



United Nations Environment Programme

**Evaluation of the
UNEP Sub-Programme on
Disasters and Conflicts**

MAIN REPORT

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Working papers

Core service area assessments

- Disaster Risk Reduction
- Environment, Conflict Prevention and Peace-building
- Disaster Recovery
- Post-crisis Environmental Assessments

Country case studies

- Afghanistan
- Sudan
- Sierra Leone
- Haiti
- Jamaica

The working papers can be obtained from the UNEP Evaluation Office upon request.

Acronyms

APELL	Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies on a Local Level Programme
CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
D&C	Disasters and Conflicts
DCPI	UNEP Division of Communication and Public Information
DEPI	UNEP Division of Environmental Policy Implementation
DEWA	UNEP Division of Early Warning and Assessments
DRC	UNEP Division of Regional Cooperation
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DTIE	UNEP Division of Technology, Industry and Economics
EA	Expected Accomplishment
EC	European Commission
Eco-DRR	Eco-system management for DRR
ECP	Environmental Cooperation for Peacebuilding
EO	UNEP Evaluation Office
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICCA	International Council of Chemicals Associations
IETC	International Environmental Technology Center
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
JEU	Joint Environment Unit (UNEP and OCHA)
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PCDMB	UNEP Post-Conflict and Disaster Management Branch
PEDRR	Partnership on Environment and Disaster Risk Reduction
RiVAMP	Risk and Vulnerability Assessment Methodology Development Project
ToC	Theory of Change
UNCT	UN Country Team
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction

UNEP Disasters and Conflicts Sub-programme Evaluation – Main Report

1 Summary of findings and recommendations

Introduction

- i. Between September 2011 and August 2012, the UNEP Evaluation Office has conducted an evaluation of UNEP's Disasters and Conflicts (D&C) Sub-programme covering the period 2006-2011. The evaluation aimed at assessing the strategic relevance and performance of the Sub-programme to determine results achieved and analyse the factors and processes affecting sub-programme performance across its four main intervention areas: post-crisis environmental assessments, post-crisis environmental recovery, environmental cooperation for peace building and disaster risk reduction.
- ii. This "Summary of findings and recommendations" presents the main findings of the evaluation as well as key recommendations and opportunities for improvement (highlighted in **bold**).

On strategic relevance

- iii. UNEP's involvement in the environmental dimensions of disasters and conflicts (D&C) is fully justified by the evolving global context and growing needs, and fully aligned with UNEP's mandate as expressed in UN General Assembly Resolutions and Reports, Governing Council Decisions and the Medium-Term Strategy 2010-2013. UNEP's comparative advantages in the area of environmental causes and consequences of conflicts and disasters is clear as well. UNEP's post-crisis interventions have demonstratively added value in many countries. In post-conflict countries UNEP's niche is usually well defined due to UNEP's longer-term presence, relatively strong funding base and good integration with broader UN programming. **It is, however, important for UNEP to also better specify its niche in disaster risk reduction and post-disaster recovery work in consultation with other UN agencies and INGOs with perhaps larger implementation resources and firmer long-term commitment at the country level.**
- iv. Overall, the areas of focus of the Disasters and Conflicts Sub-programme are relevant to global and country needs: There is a need for better integration of environmental considerations in disaster risk reduction (DRR) approaches and vice versa and better preparedness for industrial accidents. Both rapid and more in-depth post-crisis environmental impact assessments have proved essential to help prioritize environmental issues in humanitarian response and development assistance. There is also a growing need for environmental emergency support in the immediate aftermath of disasters and, subsequently, longer-term environmental recovery assistance as identified by the environmental assessment. Finally, it is necessary to better integrate risks and opportunities from natural resources and the environment in peacebuilding strategies.
- v. The overall strategic focus of the D&C Sub-programme is clear, with a first Programme Framework covering the preventive aspects of D&C, addressing conflict and disaster vulnerability from environmental factors, and a second Programme Framework focussing on post-crisis emergency response and recovery. Programme Framework 1 comprises environmental management for peacebuilding, eco-system management for DRR (Eco-DRR) and environmental emergency preparedness, which are treated in a rather disconnected way. Programme Framework 2 includes three more or less sequential components: post-crisis environmental impact assessment, integration of environmental priorities in recovery and peacebuilding planning, and country capacity building for improved environmental governance and management. While the separation of the preventive and recovery dimensions can be justified by the need to attract broader attention to crisis prevention and risk reduction – beyond those countries where a crisis has already occurred– the evaluation considers the joining of disasters and conflicts in both Programme Frameworks rather artificial. There is also something to be said about the location of the DRR area of work within the D&C Sub-programme. At first glance, it seems rather obvious that DRR would be part of this Sub-programme but, in reality, contribution by the "broader" UNEP to DRR currently happens mostly through the Climate Change Sub-programme, compared to which the DRR work in the D&C Sub-programme is quite small. Besides, on the global DRR arena, climate change adaptation has been getting more and more

attention and, certainly, more and more funding. Having a single centralized team within the D&C Sub-programme working on DRR might have its advantages in terms of coordination, but **if there is a desire to formally assign a UNEP-wide coordination role to the DRR team, then it needs to continue building its understanding of what UNEP as a whole is doing in the field of DRR, further improve on its communication and work more on the collaborative culture between units involved in DRR-related activities across the organization. In particular, UNEP should better use its growing capacity and role in the field of climate change adaptation to leverage attention and funding for environmental management approaches to DRR (Eco-DRR). A stronger connection between UNEP's climate change adaptation work and Eco-DRR work is needed both conceptually and programmatically.**

- vi. Broadly speaking, the D&C Sub-programme follows two distinct intervention strategies. The predominant one is a needs-based, demand-driven, country-level approach that accounts for more than two thirds of the sub-programme portfolio in terms of mobilized funding. This approach is used in post-crisis countries, where assessments, emergency response and recovery assistance must be tailored to the specific country needs and context because of the high diversity of situations. As a logical result, there is no common country intervention approach to speak of – each programme is tailor-made. However, this approach is rather unique in UNEP as an organisation, where most interventions are normative in nature and piloted from UNEP headquarters or regional offices. **In fact, there is a need for UNEP to better define the concept of “country programme”. More clarity is needed on what defines a UNEP country programme, what the different operating modalities can be, which conditions or criteria justify the creation of a country programme, when, how and to whom should a country programme be handed over etc.**
- vii. The second intervention strategy is a more supply-driven, top-down approach, where principles, concepts and tools - that have been tested and demonstrated on the ground by UNEP or others - are disseminated at the global or regional level. This is the more common approach in UNEP as a whole and the main intervention approach of the preventive and preparedness work of the sub-programme, i.e. the projects promoting environmental management for DRR and peacebuilding and environmental emergency preparedness. The evaluation concludes that both intervention strategies are appropriate for the types of projects and programmes they are used for and the objectives they try to achieve, but **linkages between the global work and the interventions in post-crisis country programmes could be strengthened to make more use of existing opportunities in terms of knowledge exchange and mobilization of global partnerships at the country level. Also, in country programmes where both approaches are mixed specifically in those instances where environmental management tools are locally piloted, a lot of efforts have gone into building local capacity but the relevance of these pilots could be increased by giving more attention to their dissemination and up-scaling at the national level through strategic partnerships.**
- viii. In terms of geographic targeting, the Sub-programme is global in scope in the areas of advocacy and training towards governments and international organisations, but, according to UNEP strategic documents, country assistance would be granted primarily to those countries that are particularly vulnerable to natural hazards or conflict with a strong environmental dimension. The limited number of “environmental management for DRR” pilot interventions have been focused on a few Indian Ocean Tsunami-affected countries and hurricane-prone Jamaica and the APELL programme has been concentrated in Latin America and the Asia-Pacific region. In both cases, presence of committed public agencies and capable technical institutions has oriented the country choice towards middle-income countries rather than the poorest or most vulnerable countries. **Because of the high vulnerability of African countries to droughts and floods, possibly exacerbated by climate change, and also relatively higher risks of industrial accidents because of generally poor working conditions and safety standards, these countries should receive more support from the D&C sub-programme in the field of disaster risk reduction and environmental emergency preparedness.** Peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery work was, however, resolutely focussed on fragile states where strong links exist between conflict and natural resources and, with the exception of Afghanistan, this work has been concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa. As regards post-disaster assistance, the UNEP-OCHA Joint Environment Unit (JEU) was involved in rapid environmental assessments and emergency assistance when requested, in most cases by facilitating the participation of environmental experts in UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) missions. In-depth environmental assessments and longer-term recovery support by PCDMB teams was provided following major disasters and conflicts when funding was available. Especially in post-conflict countries (but also some disaster-prone countries such as Haiti) the erosion of not only the environment but also the environmental policy and institutional

frameworks and international connection to the multilateral environmental agreements certainly justify UNEP's support and longer-term presence. But UNEP cannot be everywhere. In truth, UNEP does not have formal criteria to select countries where more in-depth and longer-term intervention is justified and the first impression might be that "UNEP goes where the funding is", that is that country choice is driven by donor interests rather than country needs or the UNEP mandate. However, funding has often become available due to UNEP's own fundraising efforts, and therefore UNEP does make decisions regarding country choice. **The issue of country selection criteria to decide where a more long-term and in-depth UNEP involvement (a country programme) is justified should definitely be addressed.**

On effectiveness

- ix. In the medium term, the D&C Sub-programme is expected to contribute to improved and equitable environmental management and governance for disaster risk reduction, improved environmental emergency response, conflict prevention and peace building, and environmental recovery in supported countries. UNEP's efforts are focussing on building different dimensions of capacity in countries vulnerable to disasters and conflicts, as the immediate outcomes, so that environmental management and governance can be improved in the medium-term. Whether these capacity building efforts can effectively contribute to changes in environmental management and governance, depends on the degree to which these immediate outcomes have effectively been achieved and the extent to which the required drivers and assumptions are present. On the basis of a reconstructed Theory of Change of the Sub-programme, six immediate outcomes were identified corresponding to different dimensions of country capacity for environmental management and emergency preparedness. It should be mentioned that across the D&C Sub-programme evaluative evidence on the achievement of outcomes and higher level results is weak, in part due to the difficulty of developing and measuring indicators at those levels. Therefore, the evaluation had to rely a lot on assessing the quality of outputs -and processes to deliver those outputs- as proxies for the achievement of outcomes.
- x. The D&C Sub-programme has been very successful in *enhancing availability and access to environmental information* in the aftermath of natural and industrial disasters and conflicts by delivering quality post-crisis environmental impact assessments in numerous crisis-affected countries. Increasingly professional communication strategies and plans helped ensure that the newly generated information was accessed and internalized by the right target audiences. Assessment results were usually well accepted by all, sometimes even by opposing parties, because UNEP was widely believed to provide neutral and independent, science-based information. **It would be useful to set up a system to track the follow-up on rapid environmental assessment findings and recommendations, to provide clearer evidence of their utility and possibly generate valuable lessons for future assessments. UNEP and OCHA should also rethink the current practice of allowing governments to refuse the publication of environmental assessments, because currently, in case a Government would refuse, there is a real risk that valuable findings and recommendations will never be known outside very restricted circles and, therefore, possibly never be acted upon. UNEP, when participating in an UNDAC post-crisis needs assessment mission, should systematically be mentioned as a contributing agency in the report because better visibility of UNEP's contribution can raise the credibility of the environment section of the report.** Within the period covered by this evaluation, most in-depth assessments by PCDMB were conducted in post-conflict countries and their reliability and usefulness was overall considered very high. Assessments have also laid the foundation for UNEP's continued post-conflict recovery support to some countries such as Sudan, Afghanistan and Sierra Leone. **While flexibility has to be allowed to adjust to a particular country and crisis context, standardizing more the format of assessment reports could be an opportunity for clearer communication, easier comparison between assessments, and better branding of UNEP.** In-depth post-crisis assessment reports are usually well written and illustrated but **the sometimes tedious section on assessment methods and techniques should be presented in annex rather than in the beginning of the main report and in-depth assessment reports should systematically be accompanied by a summary for policy makers (cf. DRC Assessment).** Also, **more efforts could have gone into equipping country-level stakeholders with the tools and skills to update or generate new knowledge and information by themselves.** Some have been directly involved in assessments and field research, and should have acquired new skills through that involvement, but **the Sub-programme could do more in terms of production of manuals, tool kits and training material, to capitalize better on more than 12 years of post-crisis assessment experience.** An exception to this has been in the "preventive" Programme Framework 1 where significant attention was given to the development of assessment

tools, their demonstration in a limited number of pilot countries and their dissemination through publications and training.

