Executive Summary

In the period under review Greece underwent a severe economic crisis which affected all core dimensions. The quality of democracy was negatively affected by a new sharp divide between supporters and opponents of the bailout extended to Greece by its creditors under strict austerity conditions. This divide cut through the electoral bases of the center-right (New Democracy) and the center-left (Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party or PASOK) – and led to the emergence of new parties that took more extreme rightist or leftist positions, including the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn. Mass-mobilizations against the austerity package accompanying the bailout were frequent and violent, while verbal and physical attacks against political institutions – such as the parliament – and against parliamentarians themselves became commonplace. The 2012 elections temporarily resolved tensions by giving anti-bailout citizens the opportunity to rally around the radical left party SYRIZA (Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás or Coalition of the Radical Left, SYRIZA), which became the main opposition party. After the elections, the two traditional contenders of power, New Democracy and PASOK, accompanied by the moderate Democratic Left party (Dimokratiki Aristera, DIMAR), formed a coalition government. If the acute and violent political conflict and the rise of neo-Nazism are the crisis’ negative effects on the quality of democracy, then the formation and survival of a coalition government – in itself a rare instance in post-authoritarian Greece – was a positive development.

Policy performance was mixed from 2011 to 2013 as Greece started recovering from the economic crisis, but there was some progress in non-economic policy sectors. Fiscal consolidation was attained as the primary budget deficit was sharply reduced. In 2010 – 2012, the Greek economy regained most of the competitiveness it had lost in the period preceding the crisis (2000 – 2008). Exports increased and tourism started recovering after 2011. The pension system was streamlined and labor relations became much less rigid than in the pre-crisis period. Meanwhile, however, depression became synonymous with the Greek economy. Unemployment soared and particularly affected vulnerable categories of the population, such as women and the young. SMEs stopped servicing their debts and paying their employees or went bankrupt to an unprecedented degree. Precarious work became the norm in the private sector.
Poverty and homelessness was visible in urban centers, while a brain drain accelerated. As far as non-economic policy sectors such as education, research, public health and the environment were concerned, cuts in government spending and the reluctance of ministers and affected interest groups to support reforms led to a clear downgrading of policy performance.

Government capacities were not exactly increased but, owing to pressure from the EC–ECB–IMF Troika which monitored the implementation of the bailout package and accompanying austerity measures, the government was obliged to effect changes in the way it steered economy and society. The Greek Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) was strengthened with competent staff and resources, the Ministry of Finance imposed its will on other line ministries and agencies with regard to government expenses, and new institutions, such as the Government Council on Reform and the economic prosecutors were founded to enhance government capacities. Time will tell if such changes in government endure after the worst effects of the crisis have been overcome.

By 2013, there was a new scrutiny of the assumptions underlying Greece’s two bailouts and their associated loan conditions. The IMF itself produced a self-critical report on the calculations of the “multiplier” effects of the adjustment measures and meanwhile, the anti-austerity political mood across Europe had shifted somewhat.

That said, the relationship between the Troika and the Greek government has had something of a soap opera quality: Greece fails to meet targets; the Troika visits and leaves without sanctioning the next quarter of Greece’s loan; the government faces huge domestic pressure; the Troika returns and a “just enough” compromise is reached. The soap opera is created by a combination of the severity of the measures and the public reaction, the inadequacies of the state administration in delivering adjustment and reform, and the political interests of the parties in power. The effect of poor state administration is to shift attention away from issues of choice – like priorities and models – to across-the-board cuts to satisfy targets not otherwise met. The result is suboptimal for all: Greece fails to adapt to a new path of economic development and growth while intense battles rage over the severity of crude and damaging cuts. In short, the Troika’s supervision achieves limited progress, “Europe” is exposed in a legitimacy crisis, and domestic institutions fail to make the deeper adjustments necessary. “Reform capacity” has improved in a very limited fashion.
Key Challenges

Greece needs to stay on the road to reform it chose in 2010 by implementing austerity measures in exchange for being saved from default, with the help of the EC–ECB–IMF Troika. Austerity policies cannot be sustained for much longer without provoking what would be almost a humanitarian crisis. Yet reforms in certain policy sectors, such as pensions, taxation and the management of state finances must be continued if the country wishes to avoid another episode of near default in the short run. Needless to say, the creation of an institutional environment hospitable to domestic private investment and foreign direct investment is a precondition of economic recovery in a country depleted of both state and private funds. In the same vein, the procedures and pace for channeling EU funds to countries in urgent need of development must be changed. With regard to Structural Funds and funds provided by banks such as the European Investment Bank, a drastic change is necessary in order to adapt to the urgency of times of crisis. It is simply impossible for Greece and other EU countries undergoing a similar crisis to wait until the usual EU and national regulations and bureaucratic requirements for the release of funds are satisfied. Greece, of course, needs to continue sound fiscal policies of the kind adopted in 2011 – 2013. Otherwise any progress in economic growth envisaged from the beginning of 2014 will prove short lived.

Furthermore, spending-cut reforms which proved impossible in other sectors – such as education, social welfare, labor markets and public health – must soon come to the fore because both the younger generation and the older generation have suffered greatly in the crisis. In 2011 – 2013 the young found that access to the labor market was greatly restricted, regardless of the number and level of academic degrees they held, while the old discovered that their living standards proved very fragile because of a combination of lowered pensions and disintegrating health care and social services. The challenge of reversing the negative social effects of the crisis – particularly as far as the young, the unemployed and the old are concerned – is not a simple matter of social justice. Meeting this challenge is vital for quality of democracy in Greece, as the crisis has unraveled political forces and has facilitated the spread of attitudes which are skeptical of, if not completely hostile to, democratic institutions.

Indeed, if pre-crisis Greek governance and democracy were the most important domestic causes of Greece’s near default, it follows that the restoration of
government institutions is a challenge of paramount importance. Even if the Greek economy finally becomes sustainable, the repetition of past governance practices can bring it once more to the edge of an abyss. To sum up, the outlook for the future, namely the second half of the 2010s, will look brighter if economic recovery goes hand in hand with reforms in policies related to working and living conditions and the enhancement of the government’s capacity to govern.
I. Economic Policies

Economy

Until the winter of 2009/2010, Greece was running an unsustainable budget deficit (-15.6% of GDP in 2009), current account balance (-11.1% of GDP in 2009) and very high public debt (129.7% of GDP in 2009). The combination of this disappointing economic performance with the aftershocks of the 2008 global economic crisis brought Greece to the brink of default in early 2010. Greece’s sovereign debt crisis was prevented by the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF which, at the request of the Greek government, bailed the country out in May 2010. Since then a Troika representing the EC, the ECB and the IMF has monitored economic policy in Greece. Taxes were raised, public spending was cut and public sector wages and pensions were lowered.

A second effort to rescue Greece took place in February 2012, when international and domestic private creditors oversaw the restructuring of Greek debt. They suffered losses which helped alleviate the Greek debt. This second rescue package was also accompanied by further austerity measures, leading to further decreases in salaries and wages not only in the public but also in the private sector (-22% decrease in the minimum monthly salary in the private sector).

The results of the above economic policy measures were mixed. A depression followed the rise in taxes and the decrease in incomes. In three years (2010 – 2012), the economy shrank by a total 19.5%. Unemployment, which was at 9.5% of the labor force in 2009, soared to 24.3% in 2012. On the other hand, in the same period the Greek economy regained two-thirds of the competitiveness it had lost in 2000 – 2009 and the budget deficit fell to 9.4% of GDP at the end of 2011.
Structural reforms of the economy were delayed, even though they were included in the first Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Greek government and the Troika in 2010. It was only in early May 2013 that a major privatization, namely the sale of the Greek state-owned OPAP lottery and sports-betting authority, was accomplished. Before 2010, Greek labor relations were rigidly regulated, while in the wake of the crisis regulations were relaxed to the point of giving employers almost a free hand to offer individual, tailor-made labor contracts to prospective workers in the private sector.

In sum, it was only under pressure from the country’s creditors that Greek governments started to streamline different regimes (incomes, pensions, taxation, labor relations) in order to follow an economic policy which started bearing fruits in the early months of 2013 and may lead the country out of the economic crisis in 2014.

**Labor Markets**

Before the crisis a rigidly regulated labor market of hundreds of state-owned enterprises and a few hundred large private companies existed side by side with a little-regulated, if not completely unregulated labor market dominated by about 800,000 small and very small enterprises. In the state and large private-company labor market, employees enjoyed on average higher job security, higher salaries and better social protection than in the small enterprise market, where job insecurity and evasion of insurance contributions were rampant. This situation, which pitted labor market insiders versus outsiders, was exacerbated in the period of the economic crisis.

In 2011 – 2013 in the context of Greece’s bailout by its creditors, job security regulations were relaxed and dismissals were facilitated. Private companies were allowed to offer tailor-made, company-wide or even individual labor contracts, instead of agreeing to nationwide collective agreements between social partners. Such measures were detrimental to the rate of unemployment, job security and the previously existing division between labor market insiders and outsiders. Now, former employees of the public and the private sectors have become outsiders.

While in the public sector only those employed on a project-by-project basis or on short fixed-term contracts fell into unemployment, as their contracts were not renewed, in the private sector unemployment soared. According to OECD data, total unemployment increased from 7.2% in 2008 to 16.3% in 2011; in the same period, long-term unemployment went from 3.4% to 8.1%; low-skilled
unemployment soared from 6.8% to 17%; and youth unemployment skyrocketed from 22.1% to 44.4%. After the implementation of the austerity policies mentioned above, the fiscal situation was stabilized.

In sum, the terms of the bailout have increased unemployment and disabled government policies for helping people into work. At best, this is a flexibilization of the labor market that will reduce costs and increase competitiveness, allowing a more sustainable economic path in the future. But in the short- and medium-term, such austerity simply increases unemployment dramatically.

**Taxes**

Historically, the state has operated to exacerbate differences between groups for clientelistic and electoral reasons and the state administration itself has been riven with operational dysfunctionalities. Thus, tax policy has been grossly ineffective in Greece, as shown by the chronic incapacity of the Greek state to collect taxes. The size of Greece’s underground economy is calculated to be as much as 30% of the official economy.

