

Terminal Evaluation of the UNEP projects in the Haiti Cote Sud Initiative Portfolio

Part II: Mer Sud and Terre Sud Projects



Pointe Abacou, Cote Sud of Haiti. One of the marine protected areas declared in 2013



Evaluation Office of UN Environment

Photos Credits:

© 2013 UN Environment Haiti Country Office

This report has been prepared by independent consultant evaluators and is a product of the Evaluation Office of UN Environment. The findings and conclusions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of Member States or the UN Environment Senior Management.

For further information on this report, please contact:

Evaluation Office of UN Environment
P. O. Box 30552-00100 GPO
Nairobi Kenya
Tel: (254-20) 762 3740
Email: chief.eou@unep.org

UNEP projects in the Haiti Cote Sud Initiative Portfolio
Project numbers: 01601 01603 01624 01550
November 2016
All rights reserved.
© 2016 Evaluation Office of UN Environment

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This terminal evaluation was prepared for the Evaluation Office of UN Environment by a team of two consultants, Yves Renard and Erum Hasan, who worked together in the preparation of evaluation instruments and of all evaluation outputs. The report benefits from a peer review conducted within Evaluation Office of UN Environment.

The Evaluation Office of UN Environment would like to thank the UN Environment Haiti Country Office project teams and all their partners for their contribution and collaboration throughout the Evaluation process. Sincere appreciation is also expressed to those who took time to provide comments to the draft report.

This terminal evaluation was undertaken prior to a new UN Environment Programme directive on the visual identity of the organisation, which replaces previous reference to the organisation as 'UNEP', with 'UN Environment'. This terminal evaluation report, having reached an advanced stage prior to the official directive, has retained the name 'UNEP' throughout to refer to the organisation.

Evaluation team

Erum Hasan – Team Lead

Yves Renard – Team Member

Evaluation Office of UN Environment

Janet Wildish – Evaluation Manager

Mercy Mwangi – Evaluation Programme Assistant

ABOUT THE EVALUATION

Joint Evaluation: No

Report Language(s): English with Executive Summary in French

Evaluation Type: Terminal Project Evaluation

Brief Description: the UN Environment Haiti Country Office supports the implementation of a portfolio of projects in the Cote Sud region, a particularly disaster-prone part of the country. This evaluation focuses on a number of inter-related projects that all completed within a common timeframe and they are addressed in two separate documents as Part I: Gouvernance Sud, along with reflection on how the whole portfolio has performed and Part II: Mer Sud and Terre Sud.

Key words: Haiti, disasters and conflict, Grand Sud, management of protected areas, terrestrial ecosystem management, marine ecosystem management, sustainable energy.

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	2
I. INTRODUCTION	21
II. THE PROJECTS	23
A. THE CONTEXT	23
B. OBJECTIVES AND COMPONENTS	27
C. TARGET AREAS/GROUPS	29
D. MILESTONES & KEY EVENTS DURING IMPLEMENTATION	33
E. IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS	34
F. PROJECT FINANCING	36
G. CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION	36
III. EVALUATION FINDINGS	37
A. STRATEGIC RELEVANCE	37
B. ACHIEVEMENT OF OUTPUTS	43
C. EFFECTIVENESS: ATTAINMENT OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND RESULTS	52
<i>DIRECT OUTCOMES FROM RECONSTRUCTED TOC</i>	52
<i>LIKELIHOOD OF IMPACT USING ROTI AND BASED ON RECONSTRUCTED TOC</i>	54
D. SUSTAINABILITY AND REPLICATION	59
E. EFFICIENCY	63
F. FACTORS AFFECTING PERFORMANCE	65
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	72
A. CONCLUSIONS	72
B. LESSONS LEARNED	80
C. RECOMMENDATIONS	82
IV. ANNEXES	84

Acronyms and abbreviations

AFD	<i>Agence Française de Développement</i>
ANAP	<i>Agence Nationale des Aires Protégées</i>
CIAT	<i>Comité Interministériel d'Aménagement du Territoire</i>
CSI	<i>Côte Sud Initiative</i>
DRR	disaster risk reduction
EO	Evaluation Office
FAD	fish aggregating device
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization (of the United Nations)
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GoH	Government of Haiti
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
MARNDR	<i>Ministère de l'Agriculture, des Ressources Naturelles et du Développement Rural</i>
MDE	<i>Ministère de l'Environnement</i>
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MPCE	<i>Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe</i>
MPA	Marine Protected Area
NAPA	National Programme of Action
NBSAP	National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan
ORE	Organization for the Rehabilitation of the Environment
PA	protected area
PADI	<i>Pêche Artisanale et Développement Intégré</i>
PCDMB	Post-Conflict and Disaster Management Branch
PRC	Project Review Committee
ROLAC	Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean
SNAP	<i>Système National des Aires Protégées</i>
ToC	theory of change
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNON	United Nations Office in Nairobi
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
USD	United States dollar

Executive Summary

1. This report is one of two products resulting from the terminal evaluation of three projects executed by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) as part of the *Côte Sud* Initiative (CSI¹) between 2013 and 2015. While focusing on these projects, the evaluation has also assessed the overall portfolio of projects in which UNEP is involved in Haiti, in the context of the country strategy formulated in 2013.

2. This report covers the “Marine Environment Regeneration in the South of Haiti” project, or *Mer Sud*, and the “Agroforestry and Landscape Rehabilitation” project, or *Terre Sud*, which focus on field-based activities in the *Département du Sud* of Haiti. A separate and complementary report covers the project entitled “Côte Sud Initiative Development Cooperation Platform” project, or *Gouvernance Sud*, as well as the overall portfolio.

3. Given UNEP’s programmatic approach of addressing marine and terrestrial landscapes, the projects *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* are best assessed together. While the projects are presented as two separate initiatives due to donor expectations and financing, in reality the two projects complement and mutually support one another. One of the value-added aspects that the UNEP Country Programme has brought to the development activities in the South region is the ridge-to-reef approach that highlights the impacts that terrestrial activities can have on the marine ecosystems and vice versa; this is best captured by examining these projects together.

Summary of Findings

4. *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* are highly relevant to national needs, regional concerns and international environmental issues and priorities. On the national front, Haiti is currently the

Résumé analytique

21. Ce rapport est l’un de deux produits issus de l’évaluation finale de trois projets réalisés par le Programme des Nations Unies pour l’environnement (PNUE) dans le cadre de l’Initiative *Côte Sud* (CSI⁵) entre 2013 et 2015. Tout en étant axée sur lesdits projets, cette évaluation a également porté sur l’ensemble du portefeuille de projets auxquels le PNUE prend part en Haïti, dans le cadre de la stratégie de pays formulée en 2013.

22. Ce rapport concerne le projet dit de « Régénération de l’environnement marin dans le sud d’Haïti », ou *Mer Sud*, et celui de « Restauration de l’agroforesterie et des paysages », ou *Terre Sud*, qui se rapportent aux activités de terrain dans le Département du Sud d’Haïti. Un rapport distinct et complémentaire portera sur le projet intitulé « Plateforme de coopération au développement dans le cadre de l’Initiative Côte Sud », ou *Gouvernance Sud*, ainsi que sur l’ensemble du portefeuille.

23. Compte tenu de l’approche programmatique du PNUE en ce qui regarde le traitement des paysages terrestres et marins, il est plus profitable d’évaluer les projets *Mer Sud* et *Terre Sud* conjointement. Bien qu’il s’agisse de deux initiatives distinctes de par les attentes des donateurs et les modes de financement, en réalité les deux projets se complètent et s’étayent mutuellement. L’un des éléments de valeur ajoutée que le programme national du PNUE a introduit dans les activités de développement dans la région du Sud est l’approche intégrée « de la crête au récif », qui permet de mettre en lumière les impacts des activités terrestres sur les écosystèmes marins et vice versa; cela apparaîtra plus clairement en examinant ces projets conjointement.

¹ CSI currently comprises 5 projects: *Gouvernance Sud*, *Mer Sud*, *Terre Sud*, *Energie Sud* and *Macaya Grand Sud*

poorest and most environmentally degraded country in the Western hemisphere². In Haiti, forest conversion combined with poor land use management, have led to environmental issues, which are worsened by severe climate events. Haiti is subject to frequent droughts and floods, exacerbated by deforestation. The population is highly dependent on small-scale subsistence farming, which makes them even more vulnerable to the damage from frequent natural disasters. While populations are heavily dependent upon environmental resources and ecosystems services, financial resources devoted to the environment are among the lowest in the national budget.³

5. Given this national context, the projects' activities are highly relevant as they address food security (fisheries and agriculture), afforestation and revegetation (combating deforestation, soil erosion), response to disaster risk (stabilizing the coastal zone, increasing buffers to sea-level rise and reforesting ravines to fight erosion), and building environmental capacity (training governmental staff on ecosystems management, strengthening local civil society organisations to respond to community needs, and providing communities with techniques and tools to promote sustainable agriculture and fisheries). *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* are also consistent with Haiti's National Biodiversity Strategy Action Plan (NBSAP), National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) and National Action Plan (NAP) to combat desertification that have been or are being developed in accordance with the provisions of international conventions.

6. *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* are carried out in a context where there is a very low baseline of capacity and environmental governance and

Sommaire des constatations

24. Les projets *Mer Sud* et *Terre Sud* sont particulièrement adaptés aux besoins nationaux, aux préoccupations régionales ainsi qu'aux priorités et enjeux environnementaux internationaux. Sur le plan national, Haïti est actuellement le pays le plus pauvre et le plus écologiquement dégradé de l'hémisphère occidental⁶. La conversion forestière, combinée à une mauvaise gestion de l'utilisation du sol, a généré des problèmes environnementaux qui sont amplifiés par des événements climatiques graves. Haïti est souvent frappé par des sécheresses et des inondations, elles-mêmes exacerbées par la déforestation. La population dépend largement d'une agriculture de subsistance à petite échelle, ce qui la rend d'autant plus vulnérable aux ravages causés par les catastrophes naturelles fréquentes. Alors même que les habitants dépendent grandement des ressources environnementales et des services écosystémiques, les fonds alloués aux besoins environnementaux sont parmi les plus maigres dans le budget national.⁷

25. Dans ce contexte national, les activités liées aux projets sont particulièrement pertinentes puisqu'elles concernent la sécurité alimentaire (pêche et agriculture), le reboisement et la végétalisation (pour combattre la déforestation et l'érosion des sols), l'intervention en cas de catastrophe (pour stabiliser la zone côtière, multiplier les zones tampons pour contrer la montée du niveau de la mer, et reboiser les ravins afin de combattre l'érosion), et le renforcement des capacités environnementales (former le personnel gouvernemental à la gestion des écosystèmes, raffermir les organisations issues de la société civile locale afin qu'elles

⁵ À l'heure actuelle, l'ICS englobe 5 projets : *Gouvernance Sud*, *Mer Sud*, *Terre Sud*, *Énergie Sud* et *Macaya Grand Sud*

² UNDP, Human Development Report 2013,

http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/14/hdr2013_en_complete.pdf

³ Haiti MDG Objectives for 2015. Available online at: <http://www.ht.undp.org/content/haiti/fr/home/mdgoverview/>

⁶ Rapport sur le développement humain, (PNUD), 2013,

http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/14/hdr2013_en_complete.pdf

⁷ OMD pour Haïti en 2015. Peuvent être consultés en ligne à l'adresse :

<http://www.ht.undp.org/content/haiti/fr/home/mdgoverview/>

where most of the interventions of the projects are the first of their kind in these locations. It is noted that when project documents were designed they could not take into account all elements that would require adaptive approach (e.g. political crises, extreme weather events, financial and administrative UNEP organisational challenges). While the evaluators recognise this and take note of the flexible and adaptive approach carried out by the Country Programme, project results are being evaluated according to the outputs and targets set out in the project documents and revisions. According to documentation, *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* have achieved substantial results, which include:

- The identification and legal declaration of the first nine Protected Areas (PA) in the *Département du Sud*.
- The establishment of a Fisheries and Aquaculture Unit in the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (*Ministère de l'Agriculture, des Ressources Naturelles et du Développement Rural - MARNDR*), and Marine Protected Area Unit in the Ministry of Environment (*Ministère de l'Environnement - MDE*) for improved environmental governance in the South.
- Support to fishing communities through (i) training on sustainable fisheries; (ii) supporting organisational development of fishing cooperatives; (iii) disseminating fishing techniques; (iv) rehabilitating fishing vessels; (v) provision of environmentally-friendly fishing materials; (vi) providing safety-at-sea training particularly in the context of disasters; and (vii) establishing fish markets for female vendors.
- Rehabilitation of natural coastal protection barriers and establishing the first native, coastal nursery.
- Agroforestry and reforestation efforts, which exceeded expectations and milestones in terms of hectares planted (fruit orchards, high value crops, riverbank stabilization, market gardens of key staple crops, grafting trees and

puissent répondre aux besoins communautaires, et fournir aux communautés les techniques et outils nécessaires pour favoriser l'agriculture et la pêche durables). *Mer Sud* et *Terre Sud* sont d'ailleurs conformes au Plan d'action stratégique national pour la biodiversité d'Haïti (PASNB), au Programme d'action national d'adaptation (PANA), et au Plan d'action national (PAN) de lutte contre la désertification, déjà élaborés en vertu des dispositions des conventions internationales, ou en voie de l'être.

26. Les projets *Mer Sud* et *Terre Sud* sont réalisés dans un contexte où l'état initial de la gouvernance et des capacités environnementales est très faible, et où la plupart des interventions mises en œuvre sont les premières de leur genre dans ces localités. Il convient de noter qu'à l'étape de la conception, les documents de projets ne pouvaient pas tenir compte de tous les éléments susceptibles d'exiger une approche adaptative (p. ex., crises politiques, événements météorologiques extrêmes, difficultés organisationnelles d'ordre financier et administratif pour le PNUE). Les évaluateurs en sont conscients et tiennent compte de l'approche flexible et adaptative adoptée par le programme national; cela étant, les résultats des projets ont été examinés en fonction des extraits et des cibles établis dans les documents de projets et les révisions. D'après les sources documentaires, *Mer Sud* et *Terre Sud* ont produit des résultats importants, notamment :

- La désignation et la proclamation officielle des neuf premières aires protégées (AP) dans le Département du Sud.
- La création d'une unité des pêches et de l'aquaculture au sein du Ministère de l'agriculture, des ressources naturelles et du développement rural (MARNDR), et d'une unité des aires marines protégées au sein du Ministère de l'environnement (MDE), en vue d'améliorer la gouvernance environnementale dans le Sud.
- L'aide aux communautés de pêcheurs sous forme de : (i) formations en matière

- reforesting ravines).
- Disaster risk reduction (DRR) through enhancing natural buffers, restoration and protection of riverbanks, and coastal communities through the planting of bamboo to reduce flash flooding and erosion in ecologically sensitive and upstream populated areas.
- Demonstration of adaptive management in the face of project delays, climate crises (droughts), unreliable partnerships, and transitional political environment.
- Strengthened local organisations and social structures, all the while maintaining equal partnerships and legitimacy.
- Strong presence in the field with excellent technical knowledge and understanding of socio-political context.
- Enhancing visibility and awareness of the vulnerabilities and potentials in the *Département du Sud* within government institutions and international partners.
- Strengthening and professionalisation of local partners, primarily a small number of locally based civil society actors involved in various aspects of project execution.
- Enhancement of coordination between departmental ministerial staff and local civil society actors.
- Building of technical and management capacity with significant investments in time, technical assistance and resources of local organisations, cooperatives and government organisations.
- Developing the first nursery of coastal native species with associated capacity building on planting.
- Interventions that have been replicated or scaled up by other international organisations (e.g. working in the South, replication of coastal nurseries, complementary activities on Marine Protected Areas - MPA).

1.

7. Despite these achievements, there are some outputs that were not fully delivered under *Mer*

- de pêche durable; (ii) soutien du développement organisationnel des coopératives de pêche; (iii) propagation de nouvelles techniques de pêche; (iv) remise en état des embarcations de pêche; (v) fourniture d'un équipement de pêche plus écologique; (vi) formations en matière de sécurité en mer, en particulier en cas de catastrophe; et (vii) ouverture de marchés pour les vendeuses de poissons.
- La restauration des barrières de protection côtière naturelles, et la création de la première pépinière d'espèces indigènes côtières.
- Des mesures d'agroforesterie et de reforestation ayant excédé les attentes et les jalons pour ce qui est des hectares ensemencés (vergers, cultures à forte valeur ajoutée, stabilisation des berges, jardins maraîchers de cultures essentielles, greffe d'arbres et reboisement des ravins).
- La réduction des risques de catastrophe (RRC) par le renforcement des zones tampons naturelles; la revalorisation et la protection des berges et des communautés riveraines par la plantation de bambou afin de limiter l'érosion et les crues soudaines dans les zones peuplées et écosensibles d'amont.
- Une capacité de gestion adaptative malgré les retards dans la réalisation des projets, les crises climatiques (sécheresses), les partenariats peu fiables, et une situation politique instable.
- Le renforcement des organisations et des structures sociales locales, dans le maintien de l'égalité et de la légitimité des partenaires.
- Une forte présence sur le terrain d'intervenants dotés d'excellentes compétences techniques et d'une parfaite connaissance du contexte socio-politique.
- Le renforcement de la visibilité et de la prise de conscience des vulnérabilités et des potentialités dans le Département du Sud auprès des institutions

Sud. Part of the reason for this is the short duration of the project, with unrealistic outputs that were incompatible with a short timeframe in the project design, coupled with severe capacity gaps. In two years, with a very low baseline of activity on sustainable fisheries and no governmental capacity to begin with, it is very difficult to achieve the lofty aims of establishing a marine resources monitoring database or developing regulations for the nine, new MPAs established under the project. *Terre Sud* was able to achieve all of its intended outputs. A more rigorous monitoring exercise is required to assess the actual impacts the project brings to people's livelihoods. For that reason, *Mer Sud's* achievement of outputs is rated as *Unsatisfactory*, while *Terre Sud's* is rated *Satisfactory*.

8. In terms of effectiveness, both *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* achieved a rating of *Satisfactory* for outcomes presented in the Reconstructed Theory of Change (ToC). However, the overall likelihood of impact of both projects is established at *Moderately Likely* for three main reasons (i) the success of the impacts of *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* are highly dependent on the success of follow-up projects, which is a substantial risk dependent on resources, staffing, vision of the donors etc.; (ii) the instability of the political environment adds uncertainty to the way things may progress; and (iii) many of the interventions under *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* are preliminary interventions, the first of their kind in the baseline. Substantial work is required to mainstream/upscale those activities, and to refine the strategies that would lead to successful implementation (e.g. livelihoods strategy and sustainable fisheries strategy).

9. In terms of sustainability, it is relevant to note that Haiti is a fragile state with an uncertain political situation. Despite this, the UNEP Country Programme has worked directly with local organisations and governmental agencies to build their capacities and legitimacy with beneficiaries in the long run. The UNEP Country Programme has fundraised for future phases of the project, and there is documented evidence of

gouvernementales et des partenaires internationaux.

- L'affermissement et la professionnalisation des partenaires locaux, et notamment d'un petit groupe d'acteurs de la société civile prenant part diversement à l'exécution des projets.
- L'amélioration de la coordination entre le personnel ministériel affecté au département et les acteurs locaux de la société civile.
- Le renforcement des capacités techniques et de gestion au moyen d'importants investissements en temps, en assistance technique et en ressources auprès des organisations, des coopératives et des entités gouvernementales locales.
- La création de la première nourricerie d'espèces indigènes côtières, et le renforcement connexe des capacités en matière d'empoissonnement.
- Des interventions reproduites ou transposées à plus grande échelle par d'autres organisations internationales (p. ex., activités dans le Sud, multiplication des nourriceries côtières, activités complémentaires dans les aires marines protégées (AMP)).

27. Malgré ces accomplissements, certains extrants n'ont pas été entièrement réalisés au titre du projet *Mer Sud*. Cela découle en partie de la courte durée du projet, au regard de laquelle certains extrants étaient irréalistes dès l'étape de la conception, ainsi que de graves lacunes du point de vue des capacités. En deux ans, avec un niveau initial d'activités de pêche durable très faible et des capacités gouvernementales inexistantes, il aurait été très difficile d'atteindre les objectifs ambitieux de créer une base de données destinée à la surveillance des ressources maritimes, ou d'élaborer des règlements régissant les neuf AMP nouvellement créées dans le cadre du projet. En revanche, le projet *Terre Sud* a réalisé tous les extrants escomptés. Un exercice de suivi plus rigoureux est nécessaire pour évaluer les impacts réels des projets sur les modes de vie des populations.

future project agreements. There is also evidence of other international organisations, most notably the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) replicating interventions piloted under *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* in their own projects. Political and environmental crises notwithstanding, it is likely that some of the initiatives will lead to policy outcomes and other projects, and based on this the project the rating for sustainability is *Likely*.

10. In terms of efficiency, the UNEP Country Programme was efficient in terms of cost-saving, timeliness, and managing the projects with a lean staff. However, the broader UNEP organisational context introduced delays in reviewing documents, issuing contracts and payments, which negatively impacted the results of the projects as well as local partners and beneficiaries. The rating for efficiency is *Moderately Unsatisfactory* for both projects.

11. With regards to project preparation, the objectives and components were clear, but for *Mer Sud* not feasible given their scope and two-year timeframe. Potential environmental, economic and social impacts of the projects were identified too generally, and a more detailed Haiti-specific risk analysis would have been useful. The capacities of executing agencies were properly considered, which is why capacity building was built into every aspect of the project. Partnership arrangements were properly identified and adequate project management arrangements were in place. Despite this, weaknesses with two partners did arise during project implementation, and were managed. Recommendations by the Project Review Committee (PRC) were addressed in both projects. However, for future iterations it would be useful to document what role stakeholders and project partners played in the design of project itself. It is worth noting that the Country Programme is under intense pressure to have project documents approved by PRC, without which the Country Programme has no seed funding to pay its staff and its day-to-day operations. The speed with which projects are

C'est pourquoi la réalisation des extrants est jugée insatisfaisante dans le cas de *Mer Sud*, et satisfaisante dans celui de *Terre Sud*.

28. Du point de vue de l'efficacité, *Mer Sud* et *Terre Sud* ont été jugés satisfaisants quant aux extrants énoncés dans la théorie du changement reconstituée (TdC). Cela étant, la probabilité générale que les deux projets aient un impact est considérée comme moyenne pour trois raisons principales : (i) la durabilité des impacts de *Mer Sud* et *Terre Sud* dépend grandement du succès des projets de suivi, ce qui représente une marge de risque considérable liée aux ressources, au recrutement du personnel, à la vision des donateurs etc.; (ii) l'instabilité du milieu politique rend l'évolution des choses plus incertaine; et (iii) de nombreuses interventions au titre de *Mer Sud* et de *Terre Sud* sont des interventions préliminaires, les premières de leur genre dans le plan de référence. Un effort important sera nécessaire pour généraliser/déployer ces activités à plus grande échelle, et raffiner les stratégies devant mener à une mise en œuvre réussie (p. ex., pour ce qui est des modes de vie et de la pêche durable).

29. En ce qui concerne la durabilité, il est important de noter qu'Haïti est un état fragile dans une situation politique instable. En dépit de ce fait, le programme national du PNUE a collaboré directement avec les organisations locales et les agences gouvernementales afin de renforcer leurs capacités et leur légitimité pour le profit durable des bénéficiaires. Le programme national du PNUE a rassemblé des fonds en vue des prochaines phases du projet, et des accords de projet à venir sont attestés de manière documentaire. Il est également établi que d'autres organisations internationales, notamment la Banque interaméricaine de développement (BID) et le Programme des Nations Unies pour le développement (PNUD) entendent reproduire les interventions mises à l'essai par *Mer Sud* et *Terre Sud* dans le cadre de leurs propres projets. Nonobstant les crises politiques et environnementales, il est probable que certaines des initiatives aboutissent à des résultats de politique publique et à la réalisation

prepared thus leaves elements to be ironed out during inception, which inevitably impacted this rating. Given the optimistic outputs for *Mer Sud*, short duration of the projects, general risk analyses, a lack of documentation of the role stakeholders played in project design, an inadequate monitoring and evaluation budget despite being approved by PRC, the rating for *Mer Sud* is *Moderately Unsatisfactory* and for *Terre Sud* is *Moderately Satisfactory*.

12. The implementation approaches used by the project were responsive to changing circumstances and conditions. The projects were able to adapt to circumstances of drought and the underperformance of two project partners. Given the presence in the field and ongoing accompaniment, the UNEP Country Programme was able to re-orient activities relatively swiftly in order to avoid loss of investment. According to partner accounts, they were able to shape and determine project activities together. UNEP Country Programme was also able to adapt to changing political circumstances as there were three Environment minister changes during project implementation, which required associated briefings, updates and renewed endorsement for activities in the South. The rating for Project Implementation and Management is thus *Satisfactory*.

13. There was a high level of participation by stakeholders and government partners, as per documented reports and consultations, and the UNEP Country Programme was able to maintain this while establishing collaborative non-hierarchical relationships. However, two partners' responsibilities had to change due to severe underperformance. Also, while there was active stakeholder participation during implementation, it was unclear to what degree, stakeholders and partners had input into the initial design of the project. Stakeholders' participation, cooperation and partnerships are rated as *Satisfactory*, with the caveat that future projects should document stakeholder input into project design.

14. On the communications and public awareness aspects, there was anecdotal

d'autres projets, et c'est pourquoi la durabilité de ce projet est considérée comme probable.

30. Du point de vue du rendement, le programme national du PNUE était efficace sur le plan de la réduction des coûts, de la rapidité d'exécution, et de la gestion des projets par un personnel peu nombreux. Cependant, le cadre organisationnel plus vaste du PNUE a induit des retards dans l'examen des documents et l'octroi des contrats et des paiements, ce qui a eu des incidences négatives sur les résultats des projets de même que sur les partenaires et les bénéficiaires locaux. Le rendement des deux projets est jugé moyennement insatisfaisant.

31. En ce qui regarde la préparation des projets, les objectifs et les composantes étaient clairement établis, mais non réalisables dans le cas de *Mer Sud* du fait de leur portée et de l'échéance de deux ans. Les impacts sociaux, économiques et environnementaux potentiels des projets ont été formulés de manière trop générale, et une analyse des risques plus détaillée et plus spécifique à Haïti eût été utile. Les capacités des organismes d'exécution ont été dûment prises en compte, et c'est pourquoi le renforcement des capacités a été intégré dans chaque dimension du projet. Les accords de partenariat ont été correctement planifiés et des modalités adéquates de gestion de projet étaient en place. Néanmoins, des défaillances concernant deux partenaires sont apparues durant la mise en œuvre du projet, et ont été prises en charge. Les recommandations du Comité d'examen des projets (PRC) ont été prises en compte dans les deux projets. Cependant, aux fins des itérations futures, il serait utile de documenter le rôle qu'ont joué les parties prenantes et les partenaires dans la conception même du projet. Il est intéressant de noter que le programme national est soumis à de fortes pressions visant à ce que les documents de projet soient approuvés par le PRC, sans lequel le programme ne dispose d'aucuns fonds de démarrage pour payer son personnel et assurer ses opérations quotidiennes. La rapidité de préparation des projets fait en sorte que certains éléments restent à peaufiner à l'étape du

evidence, as well as photographs, factsheets and online evidence, of many events, pilots, demonstrations of techniques, technologies and practices in the areas of agroforestry and sustainable fisheries. Communication tools such as Bulletins, Facebook groups, online library, and websites were used. However, at the broader UNEP level it appeared as though the organisation was not fully aware of what happens in the field, which suggests some internal communication challenges. Moreover, it is difficult to assess the impact of public awareness activities and whether/how they altered communities/individual behaviour towards more sustainable practices. Other than anecdotal accounts, or number of public awareness activities, no documented analysis was provided to the evaluators in a measurable shift in public awareness. The rating for communications and public awareness are this *Moderately Satisfactory*.

15. The projects were largely defined by UNEP Country Programme at the design stage and the strategy of developing protected areas and using those as entry points appear to come from UNEP Country Programme, based on their analysis of the benthic assessments and baseline studies. Activities were carried out with local partners and there was a strong sense of local ownership, in shaping the activities, and identifying where they were to be carried out and in liaising directly with beneficiaries. There is also the evidence of organisations taking on some of those initiatives initially started by UNEP and making them a part of their own programme of work and activities. Anecdotal feedback from project partners reflected that they felt engaged and equally involved in developing projects. In examining local ownership one also has to consider the fragile nature of the Haitian state and lack of capacity of its citizenry, which may have required UNEP to take a leadership role at design stage. Taking all this into account, the rating for country ownership and drivenness is rated as *Moderately Satisfactory*.

16. On the financial front there were large delays in payment from headquarters, which at times left partners without funds or contracts.

lancement, ce qui n'a pas manqué d'avoir une incidence sur cette évaluation. Compte tenu des extrants ambitieux du projet *Mer Sud*, de la courte durée des deux projets, des analyses générales des risques, du vide documentaire concernant le rôle des parties prenantes dans la conception des projets, et du budget insuffisant dévolu à l'évaluation et au suivi, malgré l'approbation du PRC, *Mer Sud* est jugé moyennement insatisfaisant, et *Terre Sud* moyennement satisfaisant.

32. Les approches de mise en œuvre des projets étaient sensibles au changement des circonstances et des conditions. Les projets ont su s'adapter à une situation de sécheresse et à la sous-performance de deux partenaires. Du fait de la présence d'intervenants sur le terrain et d'un encadrement constant, le programme national du PNUE a été en mesure de rediriger les activités assez rapidement de manière à éviter une perte d'investissements. D'après les comptes rendus des partenaires, ces derniers ont pu élaborer et choisir ensemble les activités liées aux projets. Enfin, le programme national du PNUE a su s'adapter à une situation politique mouvante : en effet, trois ministres de l'environnement se sont succédé durant la mise en œuvre des projets, ce qui a donc exigé des séances d'information, des révisions et de nouvelles approbations concernant les activités prévues dans le Sud. Par conséquent, la gestion et la mise en œuvre des projets sont jugées satisfaisantes.

33. Le niveau de participation des parties prenantes et des partenaires gouvernementaux était élevé, comme l'attestent les rapports et les documents de consultation, et le programme national du PNUE a su maintenir cet état de fait en favorisant des relations collaboratives et non-hiérarchiques. Cependant, les responsabilités de deux partenaires ont dû être redéfinies pour des raisons de sous-performance notable. Par ailleurs, bien que les parties prenantes aient participé activement à la mise en œuvre, il est difficile de savoir dans quelle mesure les partenaires et eux-mêmes ont contribué à la conception initiale des projets. La participation et la coopération des parties prenantes et la qualité des partenariats sont jugées satisfaisantes, à

UNEP Country Programme leveraged its relationship with UNOPS for logistical, administrative and security to support and counter some of these issues. UNDP was also able to advance some funds for *Mer Sud* as the larger UNEP organisation was unable to move funds quickly enough. While there was evidence of adaptive management in the relationship, and a demonstration of effective inter-agency cooperation, the challenges posed by UNEP's financial procedures posed significant risks to the project results and project partners. Even at the time of writing, the final project costs for *Mer Sud* have not been calculated due to final reports missing from some project partners and challenges with synchronizing data in UMOJA at the Nairobi headquarters. The rating for financial planning and management is thus *Unsatisfactory* for *Mer Sud* and *Moderately Unsatisfactory* for *Terre Sud*.