- xi. UNEP has provided technical assistance and training to several governments of natural disaster and conflict affected countries for *improving environmental and emergency preparedness strategies and planning*. The evaluation is quite confident that UNEP post-crisis assessments, sometimes followed by more specific field research on environment-conflict or -disaster linkages, have also influenced strategies and planning by raising awareness and understanding among decision makers. During the period under review, UNEP supported several disaster-affected countries in integrating environmental needs and priorities into recovery plans and, in a few cases, UNEP's support went further and led to the preparation of stand-alone environmental recovery strategies. Also in post-conflict programme countries, UNEP has in some instances supported government agencies directly with the development or up-dating of general and sector-specific environmental strategies and plans. The D&C Sub-programme has also directly promoted the use of assessment information for DRR planning in a limited number of countries, supported emergency preparedness planning as part of local APELL demonstrations, both in industrial parks and coastal tourism sites, and advised on the design of local, coastal protection projects. Planning for DRR has been indirectly supported as well, through a training initiative on Eco-DRR in partnership with the Partnership on Environment and Disaster Risk Reduction (PEDRR).
- xii. UNEP post-crisis assessments and occasional field research on more specific themes are likely to have influenced *policy making towards more sustainable environmental management*. In a few post-conflict countries, UNEP has also provided direct policy advice, in particular on how to integrate assessment and field research recommendations in environmental policy. Understandably, direct policy support was concentrated in those countries where UNEP has a longer-term country presence because policy work usually requires long-term engagement and close collaboration and trust relationships with the relevant decision makers.
- xiii. The D&C Sub-programme has contributed to *enhancing environmental regulatory frameworks* in a handful of post-crisis countries aiming at reducing the environmental impact of disasters, conflicts and reconstruction efforts, as well as promoting more sustainable post-crisis reconstruction. UNEP assisted governments with improving a quite varied and dispersed set of laws, regulations, technical standards and guidelines. In post-conflict country programmes, UNEP also managed to influence regulatory frameworks through its assessments, research, advocacy and, sometimes, direct technical assistance. In some cases, UNEP has played an advisory role in key regulatory processes led by other development partners.
- xiv. Better awareness and understanding through assessments, field-research and training courses have contributed to *enhance technical and managerial skills* in supported countries, but need to be paired with technical advice during practical use of concepts and tools by in-country stakeholders in research, policy development, planning etc. This immediate outcome was achieved to a certain extent where UNEP provided technical advice to efforts led by national and local stakeholders, such as in demonstration sites, where pilot project stakeholders received technical coaching during the practical implementation of UNEP-promoted environmental management and industrial emergency preparedness approaches. Generally speaking, skills development has usually not been comprehensive in terms of whose skills were built or of what kind of skills were built. Most attention was given to policy and planning skills, while assessment, management, monitoring and enforcement skills have received less attention. Across the post-conflict country programmes, skills were built for staff of a rather limited number of government agencies and other national partners in varied fields such as field research, community-based environmental planning, conduct of awareness campaigns, development of laws and regulations, and verification of compulsory environmental impact assessments by extractive industries. The D&C Sub-programme's direct engagement in environmental restoration and management projects in post-disaster situations has been rather limited and mainly focussed on the same countries where assessments and policy/planning support has been provided. In those quite dispersed cases, UNEP provided very specific technical advice to government and communities that were engaged in restoration and reconstruction efforts, contributing to their implementation skills. In the area of DRR and environmental emergency preparedness, implementation skills have been built in many demonstration sites. Unfortunately, due to lack of funding, the most recent Eco-DRR project could not link its training programme to practical field work as planned.
- xv. UNEP has contributed to *strengthening of environmental institutions* in those crisis-affected countries where UNEP has a longer-term country presence. Understandably, no institutional support was provided in the area of

DRR, because of the typically shorter, more localized and less intensive country engagement strategy in the countries supported by the DRR teams.

- xvi. The evaluation identified three drivers and three assumptions that are required for enhanced country capacity (on the dimensions discussed above) to effectively lead to changes in environmental governance and management for better crisis prevention and preparedness and more sustainable recovery from disasters and conflicts. These drivers and assumptions are highlighted in *italic* and discussed in the following paragraphs.
- xvii. *Integration of environmental considerations into UN and other international organisations* is considered a crucial outcome driver because these organisations often provide support to countries that goes beyond capacity building, directly supporting government agencies and other stakeholders with environmental management for recovery and improved resilience from disasters and conflicts. Certain organisations also play a major role in replication and up-scaling of UNEP capacity building efforts beyond the relatively limited geographical areas where UNEP is directly active. On the other hand, integration of environmental considerations into DRR, peacebuilding and recovery efforts led or executed by other international organisations also has a direct bearing on the environment and by making these organisations aware of their own environmental impact it is likely that they pay greater attention to the environment in their own programming. At the global level, the D&C Sub-programme has been very active in advocacy and training towards the UN and other international agencies to bring the environment on the forefront of DRR, recovery and peacebuilding approaches. UNEP is the focal point for environment in the UNDG, where it advocates for incorporating environmental issues in emergency and recovery policies, guidelines and operations. It is also the focal point for environment in the humanitarian coordination system, providing technical support to the humanitarian system to integrate environment into their programmes and plans. Through the Environment Network, UNEP has raised awareness, developed assessment tools, trained responders, provided technical assistance on environmental considerations and advocated for the inclusion of environmental components in Flash Appeals and Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP). The projects promoting environmental management for DRR have produced several communication outputs and held dissemination events to promote integration of environmental concepts and tools into policies and practices of international organisations, and there is already some evidence of effective influence by UNEP. The Environmental Cooperation for Peacebuilding (ECP) programme has been successful in introducing natural resources and the environment as both critical peacebuilding assets and potential sources of conflict in UN policy, guidelines and training curricula and kept track of these achievements. At the country level there is also evidence of integration of environmental concerns in UN and other international organisations' programming and interventions due to efforts of the UNEP post-conflict country programmes, but success was highly dependent on the supportiveness of the "leading" agencies in the UN Country Team (UNCT). After major disasters, UNEP has at times deployed experts to support United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) and UNCT teams to ensure that the environment was integrated into UN recovery operations, most often by advocating for giving the environment a prominent role in UN recovery strategies and, when needed, for ensuring that environmental issues received due consideration in OCHA Flash Appeals. But the integration of environmental concerns into humanitarian operations was sometimes seriously hampered by a lack of funding and staff resources, and also limited interest and support from humanitarian agencies' headquarters. **More global (head quarter-level) advocacy efforts could be done towards the humanitarian community on integrating environmental consideration in humanitarian assistance.**
- xviii. *Ownership of risk reduction and recovery processes and decisions by non-governmental stakeholders* is essential to change attitudes of all capacitated actors, and governments in particular, driving behavioural change. In the D&C Sub-programme civil society, community and private sector participation takes place in varying degrees in assessments, planning and implementation, but is usually of a consultative nature and can rarely be considered as true participation in decision making, management and monitoring. **Participation and ownership by non-governmental stakeholders could be stronger, so that these stakeholders feel responsible to change their own life choices, or hold themselves and others (such as government actors) accountable to comply with agreements and decisions made.** In most countries targeted by the sub-programme – particularly those emerging from conflict – national and local-level capacity tends to be very low, hampering true participation. **In a few country programmes, stronger non-governmental stakeholder participation is already actively promoted by UNEP through training, close collaboration in field activities, community-based environmental planning demonstrations etc., but there is a need for a more systematic learning mechanism from these experiences and the experiences of others.** Also, reaping the benefits of these experiences may require a longer-term

engagement at the community level that may well be beyond UNEP's mandate. **UNEP's role could be focussed more on collecting, assessing and disseminating "upwards" the local experiences of NGOs that are better placed to engage on a continuing basis with communities but have less voice with the government and international organisations based in the capitals. For this UNEP needs to strengthen its collaborative partnerships with organisations that could provide longer-term presence and upscale pilot experiences.**

- xix. Another important driver for more sustainable and equitable environmental governance is *adequate interaction, alignment and complementarity between groups and organisations involved in environmental management*. UNEP has directly and indirectly contributed to environmental cooperation at the supra-national level (between two or more countries), in particular through the Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC) partnership and the ECP programme. At the national level, UNEP's support has been focussed so far on relationships between government institutions, and in particular on bringing the environmental agencies – which received the lion's share of UNEP's capacity building support – out of isolation and obtain stronger cooperation from sector ministries such as agriculture, forestry, water and mining. In the field of DRR, the APELL approach is also very conducive to building relationships between government, the private sector and communities living and working close to industrial areas. These relationships are absolutely essential for improving accident prevention and emergency preparedness. In environment-DRR demonstration countries, the PCDMB team has also somewhat promoted **collaboration between the traditional DRR institutions (National Centres for DRR, civil protection agencies etc.) with environment-related agencies** by involving them both in training sessions and, where possible, in field demonstration projects, but **more could be done in this regard. This is particularly important because environmental management is often considered outside the mandate of the traditional DRR institutions, and they need the environmental agencies' support to promote a change in environmental management practices to support DRR.**
- xx. There is a first, overall assumption that, in the countries where the D&C Sub-programme operates, *the political and security situation will remain relatively stable*. Another assumption is that *countries will dispose of adequate resources (human and financial) to translate their enhanced capacities into effective changes in environmental governance and management*. The evaluation found that these assumptions do not always hold true, and therefore, in some cases, there is a moderate to high risk that immediate outcomes (enhanced country capacity) achieved by UNEP will not lead to significant behavioural change or impacts further up the causal pathways. For instance, the risk that the security situation deteriorates where D&C staff are working on the ground is real in many post-crisis countries. Even though the D&C teams have learned, to a certain extent, to cope with insecurity, there is definitely a limit to where UNEP teams, and their local partners, can continue operating on the ground without putting persons in danger. Security risks often seriously hamper the movement, and therefore the effectiveness, of field staff. Political instability, another real risk in many D&C countries, can result in the removal of people with whom UNEP has developed a trust relationship from key decision making positions, temporary closure of key national partner institutions, interruptions in counterpart funding flows, restrictions of access to information and project sites etc. **Wider and long-term country-level partnerships with government and civil society organisations could provide a safety net to UNEP to cope better with political instability.**
- xxi. In terms of resources, long-term funding to address environmental issues is often lacking because countries affected by disasters or conflict have usually a very weak financial resource base and the environment is in most cases not a priority concern for the governments and for most donors. Accessing funds for environment from donors may pose an increasing challenge to national partners, because of an evolution in many donors' development funding strategy and poor national capacities to develop programmes and projects to international standards. **In both areas the D&C Sub-programme could put more emphasis: on scaling up its global advocacy efforts to ensure that adequate development aid remains earmarked for environment, and on improving national capacities in post-crisis countries to mobilize funding to address environmental issues.** Private sector funding is probably an important part of the future, notably for environmental clean-up and rehabilitation of contaminated sites because of industrial activity or for industrial emergency preparedness. **The D&C Sub-programme could put more efforts in mobilizing this funding source, even though it can never fully replace government funding. Also, UNEP rules and regulations regarding accessing private funding would need to be simplified.**
- xxii. As regards human resources, there are two aspects: numbers and stability. Staff numbers in supported countries are usually insufficient at all levels and this often seriously constrains the capacity of national partners to absorb all the technical support that UNEP can offer. Turn-over of senior staff in government agencies has remained

relatively low so far, even though UNEP's focus on a limited number of people within a very limited number of institutions does constitute a risk for continuity. More junior, well trained technical staff tend to be more volatile in that they are often attracted by better paid positions with international organisations operating in the country. Turn-over of staff in international organisations is also a serious problem, because induction of new staff in complex post-crisis country situations requires much time and effort, and cooperation with key international partners at the country level can really be affected by personal interests and relationship issues. The success of UNEP's D&C country programmes is based in part on the good personal relationships and very good understanding of the country context acquired with time by a relatively small number of UNEP staff. If these staff were to leave the country team, there could be serious consequences for the continuity of the country programme. **UNEP teams working at the country level should better think through hand-over and staff induction strategies to reduce the impact of both internal and external staff movements.**

- xxiii. As mentioned above, in the medium term, the D&C Sub-programme is expected to contribute to improved and equitable environmental management and governance for disaster risk reduction, improved environmental emergency response, conflict prevention and peace building, and environmental recovery in supported countries. To reach this medium-term outcome, the challenge is to have all immediate outcomes, drivers and assumptions discussed above sufficiently achieved or present in any given country to enable behavioural change needed for a reduction of threats and vulnerabilities, and ultimately a positive impact on the sustainability of environmental benefits and livelihoods. If one or more immediate outcomes, drivers or assumptions remain lacking, they constitute obstacles or bottlenecks and the likelihood of achieving lasting change in terms of environmental management and governance is reduced, as is the likelihood of contributing to sustainable recovery of environmental benefits and livelihoods. Obviously, UNEP cannot be expected to ensure by its own efforts alone that all these elements are present and has therefore targeted its capacity building efforts towards the most important gaps in the countries' institutional framework, where UNEP, with its mandate and limited resources, believes it is likely to make a difference. Also, UNEP has made considerable efforts to partner with and seek leverage from other aid agencies, in particular those belonging to the UN system, so that other major gaps beyond UNEP's reach, could be filled. This increases the likelihood of achieving medium-term outcomes and impact in the supported countries. There are signs of country-wide improvements in environmental management and governance in the countries supported by UNEP, but these can only credibly be attributed to UNEP's work in those few countries where UNEP, through a permanent presence for an extended duration, provided continued and intensive country support. Where UNEP projects provided training and coaching linked to field demonstrations, e.g. with the APELL programme, or with coastal managers in Thailand and Indonesia, or on monitoring of industrial mining sites in Sierra Leone, behavioural changes might also have been triggered, even though in a limited manner. But a strong basis for replication and up-scaling is being built through partnerships and efforts for knowledge sharing at a broader scale.