Horizontal equity was not attained as tax payers of similar tax-paying ability contributed so differently to tax revenue. While the medium- and high-income salaried strata regularly paid taxes, tax payers raising income in the liberal professions (doctors, lawyers, engineers etc.) and in the tourist, restaurant and other businesses, refrained from declaring their actual income and were tolerated in this by tax authorities.

Despite the existence of progressive tax coefficients, tax evasion had a negative impact on vertical inequality too, as the richest Greek strata – essentially those engaged in business and in liberal professions – repeatedly made smaller direct tax contributions than the poorer strata, namely the salaried workers and employees of the public and the private sectors. In this respect, the fact that, as OECD data shows, Greece has one of the smallest marginal taxes imposed on businesses, is not helpful either. In Greece, taxation limits income inequality to a much lesser degree than in other OECD countries.

The relationship between public revenues and expenditures was also hampered, as demonstrated by the long-term borrowing requirements of the Greek state, which date back to the 1980s and the 1990s. The last year in which public revenue exceeded public expenditure was 2002. In the 2000s this long-term problem was aggravated by the policy decision to invest in costly government-
led projects, such as staging the Athens Olympics in 2004. The result was that by the end of 2009 Greece was perceived by the international markets as being close to default. The recent OECD data on structural balance confirms this.

Since 2010, under pressure from the EC–ECB–IMF Troika, successive Greek governments have tried to expand the tax base, to increase indirect taxes (VAT raised to 23% for most services), to impose new landed-property taxes (such as a new poll tax on all flats, houses or spaces with an owner paying an electricity bill) and to reorganize tax authorities in order to limit tax evasion. Increased taxation contributed to the suffocation of economic activity, leading to depression. For instance, in 2013, the sixth year of depression in a row, the economy was predicted to contract by more than 4%. However, increased taxation was combined with severe cuts in all types of public spending in 2011–2013. This led to fast fiscal consolidation, as the budget deficit decreased by six percentage points in a span of two years (2010–2011) and it continued to decrease in 2011–2013, albeit more slowly.

**Budgets**

After the economic crisis erupted in Greece in 2010, servicing the public debt became the first priority of the Greek government, but the ensuing depression depressed government revenue. Incomes decreased and the total of tax revenue was also lowered. For instance, as IMF data show at least nominally, in 2011 each Greek child was burdened with a share of the public debt which was close to $300,000.

Fiscal consolidation was attained to a large extent, in the sense that the primary deficit was sharply reduced in 2011–2013. However, owing to the contraction of the economy in the same time period, the public debt increased further. It is expected to stabilize at 175% of GDP in 2013 and stay at that level in 2014. This is an unsustainable level and there is speculation that Greece’s creditors may consider agreeing to a reduction of the debt. This prospect was, however, rejected in early 2013, as most of Greece’s public debt is held by foreign governments. Forgiving part of the debt would thus mean that taxpayers of other countries would be negatively affected.

On the other hand, without further funds coming from foreign governments, Greece would have grave difficulties overcoming the crisis in the near future. Today the Troika closely monitors budgetary policy and has helped make it more sustainable than in the past, in particular because these institutions forced Greece to overcome its formerly anachronistic budget management process,
with some 14,000 separate budget items – all poorly coordinated. The
government claims that, owing to the prudent budgetary policy of the period
2011 – 2013, small, but visible, positive economic growth will be in sight by
the beginning of 2014.

In brief, Greece’s Herculean efforts to implement harsh austerity measures in
order to improve on its budgetary policy will not succeed unless accompanied
by corresponding measures, agreed internationally, to manage the country’s
public debt in a sustainable manner.

Research and Innovation

OECD data show that in Greece public spending on R&D amounts only to
0.28% of its GDP. Most research is conducted in state universities and state
research institutions in Athens, Thessaloniki and Heraklion. Traditional fields
of research include biology, computer science, economics, various branches of
engineering, archeology and history. Research in other fields is not as
developed. Most funding for research in these fields comes from the state,
which in 2011 – 2013 was undergoing a dire fiscal crisis. More importantly,
research associated with industrial production or services is not developed, as
there is very little corresponding demand from the private sector. Yet teams of
Greek researchers regularly participate in EU-funded research projects and are
even lead partners in relevant consortia. For instance, the National Technical
University of Athens actively participates in international projects, as does the
Heraklion-based Institute for Technology and Research.

In 2011 – 2013, owing to the fiscal crisis, the Greek state was only partially
able to offer subsidies and incentives to private companies engaged in research
and innovation. Few state institutions, such as those mentioned above, and very
few companies were able to support innovations, foster new products or
enhance productivity. Examples include new brands of olive oil-based products
and pharmaceuticals (such as the products of the Korres cosmetics company).
At the same time, the government initiated and the European Union funded
programs to encourage collaboration between private companies and public
research institutions (universities; centers) under the Synergasia program in
order to foster R&D clusters and individual research projects (with some €65
million under the Aristeia program in 2011 alone). But the operational
processes for these initiatives were wanting, given the accumulated
dysfunctionalities of the state administration and the bailout budget pressures.
Much reform of both spending and instruments has been urgent, but was left
poorly tackled due to these general problems and to wider political pressures from “insiders” in the research community.

Overall, however, Greek research and innovation policy was definitely suboptimal.

Global Financial System

IMF data indicate that in 2011 Greece performed very poorly with regard to the share of non-performing loans to banks’ capital and to total loans. All this has made Greek economic policy more introverted. The crisis has not allowed the Greek government to participate in international efforts to regulate the global economic environment, other than in the context of Greece’s role as a member state of the eurozone and the European Union. In its capacity as a member state of the European Union, Greece has participated in all relevant EU summits and Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) meetings in 2011 – 2013. Still, as the crisis absorbed the government’s attention, Greece has substantively contributed to combating criminal financial activities in the world economy and to ensuring fair cost- and risk-sharing among financial market actors. It has also helped enhance information transparency and protect consumers in international financial transactions.

II. Social Policies

Education

OECD data on secondary and tertiary education show that Greece is performing rather well. For instance, one fourth of the Greek adult population has a university-level degree. The rate of school drop-out after nine years of schooling is not as alarming as in other OECD countries. In short, Greeks on average have access to education and remain in education.

Access to education is not equitable as middle- and upper-class progeny are usually more successful in passing entrance examinations. However, Greece is one of the few countries in the OECD which offers free tuition at state universities. Students do not pay tuition fees or the cost of one textbook per course, which, again, is obtained for free.
The quality of education Greek pupils and students receive is, however, a totally different matter. PISA results show that Greek secondary school pupils perform worse than their counterparts in West European countries.

At university level, quality of education is very uneven. Some university departments have a long tradition of excellence, such as Athens Law School and most of the engineering departments of the National Technical University of Athens. However, the majority of university departments have uneven infrastructure, underpaid academic and administrative staff and tumultuous campus life owing to the penetration of university institutions and processes by political party-led student factions.

This has an unavoidable negative impact on efficiency. More concretely, education in Greece was diverging from the country’s labor market trends even before the crisis. Greece, a relatively small country of approximately 11 million inhabitants, offers approximately 500 bachelor’s degree programs and an equivalent number of master’s degree programs. The large number and variety of university departments and the relatively large enrollment of pupils in secondary education and of students in tertiary education do not correspond to the types of jobs and job skills which the Greek economy needs in order to make optimum use of human capital. Even before the crisis, youth unemployment in Greece exceeded 20% in the 18 to 24 age group.

In the wake of the crisis this percentage increased dramatically. In 2013 youth unemployment was just above 60%, the highest in the European Union. This divergence between education and employment patterns was the largest problem with Greek education, which has not been resolved since the onset of the economic crisis. Reforms of the education system, particularly of tertiary education, were attempted in 2011. However, education reform was heavily resisted by opposition parties, politicized factions of student unions, university administration employees and a large share of professors who were politicized and interpreted education reform through the lens of the conflict between supporters and opponents of Greece’s bailout.

Social Inclusion

Before the crisis, several categories of the population suffered from social exclusion. These included members of minorities such as the Roma and the Muslims of north eastern Greece, and residents of mountainous areas and remote islands with little access to reliable public health care, education and social services. After the economic crisis erupted, their social situation must
have worsened, given that Greece has not established a minimum income guarantee scheme for those who fall below a certain threshold of income.

Poverty was also extended and indeed in 1990 – 2010 relative poverty hovered around 20% (measured as the share of people earning less than 60% of the median income). As for income inequality, the Gini coefficient stood at 33.60 in 2011. This was quite high, at least in comparison with the rest of the OECD.

After the crisis erupted, social exclusion became more acute, while relative poverty probably also increased. Owing to the lack of recent data, it is difficult to document the size of poverty increase resulting from the crisis. As Eurostat data shows, in 2011 poverty increased in comparison with the previous year. The same can be seen in Eurostat data on material deprivation. Poverty probably became higher in 2011 – 2013 when the government effected wage cuts in both the public and the private sectors.

In 2011 – 2013 the government announced an improvement in child allowances distributed to families in need. Local governments opened shelters and soup kitchens to help. Given the depth of the crisis, such measures probably proved inadequate.

In sum, past negligence in the field of anti-poverty and social exclusion on the part of successive governments have left the most vulnerable strata of Greek society unprepared to sustain the effects of the economic crisis. In 2011 – 2013 social exclusion accelerated and few, if any, measures were taken to balance the adverse effects of the crisis. Relevant policies failed to prevent social exclusion and to open up social opportunities.

Health

Up until the onset of the crisis, Greece spent little on pharmaceuticals and, despite inefficiencies of resource management and an established corruption culture affecting access, it still performed comparatively well in terms of infant mortality and life expectancy. For instance, in the 2000s in Greece infant mortality decreased over time, according to OECD data.

After the crisis erupted, however, public spending on health care was subjected to cuts similar to those effected in other welfare policies. Social insurance funds delayed payments to pharmacies. The latter used to deliver medicines to insured patients over the counter and then obtain payment by submitting receipts to the patients’ social insurance funds. However, these funds saw their
finances deteriorate as they depended heavily on the state budget. Moreover, the restructuring of the Greek public debt in February 2012 affected negatively the finances of health insurance funds, which held parts of that debt. In 2011–2013 the economic crisis was transformed into a severe crisis for social insurance funds.

