJakarta* prepared budgets and kept accounts, but did little else in financial management. Despite this, the Evaluators found no reference to financial management in the design of the project and little in its implementation. ITDP analysts have studied various aspects of revenue, cash collection, and internal auditing, but not the process of budgeting, asset and liability management, accounting, managerial reporting and accountability reporting.

193 Under Indonesian law, accountability reports consist of performance reports and finance reports. Under the MTEF system, the financial officer is responsible for financial management and exerts a check and balance on the performance of operational managers, in order to drive continual improvement of effectiveness and efficiency. *Good public management practice associates money with all decision-making on performance.*

194 After a poor audit report for DKI's FY 2007 financial report, the Governor required all agencies to put qualified personnel in charge of financial management, including *TransJakarta*, which now has a qualified accountant as Manager of Administration and Finance, and another as Assistant Manager Finance. Its most recent audit report (FY 2008) is a qualified report, pointing out the failure of DKI to transfer to *TransJakarta* the assets *TransJakarta* uses. *Technically TransJakarta is in breach of the law by spending funds on use of assets that it does not own.*

195 Recently DKI introduced multi-year budgeting. Key advantages of multi-year budgeting are the ability to make commitments beyond the current year, to plan continual improvements, and assure continuity of service. None of these advantages are being utilised in the way *TransJakarta* is currently budgeting.

196 Another requirement of the financial management system relates to contract management. In each public entity, a contract officer is appointed to enter contracts and manage them (PPK, *pejabat pembuat komitmen*) and an appraiser checks all contractual decisions. Both report to the head of the entity. *TransJakarta* makes a common misunderstanding of the law; the current head also assumes the role of PPK, to whom the appraiser reports, thus undermining the principle of checks and balances.

Assessment and rating on optimise financial management

197 A rating of **Moderately Unsatisfactory** is given here, partly because this important aspect of operations was omitted from the design, and partly as *TransJakarta* (as DKI in general) has been slow to fully implement existing financial management reforms, and is in breach of the law on certain aspects.

Optimise Governance and General Management

198 Initially the BRT was run by different agencies within the DKI government, coordinated by a “busway team”. DKI then established a “technical service unit” (*unit pelayanan teknis*) within DisHub, in line with incomplete national legislation of the time, to manage the operations but with little involvement in planning. This provided *TransJakarta* with some autonomy and separate identity, but neither the division of authority nor vagueness of regulation provided clear lines of accountability or incentives to perform. The structure has changed a number of times since.

199 **The current organisation of *TransJakarta*** is still imperfect. For example, *TransJakarta*'s operations division plans but does not operate; the operations are controlled by the same division that supervises operations. The infrastructure and facilities division has a section for ‘planning’ that ‘coordinates maintenance’, and a ‘maintenance’ section, apparently in charge of cleaning services, and slow to respond to failures in equipment. Its ‘ticket operations’ sales and ‘data verification’ are under the same division, ‘operations. Its public complaints unit (under the public relations section) provides no feedback to complainants. Such oddities are the result of managerial pragmatism in a regulation-bound system. While the existing organisation is imperfect, it is passably capable of continuing operations.

200 **Creating a BLU.** One of the most time-consuming aspects of ITDP’s assistance to *TransJakarta* has been supporting efforts to provide a sustainable business structure for BRT in Jakarta. In 2005, the government passed a Government Regulation 23/2005 on the formation of public service entities (BLU), intended as the basis for government public service operations, replacing the vague technical service unit format. Over the following two years the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) and Ministry of Finance (MoF) completed the implementing regulations. An extraordinary effort has been used to follow these regulations and enable DKI to create its BLU for the BRT,⁹ and it has only recently been achieved.

201 **Creating a BUMD.** UNEP had been informed that DKI has decided to make the next step, as recommended by ITDP, converting its BLU into a regional government-owned company (BUMD). The Evaluators were specifically asked to address whether the BUMD status can realistically be achieved within the remaining project duration? Before recent personnel changes in senior management positions, the Governor expressed his commitment to make it happen quickly. However, the UNEP Task Manager has informed us that, at the meeting with the Governor after the submission of the draft of this report, the Governor stated he is reconsidering this, as it is DKI’s perception that it is easier to provide subsidy to a BLU than to a BUMD.

BLU and BUMN

A **BLU** is a public service entity within the government structure. For example, a public hospital is organised as a BLU.

It has its own budget, and manages its own revenues, even though those revenues are recorded as regional revenues.

It must be managed by a public servant, and public servants must be responsible for financial decisions. It is subject to government human resources policies, and does not have independence in personnel.

The purpose of creating a BLU is to provide planning autonomy and accountability within the government apparatus.

A **BUMN** is a *regional government-owned company* separate from the government apparatus. Water supply enterprises are normally organised as a BUMD.

It obtains revenues from a variety of sources, including subsidies.

The purpose of creating a BUMN is to allow greater flexibility for management to be effective and efficient in providing a specific public service.

⁹ These regulations would appear to be self-defeatist. The intention would appear to motivate regional governments to establish performance-oriented well-managed organizations. However, the practice forces good managers trying to be performance-oriented to prepare voluminous reports and seek approval of MoHA, which would appear not to have any more competence than regional governments on good public management.

202 The concern of the Evaluators is that *TransJakarta* must be managed by a high performing management team, who can lead changes in business practice and culture. This is highly unlikely to happen with a BLU. Creation of a BUMD allows the BRT to be independent of national civil service regulations. The additional complexity of providing a subsidy to a BUMD is trivial compared with the process of changing *TransJakarta* into a high performing and continually improving organisation.

203 Technically, DKI can create a BUMD within a few months, but the process of finding and appointing excellent professional managers, that are necessary to make the BUMD a high-performing public service enterprise, will take time. The Evaluators also doubt whether this can be achieved, while conversion to BUMD status is led by a committee of mainly public servants, as is currently being considered.

204 **Business plans and minimum service standards (MSS).** Part of the process of establishing the BLU has necessitated DKI to prepare business plans and MSS, to be approved by MoHA. ITDP engaged the international business consulting company Ernst and Young to help prepare these. DKI adopted them for the purposes of gaining BLU status for *TransJakarta*. MoHA did not comment that they were inconsistent with National policy on financial management that requires checks and balances between a chief financial officer and chief operational officers, as MoHA itself has not supported this law. The proposed business plan was not subject to detailed evaluation by DKI, and much additional work is needed before a suitable business plan is prepared for the planned BUMD. The proposed MSS have been accepted well, though there are problems both with the legal framework and some of the specific standards recommended.¹⁰ Though some MSS are problematic, DKI has willingness to apply them and they are best improved through experience.

205 The greatest problem is in the approach itself, in that they are compliance-oriented rather than performance and continual-improvement oriented. One ITDP international adviser commented:¹¹

I don't like standards to be imposed ... It is preferable to use a free market approach, where there is a direct reward for making the service and price as good as possible for the clients. Instead of meeting minimum standards, the stronger approach is to search for excellence.

206 Thus the business plans need to be updated. One interviewee commented: '*TransJakarta cannot adopt continual improvement, in contracts with the private sector; as such practice is contrary to the principle of bureaucracy.*' Bureaucracy is not unreformable. In fact, bureaucratic reform is the top priority of the President. *TransJakarta* rates poorly on the key performance indicators of Change Management identified in **Annex 12**. The only (marginally) positive point is its efforts to promote a work ethic in its workforce.

207 **Contracts management.** *TransJakarta* contracts bus operations, ticket sales, security and some cleaning services. Contracts for bus operations have been made for particular corridors, but now all operators have agreed to work other corridors on demand. Originally DKI forced the four largest pre-BRT operators on each new corridor to form a consortium to operate the BRT on that corridor. DKI negotiated a price (Rupiah per kilometre, Rp/km) that has proven to be about 40 per cent over market value. The main factor behind this is possibly built-in inefficiency in the consortium organisation rather than excessive profit-making. For corridors 4-7, the Governor signed an illegal gubernatorial regulation (*Pergub 123*) that required the consortium to accept the same rate as the lowest bidder on tendered operations for the same corridors.

¹⁰ These problems have been addressed further in a separate private memo by the Evaluators to ITDP

¹¹ Pedro Szasz' comments on Minimum Service Standards for *TransJakarta* Busway. 30 December 2009.

208 The consortiums went to arbitration. ITDP provided intensive legal advice to support *TransJakarta*'s submission to arbitration. The result of this advice was a recent decision of arbitration to a minor reduction in operator fees,¹² but it also created greater awareness in DKI of the governance principles that had been neglected from the inception of the BRT, and more political will to support an improved BRT.

209 The contract for Corridor 1 now expires in mid 2011. The Evaluators believe that *TransJakarta* does not yet have a fixed policy for a new operational contractor for DKI's now-old, but still operable, one-door buses. It plans to utilise some of the articulated buses purchased for Corridor 9 on Corridor 1. There is also an urgent need to come up with a well-thought out plan to improve the services along this corridor.

210 DKI's purchase of buses for the opening of Corridors 9 and 10 is against principles of good business practice. Firstly, when operators purchase buses, they own the residual value of buses at the end of the contract, thus providing an incentive to maintain. When costs of maintenance are borne by the contractor without this incentive, *TransJakarta* is dependent on oversight to assure buses are well maintained. Secondly, purchase of buses should be the responsibility of *TransJakarta*, not *DisHub*. Not only is this the law, failure to do so weakens the accountability of *TransJakarta* and is a conflict of interest with the oversight role of *DisHub*.

211 Contracts have been prepared for operating these buses to coincide with the final opening Corridors 9 and 10. At the end of these contracts, like for Corridor 1, the buses will be returned to *DisHub* (or *TransJakarta* if the buses are transferred as required by accounting principles), which does not have the capacity to operate buses itself, and again new tenders will need to be made for operating old buses. The conditions of the proposed contracts give *TransJakarta* more authority, which is necessary to oversee maintenance than in previous contracts, but does not provide a commercial incentive to operators to keep buses in good working order.

212 The Evaluators were unable to determine whether the licenses of the existing operators along Corridors 9 and 10 have residual value, when they are ordered to stop their non-BRT operations or lose business to the BRT, and whether they should be compensated. The tenders for operating new buses could include an agreed value for compensation, which would provide these operators with an advantage in their tenders.

213 As reported under sustainability, contracts for ticketing, security and cleaning are made annually; contractors provide services for seven months each year and *TransJakarta* manages them directly for five months. The annual contracting of ticketing and security services is extraordinarily inefficient, and it is hard to find one reason why it is done this way. Prior to the change to multi-year budgeting, multi-year contracts were difficult to approve, but are no longer so.

214 In summary, *TransJakarta* does not have a clear strategy for utilising the private sector for parts of its operations. There are four main purposes of contracting with the private sector, being to guarantee the public value for money, to access financial resources for investment, to benefit from the ability of the private sector to respond to market pressures, and to reduce the size of government. *TransJakarta* ranks poorly on each purpose.

215 **Legal assistance:** The Evaluators were specifically asked whether providing legal assistance to *TransJakarta* and DKI Jakarta, as described in paragraph 208, was a valid and appropriate use of project funds. The Evaluators think that UNEP at the time should not have agreed to give legal advice, only supporting *TransJakarta* with expert advice. However,

¹² Arbitration also agreed to an extension to contracts, considering that *TransJakarta* was limiting the distance travelled by buses below that needed to earn expected rate of return.

as tangible benefits to the project were gained by providing this advice, the Evaluators consider in hindsight that such advice was justified. However, there seems no longer to be a need for legal advice.

Assessment and rating on optimise governance and general management

216 The Evaluators have found it hard to give a fair overall assessment to efforts to optimise government and general management. It was not included in the ProDoc, yet has dominated the efforts of the past two years. In this, it has followed national government policy on reforms, that themselves have remained compliance rather than performance-oriented. ITDP hired one of the most reputable business consultant companies in the country, Ernst and Young, to prepare the business plans, and yet they have failed to address this most fundamental problem of bureaucratic reform in Indonesia.

217 Recognising the effort that has been put into this issue, the Evaluators have concluded a rating of **Moderately Satisfactory**.

Special Problem: Natural Gas Supply

218 The TOR for this evaluation requests that the Evaluators comment on the current problems with respect to CNG gas supplies, as the current arrangement adversely affects the BRT in many ways. For example, buses are required to travel long distances to refuel, which costs money and wastes time and fuel. Similarly, the needs to wait in long queues means those buses are not operational, which adversely affects the overall capacity of the BRT.

219 There are two problems with respect to the supply of CNG gas :

- a. There are a very limited number of gas stations, between 3 and 5, depending on prevailing conditions, at inappropriate locations and some with inefficient pumps; and
- b. There are two gas suppliers but their tariffs for the supply of gas are different.

220 Problems with the supply of gas have existed for years and all attempts to rectify the problem have failed. The documentation on this subject is exhaustive, yet exactly why efforts have failed is unclear and not necessarily logical.

221 To overcome the problem of a limited number of gas stations and the related problems of long distances and queuing, it has been proposed that additional gas stations are developed, and this idea is fully supported. In principle, there should be, at least, one gas station allocated to each corridor, adjacent to a terminal so as to minimise off-service time. It is understood that potential gas station owners have been identified. Such stations must be capable of supplying high pressure gas (as gas tanks can be filled in 6 minutes with high pressure, but with low pressure gas it takes over 20 minutes). Relatedly, it should be noted that buses need to be refuelled twice a day and, apparently, it is not feasible to increase the size of the fuel tank.

222 The bigger problem is the cost of gas, the tariff charged for supplies. Currently, there are two suppliers, Pertamina and PT. Gas, the later is the company that wishes to apply the higher charges. In reality, all gas supplies are from Pertamina, and it apparently does not charge a reduced wholesale price to PT. Gas, which is attempting to cover handling costs and make a profit. Thus Pertamina does not compete fairly with PT. Gas.

223 The provision of subsidies from Central Government for CNG has complicated the core issues. While the issue of a national Public Service Obligation (PSO) to provide discounted gas for public transport is important, the overriding issue is building gas stations in the correct place with the correct capacity.

224 Regrettably, the Evaluators cannot identify a unique technique / methodology for overcoming the current problems, as almost everything has already been tried. In the circumstances, and because the problem would seem to be more political than technical, it is recommended that the Governor should bring the matter to the attention of the President, or at least the Coordinating Minister for the Economy, based on supporting documentation prepared by ITDP and endorsed by the project Steering Committee.

Assessment and rating on Special Problem: Natural gas supply

225 While recognising the complexity of the problem, effort has been diverted from the key issue of putting gas stations close to BRT terminals, at whatever the cost of gas. The rating given is **Unsatisfactory**, and the Evaluators are pleased that this evaluation has helped motivate DKI to take up the matter with the President.

Overall rating on component 4 (optimize busway operation)

226 Considering that the ProDoc failed to identify the importance management for optimizing busway operations, the Evaluators consider that project started with an **Unsatisfactory** rating for this component. Of the aspects of optimizing busway operations identified above, only one is above Unsatisfactory or Moderately Unsatisfactory, meaning there is only little that has been achieved to deserve an increase in the rating, and the Evaluators have rated Component 4 as **Moderately Unsatisfactory**. The importance given to good management by the Evaluators, this low rating has had a major impact on the overall rating for the project.

227 But as on so many of the other components, the evaluators recognize that improving operations has been neglected while developing a better basis of governance. With more attention to good management in the remainder of the project, this low rating can be improved very significantly.

4.5.5 Improve Public Information on BRT & Public Transport (Component 5)

228 A BRT requires a wide variety of signs, of many different sizes, which are located in many different locations. The public should be informed what is legally prohibited, be advised on what to do, as well as to obtain explanatory information about the BRT. Information should be designed for those who know the BRT well, and those who are using it for the first time. While most bus passengers repeatedly make the same trip and are familiar with the system and its idiosyncrasies, there are also many that are not familiar with the system, and those who would like to visit a new location. It would appear that *TransJakarta* do not do this task very well, except for some conventional traffic signs, which are used to protect the BRT Right of Way. The following paragraphs attempt to highlight some problems and successes.

229 As mentioned elsewhere in this report, the onboard 'Passenger Information Systems' (*Voice Announcements*) often does not function well; that is they are not operating and or they cannot be heard. When they are working, they are very good, precise and in both Indonesian and English. The related LED Display at the front of the bus, beside the driver, also often does not function well, and it is difficult to see, especially when there are many standing passengers. Hence, passengers may not know where they are or where to get off the bus.

230 Indirectly related to the above is the fact that many *Halte* do not have signs that tell you the name of the station (*you have to recognize it, by reference to adjacent buildings*). At the *Halte* that do have a name sign, it is reasonably large, but could be placed to be seen more easily. The name of *Halte* is important to the bus passengers, and it should be readable by most passengers passing through or alighting. It is suggested that ALL stations should have clearly located name signs, and that there should be several signs so that passengers,

pedestrians and road-users can all see. Further consideration should also be given to the size and colour of the signs.

231 Initially, the Busway network was relatively simple but now different buses operate on the same corridors, possibly going to different destinations. It is important that waiting passengers know the destination of each bus that arrives at the *Halte*. Currently, bus corridors are indicated by a small number on the front of the bus, and destinations are included on a relatively small paper sign stuck on the windscreen of the bus. The signs are not well displayed and appear to be temporary.

232 Most BRT, like Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) systems in the world, have a Network Map and the Jakarta BRT is no exception. Most of the maps are diagrammatic and represent the system in a simplistic format. The current BRT Map depicts the corridors well and the map is relatively easy to understand. As is to be expected, BRT Maps are openly displayed within the *Halte*; they are on moveable standalone frames. Unfortunately, they are often not conspicuously placed, and the text on the Maps is difficult to read from more than a metre or two. No BRT Maps are to be seen outside of *Halte*, for example, on the ramps or on overhead footbridges. However, some attempts have been made to make it available to the general public, for example, in brochures advertising the BRT, and in the latest telephone directories. Handouts have been designed by the project, which has handed them out at many events. *TransJakarta* apparently does not make handouts available on request at ticket offices.

233 Within the buses there are signs giving the passengers information on what passengers are allowed or not allowed to do, and how to make a complaint if they are unhappy or unsatisfied with the service. There are no BRT Maps within the buses.

234 Related to BRT lanes, there are signs indicating the fact that it is a BUS LANE, warning drivers to take care when turning, or advising them not to enter it. Many other conventional traffic signs that attempt to control traffic are placed in the vicinity of the bus lane, and to compete with them the BRT signs are often unattractive. They are also often ignored.

235 Trips on the Jakarta BRT were both an interesting and surprising experiences for the Evaluators. One of the surprises was an almost complete lack of advertising at the *Halte* and on the buses, as widespread advertising is a feature of most such systems. This report notes elsewhere that advertising could earn *TransJakarta* considerable funds, that could help keep fares relatively low and reduce the required subsidies. The advertising needs to be designed to fit into the BRT branding image, and not to compete with information about the corridor and destination of the bus.

236 None of the BRT buses have any form of advertising on the outside. Potentially, some of the buses could be covered in advertising, while others might have advertising on the rear windows. Revenues from such advertising are considerable. Within the busway buses there is also no advertising. On other similar systems it is commonplace to have strip advertising along both sides of the bus above the windows, and integrated with a Route Map showing at least the corridor on which the bus is operating and interconnections. Other information can also be provided together with the advertising. The advertising and the information systems should be designed together. Revenues from such advertising could also be substantial and should be possible on most buses.

237 Currently, there is some advertising on the outside of some *Halte*. The potential is much greater than utilised. Again the advertising should be designed together with information for the public.

238 Inside some *Halte* there is some advertising, and some concessions for selling refreshments, such as Coca Cola, but it does not appear to be well organized or consistent, and not part of an interior design that provides far more information to passengers than is now presented.

239 Advertising on the overhead footbridges is common; however, the footbridges are not presently the responsibility of *TransJakarta*. Advertising on the ramps to the bus stations, which are the responsibility of *TransJakarta*, is almost non-existent. Hence, again, there must be more advertising opportunities.

240 Elsewhere recommendations are made about stakeholder participation and public awareness in design of future Corridors.

Assessment and rating on Component 5

241 The project has supplied good advice and samples of good information for the public, however, *TransJakarta* have yet to use these ideas on an appropriate scale. In fact, instead of *TransJakarta* developing capacity from this advice, it has become dependent on it.

242 BRT signing should be delivered in many forms, including visual, vocal and audible. The rating of **Moderately Unsatisfactory** reflects the start of efforts by ITDP to make a significant change in the remainder of the project.

4.5.6 Rationalize Non-BRT Bus Routes (Component 6)

243 The Evaluators were specifically asked to assess problems that will arise in the revision of non-BRT bus routes, including revising route licenses, bus transfer facilities, and better incorporating the current private feeder services (buses from estates/housing projects feeding into BRT). Can restructuring of bus routes to provide feeder services realistically be accomplished within the remaining project duration? Is significant expansion of feeder services a realistic objective given current capacity of the BRT?

244 Defining bus routes and issuing route licences, historically, have been the reason behind many disputes and demonstrations. Currently, the issuance of bus licences is the prerogative of *DisHub*. The introduction of the BRT in 2003 created many licence disputes, and the greatest ones were only resolved by forcing the largest 'old' bus companies to form consortiums to operate on each new BRT corridor, and then negotiate an acceptable price for it.

245 Bus routes and related licensing is a complex matter and involves many groups of people and agencies. It does not only involve *DisHub*, whose prerogative is traffic control and regulation, it also involves bus operators, community groups, town planning, and the design of transfer stops.

246 The task of attempting to rationalize non-BRT bus routes has been given to *DisHub*, which has, until now, made insignificant progress. This is understandable, as *DisHub* is not a neutral party, and the head of *DisHub* has to 'wear two hats', one as regulator, and the other as coordinator and negotiator. The complexity of incentives that this creates needs to be recognized.

247 ITDP is currently in the process of appointing consultants to assist DKI with a Feeder Bus Services Study. Bus routing is expected to be the main issue.

Assessment and rating on Component 6

248 The almost total neglect of this component deserves a highly unsatisfactory rating. However, this has been increased to **Unsatisfactory**, in recognition of the start made by ITDP to conduct a Feeder Bus Services Study.

249 The issue of the conflict of interest in *DisHub* has apparently not been discussed before. There is no other existing institution in DKI that can be considered as appropriate, and some form of innovation is needed.

250 Accordingly, and in an attempt to improve on current practice, the Evaluators suggested to a meeting with two senior executives of DKI¹³ that bus routing and licensing be undertaken by an *ad hoc* group, led by someone who is capable of coordinating with the parties that have vested interests, including those mentioned above, and negotiating an agreed plan of change. In the meeting, it was suggested that overall task could be managed by the DKI REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING AGENCY, in its role of coordinator of development planning. It is expected that each of the *ad hoc* groups would cover a particular catchment area, probably related to a major bus terminal, such as Blok M or Pulogadung. Rather than start out with a large number of groups, it is suggested that one or two pilot studies are undertaken, to test the feasibility of the approach. Each of the groups should be headed by a trained negotiator, who is familiar with all aspects related to bus route licensing. Subject to timing constraints and compatibility, ITDP's Feeder Bus Services Study consultants could be involved with one or more of the groups.

251 The recommendations in the final section of this report reflect the results of that meeting. *DisHub* would still be responsible for decreeing routes and issuance of route licenses.

4.5.7 Evaluate and Implement Transport Demand Management Measures to Reduce Private Motor Vehicle Use (Component 7)

252 The Indonesian Central Government with DKI are currently considering, at least, two methods to reduce traffic flows and congestion. Since the proposals are expected to reduce traffic flows, by discouraging people from owning and or using private cars and motor cycles, there is expected to be an increased demand for public transport services, such as the BRT Busway. The two schemes under consideration are :

- a. Electronic Road Pricing (ERP); and
- b. Additional taxes for registering vehicles and changed ownership of vehicles.

253 Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) is a relatively new technologically advanced system; however, it has been operating successfully in Singapore since September 1998. Singapore was the first city in the world to implement an electronic road toll collection system for purposes of congestion pricing (see box). Based on the ProDoc, ITDP has been pushing for the introduction of ERP for a long time and, conceivably, this has helped to influence the Government. They have also suggested that DKI should change their policy with respect to car parking fees. Higher car parking fees, and especially much higher

Singapore Electronic Road Pricing

The Singapore scheme consists of ERP gantries located at all roads linking into Singapore's central business areas within the Central Area. They are also located along the expressways and arterial roads with heavy traffic, to discourage usage during peak hours.

The gantry system is actually a system of sensors on two gantries, one in front of the other. Cameras are also attached to the gantries to capture the rear license plate numbers of vehicles. Currently, there are 80 ERP gantries in Singapore.

A device known as an In-vehicle Unit (IU) is affixed on the lower right corner of the front windscreen of a car, within sight of the driver, in which a stored-value card (the CashCard) is inserted for payment of the road usage charges. The cost of the IU is S \$ 150 (approximately Rp 1 million).

It is mandatory for all Singapore-registered vehicles to be fitted with IU, if they wish to enter restricted areas.

When a vehicle equipped with an IU passes under an ERP gantry, a road usage charge is deducted from the CashCard in the IU.

The charge when passing through a gantry depends on the location and time, the peak hour being the most expensive. If drivers fail to have sufficient value in their CashCard, the owner receives a fine by post within two weeks.

¹³ The Evaluators met with Bpk Sutanto Soehodho, deputy governor for trade, industry and transport Ny Sarwo Handhayani, now Head of Bappeda.

parking fees, would, almost certainly, have a major impact on transport demand, during peak periods. It is the preferred approach to TDM in many cities around the world.

254 A similar system for DKI Jakarta would seem to be appropriate. With the change in technology since 1998, it may be possible to replace the gantries with a GPS system. Reading the number plates of motor cycles is a potential but solvable problem.

255 Increased taxation for changed ownership of vehicles is not supported, as it will, almost certainly, discourage owners from changing their papers, and good data on car ownership is required for the ERP system to operate efficiently.