On sustainability, replication and up-scaling

- xxiv. There are several factors that affect the sustainability of results achieved, both inherent to the Sub-programme and external to it. The facts that national government agencies are in most cases the primary beneficiaries of UNEP's support and that they are always closely involved in – and sometimes leading – UNEP-supported pilot initiatives, ensure that ownership by national government is usually high. However, **UNEP's support could often be more broadly targeted on a larger number of government institutions than is currently the case and should also reduce its dependency on a relatively small number of very good personal relationships within these institutions.** Also, ownership by non-governmental stakeholders remains weak, with some exceptions. The lack of long-term funding to address environmental issues constitutes another a serious threat to sustainability of all types of capacity building results achieved in most fragile states. In resource-rich countries emerging from conflict, there might be opportunities to redress the financial resource base of the countries by improving natural resource governance, but the risks of relapse into disputes and conflict are high and the financial situation of countries can also very quickly deteriorate. There are also a few very positive signs of increasing private sector funding. Some significant results achieved as regards policies, strategies, planning and regulatory frameworks should also contribute to sustainability. However, **even in the countries where UNEP already provided quite intensive support, governance structures and processes remain fragile and may need further strengthening for considerable time to come: in none of the current D&C country programmes is early withdrawal of UNEP advisable.** Also, continued corruption, poor management practices and environmental negligence in many

countries can hamper sustainable outcomes. These are, of course, much larger issues than UNEP alone can address.

- xxv. Replication and up-scaling of UNEP's direct results is essential to drive change at a larger scale, i.e. beyond the relatively few partner countries and demonstration sites. A key element of the up-scaling strategy is the promotion of up-take of UNEP concepts and tools by public and private partners at the national and international level, and the broader, international D&C and environmental communities, who in many cases cover a much larger geographic area than UNEP projects are able to cover directly. These actors are expected to integrate the concepts and tools in their own approaches and work. The D&C Sub-programme promotes this in two ways: by involving these actors directly through partnerships at the national and international level, and through communication (publications, presentations at major events etc.) and training. As mentioned above, a piloting-and-dissemination approach has been at the core of the prevention-focussed Programme Framework 1. For instance, in the area of peacebuilding work, the ECP programme has produced many knowledge products to equip national stakeholders, the UN and the EU systems with the necessary awareness and tools and has made significant progress in establishing new partnerships and building a community of practice. The programme has created an active Expert Advisory Group on Environment, Conflict and Peacebuilding that leverages the technical expertise and networks of different organizations. The ECP also catalysed and is an active member of the UN Interagency Framework for Preventive Action which coordinates the EU-UN Partnership on Natural Resources and Conflict. Eco-DRR has been promoted in the first place by the projects developing the concepts and tools, through communication products, trainings and dissemination events, with encouraging results in terms of replication in-country and statements of interest for replication by other countries. The PEDRR partnership – a mix of international environment and disaster/emergency agencies – is currently the main instrument to up-scale eco-DRR outside the pilot countries. The platform serves as a forum for knowledge exchange, but has also, under UNEP's leadership, prepared and started rolling out a training of trainers program on ecosystem-based DRR.
- xxvi. In countries where UNEP has been present for some time, it has played a significant catalytic role, for example by assisting countries to accede to key multilateral environmental agreements, linking to GEF to secure funding for enabling activities, ensuring that the countries could fulfil their obligations under the conventions. However, in several countries, despite some encouraging signs, catalytic effects in-country have remained limited and **UNEP should develop stronger operational partnerships with other key UN agencies**. Replication of certain types of assessments by other partners would be possible because the teams conducting those assessments have capitalized on the experience by making an effort to formalize the approach and tools in a manual, and sometimes even to organize training courses (for example, the rapid environmental impact assessment approach built into post-crisis needs assessments, the RIVAMP environment-sensitive disaster risk assessment method, the APELL approach, and Conflict Analysis Framework for post-conflict environmental assessments). However, **some major environmental impact assessments such as the Ogoniland assessment would also merit to be better capitalized on by developing guidelines, lessons learned etc. so that, if such assessments were to be conducted again, the assessment teams will have useful learning and guidance to rely on.**

On factors affecting sub-programme performance

Sub-programme design and structure

- xxvii. As regards the overall results framework, the evaluation found that many Expected Accomplishments, PoW Outputs, project outcomes and outputs are not pitched at a results level that corresponds to the current UNEP definitions. **EAs and project outcomes should be pitched at the immediate outcome level, which corresponds to change that is a direct result of stakeholders using project products and services outside the project setting. In the D&C Sub-programme this corresponds best with enhanced country capacity** and, therefore, only EA(1) is pitched at the right level. However, **EA(1) should also capture the work on environmental emergency preparedness, that due to the APELL programme constitutes more than three quarters of the disaster risk reduction component of Programme Framework 1 in terms of secured funding**. Most PoW Outputs combine several services or products of a different nature, and some contain results at different results levels with a cause-to-effect relationship. Many PoW Outputs and project outputs contain a result statement that is at an outcome level or even higher. **Outputs should be pitched at the level of services or products delivered by UNEP's interventions. A PoW Output can be quite generic to encompass several project outputs of a very similar nature and purpose – in that sense PoW Outputs are rather “categories” of products and services**

delivered by UNEP. Pitching project outputs at a too high level is neither fair nor helpful in the process of monitoring project performance and steering the project towards achieving its outcome(s).

- xxviii. The intervention logic of the *projects* in the D&C portfolio is globally coherent and strategic. Different phases are usually well linked and complementary: consecutive phases build progressively upon the results of previous phases, and an evolution can be seen between projects belonging to a same core service area or country programme. However, project design quality is rather heterogeneous, with an overall improvement in the quality of ProDocs since the PoW 2010-2011. For instance, **how management and supervision arrangements are expected to be set up and to function could often be described in more detail, as could the roles of collaborating UNEP units.** Complementarities between projects delivering roughly the same PoW Outputs are usually well described but **connections with other groups of projects should also be made explicit, especially between groups that belong to the same programme framework.** While the list of external partners is generally well pondered, **more details on the specific roles and responsibilities of partners should be provided.**
- xxix. **ProDocs should also present a credible and explicit exit strategy for assuring sustainability of results,** which is often lacking. In particular, hand-over modalities to other parts of UNEP or external partners should be explicitly presented in sufficient detail, because these are extremely important given the purpose and scope of the D&C Sub-programme. In contrast with the “older” generation of projects in the D&C portfolio, most projects under the PoW 2010-2011 had only limited funding secured at the time of design and approval. **Projects with a significant funding gap should only be approved if they present a credible way to promote and ensure mobilization of resources, or a well-reasoned prioritization of outputs that can be achieved in case insufficient funding should be secured.** Many ProDocs pre-dating the PoW 2010-2011 have incorporated gender into project plans mainly because it was a requirement, without truly examining how the projects could contribute to gender equity. Some more recent ProDocs present – in a few lines – how women and the poor will be engaged in key project activities such as assessments, emergency planning and training, but more details should be provided. This could help with the design of more gender and poverty sensitive responses to environmental emergencies. **A dramatic improvement of project design quality would, however, require more adequate, dedicated core funding for project design which is currently absent in most cases.** Resources (staff time and funding) for the design of new projects are currently drawn mainly from on-going projects.
- xxx. A number of “projects” are actually programmes with several components combined that could very well constitute interlinked but stand-alone projects. It is hard to see an overall programme logic emerging from the project documents, except in very broad terms. Causal or other linkages between programme components have not been thoroughly pondered and synergies and complementarities between the different components are poorly explained. In addition, because of the specific format of the UNEP ProDoc template the level of detail for each component is usually insufficient. Donors often request more detailed project documents following their own formats. **It is recommended to present such programmes in the future as a set of individual projects, with a “cover page” that provides the common background and justification for the projects, and the overall Theory of Change of the programme, including synergies and complementarities between the projects.**

Sub-programme organisation and management

- xxxi. The D&C Sub-programme is, to a large extent, managed from Geneva, by the PCDMB of DEPI. Only a few programmes are managed by others such as ENVSEC by the Regional Office for Europe and APELL by the SCP Branch of DTIE. **Cohesion and team work within the D&C Sub-programme could be improved:** even though synergies and inter-linkages exist among different initiatives, they are to a large extent designed in isolation and managed by small and rather isolated teams led by highly experienced senior staff who, in the opinion of their colleagues, are not always the best team players.
- xxxii. The internal management and supervision processes within the Sub-programme seem to be well defined and functioning, partly perhaps due to the small size of the core D&C Sub-programme team. The head of PCDMB also is the D&C Sub-programme Coordinator but has delegated a considerable portion of his coordination duties to an Acting Sub-programme Coordinator and this arrangement has worked well in the particular context of the D&C Sub-programme where most of the interventions are managed by a single branch of UNEP. However, even though the Acting Sub-programme Coordinator puts a lot of effort in playing her role in an as transparent, neutral and inclusive manner as possible, there is still a potential conflict between PCDMB interests and sub-programme interests because she reports to the PCDMB Head. More importantly, **if this set-up is to be maintained, the**

Acting Sub-programme Coordinator function, which is currently funded by project funds, **would need adequate, dedicated core resources to cover staff costs, travel expenses, coordination meetings etc.**

- xxxiii. Supervision arrangements within the Sub-programme are the traditional UNEP supervisor-supervisee arrangements, with supervisors providing strategic guidance and technical back-stopping. But supervisors are also often very closely involved in project activities, which is not best practice in terms of maintaining a clear management-supervision firewall, but probably unavoidable in very small teams. Usually a senior long-term staff member from PCDMB supervises several staff members or consultants on short-term contracts due to funding constraints. There is frequent communication and exchange between the Sub-programme Coordinator, Acting Sub-programme Coordinator and the programme and project managers. The projects seem to enjoy a high level of trust and are given considerable freedom in terms of design and delivery of their interventions. **The arrangements for the country programmes should be more standardized, though, for instance in terms of delegation of authority to the programme managers.**
- xxxiv. The majority of the projects in the current D&C Sub-programme portfolio has no classic Steering Committee because the structure was supposed to be replaced by a D&C Advisory Committee comprised of the Sub-programme Coordinator, the Acting Sub-programme Coordinator, the PCDMB Operations Manager, one staff from DEWA and one staff from DTIE, one staff member from each relevant Sub-programme, one staff member from each RO and external experts by invitation. However, this committee has never been set up because of time and resource constraints and the projects, therefore, have no “external” entity to review progress and to provide strategic guidance. **It is recommended to create the D&C Advisory Committee as envisaged.** There are a few exceptions, where projects have some form of a formal advisory or steering group such as ENVSEC or ECP.

