

Note on lessons learnt from UNEA-3 – comments –

Paras on general assessment of UNEA 4 (first 3 paras on page 2):

- ⇒ Adoption of **Ministerial Declaration** clearly is a success;
- ⇒ The qualifier “universal” may not be appropriate;
- ⇒ Key for the successful adoption of the declaration was the transparent and inclusive process under the clear guidance of the president.

- ⇒ Adoption of **resolutions and decisions** is similarly a success – one important factor for this was the good organization with the OE-CPR immediately before UNEA, the CoW, the contact groups and the friends groups.

- ⇒ The note speaks of the **tremendous success** of 405 concrete voluntary commitments by governments, civil society and business and 2.3 mil. pledges from individuals. How are these pledges captures? How is their implementation monitored?

- ⇒ The note speaks of **tremendous possible impacts** such as that more than 1.4 bill. people worldwide will breath clean air, 30% of the wolrd’s coastlines will be clean, lead in paint and fuels will be eliminated, 18,6 bill. USD will have been invested in research and innovation. We believe that UNEP should be credible in its claims, therefore, if these references are needed at all, please provide information on:
 - => how will this impact be monitored and calculated?
 - => how is the causality with UNEA be established?

- ⇒ There were 65 participants at **ministerial level, and that private sector** was engaged as never before:
 - => some JUSSCANNZ members noted troubling lack of coordination in many of the side events, dialogues and mulita-stakeholder activities, and were concerned that some stakeholders left UNEA unimpressed
 - => how was ministerial participation / private sector engagement at the previous UNEAs and GCs?
 - => how is it compared with the ministerial participation / private sector engagement at MEA HLS of 2017 (BRS, Minamata, UNFCCC, CBD).

Lessons Learned of Strategic and Political Significance

- ⇒ 3rd para: the approach that the organization of UNEA-3 was **overseen by the CPR** and the UNEA Bureau “generated stronger confidence in the process and joint ownership of its outcomes”:
- => Some JUSSCANNZ members have highlighted that the “preparatory process before the OECPR was somewhat disorganized and at times unclear ...” and that there is space for improvement of the negotiation schedule;
- => we have the impression that there were several moments of confusion and lack of clarity with regard to the respective roles of the UNEA Bureau on the one hand and the CPR and its

Bureau on the other hand in preparing for UNEA-4. We would welcome a clearer division of the respective roles.

- ⇒ 4th para: what is the basis for the statement that the focus on a theme has galvanized **global attention** on the work of UNEA?
- ⇒ 4th para: Visibility and global impact of UNEA should be nevertheless increased: What for? We think UNEA-4 had good visibility. Most importantly: visibility is not an objective in itself, but a tool to achieve something. What would be the objective of further increased visibility?
- ⇒ 5th para: we agree that the adoption of a **ministerial outcome** represents a major step forward. The main factor for this success seems to be the clear, inclusive and transparent process led by the president before and during UNEA.
- ⇒ There is clearly a need for “integrated and coordinated implementation” for the decisions of UNEA-3. This is less clear for the ministerial statement, as this is primarily a political statement.

Sub-bullets on highlights of initial assessments:

Generally, seem to be too positive and thus not very helpful

- ⇒ 1st sub-bullet: unclear what “effective transparency, ownership and inclusiveness during the inter-sessional period” means;
- ⇒ 2nd sub-bullet: the formulation “Early consensus amongst Member States” is misleading, as the UNEA Bureau has to decide;
- ⇒ 3rd sub-bullet: is there really a need for additional **regional ministerial meetings**? What would be the cost implications? Do the PoW and Budget foresee such regional ministerial meetings? What is important is that there is early an agreement on the theme for the High Level Segment of UNEA-4 so that already existing regional meetings such as AMCEN can during their ordinary meeting also prepare for UNEA.
It has also to be noted that at least the “ministerial” meeting organized for the WEOG-Region was not a big success and was probably irrelevant for UNEA-4.
- ⇒ 4th sub-bullet: support timely circulation of documentation
=> in fact, JUSSCANNZ members highlighted that distribution of UNEA documentation was late and not respecting rules of procedures.
- ⇒ 5th sub-bullet: funding of the participation of Major Groups should not be the key priority.
- ⇒ 7th sub-bullet: organizing the **OECPR back-to-back with UENA** has been appreciated as successful by all JUSSCANNZ members and most see it as a model to be followed.
JUSSCANNZ members acknowledge that the UNEA decision on the dates of UNEA-4 has led to a de facto decision that the next OECPR will be again organized back to back with UNEA. However, some JUSSCANNZ members also highlight the need for the future to better coordinate dates with the Geneva agenda and the need to consider for the future the respective roles of OECPR, CPR, and potentially the annual sub-committee and the possible burden of potential 2-week meetings.
- ⇒ 8th sub-bullet: Transparent agreement on chairs and co-chairs of sessional bodies: what are sessional bodies? Our impression was that the agreement on the chairs and co-chairs for CoW and contact groups was transparent.
- ⇒ 9th sub-bullet: the format with a separate place for ministerial statements for those ministers who would like to make such a statement seems to be working and may be repeated.
=> it would be interesting to see how many countries did not make such a statement, as they did not see a need/benefit for it (such as e.g. Switzerland).
- ⇒ 10th sub-bullet: the online and interactive resolutions platform worked well.
- ⇒ 11th sub-bullet: the “innovative one-stop online registration system” was rather confusing. We clearly prefer the older, simpler system.
- ⇒ 12th sub-bullet: we did not note an especially “effective protocol, immigration and logistics” by the Government of Kenya. On the contrary: the line and waiting time at the airport was very

long, also for diplomats and representatives for the High Level Segment. This sub-bullet may be deleted.