Assessment and rating on Component 7

256 The Evaluators were specifically asked: Given progress to date and the current administration's priorities, is it a realistic goal that an ERP system could be implemented before project end? GoI (*with DKI*) is currently proposing to introduce Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) in Jakarta. A similar system has been operating in Singapore since 1998, without serious problems. ITDP and the Evaluators believe this is an appropriate system for DKI Jakarta and fully support the proposals. However, there is only time within the project to prepare a well thought out thorough proposal; but not enough time to implement such a proposal

257 The effort put into this component to date, both by ITDP and the government is rated as **Satisfactory**.

4.5.8 Improve Pedestrian and NMT Facilities in Centre and Along Corridors (Component 8)

258 **Project initiatives.** The project has taken several initiatives to improve pedestrian and NMT facilities in the centre and along corridors. The most valuable of these has been the conversion of the historic Plaza Fatahillah into a vehicle free zone, which has illustrated to government and community alike the benefits of providing urban open space. The next step is to provide an improved walkway from the square to the Kota BRT. Second is the support that the project has given to car-free days along main corridors, that provide the opportunity to an active bicycle community to lobby government for better facilities and the public for more members of the community.

259 **Pedestrian access.** As mentioned elsewhere in this report, access to the busway stations from the adjacent footpaths and related footbridges can, sometimes, be very difficult and dangerous. Footpaths are often in bad condition with potholes and drainage-related problems, and often blocked by utility posts, trees, and impossibly high steps to drive crossings; in several places the ramps from pedestrian overbridges lead onto the roadway, as there is no effective footpath at all, or the footpath is blocked by the sub-structures of the ramps. At other places, the footpaths are made from covers to wide drainage channel; many of these 'footpaths' include dangerous steel loops or holes to assist with lifting the slabs, and, unfortunately, it is not uncommon for a slab to be partially broken or totally missing. Historically, DKI Jakarta has planted trees in the centre of the footpath, and now that they are large they can be difficult to pass. Paths are also blocked by utility company facilities and street-light control panels.

260 Probably the most dangerous problem is motor cycles, which use footpaths to bypass queues of larger vehicles, especially during peak periods. Add rain and flooded potholes and you have life-threatening situations. Bollards placed across footpaths in the 'footpath beautification programme' do not stop such traffic, as the gap available allows a motor cycle to pass through.

261 Another common hazard on the footpaths in the vicinity of bus stations are food stalls, hawkers, and beggars. Again, especially where the footpaths are narrow, such features can make movement on the footpaths difficult, and sometimes impossible. The solution is not to ban food-stalls and hawkers, but to provide for sufficient numbers to meet the demand of the public with small-scale TOD.

262 **Bicycles.** It has been proposed that the project support the creation of long bicycle paths. Such paths would support a significant and vocal Bike-to-work community, and the idea is supported. A higher priority is to make it easier for youths to use bicycles to schools and BRT Halte.

Assessment and rating Component 8

263 The Evaluators were specifically asked whether a lack of pedestrian facilities is, effectively, limiting BRT passenger numbers. Considering that, at so many *Halte*, pedestrian and NMT access can be very difficult and dangerous; the MTE concludes this is most likely true. Accordingly, ITDP is belatedly conducting a review of access to all *Halte*. A technical study of this kind will be informative, but will not necessarily lead to solutions. DKI needs to prioritize pedestrian movement, and prepare pilot examples of well-planned access to *Halte*. Such pilot examples would also link with rationalization of non-BRT bus routes at the pilot *Halte*.

264 The Evaluators were also asked how can the current achievements (Plaza Fatahillah, parking areas for bicycles) be strengthened and expanded / replicated. Plaza Fatahillah is a highly successful example of urban public space. Jakarta has developed a few other public spaces during recent years, illustrating that the failure to replicate its Plaza Fatahillah is a political, rather than a technical problem. Regrettably, many within DKI would still appear to give higher priority to increasing road space, than improved pedestrian facilities, and even take footpaths to increase road space.

265 The failure of the project so far to make any real impact on pedestrian facilities, except on protocol roads, and despite the success of Plaza Fatahillah, earns a rating of **Highly Unsatisfactory**.

4.5.9 Dissemination and Outreach to Other Cities (Component 9)

266 Initially, it was proposed that the ITDP team provide advice to a relatively large number of secondary cities in Indonesia; however, following introductory discussions with most of them, either on site or in Jakarta, it was clear that some of the cities would like and appreciate advice and others were somewhat indifferent, and did not want or propose to introduce BRT in their cities. As a result of the prevailing conditions, the Budget for this item was reduced and recent activities have been limited.

267 The city that showed the most interest and commitment to the introduction of BRT was Pekanbaru, and a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed with them on 14 March 2010. The only other cities that are considering the introduction of some form of BRT are Palembang and Yogyakarta; currently, they are not seeking any technical assistance.

268 The TOR specifically asked us to review expansion of the BRT throughout Jabodetabek, indicating appropriate milestones for achievement during the project. Only one corridor can possibly be achieved within the next 18 to 24 months, linking Tangerang to Kalideres, and it is understood that there are some political problems to be overcome.

269 The Evaluators do not support a piecemeal approach to such development. Working on a single corridor for Tangerang without looking at the future network is piecemeal. Converting roads designed for PMVs only to include BRT is also piecemeal. An integrated inter-regional **traffic and transport master plan** (RILLA) is needed that shows agreed future

BRT corridors within DKI and into Jabodetabek. An integrated **inter-regional road plan** is also needed that indicates road improvements where priority is given to public transport, including BRT wherever possible. Both these plans need to be integrated into **spatial plans**. As the draft spatial plan is urgently needed to control development, it should not be delayed, but it will need to be amended within about 18 months to assure integration with transport and road plans.

270 All new roadways must be designed firstly to improve public transport, and secondly to improve private transport, in the interests of both climate change and overall costs of transportation.

271 Within the time remaining for the project, current road improvement plans updated, and at least the principles set out for the RILLAJ can be prepared. Corridors 11-14/15 can be reviewed, particularly corridor 14 (to Depok) and 15 (to Ciledug on the South Tangerang border). Potentially, the latter two corridors could generate considerable passenger flows.

Assessment and rating Component 9

272 Considering the reduction in the scope of this component from the beginning, the Evaluators commend the work done by ITDP in support of BRT in the country, and give a rating of **Satisfactory**.

4.6 Monitoring and Evaluation

Key Performance Indicators

273 The Evaluators have been asked to comment on the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) in ProDoc. KPIs are the indicators that match Critical Success Factors (CSFs). The ProDoc sets out the objectives, and identifies components, but does not elaborate on what needs to be done for the project to be a success. See also the comments on preparedness and readiness in section 4.7.1.

274 Three types of indicators are appropriate in project design. Project managers need **project progress indicators** that compare progress against plan, in terms of activities and their effectiveness, and provide feedback into managerial planning to continually direct the project to its intended objective. The project design does not have project progress indicators. *TransJakarta* and ITDP have collected an enormous amount of data, from which appropriate project progress indicators could have been developed. Project policy makers need **project performance indicators** that measure the extent to which a project's components have achieved their desired impact, to provide feedback to policy-making, and to adjust objectives to direct the project to its intended goal. The project design has few project performance indicators, as pointed out in the comments in **Annex 3** (Progress Against KPIs from 2009 PIR with Brief Comment on Suitability of Each KPI).

275 **Global performance indicators** provide information on the contribution of a project to the success of its parent programme, so that measurement of these indicators can be consolidated into the reporting of success of the parent programme. The project was designed mainly with global performance indicators in mind, for UNEP (GHG) and DKI (increase in passengers). Unfortunately, raw data is not available for the impact of the project on these indicators, and ITDP uses proxy indicators.

276 The TOR also asks the Evaluators: "Do the milestones for the project accurately reflect project achievement of objectives?" Indeed there are few events defined in the ProDoc that can be considered as Milestones, so the primary way to improve them is to have more. ITDP have done this partially within their reporting (ITDP's milestones and Evaluator's comments are found in **Annex 7**). They have identified "milestones" for each component, and in the process changed the wording, and by implication the scope on two components. Perhaps

these milestones and changes have yet to be approved by UNEP, as the ITDP names of components and reporting of milestones are not reported in the PIR.

277 As a consequence of the above, the PIR reports on its 'KPIs' do not present the reader with a clear picture of how the programme is proceeding. In the term used in the TOR for this evaluation, the indicators are not "SMART".¹⁴

Assessment and rating on M&E design

278 The Evaluators conclude that the project does not have a well-designed M&E plan, and that the correction requires a redesign of the work breakdown structure and indicators, as well as M&E system. As a result, the M&E design is rated as **Unsatisfactory**.

279 If the changes proposed in this report are accepted, this is the appropriate time to introduce a better designed M&E system.

280 Considerable effort has been put into developing BRT performance monitoring, but further improvements are needed. The Evaluators have separately consulted with project staff on these matters. DKI itself lacks effective monitoring at several levels, and recommendations are made in other parts of this report for the project to address them.

Assessment and rating on M&E plan implementation

281 The project does have good project and task managers who are concerned, even obsessed, with progress. The project has not suffered through the lack of a good M&E plan. They have monitored and evaluated almost comprehensively anyway. Their reporting has not been as specific as desired by agencies accustomed to using modern well-defined M&E management, but they record all activities clearly in good narrative. On very few points do the Evaluators differ in ratings of performance and risks. Methods of measuring some important indicators, such as GHG savings, still require development. Reporting was lax at times, but now all reports, particular project semester reports and PIR, are produced on time.

282 M&E implementation is thus rated **Satisfactory**.

Assessment and rating on Budgeting and Funding for M&E

283 Although the ProDoc budget provides a line for M&E (a total of US\$ 17,700 with US\$ 8,500 spent by year three), ITDP's budget reports do not provide a separate line item for M&E. It provides an allowance of US \$ 40,000 for "UNEP Evaluation", presumably this MTE (and from the perspective of the Evaluators this was insufficient). The lack of a separate budget for ITDP's M&E and reporting activities has not been a problem in funding M&E, and thus a rate of **Moderately Satisfactory** is given.

Overall assessment and rating on Monitoring and Evaluation

284 The lack of a proper work-breakdown for management and plan for M&E, despite excellent reporting, leads to an overall rating of **Moderately Unsatisfactory**.

Long-term Monitoring

285 Considerable effort has been put into developing BRT performance monitoring, but there remain many problems with selection of indicators, institutional checks and balances in making records of performance, and responsiveness to the information available. The Evaluators have separately consulted with project staff on these matters, that should be prioritised in the remainder of the project.

¹⁴ Specific, Measurable, Achievable and Attributable, Relevant and Realistic, Time-bound, Timely, Trackable, and Targeted

286 DKI itself lacks effective monitoring at several levels, as recorded under management and governance sustainability. Three aspects in particular should be noted. (a) The detailed work of implementing budgets in different agencies is not planned, making monitoring of progress and coordination between agencies by the secretariat more difficult than necessary. (b) Agencies providing public services do not have cost and performance standards and other inputs from which they can assess whether they are providing the best value of service to the community. And (c) the Governor does not have indicators of the introduction of bureaucratic and leadership reforms in each agency. An explanation of items (b) and (c) are included in Annex 12.

4.7 Processes that affected Attainment of Project Results

4.7.1 Preparation and Readiness

287 The designers of the project recognised that the Governor of DKI was determined to go ahead with a BRT and wanted good technical advice. Without quick approval of the project, DKI would continue to make poor technical design decisions. The preparation of the project appears thorough in technical aspects, placing commendable attention to learning from international BRT experience. It also identified that institutional problems had been created by earlier use of emergency regulations.

288 The authors of the ProDoc emphasised the importance of governance as an issue:

Our work so far has taught us that making technical recommendations is relatively easy compared to the institutional obstacles which must be overcome to get them implemented.

289 But they decided against including any separate objective or component for governance, accountability, or general management. Thus the nine objectives and activities under them were designed with inadequate attention to institutional issues. The Evaluators questioned two people involved in the design about this decision, and received two opinions, that they had no idea of the complexity of addressing the institutional problems, and they were concerned that UNEP or the GEF may not have accepted the proposal, if these issues were included in the design.

290 Most components were divided into types of activities rather than steps towards goals. Thus Component 1 (Develop BRT corridors 4-14) was made up of activities (surveys, trainings, workshops, implementation of design, and M&E) and not steps (developing corridor by corridor). The first activity under Component 4 was “operational reforms implemented – part 1” followed by “part 2”, “part 3” and “part 4”. This does not provide a clear indication of what was expected or progress achieved.

291 But the project has proven to be responsive to real conditions, and receptive to requests from DKI for assistance in institutional matters. Though the Steering Committee has met less often than planned, its deliberations contributed to the guidance of the project. The Governor has maintained his interest. In day-to-day management, the current team works closely with counterparts and is responsive to them, but the lack of managerial and governance objectives in the project design has led to unstructured reporting and lack of indicators of progress.

292 As the project was technically well prepared, both by the consultants and by DKI, and its weakness on general managerial and governance issues have been addressed by responsiveness, a rating of **Moderately Satisfactory** is given.

4.7.2 Country Ownership / Drivenness

293 Ownership by the province is evidenced by the perseverance of the previous Governor to fast-track the original design although he bent the rules to get it started, without support of his parliament or national government.

294 Now the parliament supports the BRT as evidenced by the substantial subsidy it approves, and the current Governor takes a close personal interest in the BRT. Even the delay of implementing new corridors is due to the Governor's sense of ownership of the BRT, in his desire to resolve governance issues. He gives personal attention to all advice prepared by ITDP and he has given a commitment to the UNEP Task Manager, to review and implement recommendations from this MTE.

295 While the project has had little contact with the national government, the interviews with national officials would indicate an increasing sense of ownership, and development of national policies supportive of BRT.

296 The rating of **Satisfactory** is given, rather than Highly Satisfactory, as there are still indications that full ownership is yet to be achieved, by having BRT overtly mentioned in national transportation policy, by having public transport considered first in all transportation decisions, and by having the BRT-oriented development included in the DKI spatial plan.

4.7.3 Stakeholder Participation and Public Awareness

297 The project from the start has involved DKI's own stakeholders, including its Transportation Council that includes representatives of advocacy groups. ITDP has made use of several NGOs and academic institutions. In the last two years it has greatly increased its public participation and public awareness programs. There is still far to go, particularly with providing effective signage in and on buses, and in and on *Halte*, as reported elsewhere.

298 There is now effective stakeholder participation in the project, mainly in monitoring and in customer complaints. Much of it is unsustainable, as it is run by ITDP. *TransJakarta* is slowly increasing its capacity to run community-oriented programs. DKI, as government generally in Indonesia, is run bureaucratically, and thus resistant to stakeholder involvement. It now runs an information and complaints service, collecting and passing on complaints, but providing no feedback.

299 The public is hardly involved at all in design. The design for Corridors 11-14/15 has not undergone formal environmental impact assessment. Since the design documents do not match the field situation in several instances, it is advised to improve designs before conducting community consultations required by environmental legislation. ITDP has engaged more co-finance through corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs of a number of companies; they have contributed to minor improvements in performance. The project has nominal concern for vulnerable groups; some attempt has been made to make the BRT accessible to handicapped persons, yet there is still some way to go for the system to reach international standards of access.

300 There are a number of outspoken people who criticise the lack of responsiveness of *TransJakarta*. Such opinion is valuable, but while the Evaluators agree that the project could provide some more support to advocacy, priority should be given to building the capacity in the BRT to be responsive.

301 A rating of **Moderately Unsatisfactory** is given to the level of stakeholder participation and public awareness. This rating needs to be put in perspective. Eighteen months ago, the rating would have been highly unsatisfactory.

4.7.4 Financial Planning

302 This assessment addresses the management of GFE funding, and does not refer to either financial planning of DKI and *TransJakarta*, or of co-financing, which are evaluated elsewhere.

303 The Evaluators have been provided with the original budget in the ProcDoc, and ITDP's budget with quarterly expenditure summaries in Annex 6 on Project Expenditure Summary, as Provided by UNEP. The only line items where expenditure so far exceeds the pro-rated budget are for some senior consultant positions where the entire budget was consumed in little more than two years. Either the original budget was inadequate for the level of skill considered necessary at the time, or the people hired were paid extravagantly. When changes were made to the consultant team two years ago, several of these positions were eliminated. Whatever the problem was, it has been solved.

304 Other than this case, it would appear that ITDP's financial strategy has been frugal rather financial planning. The project has spent at an average rate of about 70 per cent of the planned cash-flow, mainly because of delays in implementation mentioned above. On most on-going activities, such as director's fees and administrative costs, the allowance is slightly underspent.

305 The project thus has a significant amount of funds available for the remainder of the assignment. The Evaluators have been impressed with the speed at which the project team appraised the recommendations of the draft of this report, and prepared a detailed budgeted plan to implement them.

306 While the original effort at financial planning had clear limitations, the financial planning being done now is commendable. The Evaluators have given a rating of **Satisfactory**, reflecting the current situation.

4.7.5 UNEP Supervision and Backstopping

307 The Evaluators have reviewed recent mission reports and PIRs prepared for 2008 and 2009. These reports indicate an awareness of problems within the narrative, and support for solutions discussed with ITDP and Steering Committee. UNEP has largely supported efforts of ITDP and DKI to implement the project, and expedited resolution of problems. UNEP provided a reasonable level of staffing, continuity, skill mix, and frequency of field visits. There is no evidence to suggest that longer or larger missions would have produced better backstopping. The Task Manager resisted a request to shift effort to a location outside of Jakarta which risked reducing the support DKI needed to solve *TransJakarta's* governance problems.

308 The Task Manager has been aware of problems in the definition of objectives and performance indicators. Rather than address these directly, these issues have been included in the MTE TOR. However, the lateness of commissioning this MTE, due in part to staffing issues in the UNEP Evaluation Office, has resulted in late resolution of many pressing issues. The MTE is about 12 months late.

309 A rating of **Satisfactory** is given for supervision and backstopping.

4.7.6 Co-financing and Project Outcomes & Sustainability

310 The main differences in co-financing have been caused by the delay in implementing Corridors 8-14 (which has delayed DKI contributions), and the need for repaving bus-lanes (that has greatly increased DKI contributions). The result is that by the end of 2009, co-financing had almost reached its planned target, while UNEP expenditure has lagged far behind. The original co-financing plan included an estimate of the fee for operators of corridors 8-14, assuming that the buses would be purchased by the operators. Direct purchase of buses for corridors 9 and 10 will show up as capital expenditure in the 2010 report, again greatly increasing the DKI contributions. Should DKI proceed with recommendations of this report on redesign of parts of Corridors 11-14/15, the DKI contribution will increase again. Changes have also occurred through a string of CSR

initiatives in support of the public relations efforts that are insignificant in money value but important in terms of project impact.

311 The substantial increase in co-financing indicates DKI's commitment to the BRT. Although a rating on this aspect was not required by the TOR, the Evaluators have rated co-financing **Highly Satisfactory**.

4.7.7 Delays and Project Outcomes & Sustainability

312 Three significant delays occurred in the project. Firstly, commencement of operations on Corridors 9 and 10 have been delayed for two years now, while awaiting the outcome of arbitration on efforts of DKI to reduce negotiated rates paid to directly-appointed consortium after tenders for new operators came in about 30 per cent below these rates. This delay actually supports the sustainability of the project in several ways, particularly since now operators can be assigned to any corridor, and new articulated buses can soon be used on Corridor 1 where there is proven demand for additional capacity.

313 Secondly, construction of Corridors 11-14 has also been delayed for almost two years. This delay is by order of the Governor, who prioritised improvements on the existing network before proceeding. This delay has a major impact on the projected increases in passengers and reductions in GHG, but may support sustainability as there are many unresolved aspects of the design of many of the corridors that require a different style and detail of planning than was used on the earlier corridors.

314 Thirdly, many improvements in operational performance have also been delayed, ostensibly while waiting for institutional changes to be made (the creation of BLU over the past 18 months, and now creation of the BUMD). Limited improvements are on-going, such as pavement improvements to bus-lanes and upgrading of *Halte* on Corridor 1 to take articulated buses. The lack of attention to much technical advice given by international experts with experience in successful BRT operations, and to simple improvements in management (maintenance, contracting of security, coordination between agencies, etc) is disappointing, as these should have been done in parallel with the institutional changes, in line with the Governor's request for improvement to existing services. Some actions were unaffected by the delays, particularly efforts in public relations.

315 Thus delays have had a mixed impact on sustainability of the project. Although a rating on this aspect was not required by the TOR, the Evaluators have rated the overall impact of delays as **Satisfactory**.

Overall assessment and rating on processes that affected attainment of project results

316 The Evaluators have given a **Satisfactory** rating to the overall impact of processes that affected attainment of project results, noting that only one of these aspects, Stakeholder Participation and Public Awareness, was less than satisfactory.

5 Conclusions

5.1 Overall Rating

317 The accompanying table (5.1) provides the Evaluators' overall ratings of the project, and concludes with an overall rating of **Moderately Unsatisfactory**. However, though the Evaluators are convinced that a strong basis for significant improvement has been laid. The Evaluators would expect at least a **Satisfactory** rating by the end of the project.

318 The overall rating reflects the larger weighting the Evaluators have given to achievement of outputs and activities, which is rated Unsatisfactory. When the Evaluators discussed ratings with the UNEP Task Manager and the ITDP team, they expressed some

concern about the possible reaction of DKI. The Evaluators pointed out press reports of a similar assessment already made by the Governor and other senior officials. When the evaluation was presented to the Steering Committee and to the Governor, it was taken as an objective assessment, linked to tangible recommendations for improvement.

Table 5.1: Rating Summary

| Criterion | Evaluator's Summary Comments | Evaluator Rating |
|--|---|--|
| A. Attainment of project objectives and results | | Overall rating |
| | | MS |
| A. 1. Effectiveness | The rating is based on the responsiveness of the project to the need to resolve governance issues, and the perception that the project is capable of significant improvement now these problems are almost resolved. If the rating had been based merely on technical improvement of performance of the BRT, it would have been less. | MS |
| A. 2. Relevance | The project remains one of the most relevant in Jakarta for responding to climate change, and is recognised by the public as a positive initiative to reduce congestion. | HS |
| A. 3. Efficiency | The project has been efficient on a number of measures. Particularly, it has employed highly skilled local consultants, and has been frugal in its expenditures. The BRT itself is not yet efficient. | S |
| B. Sustainability of Project outcomes | | Overall rating |
| | | ML |
| B. 1. Financial | ITDP prepared an oversimplified projection of satisfactory financial sustainability. Considering that recording of unrecorded assets would produce a worse projection, and tapping untapped resources (such as advertising) would produce a better projection, a Moderately Likely rating is retained. | ML |
| B. 2. Socio-political | The BRT has overcome substantial negative political opinion, and is now an accepted feature of Jakarta transport. The Evaluators would have given a higher rating of "Likely" if DKI had paid greater attention to passenger demand, passenger complaints, community advocacy and continual improvement, and if it had been more consistent on BRT in its own planning documents. | ML |
| B. 3. Institutional framework and governance | DKI has laid the foundations for institutional sustainability. If these plans are carried out, then a "Likely" rating will be appropriate. If they are not carried out, and the current institutional framework and governance prevails, a rating of "Unlikely" would be appropriate. | ML |
| B. 4. Ecological | Positive impact of BRT on global environment limited by wastage. Safety of passengers between BRT and origin / destination not yet addressed | L |
| C. Achievement of outputs and activities | | Overall rating |
| | | U |
| | | Progress on Ticketing, Transport Demand Management (TDM) , and Outreach to other cities have been rated moderately satisfactory. Only one of these relates to the performance of <i>TransJakarta</i> . All other components are rated below satisfactory, resulting in the overall rating of Unsatisfactory. In part, this is due to the Governor setting other priorities, laying the groundwork for a better rating by the end of the project. |
| D. Monitoring and Evaluation | | Overall rating |
| | | MU |
| D.1. M&E Design | Poor KPIs, work breakdown, milestones and indicators. | U |
| D.2. M&E Plan Implementation (use for adaptive management) | Although the M&E design has been unsatisfactory, good performance oriented managers in ITDP and in UNEP have been sensitive to needs and adaptive. | S |
| D.3. Budgeting and Funding for M&E activities | The Budget has been adequate for M&E activities. | MS |

Key to Rating Codes used:

HS = Highly Satisfactory (Excellent) MU = Moderately Unsatisfactory (Below Average)
 S = Satisfactory (Well above average) U = Unsatisfactory (Poor)
 MS = Moderately Satisfactory (Average) HU = Highly Unsatisfactory (Very poor)

For Sustainability only:

L = Likely
 ML = Moderately likely
 MU = Moderately unlikely
 U = Unlikely

Table 5.1: Rating Summary, continued

| Criterion | Evaluator's Summary Comments | Evaluator Rating |
|---|---|------------------|
| E. Catalytic role | | |
| F. Processes that affected attainment of project results | Overall rating | S |
| F.i Preparation and readiness | The project was technically well prepared, both by the consultants and by DKI, but weak on general managerial and governance issues, and design of performance indicators. | MS |
| F.ii Country ownership / drivenness | When the busway started it was a single leader's ambition, and he bent the rules to get it started, without support of his parliament or national government. The new governor maintains a strong sense of ownership and a desire to correct poor governance and performance. The parliament supports a significant subsidy. There is growing national ownership. | S |
| F.iii Stakeholders involvement | Two years ago, there was negligible stakeholder involvement. ITDP has since instituted an initiative of significant improvements over the last two years, which has yet to be fully adopted by the BRT. DKI, as government generally in Indonesia, is run bureaucratically, and thus resistant to stakeholder involvement, so there is major room for improvement | MU |
| F.iv Financial planning | The original financial planning would appear to have been weak on several points, but the Evaluators have been impressed by the frugality of the project and the detail of financial planning going into the adjustments in response to recommendations of the draft MTE report. | S |
| F.v UNEP Supervision and backstopping | The reports of UNEP supervision missions have been incisive, and inputs to steering committee meetings helpful and well-received. A higher rating would be possible if the MTE had been on time, and if UNEP would have insisted on correcting weaknesses of the project design | S |
| Overall Rating | While the rating of Moderately Unsatisfactory appears negative, a strong basis for significant improvement has been laid. The Evaluators would expect at least a satisfactory rating by the end of the project. Both public comments and statements by political leaders indicate this rating is shared by the people of Jakarta. | MU |

Key to Rating Codes used:

HS = Highly Satisfactory (Excellent) MU = Moderately Unsatisfactory (Below Average)
 S = Satisfactory (Well above average) U = Unsatisfactory (Poor)
 MS = Moderately Satisfactory (Average) HU = Highly Unsatisfactory (Very poor)

For Sustainability only:

L = Likely
 ML = Moderately likely
 MU = Moderately unlikely
 U = Unlikely

5.2 General Conclusions

General Objective

319 The people of Jakarta have long been calling for improvement in transport in Jakarta. However, apart from marginal improvements to the rail system in the 1990s, all efforts to improve transport were directed to the road system and thus private transport, never keeping up with the increase in ownership of cars and motorcycles. Bus transport continued to get worse, without any breakthroughs, until 2003, when the then-Governor of Jakarta made a bold decision to build the BRT.