Similar trends occurred in the finances of public hospitals, which also depended on social insurance funds for health care costs incurred by insured patients. Payments to hospitals came in arrears, while the Ministry of Health’s budget was itself subjected to cuts.

Eventually, at various time points in 2011–2013 suppliers of necessary goods and services to public hospitals delayed or completely refrained from making deliveries to such organizations. Additionally, the motivation of doctors serving in public hospitals suffered from wage cuts imposed across the public sector.

Event though public health care was in crisis, no patient was refused treatment in Greek hospitals, including non-citizens who had never paid any social insurance contributions, such as the migrants from South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Yet the fact remains that health care policy only partly achieved the three criteria, namely quality, inclusiveness and cost efficiency.

Families

Family policy is associated with the position of women in the labor market – a position which puts women at a disadvantage. The law says that employers should grant women maternity leave and hire them back nine months after giving birth. However, women tend to leave the labor market on having their first child, either because they choose to do so or because they are fired by their employer. This used to be and still is a common pattern in the private sector. A designated body of labor inspectors within the Ministry of Labor has not been effective in controlling such practices by employers.

The situation is completely different for women employed in the civil service and state-owned enterprises. Female public employees are guaranteed their jobs following maternity leave. This creates a sharp contrast to the fate of their counterparts in the private sector. Because of the crisis in 2011–2013 there were cuts in government social expenditure which took their toll on allowances for maternity leave. Nowadays, for the last six out of the nine months of maternity leave, women must survive on the minimum wage (€580 gross per month).
Moreover, family allowances in Greece are small: they amount to €35–40 per child per month. In the past, the bulk of family-related allowances were channeled to families with three or more children, regardless of family income level. This was the consequence of a preoccupation of state authorities with the size of the Greek nation rather than with a social policy-based understanding of family policy. In the first semester of 2013 a new policy, passed in the wake of the crisis, imposed income-tested thresholds for families receiving child allowances. The new policy has expanded the pool of potential recipients of child allowances, as it does not exclusively favor families with three or more children, but instead families with children in need.

Furthermore, state-owned child care facilities managed by municipalities are few and underfunded. This situation has left many dual-career families with the option of either enrolling their offspring in private daycare enterprises, where fees can be high, or resorting to the daily help of parents or parents-in-law.

Citation:
Data and information obtained through an interview with Professor Manos Matsaganis, Athens University of Economics and Business, expert on family policy in Greece. Interview conducted on 18.05.2013 in Athens.

Pensions

The Greek pension system is a pay-as-you-go corporatist system. It is based on a multitude of occupational pension funds and it is also clientelist in the sense that, due to pressure from the strongest groups – such as the liberal professions and the public sector employees – the state has subsidized certain relatively privileged funds instead of others.

Greece does not attain the first objective of pension policy because the majority of pensioners receive the minimum pension. These are pensioners with a job record consisting of periodic short-term jobs or with few insurance contributions corresponding to a short span of working life. According to the World Bank, 14.50% of Greek senior citizens are relatively poor, ranking the country among the five European countries with the worst ratios of poverty for senior citizens. Women are included among the poorest of pensioners if they have never entered the labor market. This is the case for housewives who have no insurance contributions at all and rely on a very low-level non-contributory pension.
Pension policy does not serve intergenerational equity either. Between 1990 and 2010 there were repeated failed attempts to reform the pension system in order to stabilize the rising pension expenditures that threatened to derail fiscal policy. This failure was caused by the mobilization of unions in favor of existing arrangements that primarily served the interests of middle- and old-age groups at the expense of younger generations of workers.

A combination of high replacement rates, early retirement opportunities – particularly for married women with under-age children and public sector workers – and low insurance contributions has rendered the pension system financially unsustainable. It is telling that in 2011 fewer than 40% of Greeks aged 55 to 64 were still working. The Greek dependency ratio is among the worst in Europe, on a par with Sweden, Germany and Italy, which all have better organized welfare states.

Social insurance funds relied more and more on loans and subsidies from the state budget. A reform passed in June 2010, after the crisis broke out, and implemented in 2011 was a first step toward streamlining the pension system. The reform involved lowering replacement levels, raising contributions, preventing early retirement and merging dozens of small social insurance funds into a few larger ones.

Integration

The integration of over one million atypical or illegal migrants in a society of 11 million is a very difficult task. This is the challenge that Greek society faces. In the 1990s, Greek governments ignored the problem and then made belated attempts to manage the inflow of migrants to no avail. In 2005, even before the crisis, a law provided for the integration of migrants into the labor market. However, the law was haphazardly implemented owing both the low administrative capacity of the Greek state and the reluctance of employers and social services to treat migrants in a non-discriminatory fashion. In the late 2000s, the economic and social rights of employed migrants, including rights to receive the minimum wage and insurance, were probably massively violated by Greek employers. If there was any integration of migrants, this was integration into the underground economy and the unofficial labor market. Another law was passed in 2010 primarily focusing on preconditions of naturalization of migrants, but also somewhat improving the prospects of integration. The law went largely unimplemented. Obviously in 2011 – 2013 in the midst of the crisis, the integration of migrants into the labor market was further worsened by the economic depression and unemployment.
Integration of migrants in the education system is functional in primary and secondary education, but migrants are effectively barred from entering tertiary education. Entrance examinations to the universities are open to Greek citizens or migrants holding permanent residence permits. As for social integration, this was never a strong point of Greek migration policy.

With the exception of Albanians, Bulgarians and Romanians, who probably constitute half of all migrants and first came to Greece after the fall of state socialism in south east Europe, the rest of migrants – including migrants from Asia and Africa – are systematically excluded from Greek society. It is telling, for instance, that Muslim migrants in Athens, where the majority of the migrant population has settled, still cannot exercise their religious rights in an open and official manner, as a license to build a mosque in Athens was issued by the Greek government only in early 2013.

But there is another dimension here: there is clear evidence of an increase in xenophobia and racism, given the tensions of the economic crisis. Violent acts against migrants and minorities have increased; police actions show neglect and/or sympathy for far right agendas. The rise of Golden Dawn is also a relevant factor and a symptom of the malaise. There is clear evidence of collaboration between the police and the latter at neighborhood level.

Citation:

Safe Living

As UN data on homicides and assaults for 2011 show, Greece, despite suffering from a severe economic crisis, is not a dangerous country in which to live. Naturally, there are a few neighborhoods in Athens where it is not safe to walk at night and there are also areas in the city center where the police have been unable to monitor illegal activities, such as drug trafficking and prostitution as well as violent crime. These are areas controlled by groups of illegal migrants from Africa and South Asia who have entered Greece in search of jobs or of opportunities to access western European countries. They have been unable to accomplish either aim and have since been living a life in the grey zone between precarious work in the underground economy and participation in organized crime. Since 2011 – 2013 the cumulative effects of the economic
crisis have worsened their prospects, while inter-ethnic strife among communities of migrants also erupted on rare occasions. There are also groups of East European and Greek criminals who prefer to engage in crimes against property. The result was that in the wake of the crisis many people considered some sections of the center of Athens as “no go zones.” Assaults were frequent in these downtown areas. Despite widespread stereotypes to the contrary, not all crime is related to migration. Indeed, gangs of Greeks (rather than migrants) have also participated in various forms of crime, particularly smuggling, burglaries and kidnappings.

This situation started to improve in early spring 2012 and even more so towards the end of that year. The Ministry of Public Order, which oversees police and security forces, took measures to monitor the most unsafe zones of the center of Athens by placing policemen on the streets at visible points and intersections. It stepped up efforts to deter further irregular migration from Turkey into Greece by building a fence across a point on the river Evros which separates the two countries and another along the north-east borders of Greece; and it started sweeping operations at squares where illegal commerce of forfeited consumer goods by various groups of migrants had flourished.

Of course, safety is also a matter of perception. Even if conditions improve, people may not recognize change unless considerable time lapses. Indeed, Greeks do not feel safe. For instance, as shown by the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions study conducted in Greece in 2011 by the Greek Statistical Authority (ELSTAT), the greatest risks Greeks report with regard to housing are noise (25% of the respondents), environmental pollution (also 25%) and vandalism and criminality (20%).

Citation:
Data on homicides are drawn on the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. Data on risks Greeks perceive are drawn on research conducted in the context of EU-SILK program by the Greek Statistical Authority and is available at http://www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE/BUCKET/A0802/PressReleases/A0802_SFA10_DT_AN_00_2011_08_F_GR.pdf

Global Inequalities

Until the onset of the economic crisis, Greece used to be active in assisting less developed countries in the Balkans but also in Sub-Saharan Africa through a specially designated service of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, called YDAS. In 2011 – 2013 Greece became a kind of recipient rather than a donor country, in the sense that it received loans from the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF, in order to avoid default, after becoming incapable of
servicing its public debt in 2010. Thus, in the period under consideration, the Greek government was neither able to advance social inclusion beyond its borders nor to contribute to promoting a fair global trading system. Still, in that period Greece, as a member state of the European Union, continued participating in all of the Union’s decision-making related to global social policy.

III. Environmental Policies

Environment

Greece is blessed with an attractive Mediterranean climate and has many pockets of biodiversity, but has never formulated, let alone implemented, a sustainable environmental policy. While compared to the rest of OECD nations Greece’s CO2 emissions are average and its energy intensity rather low, its ecological footprint is surprisingly large for a country that is nowadays clearly de-industrialized and has never been an industrial power. Unchecked urban development, large infrastructural works and negligent consumer behavior have probably had a negative impact on the country’s natural environment.

Indeed, in Greece economic development in tourism and agriculture has often proceeded in a haphazard manner and always took priority over environmental concerns. Environmental NGOs were only nominally consulted by the Ministry of Environment, Town Planning and Public Works (YPEXODE). In fact, public works and town planning always took precedence over environmental protection. The result was that none of the four targets of environmental protection – climate, renewable water sources, forest area biodiversity – were ever sought in a systematic fashion. Of course, as an EU member state, Greece benefits from EU environmental policy and in fact it is compelled to respect this policy by being periodically brought to the courts and fined for not implementing EU legislation – e.g., regarding waste management. In this respect, Greece has an “imported” environmental policy which serves as a substitute for its own environmental policy failure.