17. The monitoring and evaluation design was not structured to assess impact, and not costed out adequately. While financial allocations were made in both projects for a terminal evaluation, delays caused this evaluation to be funded from the *Energie Sud* project. While the Country Programme has identified the need for M&E personnel, there is no seed funding (UNEP operational funds) for this, which limits monitoring activities. The rating for monitoring and evaluation is thus *Unsatisfactory*.

18. UNEP supervision, guidance and technical backstopping, as provided by units and offices other than the Country Programme, was deemed inadequate at supporting *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud*. While the support and supervision provided by the Post-Conflict and Disaster Management Branch (PCDMB) were adequate, there were slow communications between other parts of UNEP and the Country Programme. PRC took an excessive amount of time, and recommendations were at times ill-suited to the reality on the ground. Point people/experts were not identified to provide timely support in project approvals at headquarters. The organisation was slow moving in responding to environmental crises or financial challenges. There was no

cette réserve près que les projets à venir devront documenter l'apport des parties prenantes à l'étape de la conception.

34. Sur le plan des communications et de la sensibilisation du public, nous disposons d'observations empiriques, de photographies, de fiches d'information et de documents numériques concernant plusieurs événements, mises à l'essai, et démonstrations de techniques, de technologies et de pratiques dans les domaines de l'agroforesterie et de la pêche durable. Des outils de communication tels que des bulletins, des groupes Facebook, des bibliothèques numériques et des sites Web, ont été employés. Cela dit, à l'échelle plus générale du PNUE, il semble que l'organisation ne soit pas tout à fait informée de ce qui se passe sur le terrain, ce qui laisse deviner certains problèmes de communication internes. Par ailleurs, il est difficile d'évaluer les activités de sensibilisation du public et de déterminer si/comment elles infléchissent les comportements des communautés/des individus vers des pratiques plus durables. En dehors des témoignages anecdotiques, ou du nombre d'activités de sensibilisation, les évaluateurs ne disposaient pas d'une analyse documentée attestant d'une évolution mesurable de la prise de conscience publique. Les mesures de communication et de sensibilisation du public ont été jugées moyennement satisfaisantes.

35. Les projets ont été définis dans une large mesure par le programme national du PNUE à l'étape de la conception, et la stratégie consistant à créer des aires protégées et à s'en servir comme points de départ semble également émaner du programme et de ses analyses des évaluations benthiques et des études de référence. Les activités ont été menées avec le concours des partenaires locaux; le sentiment d'appropriation locale était marqué en ce qui touche à l'élaboration des activités, à la désignation des zones dans lesquelles elles seraient effectuées, et à la coopération directe avec les bénéficiaires. Il appert également que certaines organisations reprennent quelques-unes des initiatives lancées par le PNUE et les intègrent à leur propre programme de travail et

substantial evidence of regional support from ROLAC or other regional programmes to Haiti projects. The rating for UNEP supervision, guidance and technical backstopping is thus *Unsatisfactory*.

Key Strengths of Projects

19. There were key strengths in *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* that are worth noting; some of these can be replicated in future projects and/or upscaled. These include:

20.

- Strategic choice of **focusing on a given geographic area**- the focus on an area allows for greater efficiency, concentration of activity, deeper understanding of the context and stakeholders. This also allows for results to accrue, which may have greater impact than when smaller, disparate projects are distributed in different areas.
- **Focus on field work**- all the staff involved with *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud*, including the highest ranking official, spent large parts of time in the field, liaising with stakeholders, beneficiaries, understanding the technical and socio-political context. This may have limited the distance that sometimes exists between international organisations and beneficiaries. Based on partner consultations, the UNEP Country Programme was perceived as a project partner rather than a donor in a hierarchical relationship.
- **Learning-by-doing as capacity building**- the projects created and funded positions (coordinators) within regional branches of government, and engaged these national staff in the actual delivery of activities. According to interviewed staff, this allowed national staff to be trained, liaise and manage project partners and beneficiaries, and bring those capacities gained back to the

d'activités. D'après leurs commentaires informels, les partenaires se sont sentis engagés et investis à part égale dans l'élaboration des projets. Pour bien analyser l'appropriation locale, il convient de prendre en compte la fragilité de l'état haïtien et le manque de capacités de ses citoyens, qui auraient peut-être exigé que le PNUE joue un rôle prédominant à l'étape de la conception. Compte tenu de tout ce qui précède, le degré d'appropriation et de motivation nationale est jugé satisfaisant.

36. Sur le plan financier, on déplore d'importants retards de versements de la part du siège et la direction générale (Nairobi), qui ont parfois privé les partenaires de liquidités ou de contrats. Le programme national du PNUE a tiré profit de ses relations avec l'UNOPS, du point de vue logistique, administratif et sécuritaire, afin de régler certains de ces problèmes. Le PNUD a pu avancer des fonds aux fins du projet *Mer Sud* là où l'organisation générale du PNUE n'a pas été à même de transférer les sommes nécessaires en temps voulu. Malgré les signes de gestion adaptative et de coopération efficace dans les rapports entre organismes, les obstacles liés aux procédures financières du PNUE ont fait peser des risques importants sur les résultats du projet et les partenaires. Au moment de la rédaction du présent document, le coût final du projet *Mer Sud* n'avait pas encore été calculé parce que certains partenaires n'avaient pas remis leurs rapports finaux, et que la synchronisation des données dans UMOJA au siège de Nairobi s'est avérée problématique. Par conséquent, la planification et la gestion financières sont jugées insatisfaisantes dans le cas de *Mer Sud*, et moyennement insatisfaisantes dans celui de *Terre Sud*.

37. La structure du modèle d'évaluation et de suivi (E&S) ne permettait pas d'évaluer l'impact, et son coût n'a pas été adéquatement établi. Bien que les deux projets aient réservé des fonds à l'évaluation finale, des retards ont fait en sorte que celle-ci soit financée par le biais du projet *Énergie Sud*. Bien que le programme national ait reconnu la nécessité d'allouer des ressources humaines à l'E&S, le financement de démarrage est en l'espèce inexistant (fonds opérationnels du

government institutions themselves. This also allowed a closer relationship between non-governmental partners and government coordinators to develop, which historically could be tense, but there is now evidence of collaborative relationships mentioned during consultations.

- **Dynamic leadership-** given the unique scope of the projects, it was necessary for someone to have the technical expertise to be able to drive the work forward, particularly on establishing the first protected areas in the South. A sound understanding of Caribbean ecology and context also played a significant role in moving the work forward in a focused manner. The key aspects of leadership that appear to have achieved results were thus: (i) technical expertise; (ii) ability to conduct fieldwork and work collaboratively with local stakeholders and beneficiaries; and (iii) knowledge of the Caribbean ecology, and environment.
- **Dedicated and professional staff-** that are responsive, flexible and efficient in challenging socio-political circumstances. Staff members have demonstrated long working-hours, working over weekends, faced financial challenges, political crises, and have fostered relationships of trust with partners and local communities. Staff members have also demonstrated innovation, adaptive management, and tailor-made approaches to suit the unique national context.
- **Local partnerships for project delivery-** as reported by UNEP Country Programme, one of the great strengths of this project was that it used the experience, expertise and dedication of local partners. Instead of hiring partners based in the

PNUE), ce qui limite d'autant les activités de surveillance. L'évaluation et le suivi sont donc jugés insatisfaisants.

38. La supervision, l'orientation et l'assistance technique assurées par les antennes et les bureaux du PNUE autres que le programme national ont été jugés inadéquates pour ce qui est du soutien aux projets *Mer Sud* et *Terre Sud*. Bien que le Service chargé de la gestion des situations post-conflit et post-catastrophe (PCDMB) ait offert un soutien adéquat, les communications étaient lentes entre les autres organes du PNUE et le programme national. Les travaux du PRC ont demandé un temps excessif, et ses recommandations n'étaient pas toujours adaptées à la réalité sur le terrain. Des personnes/experts-ressources n'ont pas été désignés pour accélérer les processus d'approbation des projets au siège. L'organisation a été lente à réagir aux crises environnementales et aux difficultés d'ordre financier. Il y avait peu de signes de soutien régional aux projets concernant Haïti de la part du ROLAC ou d'autres programmes voisins. La supervision, l'orientation et l'assistance technique assurées par le PNUE, en dehors d'Haïti, sont donc jugées insatisfaisantes.

Principaux points forts des projets

39. Quelques points forts des projets *Mer Sud* et *Terre Sud* méritent d'être signalés; certains de ces éléments pourront être reproduits/déployés à plus grande échelle dans le cadre de projets à venir. En voici l'inventaire :

- **Choix stratégique de se concentrer sur une zone géographique donnée** – cela permet d'accroître l'efficacité, de concentrer les activités, et de mieux comprendre le contexte et les parties prenantes. Cela permet également d'amplifier les résultats, et d'avoir sans doute plus d'impact que des petits projets disparates disséminés dans différentes régions.
- **Approche axée sur le travail de terrain** – tout le personnel qui est

capital, local organisations were mobilised to work with communities. This resulted in what appear to be three main achievements: (i) local organisations received professional development through working with UNEP; (ii) they gained legitimacy and trust with beneficiaries; (iii) the project had a feel of local ownership, despite being funded by Norway and developed/managed by UNEP. On the ground, people perceived Haitians working with, and for, Haitians, which is significant in a country that is full of international projects, consultants and donors. In fact some of the beneficiaries of UNEP projects are not even aware that they are so, due to their day-to-day dealings with local partners and intermediaries.

- A key lesson was also that it might be positive to **work outside of the hub of UN agency activity**. By focusing in a more remote region, without a baseline presence of international activity, UNEP has managed to carve out an area of expertise, where it can strengthen its comparative advantage, and avoid duplicative or competing projects/initiatives⁴.
- **Interagency collaboration**- where each organisation works according to its comparative advantage and skills, and has a clear division of roles (e.g. collaborations with UNOPS and FAO), this can strengthen projects and the organisations themselves in understanding their strategic value.
- **Using MPAs as a strategic entry point**, this has allowed the UNEP Country Programme to galvanise significant resources, interest,

intervenu dans les projets *Mer Sud* et *Terre Sud*, y compris les fonctionnaires du plus haut rang, a passé beaucoup de temps sur le terrain à assurer la liaison avec les parties prenantes et les bénéficiaires, et à intégrer le contexte technique et socio-politique. Cela a pu contribuer à réduire la distance qui sépare parfois les organisations internationales et les bénéficiaires. D'après les consultations avec les partenaires, le programme national du PNUE était perçu comme un partenaire de projet plutôt qu'un donateur placé dans une relation hiérarchique.

- **Apprentissage par la pratique comme méthode de renforcement des capacités** – les projets ont créé et financé des postes (coordinateurs) au sein des organes régionaux du gouvernement, et ont fait participer ces employés de la fonction publique à la réalisation effective des activités. D'après le personnel consulté, les employés en question ont pu ainsi recevoir une formation, assurer la liaison avec les partenaires de projet et les bénéficiaires, et les prendre en charge, puis faire bénéficier les institutions gouvernementales elles-mêmes de ces capacités acquises. Cela a également permis aux partenaires non-gouvernementaux et aux coordinateurs gouvernementaux de nouer des relations plus étroites, ce qui n'allait pas de soi historiquement, et on signale à présent des liens de collaboration dans les consultations.
- **Leadership dynamique** – compte tenu de la portée singulière des projets, il était indispensable que quelqu'un détienne l'expertise technique requise pour accomplir le

⁴ It is worth noting that UNEP's presence has now attracted other international organisations to the South. At the time of writing IDB has significant initiatives complementing UNEP activities in the South, UNDP has a project in *Nippes* and *Barraderes* and *Cayemites*, and FAO and UNDP are looking to initiate a joint GEF project in the South.

activity, communication and commitment around protection of ecosystem services, biodiversity, and livelihoods, in subsequent approved projects. The Protected Areas are now used as a rationale for on-going work in the South. Evidence of catalysed resources can be found in projects and initiatives that follow *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud*.

- **Local partners have been able to leverage funds from other organisations.** There is evidence that local organisations that initially partnered with UNEP have now been able to leverage funds from other international organisations to replicate activities carried out under *Terre Sud* and *Mer Sud*. Part of this is due to the profile that the partners have achieved through partnership with UNEP, and through participation in UNEP-supported forums.
- **A focus on the programmatic approach.** While *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* are two discrete projects, among numerous others, the UNEP Country Programme has a programmatic vision towards its activities that it attempts to carry out through projects. While this execution is challenging and not always successful, as will be demonstrated in the report, the vision underlying the projects is not a short-term one, but rather part of a programmatic approach, with a more longer-term vision, as is demonstrated by other documents of the *Côte Sud Initiative* (CSI) and follow up project documents which all complement one another, and pursue similar initiatives.
- **Working at the bureaucratic level-** While the UNEP Country Programme did work at the political level, the political level is in flux. The UNEP Country Programme invested in staffing units in MARNDR and MDE

travail, notamment pour créer les premières aires protégées dans le Sud. Une solide connaissance de l'écologie et du contexte des Caraïbes était en outre très importante pour mener à bien les travaux d'une manière concertée. Les principaux éléments de leadership qui semblent avoir porté fruit sont donc : (i) l'expertise technique; (ii) la capacité d'effectuer le travail de terrain et de collaborer avec les parties prenantes et les bénéficiaires locaux; et (iii) la connaissance de l'écologie et de l'environnement de la région des Caraïbes.

- **Personnel dévoué et professionnel** – capable de se montrer réactif, flexible et efficace dans un contexte socio-politique difficile. Les membres du personnel ont travaillé de longues heures et durant les fins de semaine, ont été confrontés à des obstacles financiers et à des crises politiques, et ont nourri des relations de confiance avec les communautés et les partenaires locaux. Ils ont également fait preuve d'innovation, et ont adopté des méthodes de gestion adaptative et des approches convenant spécifiquement à ce contexte national particulier.
- **Partenariats locaux en vue de l'exécution du projet** – ainsi que le rapporte le programme national du PNUE, l'un des grands points forts de ce projet a été de faire appel à l'expérience, à l'expertise et au dévouement des partenaires locaux. Plutôt que de recourir à des partenaires basés dans la capitale, les organisations locales ont été mobilisées pour œuvrer auprès des communautés. Ce choix semble avoir abouti à trois principales réalisations : (i) les organisations locales ont bénéficié d'un développement professionnel en collaborant avec le PNUE; (ii) elles ont gagné de la

and by inviting staff from *Mairies* to collaborate on initiatives. There is a greater chance of sustainability at the bureaucratic level given the unpredictable political context.

- **Adaptive management**- The projects have faced changing project partners, challenging financial circumstances, severe climate impacts, and changing political realities on the ground. The Country Programme has demonstrated effective adaptive responses, particularly under *Terre Sud*, to achieve intended results.

Recommendations

- The business-as-usual approach for approval of contracts, payments that need to be processed through the UNEP Country Programme, then PCDMB, and then with headquarters should be simplified and changed. The field experience is different from other kinds of UNEP work and requires flexibility and speed to respond to emerging crises and problems. The slow processes within UNEP can pose risks to projects, staff and project partners, and are not adequately responsive. While the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) plays a very positive role and helps manage some of these concerns, UNEP itself needs to re-examine processes for project offices in the field and streamline them to avoid long chains of command.
- Financial flexibility is required to address emergencies, crises and the realities of day-to-day fieldwork. Financial expertise in the country office would support budget revision processes as well the development of accurate and timely

légitimité et acquis la confiance des bénéficiaires; (iii) le projet a éveillé un sentiment d'appropriation locale, bien qu'il ait été financé par la Norvège et élaboré/géré par le PNUE. L'impression sur le terrain était que des Haïtiens travaillaient pour et avec des Haïtiens, ce qui est considérable dans un pays où les projets, les consultants et les donateurs internationaux abondent. À vrai dire, certains des bénéficiaires des projets du PNUE n'ont pas même conscience de l'être, du fait de leurs interactions quotidiennes avec les partenaires et intermédiaires locaux.

- Une importante leçon à tirer est qu'il peut aussi être profitable de **travailler en dehors du foyer d'activité des organismes de l'ONU**. En se concentrant sur une région plus isolée, sans présence initiale d'activités internationales, le PNUE a su se tailler un créneau d'expertise, dans lequel il peut consolider ses avantages comparatifs, et éviter les initiatives/projets concurrents ou redondants⁸.
- **Collaboration interorganismes** – si chaque organisation œuvre en fonction de ses compétences et de ses avantages comparatifs, en vertu d'une claire répartition des rôles (p. ex., collaborations avec l'UNOPS et la FAO), les projets et les organisations elles-mêmes peuvent se trouver renforcés par une meilleure compréhension de leur valeur stratégique propre.
- **Utiliser les AMP comme un point de départ stratégique** a permis au programme national du PNUE de galvaniser des ressources, des intérêts, des activités, des efforts de

⁸ Il est intéressant de noter que la présence du PNUE a désormais attiré d'autres organisations internationales dans le Sud. Au moment de la rédaction du présent document, la BID a entamé d'importantes initiatives venant s'adjoindre aux activités du PNUE dans le Sud, le PNUD a engagé un projet à Nippes et dans la région de Baradères et des Cayémites, et la FAO et le PNUD cherchent à lancer un projet conjoint avec le FEM dans le Sud.

expenditure reports. At the time of writing this evaluation report, financial reports have still not been finalised for *Mer Sud*, which demonstrates severe challenges within the organisation of processing financial information.

- UNEP Country Programme needs to clarify its targeting strategy where beneficiaries are concerned. While all beneficiaries are disadvantaged and vulnerable, the project documents should highlight the rationale of working with one community over another, and the unintended consequences that this may have.
- UNEP Country Programme needs to develop a deeper risk analysis in its project documents. Given the fragility of the Haitian context and some of the social issues that may arise, it would be useful to have a more detailed analysis of risk. Such a document can also touch upon the risks of unintended consequences. In particular, UNEP Country Programme should document any possible negative impacts of strengthening one community over another and how this is to be managed to ensure social cohesion. This thinking must also be captured if there is ever to be changes in staff, as newer staff may not be aware of all the risks and considerations that previous staff may have considered.
- Monitoring and evaluation needs to be strengthened. In particular, when conducting activities on livelihoods or gender, baseline information of beneficiaries should be gathered to be able to document impact. UNEP headquarters should consider institutional funding for such activities so that they are not merely dependent upon donors. Headquarters also need to carry out evaluations in a timely manner, as requested by the Country Programme.
- Livelihoods analysis needs to be strengthened and documented. While livelihoods are intended to be at the crux

communication et des engagements considérables en vue de la protection des services écosystémiques, de la biodiversité et des modes de vie, dans le cadre de projets approuvés ultérieurs. Les aires protégées servent à présent de raison d'être au prolongement des activités dans le Sud. Les projets et initiatives qui ont suivi *Mer Sud* et *Terre Sud* offrent l'exemple d'une telle capacité à catalyser les ressources.

- **Les partenaires locaux ont été en mesure d'obtenir des fonds d'autres organisations.** Il est établi que des organisations locales qui étaient initialement partenaires du PNUE ont pu obtenir des fonds d'autres organisations internationales afin de reproduire les activités effectuées au titre de *Terre Sud* et de *Mer Sud*. Cela s'explique en partie par le profil que celles-ci ont acquis du fait de leur partenariat avec le PNUE et de leur participation à des forums soutenus par le PNUE.
- **Privilégier l'approche programmatique.** Quoique *Mer Sud* et *Terre Sud* soient deux projets distincts, parmi de nombreux autres, le programme national du PNUE a une vision programmatique de ses activités qu'il s'efforce d'appliquer dans tous ses projets. Bien que cette application soit difficile et pas toujours réussie, comme le démontre ce rapport, la vision qui sous-tend les projets ne se place pas à court terme, mais procède plutôt d'une approche programmatique, axée sur le plus long terme, ainsi que l'attestent d'autres documents relatifs à l'*Initiative Côte Sud* (ICS) et les documents de suivi concernant des projets qui se complètent les uns et les autres et s'inscrivent dans de semblables initiatives.
- **Intervenir au niveau bureaucratique** – le programme national du PNUE est

of these initiatives, solid evidence is not provided on how people's livelihoods were enhanced or how this is to be measured. Measurements of the number of initiatives, or number of hectares planted with agroforestry, for instance, do not provide sufficient or applicable data on changes in livelihoods. Associated indicators such as higher enrolment in schools, fewer illnesses or savings accounts would be useful to integrate for a deeper understanding of livelihoods change and its impact on beneficiaries' lives.

- Impact of public awareness initiatives needs to be documented. While a number of public awareness activities were carried out, their impact is unclear. There should be some assessment of how people's perspectives have shifted and through which specific activities.
- Local partners' participation in project design should be documented. While there is a great sense of local ownership in the implementation, it would be useful to capture how local perspectives from the design phase were integrated and how they influenced project design.
- Short-term, discrete projects should be avoided. While this may be out of the UN Country Programme's hands and depend on the donor, it is worth noting that short-term projects can be disruptive with their start and stop dates, may create greater management and time costs, force staff to focus on fundraising instead of on delivery, and avoid an integrated programme approach which would be more suitable to the context. Numerous projects and donors also mean competing reporting requirements, onerous administrative processes. It also forces the UNEP Country Programme to box programmes into projects.
- If short-term projects are carried out, the outputs and activities have to be more realistic in terms of what can be achieved, particularly in a fragile state, with very low capacity.

intervenu au niveau politique, mais la sphère politique évolue sans cesse. Il a investi dans la dotation en personnel d'unités au sein du MARNDR et du MDE, et a invité les employés des mairies à collaborer aux initiatives. Les perspectives de durabilité sont meilleures au niveau bureaucratique compte tenu du contexte politique imprévisible.

- **Gestion adaptative** – les projets se sont heurtés à des changements de partenaires, à des conditions financières difficiles, à des impacts climatiques, et à des réalités politiques fluctuantes sur le terrain. Le programme national du PNUE a su efficacement adapter ses réponses afin d'obtenir les résultats escomptés, particulièrement dans le cadre de *Terre Sud*.

Recommandations

- L'approche routinière d'approbation des contrats et des versements – qui doivent être contrôlés par le programme national du PNUE, puis par le PCDMB, et enfin par le siège – devrait être simplifiée et modifiée. L'expérience du terrain diffère des autres types d'activités du PNUE et exige de la flexibilité et de la rapidité de réaction aux crises et aux problèmes naissants. Les procédures du PNUE sont lentes, insuffisamment réactives, et risquent de pénaliser les projets, le personnel et les partenaires. Bien que le Bureau des Nations Unies pour les services d'appui aux projets (UNOPS) joue à cet égard un rôle très utile et aide à prendre en charge certains de ces problèmes, le PNUE lui-même doit réexaminer et rationaliser ses procédures concernant les bureaux de projet sur le terrain afin d'éviter les longues chaînes hiérarchiques.
- Une certaine flexibilité financière est nécessaire pour répondre aux urgences, aux crises et aux réalités quotidiennes du

- UNEP Country Programme needs to clarify/articulate its sustainable fisheries strategy. Based on the activities that were observed during the evaluation, the focus is on strengthening cooperatives, providing technical inputs, reducing fishing near the shore, and (very) preliminary processes of fish farming. It is unclear what the long-term sustainable fisheries strategy is with what looks like a short-term approach.
 - When investing in elements like agricultural value chains, economic analyses must be carried out to ensure that projects will not lead to market distortions, saturate the market, edge out certain producers, or promote inequities. Optimal production levels, and price points need to be assessed, in light of national realities.
 - Communications within UNEP must be improved. There are a variety of lessons learned that can be applied within the broader organisation, that can be extracted from the Haiti experience. Similarly, there is expertise within the organisation that could supplement the initiatives in Haiti. It appears as though the communication channels are not effective, and mechanisms must be established to share data and experience.
- 2.
3. UNEP headquarters should consider how to improve benefits and job security for national, long-term consultants who are critical to project and programme implementation and who have demonstrated commitment in a challenging, disaster-prone environment.
- travail de terrain. La présence d'un expert financier au bureau national faciliterait les modalités de révision budgétaire et la préparation en temps opportun de comptes rendus de dépenses exacts. Au moment de la rédaction de ce rapport d'évaluation, les rapports financiers n'avaient pas encore été complétés pour le projet *Mer Sud*, ce qui démontre que le traitement des données financières se heurte à de sérieux obstacles au sein de l'organisation.
- Le programme national du PNUE doit clarifier sa stratégie de ciblage vers les bénéficiaires. Il est entendu que tous les bénéficiaires sont défavorisés et vulnérables, mais les documents de projet devraient bien souligner les raisons pour lesquelles une communauté est desservie plutôt qu'une autre, et quelles peuvent en être les conséquences non désirées.
 - Le programme national du PNUE doit présenter une analyse des risques plus approfondie dans les documents de projet. Compte tenu de la fragilité de la situation haïtienne et des problèmes sociaux qui peuvent en découler, il serait utile de disposer d'une analyse des risques plus détaillée. Un tel document pourrait d'ailleurs aborder la question des conséquences non désirées. Plus spécifiquement, le programme national du PNUE devrait indiquer toutes les incidences négatives que peut avoir l'affermissement d'une communauté plutôt que d'une autre, et de quelle manière il convient d'y répondre pour maintenir la cohésion sociale. Cette réflexion doit aussi être consignée en cas de changements de personnel, car les nouveaux employés ne seront pas forcément au fait des risques et des facteurs pris en compte par leurs prédécesseurs.
 - Les mécanismes d'évaluation et de suivi doivent être améliorés. En particulier, dans les cas des activités qui ont trait aux modes de vie ou au genre, les

renseignements de base concernant les bénéficiaires doivent être recueillis afin de pouvoir documenter l'impact. La direction générale du PNUE devrait envisager le financement institutionnel de telles activités afin qu'elles ne dépendent pas que des donateurs. Elle doit également effectuer les évaluations en temps voulu, ainsi que le requiert le programme national.

- L'analyse des modes de vie doit être étoffée et documentée. Bien qu'ils soient au cœur de ces initiatives, nous ne disposons pas de données fiables pour nous indiquer si les moyens d'existence de la population progressent, et comment le mesurer. Le recensement des initiatives, ou du nombre d'hectaresensemencés en agroforesterie, par exemple, ne fournit pas de données utilisables ou suffisantes sur l'évolution des modes de vie. Il serait utile d'intégrer à l'analyse des indicateurs connexes tels que l'augmentation des taux de scolarisation, la réduction de la prévalence des maladies et le nombre de comptes d'épargne, afin de mieux saisir la transformation des modes de vie et son impact sur la vie des bénéficiaires.
- L'incidence des initiatives de sensibilisation publique doit être documentée. Un certain nombre d'activités de ce type ont été menées, mais leur impact n'est pas certain. Il faudrait pouvoir déterminer comment les opinions populaires ont évolué et par l'effet de quelles activités précises.
- La contribution des partenaires locaux à la conception des projets devrait être documentée. Même s'il existe un sentiment très marqué d'appropriation locale à l'étape de la mise en œuvre, il serait utile de noter de quelle manière les points de vue locaux ont été intégrés à l'étape de la conception des projets et quelle influence ils ont eu à cet égard.
- Il convient d'éviter les projets séparés et à court terme. Quoique cela dépende des donateurs et non du programme national

des NU, il est important de noter que les projets à court terme peuvent avoir des effets perturbateurs liés aux dates de début et de fin, s'avérer plus coûteux du point de vue de la gestion et du temps, et forcer le personnel à se concentrer sur la collecte de fonds plutôt que sur la prestation, et à négliger une approche programmatique intégrée mieux adaptée au contexte. La multiplicité des projets et des donateurs implique aussi des exigences concurrentes d'établissement de rapports et de lourds processus administratifs. Elle oblige également le programme national du PNUE à cloisonner les programmes en projets.

- Si des projets à court terme doivent être réalisés, les résultats et les activités à accomplir doivent être plus réalistes, en particulier si l'état est fragile et dispose de très peu de capacités.
- Le programme national du PNUE doit clarifier/formuler sa stratégie en matière de pêche durable. Eu égard aux activités observées durant l'évaluation, l'accent est mis sur le renforcement des coopératives, l'apport d'un soutien technique, la réduction de la pêche près des rives, et les phases (très) préliminaires d'un système de pisciculture. Ce qui ressemble ici à une approche à courte vue ne permet pas de dégager une stratégie à long terme en matière de pêche durable.
- Avant d'investir dans des dispositifs tels que les chaînes de valeur agricoles, il faut effectuer des analyses économiques afin de s'assurer que les projets n'aient pas pour effet de dérégler ou de saturer le marché, de marginaliser certains producteurs, ou de promouvoir les inégalités. Les niveaux de production optimaux et les prix-repères doivent être estimés au regard des réalités nationales.
- Il convient d'améliorer la communication au sein du PNUE. Un éventail de leçons tirées de l'expérience haïtienne trouvent à s'appliquer à l'organisation générale. De même, celle-ci dispose d'une expertise

susceptible d'enrichir les initiatives engagées en Haïti. Les voies de communication ne paraissent pas efficaces, et des mécanismes de partage des données et de l'expérience doivent être mis en place.

- La direction générale du PNUE devrait envisager un moyen d'améliorer les avantages sociaux et la sécurité d'emploi des consultants nationaux de longue durée dont le travail est essentiel à la mise en œuvre des projets et des programmes et qui ont fait la preuve de leur engagement dans un environnement difficile et sujet aux catastrophes.

I. Introduction

40. The “Marine Environment Regeneration in the South of Haiti” and “Agroforestry and Landscape Rehabilitation” projects are two initiatives funded by the Government of Norway, as part of the *Cote Sud Initiative* (CSI). The former is the project under the *Mer Sud* umbrella of CSI, which, broadly, sought to support rural coastal communities to move from entrenched poverty and unsustainable natural resource-based livelihoods to more economically productive and environmentally sustainable ecosystem-based livelihoods, with the goal of fully utilizing coastal ecosystem services and respecting ecosystem integrity. The *Mer Sud* programming of CSI was managed entirely by UNEP. Henceforth the “Marine Environment Regeneration in the South of Haiti” will be referred to as the *Mer Sud* project.

41. The “Agroforestry and Landscape Rehabilitation” project was implemented under the *Terre Sud* umbrella of CSI. *Terre Sud* is the name of a type of programming under CSI, dedicated to terrestrial ecosystems. The overall responsibility of managing the *Terre Sud* programming belonged to UNDP, under the division of responsibilities of CSI programming, which were established to enhance coordination and collaboration among different UN agencies. UNEP was also given responsibilities under *Terre Sud*⁹. As a result, UNEP developed and implemented the “Agroforestry and Landscape Rehabilitation.” Within UNEP itself, this project was referred to as *Terre Sud* (as it reflects UNEP’s work under *Terre Sud* programming), which is how this evaluation will henceforth refer to the project.

42. While both were presented and approved as separate projects with distinct project documents and budgets, it was clear during the evaluation mission that the projects were actually complementary pieces of an integrated programme and had been designed to be implemented concurrently. One evidence of this integrated approach towards the terrestrial and marine environments is that one of the key results from *Mer Sud* was the declaration of the nine protected areas (PA) that UNEP helped identify and draft the decree for. These nine areas contain both marine and terrestrial sites, and reflect the aggregated efforts made under *Terre Sud* and *Mer Sud* that culminated in the establishment of the PAs. While the PAs were technically described as results of *Mer Sud*, *Terre Sud* was implemented in those sites, and terrestrial ecosystems were considered just as much as marine ecosystems.