320 The selection of BRT was appropriate. Along selected corridors, it would prove far more effective at moving passengers than the clogged lanes that normal buses shared with other traffic. By comparison with high investment and long preparation time for alternative modes of public transport, it could be quickly implemented at moderate expense. When the BRT started to use CNG, it was even more efficient / environmentally friendly.

321 Lacking support in either his parliament or central government, the Governor needed to do it faster and more cheaply than anywhere else in the world, in order to generate popular response from users, who would give him political support against the voices of his opponents. His solution, a compromise on design standards and a misuse of emergency funds, gained the popular response he needed; the BRT had gained popular support by the time this project commenced. The ProDoc indicated this support could be fickle, and could dissipate unless the system was expanded and improved.

322 DKI sought the help of UNEP-GEF to expand and improve it. A new Governor, the first popularly-elected leader of the city, chose to improve the existing network first, before agreeing to the expansion of the system agreed in the ProDoc.

Achievement of outputs

323 The improvements the Governor sought covered governance and legal issues, as well as performance issues. But while solutions to the governance and legal issues were being sought, the bureaucracy did little either to improve the existing situation, or to assure that the BRT would continue to improve in the long term.

324 Of the eight components of the project that relate to the Jakarta BRT, just one was deferred by the Governor's decision to improve before expand. That component was the development of new corridors. Of the remaining components, two have made satisfactory progress, being optimizing the fare system and developing transport demand management measures to reduce private motor vehicle use. The satisfactory progress made on both these components has been in the evaluation of alternatives and development of proposals. Neither has yet got to the stage of requiring decisions or development of policies.

325 Five components have achieved well below a satisfactory performance:

- a. There has been little improvement of intersection performance;
- b. There has been little optimization of busway operations;
- c. There has been little improvement of public information on the BRT, even though the project has developed many information aids;
- d. There has been no rationalization of Non-BRT Bus Routes;
- e. Other than the excellent pedestrianisation of Plaza Fatahillah, there seems to have been no serious efforts to improve pedestrian and NMT Facilities along corridors;

326 The Evaluators attempted to discern whether the heads of the various agencies responsible for aspects of the system deliberately failed to carry out the expressed will of the Governor, or whether the nature of the bureaucracy itself made it inordinately hard for them to work together to improve the service.

327 A closer analysis of the component for optimizing the busway operation helps to understand why overall performance has been so low. Two aspects of operations did improve as a result of the Governor's decision: (a) the basis for governance of *TransJakarta* by the creation of a BLU, and (b) the agreement to base contracts on competitive bidding, and re-negotiation of earlier bus-operator contracts. Another improvement was changing the busway pavement; this improvement was imperative, as the old pavement was crumbling, and was institutionally simple compared with most other aspects, as it could be carried out under existing practices.

328 These improvements are far outweighed by other aspects of the busway operation. Firstly, the bureaucracy has been unable to respond to public demand:

- a. Many *Halte* and pedestrian overbridges are clearly inadequate for the passenger demand, and little has been done systematically to improve them.

- b. The considerable managerial effort on making operational plans and on operations management has little responsiveness to passenger demand; there are often long queues of passengers, even sometimes when there are queues of buses.
- c. Over 50 per cent of on-board announcement systems found to be non-operational were fixed, not in response to public demand or concern for passengers, but in response to the finding of the Evaluators.

329 Secondly, the bureaucracy sticks to current practices, even when clearly inappropriate or wrong. It appears unable to take initiative:

- a. *TransJakarta* uses an annual bidding and contracting process for ticketing, security and cleaning services. For about five months a year, while waiting for budget and tenders, *TransJakarta* takes over the management of these services until a new contract is awarded, an absurdly inefficient and unproductive process.
- b. The special problem of assuring CNG supplies to buses has remained unresolved for the life of the project.
- c. The Evaluators found that *TransJakarta* has professional financial managers, as a result of negative reporting from the supreme audit authority, but there are still many aspects of financial management still to be improved, primarily the transfer of assets to *TransJakarta*.

330 The Evaluators conclude it is not that senior bureaucrats disregard their Governor, but that the bureaucracy itself prevents them to detect or respond to public demand, good managerial values or professional principles. The BRT, like the rest of the city government, is still oriented to regulatory compliance rather than service to the people of Jakarta. Even the new institutional arrangement of BLU is oriented to Minimum Service Standards, rather than incentives to continually improve performance. Changes in work culture are needed.

331 Most of the technical problems identified in this evaluation, and the action needed to overcome them, are found in advice already given. BRTs around the world have similar technical problems, and ITDP has consistently supplied professional advice. An excellent BRT can be managed by DKI, if it employs competent people and provides them with the authority and incentives to perform, and holds them accountable.

332 Reform of government in Indonesia began in 1998, but reform of the bureaucracy itself has only been made the focus of national development in 2010. Changes not possible when the project started are now requisite. Now is an appropriate time to introduce fundamental reforms to delivery of public services, including the BRT.

Sustainability of the BRT

333 The Jakarta BRT rates relatively well on most aspect of sustainability evaluated. One aspect deserves particular comment: the place of public transport in public decision-making.

334 Public transport and pedestrian movement can only be improved when they are given highest priority on road and traffic policy and design. Unless all roads, intersections, and traffic lights are designed to cater first for public transport and pedestrians, then public transport will remain a lower priority than private transport, and congestion will get worse.

335 The BRT will be used more, when strategic destinations are close to *Halte*. More destinations will be close to *Halte*, when property developers are given incentives to develop land adjacent to them. Sustainability of the BRT is dependent on it being indicated clearly in spatial plans.

Management of the project

336 Despite the negative nature of the overall evaluation, weaknesses found in the project design, and changes made to the scope of work, the project is currently remarkably well managed, both by the ITDP team, and the DKI counterparts. There is high country ownership / drivenness, most stakeholders are involved, and UNEP provides thorough supervision and backstopping.

337 Also, while the design of the M&E system has been found wanting, the actual monitoring and evaluation has generally been thorough and well-documented.

6 Lessons to be Learned

Scope

338 The TOR of this MTE calls for lessons to be learnt in the form of “general conclusions from the standpoint of the design and implementation of the project, based on good practices and successes or problems and mistakes. Lessons should have the potential for wider application and use.” The Evaluators have approached this section with the questions: In hindsight, how would the Evaluators have designed and implemented this project differently? What can be done now to assure future projects like this avoid problems? How can serendipitous successes be turned into planned ones?

Champions of good governance

339 Project design should by default have components for governance and management issues.

340 Projects like this BRT in Jakarta are dependent on a balance between champions with a passion for results, and systems that assure accountability. In the start of the BRT, before the project started, the Governor was indeed a champion, but in hindsight he was weak on issues of accountability. There was a high cost of neglecting principles of good governance. The new Governor, on the other hand, is stronger on issues of accountability, and professes also to be a man of action, proven to be so in other areas of governance and development.

341 The lesson from this is twofold. The first is that all projects should be led by a champion of the goals being sought. The second is that also there should be a champion of good governance to advise the champion on governance and accountability.

Building in incentives for continual improvement

342 All initiatives in reforming the provision of public services within bureaucratic government environments should pay due heed to governance systems that promote continual improvement of services, clear lines of accountability, and a performance-oriented work-ethic. For UNEP, due attention needs to be given to this issue in future project design, with agreement by the recipient of aid for advisory guidance on such broader policy issues.

Monitoring and Evaluation

343 Project design should include both project progress indicators (to compare progress against plans in terms of activities and outputs) and effectiveness indicators (to measure the extent to which the project components have achieved their desired outcomes). Where appropriate, indicators should be able to be consolidated into overall performance indicators.

Managing changes in scope

344 When UNEP agrees to changes to the scope of work, they should also agree to how these changes are incorporated into the work breakdown structure by agreeing to new or changed objectives, and effective performance indicators. MTEs should be held closer to mid-term to allow more time for response to recommendations.

7 Recommendations

7.1 Project Extension

345 The Evaluators were asked to consider the needs of a possible extension. From the outset and in principle, the Evaluators considered that an extension should be avoided, as a new leader of *TransJakarta* should be able to seek further technical advice from local sources. If some of the recommendations of this report, that require ITDP inputs beyond the remaining time of the project, are to be implemented, then a short no-cost extension may be justified. A condition would be that, within a few weeks following the MTE, DKI and ITDP can demonstrate the benefits of an extension on the basis of a realistic action plan for the remaining time of the project, and that they can prove that *TransJakarta* will be independent of externally funded ITDP support by the end of the extension.

7.2 Key recommendations for the immediate future

346 The Table of Recommendations (7.1) includes a number of imperative recommendations, identified by the letters “AA” in the priority column, which need to be implemented as soon as possible to comply with the law. The following list are the most important other recommendations from the table to establish a change of culture in DKI that is needed for a successful BRT:

- a. DKI should immediately adopt a policy that all new roadways must be designed firstly to improve public transport, and secondly to improve private transport.
- b. DKI should create a BUMD for the BRT, in order to assure that highly competent management can be appointed to run it.
- c. The Governor should immediately commence a head-hunt for a highly competent performance-oriented Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the BUMD, to be responsible for its development and transition. This person should not take responsibility for managing the BRT until the conversion to BUMD is complete.
- d. DKI should adopt Best Value principles to help change the culture of government agencies to public service and continual improvement.
- e. DKI should establish an instrument of Detailed Work Plan (*perincian rencana kerja, PRK*) needed to complement working budget documents (DPA), as an aid to coordination of implementation of busway activities.
- f. Conduct public consultations on busway design, in compliance with environmental control legislation, and make further improvements to designs based on feedback from the public.
- g. DKI should determine its capacity and willingness to fund improvements during the coming planning and budgeting session, as a basis of the design of changes to the project.
- h. In order to assist public debate and help promote advocacy for reforms, this report should be made public by DKI, and a translation published as soon as possible.

7.3 Recommendations on each evaluation parameter

347 The following multi-page Table 7.1 presents recommendations on all aspects of the project. To facilitate cross-referencing, the subject of recommendations are in the same order and under the same sub-headings as in Section 4. Right-hand columns indicate who should implement them, the time frame for implementation (immediate, during the remainder of the UNEP project, and beyond it), and the priority (imperative, important, desirable and proposed for consideration).

Table 7.1 Table of recommendations on each evaluation parameter

| No | Recommendation | To | When | Priority |
|---|--|------------------------|------|----------|
| Sustainability | | | | |
| Financial Sustainability | | | | |
| <i>See also recommendations on institutional framework, governance and management issues that are aimed at making BRT Jakarta more financially sustainable.</i> | | | | |
| 1 | DKI should hand over authority to <i>TransJakarta</i> to gain revenue from advertising. | DKI | ② | A |
| 2 | DKI should immediately transfer all assets to <i>TransJakarta</i> , and report the full extent of subsidies provided to it. | DKI | ① | AA |
| 3 | DKI should immediately develop policies similar to public service obligations (PSO) for determining subsidies for public services; ITDP should assist <i>TransJakarta</i> to develop the appropriate subsidy for the BRT based on the public service provided by reducing dependence on private transport and reducing GHG. | DKI ITDP | ② | A |
| Socio-political Sustainability | | | | |
| <i>Recommendations to DKI and ITDP on socio-political sustainability of the BRT in Jakarta are covered under other headings below.</i> | | | | |
| 4 | To assure sustainability of BRT throughout Indonesia, Gol must assure that the Government Regulations and transportation blue-print now being drafted requires regional governments to give higher priority to pedestrians and public transport users than private transport. | Gol | ① | A |
| 5 | The central government should consider a special allocation grant (DAK) to regions to subsidise footpath construction, as an incentive to develop pedestrianisation schemes combined with public transport development. | Gol | ② | C |
| 6 | National government should delegate authority over footpaths and bus lanes on national roads to governors, so that governors can on-delegate and coordinate with city governments as required. | Gol | ② | A |
| Institutional and Governance Sustainability | | | | |
| 7 | DKI should create a BUMD for the BRT, in order to assure that highly competent management can be appointed to run it.* | Governor | ① | A |
| 8 | The Governor should immediately commence a head-hunt for a highly competent performance-oriented Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the BUMD, to be responsible for its development and transition. This person should not take responsibility for managing the BRT until the conversion to BUMD is complete, when the operations are handed over by the current management. | Governor | ① | A |
| 9 | The Governor should appoint the proposed BUMD commissionaires, and commission them to appraise the plans and decisions of the appointed chief executive, giving the chief executive and commissionaires a free hand in designing a high performing professional organisation. | Governor | ② | C |
| 10 | <i>TransJakarta</i> should be given control over assets and decisions that affect performance, including design of corridors, <i>Halte</i> and terminals and accompanying access bridges and ramps, and all procurement. | DKI | ② | AA |
| 11 | On commencement of operations as a BUMD, senior management and critical positions should be filled by the best qualified professional candidates. | <i>TransJakarta</i> | ② | A |
| 12 | The Head of <i>DisHub</i> as chief operating officer of DKI responsible for transport needs to be given clear responsibility to regulate and oversee <i>TransJakarta</i> without interfering with operations. | Governor Sekda | ② | A |
| 13 | DKI should immediately commence regular consolidated reporting on the project covering all agencies contributing to its effectiveness. | All agencies of DKI | ① | AA |
| 14 | DKI should fully implement MTEF (medium term expenditure framework) practices in line with national policy on bureaucratic reform, in order to drive continual improvement through the planning and budgeting process. | DKI | ② | AA |

Key: Time frame

- ① Immediate
- ② During remainder of project
- ③ Beyond end of project

Priority

- AA Imperative
- A Important
- B Desirable
- C Proposed for consideration

Recommendations introduced since the draft report, are marked with a *.

Table 7.1 Table of recommendations on each evaluation parameter, continued

| No | Recommendation | To | When | Priority |
|--|--|---|------|----------|
| 15 | DKI should adopt Best Value principles to help change the culture of government agencies to public service and continual improvement (see Annex 12 for summary of Best Value). | DKI | ② | A |
| 16 | <i>TransJakarta</i> should apply the principles of Best Value in its management, to promote a culture of public service and continual improvement. | <i>TransJakarta</i> | ② | A |
| 17 | Future programs of DKI should place importance on the generation of data on costs standards and performance standards as the basis of effective management. This requires also the development of a profession of skilled cost analysts.* | DKI | ② | B |
| 18 | DKI should identify contributions to BRT of any agency in a separate sub-programme to enable coordination of planning and BRT budget approvals | DKI DPRD Bappeda | ② | A |
| 19 | DKI should establish an instrument of Detailed Work Plan (<i>perincian rencana kerja</i> , PRK) needed to complement working budget documents (DPA), as an aid to coordination of implementation of busway activities. | DKI DPRD Sekda | ② | A |
| 20 | <i>Pergub 123</i> (gubernatorial regulation on procurement of BRT operators) should be annulled. | Governor | ① | AA |
| Achievement of Outputs and Activities | | | | |
| Develop BRT Corridors 4-14 (Component 1) | | | | |
| 21 | If Corridors 9 and 10 are to be ready for operation by early 2011, there is an urgent need to identify what repairs / redesign is required and to tender the required work for quick completion. | <i>DisHub</i> , <i>TransJakarta</i> | ① | A |
| 22 | A quick review of the engineering designs for Corridors 11 to 14 suggests that they have been designed in accordance with past practice. The designs should be reviewed and improved, and take into consideration aspects such as the optimization of bus station locations, diversions to locations with potential high demand, overtaking lanes provided where possible and the needs of pedestrians and busway passengers are taken into account. The design review should also take into account forecast passenger flows. | <i>TransJakarta</i> , <i>DisHub</i> , <i>DisPU</i> , Bappeda, spatial planning agency, ITDP | ② | A |
| Special Issue: future BRT corridors | | | | |
| 23 | DKI should immediately adopt a policy that all new roadways must be designed firstly to improve public transport, and secondly to improve private transport. | DKI | ① | A |
| 24 | DKI should immediately review plans for the elevated roads in (a) Kebayoran Baru to accommodate extension and improvements to Corridor 1, and (b) from Tanah Abang to Matraman to accommodate a new BRT corridor. DKI is encouraged to ask ITDP and UNEP to support any design changes | DKI, ITDP UNEP | ① ② | A |
| 25 | DKI should initiate preparation of its Traffic and Transportation Master Plan (RILLAJ). ITDP should immediate design support for it, for UNEP approval of budget revision. The RILLAJ should be integrated with the master plan for roads and an amendment to the spatial plan. The principles for the future of the BRT in the RILLAJ should be completed within the remaining time of the project. | DKI, ITDP UNEP | ① ② | A |
| Optimize Fare System for Corridors 1-14 (Component 2) | | | | |
| 26 | The need for a good ticketing system for the BRT is clear, and it is proposed that DKI, including <i>TransJakarta</i> with advice from ITDP, should prepare a TOR for the supply of a system, probably similar the one operating in Seoul. To avoid problems with respect to transparency, the TOR should contain clear conceptual proposals but should not include too detailed 'technical' proposals, so that bidders can show creativity and innovation, using proven and tested technologies. The proposed system must be capable of expansion to cover additional corridors / routes, at reasonable cost. <u>And it must be maintained.</u> | DKI, <i>TransJakarta</i> , ITDP | ② | B |
| 27 | <i>TransJakarta</i> and Bank DKI should review the security arrangements of cash collections, to assure security of both cash and BRT personnel. | <i>TransJakarta</i> , Bank DKI | ② | B |

Key: Time frame

- ① Immediate
- ② During remainder of project
- ③ Beyond end of project

Priority

- AA Imperative
- A Important
- B Desirable
- C Proposed for consideration

Recommendations introduced since the draft report, are marked with a *.

Table 7.1 Table of recommendations on each evaluation parameter, continued

| No | Recommendation | To | When | Priority |
|---|--|--|------|----------|
| Improve Intersection Performance for BRT (Component 3) | | | | |
| 28 | ITDP should confirm that the proposed ATC system is appropriate and technically sound, and after such confirmation, the system should be introduced, making sure that priorities for public transport are included in the proposal. | ITDP, <i>DisHub</i> | ② | B |
| 29 | The Traffic Police have recently agreed to police the bus lanes; hence, they are currently cooperating with the BRT. In the same spirit, they should be prepared to shorten cycle times on signals that adversely affect the BRT. | Police, <i>DisHub</i> | ② | B |
| Optimize Busway Operation (Component 4) | | | | |
| 30 | In the revisions for the remaining period of the project, this component should be classified into different aspects of operations. | ITDP UNEP | ① | A |
| | <i>Optimise Design</i> | | | |
| 31 | A quick review of the engineering designs for Corridors 11 to 14 suggests that they have been designed in accordance with past practice. The designs should be reviewed and improved, and take into consideration aspects such as the optimization of bus station locations, diversions to locations with potential high demand, overtaking lanes provided where possible and the needs of pedestrians and busway passengers are taken into account. The design review should also take into account forecast passenger flows. | <i>TransJakarta, DisHub, DisPU, Bappeda, spatial planning agency, ITDP</i> | ② | A |
| 32 | Exclusivity or buses only in the bus lane is a prerequisite for the BRT. Hence, separating medians on the existing corridors should be reviewed, with a view to making the bus lanes more exclusive. | <i>DisPU TransJakarta</i> | ② | A |
| | <i>Optimise Operational Planning and Operations Management</i> | | | |
| 33 | In the interests of preparing better Operational Plans, there is a need for better data collection and analysis. Related, <i>TransJakarta</i> and ITDP should review current practice and needs, and identify what data is required, and how it should be analysed. | <i>TransJakarta ITDP</i> | ② | A |
| 34 | Review terminating some buses on counter-peak directions to make empty buses available where there are now long queues. | <i>TransJakarta ITDP</i> | ② | A |
| 35 | Consider transferring management of on-board security staff to bus operators. Change security uniforms to be more conspicuous. | <i>TransJakarta</i> | ② | A |
| | <i>Optimise Maintenance</i> | | | |
| 36 | <i>TransJakarta</i> should require 'passenger information systems' and 'LED Displays' on all corridors, and immediately repair any problems. In addition, they should require bus operators to check on the air conditioning systems and the shock absorbers of all buses, and repair or replace all defective systems. | <i>TransJakarta</i> | ② | B |
| 37 | <i>TransJakarta</i> and performance partners should assure routine bridge cleaning, and regular footpath maintenance. | <i>TransJakarta, Dinas Kebersihan, DisPU</i> | ② | B |
| | <i>Optimize Financial Management</i> | | | |
| 38 | Implement imperative financial management reforms, in particular transfer of assets, and proper checks and balances in contract management. | DKI <i>TransJakarta</i> | ① | AA |
| 39 | Implement important financial management reforms, in particular improvements to multi-year budgeting, and provision of data on costs and performance standards to enable operational managers to make decisions that provide the best value of service to the public. | <i>TransJakarta</i> | ② | A |

Key: Time frame

- ① Immediate
- ② During remainder of project
- ③ Beyond end of project

Priority

- AA Imperative
- A Important
- B Desirable
- C Proposed for consideration

Recommendations introduced since the draft report, are marked with a *.

Table 7.1 Table of recommendations on each evaluation parameter, continued

| No | Recommendation | To | When | Priority |
|--|--|---|------|----------|
| | <i>Optimize Governance</i> | | | |
| 40 | The CEO-appointee (see recommendation 8) should prepare a strategy for making the BUMD service and continual improvement-driven. | CEO-appointee | ② | A |
| 41 | The CEO-appointee (see recommendation 8) should prepare a strategy for contracting of services to assure value for money, advantages of the private sector over the public sector, and best practices of asset management. | CEO-appointee | ② | A |
| 42 | The CEO-appointee should set the policy on the use of old buses at the end of the Corridor 1 contract. | <i>TransJakarta</i> , CEO-appointee | ① ② | A |
| 43 | ITDP should provide advice to <i>TransJakarta</i> and DKI on the valuation of existing licences on Corridors 9 and 10. If necessary, contracts for new bus operations should be revised to include the value of any rightful compensation. | ITDP <i>TransJakarta</i> | ① | A |
| 44 | <i>TransJakarta</i> should immediately prepare for multi-year contracting of all operational contracts. Contracts for 2011 should be reviewed by the CEO-appointee before tendering. | <i>TransJakarta</i> | ① | AA |
| | <i>Gas Supply</i> | | | |
| 45 | As the problem of gas supply would seem to be more political than technical, it is recommended that the Governor should bring the matter to the attention of the Coordinating Minister for the Economy, based on supporting documentation prepared by ITDP and endorsed by the project Steering Committee. | DKI ITDP Coordinating Minister for the Economy | ① | A |
| Improve Public Information on BRT & Public Transport (component 5) | | | | |
| 46 | New buses should include better more reliable voice and LED systems to indicate the up-coming destination, covering all corridors on all buses. | <i>TransJakarta</i> | ① | A |
| 47 | The project should appoint a consultant to prepare a comprehensive plan for improving BRT signing. The same consultants should also have responsibility for providing proposals with respect to advertising. | <i>TransJakarta</i> ITDP | ② | A |
| Rationalize Non-BRT Bus Routes (Component 6) | | | | |
| 48 | DKI should consider that arranging new bus routes and licenses be undertaken by an ad hoc group, led by someone capable of coordinating parties with vested interests, and negotiating agreement. The overall task could be managed by the DKI BAPPEDA. Each of the ad hoc groups would cover a particular catchment area, and be headed by a trained negotiator, who is familiar with all aspects related to bus route licensing. | DKI | ② | B |
| Evaluate and Implement Transport Demand Management Measures to Reduce Private Motor Vehicle Use (Comp. 7) | | | | |
| 49 | Gol and DKI should proceed with preparing proposals for an Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) system. There is a need for both legal and technical aspects to be considered; subject to agreement in principle on legal aspects, the technical aspects can be studied in parallel with the legal aspects. Critical aspects to be covered are catchment area of the system, tariffs and hours of operation | Gol, DKI | ③ | B |
| Improve Pedestrian and NMT Facilities in Centre and Along Corridors (Component 8) | | | | |
| 50 | Introduce a programme to improve access to all <i>Halte</i> , taking into account the appropriate width of footpaths, safety, accessibility, maintenance and cleaning, and appropriate provisions for food stalls and hawkers. | <i>TransJakarta</i> <i>DisPU</i> spatial planning ITDP | ② ③ | A |
| 51 | The project should provide for creating a pilot for excellent access to one or more <i>Halte</i> by pedestrians and cyclists. This should integrate with the design of facilities for improved access for feeder services, and PMV, taxi and <i>ojek</i> drop-off. | Steering Committee, UNEP, IDTP | ② | B |

Key: Time frame

- ① Immediate
- ② During remainder of project
- ③ Beyond end of project

Priority

- AA Imperative
- A Important
- B Desirable
- C Proposed for consideration

Recommendations introduced since the draft report, are marked with a *.