Forest management is haphazard, too, subject to the vicissitudes of changing political leaderships and interests, but it is also vulnerable to fires, some of which are started deliberately for planning reasons. Moreover, Greece has struggled to develop a land registry or inventory of land ownership to
determine responsibility and control. Again, the crisis has negatively affected Greece’s ability to manage any aspect of environmental policy.

**Global Environmental Protection**

While environmental studies exist in Greece, the country has never developed enough expertise on environmental protection. Greek environmental policies – the inconsistencies of which have been exposed in the crisis years – have closely followed developments in international environmental policy and corresponding developments in EU environmental policy. Yet the record of environmental protection in Greece is not high, as evidenced by the frequent occasions on which the European Commission has referred the Greek authorities to the courts for violating European legislation on environmental protection. The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs participates in international meetings on environmental protection through diplomats to whom the relevant tasks are assigned, but one cannot say that the Greek government has substantially contributed to efforts to strengthen global environmental protection regimes.
Quality of Democracy

Electoral Processes

There is no discrimination in registration procedures and no potential candidates or parties are prevented from participating in elections. There are of course incompatibilities (e.g., one cannot be a parliamentary candidate while still serving in the army as a professional officer). With regard to candidacy, the only exception is the case of some prisoners guilty of serious crimes who have been deprived of their voting rights for a given period of time.

Before elections, parties and candidates are required to submit a petition to the highest civil and criminal court (Areios Pagos) which only controls formalities (e.g., checking if the name of a party is the same as another one).

Citation:
Regulations for registering a candidate are listed in article 55 of the Constitution, while incompatibilities are listed in articles 56, 57 and 58. For the relevant provisions of the Constitution, translated into English, see http://www.venice.coe.int/VOTA/en/start.html [accessed on 11.05.2013].

Media Access

Political parties which obtained parliamentary representation in earlier elections, either in the national parliament or the European Parliament, have equal opportunities of access to the media. For instance, the nationalist party called Popular Orthodox Rally (Laikós Orthódoxos Synagermós, LAOS) did not win any parliamentary seats in the 2012 elections, but retains its parliamentary representation in the European Parliament.

Most media outlets provide a fair and balanced coverage of the range of different political positions. However, since the neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn won parliamentary representation in the 2012 elections (winning 18 out of 300 seats in the Greek parliament), most media have not invited this party’s cadres to political debates or to interviews because it has consistently expressed strong anti-parliamentary and racist views. It is, however, a legal requirement that in the elections for the European Parliament in 2014 all parties will be given access to the media.

Citation:
Voting and Registrations Rights  
Score: 10

All adults who are at least 18 years old, are Greek citizens and have not been deprived of their voting rights (e.g., owing to a criminal court-imposed penalty), are eligible to vote. There is no discrimination in the exercise of the right to vote nor any disincentives for voting. Upon being born, Greeks are registered by their parents in the municipality where their family resides. These records serve as lists of citizens eligible to vote.

Party Financing  
Score: 5

There are rules for donations to parties and candidates and also control mechanisms for monitoring the way parties and candidates spend funds during electoral campaigns. Parties receive funds from the state budget on an annual basis. Party financing for national elections is regulated by Law 3023/2002, while the financing of competing electoral lists for local government elections is regulated by Law 3202/2003. Every year, the minister of the interior issues a ministerial ordinance which distributes funds to parties represented in parliament and the European Parliament based on their share of the total vote in the last elections. For instance, in 2013 parties received a total of approximately €11 million. This was an increase over the previous year, 2012, in which the total funds distributed to parties amounted to a little over €6 million.

However, the thresholds of spending set by the law are unrealistic, as expenses to run an electoral campaign are far above what lawmakers have deemed reasonable. Moreover, the monitoring mechanism is a parliamentary committee, whose members are members of parliament of all parties – on other words, they belong to the same group whose expenses are being monitored. This committee of MPs monitors the electoral campaign expenses of their peers. Furthermore, while parties publish information on their finances annually, neither all contributions made to the party coffers nor all sources of revenue are disclosed. In other words, monitoring exists but is more often than not ineffective.

Popular Decision-Making  
Score: 2

The constitution provides for the possibility of holding a referendum, but such a decision must be taken by the parliament, after a proposal submitted by the
Cabinet of Ministers. Referenda are limited to national level. Since the transition to democracy in 1974, only one referendum has taken place in Greece, namely the December 1974 referendum that resulted in the abolition of the monarchy.

In 2011 – 2013 the idea of holding a referendum was discredited because in October 2011 Prime Minister Papandreou surprised everyone, including Greece’s EU partners, by announcing that his government would hold a national referendum on the economic austerity measures associated with the bailout. Papandreou’s initiative provoked fears of Greece’s exit from the eurozone, if Greeks voted against the bailout. This prospect created worldwide insecurity about the fate of the euro and Papandreou was obliged to completely abandon the idea.

Citation:
The conduct of referenda in Greece is regulated by article 44 of the Constitution and Law 4023/2011.

Access to Information

Greece used to have four state-owned national and 19 state-owned regional TV channels plus dozens of local government-owned radio stations. The national and regional channels belong to a public corporation, ERT, which the government abruptly closed down on June 11, 2013, citing mismanagement, lack of transparency and misuse of public funds. The government announced that a new public TV and radio corporation would be founded and become operative before the end of 2013.

In 2011 – 2013 ERT did not show a pro-government bias, although full government control of the news had been typical of state-owned TV and radio in the past. The change in the period under review may be attributed to multiple reasons. Firstly, a coalition government was in power, in contrast to the single party governments of the past. Secondly, journalists were affiliated to many different political parties. Thirdly, the austerity measures of 2011 – 2013 turned many people and particular government employees against the government, a trend reflected in the range of opinions aired in the media. There was also unrestrained freedom in the privately owned media organizations.

Nevertheless, in the winter of 2012 the government attempted to cut an ERT talk show in which journalists consistently voiced anti-government views. A public outcry followed and the government reversed its decision.
In the period under review there were also a small number of cases of mistreatment of journalists in protest marches. This prompted Reporters without Borders to rank Greece at 86th out of 179 countries surveyed in the Freedom of the Press Index 2013, placing Greece under dozens of African and other developing countries, including war-torn or authoritarian-ruled countries.

In sum, in the period under review the government exerted much less pressure on the media than in the past.

There are a large number of electronic and print media organizations, but the structure of ownership remains oligopolistic while there is also strong cross-ownership. In a country of 11 million inhabitants, in 2011 there were 127 analog private TV stations with a national, regional or local license. There were also approximately 950 regional/local radio stations. There were four national and 13 regional state-owned TV channels catering to a small audience.

The large number of private TV channels does not indicate a diversified ownership structure. Four of them (Mega, Antenna, Star, Skai) attract the majority of viewers as they offer popular shows, including Turkish and Brazilian soap operas, and infotainment. Their owners also hold majority shares in national daily newspapers (He Kathimerini, Ta Nea, Ethnos). There is extensive cross-ownership not only among electronic and print media, but also within the field of TV and radio channels.

There is probably more pluralism in the print media. In 2011 there were 59 national newspapers and around 500 regional/local ones. However, over time, in the last two decades (1990 – 2008) circulation has dropped by 50%. The owners of the Sunday newspapers also have shares in the major private TV channels (To Vima, He Kathimerini). Some other large Sunday newspapers offer sensationalist coverage (Real News, Proto Thema). There are also regional daily newspapers in large cities.

While there is no effective anti-monopoly policy in the media business in Greece, the media do report a wide range of opinions. In 2011 – 2013 intense debates took place on all TV and radio channels over economic austerity policies.

The opposition has a voice in the media as party cadres participate daily in state and private TV and radio programs, while at least three nationwide-selling newspapers (Efimerida ton Syntaktion, Eleftherotypia, He Avgi) reflect opinions close to the radical left party SYRIZA (Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás or Coalition of the Radical Left, SYRIZA).
Access to Government Information Score: 9

Citizens’ free and easy access to official information has been regulated since 1986. A new law passed in 2010 provided for the creation of an electronic system allowing access to any public document. There are a few reasonable access restrictions pertaining to matters of national security and defense.

There are effective mechanisms of appeal and oversight enabling citizens to access information. Firstly, there are administrative courts, including the highest administrative court (Symvoulio tis Epikrateias). Secondly, there is the Greek ombudsman, founded in 1997. Unfortunately, owing to work overload, administrative courts can take a long time to decide on a case, but the ombudsman is a well-managed mechanism of appeal and oversight. The ombudsman can demand that any public service answers a citizen’s right to information.

Citation:
The two most important laws regulating access to information are Law 1599/1986 and Law 3861/2010.

Civil Rights and Political Liberties

Civil rights are protected by and included in the Constitution of Greece (passed in 1975 and amended in 1986, 2001 and 2008) and the Criminal Code. Judges are tenured and cannot be removed nor transferred by incoming governments. Courts guarantee the protection of life, freedom and property and protect all individuals against illegitimate arrest, exile, terror, torture or unjustifiable intervention into personal life. Greek citizens enjoy equal access to the law and are treated equally by the law.

However, owing to the often contradictory content of a plethora of laws and to the propensity of Greeks to resort to the courts, the courts are unable to handle a constant overflow of cases and in practice provide protection with extensive delays. Lack of digital infrastructure and modern management methods aggravate the situation. In sum, the state protects civil rights, but in practice organizational and infrastructural obstacles stand in the way of comprehensive
protection of these rights, which disproportionately harms religious and ethnic minorities and asylum seekers.

Political liberties are well protected by the constitution, including the right to vote, to think and speak freely, to assemble and demonstrate, to organize in collectives such as unions and associations and to submit petitions requiring a timely response by the competent authorities. In the period under review, protests against the austerity measures accompanying the bailout of Greece by the Troika were recurrent and the exercise of political liberties was completely unrestrained. The staging of political demonstrations at times took place on a weekly, if not daily, basis. Protests involved sit-ins and occupations of public buildings, such as state universities and central headquarters of ministries. The police intervened only when protesters threatened to storm the Greek parliament or the Prime Minister’s Office. In short, state institutions concede and effectively protect political liberties.