43. The programme versus project approach in evaluating these projects posed a challenge. The projects were designed by the Country Programme Office as dynamic programme elements, subject to change, adaptive management and budget revisions, due to the highly unpredictable context. The evaluators considered the benefits of adaptive management, and the changing context, but also had to evaluate the project according to indicators and outputs established in the design, in order to provide an assessment of results attained. Ratings should be considered in light of this—they are limited to the project approach while the Country Programme implemented a more programmatic approach.

⁹ Anecdotally UNEP was given *Mer Sud* programming and UNDP *Terre Sud* programming, yet UNEP was also granted funds under *Terre Sud* to develop a project due to their capacity to deliver in the area.

44. A single report will also prevent redundant language and will allow the evaluators to compare both projects in a single document, highlighting their complementarities and noting differences in achievement of results. The ratings tables will reflect two sets of ratings for each project. This will also demonstrate that while *Mer Sud* for instance appears to have attained less of the results as compared with *Terre Sud*, that this should be assessed in relation to the programme as a whole and not necessarily as discrete projects.

45. This evaluation report is part of, and appended to, a broader evaluation assessing the Haiti Country Programme and *Gouvernance Sud*. As *Terre Sud* and *Mer Sud* projects focus on field-based activities while the *Gouvernance Sud* project deals with issues of coordination, institutional arrangements and policy support that are central to UNEP's country strategy for Haiti, these four deliverables have been grouped in two separate documents, one on *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* and the other on *Governance Sud*. The present *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* evaluation report will often refer to the "umbrella report", by which it means the "Evaluation of the *Gouvernance Sud* and Review of the Portfolio", as it contains relevant contextual CSI and portfolio-related information to which this report will need to refer. This also reflects that *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* projects were not created in a vacuum and are interconnected with a broader programme.

46. This report will also rely on documents and annexes provided in the umbrella report, such as the Reconstructed Theory of Change (TOC). As this report and the umbrella report were developed concurrently, this report will not duplicate the Annexes already provided in the umbrella report and only provides annex 7 on "Financial Planning and Management".

47. As indicated in the umbrella report, the evaluation team is very appreciative of the staff and consultants of the Haiti Country Programme of UNEP for arranging extensive field visits, interviews, remaining available throughout the evaluation to answer questions, and providing documentation in a timely fashion. The UNEP team in Haiti was forthcoming with remarks and information and provided useful feedback to the evaluation team's reconstructed theory of change and early findings. This evaluation also benefited from clear guidance and direction from the UNEP Evaluation Office (EO) in Nairobi, and from the sensitivity it demonstrated in meeting deadlines. The evaluation team is also grateful to the international, national and local partners who willingly shared experiences, perspectives and documentation, and to the UNEP staff in PCDMB and other units within UNEP who made time available for interviews and provided feedback on the discussion note of July 2016 as provided in Annex 3 to the umbrella report.

48. In the interest of transparency it is noted that one of the evaluators in this project has been involved in drafting GEF projects with UNEP Country Programme. This was disclosed to the Evaluation Office from the onset and was determined to not represent a conflict of interest as the design of the GEF projects post-dated the CSI initiatives, but rather added a depth of familiarity with the operating context that made this complex evaluation feasible.

II. The Projects

49. The *Terre Sud* project had a budget of USD \$1.230,000 with funding from the Government of Norway, and was intended to run from 2012 to 2014. Due to delays, the time period considered in this evaluation is from 2013 to 2015. The goal of the project was to “establish a sustainable vegetal cover through a rational use of soils for agriculture and forestry through innovative techniques, income generating activities and dissemination of best practices and environmental education”. *Mer Sud*¹⁰ was also initially a two-year (2013-2015) CSI sub-project with the aims to “regenerate marine eco-systems in the South and implement a rational use of marine resources through sustainable small-scale fisheries improvements and coastal livelihoods diversification, including community based eco-tourism development”, with a budget of USD 2.460 million.

50. While this evaluation has assessed the strategic relevance, achievement of outputs, effectiveness, sustainability, efficiency and factors affecting performance, it has also specifically sought to address the following questions:


- How relevant are the projects to beneficiary needs? In addition, are they aligned with UNEP’s mandate, the Medium Term Strategy (2014-17) and relevant sub-programme strategies?
- To what extent and how efficiently did the projects deliver their intended outputs? Specifically, in what ways and how far have the projects contributed to strengthening regional government and civil society capacity to carry out concrete initiatives to promote: (a) the regeneration and sustainable use of marine ecosystems/resources; b) sustainable practices in agro-forestry; c) coordination and d) strengthening disaster preparedness and response in the environmental sector? How well are the projects designed to withstand the environmental challenges (climate change and extreme weather) endemic to the area?
- What were the internal and external factors, including internal UNEP approval processes and administrative support, that most affected performance of the projects? What management measures were taken to make full use of opportunities and address obstacles to enhance project performance?

A. The Context

51. *Terre Sud* and *Mer Sud* were implemented in the South Department (*Département du Sud*), over a stretch of approximately 300 km in terms of field activities, but with support to the department as a whole. The departmental focus was as a result of a request made by mayors, ministerial departmental directors and the departmental delegate who during a

¹⁰ It is useful to note that the *Mer Sud* project subject to this evaluation is technically a second phase and has emerged out of the lessons learned of the initial CSI-1 *Mer Sud* project. The first phase of *Mer Sud* was implemented from 2011 to 2012. This evaluation will **not** be assessing the first phase, although the evaluators are aware that many of the lessons learned and baseline content of the 2nd phase of *Mer Sud* are based on the previous phase. Henceforth reference to *Mer Sud* project is reference to the second phase.

departmental meeting in 2011, requested UN entities to support the *Département* as a whole given the lack of resources and capacity.¹¹ (The original motivations of focusing on the *Département du Sud* are reflected in the umbrella report). While UNEP has supported institutions of the *Département*, most of the actual field work is in the more restricted Southern coastal area, or directly adjacent to it, with *Terre Sud* focusing on the coast and communities slightly North of the coast on terrestrial systems¹², and *Mer Sud* focusing on the coastal and marine environments. The following map identifies the protected areas in the Grand Sud that were declared as a result of *Mer Sud*:



52. The *Département du Sud* is made up of sandy beaches, extensive mangrove areas, coral reefs, seagrass beds, 17-century forts, and traditional fishing villages. The communities served by both projects are usually small, vulnerable and often isolated villages, living in a state of permanent extreme vulnerability. The populations targeted by *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* reside in coastal zones, low-lying areas, small islands and steep topography which makes it difficult to cultivate agricultural products. The main economic activities in the zones of intervention are highly dependent on natural resources such as

¹¹ *Mer Sud* project document, page 8

¹² Project documents identify *Terre Sud* initiatives being carried out in Roche a Bateau, Coteaux, Port a Piment, Chantal and Les Anglais as they are contiguous and form part of the SouthWest side of the Massif de la Hotte mountain chain, which includes one of Haiti's biodiversity hotspots—the Macaya National Park. *Mer Sud* is identified as focusing on 8 eastern most communes and the island of Ile a Vache. This being said, all sites that have been demarcated as PAs can be thought of as places where a minimum of activities under both *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* have taken place.

fisheries, agriculture, forestry, and tourism. Charcoal production and the harvesting of vetiver are also major sources of income for those within this zone.

53. In its 2012 development plan the *Plan Stratégique de Développement d'Haïti : Vision 2030*, the Government of Haiti (GoH) selected key regional development poles considered as investment priorities to boost the regional development and economic growth of the country, and reduce the concentration of efforts and demographic pressure in the capital of Port-au-Prince. One of these decentralised “regional development poles” is the “South Pole” which comprises the three Departments located at the southwestern-most region of the country: *Départements du Sud, de Grand’Anse and de Nippes*.¹³ This declaration was heavily influenced by UNEP’s work in the region. According to anecdotal evidence, CSI, as driven by UNEP, was the first development entity to concentrate on the South, the rationale for which is further elaborated in the umbrella evaluation report. Consequently, while the *Département du Sud* has become a development priority for GoH, this is largely influenced by UNEP’s initiatives in the area.

54. There are immense capacity issues at the national and decentralised levels, which both projects seek to address. Haiti is a fragile state, subject to political crises, lack of funds and international dependency. On a day-to-day level, those implementing the projects have to constantly deal with staff changeovers, erratic policy shifts, a lack of resources, competition among ministries for international resources, poor channels of communication within the government and weak intergovernmental mechanisms.

55. There are numerous international aid organisations, a peacekeeping force, and a visible presence of international consultants and interests in Haiti. While there is a lighter presence of such entities in the South, there is anecdotally, often a prevailing attitude of distrust, particularly with UN-security agencies. This distrust can be exacerbated in a climate where elections have been postponed and local communities have few vehicles through which their agency can be expressed. Short-term, fragmented development initiatives have also contributed to scepticism with regard to the international development sector.

56. In terms of other key UN agencies in the *Département*, CSI brought with it the presence of UNOPS and UNDP. UNOPS shares an office with UNEP in Port Salut, while the UNDP headquarters are in Port-au-Prince¹⁴. A UNDP staff member occupies premises shared with the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in Les Cayes.

57. The main civil society actors involved in development work in the area associated with this project are the Organisation for the Rehabilitation of the Environment (ORE) and the fisheries organisation *Pêche Artisanale et Développement Intégré* (PADI). PADI was operating in the area prior to CSI, while ORE was brought in through CSI. Another partner that emerged in the implementation of *Mer Sud*, which was not identified in project documents, is Reef Check Haiti. Originally, UNEP’s collaboration was with Reef Check, who

¹³ The South Department is a rural and coastal land area of 2,654km² and is divided into 18 Municipalities with a population of 739,565 people (population density of 279).

¹⁴ At the time of writing there are plans for the FAO to also join this office which also demonstrates greater interest and engagement in the South

conducted research on the coral reefs of the South for UNEP Country Programme, and through its own process of decentralisation has developed Reef Check Haiti—UNEP has been a key project partner in leveraging this new organisation’s expertise. Other key stakeholders and the role the projects are provided in Annex 7.

Gender Context in the Département du Sud

58. It is necessary to highlight the specificities of the gender context in the *Département du Sud* in order to render remarks on gender relevant for the reader.

59. Gender issues in Haiti are complex and closely tied to socioeconomic class. In the rural areas of the *Département du Sud*, women are often visibly involved in economic activities, though they lack opportunities to grow their businesses or to expand their existing activities. While women do serve as part of decision-making bodies in communities, it not always in the form of women organisations, but rather as community members. The fact that men face declining prospects for employment in rural areas, often adds to the social pressures faced by women in the South because there is competition for labour, scarce resources, and more members of the family to support.

60. Economic opportunities are limited for women in Haiti. Women from the rural areas typically do not have separate bank accounts from their husbands—if they have bank accounts at all—or any dedicated access to financing. As such, women face greater difficulty in accessing capital to purchase stock for selling at markets or to acquire land with productive gardens and/or fruit trees. Women are responsible for the vast majority of marketing of vegetables and fruits, as well as selling small household goods. The money that is exchanged from selling small stocks of goods is used to purchase more or to pay for immediate household needs, creating great difficulty for women to accumulate enough savings to grow their businesses or to explore additional activities.¹⁵

61. Women’s dependency on marketing as their main economic activity can render them vulnerable to shortages of supply and makes them highly dependent on imported goods for sale.

62. While there is limited baseline data related to gender for Haiti’s *Département du Sud*, recent surveys by UNEP in 2014 and in 2015 as part of the design of the GEF project “*Ecosystem-Based Approach of Haiti’s Cote Sud*”¹⁶ have led to the following conclusions that are relevant to this evaluation:

- Men and women tend to occupy specific roles within the economic sector,
- Women tend to be responsible for transformation and commercialization in the fisheries and charcoal value chains, often within their own associations,
- Some value chains, such as castor oil and cashew, primarily engage women,
- Access to credit and technical resources are limited in the South, and often harder for women to attain, and

¹⁵ Ecosystems-Based Approach to Haiti’s Cote Sud, Project Document Approved by the GEF, 2016

¹⁶ One of the evaluators was part of the survey exercise highlighted above.

- In all value chains, women and men’s activities and contributions are inextricably linked (i.e., women’s purchases often finance fishing trips for motor boats, buy charcoal from producers, etc.)⁹

63. In the fisheries value chain, women, sometimes as part of an association of vendors, are responsible for the transformation and commercialization of fresh fish, as well as the drying and salting of fish. With regards to charcoal, women are responsible for selling charcoal in small retail quantities for daily consumption. Women may also be heavily involved in the production and wholesale of charcoal, including trade to depots and coordination of sales amongst multiple producers in geographic zones. These women tend to rely heavily on charcoal as their main source of income.

B. Objectives and Components

64. *Mer Sud* was based on two components:

- Component 1: Coastal & Marine Environmental Governance and Education
- Component 2: Community-based Ecosystem Management for Improved Well-being and Coastal Communities.

65. The logical framework was structured such that the following outputs and activities were to lead to the one overarching Outcome: “sustainable management of marine resources is promoted through increased capacities and understanding of resource users and governance structures in the South Department of Haiti.”

Table 2- Mer Sud: Outputs and Activities

Outputs	Activities
COMPONENT 1	
A. Marine environment and fisheries governance structures in the South are developed	A.1 Creation/consolidation of government Fisheries Unit in the South.
	A.2 Creation/consolidation of government Protected Areas Unit in the South.
B. Government-owned co-managed Marine Protected Areas Network with associated regulations is established	B.1. Capacity building/technical assistance in MPAs
	B2. MPA Boundaries consultation and definition
	B.3. MPA declaration
	B.4. Socio-economic Impact Assessment
	B.5. MPA Management Plan
	B.6. MPA project proposal for Implementation
C. Government-owned database and monitoring systems is developed	C.1. Registration of fishermen and boats
	C.2. Monitoring and information systems and plans
	C.3. Fisheries technical assistance activities
	C.4. Development of ecosystem and rights-

Outputs	Activities
	based fisheries schemes and associated proposed regulations
D. Improved knowledge and understanding of the need to protect the marine environment and its role for livelihoods.	D.1. "Blue events" in the form of pride campaigns
	D.2. Marine environment stands at municipality festivals
	D.3. Fishing good practices regulations leaflet
COMPONENT 2	
E. Ecologically sustainable, economically viable and locally co-managed sustainable fisheries are developed in 7 coastal municipalities	E.1. Strengthening fishing associations
	E.2. Establishment/improvement of fishing stores
	E.3. Boat rehabilitation and upgrades
	E.4. FADs installation and/or other alternatives
	E.5. Marine products conservation facilities
F. Community-based eco-tourism initiatives are developed and consolidated	F.1. Development of the Port a Piment cave system as a tourism attraction
	F.2. Development of Fort Olivier/Anglais as a tourism attraction
	F.3. Development of Ile a Vache as a tourism attraction
	F.4. Development of Port Salut beaches as a tourism attraction

66. Terre Sud is structured on two main components:
- Component 1: supports governance in agriculture and forestry through dissemination of best practices and environmental education.
 - Component 2: covers community-based ecosystem management for improved well-being of mountainous and rural communities.

67. The focus of Component 1 is on (i) harmonization of natural resources' management approaches using the government-led planning mechanisms as a platform for best practices and dissemination of locally-tested and successful techniques; and (ii) awareness-raising and environmental education activities to promote sustainable practices and prevent destructive ones.

68. The focus of Component 2 is on (i) watershed rehabilitation through agroforestry, (ii) sustainable agriculture and (iii) agricultural value chain development.

69. The project has one main outcome: "sustainable vegetal cover through a rational use of soils for agriculture and forestry in South Haiti". This outcome was meant to be delivered by the following outputs and activities articulated in the project document:

Table 3- Outputs and Activities in Agroforestry and Landscape Rehabilitation Project Document

Outputs	Activities
Outcome A- Improved knowledge and understanding of best practices for ecosystems management and restoration among government planners, field officers (table sectorielle agriculture), and farm organisations	A-1- awareness raising and environmental education
	A-2- harmonization of natural resources management approaches using the government-led planning mechanism as platform for best practices and dissemination of locally tested and successful techniques
Output B- Sustainable agro-forestry practices providing economic value to environmental protection in an integrated manner	B-1- establishing forested buffer zones along the Macaya National Park
	B-2- establishing woodlots associated to cash crops to provide rational use and survival of trees
	B-3- stabilizing riverbanks through vegetation cover
	B-4- Implementing soil conservation techniques
	B-5- establishing commercial orchards combined with coffee plantations
	B-6- Top-grafting trees to improve production
	B-7- Seedlings produced in nearby nurseries
Output C- Sustainable agriculture approaches are promoted through staple crop and horticultural production as well as soil fertility	C-1- promoting use of improved seeds and optimal inter-cropping systems
	C-2-promoting horticultural production associated to innovate small scale irrigation schemes
	C-3- enhancing soil fertility through environmentally sound and innovative measures such as cover crops and inoculated seeds.
Output D- Agricultural value chain is developed through improvement of grain storage facilities and high value crops commercialization	D-1-improving grain storage capacity
	D-2- business skills training targeting women's groups
	D-3- providing technical assistance for commercialization of high value crops

C. Target areas/Groups

70. There are three levels of beneficiaries under the *Terre Sud* and *Mer Sud* projects. These include the local communities, civil society actors and national governments and

ministries. The National governments are by far the greatest beneficiaries of investment, time and on-going accompaniment and support.¹⁷

71. At the local level, project documents and UNEP Country Programme identify the beneficiaries in the *Mer Sud* project are fisherfolk communities, as well as those involved with “blue tourism”¹⁸ in the South Department. This includes fishermen and female fish vendors who bring the fish to market. One of the entry points of working with fishing communities has been to either work directly with fishing cooperatives (through PADI), or supporting the establishment of fishing cooperatives, as organisational structures that can help leverage fisherfolk interests, organise activities, mainstream awareness of sustainability related issues and have their own systems of enforcement of sustainable practices.

72. Beneficiaries, which were not highlighted in initial project documents, also include schoolchildren from educational facilities in the coastal zone who have received swimming lessons and educational programming on marine life and fisheries, as reported by Reef Check Haiti. These beneficiaries became incorporated as part of the programming due to adaptive management, and UNEP’s own considerations that the youth, who will later reside and work in the coastal zone areas, have to better informed about the marine environment they occupy.

73. Based on consultations, project documentations, and anecdotal account the evaluators can extrapolate that women beneficiaries were primarily addressed by the following measures:

- Women were direct beneficiaries of sustainable fisheries measures such as limiting catches of small fish near the coast. Regenerative measures such as allowing small fish near the coast to grow to maturity and reproductive stages, is anticipated to support women vendors in the long run, as the shortage of coastal fish negatively impacts women’s revenue. (*Mer Sud*)
- Improving fishing-related infrastructure: Building of the Port Salut fish market which facilitated buying and selling of fish in a centralised location. Support for measures such as refrigeration further helped women retain fish products for longer. The rehabilitation of fishing boats also had a direct impact on women from fishing communities, whose livelihood depends on selling fish. (*Mer Sud*)
- Girls were included for swimming lessons and public awareness campaigns on the marine environment, (but it is unclear whether there was a targeted number of girls). (*Mer Sud*)
- Grain storage facilities for corn and coffee established for seven women’s organisations with 40 members. Coffee is a high value product, which was selected to increase women’s revenue. (*Terre Sud*)
- Women’s organisations in production and management of grain storage were established and accompanied in organisational development. Through accompaniment of ORE (as supported by UNEP Country Programme) women’s organisations were assisted in opening bank accounts, managing funds, setting

¹⁷ PIMs Summary Mer Sud

¹⁸ coastal and maritime-related tourism

funds aside for emergencies as well as future cultivation/investments, and on-going costs. (*Terre Sud*)

- Those engaged in production of high-value green value chains particularly in the areas of plantain, mango, and avocados received training in sustainable agriculture. Anecdotally from the project partner it was reported that women's incomes increased as a result of these interventions. However it is worth noting that project documents do not include baseline incomes/revenues and added value of project so it is difficult to evaluate. It is also worth noting that ORE's project report outline relatively smaller number of female beneficiaries of training compared to men. (*Terre Sud*)
- Marketing strategies and market access was also enhanced through collaborations with *Association des Producteurs et Vendeurs de Fruits du Sud* (ASPVEFS) as reported by project partner. Given that it is women that are the vendors, access to markets is crucial for their livelihoods. (*Terre Sud*)
- It is anticipated that the planting of sustainable, fast-growing forests for the purpose of cutting, harvesting/selling for energy purposes, would assist women in the charcoal value chain as well as indirectly by preserving other forms of agroforestry which can provide food security and vegetal coverage (*Terre Sud*)

74. With regards to civil society, the UNEP Country Programme has a very unique way of working with organisations. While civil society institutions such as ORE and PADI are beneficiaries to the project, they are also project partners through which many of the activities are entrusted and carried out. UNEP thus plays the role of accompaniment and financier, but also supports in organisational capacity building, and is a recipient of civil society's services. Another indirect civil society organisation includes Konbit Pou Potapiman (KPP), which has participated in the management of the Grotte Marie-Jeanne.

75. In the project documents the UNEP Country Programme had identified project partners in the categories below. While this type of language was not replicated in other documentation it is useful to consider the categorization of partners, which influenced the project design, and which did, in fact, perform relative to these categories.

- Type 1- **Leading partners**: government institutions that played a leadership role in the execution of the project and were at the same time beneficiaries of its outputs
- Type 2- **Capacity-building and technical assistance partners**: institutions bringing specific expertise through local coaching, knowledge-sharing, and technical support
- Type 3- **Rapid impact activity executing partners**: beneficiaries contracted to carry out specific actions benefitting their own communities; any institutions using cash for work schemes hiring local people.
- Type 4- **Education & awareness-raising partners**: institutions with proven track record on education activities, awareness raising, or outreach (Reef Check Haiti, PADI, ORE)
- Type 5- **Access to Finance partners**: micro-credit, social businesses, local businesses willing to invest in initiatives. This was initially only part of the *Mer Sud* project design and required the involvement of Yunus Social Business. However, given the lack of deliverables provided by the organisation, this

relationship was ceased and activities were re-directed towards initiating an aquaculture project.

76. Local and decentralised central government ministries have been significant beneficiaries of the project. Specifically, UNEP has invested heavily with the MARNDR and MDE. One of the ways UNEP has sought to increase decentralised capacity is to embed trained staff within the ministries themselves. The funding has served to finance a position in MARNDR, with the aims of supporting project implementation, and in the long-run leaving the Ministry with competent staff that has a sound understanding of environmental issues, ability to manage stakeholders, and the technical knowledge and experience. Ideally, this is also meant to strengthen government at the central level for departmental personnel can directly feedback on regional issues to the capital. One staff within MDE has been financed to participate in ecosystems management of both projects. However, these positions are dependent upon project funding. There is no evidence to suggest that MARNDR or MDE have increased governmental budgets for this type of staffing, but there is evidence of other organisations (namely IDB), supporting these units.

77. According to the agriculture and environmental coordinators hired, government institutions have benefitted from research, data on fisheries, practices and beneficiaries, technical trainings, collection of marine information, expertise on establishment of PAs from the projects. Anecdotally, the project has supported MARNDR to strengthen its institutional framework, catalyse the socio-economic development of fisheries in the South, improve the commercialisation of marine products, and improve rational management of fisheries. MDE was supported primarily through the National Agency for Protected Areas (*Agence Nationale des Aires Protégées - ANAP*), on ecosystem management of fisheries, territorial planning, and role of stakeholders/beneficiaries in ecosystem management in the PAs.

78. The Ministry of Tourism has also benefitted from accompaniment. This has been mostly in the establishment of *Grotte Marie-Jeanne* as a tourism destination, and through the leveraging of funds from the IDB for the coastal zone in the South.

79. While the capacity gaps still remain significant, the type of accompaniment that UNEP has provided has resulted in trained and motivated staff at the departmental level, who is also able to work collaboratively with civil society organisations. In fact, one of the strengths of the project's approach is that it has been able to enhance the relationship between government and civil society organisations by accompanying both during project implementation. Some of the informal consultations that were held for this evaluation included MDE, MARNDR and PADI staff and there was a congenial, collaborative style of engagement.

80. While there has been active engagement at the local, regional and national levels, participation at the municipal level has been weak. This is primarily due to the fact that there is (i) perceived lack of legitimacy of the *mairies* (municipalities) by constituents—in some towns there are two mayors, some elected but considered less legitimate than those that have adopted the position due to political influence; and (ii) the capacity is extremely low. In this environment, UNEP has been unable to find a specific partner with which to work with in the municipal arena. *Mairies* are however always invited to participate in workshops, trainings and presentations and cordial relationships are maintained. There are indirect

ways in which UNEP has benefitted municipal governments. For instance, in helping to establish the cave *Grotte Marie-Jeanne* as an eco-tourist site, the municipal government has been able to recoup ticket sales, and has now become central to the discussion on how to maintain the cave and its surrounding areas. Municipal agents have also participated on discussions of the beach restoration of *Port Salut* under *Mer Sud*, and on activities under *Energie Sud*. The level of engagement is unclear. There is clearly an interest, but political challenges exist. In discussions with the UNEP Country Programme the plan for the future is to work with non-political staff in *Mairies* and build their capacities through future projects.

D. Milestones & Key Events during Implementation

81. The following timelines highlight the key dates and milestones that the two projects encountered:

Mer Sud	Terre Sud
<p>June 2013- Project commenced following a six-month delay due to internal consultations in UNEP. Logframe changes, PRC, changes to the activities and reviews by technical experts were the cause for delay.</p>	<p>June 2013- This was the start date of the project despite the fact that it was supposed to start in April 2013. Start date was changed due to delays in partner contract approval by headquarters. Due to timing delays, the first planting season was missed.</p>
<p>August 2013- PAs are announced through Presidential decree.</p>	<p>August 2013- PAs are announced through Presidential decree.</p>
<p>September 2013- Technical experts from UNEP and FAO were invited to visit Haiti to understand local context, and prevent further delays. FAO scoping mission was requested by UNEP headquarters, unfortunately this was also delayed which further delayed activities.</p>	<p>December 2013- First Steering Committee meeting took place. Due to the delays and the possible implications on the planting/harvesting, a new calendar of agriculture activities was developed by ORE.</p>
<p>December 2013- Partner contracts were signed</p>	<p>March 2014- Meeting/Review with Donor: Government of Norway</p>
<p>March 2014- Meeting/Review with Donor: Government of Norway</p>	<p>June 2014- Beginning of a severe drought period in the South. The establishment of woodlots and orchards which started in April with the onset of the rainy season had to be interrupted due to droughts.</p>
<p>December 2015- Project ends</p>	<p>December 2014- While crop production has been achieved, activities of planting seedlings (orchards, woodlots), and establishment of plots (forage, plants coverage for fertility management, annual crops, vegetables and traditional) were</p>

Mer Sud	Terre Sud
	<p>negatively affected by the drought in the region.</p> <p>December 2015-Project ends</p>

E. Implementation Arrangements

82. *Terre Sud* was managed by UNEP, with leadership for sub-components by the Ministry of Planning (*Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe*, MPCE), MARNDR and MDE. While the MPCE has significant responsibilities described in the project documents, in reality there is no evidence of any meaningful engagement or management by the Ministry. While the *Terre Sud* programme as a whole was managed by UNDP under the auspices of CSI, there was little apparent evidence of UNDP contributions to UNEP-led *Terre Sud* project.

83. Project Management Committees (PMC) were struck for both projects, which then reported back to the broader CSI Steering Committee. The composition of the PMCs included: UNEP, MPCE, MARNDR, MDE and ORE (ORE was for *Terre Sud* only) and PADI (PADI for *Mer Sud* only). Under *Terre Sud*, UNDP was invited to participate at PMC meetings but was not an actual member.

84. While the PMCs were meant to meet every three months to review progress, this happened every 4-5 months, in line with partner reporting, to identify challenges, and make management decisions. These were anecdotally described as working sessions rather than ceremonial steering committees. The more ceremonial structures are the CSI steering committee to which the PMCs reported to (elaborated upon in the umbrella report), however there is only one account of a CSI Steering Committee being held. That being said, the working sessions of the PMCs and the on-going collaboration of the partners meant that there was an on-going review of activities. For instance, under *Terre Sud*, when it was noted that a drought was taking place, some of the activities that were not susceptible to the drought were scaled up e.g., grafting and riverbank stabilization through ORE. Similarly, under *Mer Sud*, when it was felt that the partner organisation was not delivering on social business pilots, activities on aquaculture were initiated in partnership with MARNDR and PADI.

85. In terms of monitoring, for *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud*, in collaboration with the UNEP National Project Managers, each government partner (MARNDR for fisheries & agroforestry, MDE for marine resources and MPAs, MDT for community-based tourism) were required to submit a quarterly Progress Report to the appropriate *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* Management Committee.

86. In UNEP itself, *Terre Sud* and *Mer Sud* were implemented through DEPI/PCDMB through the UNEP Haiti Country Programme. The PCDMB branch of UNEP provided overall programmatic, technical and administrative support to the two projects. With respect to administration and financial management, the main functions of the PCDMB were to:

- Receive, review requests for payments, and generate the cable to UNDP or to the United Nations Office in Nairobi (UNON) to process payment.

- Review and provide feedback on the terms of reference and selection for the recruitment of consultants, prepare and issue contracts, and manage payments.
- Review, finalise and issue contractual agreements with partners for up to 100,000 USD.
- Manage payments to project partners.
- Update expenditure reports and budgets, control expenditure against budget and control cash against payments.
- Liaise with the Human Resources Management Service at UNON on recruitment and personnel matters.
- Liaise with UNOPS whenever required to facilitate the execution of its contract.
- Conduct an assessment of due diligence prior to the approval and issuance of contracts to new partners.
- Represent the project in UN circles, and share lessons learned with UN agencies.

87. The Haiti CO led the design of the *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* projects and activities in collaboration with its partners. It liaised directly with the Government of Norway (with PCDMB also negotiating from time-to-time) facilitated regular site visits, demonstrations, and consultations with beneficiaries and project partners, and leveraged funds. The staff (part-time) required for both *Terre Sud* and *Mer Sud* projects involved:

- a UNEP South Haiti Program Manager
- a UNEP National Project Manager
- National fishing community Liaison Officer (*Mer Sud* Only)
- a UNEP Local Governance and Community Liaison Offices (*Terre Sud* only)
- a UNEP-Government expert on Geographic Information Systems
- a UNEP National Communications Officer
- a UNEP Knowledge Management and Information Technology Support Officer
- a UNOPS-administered Communications and Operations Manager
- a UNEP administrative assistant based in Port-au-Prince

88. UNOPS has played a significant role in the operations of the projects. UNOPS provides a fully serviced office in Port Salut, with all logistical and security support, transport services, vehicles and boats, human resource management services for project staff, procurement services, and management services for contracts with a value below USD 100,000. The budgets of *Terre Sud* and *Mer Sud*, funded by the Government of Norway, covered the costs of the UNOPS Project Manager and the UNOPS Support Officer.

89. UNOPS enters into individual contractor agreements with international experts, local specialists and local support personnel. In the case of ORE for *Terre Sud* and PADI and Reef Check for *Mer Sud*, UNEP carried out a pre-selection and requested UNOPS to issue the contracts. There was a written understanding that UNOPS was not responsible for the performance of the contractor. UNEP was responsible for the qualitative aspects linked to performance, and UNOPS would trigger payments when technical milestones were met. All the support provided by UNEP projects to local partners is done through contracts with selected organisations, which includes items such as travel allowances or honoraria paid to compensate personnel of partner organisations for additional responsibilities and expenses incurred in the execution of project activities. These partner organisations submit reports on activities to UNOPS as well.