Table 7.1 Table of recommendations on each evaluation parameter, continued

| No | Recommendation | To | When | Priority |
|---|---|-----------------------------------|------|----------|
| Dissemination and Outreach to Other Cities (component 9) | | | | |
| 52 | ITDP should complete its proposal for working with Pekanbaru for UNEP approval. | ITDP, UNEP | ② | B |
| 53 | ITDP should immediately design support for the preparation of the Tangerang-Kalideres corridor, for UNEP approval of budget revision. ITDP should avoid advising on the issue of cooperation between DKI and Tangerang for joint operation across the border. | ITDP, Tangerang Kemhub UNEP | ① ② | A |
| 54 | DKI and Tangerang should consider a simple barter arrangement for joint operation of the Tangerang – Harmoni route, swapping kilometres travelled by Tangerang BRT operators on DKI bus-lanes, with kilometres travelled by DKI BRT operators on Tangerang bus-lanes. | DKI, Tangerang | ② | C |
| Monitoring and Evaluation | | | | |
| <i>Recommendations on long-term monitoring are contained elsewhere in this table.</i> | | | | |
| 55 | With the changes planned for the project, the M&E system should be redesigned with improved indicators on improved work breakdown structure. | ITDP and partners, UNEP | ① | A |
| Processes that Affected Attainment of Project Results | | | | |
| Stakeholder Participation and Public Awareness | | | | |
| 56 | In the review of Corridors 11-14 recommended elsewhere, improve the design, conduct public consultations in compliance with environmental control legislation, and make further improvements to the designs based on feedback from the public. | <i>TransJakarta, DisHub</i> | ② | AA |
| Co-financing and Project Outcomes & Sustainability | | | | |
| 57 | DKI should determine its capacity and willingness to fund improvements during the coming planning and budgeting session, as a basis of the design of changes to the project. | DKI | ① | A |
| Final Recommendation | | | | |
| 58 | In order to assist public debate and help promote advocacy for reforms, this report should be made public by DKI, and a translation published as soon as possible.* | DKI | ① | A |

Key: Time frame

- ① Immediate
- ② During remainder of project
- ③ Beyond end of project

Priority

- AA Imperative
- A Important
- B Desirable
- C Proposed for consideration

Recommendations introduced since the draft report, are marked with a *.

Annexes

Annex 1 TERMS OF REFERENCE

Mid-term Evaluation of the UNEP/GEF project GF/4010-07-01 (4960) “Bus Rapid Transit and Pedestrian Improvements in Jakarta”

1. PROJECT BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW

Project rationale

New developments in the urban transport sector in Indonesia promise to counter the trend of increasing greenhouse gas emissions in this sector. Jakarta's nascent bus rapid transit (BRT) system has begun to re-allocate scarce road space in the centre of the city to efficient public transportation and has already resulted in a shift of trips from private motor vehicles. Jakarta and other Indonesia cities also have begun to improve pedestrian facilities to increase the number of walking trips, important to the development of public transport. The Institute for Transportation and Development Policy (ITDP) and its partners, which have thus far provided technical support for the Jakarta BRT, seek to develop a longer-term technical support system to help bring bus rapid transit and pedestrian improvements in Indonesia up to international state-of-the-art.

The overall objective of this project is to maximize effectiveness of the Jakarta BRT and use it as a catalyst for urban transport reform in Jakarta and other key Indonesian cities. Jakarta is at a crossroads: over the next few years, the city will either construct a premier bus rapid transit system, providing large transport and environmental benefits to its populace and a beacon for other cities in the country and region, or it will implement a system with problems and shortcomings that result in mediocre performance, ultimately cutting short its expansion or even precipitating its removal (the first corridor is, in fact, designed with easily removable lane separators, so that the road space can be given back to cars if need be). Such a failure would damage the entire concept of BRT in Asia and diminish the promise for development of other systems in the region. Thus the first eight (of nine) specific objectives in this project focus on ensuring the success of this system, through its optimized implementation and expansion from its current single corridor to a full system of 14 corridors, covering most of the city, over the next five years.

Apart from bus rapid transit, the project will explicitly support the development of non-motorized transportation systems and infrastructure, transit oriented development and transportation demand management to reduce use of private motor vehicles. Improvements in these areas will provide critical complements to BRT development, and together form the tools to achieve a long-term, sustainable shift to less greenhouse gas emitting forms of transportation.

The project has two main goals:

1. To improve the performance of the Jakarta BRT
2. Utilize BRT to build image of public transport and improve pedestrian, TDM, NMT, and land use options

Relevance to GEF Programmes

The capacity of BRT to simultaneously address multiple local developmental objectives while significantly reducing GHG emissions makes it highly consistent with the GEF criteria under Operational Programme 11.

Executing Arrangements

The implementing agency for this project is UNEP and the executing agencies are Institute for Transportation and Development Policy (ITDP), and DKI Jakarta Government.

Project Activities

An overall emphasis of project activities is on assessment and training designed to build understanding and technical capacity both within the project team and with outside stakeholders.

The project has nine components:

1. Develop BRT corridors 4-14
2. Optimize fare system for corridors 1-14
3. Improve intersection performance for BRT
4. Optimize Busway operation
5. Improve public information on BRT & public transport
6. Rationalize non-BRT bus routes
7. Evaluate and implement transport demand management measures to reduce private motor vehicle use

8. Improve pedestrian and NMT facilities in centre and along corridors

Budget

| FINANCING PLAN (US\$) | |
|--|--------------------|
| GEF PROJECT/COMPONENT | |
| Project | 5,812,000 |
| PDF A | |
| PDF B | 348,300 |
| PDF C | |
| • <i>SUB-TOTAL GEF</i> | 6,160,300 |
| CO-FINANCING | |
| Gov't of Jakarta (cash) | 187,661,000 |
| Gov't of Jakarta (in-kind) | 210,000 |
| ITDP (cash) | 104,000 |
| Others | |
| <i>Sub-Total Co-financing:</i> | 187,975,000 |
| <i>Total Project Financing:</i> | 194,135,300 |
| FINANCING FOR ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES IF ANY: | |
| LEVERAGED RESOURCES IF ANY: | |
| -- | |

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EVALUATION**1. Objective and Scope of the Evaluation**

The objective of this mid-term review (MTR) is to assess operational aspects, such as project management and implementation of activities and also the level of progress towards the achievement of the objectives. The review will assess project performance and the implementation of planned project activities and planned outputs against actual results. The risks to achievement of project outcomes and objectives will also be appraised (see Annex 5). **The Mid Term Evaluation will focus on identifying the corrective actions needed for the project to achieve maximum impact. Review findings will feed back into project management processes through specific recommendations and 'lessons learned' to date.**

The evaluation will focus on the following main questions:

Does the design of the project contribute towards?

1. Improving the performance of the Jakarta BRT
2. Utilizing BRT to build image of public transport and improving pedestrian, TDM, NMT, and land use options

The evaluation should consider the following issues with a focus on the question of how to strengthen Jakarta's BRT service quality:

1. Transfer of international best practices (operational and technology) to Jakarta
2. Institutional and capacity issues of project executing agencies and partners
3. Political relations within DKI Jakarta executive and legislative branches
4. Private sector role
5. Public opinion

The evaluation should conclude with identification of the necessary adjustments, if any, in project design, objectives, strategies and implementation arrangement; as well as recommended changes aimed at maximizing the effectiveness of the project at reducing GHG emissions from Jakarta's transport sector.

2. Methods

This mid-term evaluation will be conducted as an in-depth evaluation using a participatory approach whereby the UNEP/DGEF Task Manager, key representatives of UNEP and other relevant staff are kept informed and regularly consulted throughout the evaluation. The consultant will liaise with the UNEP/Evaluation Office and the UNEP/DGEF Task Manager on any logistic and/or methodological issues to properly conduct the review in as independent a way as possible, given the circumstances and resources offered. The draft report will be circulated to UNEP/DGEF Task Manager and the UNEP/Evaluation Office. Any comments or responses to the draft report will be sent to UNEP/Evaluation Office for collation and the consultant will be advised of any necessary revisions.

The findings of the evaluation will be based on the following:

1. A desk review of project documents including, but not limited to:

- (a) The project documents, outputs, monitoring reports (such as progress and financial reports to UNEP and GEF annual Project Implementation Review reports) and relevant correspondence.
 - (b) Notes from the Steering Group meetings.
 - (c) Other project-related material produced by the project staff or partners, including the outcomes of partnership meetings.
 - (d) Relevant material published on the project web-site: www.itdp-indonesia.org.
2. Interviews with the project management unit, project team and technical support including the current ITDP staff in Indonesia.
 3. Interviews with the UNEP/GEF project Task Manager and Fund Management Officer, and other relevant staff in UNEP dealing with Jakarta Busway related activities as necessary. The Consultant shall also gain broader perspectives from discussions with relevant GEF Secretariat staff.
 4. Interviews and telephone interviews with intended users of the project outputs and other stakeholders involved regarding their perceptions of the project, ITDP's performance, their agreement with project objectives, reasons why milestone achievement is slower than planned, and areas they feel where project objectives need to be changed. Persons to be interviewed should include:
 - (a) DKI Jakarta government personnel: Governor, Vice-Governor, Deputy Governor for Infrastructure & Transport, Secretary, Assistant Secretary for Development, Head of Planning Agency, Head of Transportation Agency, Head of *TransJakarta* Management Body, Head of Public Works Agency, Head of Parks Agency, Head of City Council Committee overseeing transportation.
 - (b) Mid-level personnel responsible for infrastructure and operations of BRT
 - (c) Lower-level personnel responsible for implementation of operations of BRT
 - (d) NGO personnel: Instran, YLKI, Fakta, Pelangi, Swisscontact, Walhi Jakarta
 - (e) Private Sector: selected Busway bus operators, ORGANDA public transport operators association, media editors.

Interviews with government stakeholders should consider the following questions:

- (a) Professionalism of ITDP staff
- (b) Value of recommendations provided by ITDP
- (c) How recommendations could be improved
- (d) Value of other services / general cooperation of ITDP
- (e) How relationship DKI Jakarta-ITDP Project office could be improved

Interviews with NGO stakeholders should consider the following questions:

- (a) How does ITDP fit in NGO community
- (b) What value does ITDP add to debate over Busway service quality
- (c) How could ITDP be more effective

5. Attitude assessment and review of media articles from past 2.5 years to assess:
 - (a) Change in attitude of media toward Busway
 - (b) Change in attitude of general public toward Busway
6. The Consultant shall determine whether to seek additional information and opinions from representatives of donor agencies and other organisations. As appropriate, these interviews could be combined with an email questionnaire.

Key Evaluation principles

In attempting to evaluate any outcomes and impacts that the project may have achieved, evaluators should remember that the project's performance should be assessed by considering the difference between the answers to two simple questions "*what happened?*" and "*what would have happened anyway?*". These questions imply that there should be consideration of the baseline conditions and trends in relation to the intended project outcomes and impacts. In addition it implies that there should be plausible evidence to attribute such outcomes and impacts to the actions of the project.

Sometimes, adequate information on baseline conditions and trends is lacking. In such cases this should be clearly highlighted by the evaluator, along with any simplifying assumptions that were taken to enable the evaluator to make informed judgements about project performance.

3. Project Evaluation Parameters

Specific topics below the evaluation parameters need direct attention as they are of direct relevance to the future direction of the project (work plan/budget) and to the final project results. Please note that the evaluators need not come with ready solutions for all issues mentioned below but rather set out a recommended pathway to address the obstacles:

A. Attainment of objectives and planned results (progress to date):

The assessment of project results seeks to determine the extent to which the project objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, and assess if the project has led to any other positive or negative consequences. While assessing a project's outcomes the evaluation will seek to determine the extent of achievement and shortcomings in reaching the project's objectives as stated in the project document and also indicate if there were any changes and whether those changes were approved. If the project did not establish a baseline (initial conditions), the evaluator should seek to estimate the baseline condition so that achievements and results can be properly established (or simplifying assumptions used). Since most GEF projects can be expected to achieve the anticipated outcomes by project closing, assessment of project outcomes should be a priority. Outcomes are the likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention's outputs. Examples of outcomes could include but are not restricted to stronger institutional capacities, higher public awareness (when leading to changes of behaviour), and transformed policy frameworks or markets. The evaluation should assess the extent to which the project's major relevant objectives were effectively and efficiently achieved or are expected to be achieved and their relevance.

- *Effectiveness*: Evaluate how, and to what extent, the stated project objectives have been met, taking into account the "achievement indicators" specified in the project document and logical framework¹⁵.
- *Relevance*: In retrospect, were the project's outcomes consistent with the focal areas/operational programme strategies and country priorities? The evaluation should also assess whether outcomes specified in the project document and or logical framework are actually outcomes and not outputs or inputs. Ascertain the nature and significance of the contribution of the project outcomes to the wider portfolio under GEF's Strategic Priority 3.
- *Efficiency*: Cost-effectiveness assesses the achievement of the environmental and developmental objectives as well as the project's outputs in relation to the inputs, costs, and implementing time. Include an assessment of outcomes in relation to inputs, costs, and implementation times based on the following questions: Was the project cost-effective? Was the project the least cost option? Was the project implementation delayed and if it was then did that affect cost-effectiveness? The evaluation should assess the contribution of cash and in-kind co-financing to project implementation and to what extent the project leveraged additional resources.

Specifically the evaluation should consider:

Number of Corridors in operation: Corridors 1-8 are operational, Corridors 9 and 10 are to commence after busses have been procured (by Government) and service contracts are awarded (expected in first half of 2010, delays possible pending legal issues). The envisioned Corridors 11-15 are already designed but revised plans of the Government mean only 11-12 could be built before project end (construction of 11 & 12 depends on parliamentary approval for further expansion of the system, which may be contentious). The construction of Corridor 1-15 were included in the UNEP project document as one of the milestones, based on the timetable of the previous administration. The new administration puts more emphasis on the improvement of the existing network of 8 (+2) corridors, than on the expansion of the network. The number of corridors may be less of an indicator of GHG reductions than other performance measures, such as number of passenger trips or passenger-km of travel. Given the new reality that not all of the corridors (1-15) will be in operation by the project's termination in 2011, the milestones need to be adapted. An assessment of DKI Jakarta's perceived priority of the BRT *TransJakarta* project (versus other road users) and (near) future prospects is necessary.

Key Performance Indicator: In order to provide the government and public with an index of progress on improving BRT service, what elements should be included in a key performance indicator?

Indicators identified: Consider if the indicators identified in the PIR accurately reflect project achievement of objectives? How could they be improved?

Institutional and governance aspects: Is the project's current revised strategy to reform the institutional and governance aspects of the Busway appropriate?

Project funds: Have project funds been used optimally for achieving objectives?

Milestones: Do the milestones for the project accurately reflect project achievement of objectives? How could they be improved?

¹⁵ In case in the original or modified expected outcomes are merely outputs/inputs then the evaluators should assess if there were any real outcomes of the project and if yes then whether these are commensurate with the realistic expectations from such projects.

B. Assessment of Sustainability of project outcomes:

Sustainability is understood as the probability of continued long-term project-derived outcomes and impacts after the GEF project funding ends. The evaluation will identify and assess the key conditions or factors that are likely to contribute or undermine the persistence of benefits after the project ends. ***At mid-term, identification of any likely barriers to sustaining the intended outcomes of the project is especially important.*** Some of these factors might be outcomes of the project, e.g. stronger institutional capacities or better informed decision-making. Other factors will include contextual circumstances or developments that are not outcomes of the project but that are relevant to the sustainability of outcomes. The evaluation should ascertain to what extent follow-up work has been initiated and how project outcomes will be sustained and enhanced over time. In this case, sustainability will be linked to the continued use and influence of scientific models and scientific findings, produced by the project.

Four aspects of sustainability should be addressed: financial, socio-political, institutional frameworks and governance, and ecological (if applicable). The following questions provide guidance on the assessment of these aspects:

- *Financial resources:* To what extent are the outcomes of the project dependent on continued financial support? What is the likelihood that any required financial resources will be available to sustain the project outcomes/benefits once the GEF assistance ends (resources can be from multiple sources, such as the public and private sectors, income generating activities, and market trends that support the project's objectives)? Was the project was successful in identifying and leveraging co-financing?
- *Socio-political:* To what extent are the outcomes of the project dependent on socio-political factors? What is the likelihood that the level of stakeholder ownership will allow for the project outcomes/benefits to be sustained? Is there sufficient public/ stakeholder awareness in support of the long term objectives of the project?
- *Institutional framework and governance:* To what extent are the outcomes of the project dependent on issues relating to institutional frameworks and governance? What is the likelihood that institutional and technical achievements, legal frameworks, policies and governance structures and processes will allow for, the project outcomes/benefits to be sustained? While responding to these questions consider if the required systems for accountability and transparency and the required technical know-how are in place.
- *Ecological:* Are there any environmental risks that can undermine the future flow of project-derived environmental benefits?

As far as possible, also identify the potential longer-term impacts considering that the evaluation is taking place at mid-term and that longer term impact is expected to be seen in a few years time. Frame any recommendations to enhance future project impact in this context. Which will be the major 'channels' for longer term impact from the project at the national and international scales? The evaluation should formulate recommendations that outline possible approaches and necessary actions to facilitate an impact assessment study in a few years time.

Specifically the evaluation should consider:

Public image (perception) of the BRT scheme depends above all on the overall performance of the system, as well as on competition with other modes of transport (especially private cars and motorcycles). Jakarta government has requested increased efforts in the area of public relations. What are the limits of public relations given the current actual service level of the BRT? What public relations efforts promise to be most effective? What is recommended to further increase the number of passengers?

C. Catalytic role

The mid-term evaluation will also describe any catalytic or replication effect of the project. What examples are there of replication and catalytic outcomes that suggest increased likelihood of sustainability? Replication approach, in the context of GEF projects, is defined as lessons and experiences coming out of the project that are replicated or scaled up in the design and implementation of other projects. Replication can have two aspects, replication proper (lessons and experiences are replicated in different geographic area) or scaling up (lessons and experiences are replicated within the same geographic area but funded by other sources). If no effects are identified, the evaluation will describe the catalytic or replication actions that the project carried out. No ratings are requested for the catalytic role.

Specifically the evaluation should consider:

Pedestrians and non motorized vehicles: How can the current achievements (Plaza Fatahillah, parking areas for bicycles) be strengthened and expanded/ replicated? Are pedestrian facilities overall limiting BRT passenger numbers?

D. Achievement of outputs and activities:

- Delivered outputs: Assessment of the project's success in producing each of the programmed outputs to date, both in quantity and quality as well as usefulness and timeliness.
- Assess to what extent the project outputs produced so far have the weight of authority/credibility, necessary to influence policy and decision-makers, particularly at the national or regional levels.

Specifically the evaluation should consider:

Quality of services offered depends on the effectiveness of measures to increase passenger flow/bus flow. Solutions considered include:

- Resizing of busses and stations along existing corridors due to increased demand (such as using articulated busses on Corridor 1)
- Bus priority at intersections (or tunnels or fly-overs)
- Better fleet management with a control center and/or other solutions to avoid bus bunching & improve bus spacing
- Review and strengthening of current bus service contracts with private companies (including the clauses of merit of penalties and incentives that can be measured)
- For each of the above, and other critical areas the evaluator may identify, how can the project best contribute to further improvements in these areas during the second part of project execution?

Electronic Integrated Ticketing System may speed up passenger flows, reduce revenue leakage and provide data on origin-destination of Busway passengers for better planning of bus operation. It is expected that a new electronic ticketing system would integrate with all corridors and with the accounting system, so as to provide *TransJakarta* with real time information on revenue and passenger-transfer data. Currently, BRT revenues go through the bank of DKI Jakarta, which lacks the required hard and software necessary for managing stored value cards. What needs to be done to put such an Electronic Integrated Ticketing System in operation before project end?

Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) refuelling stations: Identify realistic strategies to increase the number of CNG refuelling stations near existing corridors so as to optimize efficiency of service and reduction in GHG emissions.

DKI Jakarta purchasing busses for Corridor 9 & 10: Assess if there is any impact on the long-term operating cost as well as on GHG emissions?

E. Assessment of Monitoring and Evaluation Systems:

- **M&E design.** Did the project have a sound M&E plan to monitor results and track progress towards achieving project objectives? The Mid-term Evaluation will assess whether the project met the minimum requirements for project design of M&E and the application of the Project M&E plan (Minimum requirements are specified in Annex 4). The evaluation shall include an assessment of the quality, application and effectiveness of project monitoring and evaluation plans and tools, including an assessment of risk management based on the assumptions and risks identified in the project document. The M&E plan should include a baseline (including data, methodology, etc.), SMART (see Annex 4) indicators and data analysis systems, and evaluation studies at specific times to assess results. The time frame for various M&E activities and standards for outputs should have been specified.
- **M&E plan implementation.** Was an M&E system in place and did it facilitate tracking of results and progress towards projects objectives throughout the project implementation period. Were Annual project reports complete, accurate and with well justified ratings? Was the information provided by the M&E system used during the project to improve project performance and to adapt to changing needs? Did the Projects have an M&E system in place with proper training for parties responsible for M&E activities to ensure data will continue to be collected and used after project closure?
- **Budgeting and Funding for M&E activities.** Were adequate budget provisions made for M&E made and were such resources made available in a timely fashion during implementation?
- **Long-term Monitoring.** Is long-term monitoring envisaged as an outcome of the project? If so, comment specifically on the relevance of such monitoring systems to sustaining project outcomes and how the monitoring effort will be sustained.

F. Assessment of processes that affected attainment of project results.

The evaluation will consider, but need not be limited to, consideration of the following issues that may have affected project implementation and attainment of project results:

- Preparation and readiness.** Were the project's objectives and components clear, practicable and feasible within its timeframe? Were capacities of the executing institutions and counterparts

properly considered when the project was designed? Were lessons from other relevant projects properly incorporated in design? Were the partnership arrangements properly identified and the roles and responsibilities negotiated prior to implementation? Was availability of counterpart resources (funding, staff, and facilities), passage of enabling legislation, and adequate project management arrangements in place at project entry?

- Ascertain to what extent the project implementation mechanisms outlined in the project document have been closely followed. In particular, assess the role of the various committees established and whether the project document was clear and realistic to enable effective and efficient implementation, whether the project was executed according to the plan and how well the management was able to adapt to changes during the life of the project to enable the implementation of the project.
 - Evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency and adaptability of project management and the supervision of project activities/project execution arrangements at all levels (1) policy decisions: Steering Group; (2) day to day project management; (3) GEF guidance: UNEP DGEF.
- ii. **Country ownership/Driveness.** This is the relevance of the project to national development and environmental agendas, recipient country commitment, and regional and international agreements. Examples of possible evaluative questions include: Was the project design in-line with the national sectoral and development priorities and plans? Are project outcomes contributing to national development priorities and plans? Were the relevant country representatives, from government and civil society, involved in the project? Did the recipient government maintain its financial commitment to the project?
- iii. **Stakeholder involvement.** Did the project involve the relevant stakeholders through information sharing, consultation and by seeking their participation in project's design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation? For example, did the project implement appropriate outreach and public awareness campaigns? Did the project consult and make use of the skills, experience and knowledge of the appropriate government entities, NGOs, community groups, private sector, local governments and academic institutions in the design, implementation and evaluation of project activities? Were perspectives of those that would be affected by decisions, those that could affect the outcomes and those that could contribute information or other resources to the process taken into account while taking decisions? Were the relevant vulnerable groups and the powerful, the supporters and the opponents, of the processes properly involved? Specifically the evaluation will:
- Assess the mechanisms put in place by the project for identification and engagement of stakeholders in each participating country and establish, in consultation with the stakeholders, whether this mechanism was successful, and identify its strengths and weaknesses.
 - Assess the degree and effectiveness of collaboration/interactions between the various project partners and institutions during the course of implementation of the project.
 - Assess the degree and effectiveness of any various public awareness activities that were undertaken during the course of implementation of the project.
- iv. **Financial planning.** Did the project have the appropriate financial controls, including reporting and planning, that allowed management to make informed decisions regarding the budget and allowed for timely flow of funds. Specifically, the evaluation should:
- Assess the strength and utility of financial controls, including reporting, and planning to allow the project management to make informed decisions regarding the budget and allow for a proper and timely flow of funds for the payment of satisfactory project deliverables throughout the project's lifetime.
 - Present the major findings from the financial audit if one has been conducted.
 - Did promised co-financing materialize? Identify and verify the sources of co- financing as well as leveraged and associated financing (in co-operation with the IA and EA).
 - Assess whether the project has applied appropriate standards of due diligence in the management of funds and financial audits.
 - The evaluation should also include a breakdown of final actual project costs by activities compared to budget (variances), financial management (including disbursement issues), and co- financing. This information will be prepared by the relevant DGEF Fund Management Officer of the project for scrutiny by the evaluator (table attached in Annex 1 Co-financing and leveraged resources).
- v. **UNEP Supervision and backstopping.** Did UNEP Agency staff identify problems in a timely fashion and accurately estimate its seriousness? Did UNEP staff provide quality support and advice to the project, approved modifications in time and restructure the project when needed? Did UNEP Agencies provide the right staffing levels, continuity, skill mix, frequency of field visits?
- vi. **Co-financing and Project Outcomes & Sustainability.** If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for this? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect the project's outcomes and/or sustainability, and if it did affect outcomes and sustainability then in what ways and through what causal linkages?

- vii. **Delays and Project Outcomes & Sustainability.** If there were delays in project implementation and completion, the evaluation will summarise the reasons for them. Did delays affect the project's outcomes and/or sustainability, and if so in what ways and through what causal linkages?

Specifically the evaluation should consider:

Institutional set up: Can the BUMD status (*TransJakarta* as a fully publicly owned private company) realistically be achieved within the remaining project duration? What are the critical political and regulatory obstacles that need to be overcome to make this happen?

Non-BRT Feeders: Assess problems that will arise in the revision of non-BRT bus routes, including revising route licenses, bus transfer facilities, and better incorporating the current private feeder services (buses from estates/housing projects feeding into BRT). Can restructuring of bus routes to provide feeder services realistically be accomplished within the remaining project duration? Is significant expansion of feeder services a realistic objective given current capacity of the BRT?

Traffic Demand Management: Given progress to date and the current administration's priorities, is it a realistic goal that an ERP system could be implemented before project end?