Human and financial resources

- xxxv. **D&C Sub-programme staff** were found competent and experts in their field of work. A general issue across the D&C Sub-programme is that human resources are frequently over-stretched to deliver quality work within deadlines. In some ways, however, the problems related to insufficient human resources are the consequences of a successfully growing programme, partly due to the lack of dedicated UNEP core resources and to some extent related to management systems that are not well suited to becoming operational at the field level. The Sub-programme relies quite heavily on consultants, in particular for the conduct of post-crisis environmental assessments. While this brings the advantage that UNEP is able to hire the best suited experts available for a particular job, and for just the amount of time needed to complete the job, **UNEP should also consider the time and cost implications of hiring consultants, and the losses in terms of internal capacity building and lesson learning.** Short duration of contracts and the insecurity regarding their renewals has set pressure on human resources and work motivation. **It is imperative that contract security is improved for all staff and that staffing requirements of all functional units are fully met. The latter is a condition for some other recommendations of this evaluation to be feasible, as these would require additional staff time and efforts.** Despite the sometimes uncertain contract conditions, constant heavy workload and, at country level, sometimes very challenging working conditions, the turn-over rate of personnel within the D&C Sub-programme is low. D&C Sub-programme staff seem to have a high degree of ownership of their work and the nature of the work, visibility and close interaction with beneficiaries might add to their high job satisfaction. Also from an administrative point of view the Sub-programme has found creative ways for retaining consultants, which has enabled the Sub-programme to keep the same individuals on board for longer periods of time. The sub-programme has, however, experienced difficulties in recruiting qualified people to fill vacant positions at the country offices where working conditions can be very challenging.
- xxxvi. **Administrative arrangements**, such as human and financial resources management, recruitment and procurement procedures are appropriate for UNEP’s more normative and largely office- and capital-based work, but largely inadequate for the field-level operations conducted by the D&C Sub-programme. **They should be thoroughly reviewed and adapted. UNEP’s achievements and aspirations in post-conflict situations would deserve better organisational and administrative arrangements for field-based operations (such as environmental impact assessments) and longer term country presence.** Cumbersome administrative regulations and processes have caused many delays in programme delivery, which sometimes affected the credibility of UNEP in the eyes of partners. Moreover, the delays and complex procedures also affect partners (including individual contractors) at times, and might discourage their future commitment. As regards the country level operations, UNEP does not have the necessary procedures or capacity to provide administrative and operational

support, making UNEP reliant on other UN institutions such as UNDP, which makes procedures sometimes overly complex and time consuming. In some cases, staff need to be “creative” to avoid unacceptable delays and bottlenecks. **UNEP should also put special operating procedures and administrative management processes in place to support work in countries with severe security constraints** so that UNEP staff and collaborators are not put at unacceptable risk due to inadequate rules and procedures, despite the best efforts by management and administrative staff.

- xxxvii. Exact financial data on projects and other activities under the D&C Sub-programme are hard to get by and patchy at best, as it is for all other UNEP Sub-programmes. The D&C project portfolio for the period under review had an estimated total planned budget of US\$ 137.3 million and a programmed (mobilized) budget of US\$ 159.4 million. For the current PoW 2010-2011 the total planned budget is approximately US\$ 37.1 million of which US\$ 30.6 could be mobilized. In previous biennia project costs were sometimes estimated on the basis of fund mobilization prospects rather than real project funding needs, which were often higher than anticipated. For the biennium 2010-2011, project designers have been encouraged by UNEP’s Quality Assurance Section to “think big” and estimate costs based on real funding needs, regardless of fund mobilization prospects. As a result, mobilized funding was significantly less (about 17 per cent less) than was required in the project design documents. **Project design and budgeting should be as realistic as possible on both accounts: in terms of financing needs (putting a realistic cost on what UNEP wants to achieve) and in terms of resource availability (keeping the scope of the interventions within the limits of the available resources).**
- xxxviii. Environmental recovery projects account for more than two thirds of D&C Sub-programme project portfolio over the period under review, with most funding going to the post-conflict country programmes in Sudan and Afghanistan. Disaster risk reduction and emergency preparedness projects take only a very small portion of D&C Sub-programme funding, in part because of resource mobilization difficulties during the previous years.
- xxxix. The D&C Sub-programme is funded almost entirely by extra-budgetary resources. The proportion of core funding going to the D&C Sub-programme is significantly lower than to any other UNEP sub-programme. This is a consequence of the Sub-programme’s particular success to mobilize extra-budgetary resources from a dozen key donors, but is actually in contradiction with the D&C Sub-programme’s mandate and purpose within the organisation. **UNEP should allocate more core resources to the D&C Sub-programme. This would be more in line with the overall UNEP mandate, which is global and not limited to the countries where the donor community might believe that UNEP support is required. It would also make the Sub-programme more flexible to quickly assign resources to areas of need in response to environmental emergencies and requests for assistance from countries in crisis. Furthermore, this could provide a more stable and reliable funding base for the preventive side of the Sub-programme which has struggled at times to raise adequate extra-budgetary funding.**
- xl. **On the other hand, it is important to consider the success of the Sub-programme to mobilize extra-budgetary funding when thinking about handing over certain interventions to other Sub-programmes in UNEP who might not have built the same credibility and trust relationships with donors interested in funding environment-related interventions in post-crisis countries.** The D&C Sub-programme has developed an exemplary Resource Mobilization Strategy since 2009 which has been regularly updated with the evolving context of humanitarian and development aid financing. The two main areas of focus proposed by the strategy certainly make sense: **first to make sure that the environmental dimensions of disasters and conflicts become and remain a priority in policies, strategies, plans and financing frameworks of donors and crisis countries alike; and second to increase the submission of high quality programme and project proposals to relevant, both traditional and new funding sources.**
- xli. Seventy per cent of the Sub-programme’s project funding originates from 5 key donors: the UK, Finland, the EC, Norway and Sweden. The top three donors among them fund very specific interventions and the relationships between them and the D&C sub-programme can be considered narrow but stable for the near future. Other funding sources have, however, often been tapped “ad hoc” rather than based on long term partnerships, which is not favouring funding security for the Sub-programme. The evaluation fully supports the Sub-programme’s intention to **maintain and enhance relations with bilateral donors, the traditional “top” donors in particular. This is essential to ensure financial stability and predictability for the Sub-programme and will require a shift in approach towards longer-term relationships, an increased diversification of what is funded by those donors and stronger engagement with donors at the country level.**

- xlii. Almost all funding to the D&C Sub-programme is “development” funding. In line with the Sub-programme’s Resource Mobilization Strategy, **in order to leverage humanitarian financing, the sub-programme will need to make additional outreach efforts – both with donors and humanitarian partners on the ground – to make the case for addressing environmental issues as part of humanitarian response, and will also need to participate more systematically in pooled humanitarian funding mechanisms, such as Flash Appeals and the Consolidated Appeal Process. UNEP should seek wider recognition in the UN system and beyond that part of its work in post-crisis countries is actually humanitarian assistance. Stronger engagement in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), for instance, would enable UNEP to garner both visibility and credibility as a humanitarian partner.**
- xliii. The Shell Petroleum Development Company (Nigeria) Ltd. was the largest public-private sector donor to the D&C Sub-programme with its significant (and somewhat controversial) contribution to the Nigeria Ogoniland environmental impact assessment. Until now, however, the D&C Sub-programme’s engagement with the private sector has been quite weak, partly because of the stringent rules and regulations applied by UNEP when it comes to accepting direct funding from the private sector. **However, there are alternative approaches that can be explored such as direct funding of local implementation partners or partnering with international partners who can access private sector donations more easily.** In more general terms, as recommended by the Sub-programme’s Resource Mobilization Strategy, **the D&C Sub-programme should do some more research on alternative multilateral and non-traditional funding opportunities and, in collaboration with UNEP’s corporate Resource Mobilisation Section, enter into dialogue with new potential donors to advocate its case and better understand the funding opportunities and conditions.** Multilateral sources include the UN Peacebuilding Fund, the UN Trust Fund on Human Security, country-specific Multi-donor Trust Funds for post-crisis countries, and several D&C-related funds managed by the World Bank. Non-traditional donors include decentralized cooperation, private foundations and the private sector. The evaluation also supports the recommendation in the Resource Mobilization Strategy **to strengthen and diversify the Sub-programme’s relationship with the European Union.**

Cooperation and partnerships

- xliv. The D&C Sub-programme has succeeded in establishing good external partnerships. These are very important in order to achieve a wide array of immediate outcomes and outcome drivers with limited resources. The depth of partnerships as well as distribution of roles and responsibilities, however, varies. At the international level, partnerships are fostered mostly by projects in Programme Framework 1 to reach a wider audience for UNEP’s advocacy and awareness raising work and to add weight to UNEP’s messages. The longstanding partnership between UNEP and OCHA through the Joint Environment Unit to conduct rapid environmental assessments is very useful because OCHA’s operational procedures and the UNDAC mechanism are designed to mobilize experts and logistics at much shorter notice than UNEP procedures would allow. The same partnership allows UNEP to bring an environmental dimension to UNDAC Disaster Response Preparedness missions assessing countries’ preparedness for natural and industrial disasters. The need to relying on partners also has risks, however, because there is a certain loss of control over what really happens to UNEP’s concepts and tools once they have been adopted by partners. With respect to JEU-supported UNDAC disaster preparedness assessments, and from a UNEP perspective, it could be considered problematic that the delivery of a UNEP PoW Output (214) is to a large extent in the hands of another organisation (OCHA). **UNEP needs to think of ways to better monitor and maintain an adequate level of quality control over how UNEP’s concepts and tools are put to practice or disseminated by partners, and over the JEU’s delivery on the UNEP PoW.**
- xlvi. At the country level, UNEP also strongly relies on partnerships with other UN agencies, government institutions and civil society since UNEP lacks the resources to conduct large scale capacity building programmes by itself. UNEP’s ability to catalyse environmental action by international organizations at the country level depends on the level of field presence that can be maintained for participation in the UN Country Teams. UNEP’s collaboration with the UNCTs has been quite strong as regards identifying environmental risks and integrating environment in the recovery plans. Partnering with UN agencies and other humanitarian and development organisations in a post-crisis context has, however, often been difficult since environmental concerns are seldom considered as a priority. Country-level partnerships with other UN agencies on a more long-term operational level are quite limited in number and scope and often said to be so due to lack of higher-level institutional agreements. However, even if “global” collaborative agreements exist between UNEP and another organization, such as

UNDP, collaboration at the country level does not necessarily take place and seems to depend on the country teams and their personal priorities and relationships. Joint planning is strong in some components of country level interventions, but it is more common that UNEP is in charge of project design and management, and that partners supply logistics, administrative support and some technical advice only. **For disaster recovery work, partnerships and cooperation could be strengthened especially at the project planning stage: international partnerships developed through global advocacy work could be used more to foster joint planning and implementation at the country level.**

- xlvi. At the country level UNEP has been quite successful in establishing good partnerships with government agencies meeting a double purpose: development and testing of approaches and practices, and capacity building. Both are essential for ownership, sustainability and institutional up-take of practices and approaches. Especially in cases where UNEP's resources were very limited but the agenda was large, UNEP has adopted a technical advisory role within national partnerships rather than being itself a full executing agency, and this approach helped to foster greater ownership by the national partners. Sometimes collaboration with government institutions is, however, challenged because of low capacity, both in terms of skills and resources, within the relevant government institutions. Also, UNEP's partnerships with governments often rely on very few institutions which is risky as mentioned above. Partnerships with civil society organizations are established to execute small-scale demonstration projects or field research within the longer-term country programmes at a country level, but, in general are relatively limited.
- xlvii. Even though there are a few positive examples, across the D&C Sub-programme, collaboration with other UNEP divisions and branches could be much stronger because many opportunities exist. The D&C Sub-programme is mainly delivered by PCDMB and there is much room for increasing interactions with other UNEP divisions or other DEPI branches. The country programmes often resemble a 'mini-UNEP' covering themes that could also be well at home in other Sub-programmes and functional units of UNEP. PCDMB, within the D&C Sub-programme is, in a way, assembling the standard UNEP products from other parts of UNEP and delivering them in a post-crisis context where the operational capacity and experience of other UNEP entities is lacking. **There is really an opportunity for stronger collaboration and communication within the organization, because the PCDMB, as the main implementer of the D&C Sub-programme, could rely more on the UNEP branches with a high level of expertise in specific fields, and, similarly, the other UNEP divisions and DEPI branches could learn a lot from PCDMB experience with long-term country programmes, unique to the D&C Sub-programme.** The most commonly stated reason for the lack of programmatic collaboration within UNEP, despite some disparate efforts by the PCDMB, is the absence of cross-divisional work plans and resources as well as limited staff-time. **UNEP funding and staffing arrangements and procedures need to be adapted to the changes in the organizational structure and pooling of resources for joint-planning and implementation should be made possible to allow for more efficient collaboration among different divisions. UNEP also needs to develop a stronger organisation-wide incentive system for both intra-divisional and cross-divisional consultation, knowledge exchange and cooperation, which hardly exists at the moment. Adequate staff time needs to be set-aside to allow more frequent and systematic communication and experience sharing between different functional units and Sub-programmes of UNEP. The envisaged D&C Advisory Committee could also play an important role in promoting stronger collaboration across the organization. Another proposed initiative to promote intra-agency collaboration that should be carried through is the regular meetings between the sub-programme coordinators to facilitate joint planning, to develop joint policies and to ensure that the designed activities and outputs are more closely coordinated.**
- xlviii. The role of Regional Offices in the D&C Sub-programme has usually been limited to liaison activities and assisting in establishing national and regional contacts and selecting partners. The working relationship between PCDMB and ROs has generally been good but **various capacities of Regional Offices could be used better if a joint planning and implementation arrangement would be put in place.** Very rarely have ROs been involved in project development and implementation. **ROs could play a more important role in D&C country programmes, even taking over the coordination of the longer-term recovery support from the PCDMB. But for the ROs' to run country programmes efficiently, their operational capacity, funding and delegated authority need to be improved.**