90. Reporting and accountability arrangements were designed as follows:
- Quarterly reports from project partners to UNEP who reviews qualitative reports
 - UNEP's Programme Information and Management System (PIMS) reports by the Country Programme Manager – this includes information on progress made in each project against approved outcomes, outputs and indicators and milestones
 - the primary lines of reporting and accountability are from CO team to the Country Programme Manager, and from the Country Programme Manager to the Operations Manager and the Chief at PCDMB in Geneva;
 - through PCDMB, the Country Programme Manager also reports to the Coordinator of the pertinent global sub-programmes (Disasters and Conflict, and Ecosystem Management) on progress made against the expected accomplishments and the indicators of the UNEP Programme of Work.

F. Project Financing

91. *Terre Sud* received USD 1,205,881 from the Government of Norway - from 19 May 2013 to 31 December 2015.

92. *Mer Sud* received USD 2.418M – Government of Norway - from 14 June 2013 to 31 December 2015.

93. Pro bono work was carried out by project partners during payment delays from UNEP. This work is reported as not having had extensive costs, but was mostly that of follow up and consultations of project partners with beneficiaries.

94. Both projects have according to the Fund Manager, spent what they were intended to, however, *Mer Sud* financial reports have still not been finalised at this time. The reason provided are the following: (i) UNDP has not provided final information on transactions made under *Mer Sud* when they advanced funds to UNEP Country Programme, and (ii) the reconciliation has not yet taken place (on expenditures and cash contributions) between the IMIS and UMOJA financial system in Nairobi.

95. For details on financial reports under *Terre Sud*, kindly refer to Annex 7.

G. Changes during implementation

96. The main changes under *Terre Sud* involved the following:
- A no-cost extension of the project to 2015. The rationale for this was that the project commenced with such delay that it impacted the planting season and limited the time for implementation. As a result the project deadline was extended to June 2015, and the project period lasted 27 months, although initially was planned for 24 months.
 - Slight changes were made to the logframe to adjust the expected results under Outputs A,B and C. These changes were due to the drought experienced by the *Département du Sud*. The project was unable to plant as many seedlings for orchards, woodlots, forage, annual plants as originally planned and had to re-adjust its planting calendar. As riverbank stabilization activities were highly successful, according to project reports, attention was turned to establishing three nurseries of fast growing trees—rather than one as was originally

planned—for riverbank stabilization. Further, top-grafting activities were so successful and in demand by communities that they were increased in project implementation, as is reported in project documents and PIMS reports.

- MPCE, which was identified originally as one of the main implementing partners, due to its lack of capacity, remained so in name only. It is unclear at this point whether there were any funds lost to this partnership being curtailed; there are however reports of time lost.
97. In *Mer Sud*:
- The completion date was changed twice, first to June 2015 and then to December 2015. The reasons for the change were (i) time needed to complete a feasibility study for the rehabilitation of the *Port Salut* beach; (ii) time needed to complete a South-South cooperation exchange to strengthen the expertise of marine governance structures; (iii) delays in the technical assistance provided by the FAO; and (iv) completion of two sustainable business plans for alternative coastal livelihoods
 - One of the project partners, Yunus Social Business, had to be removed from activities once it failed to develop a fish hatchery as planned and alternative activities (fish farms) had to be identified and carried out
 - Activities were adjusted to meet the realities on the ground, and UNEP headquarters' requirements. This includes aquaculture research by FAO partners, beginning the construction of fish farms, swimming and diving lessons for schoolchildren, and reducing the number of fishing associations to be targeted by the project.

III. Evaluation Findings

A. Strategic Relevance

Global Strategies

98. **Bali Strategic Plan for Technology Support and Capacity Building (BSP):** The work conducted under *Terre Sud* and *Mer Sud* are highly relevant to the Bali Strategic Plan, in that the projects support the capacity of governments to address their needs, priorities and obligations in the field of the environment. Through governmental accompaniment in terms of resources, training, and broader strategic advice, the projects seek to build long-term capacity. For instance, under *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* the projects funded the positions of two coordinators—one embedded within the Ministry of Environment and the other in the Ministry of Agriculture. Those hired were the first of their kind in government to receive training of marine resources management, and dedicated to the Southern coastal zone. In the baseline, there is no curriculum on marine science or management, which is why the training and accompaniment provided was so relevant.

99. Rather than hiring consultants outside of government, the projects have sought to integrate activities within governments by placing the consultants within ministries. This learning-by-doing approach is carried out with the assumption that trainings received (e.g. in the case of *Mer Sud* marine resources management, deep-sea diving, identification of marine resources, establishing a fisheries inventory, supporting the organisational

development of local cooperatives, and in the case of *Terre Sud* trainings on agroforestry, soil preservation, riverbank stabilization etc.) have the chance of staying within ministerial institutions. However, there is the risk that this knowledge can be lost if follow-up funding is not provided, and knowledge transfer within the governmental institutions themselves are unclear.

100. It is unclear whether coordinators will remain part of governmental staff (although there is evidence of other project funding) once UNEP Country Programme's support ends, but it is anticipated that the accompaniment provided will lead to some sort of policy outcomes, which will beget their own impacts.

101. The projects are also highly relevant to the BSP in that they support intergovernmental approaches and promote inter-agency coordination and cooperation. *Gouvernance Sud*, which is the third project in this package, seeks to tie the fieldwork and operations carried out under *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud*, and upscale them to governance structures. The *Table Sectorielle sur l'environnement*, established by the UNEP Country Programme, seeks to include all partners working in the South (national, international, local actors), to ensure communication, cooperation, and most importantly coherence among activities. While the Table Sectorielle is not funded by *Terre Sud* and *Mer Sud* per se, it is an integral tool for communicating efforts, advancing partnerships and enhancing relationships among ministries, which complements the two projects. Moreover, findings and information generated from *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* are shared in such fora.

102. There is also evidence that UNEP has included other UN agencies to collaborate according to their comparative advantage. For instance, the FAO was asked to provide methodological support in the fisheries sector under *Mer Sud*, under the request from UNEP headquarters. UNOPS is an on-going project partner, which uses its technical and administrative expertise to free up time that the UNEP Country Programme can invest in fieldwork. UNDP has been invited to participate in project management committees; while the quality of this partnership has not been optimised, there is evidence of efforts made under *Terre Sud* to increase communications and input. In fact, the "ridge-to-reef" approach that is espoused in the joint package of *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* appears to have been replicated in the UNDP-GEF project named "From Ridge to Reef" which has recently commenced implementation. *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* are thus **highly relevant** to the Bali Strategic Plan.

UNEP's Medium Term Strategy 2014-2017 and Aichi Biodiversity Targets

103. The following Table highlights how the projects are relevant to UNEP's Medium Term Strategy and Aichi Biodiversity Targets. Note: only the most relevant Expected Accomplishments (EAs) are included. Chemicals and Waste, for instance, are not included as the projects do not yield any significant impacts on that strategic focus. Also, relevant results are based on consultations, partner project reports, and UNEP Country Programme documentation. Not all results were observed first-hand. For instances the hectares planted or trainings provided are based on supporting documentation and anecdotal evidence.

Table 4- UNEP's Medium Term Strategy 2014-2017, Aichi Biodiversity Targets and Project Results

Expected Accomplishment	Aichi Biodiversity Target	Relevant Results under <i>Mer Sud</i> & <i>Terre Sud</i>
Climate Change		
Climate Resilience	Target 10 (Pressures on vulnerable ecosystems reduced), 15 (Ecosystems restored and resilience enhanced)	<p>Mangrove nurseries cultivated and planted for coastal rehabilitation and to build buffers against sea level rise and negative climate events.</p> <p>Resilient agroforestry promoted</p> <p>Rehabilitation of ravines with bamboo to avoid flooding during intense rain and storms</p>
REDD+	Targets 5 (Habitat loss halved or reduced) and 15 (Ecosystems restored and resilience enhanced)	<p>Terre Sud: The project contributed to afforestation/reforestation initiatives which although modest due to delays and limited time included the coverage of 743 hectares (through the plantation of 150,00 seedlings of fruit trees, 200,000 seedlings for wood lots,) and reforestation of 27 km of river borders/buffers through the planting of fruit trees, bamboo</p> <p>Sustainable woodlots planted with fast-growing species specifically for cutting and harvesting for fuelwood and charcoal</p>
Disasters and Conflicts		
Risk Reduction Response and Recovery	Target 2 (Biodiversity values integrated)	<p>Under <i>Mer Sud</i>, boats rehabilitated to protect fishermen's assets after hurricanes and storms in Port Salut.</p> <p>Under <i>Terre Sud</i> reforestation was carried out in watersheds to prevent runoff and coastal flooding, as well as to promote food security especially in times of climate catastrophes when it is difficult to travel to markets.</p> <p>During drought, resilient species were planted and three nurseries established</p>
Ecosystem Management		
Production	Targets 7 (Sustainable agriculture, aquaculture and forestry), 14 (Ecosystems and essential services safeguarded)	<p>While there were initiatives for establishing fish farms under <i>Mer Sud</i>, these are in no way viable yet, and there is no evidence to suggest that they support improved ecosystems management or alternative livelihood for people. These farms are at an initial phase of development and can be described as pilots in the area for fish farming.</p> <p>Under <i>Terre Sud</i>, sustainable agriculture trainings were provided particularly on beans, corn, sorghum, and plantains. Coffee and corn grains stocking</p>

Expected Accomplishment	Aichi Biodiversity Target	Relevant Results under <i>Mer Sud</i> & <i>Terre Sud</i>
		methods and techniques were disseminated.
Marine Issues	Targets 6 (Sustainable management of marine living resources), 7 (Sustainable agriculture, aquaculture and forestry) and 14 (Ecosystems and essential services safeguarded)	<i>Mer Sud</i> : Trainings on marine living resources <i>Terre Sud</i> : Community awareness increased on how activities in the mountains can impact marine environment
Enabling Environment	Targets 2 (Biodiversity values integrated) and 11 (Protected areas increased and improved)	Nine marine protected areas were identified and demarcated and recognised through a Presidential decree. The area under PAs is made up of 87,422 hectares
Resource Efficiency		
Enabling Environment	7 (Sustainable agriculture, aquaculture and forestry) and 19 (Knowledge improved, shared and applied)	<i>Terre Sud</i> : Extensive sustainable agriculture programming
Environment Under Review		
Information	19 (Knowledge improved, shared and applied)	Information on marine resources management, resilient agriculture is shared with local fishermen, farmers, governments. Deep-sea diving training is provided to government; school children receive trainings on the marine environment, and swimming lessons; public events are launched; the first phases of a fisheries inventory is initiated

Regional Strategies

104. Studies conducted on regional biological connectivity have identified the Southern Region of Haiti as an important contributor to stony corals larvae dispersal to territories of the neighbouring countries of Jamaica and Cuba. Haiti's marine resources thus have implications for Caribbean conservation of key regional marine connectivity areas for biodiversity.

105. The protection of marine resources under *Mer Sud* and through the reforestation activities under *Terre Sud* are relevant to regional interests. However, there is little evidence of engagement with UNEP regional entities. Other than providing project documents to the regional office, there is a lack of display of engagement to broader regional UNEP research or support to the Haiti country office. There was evidence of South-South exchanges particularly with Cuba, who has provided training in establishing the eco-tourist site and research of the *Grotte Marie-Jeanne*. There was also a South-South Cooperation exchange with Guadeloupe and St. Lucia to strengthen the expertise of the marine governance structures created.

106. While the goals and outputs of the projects are relevant to regional needs and interests, the capacity of the UNEP regional structures have not been sufficiently used, and

have not provided sufficient support on these projects. The projects are, however, **highly relevant** to regional needs.

National Environmental Needs & Issues

107. Although having a high potential for recovery, Haiti is currently the poorest and environmentally degraded country in the Western hemisphere, whose national economy depends mostly on agriculture, with production of coffee, mango, banana, corn, beans and rice being among the most significant crops. 66.8% of Haiti's land is devoted to agriculture, mainly small-scale subsistence farming on which two-fifths of the population depend for their livelihoods. The 2012 GDP was estimated at US\$ 771 per capita¹⁹ and more than 80% of the population living below the poverty line.²⁰ Haiti is one of the least developed countries (LDCs) in the world, with growth hampered by several political and environmental crises, including a devastating earthquake in 2010 that killed 250,000 and 1,550,000 people. It occupies the 161th rank out of 187 countries with a Human Development Index of 0.456 (HDI, 2012).²¹

108. In Haiti's mountainous terrain, forest conversion, combined with poor land use management, has resulted in significant environmental issues, which are worsened by severe climate events. Haiti is subject to frequent droughts and floods, often exacerbated by deforestation. The country is subject to climate variability and extreme weather events as it lies in the middle of a hurricane belt and is subject to an average of seven hurricanes and other severe storms each year. As the population is highly dependent on small-scale subsistence farming, this makes them even more vulnerable to the damage of from frequent natural disasters.

109. There are high levels of poverty in fishing communities, which is in part caused by past degradation of fisheries resources and the marine environment. The lack of alternative sources of income or employment, often keep people working in the fisheries industry, where there is persistent poverty, and decreasing fish stock.

110. Performance against the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) remains low; in the MDG Progress Index, Haiti is ranked 119 among the world countries.²² MDG4 (child mortality rate) and MDG5 (maternal mortality rate) shows some progress, though there has been negative progression related to MDG1C (halve the proportion of undernourished population), MDG6 (begin to reverse HIV/AIDS) and MDG7 (halve the proportion of people without access to safe drinking water). Current data is not available for MDG1A (halve the proportion of population in extreme poverty), MDG2 (achieve universal primary education)

¹⁹ World Bank. *GDP per capita (current US\$)*. Online. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD>

²⁰ Index Mundi, http://www.indexmundi.com/haiti/population_below_poverty_line.html, 2003 estimates.

²¹ UNDP, Human Development Report 2013, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/14/hdr2013_en_complete.pdf

²² Center for Global Development, available online at: <http://www.cgdev.org/page/mdg-progress-index-gauging-country-level-achievements> and http://www.cgdev.org/images/mdg_leo/HT.pdf

and MDG3 (achieve gender parity in schooling).²³ Financial resources devoted to the environment are among the lowest in the national budget.²⁴

111. The southern region contains more forest than any of the other regions in Haiti, but demand for energy (firewood and charcoal) jeopardises the integrity of this essential resource for soil protection and risk reduction, such as erosion and landslides. Given this national context, the projects' activities are highly relevant as they address food security (sustainable fisheries and agriculture), afforestation and re-vegetation (combating deforestation), response to disaster risk (stabilizing the coastal zone, increasing buffers to sea-level rise and reforesting ravines).

112. In terms of national plans and priorities, *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* demonstrate alignment with the following:

- *National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP)*- The NBSAP was never completed due to the suspension of World Bank operations in Haiti as a result of the elections of May 2000. Haiti is now in the process of developing its NBSAP and is participating in the UNEP-led Global Project "Support to GEF Eligible Parties (LDC & SIDS) for the Revision of the NBSAPs and Development of Fifth National Report to the CBD-Phase II". The NBSAP profile prepared prior to the suspension articulates a vision that links the future of the Haitian nation with the way local population plans to use the diversity of biological resources. This future, as identified in the NBSAP profile, to become sustainable, needs to integrate a management approach that reconciles Haitian people with their environment and satisfies their present needs without compromising the well-being of future generations. The NBSAP profile has retained five specific objectives: 1) to promote education awareness among the public and decision-makers on biodiversity issues, in order to increase their understanding on the interest to conserve Haitian biodiversity and recognise its contribution in the process of sustainable development; 2) to undertake immediate measures to stop biodiversity erosion in natural areas and ecosystems of Haiti; 3) to conserve biodiversity resources of the country; 4) to develop and implement ecological management approaches to preserve and use biodiversity on a sustainable manner; and 5) to implement institutional, legal and fiscal measures in support to biodiversity conservation and sustainable use of components of biological diversity (UNCBD). The National Biodiversity strategy guidelines also refer to decentralisation and encourage to "Promote a decentralising approach to manage biodiversity by strengthening the Haitian civil society and territorial agencies while building their capacities to take appropriate actions to conserve biological diversity and to facilitate sustainable use of biodiversity components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources" (UNCBD). *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* objectives and expected outcomes are in line with the objectives of the NBSAP profile as they sought to protect vulnerable ecosystems and biodiversity; develop protected areas; establish a code of use of fisheries and wood; and sensitise local populations on sustainable use of marine and agricultural products.

²³ Center for Global Development, available online at: <http://www.cgdev.org/page/mdg-progress-index-gauging-country-level-achievements> and http://www.cgdev.org/images/mdg_leo/HT.pdf

²⁴ Haiti MDG Objectives for 2015. Available online at: <http://www.ht.undp.org/content/haiti/fr/home/mdgoverview/>

- *National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA)*- Haiti's NAPA identifies climate related hazards (flooding, saltwater intrusion, changes in river morphology, drought and low flows, intense rainfall and cyclones) and the main human vulnerabilities and livelihood impacts (reduced agricultural production, water shortage or groundwater depletion, flooding, food security, water pollution, loss or degradation of land). *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* were particularly in line with the following NAPA priorities:
 - Priority 2: coastal zone management
 - Priority 3: Enhancement and Conservation of Natural Resources
 - Priority 4: Preserving and Strengthening food security
 - Priority 8: Information, Education and Awareness
- *National Action Plan (NAP)*- The NAP has led to many achievements in Haiti. However, Haiti's National Capacity Self-Assessment identified several capacity building needs that remain. These include: the identification of areas at risk of imminent or possible degradation; the identification and analysis of the impacts of land degradation; the mapping of degraded areas; the integration of issues related to land degradation in policies, laws and programs in place; the mobilisation of government and public awareness; the elaboration of NAPs themselves. *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* are relevant to the NAP through promotion of sustainable agriculture, which mitigates degradation, identification and establishment of protected areas, and enhancing local awareness of improved land management and cultivation practices.

113. The strategic relevance of the projects' activities and interventions to global, regional and national environmental issues and needs are thus rated as **highly satisfactory**.

B. Achievement of Outputs

114. This section examines and assesses the achievement of outputs as per the logical framework presented in the project documents. It is essential to note that **not all achievements have been observed by the evaluators**. Project documents by the UNEP Country Programme, project partners, PIMS reports, consultations with stakeholders, anecdotal accounts provide support for these claims.

Table 5 - Achievement of Outputs under Mer Sud

Output	Achievement	Remarks
A. Marine environment and fisheries governance structures in the South are developed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In 2014- MDE began to operate a PA management unit - 2014 in MARNDR a Fisheries & Aquaculture unit in the South fully staffed - 2014 MARNDR began to lead a Fisheries sub-table, and lead the agenda - In 2015 a South-South exchange 	Initial steps have been taken towards environmental governance, but one cannot state that environmental governance has been achieved. The baseline for fisheries governance in the South was very low before the project commenced. It is thus anticipated that it will take longer than two years to have substantial developments in governance

	<p>took place to visit neighbouring countries and share lessons on governance structures</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Trainings were provided to local fishing communities on how to improve their organisational structures - 3 action plans were developed in 3 coastal communities on sustainable fisheries practices (the plans themselves were not viewed/evaluated) 	<p>structures. What <i>have</i> been successful are the first steps in establishing fisheries-related units within ministries, public awareness initiatives with local communities, and the preliminary stages of community-based governance. For baseline information on fisheries see footnote.²⁵ It is thus more accurate to state that achievements have been made on planning and capacity building, which are essential elements governance, but the project has been unable to achieve a full-fledged environmental and fisheries governance structures as targeted in the project outputs. The evaluators consider governance to be the sum of legal, social, economic and political arrangements used to manage fisheries and the environment. It has international, national and local dimensions, including legally-binding rules as well as customary arrangements. It is noted that a two-year project where there is no baseline and severe governance challenges would be unable to achieve this. While the output may have meant that project activities would work <i>towards</i> governance, the way the output is currently phrased, has not been achieved.</p>
<p>B. Government-owned co-managed Marine Protected Areas Network with associated regulations is established</p>	<p>Nine marine protected areas are created through a Presidential decree.</p> <p>The sites of these MPAs and their boundaries are identified by the UNEP Country Programme in collaboration with partners, but these have not been demarcated in any way.</p> <p>Future phases of the Project will include management plans (as part of the <i>Macaya Grand Sud Project</i>)</p>	<p>The identification and recognition of nine MPAs were a fairly large achievement under this output. However, the project was unable to establish associated regulations given the two-year time period, and unrealistic expectations of achieving this in this time-frame. As a result we see management plans folded into other projects (Macaya Grand Sud, GEF-financed Ecosystems-Based Approach to Haiti's Cote Sud).</p>

²⁵ The governing regulations in fisheries includes The 1959 Fisheries Act of Haiti, which contains provisions for management, but none addressing fishermen, fisher organisations, fishing communities and other stakeholders to participate in the management of fishery resources. A draft Fisheries Management Plan (FMP) for Haiti was prepared in 1999 with the support of FAO, but it was not introduced due to a lack of funds. Fisheries are also addressed in MARNDR's investment plan for the agriculture sector development 2010-2016, which includes the fisheries and aquaculture sector. In it, MARNDR argues that current production level of capture fisheries, estimated at 15,000 MT/year, is not too far from the maximum sustainable yield, estimated at 20,000 MT/year. On the other hand, their strong focus is placed on the aquaculture development to increase from current production level, which is estimated to be 400 MT/year, to 25,000 MT/year.

	<p>but these are not carried out in this phase. Under the current project other no tangible enforcement mechanisms have been created to protect the PAs.</p>	
<p>C. Government-owned database and monitoring systems is developed</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - a scoping mission was established - a fisheries expert visited from the FAO - Methodology for fisheries database developed - some fishing cooperatives are beginning to generate data, according to anecdotal account from MARNDR, information is not being collected equally across all targeted communities - Software, data collection protocol 	<p>This output has the least amount of achievement in the project. A great deal of work is required before a database and monitoring system is established. Prior to even identifying the technology to use, the appropriate baseline information is required, and the methods of collection, monitoring, need to be formalised and mainstreamed across all communities. This output was far too optimistic given the time frame and the lack of fisheries monitoring to begin with in the baseline. Moreover there were significant project delays due to lengthy waiting times in commencing FAO/UNEP agreement, and in awaiting a Fisheries expert.</p>
<p>D. Improved knowledge and understanding of the need to protect the marine environment and its role for livelihoods.</p>	<p>Several public awareness activities were carried out for communities across the South according to various communications documents:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - World Environment Day events - Public events at Grotte Marie-Jeanne to inform people of the biodiversity of the cave - Swimming lessons for schoolchildren along with a training lesson on marine resources, their names and how to protect them, the role of marine ecosystems and the links between the mountain and the sea - Achim Steiner visit along with, Minister of Environment: information-sharing on the role of mangroves and ECO-DRR 	<p>There have been numerous public awareness activities that have been carried out under <i>Mer Sud</i> and <i>Terre Sud</i>. While evaluators can observe the <i>Grotte Marie Jeanne</i>, and some of the biodiversity infographics, it is difficult to assess how mainstreamed this understanding has become and how it is contributing substantial changes in the behaviour of people. One of the weaknesses in the monitoring work is to be able to note the substantial change in behaviour (either at household or community basis). Anecdotally, fishing cooperative from Port Salut reported a sound understanding of sustainable fisheries practices in Port Salut, but it is difficult to assess how widespread that is in other cooperatives. In terms of collaborations with Reef Check, it is easier to monitor how many children have passed their swimming tests and participated in marine resources education courses. In the future it would be interesting to see how this coordinates with school programming on the environment and complementary activities in children's communities. Overall, what is required is measurement of whether these public awareness</p>

		<p>activities are achieving what they seek to, and whether they are resulting in correlated behaviour changes.</p>
<p>E. Ecologically sustainable, economically viable and locally co-managed sustainable fisheries are developed in 7 coastal municipalities</p>	<p>3 Community-based action plans were developed to improve fisheries and coastal livelihoods (not viewed or evaluated)</p> <p>Fisheries livelihoods and practices, and safety measures improved in two communities.</p> <p>Two communities had fishing boats rehabilitated</p> <p>Two fishing stores were developed for two communities</p> <p>7 coastal communities received fishing gear promoting sustainable fishing</p> <p>Fish farm is established but not fully functional</p> <p>Rehabilitation of 72 boats</p> <p>Training of sustainable fisheries of units in MARNDR and MDE</p>	<p>There is some evidence of improvements in economic conditions of communities; according to PADI. However some of this has been attributed to the installation of Fishing Aggregating Devices (FADs) installed in a previous project funded by the Norwegian government. Other anecdotal accounts recount the use of motorized boats and the fishing market as contributor to growing revenue.</p> <p>What is missing from project documents and from the results achieved, is a clear articulation of a sustainable fisheries strategy. While achievements may assist in a better quality of life, or improved technologies to access fish, what is required is a more holistic approach to sustainable fisheries. It is unclear at this point how one-off markets, technical inputs contribute to sustainability in fisheries. It is understood that the baseline is very low, however an overarching vision is likely guiding (or should be guiding) the interventions on fisheries; this needs to be articulated and documented. Moreover, it is unclear how the interventions on fisheries will contribute to the sustainability of the MPAs. One can infer that greater technologies and resources will promote offshore fishing and the coastal zones, however, what other interventions along the value chain were conducted to promote this sustainability?</p> <p>There is evidence of training on organisational structure, leadership, techniques of fishing, and support on motor maintenance that has been provided to communities. However, once again, this has to be linked to a broader sustainable fisheries strategy that can be articulated through project documents, partners, and beneficiaries.</p> <p>A more rigorous baseline assessment is also needed (incomes generated, change in behaviour and practice, how investments have leveraged sustainable</p>

		actions) per community to assess exact impact.
F. Community-based eco-tourism initiatives are developed and consolidated	<p>Grotte Marie Jeanne established as a tourist site.</p> <p>Fort Olivier also established as a tourist site, but not fully operational.</p> <p>Port Salut Beach rehabilitation study conducted</p>	<p>While the Grotte Marie Jeanne was established as an eco-tourist site where people can learn about its unique biodiversity, it is worth questioning what the impact of heavy tourist use will have on the cave itself.</p> <p>The Port Salut Beach Rehabilitation study was carried out to respond to some of the local pressures on UNEP, and to protect a popular beach in the area, but has led to some contentious results discussed below.</p>

Table 6 - Achievement of Outputs under Terre Sud

Outputs	Achievements	Remarks
Outcome A- Improved knowledge and understanding of best practices for ecosystems management and restoration among government planners, field officers (table sectorielle agriculture), and farm organisations	<p>The lessons learned from Terre Sud on erosion control, sustainable land management, agroforestry, and sustainable value chain were folded into a Strategy for Grand Sud and provided to government and CIAT for regional planning development purposes.</p> <p>MDE/MARNDR engaged in trainings, practices of improved ecosystems management</p> <p>One person was selected per community to be a field officer and work with ORE so that there is on-going presence in the community.</p>	<p>Terre Sud has been effective despite drought-conditions to provide ample pilots, rehabilitation sites, nurseries and learning-by doing opportunities for field officers and decentralised ministry staff.</p> <p>The lessons learned which will be especially pertinent in the management of protected areas will be folded into future projects and have been submitted to the CIAT for incorporation in their regional planning</p>
Output B- Sustainable agro-forestry practices providing economic value to environmental protection in an integrated manner	<p>695 hectares of sustainable agriculture for commercial products including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -103 ha of beans - 569 ha of corn and 	<p>The only remark to be made here is that because baseline household level/community level financial information was not gathered, it is difficult to monitor the changes in</p>

	<p>sorghum - 10 ha of plantains - 13 hectares of manioc and velvet bean</p> <p>Trainings were provided on mango and avocado production and affiliations were established with ASPVEFS to bring the products to market</p> <p>7 women's groups were established for grain storage (coffee and corn).4 of the groups developed capacity of 3.33 metric tons of storage, while 3 developed 1.83 metric tons of storage.</p> <p>Trainings on sustainable land management practices with vetiver producers were carried out through Ayitika.</p> <p>7 nurseries established producing 243,000 seedlings</p>	<p>livelihood and economic conditions. It would be useful for future monitoring and evaluation activities to capture this.</p>
<p>Output C- Sustainable agriculture approaches are promoted through staple crop and horticultural production as well as soil fertility</p>	<p>956 hectares of land rehabilitated (which exceeded the original milestone of 875 ha) 537 ha of fruit seedlings planted; 201 ha of sustainable woodlots; 128 ha of grafting 8 ha of forage 13 ha of ravines planted for erosion control sustainable staple crop production carried out on: beans, corn, sorghum, plantains, velvet beans and manioc. Varieties were selected on the</p>	<p>High level of success on this output despite the drought and project delays. An interesting point will be how sustainable some of these initiatives will be and how they will concretely impact the land cover of the landscape. This cannot be assessed at this time due to the short duration of the project.</p>

	<p>basis of popularity of use</p> <p>Innovative techniques promoted include: drip irrigation, plant cover, pest-resistant plantain introduced</p>	
<p>Output D- Agricultural value chain is developed through improvement of grain storage facilities and high value crops commercialization</p>	<p>2 key value chains benefitted from training (mango and avocado producers training and linkages to market); grain storage for coffee and corn was established; pest-resistant plantain promoted and used</p>	<p>Linkages to markets are significant, particularly for women. Anecdotally some of the women engaged with grain storage were able to report back that they saw a dramatic increase in their income, were able through assistance from ORE able to open bank accounts and establish procedures whereby funds can be re-invested in future initiatives. However, this was a very small sample of consulted women, and aggregate information is needed. Access to capital, particularly for women, is a challenge and these processes help create some financial buffers and support future planning.</p>

115. Overall, *Terre Sud* had a higher achievement of outputs than *Mer Sud*. One of the challenges for *Mer Sud* is that the outputs are at too high a level for a two-year project, where the baseline was very low. It is very challenging, for example, to set up a fisheries governance system, or fisheries monitoring system, when there was practically no work being carried out on an institutional level on fisheries in the South, prior to CSI. Perhaps if the project duration was longer, one could observe more concrete results of some of the investments made. However, despite the duration, the project design phase should have taken into account the short duration and identified outputs that were feasible under that timeframe.

116. *Mer Sud* did have the significant result of the declaration of marine protected areas. However, it is worth noting that there were no management plans, physical demarcations or enforcement capacities established under *Mer Sud*. Other than the declaration and text for the decree, all the activities to reinforce the status of protected areas are to be carried out in other projects (GEF EBA, *Macaya Grand Sud*). On one hand this raises sustainability issues, for if the actual demarcation, identification and enforcement of the PAs is to happen in other projects, it raises questions about *Mer Sud's* ability to maintain results beyond project duration. On the other hand, it highlights the deliberate planning by UNEP Country Programme to identify PAs with the plan for them to catalyse resources, interest and future

projects, which as it appears it has managed to do with a number of projects. In fact, at the time of writing a new GEF LDCF project, whose project proposal is being developed, will also seek to strengthen the PAs.