Expansion of Corridors to Neighboring Cities: DKI Jakarta would like to see to project extend to metropolitan Jakarta (including the neighboring cities of Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi, aka 'JaBoDeTaBek'). This includes linking Tangerang with the existing BRT network, and the improvement of a feeder system that includes regular buses from the entire JaBoDeTaBek region. What is the likelihood for achieving significant progress on this area before project end? Is expansion of the system a realistic objective given current capacity of the BRT? What would be an appropriate milestone(s) for achievement during the project?

Legal assistance: Is providing legal assistance to *TransJakarta* and DKI Jakarta a valid and appropriate use of project funds?

The **ratings will be presented in the form of a table** with each of the categories rated separately and with **brief justifications for the rating** based on the findings of the main analysis. An overall rating for the project should also be given. The rating system to be applied is specified in Annex 1:

4. Evaluation report format and review procedures

The report should be brief, to the point and easy to understand. It must explain; the purpose of the evaluation, exactly what was evaluated and the methods used. The report must highlight any methodological limitations, identify key concerns and present evidence-based findings, consequent conclusions, recommendations and lessons. The report should provide information on when the evaluation took place, the places visited, who was involved and be presented in a way that makes the information accessible and comprehensible. The report should include an executive summary that encapsulates the essence of the information contained in the report to facilitate dissemination and distillation of lessons.

Evidence, findings, conclusions and recommendations should be presented in a complete and balanced manner. The evaluation report shall be written in English, be of no more than 50 pages (excluding annexes), use numbered paragraphs and include:

- i) **An executive summary** (no more than 3 pages) providing a brief overview of the main conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation;
- ii) **Introduction and background** giving a brief overview of the evaluated project, for example, the objective and status of activities;
- iii) **Scope, objective and methods** presenting the evaluation's purpose, the evaluation criteria used and questions to be addressed;
- iv) **Project Performance and Impact** providing factual evidence relevant to the questions asked by the evaluator and interpretations of such evidence. This is the main substantive section of the report and should provide a commentary on all evaluation aspects (A – F above).
- v) **Conclusions and rating** of project implementation success giving the evaluator's concluding assessments and ratings of the project against given evaluation criteria and standards of performance. The conclusions should provide answers to questions about whether the project is considered good or bad, and whether the results are considered positive or negative;
- vi) **Lessons learned** presenting general conclusions from the standpoint of the design and implementation of the project, based on good practices and successes or problems and mistakes. Lessons should have the potential for wider application and use. All lessons should 'stand alone and should:
 - Specify the context from which they are derived
 - State or imply some prescriptive action;

- Specify the contexts in which they may be applied (if possible who when and where)
- vii) **Recommendations.** High quality recommendations should be *actionable* proposals that are:
1. Implementable within the timeframe and resources available
 2. Commensurate with the available capacities of project team and partners
 3. Specific in terms of who would do what and when
 4. Contain results-based language (i.e. a measurable performance target)
 5. Include a trade off analysis, when its implementation may require utilizing significant resources that would have otherwise been used for other project purposes.
- viii) **Annexes** include Terms of Reference, list of interviewees, documents reviewed, brief summary of the expertise of the evaluator / evaluation team, a summary of co-finance information etc. Dissident views or management responses to the evaluation findings may later be appended in an annex.

Examples of UNEP GEF Mid-term Evaluation Reports are available at www.unep.org/eou

Review of the Draft Evaluation Report

Draft reports shall be submitted to the Chief of Evaluation. The Chief of Evaluation will share the report with the corresponding Programme or Project Officer and his or her supervisor for initial review and consultation. The DGEF staff and Senior Executing Agency staff are allowed to comment on the draft evaluation report. They may provide feedback on any errors of fact and may highlight the significance of such errors in any conclusions. The consultation also seeks feedback on the proposed recommendations. UNEP EO collates, reviews comments and provides them to the evaluators for their consideration in preparing the final version of the report.

All UNEP GEF Evaluation Reports are subject to quality assessments by UNEP EO. These incorporate GEF Office of Evaluation quality assessment criteria and are used as a tool for providing structured feedback to the evaluator (see Annex 3).

5. Submission of Final Mid-term Evaluation Reports.

The final report shall be written in English and submitted in electronic form in MS Word format and should be sent directly to:

Segbedzi Norgbey, Chief, Evaluation Office
 UNEP, P.O. Box 30552-00100
 Nairobi, Kenya
 Tel.: (254-20) 7623387
 Fax: (254-20) 7623158
 Email: segbedzi.norgbey@unep.org

The Chief of Evaluation will share the report with the following individuals:

Ms. Maryam Niamir-Fuller
 Director, UNEP/Division of GEF Coordination
 P.O. Box 30552-00100, Nairobi, Kenya
 Tel: + 254-20-7624166
 Fax: + 254-20-7624041/4042
 Email: Maryam.Niamir-Fuller@unep.org

Peerke de Bakker
 Programme Officer, Energy
 UNEP/Division of GEF Coordination
 P.O. Box 30552-00100, Nairobi, Kenya
 Tel: +254 20 7623 257
 Fax: +254 20 7624 041/2
peerke.bakker@unep.org

The mid term report will be printed in hard copy and published on the Evaluation and Oversight Unit's web-site www.unep.org/eou. Subsequently, the report will be sent to the GEF Office of Evaluation for their review, appraisal and inclusion on the GEF website. In addition the final Evaluation report will disseminated to: The relevant GEF Focal points, Relevant Government representatives, UNEP DGEF Professional Staff, The project's Executing Agency and Technical Staff. The full list of intended recipients is attached in Annex 5.

6. Resources and schedule of the evaluation

This mid-term evaluation will be undertaken by two international evaluators contracted by the UNEP Evaluation Office (EO). The contract for the Lead Evaluator (Transport Expert) will begin on 23rd March 2010 and end on 22nd July (48 days) spread over 4 months (20 days of field work in Jakarta, 6 days of travel, 10 days desk study

and 12 days of report writing). The contract for the Supporting Evaluator (Institutional Expert) will begin on 23rd March 2010 and end on 30th June 2010 (34 days) spread over 14 weeks (12 days of field work in Jakarta, 4 days of travel, 8 days of desk study and 10 days of report writing).

The evaluators will, after an initial telephone briefing with Evaluation Office and UNEP/GEF, travel to Jakarta and meet with project staff at the beginning of the evaluation. The lead evaluator will submit a draft report on 18th June 2010 to UNEP/Evaluation Office, the UNEP/DGEF Task Manager, and key representatives of the executing agencies. Any comments or responses to the draft report will be sent to UNEP / Evaluation Office for collation and the consultant will be advised of any necessary revisions. Comments to the final draft report will be sent to the consultant by 30th June 2010 after which, the consultant will submit the final report no later than 11th July 2010.

In accordance with UNEP/GEF policy, all GEF projects are evaluated by independent evaluators contracted as consultants by the Evaluation Office. The evaluators should have the following qualifications:

A. Transport Expert and Lead Evaluator (one person)

- Post-Graduate in Transportation, minimum of ten years accumulated and recognized experience in relevant projects, minimum of five years of project evaluation and/or implementation experience in a results-based management framework, familiarity in similar country or regional situations relevant to that of the Jakarta, comprehensive knowledge of international transport industry best practices.

B. Institutional Expert

- Post-graduate in management or business, plus at least ten years experience in government institutional arrangements, minimum of five years of project management experience, including direct experience with Indonesian government institutions, preferably with specific knowledge of publicly owned private corporation (BUMD) operation and regulations. Knowledge of transport industry and projects. The Institutional expert will prepare inputs to the evaluation as agreed with the lead evaluator.

The evaluators should not have been associated with the design and implementation of the project. The evaluators will work under the overall supervision of the Chief, Evaluation Office, UNEP.

Knowledge of UNEP programmes and GEF activities is desirable. Fluency in oral and written English is a must.

7. Schedule Of Payment

Lump-Sum Option

The evaluator will receive an initial payment equivalent of Travel of the total amount due upon signature of the contract. A further 40 per cent will be paid upon submission of the draft report. A final payment of 60 per cent will be made upon satisfactory completion of work. The fee is payable under the individual Special Service Agreement (SSA) of the evaluator and IS **inclusive** of all expenses such as travel, accommodation and incidental expenses.

In case, the evaluator cannot provide the products in accordance with the TORs, the timeframe agreed, or his products are substandard, the payment to the evaluator could be withheld, until such a time the products are modified to meet UNEP's standard. In case the evaluator fails to submit a satisfactory final product to UNEP, the product prepared by the evaluator may not constitute the evaluation report.

Annex 1. OVERALL RATINGS TABLE

| Criterion | Evaluator's Summary Comments | Evaluator's Rating |
|--|------------------------------|--------------------|
| Attainment of project objectives and results (overall rating) | | |
| Sub criteria (below) | | |
| Effectiveness | | |
| Relevance | | |
| Efficiency | | |
| Sustainability of Project outcomes (overall rating) | | |
| Sub criteria (below) | | |
| Financial | | |
| Socio Political | | |
| Institutional framework and governance | | |
| Ecological | | |
| Achievement of outputs and activities | | |
| Monitoring and Evaluation (overall rating) | | |
| Sub criteria (below) | | |
| M&E Design | | |
| M&E Plan Implementation (use for adaptive management) | | |
| Budgeting and Funding for M&E activities | | |
| Catalytic Role | | |
| Preparation and readiness | | |
| Country ownership / drivenness | | |
| Stakeholders involvement | | |
| Financial planning | | |
| UNEP Supervision and backstopping | | |
| Overall Rating | | |

RATING OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND RESULTS

Highly Satisfactory (HS): The project had no shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.

Satisfactory (S): The project had minor shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.

Moderately Satisfactory (MS): The project had moderate shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.

Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU): The project had significant shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.

Unsatisfactory (U) The project had major shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.

Highly Unsatisfactory (HU): The project had severe shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.

Please note: Relevance and effectiveness will be considered as critical criteria. The overall rating of the project for achievement of objectives and results **may not be higher** than the lowest rating on either of these two criteria. Thus, to have an overall satisfactory rating for outcomes a project must have at least satisfactory ratings on both relevance and effectiveness.

RATINGS ON SUSTAINABILITY

A. Sustainability will be understood as the probability of continued long-term outcomes and impacts after the GEF project funding ends. The Mid-term evaluation will identify and assess the key conditions or factors that are likely to contribute or undermine the persistence of benefits after the project ends. Some of these factors might be outcomes of the project, i.e. stronger institutional capacities, legal frameworks, socio-economic incentives /or public awareness. Other factors will include contextual circumstances or developments that are not outcomes of the project but that are relevant to the sustainability of outcomes..

Rating system for sustainability sub-criteria

On each of the dimensions of sustainability of the project outcomes will be rated as follows.

Likely (L): There are no risks affecting this dimension of sustainability.

Moderately Likely (ML). There are moderate risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.

Moderately Unlikely (MU): There are significant risks that affect this dimension of sustainability

Unlikely (U): There are severe risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.

All the risk dimensions of sustainability are critical. Therefore, overall rating for sustainability will not be higher than the rating of the dimension with lowest ratings. For example, if a project has an Unlikely rating in either of the dimensions then its overall rating cannot be higher than Unlikely, regardless of whether higher ratings in other dimensions of sustainability produce a higher average.

RATINGS OF PROJECT M&E

Monitoring is a continuing function that uses systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing project with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated funds. Evaluation is the systematic and objective assessment of an on-going or completed project, its design, implementation and results. Project evaluation may involve the definition of appropriate standards, the examination of performance against those standards, and an assessment of actual and expected results.

The Project monitoring and evaluation system will be rated on ‘M&E Design’, ‘M&E Plan Implementation’ and ‘Budgeting and Funding for M&E activities’ as follows:

Highly Satisfactory (HS): There were no shortcomings in the project M&E system.

Satisfactory(S): There were minor shortcomings in the project M&E system.

Moderately Satisfactory (MS): There were moderate shortcomings in the project M&E system.

Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU): There were significant shortcomings in the project M&E system.

Unsatisfactory (U): There were major shortcomings in the project M&E system.

Highly Unsatisfactory (HU): The Project had no M&E system.

“M&E plan implementation” will be considered a critical parameter for the overall assessment of the M&E system. The overall rating for the M&E systems will not be higher than the rating on “M&E plan implementation.”

All other ratings will be on the GEF six point scale.

| GEF Performance Description | Alternative description on the same scale |
|--------------------------------|---|
| HS = Highly Satisfactory | Excellent |
| S = Satisfactory | Well above average |
| MS = Moderately Satisfactory | Average |
| MU = Moderately Unsatisfactory | Below Average |
| U = Unsatisfactory | Poor |
| HU = Highly Unsatisfactory | Very poor |

Annex 2. Co-financing and Leveraged Resources

Co-financing (basic data to be supplied to the consultant for verification)

| Co financing (Type/Source) | IA own | | Government | | Other* | | Total | | Total Disbursement | |
|--|--------------------------|--------|-------------|---------|-------------|--------|-------------|--------|--------------------|--------|
| | Financing (mill US\$) | | (mill US\$) | | (mill US\$) | | (mill US\$) | | (mill US\$) | |
| | Planned | Actual | Planned | Actual | Planned | Actual | Planned | Actual | Planned | Actual |
| - Grants | 0.104 | 0.005 | | | | | | | | |
| - Loans/Concessional (compared to market rate) | | | | | | | | | | |
| - Credits | | | | | | | | | | |
| - Equity investments | | | 187.661 | 134.729 | | | | | | |
| - In-kind support | | | 0.210 | 0.567 | | | | | | |
| - Other (*) | | | | | | | | | | |
| - | | | | | | | | | | |
| - | | | | | | | | | | |
| - | | | | | | | | | | |
| - | | | | | | | | | | |
| Totals | 0.104 | 0.005 | 187.871 | 135.296 | | | | | | |

* Other is referred to contributions mobilized for the project from other multilateral agencies, bilateral development cooperation agencies, NGOs, the private sector and beneficiaries.

Leveraged Resources

Leveraged resources are additional resources—beyond those committed to the project itself at the time of approval—that are mobilized later as a direct result of the project. Leveraged resources can be financial or in-kind and they may be from other donors, NGO's, foundations, governments, communities or the private sector. Please briefly describe the resources the project has leveraged since inception and indicate how these resources are contributing to the project's ultimate objective.

Table showing final actual project expenditure by activity to be supplied by the UNEP Fund management Officer. (insert here)

Annex 3**Review of the Draft Report**

Draft reports submitted to UNEP Evaluation Office are shared with the corresponding Programme or Project Officer and his or her supervisor for initial review and consultation. The DGEF staff and senior Executing Agency staff provide comments on the draft evaluation report. They may provide feedback on any errors of fact and may highlight the significance of such errors in any conclusions. The consultation also seeks agreement on the findings and recommendations. UNEP Evaluation Office collates the review comments and provides them to the evaluators for their consideration in preparing the final version of the report. General comments on the draft report with respect to compliance with these TOR are shared with the reviewer.

Quality Assessment of the Evaluation Report

All UNEP GEF Mid Term Reports are subject to quality assessments by UNEP Evaluation Office. These apply GEF Office of Evaluation quality assessment and are used as a tool for providing structured feedback to the evaluator.

The quality of the draft evaluation report is assessed and rated against the following criteria:

| GEF Report Quality Criteria | UNEP EO Assessment | Rating |
|---|---------------------------|---------------|
| A. Did the report present an assessment of relevant outcomes and achievement of project objectives in the context of the focal area programme indicators if applicable? | | |
| B. Was the report consistent and the evidence complete and convincing and were the ratings substantiated when used? | | |
| C. Did the report present a sound assessment of sustainability of outcomes? | | |
| D. Were the lessons and recommendations supported by the evidence presented? | | |
| E. Did the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used? | | |
| F. Did the report include an assessment of the quality of the project M&E system and its use for project management? | | |
| UNEP EOU additional Report Quality Criteria | UNEP EO Assessment | Rating |
| G. Quality of the lessons: Were lessons readily applicable in other contexts? Did they suggest prescriptive action? | | |
| H. Quality of the recommendations: Did recommendations specify the actions necessary to correct existing conditions or improve operations ('who?' 'what?' 'where?' 'when?'). Can they be implemented? Did the recommendations specify a goal and an associated performance indicator? | | |
| I. Was the report well written? (clear English language and grammar) | | |
| J. Did the report structure follow EO guidelines, were all requested Annexes included? | | |
| K. Were all evaluation aspects specified in the TORs adequately addressed? | | |
| L. Was the report delivered in a timely manner | | |

GEF Quality of the MTE report = $0.3*(A + B) + 0.1*(C+D+E+F)$

EO assessment of MTE report = $0.3*(G + H) + 0.1*(I+J+K+L)$

Combined quality Rating = $(2* \text{'GEF EO' rating} + \text{EO rating})/3$

The Totals are rounded and converted to the scale of HS to HU

Rating system for quality of mid-term evaluation reports

A number rating 1-6 is used for each criterion: *Highly Satisfactory* = 6, *Satisfactory* = 5, *Moderately Satisfactory* = 4, *Moderately Unsatisfactory* = 3, *Unsatisfactory* = 2, *Highly Unsatisfactory* = 1, and *unable to assess* = 0.

Annex 4 List of intended additional recipients for the Terminal Evaluation (to be completed by the IA Task Manager)

| Name | Affiliation | Email |
|-----------------------------|--|--|
| Aaron Zazueta | GEF Evaluation Office | azazueta@thegef.org |
| Government Officials | | |
| Bpk Soetanto | Depty Gov. for Transport City Government of DKI Jakarta | ssoehodho@yahoo.com |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| GEF Focal Point(s) | | |
| Agus Purnomo | GEF OFP, Special Asst to Minister of Environment | apurnomo@menlh.go.id |
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| Walter Hook | Director ITDP | whook@itdp.org |
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| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| Implementing Agency | | |
| Alexander Juras | UNEP DGEF Deputy Director | Alexander.juras@unep.org |

Annex 5 GEF Minimum requirements for M&E**Minimum Requirement 1: Project Design of M&E¹⁶**

All projects must include a concrete and fully budgeted monitoring and evaluation plan by the time of Work Programme entry (full-sized projects) or CEO approval (medium-sized projects). This plan must contain at a minimum:

- SMART (see below) indicators for project implementation, or, if no indicators are identified, an alternative plan for monitoring that will deliver reliable and valid information to management
- SMART indicators for results (outcomes and, if applicable, impacts), and, where appropriate, corporate-level indicators
- A project baseline, with:
 - a description of the problem to address
 - indicator data
 - or, if major baseline indicators are not identified, an alternative plan for addressing this within one year of implementation
- An M&E Plan with identification of reviews and evaluations which will be undertaken, such as mid-term reviews or evaluations of activities
- An organizational setup and budgets for monitoring and evaluation.

Minimum Requirement 2: Application of Project M&E

Project monitoring and supervision will include implementation of the M&E plan, comprising:

- Use of SMART indicators for implementation (or provision of a reasonable explanation if not used)
- Use of SMART indicators for results (or provision of a reasonable explanation if not used)

¹⁶ <http://gefweb.org/MonitoringandEvaluation/MEPoliciesProcedures/MEPTTools/meptstandards.html>

- Fully established baseline for the project and data compiled to review progress
- Evaluations are undertaken as planned
- Operational organizational setup for M&E and budgets spent as planned.

SMART INDICATORS GEF projects and programs should monitor using relevant performance indicators. The monitoring system should be “SMART”:

1. **Specific:** The system captures the essence of the desired result by clearly and directly relating to achieving an objective, and only that objective.
2. **Measurable:** The monitoring system and its indicators are unambiguously specified so that all parties agree on what the system covers and there are practical ways to measure the indicators and results.
3. **Achievable and Attributable:** The system identifies what changes are anticipated as a result of the intervention and whether the result(s) are realistic. Attribution requires that changes in the targeted developmental issue can be linked to the intervention.
4. **Relevant and Realistic:** The system establishes levels of performance that are likely to be achieved in a practical manner, and that reflect the expectations of stakeholders.
5. **Time-bound, Timely, Trackable, and Targeted:** The system allows progress to be tracked in a cost-effective manner at desired frequency for a set period, with clear identification of the particular stakeholder group to be impacted by the project or programme

6. ANNEX 6 RISK FACTOR TABLE

*Evaluators will use this table to summarize risks identified in the **Project Document** and reflect also **any new risks** identified in the course of the evaluation in regard to project implementation. The Notes column should be used to provide additional details concerning manifestation of the risk as **relevant**.*

| INTERNAL RISK Project management | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|---|--|---|-----|--------|-------------|------|----------------|------------------|-------|
| Risk Factor | Indicator of Low Risk | Indicator of Medium Risk | Indicator of High Risk | Low | Medium | Substantial | High | Not Applicable | To be determined | NOTES |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| Governance structure | Steering Committee and/or other project bodies meet periodically and provide effective direction/inputs | Body(ies) meets periodically but guidance/input provided to project is inadequate | Members lack commitment (seldom meet) and therefore the Committee/body does not fulfil its function | | | | | | | |
| Internal communications | Fluid and cordial | Communication process deficient although relationships between team members are good | Lack of adequate communication between team members leading to deterioration of relationships and resentment / factions | | | | | | | |
| Work flow | Project progressing according to work plan | Some changes in project work plan but without major effect on overall implementation | Major delays or changes in work plan or method of implementation | | | | | | | |
| Co-financing | Co-financing is secured and payments are received on time | Is secured but payments are slow and bureaucratic | A substantial part of pledged co-financing may not materialize | | | | | | | |

| INTERNAL RISK Project management | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|-----|--------|-------------|------|----------------|------------------|-------|
| Risk Factor | Indicator of Low Risk | Indicator of Medium Risk | Indicator of High Risk | Low | Medium | Substantial | High | Not Applicable | To be determined | NOTES |
| Budget | Activities are progressing within planned budget | Minor budget reallocation needed | Reallocation between budget lines exceeding 30% of original budget | | | | | | | |
| Financial management | Funds are correctly managed and transparently accounted for | Financial reporting slow or deficient | Serious financial reporting problems or indication of mismanagement of funds | | | | | | | |
| Reporting | Substantive reports are presented in a timely manner and are complete and accurate with a good analysis of project progress and implementation issues | Reports are complete and accurate but often delayed or lack critical analysis of progress and implementation issues | Serious concerns about quality and timeliness of project reporting | | | | | | | |
| Stakeholder involvement | Stakeholder analysis done and positive feedback from critical stakeholders and partners | Consultation and participation process seems strong but misses some groups or relevant partners | Symptoms of conflict with critical stakeholders or evidence of apathy and lack of interest from partners or other stakeholders | | | | | | | |
| External communications | Evidence that stakeholders, practitioners and/or the general public understand project and are regularly updated on progress | Communication s efforts are taking place but not yet evidence that message is successfully transmitted | Project existence is not known beyond implementation partners or misunderstandings concerning objectives and activities evident | | | | | | | |
| Short term/long term balance | Project is meeting short term needs and results within a long term perspective, particularly sustainability and replicability | Project is interested in the short term with little understanding of or interest in the long term | Longer term issues are deliberately ignored or neglected | | | | | | | |
| Science and technological issues | Project based on sound science and well established technologies | Project testing approaches, methods or technologies but based on sound analysis of options and risks | Many scientific and /or technological uncertainties | | | | | | | |

| INTERNAL RISK Project management | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|--|-----|--------|-------------|------|----------------|------------------|-------|
| Risk Factor | Indicator of Low Risk | Indicator of Medium Risk | Indicator of High Risk | Low | Medium | Substantial | High | Not Applicable | To be determined | NOTES |
| Political influences | Project decisions and choices are not particularly politically driven | Signs that some project decisions are politically motivated | Project is subject to a variety of political influences that may jeopardize project objectives | | | | | | | |
| Other, please specify. Add rows as necessary | | | | | | | | | | |

Annex 7. Detailed Assessment Topics

| Topic: | General Criteria: | Evaluation Priority: | Specific questions to address: |
|---------------------------------------|--|----------------------|---|
| Management structure | Roles & responsibilities clearly defined and understood | High | Does staff have sufficient guidance and skill development to accomplish their objectives? Is feedback given regularly and fairly? Is staff empowered to reach their objectives? Is staff utilized efficiently? |
| Governance structure | Meeting regularly and providing effective direction/inputs | Medium | Is current structure adequate? |
| Internal communications | Fluid & cordial | Medium | Any problems? |
| Work Flow | Progress according to work plan | High | What are reasons for deviation from work plan? |
| Co-Financing | Secured and timely | Low | |
| Budget | Within plan | Medium | How should budget be revised to match revision in work plan or objectives? |
| Financial management | Correctly managed; transparent accounting | Medium | Any irregularities that need to be addressed? |
| Reporting | Substantive, timely, accurate, good analysis of issues | Medium | How can reporting be improved? |
| Stakeholder involvement | Analysis completed, positive involvement | High | Is DKI Jakarta fully involved in project goals? |
| External communications | Stakeholder & general public informed | High | How effective are external communication efforts? |
| Short term / long term balance | Short term results; long term sustainability & replicability | Medium | Is balance effective? How should it be adjusted considering project end. |
| Science & Technological issues | | High | Why is known technology not being adapted; technology transfer not occurring? |
| Political Influences | | High | Are political influences on project success well understood and incorporated into strategy? |
| Political stability | | Low | |
| Environmental conditions | Hazards | Low | |
| Social, cultural and economic factors | | High | Is public support for the Busway being developed sufficiently? |
| Capacity issues | Sound technical and managerial capacity of institutions and other project partners | High | Is capacity development occurring? Are techniques being evaluated and improved? |