Non-discrimination

Protection against discrimination on the basis of race has been regulated since 1979, while protection against gender discrimination is regulated by the New Family Law passed in 1983. The European Union’s legislative acts also provide protection from gender discrimination.

However, legislation against discrimination has rarely been implemented. In the period under review the Greek state was unable to contain, let alone roll back, the outbursts of racial violence which periodically spread through neighborhoods of Athens with a high concentration of migrants from South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.

In February 2013 Nils Muižnieks, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, stated that “between October 2011 and December 2012 more than 200 racist attacks were recorded in Greece by the racist violence recording network headed by UNHCR and the National Commission for Human Rights.” Under pressure, in May 2013 the Ministry of Justice submitted a new anti-discrimination law to public deliberation, but the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) had reservations whether new legislation was necessary. Eventually four different parties submitted to parliament a draft bill on anti-discrimination and the issue was still pending in June 2013.

Citation:
For a summary of Muižnieks’ conclusions, as presented to the Council of Europe, see the document “Racist violence a real threat to democracy in Greece” available at http://www.coe.int/t/commissioner/News/2013/130201Greece_en.asp [accessed on 07.05.2013].
Rule of Law

In 2011 – 2013 during the economic crisis, the government repeatedly adapted past legislation to changing circumstances because the conditions accompanying Greece’s bailout required reforms in many policy sectors. There have been many alterations – e.g., in taxation legislation.

Because of the need to effect reforms rapidly, the government resorted to governing by decree, after passing legislation which left ample room for discretion. On the other hand, paradoxically, legal certainty may have been enhanced in Greece, because a stable austerity policy has been implemented since May 2010. Since then, in the context of Greece’s bailout, legal certainty has been monitored by the EC–ECB–IMF Troika in income, fiscal, labor market, pension and public employment policy sectors.

There are, of course, other policy sectors, such as education, research and environmental protection, where legal uncertainty rises from the difficult compromises made among government coalition partners. In Greece between November 2011 and May 2012, a caretaker government based on the trust of three parties was in power, and in June 2012 was replaced by a tripartite government. The latter consisted of the center-right party (New Democracy), the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) and the pro-European left party Democratic Left (Dimokratiki Aristera, DIMAR). Legal certainty was somewhat negatively affected because the policy preferences of these coalition partners were not always predictable.

Courts are independent of the government and the legislature. Members of the judiciary are promoted through the internal hierarchy of the judiciary. There is an exception, namely the appointment of the presidents and vice-presidents of the highest civil law and criminal law court (Areios Pagos) and administrative law court (Symvoulio tis Epikrateias) for which a different process is followed.

Justices are recruited through independent entrance examinations and are then trained in a post-graduate level school. The court system is self-managed. In a formal sense, courts in Greece are able to control whether government and administration act in conformity with the law.

Whether courts do so efficiently is another matter, because they cannot ensure legal compliance. They act with delays and pass contradictory judgment, owing to the plethora of laws and the opaque character of regulations. One example of
A law-infested policy sector is town planning, where courts have not managed
to control the government and administration in a sustained manner.

In 2011 – 2013 justices showed an unprecedented level of judicial activism.
Prompted by citizens challenging government policies, they issued court
decisions on the constitutionality of migration laws, pension laws and public
employment laws passed by the government in the context of Greece’s
fulfillment of the conditions set by the country’s creditors. In the period under
review, justices made their presence felt as never before.

Before the onset of the crisis, the appointment of justices was to a large extent
controlled by the government. After the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party (PASOK)
came to power in October 2009, the government made the process of
appointing higher ranking justices more transparent. Today, candidates for the
presidency of the highest civil law and criminal law court (Areios Pagos) and
administrative law court (Symvoulio tis Epikrateias) as well as the audit office
are nominated by justices themselves. Then the lists of candidates are
submitted to a higher-ranking organ of the parliament, the Conference of the
Presidents of the Greek Parliament. This is an all-party institution which
submits an opinion to the Cabinet of Ministers, the institution which appoints
justices at the highest posts of the courts mentioned above. In 2011 – 2013 the
government applied the seniority principle in selecting justices to serve at the
highest echelons of the justice system.

Public officeholders are not efficiently prevented from exploiting their offices
for private gain, but things have been changing since 2011. In 2011 Greece’s
CPI score was far lower than that of all other EU member states, except for
Bulgaria, and in 2012 Greece’s score fell below that of Bulgaria. There is
extensive anti-corruption legislation but the implementation gap in enforcing it
is a recurring problem. The implementation gap is visible in three outstanding
issues: party financing and parliamentary integrity; corruption of civil servants;
tax evasion. All three issues are related to the fact that Greece was at the brink
of default in 2010 and even today has not completely avoided this danger.

In 2011 – 2013 the government reacted to pressures from the country’s
creditors and from Greek society by pressing the prosecuting authorities to
furnish evidence on politicians whose names appeared on lists of those
allegedly engaged in money laundering; promised the immediate dismissal of
civil servants who had been condemned by Civil Service Disciplinary Councils
for having violated integrity legislation; and also prepared a new tax law
aiming not only to increase property and income tax, but also to reduce tax
evasion among the self-employed and liberal professions.
There is some progress on all these fronts. For instance, a former vice president of the Greek socialist governments of the 1980s and the 1990s, Akis Tsochatzopoulos, was arrested in April 2012 and a year later was brought to trial on charges of corruption. In the meantime, persons belonging to high income groups, such as businessmen and celebrities who have evaded taxes, have been called in by tax authorities to pay fines.

The visible but relatively small progress in fighting corruption is associated with multiple factors: the plethora of legislative acts on corruption and the remaining loopholes in the relevant legislation; the lack of expertise and resources available to institutions entrusted with the fight against corruption and the problematic coordination between these institutions; and at least until 2011, the lack of resolve among political and administrative elites to control corruption.

Citation:
Governance

I. Executive Capacity

Strategic Capacity

Strategic planning units at the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and the Ministry of Finance are usually staffed by academics who are affiliated with the incumbent government and work on fixed-term contracts. At the PMO there is a Directorate of Strategic Planning, whereas at the Ministry of Finance there is a Council of Economic Advisors. In 2011–2013 such units were preoccupied not with long-term planning and programming but with the task of monitoring the implementation of the austerity measures and structural reforms agreed between the government and the EC–ECB–IMF Troika.

In 2012 a Government Council on Reform was created in order to pursue long-term goals related to public sector reform, but it has remained inoperative, as relevant functions are still in the hands of the Minister of Public Administration.

Before the crisis there were short-lived strategic planning units in other ministries, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Administrative Reform (formerly known as the Ministry of the Presidency of Government). These units did not survive the frequent cabinet reshuffles before the crisis. These regular ministerial reshuffles resulted in a frequent change of policy styles and the removal of policy advisors along with the minister who had appointed them.

Non-governmental academic experts are influential in the sense that they often work as advisors to the government, to the prime minister and to ministers.
Most of the ad hoc committees formed by ministers on public policy reform are staffed by academics. It is not uncommon for academics to take long leaves of absence from their university posts and follow a political career. For instance, two of Greece’s recent prime ministers, Konstantinos Simitis and Lucas Papademos, were well-known academics.

In the tripartite coalition government which has been in power since June 2012, four major ministries – the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Administrative Reform, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Agricultural Development – are headed by academics. In short, in Greece there is more than mere influence of academics in government decision-making, there is in fact an intermarriage between politics and the academia.

This interpenetration between politics (and more specifically policymaking) and academia can be explained by the lack of expertise and substantive research taking place in any institutions or businesses apart from universities, and the unattractiveness of civil service as a career path for high quality university graduates, like doctorate holders. Academics play the role of experts in all sectors of the economy and administration and also substitute for administrative elites, which are totally absent from the upper echelons of the over-politicized civil service.

**Interministerial Coordination**

The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has adequate sectoral policy expertise, thanks to the appointment of lawyers, economists and academics in its various divisions. There is also a separate unit supervised by the prime minister – the General Secretariat of the Government (GSG). This unit on the one hand prepares the meetings of the Cabinet and on the other hand receives and evaluates draft bills. Before the economic crisis, this task was performed rather loosely, as individual ministers felt free to pursue their own policy choices, but in 2011 – 2013 things changed.

Since 2011, the Troika’s requirements and deadlines for taking specific policy measures have resulted in the PMO and the GSG playing a much more substantive role than in the past with regard to the policy content of line ministry proposals. However, they do not have the final word on draft bills, as both the previous caretaker government led by Papademos in the winter of 2011/2012 and the tripartite government led by Samaras in 2012 – 2013 relied on the parliamentary support of three parties in order to govern. In other words,
it is party leaders who decide whether important draft bills will eventually be submitted to the parliament.

The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) can return all items on policy grounds, not so much because a draft bill may not find the prime minister in agreement, but rather because in times of prolonged economic crisis many new policy proposals are rejected because they cannot be funded or are returned to line ministries if they deviate from the concrete policy guidelines included in the Memoranda of Understanding signed between Greece and its creditors in 2010 – 2012 as part of the bailout.

In fact, it is the Ministry of Finance, along with the PMO, which may play the role of gatekeeper, as Greece’s finances are closely inspected every three months by representatives of the Troika. The Troika in turn reports to the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF, while Greece’s progress with regard to reforms is also regularly discussed in European economic policy institutions, such as the Euro Working Group and the Eurogroup. One can go as far as to claim that in Greece in 2011 – 2013 there were multiple gatekeepers – some domestic and some foreign.

Before the economic crisis, line ministries involved the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) in the preparation of policy proposals primarily when the proposals dealt with the major electoral promises of the governing party or with reforms that would cause strong political reactions by the opposition and/or interest groups. Otherwise, the PMO was not capable of restraining individual ministries from pursuing their own policy agendas, particularly if a minister was a member of one of the high-ranking cadres. In other words, the prime minister was a sort of “primus inter pares”, while his office often lacked the resources to coordinate the preparation of policy proposals.