117. *Mer Sud* also did not manage to demonstrate how it was to achieve alternative livelihoods. While the fish farming project was piloted under this project, it is very much at a base level and the strategy of how this will be an alternative, rather than additional income, has yet to be shown. The livelihoods aspect of this project did not sufficiently come through in project documents and in consultations. Project partners mentioned that people's livelihoods were increased through rehabilitation of fishing vessels, and through the Port Salut fish market and refrigeration (parts of the fish market is now in disrepair impacting the structure created by UNEP), however there were no concrete figures or accounts to represent this shift or increase in livelihoods.

118. One aspect that both projects could have benefitted from would have been a more rigorous livelihoods assessment at the baseline level to be able to compare results. As both projects seek to enhance people's livelihoods while promoting sustainable practices, it is necessary to be able to document and observe the changes in people's/communities' circumstances. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence by farmers and fishermen, but it is necessary to compile this in an aggregate and comprehensive way to monitor progress on livelihoods.

119. Overall, it appears as though the results under *Mer Sud* are preliminary outputs, which require years of follow up work. Given that the project was being implemented in an environment of extremely low capacity, no real baseline projects, during a short duration, the project design should have reflected this. It would have been preferable for the project to be framed in terms of planning and capacity-building rather than governance and livelihoods, which the project did not deliver on. Rather, results from *Mer Sud* have laid some of the groundwork, particularly on building partnerships, which future projects and initiatives can be built on.

120. Under Output F, a beach rehabilitation study was commissioned by the UNEP Country Programme. To provide some context, *Port Salut* is one of the more attractive beaches in the *Département*, which attracts a fair number of national tourists for festivals and holidays. Port Salut is also the municipality in which the UNEP Country Office has its main offices. One can assume that while UNEP implements activities throughout the department, there is also a pressure to demonstrate to the local community that they are improving the environmental conditions of the municipality in which they reside. The beach, however, is rapidly eroding due to climate and human behaviours (erosion, people taking sand for construction purposes, construction of roads and homes too close to the coast). With support from the Ministry of Tourism and the municipality, a beach restoration study was undertaken, the results of which are disputed. The Ministry of Tourism which has partnered with IDB for project for tourism enhancement of the Southern coastal zone, find the recommendations for what is a relatively small beach, too expensive and too extensive, and would like to commission a second study, despite the UNEP Country Office backing the initial study. While the outcome of this will take place outside of the context of this project, it is interesting to note the dynamic and interplay among the various stakeholders. The evaluators were also privy to observe discussions on this matter at the *Table Sectorielle sur l'Environnement*, which demonstrates how this mechanism (initiated by UNEP) can also

serve as a space to present differing opinions. As the IDB will be the partner to invest in tourism in the South, their buy-in will be essential to advance this work.

121. *Terre Sud* performed despite delays and the drought. The agile work of UNEP CO and ORE in reorienting activities, and demonstrating adaptive management, was significant in achieving a high level of success. However, it is unclear from consultations and reviewing partner project reports, to what degree beneficiaries understand the needs of terrestrial ecosystems and how to support them through their livelihood activities. There have been numerous trainings conducted, hectares planted, but the shift in public awareness and how that should be measured has not been documented, despite there being numerous accounts of beneficiaries understanding the initiatives. The question of documentation is crucial.

122. Moreover, while there have been anecdotal accounts of improvements in livelihoods, it is unclear exactly how much of an economic value investments from *Terre Sud* have really brought for its beneficiaries. In future projects, it would be useful for project partners to elaborate ways in which they will monitor and measure the results from the projects. While project reports have detailed many of the quantitative results e.g. number of seeds planted, number of trainings, types of varieties planted etc.... additional qualitative data is required which would highlight the socioeconomic impacts of interventions, unintended consequences, the shift in people's attitudes and awareness, how new knowledge is to be managed and shared within the community, how gender roles are impacted, and where progress has been made within a given value chain, and where hurdles remain.

123. An additional aspect that was missing from looking at the outputs and results achieved is how the project is to account for market distortions, when strengthening particular value chains. For instance, will the production of certain goods saturate the market and decrease prices in the long run? Will certain types of resilient products edge out other producers? Has there been any economic analysis on the optimal level of production of a given value chain to enhance people's livelihoods and benefit ecosystems without saturating the market? Some of these questions have been referred to in the *Green Economy Study* led by UNEP and funded primarily by the European Union (EU) with supplemental resources from the Government of Norway. However, these questions have not been treated in interim project documents.

124. One of the achievements highlighted by project partners in *Terre Sud* was the planting of ravines to limit the amount of runoff from mountains to communities below. It was observed by the evaluators that bamboo was being used to do this. This raises questions about the species that are being used under *Terre Sud* and begs the question whether UNEP has applied the proper environmental safeguards with regards to exotic species being planted, managing possible invasive species, and why indigenous and native plants have not been exclusively used. It would be useful for future projects to highlight what safeguards will be applied.

C. Effectiveness: Attainment of Project Objectives and Results

Review of the Reconstructed Theory of Change (ToC)

125. A Reconstructed Theory of Change is presented in the umbrella report in Section III C. The Theory of Change is applicable both to the entire portfolio of UNEP's activities in Haiti, and to sub-projects Mer Sud as well. The umbrella report notes the following:

126. The reconstructed ToC includes the following elements:
- one long-term goal (expected impact), enunciated as: *sustainable development and resilient livelihoods and economic growth in the Grand Sud of Haiti through ecosystem management, integrated development planning and participatory governance*;
 - four impact pathways, with a number of activities and inputs under each pathway:
 - strengthening planning and governance
 - organisational development and capacity planning
 - technology development, transfer and promotion
 - increased and facilitated access to and use of information
 - six outcomes

Direct outcomes from reconstructed ToC

127. The reconstructed ToC identified six expected outcomes:
- an integrated approach and structure for territorial planning and governance designed and functional in *Grand Sud*
 - governance structures for critical natural areas, resources and sites established (e.g. marine protected areas, Macaya National Park, coastal fisheries, cooperatives, producers' associations)
 - identified environmental risks reduced and resilience increased
 - green economic opportunities, value chains and sustainable natural resource use generated and promoted for the economic empowerment of local communities
 - access to energy increased in environmentally and economically sustainable, and socially equitable, manner
 - capacity of national institutions (especially the Ministries of Agriculture and Environment and the *Comité Interministériel d'Aménagement du Territoire - CIAT*) in integrated planning and environmental management enhanced
128. The following table highlights the achievements of *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud*, relative to the Outcomes presented in the Reconstructed Theory of Change:

Table 7- Achievements of Project Relative to TOC Outcomes

Outcome	Evaluation of achievement
<p>An integrated approach and structure for territorial planning and governance designed and functional in <i>Grand Sud</i></p>	<p>Engaging different ministries (MDE, MARNDR, MDT, MPCE) to collaborate together on questions of sustainable fisheries and marine resources, and resilient agriculture. Including these parties on the PMC, trainings, are means to promote an integrated approach to environmental governance, which includes perspectives from different ministries. In the future phases of this project, there are plans to create a shared office space of key stakeholders in order to synergise activities on the PAs. However, no clear laws, regulations, management plans came out of these particular projects.</p> <p>Identification of the PAs as a result of Mer Sud and Terre Sud is the first step in territorial planning of these vulnerable ecosystems and sites—Presidential decree.</p>
<p>Governance structures for critical natural areas, resources and sites established (e.g. marine protected areas, Macaya National Park, coastal fisheries, cooperatives, producers’ associations)</p>	<p>Rural producers’ associations supported, with reported, anecdotal, livelihood benefits (e.g. grain storage), but no evidence of role in governance of critical areas, resources and sites</p> <p>Fishing cooperatives and associations supported and strengthened, with reported anecdotal livelihood benefits (e.g. fish markets, boat repairs), but benefits not necessarily resilient or contributing to sustainable fisheries. Only anecdotal evidence of role in governance of critical areas, resources and sites by cooperatives.</p>
<p>Identified environmental risks reduced and environmental resilience increased</p>	<p>Agro-forestry activities as well as plantations in and along ravines to reduce risk from flooding and landslides, but no measurable evidence available. Also non-native exotic species used in some of these interventions.</p> <p>Coastal nursery established, with native species, and training provided to ministry personnel, nursery managers and civil society organisations</p>
<p>Green economic opportunities, value chains and sustainable natural resource use generated and promoted for the economic empowerment of local communities</p>	<p>According to project partner reports, strategies for the development of high-value crops (avocado, coffee) in the buffer zones of protected areas formulated, and collaborations established with commodity groups.</p> <p>Reports document seedlings of tree crops produced and distributed</p>

Outcome	Evaluation of achievement
	<p>Reports document fishing boats repaired and rehabilitated</p> <p>In person viewing of the fisheries market in Port Salut constructed (but currently impacted by disrepair in other parts of the market)</p>
Access to energy increased in environmentally and economically sustainable and socially equitable manner	Woodlots established to grow fast-growing species for energy uses and as an alternative to deforestation. Intervention is too recent for tangible results, but anecdotally there is strong demand from communities to carry out this work (also being replicated in numerous other projects).
Capacity of national institutions (especially the Ministries of Agriculture and Environment and the CIAT) in integrated planning and environmental management enhanced	Trainings on marine resource management, diving, sustainable agriculture, managing stakeholders, reporting and monitoring. Difficult to assess though how mainstreamed these trainings have been within national institutions, and what impacts this will have on the long-term capacities of these organisations.

Likelihood of impact using ROTl and based on reconstructed ToC

129. As stated in the umbrella report, the reconstructed Theory of Change also identifies a number of intermediate states that provide the basis for the assessment of the likelihood of impact. These intermediate states are as follows:

- the *Grand Sud* region is moving towards a shared vision of development
- new legislation and institutional arrangements for regional planning protected area management and fisheries governance are (or are likely to be put) in place
- public, private and civil society actors recognise and take advantage of new and enhanced livelihood and energy access opportunities developed by projects
- the instruments developed are known and used (or very likely to be used) by other agencies at local and national levels.

Intermediate state	Assessment	Likelihood of impact
<i>Grand Sud</i> region moving towards shared vision of development	Mer Sud and Terre Sud have promoted a shared sense of understanding over marine and terrestrial resources and the importance of sustainable practices through community interventions in cooperatives, agricultural associations, students and small units in <i>departmental</i> ministries.	In and of themselves the projects are not likely to have a long-term impact, however they are part of a suite of projects and activities that build upon one another. The <i>Macaya Grand Sud</i> is already advancing some of the work initiated in this phase. In collaboration with the other activities (Norway-funded,

Intermediate state	Assessment	Likelihood of impact
		<p>GEF, Agence Française de Développement - AFD) the likelihood of impact is quite high. This phase has initiated the process through declaration of nine PAs, but without any regulatory or management plans in place.</p>
<p>New legislation and institutional arrangements for regional planning, protected area management and fisheries governance in (or likely to be put in) place</p>	<p>Presidential decree was made with regards to identifying the 9 protected areas in the South. New elaborative legislation was not produced under <i>Mer Sud</i> or <i>Terre Sud</i>. However, one can argue that it is the work under these projects e.g. establishing of PAs which has catalysed future work i.e. ANAP drafting text for management of PAs (has already had one mission with the Cubans in 2015 on potential text suggestions); text has also been drafted (by the CIAT) to provide a new legal and institutional basis for regional planning, with establishment of regional planning authorities (<i>autorités régionales d'aménagement</i>)</p> <p>The ANAP is also in the process of establishing a decentralised office to support protected areas in the <i>Grand Sud</i> with support from UNEP Country Office and IDB.</p> <p>Under the <i>Macaya Grand Sud</i> project, the CIAT has been mandated to lay the groundwork for new coastal management legislation</p>	<p>The catalysed actions as a result of <i>Mer Sud</i> and <i>Terre Sud</i>, reflect a high likelihood of impact. This statement however has to be considered in light of a suite of activities that are planned for follow up. At the time of writing, the <i>Macaya Grand Sud</i> Project has already been developing a management plan, the GEF-supported Ecosystems-based Approach Project already includes activities for establishing climate resilient management plans throughout the South and the GEF-supported <i>Cross Cutting Capacity Development Project for Implementation of MEAs</i> (CCCD) seeks to enhance environmental governance. If the political climate is favourable, and the suite of activities catalysed by <i>Mer Sud</i> and <i>Terre Sud</i> are considered, than there is a high likelihood of impact.</p>
<p>New and enhanced livelihood and energy access</p>	<p>Under <i>Terre Sud</i> communities are planting sustainable woodlots for alternatives to charcoal, however initiatives</p>	<p>Anecdotal accounts by project partners suggest that these will be taken on provided the costs are low and that</p>

Intermediate state	Assessment	Likelihood of impact
opportunities recognised and taken advantage of	are too recent to document results.	successful, alternative livelihoods can be provided. However there is no documented evidence of how many people are turning to sustainable energy sources as opposed to traditional ones in the <i>Mer Sud Terre Sud</i> project zones.
Instruments developed by CSI known and used by other agencies at local and national levels	<p>Lessons learned from <i>Mer Sud</i> and <i>Terre Sud</i> have reportedly been collected and developed into Strategy for the Grand Sud and shared with CIAT for regional planning purposes</p> <p>The Protected Areas identified under <i>Mer Sud</i> and <i>Terre Sud</i> are integrated into ANAP's listed of protected sites.</p>	There are on-going initiatives with regards to managing the protected areas (Macaya Grand Sud, GEF projects, regional planning documents, a shared office by inter-governmental ministries and NGOs for MPA management), which suggest a high likelihood of using the methodologies, lessons learned, and partnerships used under <i>Mer Sud</i> and <i>Terre Sud</i> , especially as these are used as baseline projects in most of the project documents for new projects.

130. This review of outcomes towards impact concerns the combined Mer Sud project. The reconstructed ToC allows the outcomes and intermediate states to capture the aggregate outcomes of both projects.

Table 1: Outcomes towards impact – ratings²⁶

Outcomes ²⁷	Rating	Intermediate states	Rating	Impact	Ratings	Overall
An integrated approach and structure for territorial planning and governance designed and functional in Grand Sud	B	<i>Grand Sud</i> region moving towards shared vision of development	C	Sustainable development and resilient livelihoods and economic growth in the Grand Sud of Haiti through ecosystem management, integrated development planning and participatory governance	BC	The overall rate is moderately likely
Governance structures for critical natural areas, resources and sites established (e.g. marine protected areas, Parc National Macaya, coastal fisheries, cooperatives, producers' associations)		New legislation and institutional for regional planning, protected area management and fisheries governance in (or likely to be put in) place				
Environmental risk reduced and resilience increased		New and enhanced livelihood and energy access opportunities recognised and taken advantage of				
Green economic opportunities, value chains and sustainable natural resource use generated and promoted for the economic empowerment of local communities		Instruments developed by CSI known and used by other agencies at local and national levels				

²⁶ See Annex 6 of the Terms of Reference (in Annex 2 to this report) for the methodology and rating scale for outcomes and progress towards 'intermediate states' (with a scale from A to D)

²⁷ These are the outputs in the reconstituted ToC

Access to energy increased in environmentally and economically sustainable and socially equitable manner					
Capacity of national institutions (especially the Ministries of Agriculture and Environment and the CIAT) in integrated planning and environmental management enhanced					
Rating justification: see section above		Rating justification: see section above			

131. The overall likelihood of impact is established at *moderately likely* for three main reasons (i) the success of the impacts of *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* are highly dependent on the success of follow up projects, which is a substantial risk; (ii) the instability of the political environment adds uncertainty to the way things may progress; and (iii) many of the interventions under *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* are preliminary interventions, the first of their kind in the baseline. Substantial work is required to mainstream/upscale those activities.

132. One aspect of effectiveness that has not been captured in this section is that of effective leadership and management, which led to many successes under the *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* projects. It is worth noting that part of the reason the initiatives have been successful is that they were led by manager that had:

- technical knowledge and experience on Protected Areas
- a sound understanding of the Caribbean context and its ecology
- ability to work in the field and at the national political level
- ability to establish a non-hierarchical relationship with project partners

133. This is important to note as the leadership in Haiti is not just a question of personality but requires the technical and social know-how to navigate a very complex political and environmental landscape. Technical expertise is particularly relevant as for many project partners, particularly for those in the government, as they often do not have baseline environmental training required for effective ecosystems management, and advice and guidance is sought from UNEP Country Programme.

D. Sustainability and Replication

134. Haiti is a fragile state with an uncertain political situation. Government structures are highly dependent upon international donors and support, and while this creates frustration and competition among ministries and sectors, there is an implicit fear that without financial support much of the government would simply collapse.

135. This creates an interesting challenge for organisations such as UNEP that are attempting to build capacities, providing resources for staffing and organisational structures, trying to strengthen environmental governance all the while knowing that if they exit shortly, many of their investments would be lost. There are evidently some elements of the projects which could potentially be sustainable e.g. beneficiaries could not un-learn the technical skills they received from the projects such grafting, sustainable agricultural methods, grain storage, swimming, diving, or information about marine resources, provided what they have learned continues to benefit livelihoods.

136. However, it is difficult to claim how sustainable most of the outputs would be *ceterus paribus*. It is also clear that despite certain aspects of sustainability, the fact is that resources are required to maintain structural and long-term changes. In order to assess sustainability of these projects, as stated in the umbrella report, the evaluation will assess the extent to which: (a) external factors have been taken into account in design and execution, (b) specific outputs and outcomes are, and will be, as sustainable as conditions permit and (c) strategic actions have been taken to mitigate the impact of these external factors.

137. In terms of **external factors**, the most significant factor is that the projects recognise the level of capacity and resource shortage that exists within the Haitian government. Capacity gaps

and weaknesses are well captured within the project documents as accompaniment and the learning-by-doing approach is embedded within every output of both projects.

138. The presence of the UNEP Country Programme office in the field, particularly of the two technical consultants working on *Terre Sud* and *Mer Sud*, further demonstrates the understanding of the UNEP Country Programme of the fragile context, the on-going challenges and needs of stakeholders, and the need for face-to-face accompaniment on a regular basis.

139. Another element that supports sustainability is that the UNEP Country Programme directly puts local organisations in the centre of implementing activities. This means that even in the future, if UNEP is unable to carry out this work, it has helped organisations such as ORE, PADI and now Reef Check Haiti foster legitimacy and recognition in the South. In fact, many of the more remote beneficiaries at times do not know that projects have been carried out by UNEP, but know of the local organisation that is assisting them. In a sense, this has a more long-term impact on the social fabric and social cohesion of communities, and local counterparts, which contributes to the sustainability of their work.

140. Moreover, in carrying out activities in partnership with local organisations, the UNEP Country Programme has been able to support the organisational development of these entities—some of these have reportedly been able to leverage larger funds and support from other organisations. In working with UNEP Country Programme, these organisations have had to conduct monitoring and evaluation activities—and these have been useful exercises for their own organisational development, although this needs further development..

141. There are two key factors with regards to the design of the project, however, that do not lend themselves well for the sustainability of the projects. This includes (i) short duration of the project and (ii) unrealistic outputs in the given timeframe. It is understood that the UNEP Country Programme had little choice in the length of time the projects were to run; the timing was determined by the donor, and UNEP Country Programme had to fit their goals and objectives within that timing. However, the short-term project based approach does not work well with the deep fragility of the Haitian context. It is worth mentioning that such short-term approaches i.e. two years to transform governance structures of marine resources or rehabilitating agroforestry and landscape, in all likelihood can only initiate the preliminary stages of what it is seeking to achieve.

142. Projects carried out in spurts can have negative impacts on project partners, stakeholders and beneficiaries who may have long waiting times between project cycles, thereby losing momentum, credibility and interest from participants. This point was raised by one of the project partners who stated that qualitative, social-organizing type of work such as supporting cooperatives or farmer organisations are particularly negatively impacted when there are delays, especially when they require support during their formative stages. Anchoring work from project to project with differing donors and differing expectations can disrupt the flow of activity. However, the evaluators recognise that this is not something that UNEP Country Programme can wholly control.

143. Project duration is also a challenge when working on issues related to agro-forestry, which requires a minimum amount of time for planting and growth. As was witnessed in the *Terre Sud* project, administrative delays with UNEP headquarters led to missing of the planting season. While a certain amount of seedlings were planted and the project cycle was extended to 2015, the fact remains that risk factors are harder to manage in a short-project period where there is not sufficient time for adaptive management and changes. In the future it is recommended that two-year project

cycles be avoided. It is also difficult to measure the success of agro-forestry interventions; results are mostly based on the amount of planting, trainings, seedlings, and hectares covered—not necessarily on how many of those plantings survive/thrive given environmental and social constraints. Short project cycles thus limit the effectiveness of monitoring and evaluations.

144. The second element of design, which poses a challenge to sustainability, is a lofty set of outputs, particularly under *Mer Sud*, which were not well suited to the duration or the location. Given that the baseline capacity in the *département* is very low, it is unrealistic to imagine that environmental governance or livelihoods can be augmented in this context. This may create unreasonable expectations for partners, donors, evaluators and lead to lost opportunities. If instead the project was framed in terms of coordination and planning, there could be greater emphasis on formative, baseline activities, which would improve the likelihood of sustainability of the projects over time.

145. Similarly in the case of *Terre Sud*, there is an emphasis on improving livelihoods. While there is anecdotal evidence of improved incomes for particular beneficiaries, there is no documentation of how substantially practices, and behaviours, have changed, which makes it difficult to ascertain how sustainable the practices will be. There is documentation on numbers of training, but there is data missing on how those trainings have resulted in environmental resilient agroforestry.

146. In terms of the **strategic actions that UNEP has taken** to address sustainability factors, the UNEP Country Programme has constantly fundraised for future phases of the project. In a sense, the only way to consistently advance on progress made is to ensure resources are available for the environmental management in Haiti. The work of the Country Office thus entails that in addition to conducting fieldwork, maintaining partnerships with stakeholders and beneficiaries, they must constantly be seeking/fundraising for resources to finance future work, and those finances are only committed when substantial results are demonstrated in the field. For instance, as the culmination of *Terre Sud* and *Mer Sud* led to the articulation of nine PAs, the *Macaya Grand Sud* (financed by Norway) was proposed as a next phase to put in a place a management plan in one of the PAs (Macaya), and to create zones of sustainable economic activity in buffer zones. Similarly a project approved by the GEF “Ecosystems-based Approach to Haiti’s Cote Sud” was developed and approved to establish climate-resilient management plans in the PAs, identify a new MPA (Jeremie) and pilot sustainable livelihood activities in the PAs, as a follow up to the baseline work carried out under *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud*. Similarly on the governance side, UNEP has leveraged funds from the GEF-supported *Cross-Cutting Capacity Development Project for MEA implementation*, which attempts to concretise some of the governance structures e.g. Integrated Coastal Zone Management Office, which can also be considered as a latter phase of *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud*.

147. There is consequently a logical flow between projects. While separate donors may impose their own restrictions/demands upon the type of activities that they would like to see, the CO is able to create an integrative link between the various activities whether it is through using the same project partners, working in adjacent geographic sites, utilizing the mechanisms established under one project (e.g. table sectorielle), as vehicles for follow-up projects.

148. The other step UNEP Country Programme has taken to improve chances of sustainability is to begin the devolving of tasks and responsibilities during the project cycle itself. One such example is that of the *Grotte Marie Jeanne* in Port-a-Piment. While, UNEP was instrumental in identifying the cave as having eco-tourism potential due to its unique biodiversity and geological features, (UNEP Country Programme also arranged for a Cuban delegation to provide trainings on how to manage

such vulnerable sites, identify biodiversity), practical management of the cave by the end of the project was in the hands of the local communities. It is the local staff/communities as supported by the KPP and the local *mairie* themselves (in addition to UNEP resources) who are managing the day-to-day functioning, the selling of tickets, the managing of tourists. While the tour guides received training from UNEP support, they are now able to respond to tourists' needs independently. Anecdotally, the staff also reported that decisions are made through participatory community processes. The site now receives busloads of tourists particularly during national holidays.

149. The devolving of tasks to local partners also assists with the learning-by-doing approach and is able to give the UNEP Country Programme an idea of which local actors can thrive and provide on-going support. For instance, under *Terre Sud*, originally the project had Yunus Social Business as a major project partner that would carry out activities. When it became clear that the partner would not be able to deliver activities, and was also unable to use UNEP Country Programme accompaniment as a means to deliver, their role had to be removed from the project. The Country Programme is fully aware that none of the project partners are fully capacitated when the relationship begins, but needs a basic level of commitment, growth, accompaniment and initiative to be able to progress on project results. By working in tandem with organisations, those entities that demonstrate serious deficiencies, issues with financial accountability, and other high risks, can be identified. This prevents sustainability issues down the road with mis-managed organisations, and ensures that the more committed and demonstrably sound organisations continue to work in the region beyond the project duration.

150. Another strategic choice, which improves chances for sustainability, is investment in social structures of local communities. In *Mer Sud* the project invests heavily in strengthening fishermen's cooperatives so they are better organised to tackle unsustainable methods, and under *Terre Sud* farmer's associations/producer groups are trained. This reflects the UNEP Country Programme's understanding of the context—Haiti is reported as having one of the strongest fisherfolk organisational systems in the CARICOM region and approximately 52% of fishermen are reported to be members in some type of fishermen's organisation.²⁸ Leveraging social structures and influence for sustainable changes can at times be more effective than laws and regulations that no one knows about. Although the results of the initiatives cannot be qualified at the time of writing i.e. how successful and established are cooperatives in managing their fisheries and community concerns, the approach is an interesting one.

151. Both *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* take stock of the organisational culture of the country. As well, the projects demonstrate that sustainable practices are far more likely to be taken on, if the community takes them on and has had an opportunity to discuss options, and test practices. Instead of focusing on individual beneficiaries, by focusing on collectives, projects have a greater chance of seeing results at a larger scale, and of being integrated into cooperatives' practices. As was witnessed by the *Port Salut* fishing cooperative for instance, once the cooperative decided to no longer fish small fish near the shore to allow for regeneration, the entire cooperative discussed the reasoning and eventually identified that this was a practice for their own good. One of their challenges now is fishermen from outside of the community and cooperative that come and fish in shallow waters.

²⁸ Mateo, J. & Haughton, M. *A Review of the Fisheries Sector of Haiti with Recommendations for its Strengthening*. 54th Gulf and Caribbean Fisheries Institute. 2003. Page 67

152. The sense of local ownership that the projects have instilled through working with local organisations, communities and empowering partners to work as equals, supports sustainable outcome at the local level. However, one must be aware that if the UNEP Country Programme were to pull out immediately after *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud*, project partners would suffer. Both the main partners, PADI and ORE existed prior to UNEP CO's involvement in the South, and would likely continue to do so, but it is unclear whether they would remain in the *Département*. As reported by ORE for instance, they came to work in the region due to UNEP's request.

153. Based on the strategies employed under *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* in a fragile and uncertain context, the methods and strategies employed by the project make them sustainable in a challenging context.

154. In terms of replication, the strengths of the project (working with local partners and organisations, capacitating governments through a learning-by-doing approach and supporting decentralised and regional ministerial staff) have already been replicated under the *Macaya Grand Sud* project, and in the design of three UNEP GEF projects. The lessons learned regarding partnerships, as well as the need for maintaining agreements with UNOPS for improved administration, are folded into future projects.

155. One can also observe some elements of the UNEP Country Programme's approach reflected in other agencies' projects. As stated earlier the terrestrial and marine relationships highlighted and espoused through the aggregate work of *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud*, is now embodied in the UNDP-GEF Ridge to Reef project. IDB is also now conducting a project in an adjacent region to cover one of the PAs identified by UNEP (*Aquin St. Louis*). The FAO and UNDP are currently in the process of developing a new GEF project and have vocalised interest in situating it in the South. All of these initiatives are using Protected Areas as a rationale for working in the South. Further, while the UNEP Country Programme identified Fort Olivier as an eco-tourist site under *Mer Sud*, it is now IDB that will develop the management plans in its project. Similarly, once there is agreement on the beach restoration activity in Port Salut, IDB will take on the initiative, which was initially identified by the UNEP Country Programme.

156. There is thus great potential for the work under *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* to be upscaled and replicated.

E. Efficiency

157. This section will assess the cost-effectiveness and timeliness of project execution. In order to do so however, it is worth noting that there are two levels of efficiency that have to be assessed relative to *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud*.

158. The first is the efficiency on the ground by the UNEP Country Programme and its project partners, in administering project activities, responding to challenges, applying cost-or-timesaving measures to bring the project as far as possible in achieving results.

159. There is also a second level and that is of UNEP outside of the field. This is especially pertinent, as most of the decisions, funding requests, and payments need to come from PCDMB and headquarters. The structure outside of the country office has a significant role to play in the efficiency of project implementation on the ground.

160. On the ground level, the following observations can be made:
- The UNEP Programme is lean. There are only two permanent staff members and the rest are made up of consultants who for the most part have been on staff for many years. Although this may have other implications (potential inequalities with local staff), a small team conducts a great deal of work which provides a great deal of cost saving.
 - There has been on-going adaptive management in the projects to avoid activities/partners that are headed for failure. In the example of *Mer Sud*, the French *Institut Français de Recherche pour l'Exploitation de la Mer* (IFREMER), which had expertise in a different domain than was needed, was removed as a main project partner so that funds could be invested with partners that could provide more strategic support. In the case of Yunus Social Business, when it became apparent that it would not be able to deliver and was not in line with the principles of the project, *Terre Sud* sought to replace those activities. This avoids the loss of investments, and is another cost-saving measure.
 - UNEP works with local communities on the ground, thus avoiding excessive travel costs on their part. Instead of large civil society organisations based in Port-au-Prince, the project partners are present and able to respond rapidly to community needs. This avoids time delays and transportation costs.
 - UNEP's office is in Port-Salut, which allows for rapid travel to implementation sites, and on-going communication with stakeholders and beneficiaries without added costs or time lags.
 - In order to ensure smooth and rapid administration, UNEP shares an office with UNOPS, and relies on them for their security, administrative and procurement expertise for a 7% agency fee.
 - One key inefficiency that can be observed in the implementation of the project is the lack of an FMO on the ground. The amount of time in relaying/receiving financial information, as well as the inaccuracies, revisions could all be avoided if there was a financial person in the field office. Moreover the country office needs to have flexibility to react quickly to crises e.g. droughts, floods, and hurricanes. An FMO on the ground, or increased financial flexibility in the country office could speed the process by which funds could be freed for emergency measures.
161. In terms of the broader UNEP context and how it impacted the efficiency of *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud*, the following is to be considered:
- For *Terre Sud* there were three months of delays to issue contracts for project partners. Three months in a two-year project is a significant amount of time and this made the project reportedly miss a planting season, and create stress for project partners and beneficiaries.
 - Under *Mer Sud*, the PRC process reportedly took six months, which delayed the project start date, and created significant tensions with counterparts who had to wait. There was also no focal point at headquarters that was monitoring and following up on this file, which allowed the delays to happen, and key experts in the EM programme area were consulted with delay. It was also challenging for counterparts in the field to understand how internal UNEP processes can take six months, which creates an image problem for UNEP.
 - In addition to delays from PRC, headquarters insisted that an FAO fisheries specialist carry out a scoping mission; however FAO at the country level does not have the fisheries experience required, and a specialist was requested from Rome which further delayed the scoping mission and activities.
 - There were delays in the Terminal Evaluation of these two projects. The funding for this evaluation is thus coming out of *Energie Sud*. An earlier evaluation and key lessons learned could have helped the development of GEF, AFD and other Norwegian-funded projects.