Annex 2 Original Project Logical Framework

| Objective / Outcome | Output | Verifiable Indicators | Means of Verification | Assumptions | Risks |
|--|--|---|--|---|---|
| Overall Goal: Maximize effectiveness of the Jakarta BRT and use it as a catalyst for urban transport reform in Jakarta and other key Indonesian cities. | | | | | |
| Goal A: Improve Performance of the Jakarta BRT | | | | | |
| Objective 1: Develop BRT Corridors 4-14 | | | | | |
| Outcome: BRT implemented on corridors 4-14 with routes optimized | 600,000 additional BRT Passenger Trips per day | BRT system ridership | BRT system gate entry counts, computer tabulated | Optimum routing will increase system ridership, improving modal shift to BRT | Political and social considerations could prevent giving BRT exclusive right-of-way in some narrow road segments if public and political support for BRT is insufficient. |
| | 263,000 t CO ₂ eq reduced per year | Fuel Consumption, passenger-km | Fueling records; fuel consumption verification tests | | |
| Objective 2: Optimize Fare System for Corridors 1-14 | | | | | |
| Outcome: Integrated fare system with controls stops fare leakage. Competitive contracting implemented for BRT bus operation, reducing costs | 105,000 additional BRT passengers per day | Per-km payment amount to BRT operators. | Operator contracts | Improved passenger flow and comfort in stations will increase ridership. | Private contractors may be resistant to a transparent contracting process if public and political will are insufficiently clear. |
| | 46,000 t CO ₂ eq reduced per year | BRT system Fuel consumption, passenger-km | Fueling records; data above | 50% price elasticity of demand; Objective 1 achieved | |
| Objective 3: Improve Intersection Performance for BRT | | | | | |
| Outcome: Intersection conflicts reduced to acceptable levels. BRT average speed increases to 25km/hr; | 5km/hr BRT average speed increase | BRT average speed | Velocity Surveys | More efficient solutions can be identified for problem intersections along the BRT corridors. | Concern for mixed traffic flow could prevent prioritizing BRT flow if public and political support for BRT is insufficient. |

| Objective / Outcome | Output | Verifiable Indicators | Means of Verification | Assumptions | Risks |
|--|---|---|--|--|---|
| improved political support for BRT by reducing impacts on mixed traffic | BRT Passengers increases by 118,000/day | BRT system ridership | BRT system gate entry counts, computer tabulated | Objective 1 & 2 achieved; 50% price elasticity of demand | |
| | 52,000 t CO ₂ eq reduced per year | Fuel consumption, passenger-km | Fueling records; fuel consumption verification tests; data above | | |
| Objective 4: Optimize Busway Operation | | | | | |
| Outcome: Increased average speed of BRT, 5% reduction of fleet downtime, reduced operating costs; 8% reduction in fuel consumption | average speed of BRT improves from 25 to 28 km/hour | Average travel time for various O-D points on BRT system. | Velocity surveys | | Negligible, as all changes increase efficiency and reduce total costs. |
| | 133,000 additional BRT passengers/day | BRT system ridership | BRT system gate entry counts, computer tabulated | 50% price elasticity of demand; avg 70 buses/route running 600km/day each; Objective 1-3 achieved | |
| | 64,000 t CO ₂ eq reduced per year | Fuel consumption, passenger-km | Fueling records; fuel consumption verification tests; data above | | |
| Objective 5: Improve public perception of BRT | | | | | |
| Outcome: Public understanding of BRT and optimal use of public road space increased. Web and SMS based routing information system available to potential passengers. | 96,000 additional BRT passengers/day | BRT system ridership | BRT system gate entry counts, computer tabulated | Specific information on customer-selected point-to-point travel will increase system ridership by 10%; Objectives 1-4 achieved | BRT customers may not have affordable internet or telephone access to routing information system. |
| | 42,000 (t CO ₂ eq reduced per year | Fuel consumption, passenger-km | Fueling records; fuel consumption verification tests; data above | | |
| Goal B: Utilize BRT to Improve Public Transport, Pedestrian/NMT, and Land Use | | | | | |

| Objective / Outcome | Output | Verifiable Indicators | Means of Verification | Assumptions | Risks |
|--|---|---|--|--|---|
| Objective 6: Rationalize Non-BRT Bus Routes | | | | | |
| Outcome: Increase of passenger from bus feeder system from 5% to 13% of BRT passengers; of which 32% are new passengers and 32% shifted from PMV feeder, reducing PMV feeder trips and increasing total BRT passengers | 200% increase in BRT passengers using bus feeder | Total bus route km. Average bus occupancy. | Itinerary surveys. On-board O-D surveys. | Routes can be improved to both better serve customers and increase operator income. Objective 1-5 Achieved; 20% of BRT trips have PMV feeder with average trip distance of 8km | Political obstacles to bus route reform and corrupt routing practices could prevent significant change unless public and political involvement is sufficient to demand reform of the process. |
| | 50% reduction in BRT passengers using private motor vehicle as feeder; 250,000 fewer PMV km per day | PMV feeder trips | BRT passenger surveys | | |
| | 1,050,000 fewer private motor vehicle feeder trips per day | BRT system ridership | BRT system gate entry counts, computer tabulated | | |
| | 114,000 t CO ₂ eq reduced per year | Fuel consumption, passenger-km | Fueling records; fuel consumption verification tests; data above | | |
| Objective 7: Evaluate and Implement Transport Demand Management Measures to Reduce Private Motor Vehicle Use | | | | | |
| Outcome: TDM measure implemented so that cost of PMV use is greater than BRT fare | TDM charge for operating PMV on congested portions of BRT corridors | Existence of pricing scheme. | Charging counts, tabulated by computer | Increased price for driving private motor vehicles during peak hours will cause modal shift to BRT and other less energy intensive modes. Objective 1-6 achieved | Public resistance to paying more for driving may prevent implementation; inclusion of motorcycles could be technically difficult. |
| | 720,000 additional BRT passengers per day | BRT system ridership | BRT system gate entry counts, computer tabulated | | |
| | Doubling of passengers from PMV from 25% to 50% | PMV feeder trips | BRT passenger surveys | | |
| | 913,000 t CO ₂ eq reduced per year | Fuel consumption, passenger-km | Fueling records; fuel consumption verification tests; data above | | |

| Objective / Outcome | Output | Verifiable Indicators | Means of Verification | Assumptions | Risks |
|--|--|---|--|--|--|
| Objective 8: Improve Pedestrian, NMT Facilities and Land Use in Center and Along Corridors | | | | | |
| Outcome: Convenient NMT and pedestrian trips increases BRT trips to do pedestrian ease; increased feeder trips by bicycle | Additional BRT passengers from pedestrian and bike connections | BRT passengers coming from pedestrian and bicycle. | Pedestrian activity measurements. BRT bike parking lot occupancy counts. BRT customer surveys of mode used to get to BRT station. | Improved pedestrian and NMT facilities will increase the length and frequency of pedestrian/NMT trips enough to displace more energy intensive modes. Objective 1-7 achieved; 20% of BRT trips have PMV feeder with average trip distance of 4km PMV feeder trips cut in half; remaining trips average 5km | Pedestrian facilities may not be attractive enough to increase pedestrian trips if there is insufficient private investment in the area. |
| | 246,000 fewer PMV kms as feeder and short-distance trips | PMV feeder trips | BRT passenger surveys | | |
| | 39,000 t CO2eq reduced per year. | Fuel consumption, passenger-km | Fueling records; fuel consumption verification tests; data above | | |
| Objective 9: Dissemination and Outreach to Other Cities | | | | | |
| Outcome: Full BRT implemented in 1 of target cities; BRT draws some passengers from private motor vehicles. Or increased number of students walking and biking to school increased use of bicycle for short trips. | 30,000 additional daily trips by public transit or 150,000 fewer short trip motorcycle km per year | Public transit ridership in target cities. BRT capacity, average speed, ridership figures. Bicycle and pedestrian trips among students and other target groups. | Frequency and visual occupancy surveys. BRT system fare entries. Bicycle traffic counts. Pedestrian activity surveys. Intercept survey on previous mode. | The physical example of Jakarta's BRT will inspire efforts to replicate it. 1% shift to walk or NMT. 10,000 short pass trips/day in focus areas | Poorly implemented BRT systems could degrade the image of BRT if technical assistance is insufficient. |
| | 15,000 t CO2eq reduced per year | BRT Fuel consumption, passenger-km. Motorcycle fuel consumption. | Fueling records; fuel consumption verification test and surveys of drivers; data above. Fuel consumption measurements. Traffic counts | | |

Annex 3 Progress Against KPIs from 2009 PIR with Brief Comment on Suitability of Each KPI

| Project objective and Outcomes | Description of indicator ¹⁷ | Baseline level ¹⁸ | Mid-term target ¹⁹ | End-of-project target | Level at 30 June 2009 | Comment on KPI |
|--|---|------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|---|---|
| Objective²⁰ 1: Develop BRT Corridors 4-14 Outcome: BRT implemented on corridors 4-14 with routes optimized | Number of corridors operating | 3 | 9 | 14 | 8 | Indicates progress not performance |
| | km of busway | 44 | 130 | 250 | 124 | Indicates progress not performance |
| | BRT system ridership (daily - averaged for most recent month) | 113,957 | 300,000 | 713,957 | 254,000 | Partial indicator of performance |
| | Passenger-km on BRT (daily) | 592,576 | 2,400,000 | 7,139,570 | 3,810,000 | Good indicator but data not readily available requires sample and extrapolation |
| | average passenger trip length (km) | 4.4 | 8 | 10 | 16 | Indicator of market demand not performance Here longer is considered better, in measure PIR of efficiency shorter is better. |
| | Liters of fuel consumed per BRT passenger km | 0.24 (based on estimate) | 0.22 | 0.16 | 0.22 (weighted average) | Not a performance indicator |
| | bus fuel usage - liters/km | 0.71 (estimated) | 0.70 | 0.66 | Diesel = 0.55 CNG = 0.93 CNG articulated = 1.37 | Ambiguous. Possible indicator fuel wastage due to idling and refuelling. |
| | passengers per bus km | 3 | 3.2 | 4 | 3.15 (average) | Too many factors involved. A combination of waiting time (to measure market responsiveness) and unused passenger capacity (to measure efficiency) |
| | | | | | | SUMMARY: too many indicators do not relate to the objective stated |

¹⁷ Add rows if your project has more than 3 key indicators per objective or outcome.

¹⁸ Depending on selected indicator, quantitative or qualitative baseline levels and targets could be used (see Glossary included as Annex 1).

¹⁹ Many projects did not identify Mid-term targets at the design stage therefore this column should only be filled if relevant.

²⁰ Add rows if your project has more than 4 objective-level indicators. Same applies for the number of outcome-level indicators.

| Project objective and Outcomes | Description of indicator ¹⁷ | Baseline level ¹⁸ | Mid-term target ¹⁹ | End-of-project target | Level at 30 June 2009 | Comment on KPI |
|---|--|---|-------------------------------|---|---|---|
| Objective 2: Optimize Fare System For Corridors 1-14 Outcome 2-1: Integrated fare system with controls stops fare leakage. | Passenger-km (additional to Objective 1) | 592,576 | 2,700,000 | 7,244,570 | 3,810,000 (unable to measure additional km per objective) | Does not measure objective or outcome stated. |
| | Amount paid (Rupiah/km) to BRT operators (non-articulated bus) | 12,855 | 11,500 | 9500 | - Cor4: 9,536 - Cor5: 9,371 - Cor7: 9,422 | Does not measure objective or outcome stated |
| Outcome 2-2: Competitive contracting implemented for BRT bus operation, reducing costs | Amount paid per-km to BRT operators. | IDR 12855 | Not specified | Competitive price based on then existing costs. | Competitive price based on bidding result implemented on 37% of corridors | Does not measure objective stated, Best Value principles lead to a different way of approaching measurement of performance. |
| Objective 3: Improve Intersection Performance for BRT. Outcome 3-1: Intersection conflicts reduced to acceptable levels. BRT average speed increases to 25km/hr | BRT average speed (km/h) | 21.5 (error in baseline report being investigated; likely figure is 18.5) | 22 | 25 | 20.1 | The measure should be the increase in speed that can be attributed to improved intersections. |
| Outcome 3-2: Improved political support for BRT by reducing impacts on mixed traffic Objective 4: Optimize busway operation. Outcome 4-1: Increased average speed of BRT | BRT passengers/day (additional to previous objectives) | 113,957 | 300,000 | 831,957 | 254,000 (unable to measure additional per objective) | Outcome incorrectly stated, should refer only to reduced mixed traffic. The measure should be increase in speed that can be attributed to less mixed traffic. |
| | BRT average speed (km/h) – [additional to Objective 3] | 21.5 | 23 | 28 | 20.1 (unable to measure additional per objective) | Unclear what change is to be measured that would result in increased speed. It could be more empty buses. |
| Outcome 4-2: 5% reduction of fleet downtime, reduced operating costs Outcome 4-3: 8% reduction in fuel consumption | BRT passengers/day (additional to previous objectives) | 113,957.0 | 300,000 | 964,957 | 254,000 (unable to measure additional per objective) | Unclear what change is to be measured that would result in increased passengers. |
| | Proportion of buses reserved by operators for downtime * | 6.80% | 6% | 5% | 9.62% | The measure should be the average time per day during operating time that buses are not operating |
| | Fuel consumption of buses (liters/km) | 0.71 | 0.70 | 0.66 | Diesel = 0.55 CNG = 0.93 CNG articulated = 1.37 | -- |

| Project objective and Outcomes | Description of indicator ¹⁷ | Baseline level ¹⁸ | Mid-term target ¹⁹ | End-of-project target | Level at 30 June 2009 | Comment on KPI |
|---|--|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|---|--|--|
| | | | | | | Many other indicators can be suggested, such as those proposed for MSS, indicators of achieving Best Value, indicators of improved management, etc |
| Objective 5: Improve public perception of BRT Outcome 5-1: Public understanding of BRT and optimal use of public road space increased. | BRT passengers/day (additional to previous objectives) | 113,957.0 | 340,000 | 1,060,957 | 254,000 (unable to measure additional per objective) | Indicator does not relate to either the objective or the outcome. Outcome 5-1 covers two entirely different matters. |
| Outcome 5-2: Web and SMS based routing information system available to potential passengers | Information system deployed. | no information system for routing | NA | Web based + printing material of routing information system | 90% implemented at www.itdp-indonesia.org and www.transjakartabusway.com | Measures availability not success at improving public perception |
| Objective 6: Rationalize Non-BRT Bus Routes. Outcome 6-1: Increase of passenger from bus feeder system from 5% to 13% of BRT passengers; of which 32 % are new passengers and 32 % shifted from PMV feeder | BRT passengers using bus feeder | 9.1% | 10.0% | 25.0% | 15.0% | Indicators fail to measure improved public perception, and the component fails to include the most important element, signage and information available to passengers on buses and at <i>Halte</i> Only partial measure. The key measures would be (a) the increase in non-BRT connecting to the BRT, and (b) the increase in non-BRT passengers in order to connect to the BRT |
| | BRT passengers using PMV feeder | 7.5% | 7.5% | 3.8% | 6% | Not a helpful indicator. |
| Outcome 6-2: reducing PMV feeder trips and increasing total BRT passengers | Km of PMV feeder trips | no measurement; survey pending | = baseline | 50% reduction in PMV feeder trips totaling 250,000 PMV km/day | Unable to complete interview O-D survey needed for measurement | Wrong indicator as PMV feeder trips may increase as more drivers switch to BRT. |
| | | | | | | No indicator for number of non-BRT routes rationalised, or of improved travel time achieved by such rationalisation |

| Project objective and Outcomes | Description of indicator ¹⁷ | Baseline level ¹⁸ | Mid-term target ¹⁹ | End-of-project target | Level at 30 June 2009 | Comment on KPI |
|--|--|---------------------------------------|--|---|--|--|
| Objective 7: Evaluate and Implement Transport Demand Management Measures to Reduce Private Motor Vehicle Use Outcome: TDM measure implemented so that cost of PMV use is greater than BRT fare | TDM charge for operating PMV on congested portions of BRT corridors | 3-in-1 policy on corridor 1 | Improved public and political acceptance for electronic road pricing | ERP implemented on busway corridor roads | 10% complete: Prepared Detailed Engineering Design & required regulations | These are progress indicators not performance indicators |
| | BRT passengers/day (additional to previous objectives) | 113,957.0 | 340,000 | 1,780,957 | not applicable | Indicator has no direct relevance to achievement of the objective |
| | Number of BRT passengers whose previous mode was PMV | 22,791 | 23,000 | 890,479 | not applicable | Correct indicator, once the system is in place |
| Objective 8: Improve Pedestrian, NMT Facilities and Land Use in Center and Along Corridors Outcome 8-1: Convenient NMT and pedestrian trips increases BRT trips. | BRT passengers with walking connecting trips | 30.60% | 35% | 50% | 21% | Appropriate indicator. |
| | Amount of PMV kms as feeder and short-distance trips / Number of feeder trips by bicycle | no measurement; survey pending / 0.01 | 5% reduction from baseline / 2% | 25% reduction in total PMV feeder km from baseline / 5% | Unable to complete interview O-D survey needed for PMV trip assessment ; bicycle feeder at 11% | Does not include reduction in becak and hired motor bikes Number of feeder trips by bicycle is a good indicator |
| | | | | | | Does not include indicators of land use changes |
| Outcome 8-2: Increased feeder trips by walking | BRT passengers with walking connecting trips | 30.60% | 35% | 50% | 0.58% (based on <i>TransJakarta</i> survey; need to review how question was asked) | Repetition of the first indicator above |
| Outcome 9: ⁴¹ Dissemination and Outreach to Other Cities. Outcome: Full BRT implemented in 1 of target cities; BRT draws some passengers from private motor vehicles. Or increased number of students walking and biking to school increased use of bicycle for short trips [NOTE: outcome needs adjustment after funding cut from original proposal] | BRT established | Planning of BRT in other cities | BRT planning in progress | 1 BRT established in Indonesian city | Pedestrian improvements implemented in Solo; bus improvements implemented in Yogyakarta. | -- |

²¹ Add rows if your project has more than 5 Outcomes.

Annex 4 Co-financing and Leveraged Resources, as Provided by DGEF Fund Management Officer

The following table provided to the Evaluators by UNEP still does not include “other” funding. The figures below information provided by DKI and ITDP. Assessment of co-financing in the body of the report has been based on information provided in a format that that we could not use to complete the table ourselves, some of it in the accompanying annexes.

| Co financing (Type/Source) | IA own Financing (mill US\$) | | Government (mill US\$) | | Other* (mill US\$) | | Total (mill US\$) | | Total Disbursement (mill US\$) | |
|---|------------------------------------|--------|-------------------------------|---------|---------------------------|--------|--------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------|--------|
| | Planned | Actual | Planned | Actual | Planned | Actual | Planned | Actual | Planned | Actual |
| - Grants | 0.104 | 0.0217 | | | | | | | | |
| - Loans/Concession al (compared to market rate) | | | | | | | | | | |
| - Credits | | | | | | | | | | |
| - Equity investments | | | 187.661 | 182.416 | | | | | | |
| - In-kind support | | | 0.210 | 0.567 | | | | | | |
| - Other (*) - | | | | | | | | | | |
| Totals | 0.104 | 0.0217 | 187.871 | 182.983 | | | | | | |

Annex 5 2009 Co-financing Data, as Supplied by ITDP Jakarta

| No. | Agencies/Organizations | Activities/Programme | Expenditures (IDR) | |
|-----------|--|--|------------------------|--------------------|
| | | | ITDP's Partners | ITDP |
| I. | Expenditures of Government of DKI Jakarta | Activities/Programme relate to Busway development | 453,727,874,365 | |
| 1.1. | Financial Management Agency (BADAN PENGELOLA KEUANGAN DAERAH) | Improvements of management and organizational structures of <i>TransJakarta</i> and Parking Area | 500,000,000 | |
| 1.2. | Transport Agency (DINAS PERHUBUNGAN) | Monitoring and Control Busway Corridor, maintenance of crossing bridges, traffic lights improvements, design feeder, etc | 28,665,411,200 | |
| 1.3. | BLUD <i>TransJakarta</i> Busway | Operation of busway, maintenance of shelters, ticketing, procurement of CCTV, website maintenance, etc | 292,499,250,000 | |
| 1.4. | Urban Infrastructures and Facilities Bureau (BIRO PRASARANA DAN SARANA KOTA) | Busway Infrastructures Improvement | 323,000,000 | |
| 1.5. | Public Works Agency (DINAS PEKERJAAN UMUM) | 1) Roads Improvement along busway corridors (I-X); 2) Maintenance; 3) Land acquisition; 4) drainage, etc | 125,200,000,000 | |
| 1.6. | Parks and Funeral Agency (DINAS PERTAMANAN DAN PEMAKAMAN) | Green area along busway corridors (VIII, IX X) | 4,500,000,000 | |
| 1.7. | Tourism and Culture Agency (DINAS PARIWISATA DAN KEBUDAYAAN) | Tourism Spatial Arrangement along busway corridor (I, IV and V) | 400,000,000 | |
| II | Coca Cola | Promoting public support for keeping <i>TransJakarta</i> facilities clean (Busway Shelter Cleaning Day) | 254,726,300 | 19,226,300 |
| III | 'Suara <i>TransJakarta</i>', Green Map, Green Radio | Raising public educations and awareness in using public transportation (busway) which helps promote cleaner air, campaigning sustainable transportation (nine times running TOUR DE BUSWAY 2009) | 857,066,515 | 27,116,515 |
| IV | MEDIA COVERAGE | JOURNALIST WORKSHOP to provide comprehensive knowledge to avoid misperception and misjudgment on the BRT system and its implementation | 28,903,350 | 10,903,350 |
| V | BLU, Coca Cola & <i>TransJakarta</i> Bus Operators | Mixed-Traffic Clearance Campaign | 109,280,000 | 18,746,000 |
| VI | Indonesia Transport Society (MTI) | MTI - JOURNALIST WORKSHOP on Revitalization of Urban Transport | 33,300,500 | 23,300,500 |
| VII | fX Lifestyle and Bike To Work | To encourage the use of bicycles as a form of transportation by providing BIKE RACK Facilities | 356,936,500 | 59,686,500 |
| | TOTAL | | 453,727,874,365 | 158,979,165 |

Annex 6 Project Expenditure Summary, as Provided by UNEP

| Objec code | Description | Original Budget | Exp. Oct.to Dec 06 | Exp. Jan - Mar. 07 | Exp. Apr 07 - Jun. 07 | Exp. Jul - Sept 07 | Exp. Oct - Dec 07 | Exp. Jan - Mar. 08 | Exp. Apr - Jun. 08 | Exp. July - Sept. 08 | Exp. Oct - Dec. 08 | Exp. Jan - Mar 09 | Exp. Apr - Jun 09 | Exp. Jul - Sept 09 | Exp. Oct- Dec 09 | Total Exp.in IMIS |
|------------|-------------------------------|-----------------|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| 1101 | Executive director | 19,458.00 | | 1,244.87 | 529.27 | 245.86 | 1,293.06 | 2,519.29 | | | 1,425.64 | | | 639.82 | | 7,897.81 |
| 1102 | Asian Regional Director | 60,314.00 | 1,063.99 | 3,950.51 | 2,342.72 | 1,678.95 | 2,763.83 | 3,037.06 | 4,760.74 | 2,385.18 | 2,430.88 | 7,330.42 | 1,251.71 | 1,904.07 | 1,013.81 | 35,913.87 |
| 1103 | BRT Technical Director | 3,236.00 | | | | | | 954.21 | 2,281.44 | | | | | | | 3,235.65 |
| 1104 | Project Director | 172,140.00 | | 3,268.99 | 5,253.47 | 9,302.56 | 5,044.75 | 9,252.91 | 11,842.59 | 15,560.65 | 6,613.87 | 10,716.74 | 4,067.54 | 8,141.69 | 7,400.61 | 96,466.37 |
| 1105 | Project Coordinator | 31,319.00 | | 682.14 | 1,889.29 | 2,151.46 | 2,098.88 | 4,942.25 | 5,450.24 | 11,169.09 | 2,935.40 | | | | | 31,318.75 |
| 1106 | Training Coordinator | 17,679.00 | | 539.08 | 1,803.26 | 1,538.30 | 3,519.37 | 3,715.04 | 918.84 | 3,296.83 | 2,348.32 | | | | | 17,679.04 |
| 1107 | Staff time | 10,107.00 | | 477.48 | 1,494.75 | 1,506.03 | 2,721.74 | | 1,560.96 | 713.56 | 1,632.78 | | | | | 10,107.30 |
| 1108 | Communications Director | 22,100.00 | 945.00 | | 1,508.38 | | 2,546.63 | | | | | | | | | 5,000.01 |
| 1151 | Finance Assistant Indo | 35,921.00 | | 392.21 | 1,227.83 | 1,843.55 | 4,968.73 | 2,622.95 | 1,426.00 | 1,677.93 | 1,062.08 | 1,252.71 | 1,660.44 | 2,299.77 | 1,087.07 | 21,521.27 |
| 1152 | Administrative Assistant | 32,726.00 | 1,280.56 | | 324.48 | 35.87 | 5,504.36 | 17.35 | | | 1,563.60 | 2,019.97 | 2,867.65 | 1,554.21 | 858.16 | 16,026.21 |
| 1153 | Office Assistant | 8,300.00 | | | | | | | | | | | | 1,100.23 | | 1,100.23 |
| 1201 | BRT Design | 22,057.00 | 274.65 | 1,229.58 | | | 3,853.05 | | | | | 5,300.00 | | | | 10,657.28 |
| 1202 | Modeler | 39,822.00 | 2,000.85 | | | | | | 10,021.42 | | | | 6,565.22 | | 6,834.78 | 25,422.27 |
| 1203 | Public Transit Operations | 24,024.00 | | | | | 6,000.00 | | 3,123.55 | | | | | | 2,000.16 | 11,123.71 |
| 1204 | Traffic Infrastructure | 18,781.00 | | | | | | | 80.98 | | | | | | | 80.98 |
| 1205 | Transportation Demand M | 10,499.00 | 1,247.28 | 652.06 | | | | | | | | | | | | 1,899.34 |
| 1206 | Pedestrian Design | 13,431.00 | 533.21 | | | | 3,082.44 | 3,215.39 | | | | | | | | 6,831.04 |
| 1207 | Consultant travel | 52,253.00 | | 408.48 | | 323.09 | 4,483.08 | | 1,438.35 | | | 1,724.48 | | 6,973.67 | 4,468.76 | 19,819.91 |
| 1208 | Environment Specialist | 63,300.00 | | | | | | | | | | 6,263.62 | 5,514.08 | 5,865.45 | 1,556.85 | 19,200.00 |
| 1209 | Transportation Specialist | 58,900.00 | | | | | | | | | | 2,505.45 | 2,536.04 | 2,284.59 | 3,553.88 | 10,879.96 |
| 1210 | Transportation Engineer | 29,400.00 | | | | | | | | | | 1,722.50 | 1,237.37 | 2,606.16 | 3,333.98 | 8,900.01 |
| 1211 | Transp & Comm specialist | 66,700.00 | | | | | | | | | | 3,755.26 | 2,712.62 | 8,345.96 | 848.87 | 15,662.71 |
| 1212 | Communication Specialist | 48,500.00 | | | | | | | | | | 2,700.98 | 1,977.09 | 2,976.90 | 6,511.92 | 14,166.89 |
| 1601 | Staff Travel | 58,395.00 | 2,598.50 | | 2,247.49 | 1,729.62 | 4,224.39 | 4,741.00 | 5,953.81 | | | 6,114.78 | 1,101.11 | 4,302.42 | 150.62 | 33,163.74 |
| 2201 | Environmental NGO partic | 111,878.00 | | 6,955.30 | 6,391.39 | 7,422.26 | 3,131.06 | | | | 4,378.08 | | | | 10,961.71 | 39,239.80 |
| 2202 | Transportation NGO partic | 131,544.00 | | | 6,391.39 | 7,422.26 | 10,186.36 | 7,286.67 | 7,616.13 | 6,952.63 | 2,189.04 | 7,702.25 | 7,420.50 | 7,426.54 | 4,050.72 | 74,644.49 |
| 2203 | Other Transp NGO partic | 61,206.00 | | | 3,834.83 | 4,453.35 | 2,642.09 | 4,510.79 | | | 4,065.36 | 3,594.38 | 3,544.87 | | | 26,645.67 |
| 2204 | Other NGO participation | 38,729.00 | | | | | 6,000.00 | | 6,090.08 | 5,738.68 | | | | | | 17,828.76 |
| 2205 | NGO Interviews Surveys | 78,719.00 | | | | | 3,575.04 | 1,882.47 | 361.59 | | | | | | | 5,819.10 |
| 2206 | Survey team | 139,409.00 | | | 201.55 | | 298.45 | 8,140.53 | 3,768.26 | | | | | 3,993.32 | 14,653.88 | 31,055.99 |
| 2301 | Transportation Surveyors | 47,255.00 | | | | | 30,054.63 | | | | | 219.54 | 4,194.23 | | | 34,468.40 |
| 2302 | Focus Group Consultant | 43,714.00 | | | | | 3,302.62 | 4,411.79 | | | | | 5,353.88 | | | 13,068.29 |
| 2303 | Web site development | 63,688.00 | | | | 1,187.70 | | | | | | | 369.49 | 907.36 | 2,611.46 | 5,076.01 |
| 3201 | Activity 1 Practicum Training | 190,451.00 | | 2,863.27 | 11,157.88 | 610.70 | 5,468.15 | | 42,605.20 | 12,591.95 | 16,953.67 | 8,118.48 | 931.96 | | 1,449.56 | 102,750.82 |
| 3202 | Activity 1 Training Transport | 36,480.00 | 1,098.60 | | | | 1,001.41 | | | | 3,080.18 | 10,716.74 | | | | 15,896.93 |
| 3203 | Activity 1 - Study tours | 50,539.00 | 7,923.57 | | | | 23,315.61 | | | | | | | | 7,400.61 | 38,639.79 |
| 3204 | Activity 2 Practicum Training | 198,348.00 | | 1,114.12 | 28,272.45 | 36,122.83 | | | 11,308.40 | 4,770.35 | 2,159.35 | 767.83 | 20,777.86 | 4,117.67 | 25,002.96 | 134,413.82 |
| 3205 | Activity 2 model use training | 94,400.00 | 7,907.76 | 4,979.48 | 1,061.92 | | 9,050.85 | | | | | | | | 11,882.50 | 34,882.51 |