In 2011 – 2013 in the wake of the economic crisis, the PMO, probably at the insistence of Troika, upgraded its resources by hiring competent staff and adopting more efficient methods of monitoring policy proposals from line ministries. The PMO’s staff kept records on the progress made by line ministries in preparing policy proposals in line with the Memoranda of Understanding signed between Greece and its creditors and kept track of the pace at which such proposals were prepared, screened by the PMO and submitted to parliament as draft bills.

Citation:
The Cabinet consists of 17 ministers who meet neither frequently nor on a regular basis. Meetings of the Cabinet are not preceded by meetings of cabinet or ministerial committees. There are cabinet committees assigned to oversee specific policy sectors which, however, convene only when a major policy decision has to be taken. For instance, in May 2013 the Government Council on Foreign Affairs and Defense (KYSEA), a ministerial committee composed of ten ministers and the head of the joint chiefs of staff of the Greek armed forces and directed by the prime minister, convened in a special session and approved a new organizational structure for the Greek armed forces. Another example is the meeting of the Government Council of Reform, a cabinet committee focusing primarily on administrative reform, which took place in April 2013. The meeting, which was only the fourth in a span of 12 months, was presided over by the prime minister and was attended by ten ministers and deputy ministers. In other words, substantive policy work is done at line ministries and the Prime Minister’s Office before issues arrive at Cabinet and ministerial committees, which perform an important symbolic function by engaging the majority of ministers in important policy choices.

Greek bureaucracy is over-politicized and under-resourced. Each minister has a fluctuating number of political advisors at his or her disposal. Policy proposals are rarely prepared by civil servants in line ministries, as they often lack modern scientific and management skills. Policy proposals are usually assigned to ministerial advisors, who are short-term political appointees and can be non-academic experts, academics and governing party cadres. Top civil servants contribute to policy proposals by suggesting what is legally permissible and technically feasible, although even in those issues ministers often tend to trust their own legal and technical advisors. The remaining civil servants at lower levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy rarely, if ever, know of, let alone contribute to policy proposals.

Moreover, there is little horizontal coordination among civil servants working in different ministries. If there is a need for interministerial coordination, ministers assign the task to their advisors, who communicate with advisors of ministers in other line ministries and the Prime Minister’s Office in order to achieve administrative coordination. Even though this informal institution of coordination involving ministers and their political entourage bypasses the civil service, it can prove efficient at times of crisis, when time pressure is very high.

Most coordination mechanisms are informal and complement the more meager formal coordination mechanisms such as the infrequently convened cabinet and ministerial committees. Most informal mechanisms are ad hoc meetings among ministers convened at the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) with or without the
prime minister. Decisions taken at such meetings are then followed up by meetings of advisors to ministers and/or person-to-person contacts between staff members of the PMO and advisors to ministers.

Evidence-based Instruments

RIA has been nominally adopted but in practice policy proposals are not accompanied by RIA. The Prime Minister’s Office issued a prime minister’s circular in July 2006, requesting that all ministries start RIA in their policy field, but in practice little progress has been achieved since then.

RIA analyses do not really exist.

Sustainability checks do not exist.

Societal Consultation

Before the economic crisis, there were institutions facilitating societal consultation – for example, the Economic and Social Committee, in which social partners debated economic and social policy proposal. In addition, official negotiations took place every two years between employers’ associations and trade unions, culminating in national collective labor pacts. Moreover, before submitting a draft bill to the parliament, each ministry allowed for a short period of electronic public deliberation on its proposals through an open dialogue organized at the ministry’s website.

While before the crisis these consultative organs and processes often functioned suboptimally, owing to the traditional combative stance of employers’ associations and trade unions, at least the institutional setup for societal consultation was available. After the crisis erupted, societal consultation disintegrated. On the one hand, in 2011 – 2013 the government, under pressure from the Troika, sought to manage Greece’s economic problems by taking austerity measures which unions opposed fiercely. While the government consulted with social partners in order to convince them to help saving Greece’s ailing economy, eventually measures were dictated, not negotiated. On the other hand, while society seemed to solidly oppose the austerity measures, in practice, large and small interest groups pursued individual strategies of survival. Interest group strategies aimed to preserve their own earlier regimes of collective rights and privileges. Indeed, before the crisis these different regimes consisted of tailor-made provisions which had
been granted by past governments to certain professions – for instance, the right to early retirement or to tax exemption. Another privilege that beneficiaries fought tooth and nail to preserve in 2011 – 2013 was closed access to certain professions, such as pharmacists and notaries. This refuted the idea of societal consultation, let alone social consensus.

**Policy Communication**

For the Greek government, 2011 – 2013 was a period of hectic, if not panicked decision-making in order to avoid default. The government was preoccupied with negotiations with the Troika and the implementation of painful income and pension policies. Consequently, the government devoted very limited time and resources to communication, let alone coordination of communication flowing from ministries or strategic communication planning.

This proved to be a grave mistake for successive governments. Greek society had a limited understanding of the very few options available to the Greek government in order to avoid default and remain in the eurozone.

Messages were mostly coherent, not because of any purposeful coordination, but because all ministries were pressed to pursue the same policy of spending cuts and administrative reorganization. However, the fact that some ministers and most civil servants were reluctant to embark on any change sent a contradictory message to the rest of society – for instance, to private sector workers who took heavy income losses, and to tax payers. On the other hand, because of this communication void, the sensationalist press, some parties of the extreme right and the extreme left and narrowly focused interest groups were able to communicate to the public unrealistic, if not extravagant messages on policies, including suggestions that Greece allied itself to China and Russia, or that the public seized power by storming political institutions.

**Implementation**

Greece has a long-term pattern of poor intra-governmental coordination and, often, weak structures for implementation and follow-up. The weaknesses and constraints of the state bureaucracy are instrumental – low-skilled; operating with a Napoleonic legal formalism; infused with clientelism and some corruption; limited management effectiveness; an inefficient distribution of resources. It all adds up to low reform capacity without an external intervention.
Before the crisis, there was almost no tradition of setting performance benchmarks for government efficiency. The Memoranda of Understanding signed by the Greek government and its creditors included specific policy targets, implementation deadlines and performance indicators. One example is the merging of administrative units within each of the central services of ministries in order to decrease the sum total of units by 30%. In 2011 – 2013 the government was able to achieve some of the set benchmarks, such as passing reform legislation in the fields of pensions and labor relations within specific deadlines and accomplishing fiscal consolidation by minimizing Greece’s primary budget deficit. Other tasks traditionally managed with efficiency – such as the conduct of nationwide university entrance examinations – were also accomplished in the crisis period. The government was also largely successful in collecting the new landed property tax included in electricity bills, issued by the state-managed, monopoly corporation, DEI (the Public Power Corporation). The new tax was thus collected from home owners who paid it along with their electricity bill.

However, the government largely failed in other crucial fronts. For instance, it failed to efficiently collect taxes from the usual tax evading strata, such as businessmen and members of the liberal professions, and it fell short of the privatization of state-owned enterprises – a measure frequently announced but rarely implemented. The mixed image offered by the above examples results from a perennial combination of a weak political will to really implement reforms and long-term administrative incapacity that rendered some ministries too heavy to move ahead, if not completely numb.

Before the crisis, ministers had few incentives to comply with the government’s program, other than their own conviction that government policy was right. Ministers were almost always members of parliament and were reluctant to pursue any policy tarnishing their public image. Until the elections of May 2012, candidates in parliamentary elections would be elected on the basis of preference vote. Parties used to prepare long lists of party candidates in every electoral district from which citizens were expected to choose. As a consequence, ministers would refrain from implementing the government’s program if it provoked a reaction from the press or even small trade unions and associations, out of fear that they might not be reelected.

However, in the elections of June 2012 which immediately followed those of May 2012, the law required parties to submit to voters party lists rather than preference lists. Moreover, the organization of government changed in the sense that the prime minister himself and the Prime Minister’s Office as well almost all ministers felt the pressure of the Troika to implement the measures
included in the austerity package Greece adopted in exchange for their bailout. Thus, in 2011 – 2013 ministerial compliance was probably increased, but this was the result of the fear of heavy sanctions (e.g., imminent default by Greece) rather than any incentives.

Since May 2010, when the Papandreou government obtained the first bailout package and its accompanying austerity measures, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has tightened its supervision over line ministries. Greece’s creditors demanded specific measures of fiscal consolidation and structural reforms. However, traditionally minded socialist ministers of the Papandreou Cabinet did not implement austerity measures in a consistent manner, while the PMO was often unable to motivate them to do so. In the caretaker Papademos government which was in power from November 2011 to May 2012, the PMO tried, often in vain, to monitor the implementation activities of line ministries, but the fact that ministers came from three different parties, each pursuing their own agendas, undermined policy implementation. The efficiency of the PMO’s monitoring of line ministries has improved since June 2012, when Samaras, the head of the center-right New Democracy party, formed a tripartite government in which the vast majority of ministers come from his own party.

In Greece most ministries supervise dozens of state agencies. For instance, the Ministry of Transport supervises the state-owned public transport companies in Athens and Thessaloniki, the Ministry of Health supervises all public hospitals and the Ministry of Finance supervises numerous state-owned enterprises. Before the crisis, supervision was lax – a tendency which led to state agencies like those named above incurring very high debts. The cost of servicing such debts was assumed by the state budget. In the long run, this pattern, along with other deficiencies of governance, led to Greece’s deep, ongoing fiscal crisis.

After Greece’s first bailout in 2010, the supervision of state agencies became much more tight. In fact, the Ministry of Finance acquired substantive powers to oversee the management of state agencies even in cases where the latter still nominally belonged to the jurisdiction of other line ministries. In 2011 – 2013 progress became visible as far as monitoring of state agencies was concerned, as Greece was able to drastically reduce its primary budget deficit.

The term “subnational self-government” refers to directly elected regional authorities and municipal authorities. These may be able to raise funds through a few taxes, like those imposed on restaurants for the use of open spaces (pedestrian zones, squares), and also through applying to EU Structural Funds. In practice, however, the long-term trend to delegate authority from central government to subnational governments was not accompanied by a corresponding trend to guarantee adequate funding sources to these subnational
governments. In the period under review, the contrary happened. The government, anxious to effect fiscal consolidation, was extremely frugal with regard to task funding. Moreover, the municipal authorities, which used to obtain easy credit from state-owned banks, found out that this option was no longer available. The result was that subnational governments had to clip some of the social services, cultural and other activities they used to offer to citizens.