162. These issues had significant impacts on the project. Every project partner that was interviewed during the course of the evaluation stated that the greatest challenge in working with UNEP were the delays that took place in Geneva and Nairobi. Contracts and documents that were reportedly signed within days in a complicated country like Haiti, took months at headquarters. Fortunately, the relationship of trust and partnership is very strong with the UNEP Country Programme and many continued working with the expectation that their contracts would resume. However, it is undeniable that this exposes the project, the UNEP country staff, its project partners, and its beneficiaries to inefficiencies and high risks.

163. To manage the risks, it is recommended that the chain of approvals (finances, documents, contracts) be re-examined, and simplified. In essence, the UNEP Country Programme operates as a project, but to be able to do so it requires some monetary flexibility to respond to risks and opportunities in efficient ways. Going through both Geneva and then Nairobi through an un-streamlined process, means delays, and potentially loss of opportunities and interest on the part of stakeholders. To remain efficient the structures surrounding the project also needs to be dynamic and tightly run. Perhaps one of the recommendations is to house an FMO in the country, and allocate a portion of the project budgets to UNEP Country Programme itself for its functioning. The business-as-usual approach that headquarters has towards its work does not fit with the field presence or project approach, that by nature has to be lean and responsive.

164. There was also a lack of knowledge of these two projects at headquarters, which may have contributed to the delays on the ground. Inefficiencies can result when there is a lack of knowledge of what is required at a field office, particularly when that is not the norm for UNEP. It is encouraged that there is improved communication between headquarters and Haiti CO and more site visits from headquarters.

165. UNEP managed some of these inefficiencies by building a strong relationship with UNOPS and maintaining its cordial relations with stakeholders. In particular, with UNOPS, there is a very clear division of labour based on the institutions' comparative advantage. UNEP Country Programme deals with the donors and stakeholders, and UNOPS takes care of all the logistics. The UNEP Country Programme also manages the deliverables and compliance with contracts and terms of reference, and then UNOPS makes payments based on milestones met, puts the call out for proposals and issues contracts. This strengthened relationship emerged from the inefficiencies faced under *Terre Sud* and *Mer Sud*.

F. Factors Affecting Performance

Strategy and Approach

166. UNEP's Strategy in the Haiti *Grand Sud* Region seeks to address the following threats and barriers:

- Terrestrial and marine biodiversity loss
- Severe land degradation (topsoil loss) and water scarcity
- Isolated, small, poor communities with no access to basic services
- Energy poverty and low levels of investment and infrastructure
- High vulnerability and exposure to natural hazards
- Low/no capacity to establish, manage, monitor
- Lack of access to sustainable, resilient livelihood options in the broader ecosystem

167. In particular, the UNEP Country Programme's strategy of intervention comprises five main pillars to support sustainable development and resilient economic growth:

(1) *Biodiversity & Protected Areas*- Identify, establish and manage protected areas (marine and terrestrial) in Haiti Grand Sud Region

(2) *Green Economy and Value Chains*- Reinforce existing natural resource-based value chains and create new income-generating activities in the Grand Sud region

(3) *Natural Protection and Risk Reduction*- Restore natural protection barriers and protect population and economic activities near riverbanks, river mouths, and shorelines in Haiti Grand Sud Region

(4) *Sustainable Energy and Renewable*- improve access to sustainable energy in the Haiti Grand Sud Region through enhanced governance and education, renewables and rural electrification as well as sustainable cooking and heating fuels and solutions.

(5) *Regional Planning and Governance*- Develop a Grand Sud Regional Plan to guide private and public investment and consider biodiversity values, ecosystem services, environmental health issues and sustainable energy.

168. According to the aforementioned tenets of UNEP's strategy, *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* comply, in principle, with the UNEP Country Programme's strategic approach, based on the logical frameworks underpinning the projects. Other than the development of renewable energy (which is covered in *Energie Sud*), are included in the logical framework, although as reflected in Sections III. B. on *Achievement of Outputs*, not attained. In a sense, both *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* provide the preliminary stages— research, capacity building, coordination, planning, strategies' articulation— required to address the broader vision of the programme.

4.

169. Another strategic decision which has impacted the results of *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud*, is that of housing the office in Port Salut, and living in proximity to those being served by project activities. Although there is criticism of housing the main office outside of Port-au-Prince, particularly outside of the melee of UN agencies, the evaluators observed the legitimacy that the UNEP Country Programme has with project partners. The UNEP Country Programme is seen less as a donor, in a traditionally hierarchical relationship, and more as a partner working in common cause for the advancement of the South, which will ultimately benefit the rest of the country.

170. Living in the same area where the interventions are held, also means that the UNEP Country Programme is sharing some of the realities of residing in the South and is held accountable by the beneficiaries and stakeholders that they are surrounded by. Sometimes that also means that the Country Programme must demonstrate its value added to the local population in more than conceptual activities. For instance, under *Mer Sud*, the UNEP Country Programme helped build a fish market in Port Salut. In this circumstance, by living in the community, the Country Programme realised that it had to move beyond fisheries regulations, and refrigeration and supporting cooperatives, but also providing the infrastructure for members of the community to gather and buy and sell fish. This was particularly relevant to the women of the market who had a place to sell fish in proximity to where it was caught, and in proximity to the other markets, which allowed them more customers. Unfortunately, during the last visit it was noted that the market had fallen into disrepair, due to a climate event, which had disrupted the female fish sellers once again, and which raise sustainability issues.

171. Unfortunately, this strategic decision can also add local pressures on UNEP. For instance the *Port Salut* beach restoration project, which is framed by the UNEP Country Programme as a part of its resilience building, is also in part informed by living in the *Port Salut* community and observing

the impacts. This project has however, not been endorsed by the Ministry of Tourism and IDB who are project partners on this initiative.

172. Another core part of UNEP Country Programme's approach is working with local organisations. As mentioned in the section on *Sustainability*, this builds the legitimacy and confidence of local organisations, provides organisational development to project partners and allows Haitians to work with Haitians, which positively impacts social relations and social cohesion. It also is a promising tactic to ensure long-term sustainability.

173. A strategic choice in both *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* was to focus on governance while trying to improve ecosystems—this was mostly carried out through *Gouvernance Sud*, which was operating concurrently. At times, this is particularly taxing given how low the capacity in governmental ministries is and also how regional ministerial staff is sometimes regarded vis-à-vis staff in the capital (with less influence). Throughout *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* however, constant efforts to improve relationships with ministries and capacities of ministerial staff, are reported, which is seen as a crucial preliminary step for effective governance. However, this is not always recognised by the staff in the capital. As was noted by one staff member of a branch in the Ministry of Environment, the central ministry at times was unaware of what the UNEP Country Office did vis-à-vis protected areas, and what projects it is advancing in the South. When a follow-up question was asked with regards to the fact that there is MDE staff on the ground that is accompanying the projects and whether there are structural channels of communication where such information can be shared, the response reflected that the MDE has communication challenges. Thus, while the UNEP Country Programme may be investing heavily in building up certain branches of ministries, the impact may not be felt across the department, and in fact the capacity may be so low, that colleagues may not be accessing/optimizing the appropriate information being generated.

174. One very interesting strategic choice that was made during *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* was the focus on identifying and declaring the marine and terrestrial protected areas. As becomes apparent when one reviews the documentation and the follow up projects that have emerged, the PAs have become galvanising structures through which other key issues will be addressed in other projects: sustainable use of ecosystems, improved livelihoods of local people, resilient agriculture and agroforestry and sustainable fisheries. It is difficult to ascertain whether this was the best avenue to take strategically, however it is apparent that the declaration of these PAs has catalysed substantial political interest and international funds. Not only did the PAs receive a Presidential decree, the South was then hailed a development priority. As for funding, the establishment of PAs that are now included in several projects has catalysed support by the Norwegian and French governments as well the GEF. It will take another few years to observe how these entities function and whether they become sustainable, but at this time it is useful to note that they are strategic loci of environmental action in the South, and in Haiti as a whole. *Mer Sud*, however, was unable to establish boundaries, legislation and management plans for the PAs.

Design

175. There are several problematic aspects to the design of *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud*, some of which are tied to donor expectations. The first, for instance, is the separation of these two projects (and others under CSI) that is somewhat arbitrary. The projects are highly complementary to one another; many of them share project partners, and cover territory that is adjacent to one another and impacts one another. To be a truly coherent project, both projects would be a single programme with the recognition that activities on the terrestrial landscape impact the marine side,

and vice versa. The way the projects were implemented it is apparent that that was clear to the UNEP Country staff, however, this does not emerge in the project documents.

176. Having *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* as discrete projects creates more work in terms of reporting, finances, cash flow, and administration. A programmatic approach would save on those costs and on time. The use of PAs as a central locus of action to galvanise change around, also supports the need for integrating *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* on paper.

177. A second point that may also be linked, and was referred to earlier in the section on *Sustainability*, is the short duration of the projects. While the project documents were approved both by internal UNEP processes and the donor, it is difficult to achieve all the anticipated results in a two-year period—particularly in a fragile state, one that is prone to severe climate events and that has such low capacity.

178. Another point, also highlighted in the *Sustainability* section, was the unrealistic logical framework and outputs described at the onset, particularly in *Mer Sud*. Given the low capacity, the lack of existing programming and the political challenges, environmental governance and livelihoods building could not be achieved in this project duration and place. Instead the outputs should have reflected the preliminary stages required in establishing a livelihoods baseline, capacity building, coordination and partnerships. The achievement of results would have been far greater and this would have supported future programming and projects in a more incremental way. *Mer Sud* should have been more focused on planning and coordination, rather than achieving high-level results on governance and livelihoods.

179. The gender approach is not treated sufficiently in the project design. While some women beneficiaries are referred to, this is done in a cursory manner without a substantial baseline to compare to. While several baseline studies are referred to in the project documents and justify the description of activities, the information on gender is sorely missing. In order to truly capture possible impacts on women, baseline data on women in the area must be collected. Broader social impacts of women's participation in project activities are missing, and a vision of how incremental changes will impact systemic relations is also not referred to.

180. An aspect that is missing in the project documents is a detailed risk analysis. While the UNEP Country Programme and its project partners may have a very clear idea about different kinds of risks that exist and how to manage them, this needs to be captured in documentation for new staff, for donors, UNEP headquarters, and for other agencies working in Haiti. For instance, some of the delicate balancing that the UNEP Country Programme achieved vis-à-vis project partners that were removed from project activities needs to be captured in a risk analysis for future work.

181. The risks, in particular, to unintended consequences are not treated in the document. These are vital as Haiti is a fragile state with some levels of social unrest. For instance, if project outcomes benefit one community over another, what will the impacts be? If certain modes of production lead to saturating the market with a particular good or commodity, how will this impact other people in the community/value chains? If some fishermen have motorised vessels and can access bigger fish, and others cannot, how does this impact fishermen community? What if a community wishes to be beneficiaries to a project but there are not sufficient resources to include them, how does this impact social cohesion and project success? How does one decide which communities are added as project beneficiaries when vulnerability is prolific and everywhere in the department? Do increased benefits from project interventions negatively affect communities in any

ways or alter power dynamics? These are all examples of issues that need to be addressed in future risk analyses.

182. While beneficiaries are key to project design and are described in project documents and apparent through project activities, the rationale of why certain communities were selected rather than others is not clearly outlined. While the majority of the South is composed of vulnerable people with precarious employment, and highly dependent on natural resources, a clear targeting strategy would be useful. In discussing why certain communities are selected and not others, a conversation on social risks that this entails would also be useful.

Communications and Public Awareness

183. The UNEP Country Programme provides annual factsheets with updates on each project; a newsletter called *Bulletin du Sud*; the self assessment and substantive progress report (UNEP 2015b); the website of the *Délégation du Sud*; the online library; the joint reporting by UN agencies active in the South; as well as a Facebook group which reflected the activities under *Mer Sud*.

184. UNEP also hosted numerous public awareness campaigns around World Environment Day, pilots and demonstrations with local community members. However, there is no data available to demonstrate how these public awareness activities resulted in a shift in community or individual behaviour.

185. South-South exchanges were held particularly with Cuba in the design of *Grotte Marie Jeanne*, and in collaborations with ANAP to share lessons learned on PA management. A technical study visit with members of Haitian government, civil society and UNEP Country Programme members were held with Guadeloupe and St. Lucia.

186. Knowledge management, however, is not clearly articulated in the design of the project documents, and how these will support UNEP's work in headquarters. It is also unclear how the units trained and accompanied by the UNEP Country Programme, will translate the capacities acquired back to their central ministries.

187. The communication within UNEP itself appears to have some gaps, where there appears to be a lack of knowledge of the projects and what they have achieved. There is data and knowledge generated in these two projects that would be useful to several different branches of UNEP, and this flow of information needs to be facilitated somehow. Moreover, an improved understanding of these types of projects by UNEP would perhaps benefit the logistical, administrative and financial sectors to respond to needs on the ground.

188. The value added of a regional office has not been fully explored. There are on the ground experiences that would be relevant to the regional office. The regional office in turn could provide guidance perhaps on methodological approaches to sustainable fisheries or livelihoods analysis.

Country Ownership and Drivenness

189. *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* are both led by the UNEP Country Programme. It is through assessments conducted and commissioned by UNEP CO that the South was then noted as a vulnerable region with valuable ecosystems that required protection. This process was not

government-led. Rather one can observe the government declaring the area a priority after UNEP started working there.

190. While in most cases this would indicate a lack of ownership and drivenness, consultations indicate otherwise. Project partners appear to be heavily involved in the project and shaping its activities, according to consultations. For instance, ORE determines where to plant, what to plant, which community to work in, with consultation with the UNEP Country Programme. Similarly, PADI identifies which cooperative to work with and how to frame its activities and consults and informs the UNEP Country Programme. In the case of ORE, a local technician is identified in every community they work in, and this person provides on-going accompaniment to his or her fellow community members, according to consultations. This indicates that often the face of the project, for local communities, is a representative in their own community, and local civil society actors.

191. This supports buy-in and initiative on the part of local communities. After all, the UNEP Country Programme has chosen the partners it works with because they have greater knowledge of the local culture, organisational structures, and in their areas of technical focus. In many instances, they can thus shape day-to-day activities while UNEP provides an overall structure, responds to donors, and frames the project's architecture. Obviously, there is no question that UNEP has greater influence in terms of managing the funds, and determining which partners to work with. However, given the unique relationships that the Country Programme has been able to carve out, partners feel empowered and shape projects as they are carried out. Working sessions carried out every 4-5 months assist in this process. What is missing however is the *documentation* of stakeholders' input in project design. It would be useful to append minutes in future project reports.

Financial Planning and Management

192. In terms of financial planning and management, there were delays and inaccuracies in expenditure reports and budget updates. Part of the challenge is that this work is carried out in Geneva, with very broad UNEP categories, whereas the Country Programme needs a rolling budget with specifics to be able to monitor closely how much funding they have available for each expenditure line. In order to address this, the UNEP Country Programme began to use their own excel budget, which is a duplication of work with what is happening in Geneva and adds further work for the staff in the country office. A financial person in the Country Programme would be very useful.

193. A new financial, administrative system UMOJA was only introduced near the end of the project cycle, however it had wide-ranging impacts, such as delays in paying consultants and partners. During the *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* project cycles, anecdotally, no training was provided to the administrative assistant in the CO on how to use the system, and the Geneva PCBMD office also received very little support in dealing with the challenges of the system, and there was a delayed response from head office in responding to requests for clarification and support.

194. From the project reports and consultations it appears that proper processes and transparent methods were utilised. However, to mobilise funds, the UNEP Country Programme did have to enter into agreements with UNOPS and UNDP for access to funds due to delays from UNEP itself.

195. One could argue that the baseline work initiated under *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* has leveraged other funds. In particular the following projects, which directly address the PAs have leveraged the following resources:

- GEF-funded “Ecosystems-Based Approach to Haiti’s Cote Sud”: USD 6,216,000 (approved by GEF, implementation to begin Fall 2016)
- GEF-funded Less Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) Project, un-named and in process of development: approximately USD 6,000,000
- Macaya Grand Sud: USD 9,047,530
- Other projects in preparation but not yet approved with final figures: project currently being finalised with AFD, and Green Economy and Waste project (to be submitted to Norway)

196. The extreme financial challenges are illustrated by the fact that the Mer Sud financial reports have still not been finalised or completed. Part of the reason is due to the challenges of reconciling information between IMIS and UMOJA, and the unavailability of technical staff/resources to carry this out.

UNEP Supervision, Guidance and Backstopping

197. The UNEP Country Programme received adequate support and supervision from PCDMB, although improved financial/expenditure reports and budget revision processes would have supported the Country Programme additionally.

198. On-going technical support is required from headquarters on UMOJA. The regional office (Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean - ROLAC) was sent project reports for information. In future iterations, a more active relationship can be sought.

199. Financial information was provided with delay. PRCs took an excessive amount of time and anecdotally staff is often unavailable at headquarters to reconcile financial data. A point-person/expert was not identified at headquarters to assist through the PRC process, and often recommendations (such as having an FAO country expert help with fisheries, even though the FAO team in Haiti does not have a fisheries expert), was incompatible with realities on the ground.

Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)

200. On the monitoring end, one of the challenges in working with several local partners is to mainstream the way in which data is collected and then reported. The UNEP Country Programme, in working with project partners has managed to develop budget templates and reporting requirements that project partners have learned to comply with and respond to. While the project partners report back on information such as how many seeds have been planted, or kilometres have been planted (ORE under *Terre Sud* for example), there is a lack of rigorous information on the human indicators in the baseline e.g. original incomes of people, means of livelihood, gender disaggregated data and then impacts on those people.

201. There has been a lack of staff in the UNEP Country Programme dedicated to monitoring and evaluation within the country office and in guiding partner organisations' monitoring practices. However, one of the lessons learned of these projects was the need for monitoring and evaluation staff, whose staffing is currently underway. It is worth noting that all monitoring activities conducted by the UNEP Country Programme are 100 per cent funded by the donor. If the donor does not allocate funding for monitoring positions (in addition to the other activities they fund) there is no seed finding available by UNEP. This creates a limitations and constraints on the scope of M&E activities.

202. In terms of evaluations, while the projects allocated insufficient funding for these, the terminal evaluation is not being funded by the budgets allocated under *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* due to delays and lack of planned resources. Instead, funds are being used from the evaluation budget of the *Energie Sud* project, which demonstrates insufficient funds and a lack of efficiency in carrying out the evaluations.

203. The evaluation has also been delayed. While the Country Programme requested to undertake a terminal evaluation in a timely fashion (with reminders in the fourth quarter of 2014 and 2015), headquarters did not commence the terminal evaluation process until 2016.

204. The UNEP Country Programme reported back on progress of the projects through the Programme Information and Management System (PIMS). While reviewing PIMS summaries there were some notes in project reports stating that text had disappeared; this reflects the lack of reliability of the system. Either PIMS has to be better utilised or an improved monitoring system should be established with more detailed notes and remarks.

III. Conclusions and Recommendations

A. Conclusions

205. *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* are part of an innovative set of activities, in a geographic context where there was very little international development activity. By focusing in a limited, and highly vulnerable environment, the UNEP Country Programme seeks to build resilience—both of ecosystems and livelihoods. *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* are complementary projects, which sought to respond to this, by addressing terrestrial and marine ecosystems, and associated livelihoods.

206. Both projects contributed to planning and capacity building by initiating many of the roles, collaborations and communications among relevant stakeholders. Civil society organisations have been key players in implementing activities and liaising with beneficiaries. Significant investments have been made into Ministerial capacity, particularly of agriculture and environment, to highlight the importance of protected areas and vulnerable ecosystems.

207. Under the project, the UNEP Country Programme managed to establish constructive, non-hierarchical relationships with partners and beneficiaries, who took an active part in shaping and administering project activities. The staff is dedicated, flexible in responding to arising challenges and appreciated by local partners.

208. The projects were implemented in the face of many challenges, which include operating in a fragile state-context, on-going political transitions and instability, climate crises, a slow-responding UNEP organisational structure causing delays in payments, reviews of documents and issuing of contracts.

209. The projects were highly relevant to the national context as they sought to address livelihoods in a region where most of the population lives below the poverty line. The projects also sought to target ecosystems that are regionally relevant due to their globally significant biological diversity. The projects were in line with various international priorities and in particular with UNEP's Medium Term Strategy 2014-2017.

210. While achievements on planning and coordination were attained, and the declaration of nine marine protected areas was issued, *Mer Sud*, did not produce the outputs it was set out to. Part of this was due to an unrealistic project design, which could not be carried out in the two-year project duration. Another reason was the lack of baseline capacity that required the project to initiate activities at a base level. For that reason, it would be more useful to structure/observe *Mer Sud* as a planning and capacity-building project, rather than a governance and livelihoods project that can only come at a latter stage of development. However, as it was construed as a governance and livelihoods-focused projects, *Mer Sud* was unable to meet the outputs and expectations articulated in project documents.

211. In addition to the challenges listed throughout the document and addressed in the forthcoming section on *Recommendations*, one of the key improvements that could be brought to future iterations of *Mer Sud*, and to the UNEP Country Programme as a whole, is a clear sustainable fisheries and livelihoods strategy. This would require aggregating information from baseline assessments, monitoring and implementation activities in other projects, to a more coherent approach. While sustainable fisheries is a programmatic goal and included in the *Mer Sud*, the activities carried out under this umbrella did not appear to contribute to a long-term sustainable fisheries system, and appear rather to be short-term supports to fishing communities, such as rehabilitating vessels, initiating small-scale fish ponds, and improving technologies and markets for fisherfolk communities.

212. One of the more long-term approaches encompassed within *Mer Sud*, was the focus on working with local communities and strengthening fishing communities' social structures such as cooperatives. This approach takes into account the organisational culture of communities, and recognises the potential value of local governance. However, this process is at a very preliminary level, and will require substantial follow-up and accompaniment after the project duration, which raises questions of sustainability. There is also a lack of documentation on qualitative social

supports, such as the accompaniment provided to cooperatives and collectives. It would be useful to capture in future documentation, what type of governance was achieved at the association level, and how it was achieved, as well as what elements worked and failed, and whether some communities were more successful than others, and for which reasons. The notion of building up cooperatives is notionally very positive, however monitoring and outcomes of these interventions would be very useful.

213. Under *Terre Sud*, which achieved many of its quantitative objectives, a rigorous analysis is required to aggregate benefits on people's livelihoods, and how these activities translated to resilient impacts on ecosystems services. While many of the initiatives were carried out despite the drought, and contract delays, it is worth investigating what type of environmental safeguards are in place to monitor the types of non-native species that are being planted, how invasive species are being contained, what type of impacts investments in certain value chains are having on the broader market, and to what degree concepts of resilience are being understood and reproduced beyond project support; these were all elements that were not sufficiently reflected in partner project reports or consultations²⁹.

214. The livelihoods approach, as documented under UNEP Country Programme's green economy approach within their strategy, highlights what value chains they will act upon, but does not highlight tools of measurement and indicators of livelihoods improvement. There is a lack of economic analysis when speaking of livelihoods in both the *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* projects. This is particularly relevant when both projects seek to target value chains (fisheries under *Mer Sud* and agro-fruit under *Terre Sud*). In order to measure changes in livelihoods baseline data is required, and strategies at different points in the value chain need to be described. Further, when investing in certain products, the projects need to ensure that they are not distorting the market through increased supply of particular goods.

215. In terms of sustainability, both projects are anticipated to be sustainable mostly because there is evidence of mobilisation of resources through other projects, and investments were made in community structures and organisations. However, if the projects were considered in of themselves, the level of sustainability would be very low, given the preliminary-level of activities and low baseline capacity. Upon examination it is clear, however, that the projects are part of a programmatic approach by the UNEP Country Programme, and considering them as discrete one-off projects would be inaccurate when looking at sustainability. There are already a suite of projects (funded by Norway, GEF, AFD), which seek to replicate, upscale and use the same partners as under *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud*. As such, even though the evaluation is examining these projects, it is tied to the umbrella report that examines the portfolio of activities.

216. The UNEP Country Programme was efficient in carrying out its activities and this is due to its presence in the field, its lean, responsive team and effective leadership. However, the size of the team raises questions of how it will upscale work in the future, and what its absorptive capacity is of managing additional resources coming down the pipeline, particularly with broader challenges

²⁹ The evaluators did meet with one grain storage community group, a banana producer engaged with resilient production, as well as planting of nurseries. While these examples all demonstrate activities beyond *Terre Sud* project duration, it is useful to aggregate and document which activities have been sustainable without any project support, and which have been mainstreamed and taken on by communities as part of their practices. This is mostly a question of how to capture, monitor and communicate this information in a way that can allow cumulative effects of the project to be assessed.

with the UNEP organisational and administrative structure. Much of the team under *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* was composed of long-term consultants, which down the road could cause equity issues between permanent staff and consultants. This is particularly the case for local consultants who receive salaries in devalued Haitian currency, do not have pension and benefits and have differing phone/internet plans. As the UNEP Country Programme attracts more resources and projects, these issues should be addressed.

217. The inefficiencies in delivering under *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* were strongly linked to broader UNEP structures and its slow moving pace in reviewing documents, issuing contracts and payments, and long chain of administration for approvals. This may in part be due to the incompatibility between UNEP's "regular" work and fieldwork, which requires quick responses and adaptive management to respond to threats and crises. It is anticipated that the strengthening of regional offices will ameliorate some of the inefficiencies. However, it is also necessary for financial flexibility to exist at the field level to address challenges, and a more streamlined administrative process is needed in general to respond to needs in the field. Some of the inefficiencies posed by UNEP were managed through inter-agency collaborations with UNOPS and UNDP.

218. Part of these challenges may also be a result of communication lapses. While the UNEP Country Programme has been effective in developing bulletins, Facebook groups, factsheets, and reports, for some reason there has been a lack of understanding of the work in Haiti in the broader UNEP organisation. Visits from headquarters at mid-management levels could perhaps alleviate this, and PCDMB could also examine its role as the go-between these Nairobi and Haiti. Communications staff in UNEP headquarters should also consider field visits so as to have a better understanding of the context, activities and work being carried out. The Country Programme could perhaps tailor its materials for headquarters and have regular briefing sessions.

219. Overall, in terms of project success with regards to intended goals, *Mer Sud* was unable to demonstrate the regeneration and sustainable use of marine ecosystems and marine resources. The project succeeded in establishing the partnerships that may help facilitate work with communities, most notably with PADI and Reef Check Haiti. The project also succeeded in identifying nine protected areas and obtaining the political support necessary for a decree, which is a significant accomplishment given political challenges in Haiti, and the lack of interest in the *Département* prior to UNEP's activities. There is evidence through subsequent project documents and approvals, that the PAs will catalyse funds. However, in of itself, *Mer Sud* was unable to produce any regulatory frameworks, management plans or demarcations for these sites. If follow up activities were not organised by the UNEP Country Programme, it is likely that the PAs would be so in name only.

220. According to partner project reports, sustainable practices in agro-forestry were disseminated widely through pilots, trainings, and community-level accompaniment. While the project documents reported on the number of hectares planted, types of seedlings, types of agro-forestry promoted, it is unclear as to level of uptake at the community level beyond project supports. This may be an issue of monitoring and communication, but are critical to be able to assess results at the *departmental* level.

221. Both projects, *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* introduce concepts of environmental disaster risk reduction by planting of ravines, riverbank stabilization and development of nurseries for coastal plantations. However at this time, one cannot state that these have had any measurable impacts on

disaster risk reduction. These initiatives are at a preliminary stage. During the project period there were no significant hurricanes, but there was a drought. The projects were able to withstand the drought, and initiatives under *Terre Sud* were reoriented to support beneficiaries.

222. Both projects require deeper risk analyses that refer to potential unintended consequences and mitigation strategies. This is particularly relevant given that Haiti is a fragile state, and there is some scepticism in the country of international development initiatives.

Criterion	Summary Assessment	Rating
A. Strategic relevance	Both projects are highly relevant to national needs and consistent with national plans and priorities. They are also in line with regional interests given the role Haiti's <i>Cote Sud</i> and marine resources play in the Caribbean context, and they fit within global priorities.	Mer Sud: HS Terre Sud: HS
B. Achievement of outputs	<p>Under <i>Mer Sud</i>, due to project duration limitations, unrealistic outputs, and severe delays, outputs were only partially delivered upon. Project was unable to produce regulations governing MPAs, and a fisheries monitoring database is not fully developed or operational, nor were aquaculture initiatives fully functional.</p> <p>Terre Sud was able to deliver outputs as cited in the logical framework further monitoring/analysis is required to observe whether changes in livelihoods, ecosystems were achieved.</p>	Mer Sud: U Terre Sud: S
C. Effectiveness: Attainment of project objectives and results		Mer Sud: ML Terre Sud: ML
1. Achievement of direct outcomes as defined in reconstructed ToC	Both projects satisfactorily achieved the direct outcomes as defined in the reconstructed ToC.	Mer Sud: S Terre Sud: S
2. Likelihood of impact using ROTI approach	The overall likelihood of impact of both projects is established at <i>moderately likely</i> for three main reasons (i) the success of the impacts of <i>Mer Sud</i> and <i>Terre Sud</i> are highly dependent on the	Mer Sud: ML Terre Sud: ML

Criterion	Summary Assessment	Rating
	success of follow up projects, which is a substantial risk dependent on resources, staffing, vision of the donor etc.; (ii) the instability of the political environment adds uncertainty to the way things may progress; and (iii) many of the interventions under <i>Mer Sud</i> and <i>Terre Sud</i> are preliminary interventions, the first of their kind in the baseline. Substantial work is required to mainstream/upscale those activities.	
D. Sustainability and replication	UNEP Country Programme has invested in capacities of governments and project partners, and has sought funding for future phases of work. However, investments in <i>Terre Sud</i> and <i>Mer Sud</i> are highly dependent upon other projects and not self-sustaining. Replication of activities has already commenced in other projects	Mer Sud: L Terre Sud: L
1. Financial resources	Financial resources have already been secured through GEF projects, AFD and future Norway funding	Mer Sud: HL Terre Sud; HL
2. Socio-political sustainability	By investing in local partners, and cooperatives and farmers associations, the project assumes that despite political transitions some of the capacities gained will remain at the local level.	Mer Sud: ML Terre Sud: ML
3. Institutional framework	New units within MDE and MARNDR, participation at the <i>Tables</i> (agriculture, environment), collaborations between CSOs, government and beneficiaries suggest	Mer Sud: ML Terre Sud: ML
4. Environmental sustainability	There are no real negative foreseeable impacts on the environment that can be observed.	Mer Sud: L Terre Sud: L
5. Catalytic role and replication	There is already strong evidence of replication and of other projects being catalysed	Mer Sud: HL Terre Sud: HL

Criterion	Summary Assessment	Rating
	as a result of these projects (Macaya, GEF projects, AFD)	
E. Efficiency	UNEP Country Programme is highly efficient in terms of cost-saving and timeliness. However, the broader UNEP organisation and the delays in reviewing documents, issuing contracts and issuing payments has negatively impacted the results of the projects as well as local partners and beneficiaries.	Mer Sud: MU Terre Sud: MU
F. Factors affecting project performance		Mer Sud: MS Terre Sud: S
1. Preparation and readiness	Project's objectives and components were clear, but for <i>Mer Sud</i> , not feasible within its two-year timeframe. Negative environmental, economic and social impacts of the projects were identified generally, but a more detailed risk analysis was needed. The capacities of executing agencies were properly considered, which is why capacity building was built into every aspect of the project. Partnership arrangements were properly identified and adequate project management arrangements were in place. Recommendations by the Project Review Committee (PRC) were addressed and adhered to in both projects.	Mer Sud: MU Terre Sud: MS
2. Project implementation and management	There was demonstration of adaptive management in both projects. Project partners' roles had to be changed when underperforming, activities had to be re-oriented due to the drought, and project had to be extended due to delays by UNEP headquarters.	Mer Sud: HS Terre Sud: HS
3. Stakeholders participation, cooperation and partnerships	High stakeholder participation and ability to maintain equal and participatory relationships. Two partners did not perform as needed.	Mer Sud: S Terre Sud: S
4. Communication and public	While there were many public	Mer Sud: MS

Criterion	Summary Assessment	Rating
awareness	awareness measures it is difficult to assess how salient these were for the community. In terms of communications there are numerous products (online library, website, Facebook groups, bulletins) but the lack of awareness at UNEP itself reflects that there are communication challenges.	Terre Sud: MS
5. Country ownership and driven-ness	Largely driven by UNEP Country Programme at the design phase, but great buy-in by local partners and governments, and in the implementation phases the project partners plan and determine many of the activities.	Mer Sud: MS Terre Sud: MS
6. Financial planning and management	Huge financial delays from headquarters. Partners were left without contracts, planting season was missed. While UNEP Country Programme attempted to remedy this in creative ways and have leveraged UNOPS for support, financial executing from UNEP headquarters hampered this process.	Mer Sud: U Terre Sud: MU
7. UNEP supervision, guidance and technical backstopping	PCDMB support and supervision is adequate. There have been problems caused by poor communication between the CO and other parts of UNEP (e.g. direct communication with country without informing the CO). There was no substantial evidence of regional support from ROLAC or other regional programmes to Haiti projects. PRC took an excessive amount of time, recommendations were at times, ill-suited to the reality on the ground. Point people/experts were not identified to provide timely support in project approvals. The organisation was slow	Mer Sud: U Terre Sud: U

Criterion	Summary Assessment	Rating
	moving in responding to environmental crises or financial challenges.	
8. Monitoring and evaluation		Mer Sud: U Terre Sud: U
a. M&E Design	M&E design in the logical framework was adequate, but it was not sufficient to allow for monitoring and assessment of the overall effectiveness and impact, nor of changes in livelihoods of targeted communities	Mer Sud: MS Terre Sud: MS
b. Budgeting and funding for M&E activities	Insufficient budgeting was provided in the plan, however given delays the budget used to finance this evaluation is from another project (<i>Energie Sud</i>)	Mer Sud: U Terre Sud: U
c. M&E Plan Implementation	Monitoring of indicators in the PIMS system was done Project activities were well communicated through factsheets, the <i>Bulletin du Sud</i> , the website, the Facebook page and other media and products There was no mid-term review, due to the short duration of the project. Rigorous monitoring of unintended consequences, impacts was not carried out	Mer Sud: MS Terre Sud: MS
Overall project rating		Mer Sud: U Terre Sud: S

B. Lessons Learned

The key lessons learned from *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* include:

- **Focusing on a given geographic area-** the focus on an area allows for greater efficiency, concentration of activity, deeper understanding of the context and stakeholders. This also allows for results to accrue, which may have greater impact than when smaller, disparate projects are distributed in different areas. A key lesson was also that it might be positive to be working outside of the hub of UN agency activity. By focusing in a more remote region, without a baseline presence of international activity, UNEP has managed to carve out an area of where it can strengthen its comparative advantage, and avoid duplicative or competing projects/initiatives.