Reporting, monitoring and evaluation

- xlix. Progress reporting in the D&C Sub-programme has improved considerably since the PoW 2010-2011. Before 2010, reporting requirements for projects lacked clarity on the contents, periodicity, reporting lines and reporting responsibilities. Progress reports for individual projects are scarce and, when they exist, of very variable quality. Most completed projects also lack a completion report worth the name. Currently, reporting in the D&C Sub-programme, which is a shared responsibility between the project managers and the (Acting) Sub-programme Coordinator, is quite systematic and standardized.
- i. Across the Sub-programme, monitoring is essentially done at the activity and output level. **Monitoring should also keep track of progress on immediate outcomes.** Currently, when mention is made of contributions to country capacity, this is usually assumed from the nature and quality of outputs delivered and evidence about capacity improvements is rarely presented. **For progress monitoring on immediate outcome and outcomes to be possible, better baseline information is needed, indicators need to be SMARTer, and a decent budget needs to be set aside for monitoring in project budgets.** Monitoring of the larger programmes within the D&C Sub-programme is quite uneven. The ECP and the Sudan Country Programmes are exemplary, with sound donor-imposed logframes and good practices in programme-wide monitoring of results at the outcome level. In other country programmes monitoring is focused mainly on outputs, activities and finances.
- ii. There is, overall, little independent evaluative evidence for the projects in the D&C portfolio. Even obligatory completion reports of a reasonable quality have not been prepared for most completed projects. Less than a quarter of the closed or inactive projects in the D&C Sub-programme over the last six years have been independently evaluated and only a few more underwent a semi-independent review. Not one of the post-disaster or post-conflict environmental impact assessments conducted by UNEP has ever been evaluated, even though such evaluations could be extremely useful to draw lessons from experience. The on-going projects in the D&C portfolio have not planned or budgeted for mid-term evaluations. Terminal evaluations, however, have been planned and more or less adequately budgeted for. **To strengthen the evaluative evidence base on achievement of Sub-programme outcomes and progress towards impact, it is imperative that all projects are independently evaluated around the time of completion. Good quality completion reports should be systematically prepared by the project teams to provide a strong basis for the subsequent independent terminal evaluation. The ability to demonstrate achievements at the outcome and impact level and being fully transparent on success and failure alike will help to improve branding of UNEP's D&C Sub-programme and support fund raising efforts for the Sub-programme's activities.**

2 Introduction and background

1. In line with the UNEP Evaluation Policy, the Evaluation Office Work Plans for 2010-2011 and 2012-2013 and in consultation with the UNEP Executive Office, the UNEP Evaluation Office (EO) has conducted a Sub-programme Evaluation of UNEP's Disasters and Conflicts Sub-programme. The Sub-programme Evaluation aims at assessing the strategic relevance and the performance of the D&C Sub-programme over the last three biennia (2006 to 2011) to determine results achieved and draw lessons for sub-programme improvement.
2. During the evaluation process, there were many opportunities for consultation between the Evaluation Team and the main targeted users of the Sub-programme Evaluation. The Terms of Reference, inception meetings and interviews, the Inception Report, numerous field visits and in-depth interviews, seven evaluation working papers, discussions on preliminary findings and recommendations for future Sub-programme design and this draft main report, all constituted opportunities for communicating findings and ideas as they emerged towards the intended users of the evaluation, and for obtaining their feedback, all along the evaluation process.
3. After presenting the broader context of the D&C Sub-programme, the Sub-programme Evaluation objectives and approach and the structure of the D&C Sub-programme, the evaluation proposes a re-constructed Theory of Change (ToC) of the Sub-programme. Based on this ToC, the evaluation proceeds with an assessment of strategic relevance of the Sub-programme. It then reviews the achievement of immediate outcomes, and the likelihood of impact and sustainability of results. Finally, the evaluation discusses the main factors affecting the performance of the Sub-programme.

2.1 Background – Environment, Disasters and Conflicts

4. Current trends suggest that more people, particularly in developing countries, will be affected by humanitarian emergencies in the coming decades. By 2015, climate-related disasters, such as floods and droughts, are predicted to affect over 375 million people on average every year¹. Other disasters (such as earthquakes) as well as conflicts driven by natural resources may affect many more.
5. As we move beyond the first decade of the new millennium, the links between the environment and security seem to be further confirmed. The world is witnessing an increasing number of climate-related disasters, such as the floods in Pakistan, massive forest fires in Russia caused by the worst heat wave in decades, the North American storm complex, landslides in Uganda caused by heavy rains and the worst drought in a century in South-western China, all occurring during the single year 2010. Conflicts triggered or fuelled by natural resources persist in several countries, while the consequences of land degradation are likely to further increase the risks of environment as a driver of conflict and migration.
6. UNEP² suggests that in the last 60 years, at least 40 per cent of all intrastate conflicts have had a link to natural resources, and that this link increases the risk of a conflict relapse. Since 1990, at least 18 violent conflicts have either been fuelled by 'high-value' natural resources like timber, diamonds, gold, minerals and oil, or originated from disputes over increasingly scarce ones like fertile land and water. In the context of fertile land and water, climate change is seen as a 'threat multiplier' exacerbating threats caused by persistent poverty or weak resource management. Conversely, sustainable management and equitable sharing of natural resources can help reduce disaster and conflict risk and provide a strong platform for recovery, prevention and sustainable development.

2.2 UNEP response to disasters and conflicts

7. UNEP is the principal body of the UN in the field of the environment with the role of global environmental authority. This includes setting the global environmental agenda, promoting the coherent implementation of the environmental dimension of sustainable development within the United Nations system, and serving as an authoritative advocate for the global environment.

¹ Oxfam, The Right to Survive, 2009

² UNEP, From Conflict to Peacebuilding: the Role of Natural Resources and the Environment, Geneva, 2009, p.8

8. In the late 1980s, the United Nations formally recognized the need to strengthen international cooperation in monitoring, assessing and anticipating environmental threats and rendering assistance in cases of environmental emergencies. General Assembly Resolution 44/224 (1989) was based on the acknowledgement by the Member States of the connections between environmental conditions, human health and development efforts. Since then, UNEP has been developing its capacity to address the environmental dimensions of disasters and conflicts based on subsequent mandates and requests by the UN General Assembly, the UNEP Governing Council and National Governments.
9. UNEP's efforts began as activities scattered around the organization within different divisions and based on different partnerships but became gradually more consistent and coordinated, as the recognition of the importance of addressing environmental factors of disasters and conflicts grew. For example, the Joint UNEP/OCHA Environment Unit (JEU) was established in 1994 to combine UNEP's technical expertise with the humanitarian response coordination structure of OCHA to rapidly mobilize and coordinate emergency assistance to countries facing conflicts, disasters and industrial accidents with significant environmental impacts. In 1998, the APELL (Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at Local Level) programme was launched as a tool to prevent industrial and technological accidents and minimize their environmental impacts. In 2003, the Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC) was established by UNDP, UNEP and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and later joined by the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe (REC) to reduce tensions and to increase cooperation through the joint management of natural resources and environmental threats in Eastern Europe, South Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia.
10. Following a conflict or a disaster UNEP has mobilized experts to assess the environmental consequences of the events. The first post-conflict assessment was conducted in 1999 in Kosovo followed by subsequent assessments in the Balkans. The mandate was given to UNEP by the Secretary General as a part of an attempt to include the environment as an element in post-crisis needs assessments. UNEP established a specialized task force, the Joint UNEP/UNCHS (Habitat)³ Balkans Task Force on extra-budgetary basis to assess the environmental effects of the Balkans war, including of the bombings of industrial sites in the Balkans. Based on these assessments, follow-up projects were designed and implemented, including a clean-up of contaminated sites in Serbia. The Task Force was eventually transformed into a Post-Conflict Assessment Unit in 2001 and finally, as result of the work in Balkans and the increased demand to assess environmental impacts in post-conflict situations, a Post-Conflict Branch (PCoB) was established in Geneva under the Division of Environmental Policy Implementation (DEPI) in 2003 with a mandate to address environmental priorities in post-conflict countries.
11. Also, a Disaster Management Branch (DMB) was established in DEPI to work on disaster risk reduction and conduct assessments of the environmental impacts of natural disasters. Finally, in 2007, the two branches, PCoB and DMB, were merged into one forming the Post-Conflict and Disaster Management Branch (PCDMB) based in Geneva and belonging to DEPI.
12. In 2008, the UNEP Governing Council accepted UNEP's Medium-Term Strategy (MTS) for the period 2010-2013, and authorized the Executive Director of UNEP to use the MTS in formulating the Programmes of Work (PoW) 2010-2011 and 2012-2013. The new MTS was based on UNEP's comparative advantages, mandate, scientific evidence, and an analysis of where UNEP could make transformative differences. It also represented a reform of UNEP towards an organization with more results-based planning and management, and strengthened UNEP's country and regional focus. The reform included a formulation of the UNEP PoW around thematic Sub-programmes, which were identified as Climate Change, Disasters and Conflicts, Environmental Governance, Ecosystem Management, Harmful Substances and Hazardous Waste, and Resource Efficiency.
13. The UNEP Disasters and Conflicts Sub-programme, coordinated by DEPI, provides a coordination framework to the efforts of the PCDMB, the JEU, APELL, ENVSEC and a few other smaller working units within UNEP to understand and reduce both the environmental causes and consequences of disasters and conflicts, and the impacts of environmental degradation from disasters and conflicts on human health, livelihoods and security. The four core service areas to Member States that UNEP has committed to deliver under the D&C Sub-programme are: (i) post-crisis environmental assessments; (ii) post-crisis environmental recovery; (iii) environmental cooperation for peace building; and (iv) disaster risk reduction.

³ The Task Force combined expertise from, among others, UNEP and UN-Habitat staff in Geneva and Nairobi, the Joint UNEP/OCHA Environment Unit, UNEP's Chemicals programme, GRID, and UNEP ROE

14. UNEP's entry point is assessing the environmental risks and impacts of disasters and conflicts. If there is need, and sufficient funding can be leveraged, UNEP engages in more detailed environmental assessments with follow-up activities in the form of a recovery programme. UNEP has been working with its partners in numerous countries recovering from disasters and conflicts, as well as implementing global projects to improve international response to disasters and conflicts, enhance disaster and conflict prevention measures and to strengthen collaboration among the various actors working in disasters and conflicts settings. UNEP is also part of the Early Recovery Cluster of the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) humanitarian cluster system established in 2005 with a responsibility of ensuring that environmental considerations are fully mainstreamed into relief and early recovery policy, planning and operations.
15. The first formal country project office established in Afghanistan in 2003 is still functioning and other project offices were later set up in Sudan, South Sudan, Haiti and Nigeria. The country offices provide more long-term and focused assistance to countries recovering from crisis in the form of strengthening environmental governance and promoting sustainable use of natural resources. Environmental assessments have been conducted in numerous countries such as Haiti, Afghanistan, Sudan, DRC, the occupied Palestinian territories, Nigeria and Lebanon highlighting the importance of addressing environmental considerations in crisis situations.