- ⇒ 13th sub-bullet: informal deadlines on submission leading to “deeper consideration of proposals”: we believe that every country must have the right to submit proposals late, moreover, sometimes consideration of specific topics that need expertise from capital is done more effectively only at UNEA.

Sub-bullets on challenges:

- ⇒ 1st sub-bullet: good planning is always good;
- ⇒ 2nd sub-bullet: enhance visibility is certainly ok, but it is important to bear in mind what the objective of increased visibility is (visibility should be a tool to achieve something, not a goal in itself);
- ⇒ 3rd sub-bullet: we believe it is important that the CPR can fully fulfill its role to support preparation of UNEA-4 by overseeing the work of UNEP, reviewing the implementation of the PoW and of the resolutions, and to prepare for the new PoW and budget. CPR should receive adequate time for this and adequate support, including timely and good documentation;
- ⇒ 4th sub-bullet: we are not convinced that UNEA is insufficiently funded;
- ⇒ 5th sub-bullet: the capacity of Gigiri seems to be fine, problem is not lack of capacity, but insufficient planning and coordination of meetings and side-events. During UNEA, priority in room allocation should be given to the contact groups resp. to the ministerial consultations;
- ⇒ 7th sub-bullet: the concern that some major groups were not satisfied with their role / space at UNEA-3 was shared within JUSSCANNZ. In order to address this concern, it would be appropriate to ask stakeholder and major groups for their comments / suggestions;

Conclusion and key recommendations:

Management of the inter-sessional period:

- ⇒ 1st sub-bullet: It is not clear to which key recommendations the term “several” refers, this should be clarified;
The role of CPR and UNEA Bureau should indeed be clarified. We see a crucial role of the CPR in overseeing the work of UNEP, in reviewing the implementation of the PoW and of the resolutions, and in preparing the new PoW and budget. CPR should receive adequate time for this and adequate support, including timely and good documentation.
- ⇒ 2nd sub-bullet: CPR should indeed agree on the date of the next OECPR. JUSSCANNZ members support to organize it next time again back-to-back with UNEA, the decision on the date of UNEA-4 is seen as a de-facto agreement on the back-to-back session. In fact, there is not sufficient time to organize a meaningful OECPR stand alone and earlier.
At the same time, this arrangement should be carefully considered at the next UNEA in light of the past experiences, of the respective roles of the different bodies, the possible costs/benefits of a 2 week session and in the light of the shift of the UN Budget process to a yearly budget. It is not clear why the Major Groups should be involved in the planning of the next OECPR.
- ⇒ 3rd sub-bullet: The UENA bureau is responsible for the preparation of the provisional UNEA Agenda; there is a clear GEO-6 process responsible for the preparation of the input into UNEA;
- ⇒ 4th sub-bullet: support
- ⇒ 5th sub-bullet: Member States should be *invited* to do so.
- ⇒ 6th sub-bullet: CPR should focus its energy on the oversight of UNEP and on PoW and budget; in several areas which require specific expertise of the competent expertise of ministries, pre-negotiations of resolutions by the CPR is not necessarily useful. Moreover, many countries are not represented in the CPR in Nairobi. Thus, there is no need for “extended informal-formal sessions” focusing on these issues in the lead-up to UNEA.
- ⇒ 7th sub-bullet: The rules of procedures should be respected. There is no need to change them.

Resourcing for UNEA

- ⇒ We are not convinced that additional resources from the UN regular budget or from extra-budgetary contributions from Member States are needed;
- ⇒ Holding UNEA is a key task of UNEP and should be covered through the core-budget;
=> What amount is foreseen for organizing UNEA in the UNEP Environment Fund budget?
=> What additional costs than budgeted by UNEA would be needed? Why were these not included in the budget?

Strengthening procedures and governance of UNEA:

- ⇒ 1st sub-bullet: support timely distribution of documents
=> JUSSCANNZ members have stressed that this was a problem in the lead-up to UNEA-3 and that deadlines were not always respected;
- ⇒ 2nd sub-bullet: there is no need to review the rules of procedures;
- ⇒ 4th sub-bullet: support that the UNEA bureau should continue to exercise ownership of preparing UNEA-4. Consultations by bureau members with their groups is crucial;
- ⇒ 5th sub-bullet: What does that mean concretely? The CPR has a crucial role in overseeing implementation of and in preparing of PoW and budget – we are sometimes concerned that the CPR does not have sufficient space and support to fulfill this critical task but is distracted by activities for which the added value of the CPR is limited.

Transparency, ownership and inclusiveness:

- ⇒ 1st sub-bullet: Not convinced by the need of new or additional regional ministerial preparatory meetings;
- ⇒ 2nd sub-bullet: support, this is a task of the UNEA bureau and should be done in good consultations by bureau members with their regional groups;
- ⇒ 4th sub-bullet: it is important that UNEA Bureau members ensure these consultations with their regional groups;
- ⇒ 5th sub-bullet: the same approach as for UNEA-3 should be followed: the president should lead this process in a clear, transparent, and inclusive manner.

More effective HLS

- ⇒ 1st sub-bullet: Not convinced by the need of additional regional ministerial preparatory meetings;
- ⇒ 3rd sub-bullet: what does this mean and imply?
- ⇒ 4th sub-bullet: Why is the Science-Police-Business Forum not also including other civil society than business? The forum should not conflict with the needs of UNEA, namely with regard to rooms for informal and informal-informal negotiations.
- ⇒ 5th sub-bullet: support continuation of space for national statements for those who want to make such a statement
=> how many states did make, how many did not make such a statement at UNEA-3?

Global visibility of UNEA

- ⇒ Visibility should not be seen as an objective in itself but as a tool to achieve a certain policy objective. Therefore, it would be good to assess what the objective of enhanced visibility of UNEA would be, based on this, targeted measures can be developed.