- **Focus on field work-** active participation and presence in the field can help foster mutual trust, understanding of local culture and norms, identification of trusted partners and greater legitimacy in the eyes of beneficiaries.
- **Learning-by-doing as capacity building-** Including beneficiaries in activity implementation can professionalise their capacities, increase exposure to administration and management issues, and enhance relationships with beneficiaries.
- **Dynamic leadership-** In a fragile state with low capacity, it was necessary for someone to have the technical expertise to be able to drive the work forward, particularly on establishing the first protected areas in the South. A sound understanding of Caribbean ecology and context also played a significant role in moving the work forward in a focused manner. The three key aspects of leadership that appear to have achieved results were thus: (i) technical expertise; (ii) ability to conduct fieldwork and work collaboratively with local stakeholders and beneficiaries; and (iii) knowledge of the Caribbean ecology, and environment.
- **Local partnerships for project delivery-** one of the great strengths as reported by the Country Programme, of this project was that it used the experience, expertise and dedication of local partners. Instead of hiring NGOs based in the capital, local organisations were mobilised to work with communities. This resulted in what appear to be three main achievements (i) local organisations received professional development through working with UNEP; (ii) local organisations gained legitimacy and trust with beneficiaries; (iii) the project had a feel of local ownership, despite being funded by Norway and developed by UNEP. On the ground, people perceived Haitians working with, and for, Haitians, which is significant in a country that is full of international projects, consultants and donors. In fact some of the beneficiaries of UNEP projects are not even aware that they are so, due to their day-to-day dealings with local partners and intermediaries.
- **Interagency collaboration** where each organisation works according to its comparative advantage and skills, and has a clear division of roles (e.g. collaborations with UNOPS and FAO) can strengthen projects, and manage challenges.
- **Using MPAs as a strategic entry point** has allowed the Country Programme to galvanise significant resources, interest, activity, communication and commitment around protection of ecosystem services, biodiversity, and livelihoods, although not in the duration of these projects. In fact, the evidence of the catalysed resources is in projects and initiatives that will follow *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud*.
- **Working at the bureaucratic level-** While the UNEP Country Programme did work at the political level, the political level is in flux. Instead, the Country Programme invested in staffing units in MARNDR, MDE and inviting staff from *Mairies* to collaborate on initiatives. There is a greater chance of sustainability at the bureaucratic level given the political context.
- **Local partners have been able to leverage funds from other organisations.** There is evidence that some local organisations that initially partnered with UNEP, have now been able to leverage funds from other international organisations to replicate activities carried out under *Terre Sud* and *Mer Sud*. Part of this is due to the profile that the partners have achieved through partnership with UNEP, and through participation in UNEP-supported fora.

- 6.
- **A focus on the programmatic approach.** While *Mer Sud* and *Terre Sud* are two discrete projects, among numerous others, the UNEP Country Programme has a programmatic vision towards its activities that it attempts to carry out through projects. While this execution is challenging and not always successful, as will be demonstrated in the report, the vision underlying the projects is not a short-term one, but rather part of a programmatic approach, with a more longer-term vision, as is demonstrated by other CSI documents and follow up project documents which all complement one another, and pursue similar initiatives.

C. Recommendations

- (1) The business-as-usual approach for approval of contracts, payments that need to be processed through the Country Programme and PCDMB, and then to headquarters should be simplified and changed. The field experience is different than other kinds of UNEP work and requires flexibility and speed to respond to emerging crises and problems. The slow processes within UNEP itself can create risks to projects, staff and project partners. While UNOPS plays a very positive role and helps manage some of these concerns, UNEP itself needs to re-examine these processes for project offices in the field and streamline them to avoid long chains of command.
 - (2) Financial flexibilities are required at the field level to respond to emergencies, crises and provide timely expenditure reports and reviews.
 - (3) The UNEP Country Programme needs to clarify its targeting strategy where beneficiaries are concerned. While all beneficiaries are disadvantaged and vulnerable, the project documents should highlight the rationale of working with one community over another, the selection process, and the unintended consequences that this may have.
 - (4) The UNEP Country Programme needs to develop a deeper risk analysis in its project documents. Given the fragility of the Haitian context and some of the social issues that may arise, it would be useful to have a more detailed analysis of risk. Such a document can also touch upon the risks of unintended consequences. In particular, the UNEP Country Programme should document any possible negative impacts of strengthening one community over another, risks of market distortion when investing in particular value chains, and how this is to be managed to ensure social cohesion.
- 7.
- (5) Monitoring and evaluation needs to be strengthened. In particular, when conducting activities on livelihoods or gender, baseline information of beneficiaries should be gathered to be able to document impact. Monitoring should also try to capture the impacts of public awareness activities, and whether this has led to shifts in behaviour by communities/individuals.
 - (6) Livelihoods analysis needs to be strengthened and documented. While livelihoods are intended to be at the crux of these initiatives, solid evidence is not provided on how people's livelihoods were enhanced or how this is to be measured, and maintained. Number of initiatives, or hectares planted with agroforestry, for instance do not provide sufficient data on changes in livelihoods. Associated indicators, such as higher enrolment in schools, fewer

illnesses, savings accounts, would be useful to integrate for a deeper understanding of livelihoods change and its impact on beneficiaries' lives.

- (7) Local partners participation in project design should be documented. While there is a great sense of local ownership in the implementation, it would be useful to document local perspectives from the design phase.
- (8) Short-term, discrete projects should be avoided. While this may be out of UN Country Programme's hands and depend on the donor, it is worth noting that short-term projects can be disruptive with their start and stop dates, create greater management and time costs, force staff to focus on fundraising instead of on delivery, and avoid an integrated programme approach which would be more suitable to the context.
- (9) If short-term projects are carried out, the outputs and activities have to be more realistic in terms of what can be achieved, particularly in a fragile state.
- (10) UNEP CO needs to clarify/articulate its sustainable fisheries strategy. Based on the activities that were observed during the evaluation, the focus is on strengthening cooperatives, reducing fishing near the shore, and beginning the process of fish farming, as well as supporting fishing communities with technical inputs and rehabilitated vessels. These appear to be supportive inputs and a broader sustainable fisheries strategy should be articulating the links between these activities and sustainability of the MPAs.
- (11) When investing in elements like agricultural value chains, economic analyses must be carried out to ensure that projects will not lead to market distortions, saturate the market, edge out certain producers, or promote inequities. Optimal production levels, and price points need to be assessed, in light of national realities. Therefore, some economic analyses should be carried out.
- (12) Communications within UNEP must be improved. There are a variety of lessons learned that can be applied within the broader organisation, that can be extracted from the Haiti experience. Similarly, there is expertise within the organisation that could supplement the initiatives in Haiti. It appears as though the communication channels are not effective, and mechanisms must be established to share data and experience.
- (13) UNEP headquarters should consider how to improve benefits and job security for national team members. Administratively, these individuals are treated as short-term consultants, with contracts periodically renewed, but these are competent professionals who play an absolutely essential role in programmes such as this, and who have demonstrated a high-level of commitment in a challenging, disaster-prone environment. The reason typically given for UNEP's inability to provide them with normal employment conditions is the rigidity of UN procedures; if so, all efforts should be made to review these procedures for more effective programme and project implementation, and for greater equity.

IV. Annexes

Annex 1- Financial Planning and Management

Kindly note that the Project Identification Table for *Mer Sud* is not presented as at the time of writing financial expenditures have not been finalized. A completed table will be appended once the data is made available to the evaluators.

Project Identification Table (Terre Sud project)

UNEP approval date:	May 2013	First disbursement:	December 2012
Actual start date:	May 2013	Planned duration:	21 months
Intended completion date:	December 2014	Actual or expected completion date:	December 2015
Total cost:	USD 1,205,881	Co-financing:	0
Norway Contribution:	USD 1,205,881		
Mid-term review (planned date):		Terminal evaluation (actual date):	April – September 2016
Mid-term review (actual date):	No mid-term review	No. of revisions:	2 extensions (January 2015, and March 2016) ³⁰
Date of last Steering Committee meeting:		Date of last revision:	March 2016
Disbursement as of 31 December:	USD 1,205,881	Date of financial closure:	December 2015
Date of completion:	31 December 2015	Actual expenditures reported as of 31 December 2015	USD 1,205,881
Total co-financing realised as of 31 December 2015		Actual expenditures entered in IMIS and UMOJA as of 31 December 2015	USD 1,205,881 ³¹

³⁰ A project extension was requested in October 2015 but there was some confusion with Nairobi and it was not fully processed at that point

³¹ There is no outstanding obligation for this amount. However, PSC was double accounted in the IMIS and UMOJA systems. The PSC remains to be corrected. Once this is corrected, the balance will be rectified to absorb the over-expenditure on either the Development Platform or Mer Sud projects.

Financial management components	Rating	Evidence/ Comments
Attention paid to compliance with procurement rules and regulations	Mer Sud: S Terre Sud: S	UNOPS was utilised for procurement purposes. UNOPS demonstrated adequate compliance to procurement rules and regulations.
Contact/communication between the PM & Division Fund Managers	Mer Sud: U Terre Sud: U	For both projects the communication there were accounts of slow and unclear communications between fund managers and fund managers.
PM knowledge of the project financials	Mer Sud: MS Terre Sud: MS	There is evidence of the PM having some knowledge of expenditures, but CO required more up-to-date and detailed expenditure reports to keep track of available funds. Some of the expenditure reports were reported as being too general, not timely and with errors.
PM responsiveness to financial requests	Mer Sud: U Terre Sud: MS	While the CO made financial requests, the time it took to finalise contracts and payments within UNEP impacted PM's responsiveness to financial requests.
Were the following documents provided to the evaluator:		
A.	Crystal Report	N
B.	All relevant project Legal agreements (SSFA, PCA, ICA) if requested	N
C.	Associated Financial reports for legal agreements (where applicable)	Y
D.	Copies of any completed audits	N/A
Availability of project legal agreements and financial reports	Mer Sud: U Terre Sud: MS	Mer Sud's financial reports have still not been finalised, while Terre Sud's contains an error.
Timeliness of project financial reports and audits	Mer Sud: U Terre Sud: U	Project reports were provided with delay, evaluation was conducted with delay. Mer Sud project reports are still not finalised.
Quality of project financial reports and audits	Mer Sud: S Terre Sud: S	Reports appear to be satisfactory however errors were reported during project implementation.
PM knowledge of partner financial expenditure	Mer Sud: MS Terre Sud: S	Under Mer Sud there are, reportedly, still financial reports missing from one project partner and the UNDP.
Overall rating	Mer Sud: MU Terre Sud: MS	Given that expenditures have still not been finalised (Mer Sud) and the slow processes of developing expenditure reports, which did not meet the needs of the CO, and required them to develop their own monitoring system for expenditures, the ratings are low.

Annex 2: Terms of Reference

TERMS OF REFERENCE³²

**Terminal Evaluation of the UNEP projects in the
“Haiti Côte Sud Initiative Portfolio**

Prepared: January 2016

³² TOR template version of June 6 2015

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Table of Contents

I. PROJECT BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW	88
1. Project General Information	88
2. Project Rationale.....	90
3. Project Objectives and Components	92
4. Executing Arrangements	95
5. Project Cost and Financing	102
6. Implementation Issues	102
II. <u>TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EVALUATION</u>	103
1. <u>Objective and Scope of the Evaluation</u>	103
2. <u>Overall Approach and Methods</u>	104
3. <u>Key Evaluation Principles</u>	105
4. <u>Evaluation Deliverables and Review Procedures</u>	106
5. <u>Logistical Arrangements</u>	108
6. <u>Schedule of the Evaluation</u>	108

Tables

1. 1-5. Project Summaries	X
6. Total budgets	
7. Tentative Schedule for the Evaluation.....	X

Annexes

1. Consultant-specific Terms of Reference.....	2
2. Description of UNEP Evaluation Criteria	
3. Annotated Table of Contents of the Main Evaluation Deliverables	
4. Project Costs and Co-financing Tables	
5. Template for the Assessment of the Quality of Project Design	
6. Introduction to Theory of Change / Impact pathways, the ROTI Method and the ROTI Results Score sheet	
7. Stakeholder Analysis for the Evaluation Inception Report	
8. Evaluation Ratings	
9. Template for 2-page Bulletin Summarising Project Results and Key Lessons	
10. Quality Assessment of the Evaluation Report	
11. Previous Evaluations	
12. Map of Intervention Area	
13. Documentation List for the Evaluation	
14. Acronyms used in these Terms of Reference	

PROJECT BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW

Project General Information

Table 1. Project Summaries

Project Summary: 01601 Côte Sud Initiative Development Cooperation Platform

UNEP PIMS ID:	01601 Côte Sud Initiative Development Cooperation Platform	IMIS number:	1121
Sub-programme:	Disasters and Conflict	Expected Accomplishment(s):	PoW 2012-2013: Expected Accomplishment 3 PoW 2014-2015: Expected Accomplishment 2
UNEP approval date:		PoW Output(s):	2012-2013: #231 2014-2015: #223
Expected Start Date:	19.04.13	Actual start date:	01.04.13
Planned completion date:	30.06.15	Actual completion date:	31.12.15
Planned project budget at approval:	\$857,999	Total expenditures reported as of [05.01.16]:	\$3,348,155.9
Planned Environment Fund (EF) allocation:		Actual EF expenditures reported as of [date]:	
Planned Extra-budgetary financing (XBF):		Actual XBF expenditures reported as of [date]:	
XBF secured:		Leveraged financing:	
First Disbursement:		Date of financial closure:	
No. of revisions:		Date of last revision:	
Date of last Steering Committee meeting:			
Mid-term review/evaluation (planned date):		Mid-term review/evaluation (actual date):	
Terminal Evaluation (actual date):			

Project Summary: 01603 Agroforestry and Landscape Rehabilitation Project

UNEP PIMS ID:	01603 Agroforestry and Landscape Rehabilitation Project	IMIS number:	2J57
Sub-programme:	Ecosystem Management	Expected Accomplishment(s):	Countries and regions have the capacity to utilize and apply ecosystem management tools
UNEP approval date:		PoW Output(s):	311, 321, 331, 333, 334, 336
Expected Start Date:	19.04.13	Actual start date:	01.04.13

Planned completion date:	30.06.15	Actual completion date:	31.12.15
Planned project budget at approval:	\$1,205,881	Total expenditures reported as of [05.01.16]:	\$134,067.14
Planned Environment Fund (EF) allocation:		Actual EF expenditures reported as of [date]:	
Planned Extra-budgetary financing (XBF):		Actual XBF expenditures reported as of [date]:	
XBF secured:		Leveraged financing:	
First Disbursement:		Date of financial closure:	
No. of revisions:		Date of last revision:	
Date of last Steering Committee meeting:			
Mid-term review/ evaluation (planned date):		Mid-term review/ evaluation (actual date):	
Terminal Evaluation (actual date):			

Project Summary: 01624 Mer Sud – Marine Environment Regeneration in the South of Haiti

UNEP PIMS ID:	01624 Mer Sud – Marine Environment Regeneration in the South of Haiti	IMIS number:	2J91
Sub-programme:	Ecosystem Management	Expected Accomplishment(s):	3.2 Countries and regions have the capacity to utilize and apply ecosystem management tools.
UNEP approval date:		PoW Output(s):	3.2.1; 3.2.2; 3.3.1; 3.1.1; 3.3.4; 3.3.6
Expected Start Date:	14 th June 2013	Actual start date:	01.09.12
Planned completion date:	30 th June 2015	Actual completion date:	31.12.15
Planned project budget at approval:	\$2,660,446	Total expenditures reported as of [date]:	\$1,654,802.81
Planned Environment Fund (EF) allocation:		Actual EF expenditures reported as of [date]:	
Planned Extra-budgetary financing (XBF):		Actual XBF expenditures reported as of [date]:	
XBF secured:		Leveraged financing:	
First Disbursement:		Date of financial closure:	
No. of revisions:		Date of last revision:	
Date of last Steering Committee meeting:			
Mid-term review/ evaluation (planned date):		Mid-term review/ evaluation (actual date):	
Terminal Evaluation (actual date):			

Project Summary: 01550 Haiti Sustainable Energy – South Department NMFA Project

UNEP PIMS ID:	01550 Haiti Sustainable Energy – South Department NMFA Project	IMIS number:	2H43
Sub-programme:	Disasters and Conflict	Expected Accomplishment(s):	3
UNEP approval date:		PoW Output(s):	#231
Expected Start Date:	07.11.12	Actual start date:	01.09.12
Planned completion date:	31.12.15	Actual completion date:	31.12.16
Planned project budget at approval:	\$9,776,000	Total expenditures reported as of [05.01.16]:	\$3,372,359.56
Planned Environment Fund (EF) allocation:		Actual EF expenditures reported as of [date]:	
Planned Extra-budgetary financing (XBF):		Actual XBF expenditures reported as of [date]:	
XBF secured:		Leveraged financing:	
First Disbursement:		Date of financial closure:	
No. of revisions:		Date of last revision:	
Date of last Steering Committee meeting:			
Mid-term review/ evaluation (planned date):		Mid-term review/ evaluation (actual date):	
Terminal Evaluation (actual date):			

Project Rationale

These Terms of Reference (TOR) describe the scope of work associated with terminal evaluations (TE) of UNEP-led projects implemented in Haiti between 2013-2015. The scope of work will include: a) **project level terminal evaluations of three initiatives** implemented under both the Disasters and Conflict and Ecosystem Management UNEP Sub-programmes; b) **desk-based progress reviews of two other ongoing initiatives**; and c) **an assessment of how the Haiti portfolio³³** contributes to the UNEP Haiti Country Programme Strategy (2013-17).

The three completed projects to be evaluated contribute to Phase 2 of UNEP-Norway collaboration in the South of Haiti and are as follows (total budgets/spend to be confirmed during evaluation):

Gouvernance Sud or 'Côte Sud Initiative Development Cooperation Platform project' (USD 0.689M - from 19 April 2013 to 31 December 2015)

Terre Sud or 'Agroforestry & Landscape Rehabilitation project' (USD 1.205M – from 19 Apr 2013 to 31 December 2015)

Mer Sud or 'Marine Environment Regeneration in the South of Haiti project' (USD 2.418M – from 14 June 2013 to 31 December 2015)

³³ The Haiti 'portfolio' has its origins in a humanitarian response in 2008 and the current country programme is managed by the Post-Conflict and Disaster Management Branch in Geneva. The projects eligible for terminal evaluation belong to the Cote Sud Initiative, which are designed to be implemented through a country presence. Haiti is also included in other UNEP multi-country initiatives, such as the Caribbean Biological Corridor. New projects have also recently been approved for funding through the Global Environment Fund.

The two ongoing projects that also contribute to UNEP's strategic intervention in Southern Haiti are:

Energie Sud or 'Haiti Sustainable Energy project' (USD 7.805M – from 07 November 2012 to 31 December 2016)

Macaya Grand Sud (USD 9.385 – from March 2015 – December 2017)

Three phases of projects have been designed to-date (the first two under the CSI), with the first two phases already implemented.

Phase	Projects
Phase 1 (2010-13)	Haiti Regeneration Initiative - <i>a concept that was undermined by the earthquake</i>
	Southwest Sustainable Development Project (Phase 1 of Côte Sud Initiative)
Phase 2 (2013-15)	Côte Sud Initiative Development Cooperation Platform Project (Phase 2 of Côte Sud Initiative – Gouvernance Sud Program)
	Agroforestry & Landscape Rehabilitation Project (Phase 2 of Côte Sud Initiative – Terre Sud Program)
	Haiti Mer Sud Project (Phase 2 of Côte Sud Initiative – Mer Sud Program)
	Sustainable Energy Project (2012-2016, ongoing) (Phase 2 of Côte Sud Initiative – Energie Sud Program)
Phase 3 (2015-17)	Macaya Grand Sud project (ongoing)

Other previous and ongoing projects in Haiti will be identified during the course of the evaluation as appropriate.

The work undertaken in Phase 1 was the subject of a Haiti case study in April 2012 prepared for the Evaluation of the UNEP Disasters and Conflicts Sub-programme in October 2012 (see Annex 11 for copies).

The completion of Phase 2 provides an opportunity to evaluate the achievements of the three individual projects as well as carrying out a longer-term assessment of how the Haiti portfolio is contributing to the Haiti Country Programme Strategy. The evaluation will consider how evaluation findings have informed current and future project designs (under evaluation question b, iii).

Following several stand-alone initiatives in Haiti, UNEP first established a country programme in 2008 at the request of the Government of Haiti (GoH) with the intention of implementing a 5-year plan addressing environmental degradation, extreme poverty and disaster vulnerability at a country level. The January 2010 earthquake, and the associated relief and recovery efforts of the UN, forced UNEP to substantially change its plans. The organization implemented a range of short- to medium-term projects, mainly in the areas of energy, sanitation, resettlement planning and waste management in camps for internally displaced persons. UNEP also provided emergency-related technical assistance on a national scale. These projects were completed at the end of 2011.

In 2011, UNEP resumed its planning and implementation of long-term sustainable development projects in Haiti, embodied in the UNEP Haiti Country Programme (2013-17). One of UNEP's decisions was to concentrate the programme and field projects geographically in the South Department guided by the Grand Sud Strategy and implemented through the Côte Sud Initiative (CSI), which is delivered through a coalition of UN agencies and associated partners that aim to promote the resilient development and economic growth of this coastal region. The decentralized CSI coalition was designed to provide support in coordination, implementation and reporting to the government through a One UN spirit. Several UN agencies (UNEP, FAO, UNOPS, UNDP) and partners have been gradually joining the joint initiative, which UNEP is coordinating for 5 years (2011-2015) on a voluntary basis.

UNEP's Haiti Grand Sud Strategy is structured around five pillars of activity: i) Biodiversity and Protected Areas; ii) Green Economy and Value Chains; iii) Natural Protection and Risk Reduction; iv) Sustainable Energy and Renewable Energy; and v) Regional Planning and Decentralization.

The south-western end of the Southern Peninsula is one of the most 'neglected'³⁴ regions in Haiti and continues to suffer from serious land degradation³⁵, relatively low levels of investment, difficult transport links and high vulnerability to hurricanes, floods and earthquakes. At the same time the south-western region (South Department) contains all of Haiti's remaining natural forest and exhibits high level of endemic biodiversity. It is one of the country's main economic development zones with significant agricultural potential, the best beach and park tourism potential and is adjacent to the Macaya National Park.

The CSI area is tightly focused on 10 Communes in the southwest of the South Department of Haiti, covering an area of 780km² and a population of 205,000. The CSI is planned for 20 years, with annual work plans, 5-year master plans and a formal coordination structure with strong department and commune level local and government ownership. This project will be implemented and overseen by a partnership including the following members: Government of Haiti (Min – Planning (focal point), Agriculture, Public Works, Health, Education, Tourism and Environment, Offices of the Sud Delegate and 10 Communes), Government of Norway, UNEP, UNOPS, (formal UN Participating Agencies), Catholic Relief Services, The Earth Institute, The Nature Conservancy, ORE, Earthspark and over 20 community based organizations.

Given the geographical focus in the South Department and the long-term aim of facilitating the coordination of environmental development at a sub-national level, the main UNEP office was established in Port Salut (South Department), while a small liaison office was maintained in Port-au-Prince.

Project Objectives and Components

The **UNEP Haiti Country Programme Strategy** (2013-17) documents the country vision as: *'the Haiti Country Programme supports and catalyzes a collaborative effort that will contribute to reducing rural poverty, diminishing disaster and climate change vulnerability, and halting and reversing environmental degradation throughout rural Haiti'*. Its stated approach is:

- Adopting an integrated approach combining capacity development at national and department levels to improve environmental governance and to support Haiti's compliance with multilateral environmental agreement (MEA) commitments;
- Promoting alliances to catalyze ecological potential and reduce vulnerability at department level (Department Coalitions) and to facilitate transnational resources management (Transnational Programme);
- Promoting integrated resources management, conservation and regeneration of ecosystem services, and supporting related sectors;
- Promoting the linkages between disaster risk reduction and ecosystems

While keeping the focus in the southern region, UNEP articulated its interventions at 3 levels as detailed below:

1. National Level: Haiti National Environment and Energy Governance

³⁴ According to early project documents (eg PIMS 1255) the CSI area has the same general challenges as most of rural Haiti-but it also has a selection of locally specific challenges including: serious land degradation, relatively low levels of investment, difficult transport links and high vulnerability to hurricanes, floods and earthquakes. These TORs assume this neglect to be related to a lack of investment by the GoH – to be confirmed during this evaluation.

³⁵ Project documents (PIMS 1255) prepared shortly after the 2010 hurricane cite 'deforestation and destructive farming practices on very steep slopes resulting in massive erosion and losses of soil fertility' as the primary causes of land degradation.

- Mainstreaming environment and energy into national government and UN planning and policy process
- International Conventions and Protocols (Cartagena, Ramsar, Biodiversity, Ozone)
- Capacity building to e.g. Ministry of Environment (MDE) and MTPTC (Eng)
- Environment Communication and Education

2. Sub-National Level: Haiti Grand Sud Region Sustainable Development (through CSI to end 2015³⁶)

- One UN at regional level (initiated by UNEP but in the process of being led/piloted by RCO and GoH)
- UNEP focuses on the Grand Sud Region as a demonstration region for sustainable development and resilient economic growth through 5 components:
 - Protected Areas and Biodiversity
 - Green Economy and Value Chains³⁷
 - Natural barriers and Disaster Risk Reduction
 - Sustainable Energy and Renewables
 - Waste management
 - Regional Planning and Sustainable Investments

3. Caribbean-Regional Level: Haiti Transnational Program and the Caribbean Biological Corridor

- South-South Cooperation to support Haiti
- Haiti participation to solutions for transnational problems

The three completed projects that are to be evaluated under these TOR contribute to the second intervention level in the Grand Sud Region while the realization of the Haiti Country Programme strategy depends on all three intervention levels.

The overall objective of the **Grand Sud Strategy**³⁸ is to support more sustainable and resilient livelihoods in Haiti's south-western peninsula through an ecosystem based approach. The long-term outcomes of the strategy are expressed as:

A common, integrated and long-term vision for the sustainable development of the region
 Greater recognition, protection, restoration and sustainable use of marine and terrestrial biodiversity
 Sound implementation of ecosystem-based approach for reducing disaster risk and developing sustainable value chains (fisheries, cacao, fruit-trees, castor oil, solid waste)
 Increasing energy access in remote areas through new solutions to energy poverty

The Strategy is delivered through five pillars of activity, each with a specific objective :

Biodiversity and Protected Areas: To identify, establish and manage protected areas (PA), both marine and terrestrial, in Haiti Grand Sud region

Green Economy and Value Chains: To reinforce existing natural resource-based value chains and create new income generating activities in the Grand Sud region

Natural Protection and Risk Reduction: To restore natural protection barriers and protect population and economic activities near riverbanks, river mouths and shorelines in Haiti Grand Sud region

Sustainable Energy and Renewable Energy: To improve access to sustainable energy in the Haiti Grand Sud region through enhanced governance and education, renewables and rural electrification as well as sustainable cooking and heating fuels and solutions.

³⁷ Green Economy and Value Chains includes Waste Management, which is being considered for 'stand alone' status.

³⁸ UNEP Programme in the South of Haiti: strategy, achievements, lessons learned (2013-2015). UNEP self-assessment and substantive progress report (Nov 2015).

Regional Planning and Governance: To develop a Grand Sud Regional Plan to guide private and public investment and consider biodiversity values, ecosystem services, environmental health issues and sustainable energy.

Each of the projects in Phase 2 are intended to contribute to at least one of the pillars listed above and have the following project-level objectives, components, component outcomes and expected outputs:

SUMMARY OF COMPLETED PROJECTS

(full and approved versions to be supplied direct from the Haiti Project Team)

Table 1. Objectives, components and outputs of the Côte Sud Initiative Development Cooperation Platform Project

Objective	Components	Project Outputs
To enhance the coordination, the quality and the amount of international development investments in the South Department of Haiti matching the priorities set by departmental and municipal planning governance structures	1. Support to departmental-scale aid coordination	A. Support provided to the Ministry of Planning in the South Department (MPCE Sud) to promote sustainable development through the departmental-scale development governance mechanisms.
	2. Support to municipal-scale aid coordination	B. Support provided to three municipalities to ensure proper planning, coordination and follow-up of municipal-scale development governance mechanisms through equipped, trained and operational « Tables de Concertation Comunales » considering an inclusive gender approach.
	3. Communication and fundraising	C. Major progress, successes, opportunities and challenges identified in the frame of CSI projects in the South are communicated and serve as a basis for fundraising.
	4. Technical assistance on environment and energy	D. Technical assistance on environment and energy is provided to the government as needed.