While nominally the autonomy of subnational self-governments is guaranteed by the constitution – which requires that the government provides them with all legislative, regulatory and financial means to accomplish their tasks – in practice, particularly in the period under review, subnational self-governments had very few means at their disposal. The government de facto narrowed the scope of discretion of subnational self-governments because it simply discovered that the state’s finances were on the brink of collapse.

Citation:
Article 102 of the constitution provides for the autonomy of subnational governments.

Before the crisis, an uneven allocation of staff, infrastructure and funds rendered the standards for public services unpredictable. The only thing that was reasonably predictable was that public services, such as public health and education, were substandard in mountainous regions and remote islands. For example, hospitals, welfare services and schools were understaffed in these areas. In 2011 – 2013 owing to the crisis, the situation became worse as supplies like drugs were depleted, while cuts in government spending led to uncertainty about the time, scope and quality of public service delivery at the subnational level.

Adaptability

In the case of Greece, international and supranational development in the period under review amounted to pressures on the government to help contain any spillover of the economic crisis from Greece to other eurozone countries and also to prevent any further deterioration in the Greek economy. Under pressure from the Troika, in 2011 – 2013 Greece started streamlining and recapitalizing its banking system, cutting down the size of central services of ministries, coordinating the fight against corruption waged by different Greek agencies, and strengthening the administrative capacity of the Prime Minister’s Office which was ultimately responsible for the implementation of the program shaped by the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF to finance Greece’s bailout.
In 2011 – 2013 Greece, through its membership of the eurozone and through EU summits and meetings of ministers, participated in international efforts to foster the provision of public goods. For instance, at international fora Greece particularly pressed the point that migration from the developing world into Europe is not solely a Greek problem arising from its geographical position between Europe and Asia, and that a global response to migration should be formed. Otherwise, owing to its own severe economic crisis, Greece was unable either to develop institutional capacities beyond its role as an EU member state towards fostering the provision of public goods or to devote resources to ensuring coherence in national policies in line with international policies.

Organizational Reform

In 2011 – 2013 the government was under pressure to pursue short-term policy goals, such as the drastic reduction of budget deficit, and did not have time to reorganize the monitoring of institutional arrangements of governing. Nevertheless, in 2011, before falling from power, the Papandreou government commissioned an international advisory committee to submit a report on strengthening the peak of the government to the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and the parliament. The PMO was evaluated as under-resourced and as having limited jurisdiction. Another such report, produced by the OECD in 2011 at the request of the Ministry of Public Administration, offered an overview of government organization and public administration and made reform proposals.

Apart from those external, albeit ad hoc monitoring efforts, there are two institutions internal to the political system which could function as monitoring mechanisms. The first is the parliament’s Special Permanent Committee on Institutions and Transparency, which is, however, primarily preoccupied with cases of corruption. The second is the Government Council on Reform, a new government organ established in 2012 and composed of government ministers, which convenes infrequently to approve reform plans already made by the PMO. In brief, there is some monitoring but it is not regular.

The repeated tendency of Greek governments to change institutional arrangements was demonstrated again when the tripartite coalition government led by Samaras, which came to power in June 2012, re instituted two ministries – the Ministry of Macedonia-Thrace and the Ministry of Shipping and the Aegean Sea – which had been abolished when the Papandreou government came to power in October 2009. Such changes are not necessarily related to shifts in plans to improve the government’s strategic capacity, but to short-term
considerations about the symbolic importance of certain regions (Macedonia, the Aegean Sea) for Greece and to the inertia of past administrative traditions. Admittedly, under pressure from the Troika, the government tried to improve its strategic capacity by establishing the Government Council of Reform in 2012. This was a cabinet committee entrusted with the task of enhancing reform capacity. However, the committee has not yet been endowed with adequate administrative support to perform its role and has only played a role auxiliary to the Prime Minister’s Office. In sum, the government changes its institutional arrangements but does so in a non-systematic fashion and there is little follow-up on previous policy decisions.

II. Executive Accountability

Citizens’ Participatory Competence

Before the economic crisis, voter turnout in Greek parliamentary elections was very high and steadily exceeded 70% of all those registered to vote, but in the most recent elections of June 2013, turnout dropped to 62.5%. This was symptom of the political estrangement felt by Greek voters who blamed Greece’s political elites for the ills the country has faced since 2010. Moreover, even before the crisis, citizens did not really obtain enough information on government policymaking, as the media leaned towards infotainment, while individual members of parliament rarely had systematic personal contact or discussed substantive policy issues with their voters in the electoral districts which they represented.

In Greece there is a tradition of appealing to government ministers or MPs in order to obtain favors such as accelerating the award of a pension or facilitating the hiring of a family member in the public sector. In 2011 – 2013 this practice was probably curbed, as government funds had been depleted. There is no tradition of voicing policy opinions to politicians either, unless of course one refers to claims made by organized interest groups.

In 2011 – 2013 there was wide coverage of the austerity policy measures accompanying Greece’s bailout. Yet, the speed, complexity and amount of legislation passed in order to satisfy the conditions imposed on Greece by the EC–ECB–IMF Troika were immense. The Memoranda of Understanding signed between the Greek government and the Troika – which contained the
government measures implemented in the fields of economy, taxation, incomes, pensions and labor relations – were extensive, detailed and complicated. Eventually, citizens got only a rare glimpse at the content of policy measures, which they in any case perceived through the distorting lens of polarized party conflict between the pro-Memorandum and anti-Memorandum political parties.

Citation:
The Ministry of Interior reports turnout in elections. The relevant percentage figures are available at the Ministry’s website http://ekloges.ypes.gr/v2012b/public/... Accessed on 03.06.2013.

**Legislative Actors’ Resources**

Members of the Greek parliament are granted full access to the well-resourced library of the parliament. They are also entitled to hire two scientific advisors who are paid out of the parliament’s budget. MPs select these advisors and it is not uncommon for them to hire family members or friends who in effect do administrative and secretarial rather than research work.

Nevertheless, each party represented in parliament has its own scientific support group, funded by the annual funds given by the state to parties as part of regular party financing through the state budget.

In the past, the Greek parliament commissioned the publication of research reports and academic work useful for policymaking, although this was not systematic and depended on the preferences and predispositions of the speaker of the parliament. Nowadays, owing to the ongoing economic crisis, few if any monetary allowances are channeled to independent research.

Members of parliament have the right to request the supply of government documents and frequently exercise this right. Documents are normally delivered in full, within one month, from the competent ministry to the parliament. Restrictions apply to documents containing sensitive information on diplomatic, military or pertinent to national security issues, which ministers may decide to withhold from the parliament.

Citation:

The rights of committees are plentiful and are often exercised. Ministers are
regularly summoned to committees but they are obliged to appear in front of a committee only if two-fifths of the committee members require them to do so. There are a few restrictions with regard to information given to the committees by the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The latter may restrict his or her comments only to armaments supplies, while the latter is not obliged to give information on any ongoing negotiations or talks in which Greece still participates.

Citation:
The summoning of ministers is regulated by article 41A of the Standing Orders of the Greek parliament. Information on this procedure is available (in Greek) at http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vo uli-ton-Ellinon/Kanonismos-tis-Voul is/article-41a/. Accessed on 05.06.2013.

The rights of regular committees are not at all limited. In fact, they may, if they wish, summon experts from ministries, from universities, NGOs and from professional associations. At various points in 2011 – 2013 experts have been summoned to the competent committee. Examples include high-ranking EC officials of Greek origin who have briefed the European Affairs Committee and university professors who have briefed the Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs on university reforms.

It is doubtful, however, that the summoning of experts to committee meetings has had any significant affect on the quality of parliamentary work. This is not the unfortunate outcome of a lack of expertise, but is related to a culture of over-politicization of all issues debated in committees and the plenary of the parliament. There is very little, if any, agreement between government and opposition, who tend to clash head on, regardless of the policy issue at hand and even if there is consensus among experts that policy choices are very limited. This pattern reflects the long-term polarization in the Greek party system. Until 2011, the aforementioned polarization was evident in the repeated acute parliamentary debates between the center-right New Democracy party and the center-left Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party (PASOK). In 2011 – 2013 a similar, if not even more accentuated trend was observed in the confrontation between the New Democracy, which led a tripartite coalition, and the radical left party SYRIZA (Synaspismós Rizospastikis Aristerás or Coalition of the Radical Left).

Citation:
Summoning experts to regular committees is regulated by article 38 of the Standing Orders of the Greek parliament.

There are of 17 ministries in Greece today, whereas there are just six regular parliamentary committees (called “Standing Committees”). This creates a task
mismatch as there are more ministries than committees. Yet the tasks matched to different committees are not incompatible and do not cause concern. Task areas are related and are jointly carried out. For instance, there is a Standing Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs and a Standing Committee on National Defense and Foreign Affairs.

The problem with monitoring ministries in Greece is more substantive than procedural. It is connected to the glancing attention ministers – as well as most of the media – pay to instances of control exerted on the government by the parliament; the sparse information channeled from ministries to parliamentary committees; and the very uneven and sometimes decorative participation of members of parliament in committee meetings. In short, even though, as is the case with parliaments all over the world, competences have been transferred from the plenary of the Greek parliament to the regular committees (which examine new bills of law) in reality this has not necessarily improved the quality of legislation and parliamentary control.

Citation:

The audit office is an institution independent of the government and the parliament. It has a double nature: it is both a court that intervenes to resolve a limited number of disputes related to the implementation of administrative law (e.g., civil service pensions) and a high-ranking administrative institution entrusted with the oversight of all expenses incurred by public services. The public services that fall within the jurisdiction of the audit office include ministries and public bodies whose function is monitored by ministries.

The staff of the audit office is composed of judges who follow a career path comparable to that of judges of the Greek court system. At the end of the year, the audit office is obliged to submit to the parliament an annual financial statement and the state’s balance sheet.