2.3 Objectives and approach of the Evaluation

Purpose of the Evaluation

16. The Evaluation aims at assessing the relevance and overall performance of UNEP work related to the environmental dimensions of disasters and conflicts in the last three biennia according to standard evaluation criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact). The Evaluation considers to what extent UNEP has contributed, in response to the growing demand from Member States, to addressing the environmental causes and consequences of disasters and conflicts and whether the results achieved are likely to reduce threats to human well-being from natural and man-made disasters with a strong environmental dimension.
17. The Evaluation is expected to help UNEP identify key lessons on strategic positioning, management arrangements and day-to-day programme implementation that will provide a useful basis for improved sub-programme design and delivery.
18. The Evaluation examines the relevance of UNEP's Disaster and Conflict (D&C) strategy and its delivery performance across its four main intervention areas (core service areas - CSAs):
 - (i) Post-crisis environmental assessments;
 - (ii) Post-crisis environmental recovery;
 - (iii) Environmental cooperation for peace building; and
 - (iv) Disaster risk reduction.

Scope of the Evaluation

19. The Evaluation covers UNEP's D&C-related work over the last three biennia (1 January 2006 to 31 December 2011). This does not imply, however, that the period before 2006 has been entirely ignored. The year 2005, in particular, was a pivotal year for D&C-related work within UNEP – and the UN as a whole – with the UN's (and UNEP's) involvement in recovery work after the Indian Ocean Tsunami, the creation of the Hyogo Framework for Action, and the establishment of the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) humanitarian cluster system. UNEP's performance before 2006 will not be assessed, but contextual elements, examples and lessons learned from the preceding years are still considered to assess to what extent these have been taken into account in planning and implementation of D&C related activities during the period under review.
20. The evaluation considered those projects that have been on-going (active) within the period 1 January 2006 and 31 December 2011. Projects inactive or closed before 1 January 2006 or started after 31 December 2011 have not been included. For the choice of projects, two periods need to be distinguished. In the first two biennia (2006-2009), the scope of the Evaluation is defined by the projects and "costed" divisional activities that fall under Expected Accomplishments and Programme of Work Outputs with an explicit reference to one or more of the four core service areas of the current Sub-programme. In the current Medium-Term Strategy period (2010-2013) and PoW (2010-2011), the disasters and conflicts theme constitutes a UNEP sub-programme on its own, and the scope of the Evaluation is limited to the projects and other activities classified under the Sub-programme. Nonetheless,

there can be a strong disaster risk reduction or environmental rehabilitation dimension to UNEP projects that are classified under other sub-programmes, for instance climate change adaptation projects. This evaluation looks at linkages between the D&C Sub-programme and those other interventions, but the assessment of the latter will be done as part of future Sub-programme evaluations. It should also be noted that the projects considered for this evaluation are only those that have passed the formal UNEP project approval process and have been registered in the UNEP Programme Information and Management System (PIMS)⁴.

21. The geographic scope of the evaluation is the same as the geographic scope of the D&C sub-programme discussed under Section 3.3 below. Most risk reduction work, including disaster risk reduction, conflict prevention/peace building and emergency preparedness initiatives under EA(1), have a global scope, with demonstrations or pilot testing at the country level. Post-crisis assessments and recovery work under EA(2) and (c), are mostly country-based. Therefore, the evaluation assesses Sub-programme performance both at the global and country level.
22. Given the large number of countries where the D&C sub-programme is operating, it was not possible for the evaluation team to assess all country-level assistance. Only a sample of countries were studied in-depth and the selection criteria for these countries are presented under the paragraphs 36-37 below.
23. In terms of assessment of results achieved, the evaluation of the sub-programme is pitched primarily at the immediate outcome level and above, that is at the level of the Expected Accomplishments and Sub-programme objective. Activities and outputs were reviewed as factors contributing to the achievement of outcomes and progress towards impact, rather than as expected results per se. Thus, the Evaluation did not comprehensively assess the conduct of activities or the delivery of outputs against work plans, but reviewed these lower-level results only to the extent that their delivery (or absence) has contributed to the achievement of immediate outcomes and higher-level results.
24. The project-level assessment has focussed primarily on global and regional projects and looked at sets of projects belonging to one or more core service areas of the D&C Sub-programme. Country-level projects were assessed as part of the country case studies conducted in a sample of representative countries. Given the relatively limited time and resources for the evaluation, it has been decided not to conduct an in-depth review of country-level projects in those countries that were not covered by the country case studies.

Evaluation target audience

25. The immediate and priority users of the Evaluation include:
 - The UNEP Senior Management Team, comprised of the Executive Director, the Deputy Executive Director, the Divisional Directors, the Director of the GEF Coordination Office, the Chief of the Executive Office and the Chief of the Office for Operations;
 - The Directors of the Regional Offices and RO staff involved in the D&C Sub-programme
 - Relevant staff from the Executive Office, and in particular the Chief Scientist and the Quality Assurance Section
 - The D&C Sub-programme Coordinator and other Sub-programme Coordinators
 - UNEP managers and other staff involved in the D&C Sub-programme, in particular: the Post-Conflict and Disaster Management Branch (Division of Environmental Policy Implementation), the Joint UNEP/OCHA Environment Unit (Emergencies Services Branch of OCHA), Built Environment Unit (previously called the Sustainable Building and Construction Unit) and the Business and Industry Unit (Sustainable Consumption and Production Branch, Division of Technology, Industry and Economics), and the Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC) hosted by the UNEP Regional Office for Europe,
 - The UNEP Committee of Permanent Representatives and the UNEP Governing Council/Global Ministerial Environmental Forum.
26. Interest in the Evaluation is likely to be shown by other stakeholders and partners, including: the UN Secretariat, UN or other international bodies working on disaster and conflict prevention and recovery, secretariats and offices of

⁴ During the inception phase of the evaluation, the evaluation team was provided with a D&C project list by the Sub-programme Coordinator, which was complemented by a few other D&C projects found in the PIMS. However, at the time of review of draft evaluation report, the evaluation team was notified that a few more projects were missing from the list of projects considered by the evaluation, i.e. projects that were not on the initial list provided by the D&C Sub-programme Coordinator nor present in the PIMS. E.g. a post-conflict environmental assessment conducted in Rwanda (2011) and a post-disaster needs assessment conducted after an oil spill in Ukraine (2008). These projects could not be considered by the evaluation and are not included in project counts and financial analyses.

relevant cooperation agreements, commissions and committees, NGOs and civil society groups, research centres and academia etcetera.

27. To increase learning and ownership by the evaluation audience, a participatory and collaborative approach was used, with much emphasis on interviews and opportunities for UNEP staff to comment on intermediate products of the evaluation.

Analytical framework of the Evaluation

Three inter-related areas of focus

28. At the overall Sub-programme level, the Sub-programme Evaluation assesses the relevance and appropriateness of Sub-programme objectives and strategy. It analyses the clarity and coherence of the Sub-programme's vision, objectives and intervention strategy, within the changing global, regional and national context, and the evolving overall mandate and comparative advantages of UNEP.
29. The evaluation further assesses the performance of the Sub-programme in terms of effectiveness (i.e. achievement of outcomes, sustainability, up-scaling and catalytic effects). The evaluation also review the potential or likelihood that immediate outcomes are leading towards impact, by verifying the drivers and assumptions made for impact achievement. Which immediate outcomes, drivers and assumptions are assessed, is determined by a reconstruction of the Sub-programme's Theory of Change.
30. The evaluation also looks in more detail at factors affecting Sub-programme performance: intervention design issues, organisational and management aspects, partnerships and specific business processes that affect the overall performance of the D&C Sub-programme.

Three units of analysis

31. The Sub-programme Evaluation was conducted at the level of three different "units of account and learning": at the level of the D&C sub-programme itself, the D&C core service area and the UNEP D&C country programmes. Given the relative complexity of the overall sub-programme, the two other units are more adequate units of account because the contribution to immediate outcomes and progress towards impact can more easily be attributed to UNEP outputs delivered within a core service area or in a particular country. They are also better units of analysis for learning, as they are better defined and delimited, and less complex than the sub-programme as a whole, but still provide the opportunity to see linkages between interventions either within or between main areas of intervention, or within a same country. Last but not least, the country-level assessments provide the much needed assessment of the linkages between the different core service areas, which are often present in sequence or in parallel in one same country.

Theory of Change

32. A "Theory of Change" (ToC) depicts the logical sequence of desired changes (also called "causal pathways" or "results chains") to which an intervention, programme, strategy etc. is expected to contribute. It shows the causal linkages between changes at different results levels (outputs, outcomes, intermediary states and impact), and the actors and factors influencing those changes. The reconstruction of a ToC can help to identify the immediate outcomes of UNEP's work and the intermediary states between outcomes and desired impact. It also helps determine the key factors affecting the achievement of outcomes, intermediary states and impact, including outputs (goods and services produced by the interventions) and other drivers, assumptions made and the expected role and contributions by UNEP and other key actors.
33. In most cases, UNEP will not have entire control over the processes towards achieving outcomes and impact. For example, there might be external factors, such as political will, which will partly determine if the delivered outputs will lead to outcomes and further to impacts. However, UNEP may be able to produce additional outputs or build on partnerships to increase the likelihood that desired changes will happen. Therefore, the reconstructed ToC includes the drivers and assumptions that may either promote or inhibit the various change processes identified.
34. Since impact is a result of a long term change, and requires specialised tools to be measured, this evaluation only assesses the potential (likelihood) of impact, and the processes in place and progress made towards it.

35. The evaluation has mapped out Theories of Change for different “units of analysis”: the four core service areas, the sampled country programmes and, bringing it all together, for the overall Sub-programme.

Selection criteria for case study countries

36. UNEP has conducted D&C related work in over 40 countries. However, given the relatively scarce resources available to the evaluation, it was necessary to select a limited number of five countries to be visited. The selection criteria for the countries are the following:

- A significant D&C-related intervention has been or is still being conducted in the last two years – this to ensure that there is still a memory in the country of the interventions conducted;
- Country interventions include at least one of the following three CSAs : post-crisis environmental recovery, environmental cooperation for peace building, or disaster risk reduction; and each of these areas is represented in the overall country sample;
- The duration and size of the D&C country interventions;
- A reasonable regional coverage of the sample; and
- The security situation in the country should allow for sufficient access to people and intervention sites.

37. The five countries selected for visit and assessment were Afghanistan, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Haiti and Jamaica.

Evaluation data sources and collection techniques

38. This evaluation used a combination of techniques: desk review, interviews, and direct observations.

39. The desk review helped the evaluation team to gain essential knowledge of the global, regional and country context related to the environmental dimensions of past or potential crises and a broad overview of UNEP’s D&C-related work at those different levels. Documents reviewed include:

- Relevant background documentation on the environmental dimensions of disasters and conflicts, and on current approaches and challenges to prevent and recover from the environmental consequences of disasters and conflicts;
- Background documentation on UNEP’s strategy and engagement in the field of D&C prevention and recovery, including: PoW documents (from 2006 onwards); D&C Sub-Programme 2010-11 Strategy (as expressed in the two Programme Frameworks under the D&C Sub-Programme), the UNEP Medium Term Strategy 2010-13, relevant costed work plans, project design documents;
- Background documentation on UNEP partnerships with key actors in the field of D&C;
- Design, progress, completion and evaluation reports of UNEP projects related to D&C ;
- Sub-programme monitoring reports, including: Programme Performance Reports, quarterly sub-programme progress reports ; and
- Rapid environmental assessment and post-crisis environmental assessment reports.

40. The evaluators used a rather informal, semi-structured interview method, assisted by a list of topics to be discussed but not a rigid questionnaire. Interviews were conducted with:

- D&C Sub-programme management and staff in the PCDMB and other entities such as the Joint UNEP/OCHA Unit and the Coordination Unit of the ENVSEC Secretariat ;
- UNEP senior management staff
- Other relevant Units and Sub-programmes of UNEP in Nairobi and the Regional Offices ;
- Field staff in the visited countries
- Key partners and stakeholders in the visited countries, including selected senior representatives of UN and other agencies operating on environment, disaster and conflict issues; partner Ministries and National Agencies of Environment; Bilateral and multi-lateral donors that are involved in the subject and have funded the Sub-programme projects as well as those key funders in these countries that have not funded the Sub-programme projects; INGOs, civil society and NGOs, local authorities, etc.
- Global partners of the D&C Sub-programme

41. It was originally planned to conduct a survey of partners by means of an e-mail questionnaire, but for different reasons this has been abandoned.