Annex 6 – Project Expenditure Summary as provided by ITDP

| Objec code | Description | Original Budget | Exp. Oct.to Dec 06 | Exp. Jan - Mar. 07 | Exp. Apr 07 - Jun. 07 | Exp. Jul - Sept 07 | Exp. Oct - Dec 07 | Exp. Jan - Mar. 08 | Exp. Apr - Jun. 08 | Exp. July - Sept. 08 | Exp. Oct - Dec. 08 | Exp. Jan - Mar 09 | Exp. Apr - Jun 09 | Exp. Jul - Sept 09 | Exp. Oct- Dec 09 | Total Exp.in IMIS |
|------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| 3206 | Activity 2 - Study tours | 335,627.00 | 27,020.11 | 30,312.71 | | | 25,766.29 | 1,410.55 | | 53,098.84 | -10,981.35 | | | 143,560.55 | 49,942.57 | 320,130.27 |
| 3207 | Activity 3 Practicum Traing | 147,268.00 | | | 3,239.87 | | | 23,287.93 | 23,240.05 | | | | 27,567.96 | | | 77,335.81 |
| 3208 | Activity 3 – Trainings | 31,900.00 | | | | | | | | | | 12,492.30 | | | 7,507.71 | 20,000.01 |
| 3209 | Activity 3 - Study tours | 61,400.00 | | | | | | | | | | | | 22,843.44 | | 22,843.44 |
| 3210 | Activity 4 Practicum Traing | 383,065.00 | | 15,802.03 | 9,831.88 | 15,203.79 | 6,962.29 | 4,146.62 | 22,734.50 | | 13,784.15 | | 44,875.59 | 60,086.24 | 45,038.16 | 238,465.25 |
| 3211 | Activity 4 – Trainings | 32,333.00 | | 7,627.65 | 5,326.16 | | | | | 2,879.33 | | | 6,800.01 | | | 22,633.15 |
| 3212 | Activity 4 - Study tours | 70,918.00 | | | 6,346.84 | | | 23,271.07 | | | | | | 19,500.00 | | 49,117.91 |
| 3213 | Activity 5 – Trainings | 404,810.00 | | 1,421.10 | 9,069.00 | 7,035.99 | 73.92 | 3,166.61 | 43.09 | | | 18,631.94 | | 11,602.08 | 27,419.06 | 78,462.79 |
| 3214 | Activyt 5 - Study tours | 162,107.00 | | | 24,909.05 | | | 11,241.16 | | 16,647.66 | 9,309.36 | | | | | 35,000.00 |
| 3215 | Activity 6 Practicum Traing | 132,357.00 | | | | 5,076.94 | | | 2,380.37 | | | | | | | 21,335.09 |
| 3216 | Activity 6 Model use training | 37,500.00 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 0.00 |
| 3217 | Activity 6 - Study tours | 113,000.00 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 0.00 |
| 3218 | Activity 7 Practicum Traing | 72,966.00 | | 14,558.45 | 292.71 | | 3,597.48 | 2,916.95 | | | | | | | | 21,365.59 |
| 3219 | Activity 7 – Training | 36,450.00 | 4,641.85 | | | | 58.15 | | | | | | | | | 9,553.22 |
| 3220 | Activity 7 - Study tours | 173,505.00 | | 14,796.03 | 20,769.48 | | 9,498.07 | | | 49,741.09 | | | | | | 94,804.67 |
| 3221 | Activity 8 Practicum Traing | 124,324.00 | | | 9,587.08 | | 20,036.41 | | 11,463.89 | 4,136.63 | | | | | | 45,224.01 |
| 3222 | Activity 8 – Trainings | 51,069.00 | 5,481.80 | 6,491.61 | | | | 1,995.41 | | | | | | | | 13,968.82 |
| 3223 | Activity 8 - Study tours | 52,177.00 | | | 9,338.31 | | 16,233.46 | | | 3,205.42 | | 4,247.08 | | | | 33,024.27 |
| 3224 | Activity 9 Practicum Traing | 22,298.00 | 184.32 | | | | 1,006.31 | 407.75 | | | | | | | | 1,598.38 |
| 3225 | Activity 9 - Trainings | 53,833.00 | | 5,533.12 | | | | | | | | | | | | 5,533.12 |
| 3226 | Activity 9 - Study tours | 42,499.00 | | | | | | | | 6,098.56 | | | | | | 6,098.56 |
| 3301 | Project Steering Committee | 4,751.00 | | | | 1,151.34 | | | | | | | | | | 1,151.34 |
| 3302 | Project Overview Conf | 25,583.00 | 6,614.15 | 69.09 | | | | | | | | | | | 157.64 | 6,840.88 |
| 3303 | Project Activity workshop | 609,122.00 | 47,725.91 | 16,544.00 | 11,480.90 | 9,241.56 | 24,350.35 | 642.39 | 14,006.74 | 5,607.12 | 4,723.08 | 2,114.39 | 17,960.70 | 31,229.94 | 24,415.17 | 210,042.25 |
| 4101 | Office supplies | 8,179.00 | 336.94 | 495.53 | 65.17 | 475.56 | 126.80 | 452.73 | 796.68 | 630.33 | | 632.95 | 514.99 | 227.49 | 224.03 | 4,979.20 |
| 4102 | Computer software | 5,263.00 | | | 223.65 | 29.63 | 105.41 | 539.00 | 1,164.88 | | | | | | | 2,062.57 |
| 4201 | Computers | 24,220.00 | 827.25 | | 6,672.16 | | 1,341.55 | | | | 3,000.00 | 1,486.97 | 1,753.00 | | | 15,080.93 |
| 4202 | Office machines | 1,517.00 | | | 289.99 | 467.57 | 42.44 | | 117.18 | | | | | | | 917.18 |
| 4203 | Other Equipment | 4,182.00 | | | | 1,074.68 | 325.32 | 81.61 | | | | 231.61 | | | 387.31 | 2,100.53 |
| 4301 | Office maintenance | 5,361.00 | | | 528.96 | | | 629.66 | 458.50 | 779.75 | 263.90 | 487.48 | 204.43 | | | 3,352.68 |
| 5101 | O&M equipment | 4,469.00 | | | 1,020.28 | | | | | | 748.81 | | | | | 1,769.09 |
| 5201 | Training Materials | 81,934.00 | 1,377.30 | | 539.50 | | | | 217.42 | | | | 49.47 | | 35.65 | 2,219.34 |
| 5202 | Translation | 19,426.00 | | | | | | | 725.55 | | | 138.96 | | | 163.55 | 1,028.06 |
| 5203 | Media Placements | 119,300.00 | | | | | | | | | | 14.98 | 134.24 | | 5,173.55 | 5,322.77 |
| 5204 | Brochures and displays | 43,873.00 | | 2,513.76 | | | 1,775.67 | 149.82 | 1,915.68 | 855.96 | 1,862.12 | 5,310.70 | 1,091.04 | 1,562.09 | 1,600.17 | 18,637.01 |
| 5301 | Communication Cost | 25,767.00 | 65.48 | 381.66 | 765.11 | 1,234.04 | 253.71 | 366.21 | 1,904.16 | 1,601.47 | 1,195.23 | 1,071.77 | 486.38 | 1,224.18 | 482.59 | 11,031.99 |
| 5501 | Consultant and modelling | 41,925.00 | | 2,318.43 | | 606.15 | | | | | | | 7,423.48 | 16,918.80 | 62.70 | 27,329.56 |
| 5581 | UNEP Evaluation | 40,000.00 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 0.00 |
| | Total | 5,812,000.00 | 121,149.08 | 147,622.74 | 196,228.45 | 119,171.64 | 261,684.21 | 135,955.17 | 201,777.27 | 210,139.01 | 76,743.55 | 129,387.26 | 182,944.95 | 374,194.64 | 346,131.04 | 2,503,129.01 |

Annex 7 ITDP Project Milestones with Evaluator’s Comments

Milestones are intended as indicators of progress towards an objective and not indicators of having reached an objective. Most of these ITDP “milestones” are expressed as either an achievement of an objective, or not specific of either objective or progress.

| ITDP Project Milestones | Comments |
|--|--|
| Objective 1: Optimize route selection for Corridors 7-14 | |
| Jakarta BRT Corridors 4-7 Implemented in Year 1 | This is milestone of progress towards completion of the Busway system |
| Jakarta BRT Corridors 8-11 Implemented in Year 2 | Ditto |
| Jakarta BRT Corridors 11-14 Implemented in Year 3 | Perhaps there is a need for intermediary milestone, such as the Governor's decision to proceed, the review of the design and environmental impact studies. |
| Objective 2: Estimate Demand and Design Needs for Corridors 7-14 | |
| TransJakarta becomes legal entity able to control fare revenue in Year 2 | This is milestone of progress towards optimising busway operations, not estimating demand and design needs, or implementing an effective fare system. |
| Fare system control mechanisms implemented in Year 3 | This is milestone of progress towards an effective fare system. |
| Competitive tender for fare system and bus operations implemented in Year 4 | Not clear as bus operations were competitively tendered in year 2-3. |
| Objective 3: Improve Intersection Performance for BRT | |
| Intersection reforms implemented in Year 4 and Year 5 | This is not a milestone |
| Objective 4: Optimize Busway Operation | |
| Operation reforms implemented in Years 2, 3 4 and 5 | This is not a milestone |
| Objective 5: Improve public information on BRT & public transport | |
| Public transit routing information system implemented in Year 4 | This is a final result not a milestone |
| Objective 6: Rationalize Non-BRT Bus Routes | |
| New, rationalized, bus routes established in Jakarta in Year 5 | This is not a milestone but a result that surely must be implemented in steps and stages |
| Objective 7: Evaluate and Implement Transport Demand Management (TDM) Measures to Reduce Private Motor Vehicle Use | |
| Road pricing TDM scheme implemented in Jakarta in Year 5 | This is a final result not a milestone |
| Objective 8: Improve Pedestrian and NMT Facilities in Center and Along Corridors | |
| Pedestrian area implemented near Jakarta “Kota” BRT station in Year 2 | This is a milestone |
| Secure bike parking areas established at 4 BRT stations in Year 3 | This is a milestone |
| Redevelopment plans agreed for Plaza Fatahillah as transit oriented development in Year 4 | This is a milestone |
| Pedestrian improvements achieved within 200 meters of all BRT stations in Year 5 | This is a milestone, but perhaps needs more milestones before getting here |
| Objective 9: Dissemination and Outreach to Other Cities | |
| Achieve fully developed plans for a BRT system, pedestrian zone, and/or NMT facility in at least 2 other cities by Year 4. | Several earlier milestones clearly needed, as agreement on which location.. |

Annex 8 Interviewees

DKI Jakarta

| | |
|---|---|
| Office of the Governor | Sutanto Soehodho, deputy governor for trade, industry and transport |
| Project Steering Committee <i>TransJakarta</i> | Meetings of 22 April and 24 June 2010 DA. Rini Ekotomo, Head Managers of Administration and Finance, Facilities and Infrastructure, Control, and Operations Assistant Manager for Finance |
| Regional Secretariat | Mara Oloan Siregar, Assistant Secretary for Economic Development Sarwo Handhayani, Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure and Spatial Planning Udar Pristono, Head of Urban Infrastructure & Facilities Bureau Moch. Ichwan, head of Organisation Bureau, with staff |
| Transportation Agency | Tauchid, Head Akbar, head of traffic management and engineering sub-agency |
| Public Works Agency | Yudi Pebriadi, Roads division |
| Spatial Planning Agency | Wiriyatmoko, Head |
| Parks and Burial Grounds Agency | Catharina Suryowati, agency secretary |

GOI

| | |
|-----------------------|--|
| Ministry of Transport | Elly Sinaga, Director for Urban Transportation |
|-----------------------|--|

Bus Operators

| | |
|---------------------------------|---|
| PT. Primajasa Perdanaraya Utama | Sofi Irawan, General Manger with senior managers |
| PT. Jakarta Express Trans (JET) | Payaman Manik, Operational Director with senior manager |

CSR Partners

| | |
|---------------|----------------------------------|
| Podomoro City | Alvin, General Manager Marketing |
| Coca Cola | Danny Dewanto and colleagues |

NGOs

| | |
|-------------------|--|
| FAKTA | Azas Tigor Nainggolan, chairman (and also chairman of Jakarta Transport Council) |
| YLKI | Tulus Abadi, Manager |
| Pelangi Indonesia | Moekti K. Soejachmoen, Indira, Bobby |
| INSTRAN | Darmaningtyas |

Project partners

UNEP

Peerke de Bakker

ITDP

John Ernst, Director

Milatia Kusuma, Team Leader, and staff

Others

Indonesia Infrastructure Initiative

Peter Benson, PSO consultant, Bappenas

Annex 9 List of Documents Reviewed

UNEP/GEF Documents

- GEF Project Executive Summary GEF Council Work Programme Submission Project No 2954 Bus Rapid Transit and Pedestrian Improvements in Jakarta. 24 March 2006. (filename: UNEP Indonesia Operational Programme -11 Exec Summary 4May06)
- GEF Project Brief Project No 2954. Bus Rapid Transit and Pedestrian Improvements in Jakarta. 24 March 2006. (filename: UNEP Indonesia GEF Operational Programme -11 FSP brief - 4May06)
- UNEP GEF Project Implementation Reports (PIR). Bus Rapid Transit & Pedestrian Improvements Project in Jakarta. Fiscal Year 2008 and 2009
- Peerke de Bakker. Mission Reports. May 2008, August 2009

Legislation and Regulation

- Undang-undang Republik Indonesia No.19 tahun 2003 tentang Badan Usaha Milik Negara (SoE Law)
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- Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia No.41 tahun 1993 tentang Angkutan Jalan (Government Regulation on road transportation)
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<http://dishub.jakarta.go.id/>

Annex 10 Expertise of Evaluation Team – Brief CVs

Mr. David Antell Transport Expert and Lead Evaluator

8 Thorn Close, Claygate, Surrey, UK

Mobile : + 62 813 865 31546. Email : david_antell@yahoo.com

NATIONALITY : British

KEY QUALIFICATIONS, AREAS OF INTEREST:

Areas of professional interest include transport planning and engineering, environmental planning and urban development. Transport Planner on the Master Plan for DKI Jakarta, 1985 to 2005, and many other transport plans for Indonesia / DKI Jakarta.

LANGUAGES :

English, Spanish and Indonesian

COUNTRY WORK EXPERIENCE :

Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Brunei, India, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Spain and the UK.

EDUCATION :

Professional qualifications in Civil Engineering, Municipal Engineering and Traffic / Highway Engineering

WORK EXPERIENCE :

Relevant CONSULTANCY ASSIGNMENTS

| | |
|--------------|--|
| 2009 Ongoing | Senior Environmental and Social Specialist on the RSC Project Team in Makassar, Sulawesi, an AusAID EINRIP Project |
| 2008 Ongoing | Team Leader on the Western Indonesia National Roads Improvement Project (WINRIP), a World Bank Project. |
| 2006 - 2008 | Team Leader for Technical Assistance for Improving the Management of Environmental and Socio-Cultural Impacts of Road Development in Sensitive Areas (IMES) |
| 2007 - 2008 | Programme Manager on the IREP 2 Project in Banda Aceh, Indonesia |
| 2005 - 2006 | Team Leader : Technical Assistance on Project Procurement, Quality Assurance and Monitoring (PQAM), Banda Aceh, Indonesia. |
| 2004 - 2005 | Institutional Development Specialist : ADB's Southern Philippines Inter-modal Transport Development Project for Mindanao and Palawan. PSP Transportation Expert : World Bank's Private Provision of Infrastructure Technical Assistance (PPITA) in Indonesia. Institutions Expert and Transport Planner ; JBIC's SAPI Rural Roads Construction Project (RRCP) in Pakistan |
| 2003 | Transport Planner on the Aqaba (Jordan) Technical Assistance Support Project (ATASP) for the Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority (ASEZA). |
| 2000 - 2003 | Transport Planner and Traffic Engineer / Management Expert , Capacity Building for 'Transport Planning, Traffic Engineering / Management Study' for the MMDA, Philippines |
| 1999 | Transport Planner Transport Sector Strategy Study' (TSSS), Indonesia |

Mr. Owen Podger Institutional Expert

Vila Bukit Mas D-29 Surabaya Indonesia

Mobile: +62 812 8464 5179 Email: micah68@centrin.net.id

NATIONALITY: Australia

KEY QUALIFICATIONS, AREAS OF INTEREST:

Areas of professional interest: public sector and public service management, governance reforms, change management, and disaster management

LANGUAGES:

English and Indonesia

COUNTRY WORK EXPERIENCE:

Indonesia (25 years), Australia, Singapore, China, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, USA

EDUCATION:

Professional qualifications in architecture, urban planning and construction management.

WORK EXPERIENCE:

Relevant CONSULTANCY ASSIGNMENTS

- 2009- Adviser on capacity building in infrastructure planning, Papua and West Papua (AusAID)
- 2008-2009 Adviser to Indonesian Senate on revision of laws on regional government (USAID)
- 2007 - Adviser on implementation of special autonomy, Government of Aceh (European Union)
- 2007, 2004 Trainer in accountability in public service to regional governments (AusAID)
- 2007-8 Adviser on restoration of local government in Nias Islands after the 2005 earthquake (UNDP)
- 2005-6 Planning adviser to the Aceh-Nias Reconstruction Agency (USAID)
- 2004 Short-term Adviser on anti-corruption and good governance in Indonesia (ADB)
- 2003-4 Team leader, managing regional disparities in government programs to Indonesian regions (ADB)
- 2003 Budgeting and planning adviser for governance reform support programme (CIDA)
- 2003 Institutional Adviser, Beijing Drainage Group (World Bank)
- 2002 Institutional Adviser, Water Supply and Sanitation (Sector) Project Preparation (ADB).
- 1992 Capacity building adviser, Karachi Transportation Company (World Bank)

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- Senate of Indonesia (2009). Academic Papers and draft laws for regional government, regional elections, and village government. With Senate Committee 1 and Faculty of Law, University of Indonesia.
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Annex 11 Risk Factor Table

| Risk Factor | Indicator of Low Risk | Indicator of Medium Risk | Indicator of High Risk | Low | Medium | Substantial | High | Not Applicable | To be determined | Notes |
|--|---|--|---|-----|--------|-------------|------|----------------|------------------|---|
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| INTERNAL RISK - project management | | | | | | | | | | |
| Management structure (of the project) | Stable with roles and responsibilities clearly defined and understood | Individuals understand their own role but are unsure of responsibilities of others | Unclear responsibilities or overlapping functions which lead to management problems | L | | | | | | ITDP team works well and has good relations with Governor and all stakeholders. See additional External Risk Factor "BRT management structure" |
| Governance structure | Steering Committee and/or other project bodies meet periodically and provide effective direction/inputs | Body(ies) meets periodically but guidance/input provided to project is inadequate | Members lack commitment (seldom meet) and therefore the Committee/body does not fulfil its function | | | S | | | | Steering Committee meets, and the Governor takes active interest, but effectiveness depends on a paradigm shift in DKI governance structure. See additional external risk factor "DKI governance structure" |
| Internal communications | Fluid and cordial | Communication process deficient although relationships between team members are good | Lack of adequate communication between team members leading to deterioration of relationships and resentment / factions | | M | | | | | Communications between ITDP and project partners are normally fluid and cordial, but sometimes communications on strategic issues fails to result in decisions and action. Communications within ITDP is excellent. |

| Risk Factor | Indicator of Low Risk | Indicator of Medium Risk | Indicator of High Risk | Low | Medium | Substantial | High | Not Applicable | To be determined | Notes |
|-----------------------------|---|--|--|-----|--------|-------------|------|----------------|------------------|--|
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| Work flow | Project progressing according to work plan | Some changes in project work plan but without major effect on overall implementation | Major delays or changes in work plan or method of implementation | | | | H | | | <p>There has been little progress in most components over the past two years, due to governance problems created at inception of the BRT and an executive decision to solve these problems before proceeding with new corridors. More could have been done on the existing system.</p> <p>By correcting governance issues and following recommendations herein, workflow risk can possibly be rated M or L.</p> |
| Co-financing | Co-financing is secured and payments are received on time | Is secured but payments are slow and bureaucratic | A substantial part of pledged co-financing may not materialize | | M | | | | | <p>The evaluators do not agree with the 2009 PIR assessment of law risk. Finance is secured but project delays mean payments on capital outlays are far behind. New sources of finance are small and potentially unsustainable, as they are a result of ITDP effort not <i>TransJakarta</i>s</p> |
| Budget (adherence) | Activities are progressing within planned budget | Minor budget reallocation needed | Reallocation between budget lines exceeding 30% of original budget | | M | | | | | <p>Refers to UNEP budget only. Activities progress within budget lines only by redefinition of the scope of component 4 to include legal and governance issues not in the original design. Major budget re-allocation may be needed. due to underspending and potential improvements to the programme recommended in this report.</p> <p>See additional risk factor "DKI Budget" below for comment on DKI budgeting for BRT.</p> |
| Financial management | Funds are correctly managed and transparently accounted for | Financial reporting slow or deficient | Serious financial reporting problems or indication of mismanagement of funds | L | | | | | | <p>As ITDP keeps good records of project accounts, official reporting could be more prompt.</p> <p>See additional risk factor " <i>TransJakarta</i> and DKI Financial management" below</p> |