Table 2. Objectives, components and outputs of the Agroforestry & Landscape Rehabilitation Project (Terre Sud Programme)

Objective	Components	Project Outputs
To establish a sustainable vegetal cover through a rational use of soils for agriculture and forestry through innovative techniques, income generating activities and dissemination of best practices and environmental education	1. Community-based Ecosystem Management (Component 2 in ProDoc)	A. Sustainable agro-forestry practices are promoted to provide economic values to environmental protection in an integrated manner (Output B in the ProDoc)
		B. Sustainable agriculture approaches are promoted through staple crop and horticultural production as well as soil fertility (Output C in the ProDoc)
		C. The value chain of key agriculture products is developed through improvement of grain storage facilities and high value crops commercialization
	Cancelled ³⁹ : Component 1. Governance support in agriculture and forestry	Cancelled: Improved knowledge and understanding of best practices for ecosystem management and restoration among government planners, field officers, local NGOs and practitioners (Output A in ProDoc)

Table 3. Objectives, components and outputs of the Haiti Mer Sud Project

Objective	Components	Project Outputs
To promote marine ecosystems regeneration and sustainable management of marine resources through integrated coastal zone management	1. Coastal and Marine Environmental Governance and Education	A. Marine environment and fisheries governance structures in the South are developed
		B. The establishment of a government owned co-managed Marine Protected Areas Network with associated regulations is established in the frame of a long-term integrated coastal and marine zone management process
		C. The development of a government owned database and monitoring systems of marine resources and resource

³⁹ See para 36.

<p>Project outcome: Sustainable management of marine resources is promoted through increased understanding and capacities of resources users and governance structures in the South Department of Haiti</p>		users
	<p>2. Community –based Ecosystem Management for Improved Well-being of Coastal Communities</p>	D. Improved knowledge and understanding of the need to protect the marine environment and its role for livelihoods among Government planners, local NGOs, resources users, children
		E. Ecologically sustainable, economically viable and locally co-managed sustainable fisheries are developed in 7 coastal municipalities
		F. Community based ecotourism initiatives are developed and consolidated based on sustainable development of local nature and historical assets

ONGOING PROJECTS

Table 4. Objectives, components and outputs of the Haiti Sustainable Energy Project

Objective	Components	Project Outputs
<p>To significantly increase energy access in the South Department of Haiti, in an environmentally and economically sustainable manner – thereby supporting the larger national goal of sustainable recovery.</p> <p>Secondary goal: to demonstrate and support national-scale rollout of innovative and sustainable solutions to energy poverty, with an emphasis on the promotion of renewable energy technologies and a Green Economy approach.</p>	1. Renewable Energy Sector Education and Governance	1. The capacity of the new Ministry of Energy Security for planning, development and oversight of renewable energy policies, programmes and projects is increased
	2.1. Household Lighting and Electricity – Level 1	2.1. Level 1 lighting and energy provided to 10,000 households in the South Department
	2.2 Household lighting and electricity – Level 2	2.2. Level 2 lighting and electricity provided to 3,000 households in the South Department
	3. Haiti Rural Electricity Cooperative	3. Haiti Rural Energy Cooperative, including 3 operating hybrid mini-grids, launched and stabilized
	4. Grid Renewables for the South Department	4. Integration of at least 10MW of renewable energy power generation into the Les Cayes regional grid catalysed

Table 5. Objectives, components and outputs of the Macaya Grand Sud Project

Objective	Components	Project Outputs
<p>To support the Government of Haiti in promoting the use of ecosystem management approaches in the Southern region of the country to maintain provision of ecosystem services and sustainable productivity of terrestrial and aquatic systems.</p>	1. Protected Areas:	1. 4 enacted protected areas 2. Identification of new protected areas
	2. Sustainable Resilient Livelihoods	3. Increased capacity of government and local users to promote sustainable environmental management for socio economic purposes outside protected areas
	3. Regional Planning	4. Southern Haiti Regional Development Plan takes ecological potential and threats into account and is a widely recognised as a framework for long term investment.

Executing Arrangements

The executing arrangements described below are as described in project documents, with some more current detail provided. The actual executing arrangements will be verified during the course of the evaluation and their effectiveness reviewed (evaluation questions a, iii and b, i).

Within UNEP, the projects are implemented by the Post-conflict and Disaster Management Branch, through its **UNEP Haiti Project Team**. The projects are managed by a team of a dozen staff as follows below. The

evaluation will confirm the current management arrangements and reflect on their effectiveness under Factors Affecting Performance.

- A **UNEP South Haiti Programme Manager** (P3) continuing on from Phase 1 manages the delivery of project activities of the CSI Development Cooperation Platform Project (charged at 20%), the Agroforestry and Landscape Rehabilitation Project (20%) and the Mer Sud project (40%) and ensures effective participation and political ownership of the processes. The UNEP South Haiti Programme Manager liaises with the relevant ministries at both national and South Department levels in order to ensure coherence between the capital and the South Department.
- A **UNEP Country Programme Manager** (P4), present on the ground since 2008, provides overall supervision to the UNEP Haiti Project Team.
- A **UNEP Haiti Programme Manager in Geneva** (P5) travelling frequently to Haiti is programme manager for the Haiti Sustainable Energy Project (charged at 80%).
- A **UNEP Local Governance and Community Liaison Officer** (charged to xx) supports and reports to the UNEP South Haiti Programme Manager to ensure the coordination and follow-up of the activities carried out at the municipal and community level.
- A **UNEP-Government Expert on GIS** (consultant recruited by the Government - charged to xx) supports project activities and reports to the UNEP South Haiti Programme Manager.
- A **UNEP National Communications Officer** (charged xx% to the CSI Development Cooperation Platform Project) reports to the UNEP South Haiti Programme Manager and supports project activities in terms of communications and public relations services. Together with the UNEP South Haiti Programme Manager, the UNEP National Communication officer maintains liaison with the Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean (ROLAC) in order to ensure coordination and two-way communication flow at regional level.
- A **UNEP Knowledge Management and IT Support Officer** (charged xx% to the Haiti Mer Sud Project) reports to the UNEP South Haiti Programme Manager and supports the project team by developing and managing the project database (including all the data and products generated in electronic form). (S)he supports the Communication Officer in disseminating project progress through online platforms (created or consolidated). This staff member also provides IT support to the project team and is under the technical supervision of the UNOPS Communications and Operations Manager (see below).
- A **Communications and Operations Manager** (charged at 50% to the Haiti Mer Sud Project and at 50% to the CSI Development Cooperation Platform Project) supports and reports to the UNEP South Haiti Programme Manager on logistics, human resources and procurement services provided by UNOPS (with UNEP retaining overall responsibility).
- A **UNEP Administrative Assistant** based in Port au Prince (UNDP-hosted - charged to xx) is in charge of contractual and admin/financial procedures with the partners and is technically supervised by a UNEP administrative officer based in Geneva (charged part-time to the Haiti projects).

Staff specifically for the Haiti Mer Sud Project:

- A **UNEP National Project Manager** (charged 100% to this project) supports and reports to the UNEP South Haiti Programme Manager and ensures coordination of local partners, working in close collaboration with fisheries technicians (Ministry of Agriculture) to ensure the timely implementation of community based activities with local ownership.
- A **National Fishing Community Liaison Facilitator** (who also is the Mer Sud boat skipper and charged to this project) assists the National Project Manager in liaising with fishing communities.

Staff specifically for the Haiti Sustainable Energy Project:

A **Project Officer** (50% of a P2) based in Geneva focusses on project management, contracting, reporting and supporting technical document development via desk studies and field visits
A Senior Project Manager for Energy (P5), based in Geneva, ensuring the management of the Energy project, and providing supervision and technical backstopping.

An **Administrative Assistant** (50% of a G staff) based in Geneva

A **UNEP Senior Consultant** focussing on Government capacity building in Component 1 and multiple technical/substantive issues in Component 4

Electrical Engineer (seconded from the Norwegian Refugee Council) focusing on grid integration, technical design, liaison and capacity building for the national electrical utility (Component 4)

The majority of staff in the **Haiti project team** were already in place from the CSI Phase I and are consultants employed on UNOPS contracts. The UNEP South Haiti Programme Manager, the UNEP Country Programme Manager and most personnel hired specifically for the Haiti Sustainable Energy Project are on UNEP contracts.

The UNEP Haiti Team is based in the **Côte Sud Initiative Office** in Port Salut, in the South Department, and shares some of the substantial logistical capacity built by the previous CSI phase, in particular office space, IT services, boats and cars. This office also hosts government officials and UN staff as part of Phase II.

Project-level guidance and oversight is provided by **project management committees** (except for the Haiti Sustainable Energy Project). These management committees are composed of relevant GoH ministries in charge of respective project sub-components following their respective mandates⁴⁰, UNEP and implementing partners. The Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (MPCE) provides overall leadership and chairs all project management committees with UNEP coordination support. The committees are expected to meet every 3 months to review progress, identify challenges and opportunities and take management decisions based on the project work plans. UNDP also takes part in the meetings to ensure harmonization of approaches.

Government ministries are key partners for project implementation. They ensure overall leadership in planning and coordination and decision-making, field activities, monitoring and education/communication activities.

UNDP, through a separate stand-alone project, and UNEP, through the Agroforestry and Landscape Rehabilitation project, agreed to seek synergies in the context of the Terre Sud Programme. While UNDP carries out a watershed co-management plan for 10 municipalities, UNEP implements innovative techniques and income generation activities in 6 of those 10 municipalities. UNDP is the Terre Sud Programme support coordinator under the leadership of the GoH and ensures governance support to the monthly coordination mechanism in the agricultural sector at Departmental level.

Specifically for the Mer Sud Project, UNEP technical oversight is provided by the Freshwater and Marine Ecosystem Branch (FMEB) of Division of Environmental Policy Implementation (DEPI) which is expected to review the implementation, especially focusing on the actual impact of the project on environmental and socio-economic conditions. An FMEB Programme Officer is expected to carry out a field visit at least once a year to discuss the project implementation with the local stakeholders and project partners. Other projects may receive TA from UNEP HQ – to be confirmed/clarified during the evaluation.

The projects are expected to seek synergies in the context of the Biological Caribbean Corridor project, the Regional Seas Programme or any other major UNEP ecosystem related initiatives in the Caribbean region in order to highlight and reflect UNEP Haiti ecosystem based interventions at a regional level. The evaluation will consider whether similar project synergies have also held for work in disasters and conflict.

The projects should liaise on a regular basis with DEPI in Nairobi, the Panama-based ROLAC office and the Jamaica based CAR/RCU, to keep UNEP regional entities updated on opportunities, challenges and progresses on the ground. UNEP staff based in offices in Nairobi, Panama and Kingston⁴¹ are also expected

⁴⁰ **Mer Sud project** : Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (MPCE), Ministry of Agriculture (MARNDR), Ministry of Environment (MDE), and Ministry of Tourism; **Agroforestry and Landscape Rehabilitation Project**: MPCE, MARNDR, MDE; **CSI Platform project**: MPCE

⁴¹ Kingston office is due to open in early 2016.

to play project support and/or facilitation roles. The UNEP Haiti Project Team is also expected to take part in any regional events and technical workshops on ecosystem management issues in the Caribbean region (in collaboration with the Ministry of Environment) in order to advocate for Haiti and put country issues on the regional agenda. ROLAC is expected to provide policy advice and participate in high-level events designed to support aid coordination for environment, energy and sustainable development at sub-national level.

The Haiti Sustainable Energy project has no project management committee but a Project Steering Committee composed of the Ministry of Energy (chair), Ministry of Environment, the Electricity Utility of Haiti, UNEP and the Government of Norway. It meets on a six-monthly basis and approves the annual work plans and other major planning decisions.

The projects are part of the CSI framework and as such, the Project Management Committees operate under the leadership of the CSI Steering Committee. The CSI Management Arrangement and reporting lines correspond to the CSI structure and are based on a project management and matrix approach. It is designed as a flexible pyramidal structure to assist in maintaining organizational stability and continuity as the initiative grows in scale and complexity and potentially faces difficult financial periods. In practical terms, the CSI Management Arrangement was originally designed with the following 3 hierarchical levels of management and decision-making but was subsequently revised due to practical constraints:

Initial design

- (i) **Oversight level** – CSI Steering Committee meeting every 6 month;
- (ii) **Programme Level** - Programme Coordination Committees meeting every 3 month;
- (iii) **Project Level**- Project Management Committees meeting every month. Figures 1, 2 and 3 below illustrate UNEP Haiti Team internal management arrangements and the CSI management structure and reporting lines.

Current design




Figure 1 : UNEP Haiti Team internal management arrangements – as planned at project design stage.

A new UNEP internal structure has been developed in the course of 2015:




Figure 2: UNEP Haiti Team internal management arrangements – as currently operating.




Figure 3. CSI management structure and reporting lines – as planned at design stage (to be clarified/confirmed during this evaluation)

Project Cost and Financing

Table 6. Total budgets (USD) and funding sources of the four CSI projects

	<i>Development Cooperation Platform</i>	<i>Agroforestry and Landscape Rehabilitation</i>	<i>Sustainable Energy</i>	<i>Mer Sud</i>
<i>Cost to the Government of Norway</i>	703,000	1,230,000	6,900,000	2,460,446
<i>Co-financing</i>				
<i>Cash</i>	0	0	0	0
<i>In-Kind</i>	0	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Norwegian Refugee Council 700,000 • Government of Norway 300,000 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Countries 200,000
<i>Co-financing total</i>	0	0	1,000,000	200,000
Total	703,000	1,230,000	7,900,000	2,660,446

Present total estimated project cost at design, broken down per component and per funding source. Use tables as appropriate. Present most recent figures on disbursement

Implementation Issues

Project implementation issues are reported on a 6-monthly basis through UNEP's Programme Information Management System (PIMS) and a summary of challenges met by the Haiti country programme is recorded in the 2013-2015 Self-assessment & Substantive Progress Report prepared for the Norway-UNEP 2015 annual review. The consultant will be provided with access to all sources of monitoring information at inception stage.

Some of the topics raised include:

- National leadership and local capacity;
- Natural hazards and the need to adapt;
- Administrative and financial procedures;
- Rapid tourism growth in the South;
- Cancellation of Component 1: Governance support in agriculture and forestry and;
- Serious challenges in the energy sector

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EVALUATION

Objective and Scope of the Evaluation

In line with the UNEP Evaluation Policy⁴² and the UNEP Programme Manual⁴³, the TE is undertaken at completion of projects **to assess project performance (in terms of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency), and determine outcomes and impacts (actual and potential) stemming from the project, including their sustainability.** The evaluation has two primary purposes: (i) to provide evidence of results to meet accountability requirements, and (ii) to promote operational improvement, learning and knowledge sharing through results and lessons learned among UNEP, the Government of Haiti, Government of Norway, other UN agencies and Haitian partner organisations. Therefore, the evaluation will identify lessons of operational relevance for future project formulation and implementation.

As UNEP's engagement in Haiti is seen as a long-term effort to enhance the country's environmental management capacity, the evaluation will be informed by the findings of previous evaluations of the Haiti Regeneration Initiative (2010-2011)⁴⁴. It will focus on the following sets of **key questions**, based on the project's intended outcomes, which may be expanded by the consultants as deemed appropriate:

Individual Project Evaluations

- i) **How relevant are the projects to beneficiary needs?** In addition, are they aligned with UNEP's mandate, the Medium Term Strategy (2014-17), the UNEP Programmes of Work (2012-13 and 2014-15) and relevant sub-programme strategies?
- ii) **To what extent and how efficiently did the projects deliver their intended outputs?** Specifically, in what ways and how far have the projects contributed to strengthening regional government and civil society capacity to carry out concrete initiatives to promote: a) the regeneration and sustainable use of marine ecosystems/resources; b) sustainable practices in agro-forestry; c) coordination and d) strengthening disaster preparedness and response in the environmental sector? How well are the projects designed to withstand the environmental challenges (climate change and extreme weather) endemic to the area?
- iii) **What were the internal and external factors, including internal UNEP approval processes and administrative support, that most affected performance of the projects?** What management measures were taken to make full use of opportunities and address obstacles to enhance project performance?

Portfolio Evaluation

- i) **How appropriate is the management structure for this country programme?** (ie. the structure and funding of the Haiti Project Team, both in country and in Geneva; roles and functions of ministerial staff; structure of committees; partnership model; consultancy contracts etc). What are the benefits and drawbacks of the country office being based in Port Salut with respect to a) addressing identified challenges, making a tangible impact on environmental issues, b) national (central and regional) government capacity building and c) coordination and partnership building with other development agencies as well as local civil society?

⁴² <http://www.unep.org/eou/StandardsPolicyandPractices/UNEPEvaluationPolicy/tabid/3050/language/en-US/Default.aspx>

⁴³ http://www.unep.org/QAS/Documents/UNEP_Programme_Manual_May_2013.pdf

⁴⁴ Evaluation of the UNEP Sub-Programme on Disasters and Conflicts (Oct 2012) and UNEP Haiti Country Case Study (April, 2012)

ii) **How well, and in what ways, have the projects worked as a coherent set of interventions contributing to common goals?** Specifically, how has the Haiti portfolio contributed to the UNEP Haiti Country Programme Strategy in Haiti, the broader programme of UNEP's work in disasters and conflict and the Grand Sud Strategy? To what extent is there an explicit and feasible exit strategy informing the forward planning of UNEP's work in Haiti?

iii) **To what extent has the Haiti portfolio responded and contributed to evidence-based programming?** Specifically how well, and in what ways, have projects incorporated findings and recommendations from previous evaluative work? To what extent has the learning from the Haiti portfolio contributed to wider internal (UNEP) and external (Caribbean networks) dialogue and thinking on environmental challenges and solutions in the context of disaster-prone ecosystems?

Overall Approach and Methods

The TE of the projects will be conducted by a team of two independent consultants under the overall responsibility and management of the UNEP Evaluation Office in consultation with the UNEP Project Manager and the Sub-programme Coordinators of the Disasters and Conflict and Ecosystem Management Sub-programmes.

It will be an in-depth evaluation using a participatory approach whereby key stakeholders are kept informed and consulted throughout the evaluation process. Both quantitative and qualitative evaluation methods will be used to determine project achievements against the expected outputs, outcomes and impacts. It is highly recommended that the consultants maintain close communication with the project team and promote information exchange throughout the evaluation implementation phase in order to increase their (and other stakeholder) ownership of the evaluation findings.

The findings of the evaluation will be based on the following:

- (a) A **desk review** of:
 - documentation found at www.grandsudhaiti.ht (librairie en ligne)
 - Relevant background documentation, (see Annex 13, documents will be made available through Dropbox)
 - Project design documents (including minutes of the project design review meeting at approval); Annual Work Plans and Budgets or equivalent, revisions to the project (Project Document Supplement), the logical framework and its budget;
 - Project reports such as six-monthly progress and financial reports, progress reports from collaborating partners, meeting minutes, relevant correspondence etc.;
 - Project outputs: [list];
 - Mid-Term Reviews/Evaluations of the projects

- a. **Interviews (individual or in group) with:**

- UNEP Project Manager
 - Project management team
 - UNEP Fund Management Officer;
 - Project partners, including [list];
 - Relevant resource persons, including government representatives at municipal, regional (South Department) and central (national) levels

- b. **Surveys** – to be proposed by the consultants as part of the inception phase.

- c. **Field visits** – the consultants will propose a plan for independent and/or joint visits to Haiti as part of the inception phase.
- d. **Other data collection tools** - as deemed appropriate and proposed by the consultants as part of the inception phase.

Key Evaluation Principles

Evaluation findings and judgements should be based on **sound evidence and analysis**, clearly documented in the evaluation report. Information will be triangulated (i.e. verified from different sources) to the greatest extent possible, and where triangulation is not possible, single sources will be mentioned. Analysis leading to evaluative judgements should always be clearly spelled out.

The evaluation will assess the project with respect to **a minimum set of evaluation criteria** grouped in six categories: (1) Strategic relevance; (2) Achievement of outputs; (3) Attainment of objectives and planned results, which comprises the assessment of outcomes achieved, effectiveness and likelihood of impact; (3) Sustainability and replication; (4) Efficiency and (5) Factors and processes affecting project performance. The evaluation consultants can propose other evaluation criteria as deemed appropriate. **See Annex 2 for a full description of UNEP's evaluation criteria.**

Ratings. All evaluation criteria will be rated on a six-point scale. Annex 8 provides guidance on how the different criteria should be rated and how ratings should be aggregated for the different evaluation criterion categories.

Baselines and counterfactuals. In attempting to attribute any outcomes and impacts to the project intervention, the evaluators should consider the difference between *what has happened with*, and *what would have happened without*, the project. This implies that there should be consideration of the baseline conditions, trends and counterfactuals in relation to the intended project outcomes and impacts. It also means that there should be plausible evidence to attribute such outcomes and impacts to the actions of the project. Sometimes, adequate information on baseline conditions, trends or counterfactuals is lacking. In such cases this should be clearly highlighted by the evaluators, along with any simplifying assumptions that were taken to enable the evaluator to make informed judgements about project performance.

The "Why?" Question. As this is a terminal evaluation and a follow-up project is likely [or similar interventions are envisaged for the future], particular attention should be given to learning from the experience. Therefore, the "Why?" question should be at the front of the consultants' minds all through the evaluation exercise. This means that the consultants need to go beyond the assessment of "what" the project performance was, and make a serious effort to provide a deeper understanding of "why" the performance was as it was, i.e. of processes affecting attainment of project results (criteria under category F – see below). This should provide the basis for the lessons that can be drawn from the project. In fact, the usefulness of the evaluation will be determined to a large extent by the capacity of the consultants to explain "why things happened" as they happened and are likely to evolve in this or that direction, which goes well beyond the mere review of "where things stand" at the time of evaluation.

Communicating evaluation results. Once the consultant(s) has obtained evaluation findings, lessons and results, the Evaluation Office will share the findings and lessons with the key stakeholders. Evaluation results should be communicated to the key stakeholders in a brief and concise manner that encapsulates the evaluation exercise in its entirety. There may, however, be several intended audiences, each with different interests and preferences regarding the report. The Evaluation Manager will plan with the consultant(s) which audiences to target and the easiest and clearest way to communicate the key evaluation findings and lessons to them. This may include

some or all of the following; a webinar, conference calls with relevant stakeholders, the preparation of an evaluation brief or interactive presentation.

A key aim of the evaluation is to encourage reflection and learning by UNEP staff and key project stakeholders. The consultant should consider how reflection and learning can be promoted, both through the evaluation process and in the communication of evaluation findings and key lessons.

Evaluation Deliverables and Review Procedures

The evaluation team will prepare an **inception report** (see Annex 3) containing a thorough **review of the project context; project design quality; a draft reconstructed Theory of Change (ToC) of the project; an initial stakeholder analysis; the evaluation framework** and a tentative **evaluation schedule**.

It is expected that a large portion of the desk review will be conducted during the inception phase. It will be important to acquire a good understanding of the project context, design and process at this stage. The review of **project design quality** will cover the following aspects (see Annex 5 for the detailed project design assessment matrix):

- Strategic relevance of the project
- Preparation and readiness;
- Financial planning;
- M&E design;
- Complementarity with UNEP strategies and programmes;
- Sustainability considerations and measures planned to promote replication and up-scaling.

The inception report will present a draft, desk-based **reconstructed ToC** of the project (see Annex 6 for guidance on reconstructing the ToC). It is vital to reconstruct the ToC *before* most of the data collection (review of progress reports, in-depth interviews, surveys etc.) is done, because the ToC will define which direct outcomes, drivers and assumptions of the project need to be assessed and measured – based on which indicators – to allow adequate data collection for the evaluation of project effectiveness, likelihood of impact and sustainability.

The inception report will also include an initial **stakeholder analysis** identifying key stakeholders, networks and channels of communication. This information should be gathered from the project documents and discussion with the project team. See Annex 7 for template.

The **evaluation framework** will present in further detail the overall evaluation approach. It will specify for each evaluation question under the various criteria what the respective indicators and data sources will be. The evaluation framework should summarize the information available from project documentation against each of the main evaluation parameters. Any gaps in information should be identified and methods for additional data collection, verification and analysis should be specified. Evaluations/reviews of other large assessments can provide ideas about the most appropriate evaluation methods to be used.

The inception report will also present a tentative **schedule for the overall evaluation process**, including a draft programme for the country visit and tentative list of people/institutions to be interviewed.

Effective communication strategies help stakeholders understand the results and use the information for organisational learning and improvement. While the evaluation is expected to result in a comprehensive document, content is not always best shared in a long and detailed report; this is best presented in a synthesised form using any of a variety of creative and innovative methods. The evaluator is encouraged to make use of multimedia formats in the gathering of information eg. video, photos, sound recordings. Together with the full report, the evaluator will be expected to produce a **2-page summary of key findings and lessons**. A template for this has been provided in Annex 9.

The inception report will be submitted for review and approval by the Evaluation Office before the any further data collection and analysis is undertaken.

When data collection and analysis has almost been completed, the evaluation team will prepare a short **note on preliminary findings and recommendations** for discussion with the project team and the Evaluation Reference Group. The purpose of the note is to allow the evaluation team to receive guidance on the relevance and validity of the main findings emerging from the evaluation.

The main evaluation report should be brief (no longer than 40 pages – excluding the executive summary and annexes), to the point and written in plain English. The report will follow the annotated Table of Contents outlined in Annex 3. It must explain the purpose of the evaluation, exactly what was evaluated and the methods used (with their limitations). The report will present evidence-based and balanced findings, consequent conclusions, lessons and recommendations, which will be cross-referenced to each other. The report should be presented in a way that makes the information accessible and comprehensible. Any dissident views in response to evaluation findings will be appended in footnote or annex as appropriate. To avoid repetitions in the report, the authors will use numbered paragraphs and make cross-references where possible.

Review of the draft evaluation report. The evaluation team will submit a zero draft report to the UNEP EO and revise the draft following the comments and suggestions made by the EO. Once a draft of adequate quality has been accepted, the EO will share this first draft report with the Project Manager, who will alert the EO in case the report would contain any blatant factual errors. The Evaluation Office will then forward the first draft report to the other project stakeholders, in particular [list] for their review and comments. Stakeholders may provide feedback on any errors of fact and may highlight the significance of such errors in any conclusions. It is also very important that stakeholders provide feedback on the proposed recommendations and lessons. Comments would be expected within two weeks after the draft report has been shared. Any comments or responses to the draft report will be sent to the UNEP EO for collation. The EO will provide the comments to the evaluation team for consideration in preparing the final draft report, along with its own views.

The evaluation team will submit the final draft report no later than 2 weeks after reception of stakeholder comments. The team will prepare a **response to comments**, listing those comments not or only partially accepted by them that could therefore not or only partially be accommodated in the final report. They will explain why those comments have not or only partially been accepted, providing evidence as required. This response to comments will be shared by the EO with the interested stakeholders to ensure full transparency.

Submission of the final evaluation report. The final report shall be submitted by Email to the Head of the Evaluation Office. The Evaluation Office will finalize the report and share it with the interested Divisions and Sub-programme Coordinators in UNEP. The final evaluation report will be published on the UNEP Evaluation Office web-site www.unep.org/eou.

As per usual practice, the UNEP EO will prepare a **quality assessment** of the zero draft and final draft report, which is a tool for providing structured feedback to the evaluation consultants. The quality of the report will be assessed and rated against the criteria specified in Annex 10.

The UNEP Evaluation Office will assess the ratings in the final evaluation report based on a careful review of the evidence collated by the evaluation consultants and the internal consistency of the report. Where there are differences of opinion between the evaluator and UNEP Evaluation Office on project ratings, both viewpoints will be clearly presented in the final report. The UNEP Evaluation Office ratings will be considered the final ratings for the project.

At the end of the evaluation process, the Evaluation Office will prepare a **Recommendations Implementation Plan (RIP)** in the format of a table to be completed and updated at regular intervals by the Project Manager. After reception of the Recommendations Implementation Plan, the Project Manager is expected to complete it and return it to the EO within one month. (S)he is expected to

update the plan every six month until the end of the tracking period. As this is a Terminal Evaluation, the tracking period for implementation of recommendations will be 18 months, unless it is agreed to make this period shorter or longer as required for realistic implementation of all evaluation recommendations. Tracking points will be every six months after completion of the implementation plan.

Logistical Arrangements

The Consultant’s Team. This Terminal Evaluation will be undertaken by two independent evaluation consultants contracted by the UNEP Evaluation Office. The consultants will work under the overall responsibility of the UNEP Evaluation Office and will consult with the EO on any procedural and methodological matters related to the evaluation. It is, however, the consultants’ individual responsibility to arrange for their travel, visa, obtain documentary evidence, plan meetings with stakeholders, organize online surveys, and any other logistical matters related to the assignment. The UNEP Project Manager and project team will, where possible, provide logistical support (introductions, meetings etc.) allowing the consultants to conduct the evaluation as efficiently and independently as possible.

The evaluation team will consist of a Team Leader and one Supporting Consultant. The Supporting Consultant will evaluate the Agro-forestry and Landscape Rehabilitation and Mer Sud projects and the Team Leader will evaluate the CSI Development Cooperation Platform project, carrying out desk-based progress reviews of the two ongoing projects and addressing the evaluation of the overall portfolio.

The Team Leader will coordinate data collection and analysis, and the preparation of the main report for the evaluation, with substantive contributions by the Supporting Consultant. Both consultants will ensure together that all evaluation criteria and questions are adequately covered. (Full details about the specific roles and responsibilities of the team members are presented in Annex 1 of these TORs).

The Team Leader should have at least 20 years of technical / evaluation experience, including of evaluation large, regional or global programmes and using a Theory of Change approach; and a broad understanding of large-scale, consultative assessment processes and factors influencing use of assessments and/or scientific research for decision-making. They will have experience of government capacity building and policy implementation within an environmental context. The Supporting Consultant will have a solid environmental education and professional experience; adequate monitoring and evaluation experience; and experience in managing partnerships, knowledge management and communication. They will have experience in ecosystems management and rehabilitation and livelihoods adaptation and strengthening.

By undersigning the service contract with UNEP/UNON, the consultants certify that they have not been associated with the design and implementation of the project in any way which may jeopardize their independence and impartiality towards project achievements and project partner performance. In addition, they will not have any future interests (within six months after completion of the contract) with the project’s executing or implementing units.

Schedule of the Evaluation

Table 7 below presents the tentative schedule for the evaluation.

Table 7. Tentative Schedule for the Evaluation

Milestone	Deadline
Evaluation consultant contract signed	25 th March 2016
Inception Report	29 th April 2016
Evaluation Mission	May 2016

Telephone interviews, surveys etc.	May 2016
Note on preliminary findings and recommendations	31st May 2016
Zero draft report	30 th June 2016
Draft Report shared with UNEP Project Manager	15 th July 2016
Draft Report shared with project team	22 nd July 2016
Draft Report shared with stakeholders	29 th July 2016
Final Report	26 th August 2016