Main limitations and lessons learned from the evaluation

42. Interviews with global partners were insufficient to collect a broad spectrum of external views on the relevance and effectiveness of UNEP's D&C Sub-programme. The evaluation also had a real challenge in identifying hard evidence on immediate outcomes and higher-level results.
43. An important lesson learned from the evaluation process was the need to make the selection process of the evaluation consultants more rigorous. Because the team for most evaluations is very small, every member has significant influence on the quality of evaluation process and deliverables, and if – for whatever reason – one member is unable to perform as expected, this can dramatically increase the burden on the other team members who need to compensate for this.
44. Another lesson learned, the hard way, is that the administrative procedures in UNEP regarding the availability of the evaluation budget need to be more carefully understood by the evaluation manager, to avoid that part of the budget is lost at the end of a financial year.
45. In terms of process, it would have been useful to reconstruct the Theory of Change of the Sub-programme during the inception phase of the evaluation, so that the results chain diagrams could be discussed with interviewees for validation, and so that the working papers and final report could have been drafted with agreed immediate outcomes, drivers and assumptions in mind.
46. Finally, it would have been useful to make data/documentation requests very early on in the process, so that most documentation could be at hand for the inception phase. The evaluation consultants could have done more documentation review before meeting stakeholders, which would have made the interviews more focused on concrete issues, rather than on generalities as was often the case.

3 Overview of UNEP's Disasters and Conflicts Sub-programme

3.1 UNEP D&C Sub-Programme structure & partners

47. The evaluation of UNEP's D&C Sub-programme focuses on UNEP's work during the last three biennia (2006-2011) as per the biennial Strategic Frameworks and Programs of Work (PoWs), and the on-going four-year Medium-term Strategy (MTS) 2010-2013. These strategic documents specify the higher level results for each of the Sub-programmes, from Sub-programme objectives to Expected Accomplishments (EAs) down to PoW Outputs. EAs were defined by UNEP as *"direct outcomes for a Programme of Work"* and they are the next level of results under Sub-programme objectives. PoW Outputs are UNEP products and services expected to contribute towards the achievement of EAs and the individual projects under each Sub-programme are designed to deliver the PoW Outputs.
48. During the last three biennia, the EAs for UNEP's work on the environmental aspects of D&C have evolved to some extent, but the main areas of focus have remained similar and the main delivery of the D&C-related work has been embedded under DEPI.
49. The Strategic Framework for the biennium 2006-2007 specified several EAs to respond to the need to address environmental aspects of disasters and conflicts. The main EA in this regard was EA(3) for DEPI: *"Enhanced capacity at the International, regional, sub-regional and national levels to prevent, reduce the risk of, prepare for and respond to environmental emergencies; and to conduct post-disaster and conflict assessments and clean-up"*. The APELL-programme, however, was expected to contribute to the delivery of EA(2) of DTIE: *"Increased understanding and implementation by public and private sector decision makers and organizations of environmentally sound management practices and tools, including cleaner production, sustainable consumption and prevention of and responses to environmental threats and emergencies"*. In addition, the EA(a) *"Enhanced ability of public and private sector decision makers and organizations to access, adopt and use environmentally sound technologies and to make informed choices about water resources management and energy production and use"* and EA(c) *"Progress made by countries and the international community towards ensuring that chemicals are used and produced in ways that lead to the minimization of significant adverse effects on human health and the environment"* are also contributing towards UNEP's work in the field of disasters and conflicts.
50. The aspects of country and regional cooperation, for example in terms of several agreements and partnerships for the Disasters and Conflicts country programmes were embedded into the Programme Framework for the Division of Regional Cooperation and Representation (DRC) as the EA(a) *"Strengthened policy dialogue and cooperation among and between countries and institutions in the regions in addressing environmental issues of common concern and priority"*. The DRC is also hosting the ENVSEC-Programme which, in the Programme Framework for 2006-2007 was designed to contribute to the EA(c) *"Increased support for international cooperation on the environmental dimensions of sustainable development"*.
51. The UNEP Division for Environmental Law and Conventions (DEL⁵) was further responsible of the delivery of the EA(b) *"Enhanced capacity of policy makers to respond to environmental challenges and internationally agreed development goals through the development of new and revised policy instruments, taking into account social and economic concerns; and incorporating such policies at the national level into development"*.
52. The Programme of Work for DEPI in 2008-2009 did not specify EAs only for the disasters and conflicts aspects of work. However, the activities which were undertaken to e.g. conduct impact assessments in post-conflict and disaster situations, were contributing to more broadly formulated results, e.g. EA(a) *"Improved access to relevant implementation tools (including dialogue forums) for integrated natural resources management and restoration of degraded ecosystems, including, among other things, freshwater, coasts and oceans, by Governments and other stakeholders"*; EA(b) *"Strengthened capacity of Governments and other stakeholders to mainstream best practices and a gender equality perspective in natural resource management into national development planning processes and for the restoration of degraded ecosystems"*; and EA(c) *"Increased incorporation by partners of UNEP-tested tools and best practices for natural resources management and ecosystem restoration into their regular programmes and activities"*.

⁵ Formerly called Division for Policy Development and Law (DPDL).

53. In the PoW 2008-2009, the main EA for DEWA which was contributing towards the D&C work was the EA(c) *“Enhanced institutional and technological capacity in developing countries and countries with economies in transition for data collection, research, analysis, monitoring, environmental assessment, early warning, networking and partnerships”*.
54. The APELL-Programme remained under DTIE, contributing to the EA(b) *“Increased understanding and implementation by public and private sector decision makers of sustainable consumption and production, including in sectors, such as construction and tourism, and increased voluntary initiatives promoting corporate environmental responsibility, as well as prevention of and response to environmental emergencies, giving due consideration to gender equality issues”*.
55. UNEP DRC remained with the Expected Accomplishments for cooperation and as the host of the ENVSEC-initiative, EA(b) *“Increased cooperation with Governments and intergovernmental, non-governmental and United Nations partners in the delivery of programmes and projects at the regional/sub-regional/national levels, addressing environmental priorities identified by the UNEP Governing Council and by the regional institutions”*.
56. Since the approval of the MTS for 2010-2013 and the PoW 2010-2011, D&C-related activities are planned under the D&C Sub-programme. The D&C Sub-programme comprises two Programme Frameworks. These are an intermediate level of planning document, in use since this biennium, that show the different sets of projects across all Divisions and Regional Offices necessary to achieve a given Sub-programme objective or an Expected Accomplishment.
57. The first Programme Framework covers the preventive aspects of the D&C Programme of Work 2010-2011 and addresses EA(1): *“Enhanced capacity of Member States in environmental management in order to contribute to natural and human-made disaster risk reduction”*. The Programme Framework focuses on UNEP’s work in addressing vulnerability to conflicts and disasters from environmental factors. UNEP builds capacity, develops strategies and implements pilot projects to reduce the risks in countries and regions which are identified by UNEP to be vulnerable to natural hazards or conflicts, are experiencing serious development pressure and environmental degradation and have poor governance systems to manage natural resources.
58. The second Programme Framework combines two EAs, namely: EA(2): *“Rapid and reliable environmental assessments following conflicts and disasters as requested”* and EA(3): *“The post-crisis assessment and recovery process contributes to improved environmental management and the sustainable use of natural resources”*. It covers the response aspects of the D&C PoW 2010-2011. This Programme Framework focuses on UNEP’s work in post-crisis situations, including the identification of risks to human health, livelihoods and security from the environmental impacts of conflicts and disasters, the integration of environmental needs and priorities into recovery, peace building, development planning and capacity-building for improved environmental management to support long-term stability and socio-economic development. UNEP is expected to respond to requests for technical assistance through environmental assessments, governance, clean-ups, ecosystem rehabilitation, sustainable reconstruction, and peace building projects in countries where environment has been severely degraded due to disasters or conflicts.

3.2 UNEP D&C Sub-programme project portfolio

59. The portfolio of D&C projects implemented since 2006 includes 47 projects, 11 of which were designed and launched before 2006. More than half the projects in the portfolio were or are implemented in a single country. 21 projects were on-going at the time of evaluation (second half of 2011), of which 12 were launched during the biennium 2010-2011.
60. The largest number of projects (21) belongs to the environmental recovery core service area (CSA), of which 15 are post-conflict interventions (including 9 projects under the post-conflict country programmes in Sudan, Afghanistan and DR Congo) and 6 are post-disaster interventions. Even though in terms of financing it is by far the smallest CSA, disaster risk reduction comprises 13 different projects. The post-crisis environmental assessment CSA counts 9 projects, and the conflict prevention and peacebuilding CSA counts 4 (the 2 phases of ECP and the 2 phases of ENVSEC). The relative size of the four CSAs in terms of funding is discussed under paragraph 276.
61. Figures 1 to 4 are graphical representations of the projects in the D&C Sub-programme portfolio since 2006 with their formal links to the 2010-2013 MTS Expected Accomplishments and 2010-2011 PoW Outputs, organised by CSA.




Figure 1. Post-crisis environmental assessment projects on-going on 1 January 2006 or later with links to 2010-2013 MTS EAs and 2010-2011 PoW Outputs (Source: PIMS⁶).

⁶ A few assessments (e.g. Ukraine oil spill 2008; Rwanda 2011) were conducted by the PCDMB without prior formal UNEP project approval and without registration in PIMS. The evaluation team has not represented these assessments in this diagram (see also footnote 5).




Figure 2. Post-crisis environmental recovery projects on-going on 1 January 2006 or later, with links to 2010-2013 MTS EAs and 2010-2011 PoW Outputs.




Figure 3. Environmental cooperation for peace building projects on-going on 1 January 2006 or later, with links to 2010-2013 MTS EAs and 2010-2011 PoW Outputs.




Figure 4. Disaster risk reduction projects on-going on 1 January 2006 or later, with links to 2010-2013 MTS EAs and 2010-2011 PoW Outputs.

3.3 Geographic distribution of UNEP's D&C work

62. UNEP's D&C-related interventions are conducted in all regions of the world. The number of countries where UNEP has delivered crisis assistance exceeds 40 and the Joint Environment Unit has delivered early response assistance to more than 70 countries. Most of the risk reduction work, including disaster risk reduction, conflict prevention/peace building and emergency preparedness initiatives under EA(1), has a global or regional scope, with demonstrations or pilot testing at the country level. Post-crisis assessments and recovery work under EA(2) and (3), are mostly country-based. Naturally, most country interventions – be it pilots or post-crisis assistance projects - are situated in countries with a high vulnerability to disasters or conflicts, either with a strong environmental dimension to the causes or to the consequences of the crisis, or both.
63. Because vulnerability to disasters is determined partly by geographic location (e.g. in an earthquake prone area) but also to a large extent by the capacity of the country to cope on its own with environment-related crises, the majority of post-disaster recovery or disaster risk reduction interventions are located in Central America and South-East Asia. Vulnerability to conflict surrounding natural resources is highest in Africa, but also in Eastern Europe, and that is where most post-conflict and environmental cooperation for peace building interventions are being undertaken.

3.4 Theory of Change of the D&C Sub-programme

Overview

64. The Theory of Change (ToC) of the D&C Sub-programme depicts the causal pathways from outputs to outcomes over intermediate states towards impact. It helps to identify the Sub-programme outcomes and intermediate states towards impact, and also helps to determine key factors affecting the achievement of outcomes, intermediate states and impact, including the necessary drivers and assumptions made and the expected role and contributions by key actors.
65. The diagrams on the next pages (Figures 5 to 9) show the reconstructed Theory of Change of the Sub-programme. The Sub-programme is presented in two halves: one for interventions and change processes in relation to disasters (natural disasters and industrial accidents) and one in relation to conflicts. There are a few well-founded reasons why it makes sense to present the Sub-programme in these two quite distinct halves (see paragraphs 101-103). The diagrams have also been split into upper and lower result levels, but this is because the whole results chain from outputs to impact could not fit in a single page. At the lower results levels, the DRR and preparedness portion of the disaster-related work is presented on a separate page than the post-disaster recovery work.
66. The higher level of the ToC, from EA towards Impact, has been reconstructed on the basis of Sub-programme strategy, Programme Framework Documents and project justification narratives in Project Documents. This consisted of the identification of Outcomes, Intermediate States, drivers and assumptions between the EA and Impact. At the output and immediate outcome level, we made use as much as possible of the same wording as the EAs and PoW Outputs in the PoW 2010-2011, but there was often a need to decompose the PoW Outputs into result statements at a more appropriate level and location within the causal pathways. Project outputs have been brought into the picture in *italic*, where these were not captured adequately by PoW Outputs.
67. The diagrams also present all projects in the D&C portfolio between 2006 and 2011. Linkages between projects and PoW Outputs were easy to establish for the current projects, as their Project Documents explicitly mention the relationship between project outputs and PoW Outputs. For projects designed before the PoW 2010-2011 those relationships were inferred to the extent possible from similarities between project outputs and outcomes and results statements in the reconstructed Theory of Change.