| Risk Factor | Indicator of Low Risk | Indicator of Medium Risk | Indicator of High Risk | Low | Medium | Substantial | High | Not Applicable | To be determined | Notes |
|-------------------------------------|--|--|---|-----|--------|-------------|------|----------------|------------------|---|
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| Reporting | Substantial reports are presented in a timely manner and are complete and accurate with a good analysis of project progress and implementation | Reports are complete and accurate but often delayed or lack critical analysis of progress and implementation | Serious concerns about quality and timeliness of project reporting | | M | | | | | ITDP and UNEP have improved the quality and immediacy of project reports. They are supported by excellent records of meetings and missions. When weaknesses of indicators of progress are addressed, this rating can be raised to L. See additional risk factor on DKI Reporting |
| Stakeholder involvement | Stakeholder analysis done and positive feedback from critical stakeholders and partners | Consultation and participation process seems strong but misses some groups or relevant partners | Symptoms of conflict with critical stakeholders or evidence of apathy and lack of interest from partners or other stakeholders | | M | | | | | The TOR requires the Evaluators to respond to the specific question: "is DKI Jakarta fully involved in project goals?" Our assessment is yes, there is a good understanding of the roles and requirements of related agencies, including the Jakarta Transport Council. The 2009 PIR indicated substantial risk here, due to a dispute on operator payment rates, which has now been settled. |
| External communications | Evidence that stakeholders, practitioners and/or the general public understand project and are regularly updated on progress | Communications efforts are taking place but not yet evidence that message is successfully transmitted | Project existence is not known beyond implementation partners or misunderstandings concerning objectives and activities evident | | M | | | | | Significant improvements have been made to communicate the project over the past 18 months, driven by ITDP rather than the BRT. Improvements by ITDP are no longer a priority. See additional risk factor on the serious gap in the external communications of <i>TransJakarta</i> on the service it provides. |
| Short term/long term balance | Project is meeting short term needs and results within a long term perspective, particularly sustainability and replicability | Project is interested in the short term with little understanding of or interest in the long term | Longer term issues are deliberately ignored or neglected | | M | | | | | The project has sacrificed many opportunities to get on with performance improvements, while placing priority on the long term goal of appropriate governance and management structures. |

| Risk Factor | Indicator of Low Risk | Indicator of Medium Risk | Indicator of High Risk | Low | Medium | Substantial | High | Not Applicable | To be determined | Notes |
|---|---|--|--|-----|----------|-------------|------|----------------|------------------|---|
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| Science and technological issues | Project based on sound science and well established technologies | Project testing approaches, methods or technologies but based on sound analysis of options and risks | Many scientific and /or technological uncertainties | | | S | | | | The Evaluators disagree with the rating given by the Project Manager and Task Manager. Much sound advice given to DKI on systems design and operational planning has not been applied. |
| Political influences | Project decisions and choices are not particularly politically driven | Signs that some project decisions are politically motivated | Project is subject to a variety of political influences that may jeopardize project objectives | | | S | | | | There are positive and negative political influences. Decisions are politically driven by the Governor in the interests of promoting project objectives. <i>TransJakarta</i> is reactive to outside pressures rather than responsive. |
| EXTERNAL RISK - project context | | | | | | | | | | |
| Political stability | Political context is stable and safe | Political context is unstable but predictable and not a threat to project implementation | Very disruptive and volatile | | M | | | | | The Evaluators agree with the PIR rating. However, recent issues of sexual harassment (negative) and police support for bus-lane exclusivity (positive) indicate that the political context is not always predictable though stable. |
| Environmental conditions | Project area is not affected by severe weather events or major environmental stress factors | Project area is subject to more or less predictable disasters or changes | Project area has very harsh environmental conditions | | M | | | | | The Evaluators disagree with the PIR rating. A significant amount of environmental improvement anticipated by using CNG is lost due to poor location of gas stations, long queues and congestion. There is a real risk of increased accidents on the opening of Corridors 9 and 10 unless there are improvements to the design. <i>Many Halte</i> have unsafe pedestrian access. |

| Risk Factor | Indicator of Low Risk | Indicator of Medium Risk | Indicator of High Risk | Low | Medium | Substantial | High | Not Applicable | To be determined | Notes |
|--|--|--|---|-----|--------|-------------|------|----------------|------------------|---|
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| Social, cultural and economic factors | There are no evident social, cultural and/or economic issues that may affect project performance and results | Social or economic issues or changes pose challenges to project implementation but mitigation strategies have been developed | Project is highly sensitive to economic fluctuations, to social issues or cultural barriers | | M | | | | | The current fare is below researched willingness to pay, but the proposed increase from Rp 3500 to Rp 5000 will create some social reaction. Except for along Corridor 1, the BRT still plays a minor overall role in transportation in Jakarta. Further expansion and needed improvement of many <i>Halte</i> will require land procurement and construction of elevated roads that will have significant social and economic impacts. |
| Capacity issues | Sound technical and managerial capacity of institutions and other project partners | Weaknesses exist but have been identified and actions is taken to build the necessary capacity | Capacity is very low at all levels and partners require constant support and technical assistance | | | S | | | | Inadequate attention is given to capacity building. Institutional reglomana requires staff to await SOPs prepared by others (ITDP) rather than efforts to continually improve. For BRT to make a significant improvement in performance, it must professionalise. |
| Others: | | | | | | | | | | |
| BRT Management structure | Stable with roles and responsibilities clearly defined and understood | Individuals understand their own role but are unsure of responsibilities of others | Unclear responsibilities or overlapping functions which lead to management problems | | | S | | | | <i>TransJakarta</i> staff members have sufficient guidance and skills to maintain current levels of underperformance. It is not yet structured to be professional or to continuously improve. ITDP is skilled and its team leader provides excellent feedback to staff. Acceptance of recommendations on management structure and process of establishing the BUMD as recommended herein will potential reduce the risk to L |

| Risk Factor | Indicator of Low Risk | Indicator of Medium Risk | Indicator of High Risk | Low | Medium | Substantial | High | Not Applicable | To be determined | Notes |
|---|---|--|--|-----|--------|-------------|------|----------------|------------------|--|
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| DKI Governance structure | Structure provides checks and balances, appropriate lines of accountability, and is oriented to continual improvement | People work to rules | Performance is constrained by decisions of people who are not accountable for outcomes, there are inadequate checks and balances | | | | H | | | The head of <i>TransJakarta</i> is not responsible for design of the BRT, and the BRT designers are not responsible for performance. This risk can be reduced to L within 18 months by implementing the proposed change of <i>TransJakarta</i> to BUMD status, and full implementation of financial management reforms and the recommendations of this report. |
| DKI Budget | Activities are budgeted and progressing within agreed plan | Minor budget reallocation needed | Reallocation between budget lines exceeding 30% of original budget | | | | H | | | DKI allocate its budget annually in a process requiring parliamentary review. Considerable determination will be needed to assure allocation of funds in 2011 to put the programme back on track, and make the considerable increase in investment that this report recommends. |
| <i>TransJakarta</i> and DKI financial management | BRT public funds are correctly managed and transparently accounted for | Financial reporting slow or deficient | Serious financial reporting problems or indication of mismanagement of funds | | | | H | | | Despite improvements achieved by placing professional accountants in <i>TransJakarta</i> , financial reports are still non-compliant with Indonesian public accounting standards and do not provide information needed for effective management and accountability. There is no indication of mismanagement of funds. Full adoption of financial management reforms will soon reduce this risk rating to L. |
| DKI Reporting | Substantial DKI reports on the BRT are presented in a timely manner and are complete and accurate with a good analysis of project progress and implementation | DKI reports are complete and accurate but often delayed or lack critical analysis of progress and implementation | Serious concerns about quality and timeliness of DKI project reporting | | | | H | | | With responsibility across several institutions there is no reporting in DKI on progress of the BRT. DKI's systems of reporting do not require that <i>TransJakarta</i> provide regular reports on improvement of services or Change Management, as will be required under the new law on public services. |

| Risk Factor | Indicator of Low Risk | Indicator of Medium Risk | Indicator of High Risk | Low | Medium | Substantial | High | Not Applicable | To be determined | Notes |
|---|--|---|--|-----|--------|-------------|------|----------------|------------------|--|
| TransJakarta stakeholder involvement | Stakeholder analysis done and positive feedback from critical stakeholders and partners beyond DKI | Consultation and participation process seems strong but misses some groups or relevant partners | Symptoms of conflict with critical stakeholders or evidence of apathy and lack of interest from partners or other stakeholders | | | | H | | | <p>ITDP has improved <i>TransJakarta</i> public relations, particular related to engaging businesses in CSR and user-groups. If <i>TransJakarta</i> was responsive to passengers, there would be:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More buses to meet demand • Better signage and information on services • Channelling of passengers on <i>Halte</i> • Prompt maintenance and regular cleaning of <i>Halte</i>, bridges and ramps • Well-considered feedback to complainants |
| TransJakarta external communications | Evidence that stakeholders, practitioners and/or the general public understand BRT and are regularly updated on progress | Communications efforts are taking place but not yet evidence that message is successfully transmitted | BRT existence is not known beyond current users or do not know how to use it | | | | H | | | <p><i>TransJakarta</i> information available to passengers and potential passengers is very poor. Signage is minimal on and in buses and <i>Halte</i>.</p> |
| | | | | | | | | | | |

Annex 12 Best Value Principles and Key Success Factors for Change Management

Best Value

Best value principles have been used in UK, Australia and elsewhere as a simplified quality management approach in provision of public services, and are recommended to DKI for at least a transition period while changing from a bureaucratic regulatory approach to a performance and continual improvement approach. This approach is compatible with the Indonesian Law on Public Services.

The six principles are:

1. All public services must be **responsive to needs of the community**
2. Each public service must be **accessible** to those members of the community for whom the service is intended.
3. Service providers must achieve **continuous improvement** in the provision of each of their services
4. All public services must meet **quality and cost standards**. Every service provider must develop its own quality and cost standards for each service it provides. Quality and cost standard set out the performance outcomes that the service provider intends to achieve. Service providers may develop different quality and cost standards for different classes of services.
5. Each service provider must develop a **programme of regular consultation** with its community in relation to the services it provides
6. Each service provider must **report regularly to its community** on its achievements in service provision, in relation to the above five principles

Enforcement of the principles is institutionalised by the creation of a small commission that appraises performance and reports back to the Governor, who then reports to the DPRD. The commission prepares its appraisal by consultation with stakeholders and the general public in order to focus on principal factors affecting performance.

Key Success Factors for Change Management

1. Good managers *strengthen the command* of their elected head of government over the whole of their government, in the preparation and implementation of policy. Good systems provide *effective span of control*, balance by a degree of managerial autonomy for every manager.
2. Good managers *integrate* their work with the work of all other sections and agencies so as to reduce conflicts, overlaps and inefficiencies. They take the initiative of working together to assure achievement of complex goals. Good systems do not overlap or leave gaps, and make rules that encourage workers to work with other agencies and the public to achieve goals.
3. Good managers implement *performance-based financial management* and *financial-based performance management*, with integrity, because they are using the people's money to serve the people. They are aware of the costs of what they do. Good systems enable budgets to be prepared that related planned performance to the financial resources needed, then provide managers with financial and technical progress data on demand.
4. Good managers build a *new ethos* of government which serves the people ethically and competently. They are people of integrity, dedicated to the people, with a clear sense of public good and public money. Good systems encourage fairness, goodness, diligence, competence, and performance, reducing the opportunities for unethical behaviour and punishing it when it occurs.

5. Good managers continually aim for the *best value* in providing services to the people, for the people and with the people, *with emphasis on services that promote economic growth in a sustainable environment*. Good systems provide the information to improve value in serving the people, provide the resources to improve value, and reward successes in providing improved value.
6. Good managers create *partnerships* with community groups and business to facilitate their full effectiveness in serving the community. They seek new ways of delivering and financing to maximise public self-governance, public service and the use of public funding. Good public systems recognise that people can perform many of the functions of government better than the government can, and allow for alternative service delivery systems wherever possible.
7. Good managers produce *effective policies* that will stimulate legal certainty, economic growth, and social justice. Good systems assure policies that will stimulate legal certainty, economic growth, and social justice, by demanding high standards of drafting and careful impact assessment.
8. Good managers place the most *competent people in every position*. Good systems assure good people can be attracted to and held in every position.
9. Good managers use *ICT to make paradigm changes* in the provision of services. Good systems include e-procurement, internet access to data, digital mapping, use of sms for handing messages and collecting data.

Annex 13 Example of Vehicle Operational Plan of Jakarta BRT

OPERASIONAL KENDARAAN BUSWAY

PT. JAKARTA TRANS METROPOLITAN

Terhitung Mulai Tanggal 01 Februari 2010

| KORIDOR 4 (Pulo Gadung – Dukuh Atas) | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------|-----------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|
| PERIODE (JAM) | | SENIN s/d JUMAT | | SABTU/MINGGU/LIBUR | |
| | | HEADWAY | BUS OPERASI | HEADWAY | BUS OPERASI |
| 5:00 | 6:00 | Tabel Bawah | 7 | Tabel Bawah | 8 |
| 6:00 | 7:00 | 4.09 | 22 | 5.00 | 18 |
| 7:00 | 8:00 | 4.09 | 22 | 5.00 | 18 |
| 8:00 | 9:00 | 4.09 | 22 | 4.09 | 22 |
| 9:00 | 10:00 | 4.09 | 22 | 4.09 | 22 |
| 10:00 | 11:00 | 4.09 | 22 | 4.09 | 22 |
| 11:00 | 12:00 | 4.09 | 22 | 4.09 | 22 |
| 12:00 | 13:00 | 4.09 | 22 | 4.09 | 22 |
| 13:00 | 14:00 | 4.09 | 22 | 4.09 | 22 |
| 14:00 | 15:00 | 4.09 | 22 | 4.09 | 22 |
| 15:00 | 16:00 | 4.09 | 22 | 4.09 | 22 |
| 16:00 | 17:00 | 4.09 | 22 | 4.09 | 22 |
| 17:00 | 18:00 | 4.09 | 22 | 4.09 | 22 |
| 18:00 | 19:00 | 4.09 | 22 | 4.09 | 22 |
| 19:00 | 20:00 | 4.09 | 22 | 4.09 | 22 |
| 20:00 | 21:00 | 5.00 | 18 | 9.00 | 10 |
| 21:00 | 22:00 | 9.00 | 10 | 11.25 | 8 |

| HALTE PEMBERANGKATAN PERTAMA | | | | | |
|------------------------------|-------|----------------------------|------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| PERIODE (JAM) | | SENIN s/d JUMAT | | MINGGU/LIBUR | |
| | | Pulo Gadung | Dukuh Atas | Pulo Gadung | Dukuh Atas |
| 05:00 | 06:00 | 7 bus (h'way = 5 menit) | | 5 bus (h'way = 6 menit) | 3 bus (h'way = 12 menit) |
| 06:00 | 07:00 | 7 | 8 | 5 | 5 |
| 07:00 | 08:00 | | | | |
| 08:00 | 09:00 | | | 2 | 2 |
| 09:00 | 0:00 | | | | |

| HALTE PEMULANGAN TERAKHIR | | | | | |
|---------------------------|-------|-----------------|------------|--------------|------------|
| PERIODE (JAM) | | SENIN s/d JUMAT | | MINGGU/LIBUR | |
| | | Pulo Gadung | Dukuh Atas | Pulo Gadung | Dukuh Atas |
| 18:00 | 19:00 | | | | |
| 19:00 | 20:00 | | | | |
| 20:00 | 21:00 | 4 | | 12 | |
| 21:00 | 22:00 | 8 | | 2 | |
| >22 | :00 | 6 | 4 | 5 | 3 |

Annex 14 Minutes of Steering Committee Meeting held on 24 June 2010

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| Dated, venue | Friday, 25 June 2010, @Balai Kota |
| Time | 15.30.30-17.45 |
| Attendees | See Attachment |
| Subject | Project Steering Committee (PSC) Meeting |
| Summary of meeting results | <p>The PSC meeting was chaired by the Assistant Secretary for Economic – Mr. Hasan Basri</p> <p>Remarks of Task Manager UNEP – Mr. Peerke de Bakker</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - This Steering Committee meeting is a special meeting and probably the most important Steering Committee Meeting for the project, as we will discuss the draft of the Mid Term Evaluation (MTE). - The MTE is a mandatory process for all UNEP projects. The MTE was prepared beginning in August 2009, but the implementation was late due to the UN bureaucratic process. - The MTE assesses how the project has been doing, the lessons learned, and ensures that the second part of project execution will be better. The aim is that the GEF funds are used optimally in order to achieve the project objectives. - The independent evaluators (Mr. David Antell and Mr. Owen Podger) who were recruited by an independent division unit of UNEP, the Evaluation and Oversight Unit, took a close look at the project performance and prepared recommendations for the next 18 months of project execution. - The evaluators have only made recommendations, while the Steering Committee has the ultimate authority to decide on what recommendations shall be taken on board. Some recommendations may only make sense if the Jakarta Government fully endorses them. - Based on MTE results, direction and priorities need to be set and the remaining project budget (less than half of 5.8 million USD) should be revised accordingly. - All stakeholders are invited to discuss the draft report of MTE before it is finalized and submitted to the UNEP Evaluation Office. <p>Evaluator's presentation</p> <p>The evaluators have rated the project overall as Moderately Unsatisfactory as the reflection of the diversion of the project to overcome problems of governance from when the BRT started.</p> <p><i>Recommendations for technical matters :</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Planning Aspects <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Learn from the planning, design and construction of corridors 1 – 10, e.g., optimization of the location of bus stations, extensions to potential high demand locations, provision of passing lanes, and pay attention to the needs of pedestrians/potential passengers 2) Planning, Design and Construction-related Aspects <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Improve and properly maintain the pedestrian connections to reach public transport throughout the city - Identify required repairs/redesign of corridors 9 & 10 - Critical review and redesign of corridors 11-14, and consider to drop or replace |

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| | <p>some of the proposed corridors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Use better and more accurate data for operational planning - Modify some routes in an attempt to reduce queues and delays, e.g., to stop (and reverse) some northbound buses at Bank Indonesia, and southbound buses at HI roundabout - Provide appropriate signage and passenger information particularly the onboard “Passenger Information System” and the LED display - Guarantee bus lane exclusivity, including the introduction of additional separators to physically segregate bus and mixed traffic - Improve the Area Traffic Control (ATC) signal system to avoid delays and the bunching of buses - Coordinate with Traffic Police to shorten cycle times on signals that adversely affect the BRT - Increase bus operational efficiency by operating the articulated buses on high demand routes and single buses on low demand routes - Consider transferring the management of on-board security staff to bus operators and change the security uniforms - Assure routine bridge cleaning and regular footpath maintenance <p>3) Other Aspects</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Clarify legal status and develop technical proposals of ERP. Do not apply the increased tax on changing vehicle ownership papers, which will jeopardize the enforcement of the ERP system - Prepare the ToR for the supply of a good secure ticketing system which must be capable of expansion to cover additional corridors and other transport modes at reasonable cost, and it must be maintained - Consider the advertising on the outside and inside of the buses, and the bus stations in full coordination with signing <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Recommendations for institutional matters:</i></p> <p>The recommendations consist of imperative (comply with national policy) and important (improve management and oversight of the busway) recommendations.</p> <p>1) Imperative recommendations (which should not need ITDP support)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Fully implement financial management reforms (Medium Term Expenditure Framework - MTEF) - Immediately transfer all busway assets to Transjakarta - Immediately commence regular consolidated reporting on the BRT - Give control over assets and decisions that affect performance to Transjakarta - Annul Pergub 123 - Immediately prepare for multi-year contracting of all operational contracts - Immediately commence a head-hunt for a highly competent performance-oriented Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Transjakarta who will be responsible for the BUMD development and transition and should not take responsibility for managing the BRT until the conversion to BUMD is complete - Appoint commissioners and commission them to appraise the plans and decisions of the appointed CEO <p>2) Important recommendations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Give clear responsibility to the Head of Dishub to regulate and oversee Transjakarta without interfering with operations - Immediately adopt a policy that all new roadways must be prioritized to improve public transport |
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- Immediately review plans for the elevated roads in Kebayoran Baru and from Tanah Abang to Matraman
- Initiate preparation of the transportation master plan, RILLAJ (Rencana Induk Lalu Lintas dan Angkutan Jalan), which should be integrated with the master plan for roads and an amendment to the spatial plan
- Consider more BRT-based TOD in the amended spatial plan
- Redesign the proposed terminal at Dukuh Atas to include the busway terminal for corridors 4 & 6 and a new bus stop for corridor 1
- Adopt Best Value principles to help change the culture of government agencies to public service with continual improvement
- Establish Detailed Work Plans to complement working budget documents
- Provide the valuation of existing licenses on corridors 9 & 10
- Make the decision on what to do with old buses now used on corridor 1

Discussions/Recommendations

Mr. Hasan Basri realized that there are many things that need to be improved as stated by the evaluators. He invited the members of Steering Committee to comment, provide recommendations, and even give the commitment to implement the recommendations from the evaluators.

1) Head of Transjakarta BLU – Ms. DA Rini

- In general the fact findings of the evaluators are correct
- Route modification is continuously implemented. However the buses at corridor 1 cannot stop and reverse at HI roundabout during peak hours.
- Requested ITDP support for improving signage and passenger information in the bus and in the shelter. It was informed that almost 95% of the LED displays in the buses are now working since BLU requested the bus operators to operate it and will be fined if the LED does not work well.
- The uniforms of security staff will be adjusted in line with the application of just agreed identity color of Transjakarta (orange-red)
- The need of Pergub 123 revision/replacement and about the need of compensation for existing bus operators had been discussed with Dishub. Without the replacement of Pergub 123, BLU Transjakarta could not conduct the bus operator procurement for corridors 9 & 10
- The highly competent CEO for Transjakarta should be recruited soon
- Transjakarta had tried out the operation of articulated buses along corridor 1, however some bus stops are not yet modified for the operation of articulated buses
- Questioned about the organizational reform of Transjakarta, which is not described clearly in the draft report of MTE

2) Vice Head of Transportation Agency – Mr. Riza

- Informed that some bus stops along corridor 1 had been adjusted.
- Based on question from Mr. John Ernst about the connection of BRT to Tangerang, Dishub will bring this issue to internal discussion of DKI Jakarta.

3) Legal Bureau – Mr. Puspla

Pergub 123 is being revised. Mr. Owen reminded that Pergub 123 should be annulled since the procurement of bus operator should comply with Keppres 80.

4) Final Discussions on MTE results:

- Mr. Peerke de Bakker reminded that programme priority should be decided

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| | <p>soon, including the decision on the plan of BRT extension to Tangerang, since the programme and budget revision for the next 18 months will need approval from GEF-UNEP</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mr. Hasan Basri agreed with and accepted all the fact findings and recommendations from the Mid Term Evaluation. Therefore the most important thing is how to implement the recommendations from the evaluators. In general the recommendations can be categorized into: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Improvements of busway system e.g. routes, buses, operation, etc o The operation of corridors 9 & 10 and the plan of next corridors o The institutional and legal aspects which should be addressed - Some additional discussions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Legal basis for bus operator procurement will be assessed soon, thereafter the bus operator for corridor 9 & 10 can be procured. o Extension of Jakarta BRT to surrounding cities will be discussed later within DKI due to political issues o The reformation of TJ institution to be more appropriate organization is still being assessed. o Improvement programme of ATCS has been budgeted. o Better signing and information for busway passenger and improvement of pedestrian facilities can be accelerated o Non fare box revenue, particularly from advertising will need serious discussion o Assets transferring to Transjakarta has to be clarified soon o The current TOD proposal is too concentrated on railway based, however it is agreed that link or integration with other modes of transportation is very important in order to generate passengers for both, BRT and MRT o The implementation of Minimum Services Standard (MSS) is not clearly recommended by the evaluator. However it was clarified by the evaluator that the implementation of MSS is part of Best Value principles which should be adopted by DKI Jakarta. <p>5) ITDP’s Response to the Recommendations of the Mid Term Evaluation</p> <p>Most of the recommendations of the Mid Term Evaluation are in-line with the proposed programme of ITDP for 2010 – 2011. Programme priority has been planned and adjusted with the remaining budget. In general ITDP programme consist of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Institutional improvement (Local Regulation for Equity Injection, PSO, and establishment of BUMD) - Support the implementation of strategic business plan - Assist the implementation of MSS - Improve bus operational - Study on feeder system - Assist campaign programme - Promote the NMT & TDM <p>6) Comments to ITDP’s Work Programme and Closing Discussion</p> <p>Mr. Hasan Basri agreed with almost all of ITDP’s programme, only the assessment of PSO mechanism should be changed to “better channeling subsidy mechanism” since TJ current status is as a Full BLU.</p> <p>Mr. John Ernst explained that ITDP was asked by the Governor to support the institutional reform from BLU to BUMD which was targeted to be achieved by the</p> |
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| | beginning of 2011. Mr. Hasan Basri stated that Jakarta Government still commit to reform the institution of Transjakarta to be more flexible and to be able to cope up with the dynamic development of busway. However maximum efforts should be made within 2.5 months to improve Transjakarta level of service ,while its current status is as a Full BLU. |
| Conclusion of the Meeting | All recommendations of Mid Term Evaluation can be agreed and accepted. |
| Follow-up / Action Plan | Mr. Hasan Basri will take a lead in implementing the recommendations of MTE |

List of Attendees

Task Manager of UNEP: Peerke de Bakker

DKI Jakarta

1. Assistant Secretary for Economy : Ir. Hasan Basri Saleh, M.Sc
2. Deputy Governor for Industry and Transportation
- Assistant Deputy: Agung Widodo
3. Head of Transport Agency (Dishub)
- Deputy Head of Transport Agency : Riza Hashim
- Secretary General of Transport Agency : Hasbi Hasibuan
- Benhard Hutajulu
4. Urban Infrastructures & Facilities (Biro ASP)
- Heru Panatas
5. Legal Bureau (Biro Hukum)
- Puspla Dirdjaja
6. Head of Economic Bureau (Biro Perekonomian)
- Head of Economic Bureau – Dra. Ratnaningsih, Ak, M.Si
- Bambang Sardito
- Rustam
- Eric
7. Regional Investment Agency (BPMP)
- Indarini E
- Eddy Swardi
8. City Financial Agency (BPKD)
- A. Maulana
- Fatimah
- Iwan Tama A.
9. Organization and governance (Ortala)
- Head of Organization and Governance : Drs. Moch. Ichwan, MM, ME
10. Jakarta Police (Polda)
- K. Pinem
11. Transjakarta BLU
- Head of Transjakarta BLU – DA Rini

Project Evaluator (Consultant for UNEP): David Antell and Owen Podger

ITDP : John Ernst, Milatia Kusuma, Restiti, Yoga Adiwianto, Muhammad Saifullah, Ratna Yunita, Rosyadah