However, the only sense in which the audit office may be understood as being accountable to the parliament relates to the appointment of its president and vice presidents: they are selected by a high-ranking parliamentary body consisting of the president and the vice presidents of the Greek parliament, but it is the government which makes their final appointment, as in the case of the high-ranking judges in the rest of courts in Greece. After being appointed, audit court judges are not accountable to the government or the parliament and in
fact enjoy the same tenure and independence as their counterparts in the highest civil and criminal court (Areios Pagos) and the highest administrative court (Symvoulio tis Epikrateias).

Citation:

Ombuds Office
Score: 9

The ombuds office, which was founded in Greece in 1997 by the current serving European Ombudsman, Professor Nikiforos Diamandouros, is widely recognized as one of the most well-organized and -staffed public services in the country. The Greek ombudsman is selected and appointed by a group of high-ranking parliamentarians from the Greek parliament, and is obliged to report to the parliament by submitting an annual report.

The ombuds office has generally been popular with citizens. It receives and processes complaints from citizens who are frequently caught in the web of the sprawling Greek bureaucracy. In fact, it acts as an intermediary in citizen–administration relations. Depending on the complaint at hand, the ombuds office can intervene with the central, regional and local bureaucracy. The staff of the ombuds office cannot force the administration to act in accordance with the law or in agreement with the citizen’s complaint, but it can pressure the government to change existing legislation and can also inform the prosecutor’s office of any criminal offences committed by administrative employees and officials in the course of discharging their duties.

Citation:

Media

The most popular TV and radio channels are privately owned and do not provide in-depth information but rather infotainment programs. Such channels may offer in-depth information only in cases in which the economic interests of private media owners are affected by a prospective government decision. For instance, if a media owner opposes a certain investment or project, then he or she will have the channel’s staff report extensively and in a negative fashion on the investment or project at hand.

The withholding of in-depth information on government decision-making is
linked to the fluctuating relations between private media and the government. Media owners often change sides, now favoring the government, then the opposition. This depends on the flow of information media owners obtain from the government, on the access to state-owned bank credit they may enjoy and more generally on the extent of preferential treatment they may enjoy from the state in comparison with their competitors.

The state-owned TV and radio channels – which cater to a small audience and cannot really compete with private channels – offer somewhat more sophisticated information and analysis before government decision-making. However, even in such channels, the quality of information and analysis largely depends on the professionalism of producers and journalists. On state-owned TV and radio channels the quality of information also depends on the personal agenda and political ideology of producers and journalists, who may be either pro-government or anti-government. In other words, even though the government of the day controls the board of directors of state-owned TV and radio, journalists employed by these media are not controlled by media management. This lack of control over the content of TV and radio programs may not increase the extent and quality of in-depth information or reduce political bias, as journalists employed by state-owned media may feel free to openly favor the political party with which they are affiliated. In other words, the quality of in-depth information provided is very uneven.

The situation is somewhat different with regard to newspapers. The circulation of dailies is comparatively low. However, among the daily newspapers and particularly Sunday newspapers one finds interesting pieces of analysis and even some articles based on reliable investigative journalism. The problem for Greek democracy of course is that, as in many other advanced democracies, the reading of and debate over newspaper reports is gradually becoming an interest of the urban, educated elites, as the masses seem to prefer the popular electronic media and the sensationalist press.

Online news is available through various websites which provide unreliable information, often based on rumors or gossip. Such information is rarely accompanied by informed analysis. However, on the positive side, readers looking for opinion articles and in-depth information may visit a few websites which do not provide news coverage but instead offer an array of perspectives. On these websites one may also follow debates in exchanges provoked by an original contributor. Such debates often evolve around the causes and consequences of the economic crisis, the policies of economic austerity followed in Greece since 2010, democracy, corruption, nationalism,
unregistered migration into Greece, racism, and the future of European Union. In short, one may find interesting in-depth information by browsing Greek websites.

**Parties and Interest Associations**

In the 2000s, major Greek parties such as the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) and the conservative New Democracy party were characterized by familism, in the sense that party leadership was in the hands of progeny of the founders of parties. Indeed, this was the case of George Papandreou, the son of PASOK’s founder, Andreas Papandreou, and Kostas Karamanlis, nephew of New Democracy’s founder, Konstantinos Karamanlis. However, as the decade ended, both those leaders fell from power, either through electoral defeat (in the case of Karamanlis) or because of failure to manage the economic crisis (in the case of Papandreou). In 2011 – 2013, the radical left party SYRIZA (Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás or Coalition of the Radical Left, SYRIZA), competed with New Democracy in elections and became the main party of opposition to the New Democracy-led coalition government. Compared to the two aforementioned parties, SYRIZA is a much less nepotistic party, as its leader, Alexis Tsipras, does not come from an old political family. In PASOK, the fact that a new leader. Evangelos Venizelos, replaced George Papandreou in the party’s presidency in 2012 offered an opportunity for reshuffling. A similar, but less pronounced trend occurred in New Democracy when Antonis Samaras replaced Kostas Karamanlis after the latter’s 2009 electoral defeat.

Yet both PASOK and New Democracy as well as the SYRIZA party continue to suffer from two organizational defects: these defects are intense factionalism and heavy-handed control of lists of candidates and agendas of issues by the party leadership.

Indeed, major parties in Greece are characterized by intense factionalism, namely by the existence of officially recognized or informal groups of party cadres who compete during intra-party elections for posts in the top party organs, such as the executive or political bureau of a party and its central committee.

Moreover, a small circle around the party leader have the final word over who is going to be included in the party lists, even though, compared to the past, local and regional party organizations in 2011 – 2013 had their own voice and proposed different candidates and different issues to party leaderships. One
cannot speak of party autocracy in Greek parties, as strong leaders faded away in the 2000s. Yet on most occasions, the extent of control exercised by the party leader over the party indicates that decision-making is restricted to the leader’s entourage.

Associations of employers and employees do not really engage in a constructive dialogue during the period of formulation of any relevant policies. There are multiple reasons for this: labor relations in Greece are usually tense; there is a lack of policy expertise outside the boundaries of ministries and universities; and because interest associations have adapted to functioning in a volatile domestic institutional environment in which there is almost no tradition of planning and programming. Nevertheless, interest associations make relevant policy proposals in a few policy areas, such as macroeconomic policy, incomes and pensions, and labor relations. Leading businesses do not have their own associations, but some leading private banks produce policy papers and reports through their economic research departments.

Employers’ associations and trade unions have their own think tanks, which are staffed by researchers and also employ the services of Greek academics producing research reports and policy papers. Think tanks linked to interest associations hardly ever engage in common projects, let alone policy-oriented research. The think tank of the association of Greek industrialists (SEV) is the Institute of Economic and Industrial Research (IOBE). Depending on the policy issue, this think tank may retain some autonomy from the leadership of SEV and promote the policy views of its own staff. The corresponding think tank representing the views of labor is a joint institution of the two largest confederations of workers (GSEE for private sector workers and workers of state-owned enterprises, ADEDY for civil servants). This is called the Institute of Labor (INE-GSEE/ADEDY). Recently, in the wake of the economic crisis, the INE has attracted the collaboration of some Greek and foreign academics who have made its profile more sophisticated and more respectable than in the past. The rest of the interest associations, such as the national association of merchants (ESEE) and the association of artisans, craftsmen and owners of small enterprises (GSEVE), have relatively less well-resourced and smaller think tanks.

Notably, in 2011 – 2013 the role of think tanks was constrained. In the period under consideration, policy formulation was to a large extent confined to the results of negotiations between successive Greek governments seeking to avert sovereign default, on the one hand, and representatives of Greece’s creditors (and particularly of the EC–ECB–IMF Troika), on the other. There was little space and time for interest associations to formulate policy proposals, except of
course for the obvious and predictable reaction of the INE think tank, which rejected all policy measures introduced by the Troika. Such measures were not warmly received by the opponents of labor either. In the context of Greece’s deep economic depression in 2009 – 2013, some policy guidelines, such as the Troika’s insistence on lowering monthly wages in the private sector, received only lukewarm responses from policy experts and representatives of associations of employers.

Citation:
The opinions of the think tank of the labor unions, i.e., the INE think tank, are available at its website http://www.inegsee.gr/ (no foreign language version of this website’s contents). For opinions mostly reflecting the views of Greek industrialists, see the website of the think tank IOBE at http://www.iobe.gr/index.asp?a_id=122 (english version of the website).

Greek civil society is relatively underdeveloped in the sense that Greeks do not devote time or money to voluntary associations and particularly not to non-economic interest associations. A survey of the European Foundation for Working and Living Conditions, conducted in 2011, is telling enough: while on the average in the EU-27 over 20% of citizens participated in voluntary activities, Greece along with Portugal, Spain, Malta, Bulgaria and Romania, showed a much lower participation rate of between 10% and 15%. According to the Eurobarometer 2011 study, only 14% of Greeks participated regularly or occasionally in a voluntary activity. In this context, “voluntary activities” means unpaid work such as charity or communal work. Low participation is related to rather small or infrequent capability to formulate relevant policies, as non-economic interest associations do not have the resources to become involved in policy formulation and the Greek state does not invite them to do so.

Among all social non-economic interest associations, environmental associations are most developed in Greece. The World Wildlife Fund claims that there are more than 300 environmental groups in Greece, but their impact remains small. This can be accounted for, firstly, by the fact that policymakers prioritize other policy targets over enhancing environmental protection; and, secondly, because narrow, political party-driven policy considerations, which are dense and dominant in policymaking, marginalize other causes.

On the other hand, religion and particularly the state-sanctioned religion – Greek Orthodox Christianity – plays a preponderant role in formulating policies, including policy on ecclesiastical matters and education policy for primary and tertiary education. For instance, religion is a compulsory subject in...
all grades of primary school and high school. The Greek Orthodox Church enjoys a tailor-made taxation regime which allows it to sustain a large landed property. The constitution of Greece does not exclude other religions or Christian dogmas, but officially recognizes the dominant status of the Greek Orthodox Church. In effect, state and church have not ever severed their ties and the Greek state pays for the budget of the Greek Orthodox Church to this day. In that respect the policy role of the religious community represented by that church is quite significant, while that of other religious communities remains negligible.

Citation:
The provisions of the Constitution of Greece on the Greek Orthodox Church can be found in article 3 of the Constitution.
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