Figure 5. Theory of Change at higher result levels - natural and industrial disasters




Figure 6. Theory of Change at lower result levels – disaster risk reduction and emergency preparedness




Figure 7. Theory of Change at lower result levels – post-disaster environmental recovery




Figure 8. Theory of Change at higher result levels – conflict prevention, peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery




Figure 9. Theory of Change at lower result levels – conflict prevention, peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery

Causal pathways

68. The overall **impact** that the D&C Sub-programme seeks to achieve is that the threat from natural and industrial disasters or conflicts is reduced so that environmental benefits and human livelihoods can be better sustained. Below the impact level, the Theory of Change is different for the disaster-related work and the conflict-related work, so these will be discussed separately.
69. As regards natural and industrial disasters, the overall impact should be achieved by reducing the consequences of disasters, both by preventive and emergency planning work and making post-disaster recovery more effective and sustainable, by increasing resilience to future shocks. On the preventive side, the severity of the consequences of natural and industrial disasters needs to be reduced, through improved environmental management and appropriate environmental emergency response, which are the two expected **outcomes** of the DRR Core Service Area. After disasters have occurred, the expected outcome is that the recovery process leads to more sustainable environmental governance and management. This is the expected outcome of the post-disaster recovery CSA.
70. The improvement in environmental governance and management, as well as the better emergency response, would aim, in the first place, at mitigating the consequences of disasters on the environment, human health and livelihoods by building resilience of communities and eco-systems to future natural and industrial hazards. To a lesser extent, the Sub-programme also aims at manipulating those environmental factors that influence natural or industrial hazard risk, either by reducing the frequency or the size of hazards (or both). These are all **intermediate states** towards impact.
71. The proposed **immediate outcome** is pitched at the country capacity level. This is the result level at which UNEP can have clear, direct influence. The immediate outcome of UNEP's services and products in the area of natural and industrial disasters, is that the environmental governance and management capacity of Member States is enhanced for disaster risk reduction, emergency preparedness and post-disaster recovery. It is a combination of the disaster prevention/preparedness dimension represented by EA(1) of the D&C Sub-programme, the post-crisis assessment work captured by EA(2), and the post-disaster recovery dimension encapsulated in EA(3). The Immediate Outcome can be further decomposed in the different dimensions of country capacity to which UNEP services and products (i.e. outputs) are expected to contribute:
- (i) Raised awareness and better information on environment-disaster linkages;
 - (ii) Improved environmental management, DRR and post-disaster recovery strategies and planning;
 - (iii) Environmental concerns integrated in DRR and post-disaster recovery policies;
 - (iv) More adequate environmental regulatory framework;
 - (v) Enhanced environmental management skills; and
 - (vi) Stronger environmental institutions.
72. These dimensions are clearly interdependent, meaning that change in one dimension can influence change in another. For example, environmental strategies and planning should improve when policies are strengthened. Policies, strategies and planning are expected to be more relevant when based on sound information.
73. As regards the "lower level" of the Theory of Change for disasters-related work, the **PoW Outputs** have been decomposed when they combined several services or products (e.g. Environmental policy support and environmental institutional support for PoW Output (231)⁷ were considered as two different outputs) or when they contained different results statements with a cause-to-effect relationship (e.g. assessments delivered to determine where environmental factors are contributing to disaster risk for PoW Output (211) were considered as two outputs with the first leading to the other). In some cases, the PoW Outputs contained a result statement at the immediate outcome level, and in the ToC diagram this statement was then attached to the relevant dimension of Member State capacity (e.g. PoW Output (223) would ensure that environmental considerations are integrated within relief and recovery policies, practices and appeals. This PoW Output was decomposed in four parts: "environmental considerations integrated within relief plans" and "environmental considerations integrated within disaster recovery plans" were considered as part of improved post-disaster recovery strategies and planning;

⁷ Coding for the PoW Outputs uses 3 numbers. The first number refers to the Sub-programme (D&C is the 2nd Sub-programme), the second to the EA (EA(3) is the EA related to post-crisis recovery work) and the third is the number given to the PoW Output itself.

“environmental considerations integrated within disaster recovery policies” was considered as part of improved post-disaster recovery policies; and “environmental considerations integrated within relief and recovery practices” was considered as part of more sustainable environmental management for environmental recovery). An important output of the DRR project portfolio is not captured by the PoW Outputs and was added in the reconstructed ToC: the advocacy for environmental management for DRR at, and support to, international platforms for DRR such as the UNISDR and the Platform for Environment and DRR (PEDRR). This output aims at much more than the uptake of policy toolkits and education modules by UN agencies as stated in PoW Output (212). Two outputs that were delivered by projects pre-dating the PoW 2010-2011 were also added to the ToC diagrams: the DRR assessment approach developed that takes environmental factors into account and the environmental assessment module developed for the Post-disaster Needs Assessment Framework.

74. In the area of the **environment-conflict linkages**, the second “half” of the D&C Sub-programme, the overall impact should be achieved by reducing the threats posed by violent conflicts on the environment and human livelihoods, both by conflict prevention and peacebuilding work, and sustainable post-conflict recovery. The expected **outcome** leading to this is more equitable and sustainable environmental governance and management, which should reduce the environmental consequences of conflicts and also directly contribute to recovery and sustainability of environmental benefits and human livelihoods after conflicts have occurred. It should also reduce the environmental factors contributing to conflict or favour the use of shared natural resources as a platform for dialogue, trust-building and cooperation. These are **intermediate states** towards impact.
75. Consistent with the immediate outcome for the disaster-related interventions, the proposed **immediate outcome** for conflict-related work is also pitched at the country capacity level. The immediate outcome of UNEP’s services and products in the area of conflict, is that the environmental governance and management capacity of Member States is improved for conflict prevention, peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery. It is a combination of the conflict prevention/peacebuilding dimension represented by EA(1) of the D&C Sub-programme, and the post-conflict recovery dimension (mostly at the country level) encapsulated in EA(3). Again, the Immediate Outcome can be decomposed in six interdependent dimensions of country capacity to which UNEP outputs are expected to contribute:
 - (i) Raised awareness and better information on environment-conflict linkages;
 - (ii) Environmental considerations integrated in peacebuilding and recovery strategies and planning;
 - (iii) Environmental considerations integrated in peacebuilding and recovery policies;
 - (iv) More adequate environmental regulatory framework;
 - (v) Enhanced environmental management skills; and
 - (vi) Stronger environmental institutions.
76. For the “lower level” of the Theory of Change for conflict-related work, several **PoW Outputs** also needed to be decomposed when they combined several services or products (e.g. Policy toolkits and education modules joined in PoW Output (212) were considered as two different outputs). Again, some PoW Outputs contained a results statement at the immediate outcome level, and in the ToC diagram this statement was then attached to the relevant dimension of Member State capacity.

Drivers and assumptions

77. Drivers and assumptions are those factors or conditions that need to be present for change to happen along the causal pathways of the Theory of Change from outputs over outcomes to impacts, which are not an explicit part of the intervention logic of the programme. Drivers are factors over which the programme can exercise a certain level of control and which can therefore be influenced by programme outputs and activities. Assumptions are factors which the programme cannot influence, either by choice or by lack of capacity.
78. There is a basic assumption in the countries where the UNEP D&C Sub-programme is operating that the political and security situation will remain relatively stable. This important assumption is not pictured in the ToC diagrams because it would need to be pictured at every result level and would “overload” the diagrams. However, the assumption must hold true for UNEP to be able to deliver most of its outputs, it must hold true for stakeholders to make use of UNEP’s outputs, and it must also hold true at the intermediate state and impact levels inasmuch that political instability or a worsening situation of insecurity can trigger a relapse into conflict despite UNEP’s peacebuilding efforts using the environment as an entry-point. UNEP expects to contribute to stability and safety at

the intermediate state level, and therefore there is a feedback loop downwards to the output and outcome levels: in this way, the stability and safety assumption could also be considered as a driver.

79. Most drivers and assumptions identified for the D&C Sub-programme are needed for the immediate outcomes – at the country capacity level – to lead to actual governance and management changes. The main outcome drivers are:

- (i) Integration of environmental considerations into UN and other international organizations;
- (ii) Stronger non-governmental stakeholder (including local communities, civil society and the private sector) ownership of decisions; and
- (iii) Interaction, alignment and complementarity between groups and organisations involved in environmental management.

80. The main assumptions at the outcome level are:

- (i) Adequate financial resources: these are required to transform policy, plans, regulations and skills into action; and
- (ii) Adequate staff numbers and low staff turn-over in target institutions: these are necessary for achieving the medium-term outcomes sustainably and at a larger scale.

81. A few drivers were also added in the “lower level” ToC, derived from PoW Outputs, project outputs or activities. For example, the RiVAMP in Jamaica was expected to make efforts to promote the adoption of the environment-sensitive disaster risk assessment approach developed by the project through incorporation of the approach in larger DRR capacity building initiatives.

82. Finally, an important assumption is made along the intermediate states towards impact that non-environmental causes of disasters and conflicts are not increasing. Obviously, environmental factors are not the only causes of conflicts or disaster vulnerability, and improved environmental governance and management alone cannot guarantee that environmental benefits are sustained. UNEP can only achieve success in reducing the consequences of disasters and conflicts where other changing factors (political, climatic, geomorphological, technological etc.) do not significantly increase the frequency, size or vulnerabilities to disasters and conflicts. This highlights the importance of not treating the environment in isolation of the broader context of disasters and conflicts.

4 Evaluation Findings

4.1 Strategic Relevance

83. The two Programme Framework Documents for the D&C Sub-programme, prepared for the UNEP PoW 2010-2011, come closest to presenting a “strategy” for the Sub-programme. Some elements of a strategy are also captured in other types of document, such as the overall *Strategy for integrating D&C as a theme across UNEP* drafted in 2008, or the Project Documents (ProDocs) prepared for the individual projects. The UNEP Medium-Term Strategy for 2010-2013, and the biennial Strategic Frameworks and Programmes of Work, remain very general and do not present any “strategies” at the level of the core service areas of the Sub-programmes. The Programme Framework Documents provide the essential link between the projects and the overall UNEP D&C Sub-programme strategy.
84. The analysis of strategic relevance is centred around the four questions: Why? What? How? and Where?

Why?

85. Why should UNEP be concerned by and involved in disasters and conflicts? This question looks at the analysis of the global context and needs, and UNEP’s mandate and comparative advantage.

Global context and needs

86. Overall, the evaluation finds that the global context and needs fully justify UNEP’s involvement in the area of disasters and conflicts. The context and needs analysis in the different planning documents is convincing. It is very short and superficial in the Programme Framework Logic section of the Programme Framework Documents, but more detailed in the attached Project Concepts, and, not surprisingly, most detail of all is provided in the ProDocs.
87. Natural disasters and violent conflicts can be linked to the environment in two ways. First, disasters and conflicts can directly damage the environment and eco-systems through pollution of air, water and soils and destruction of natural resources such as soils, vegetation cover and coral reef barriers. Second, poor governance and mismanagement of scarce natural resources such as land and water or high-value natural resources such as minerals and oil can contribute to conflict, while mismanagement of the environment can increase the vulnerability of eco-systems to hazards. The relationship between disasters and conflicts on one side and the environment on the other is credibly explained in several publications by UNEP and others such as the UNEP flagship Policy Report “From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment” published early 2009 and the “Ecosystem-based disaster risk management” chapter of the UNISDR Global Assessment Report 2011. The numerous environmental impact assessments conducted by UNEP in the aftermath of natural disasters or conflicts also systematically show those ever-present linkages.
88. Similarly, relief and recovery operations are also related to the environment in two ways. On the one hand, they can have serious consequences on the environment, by adding to the pollution or destruction of natural resources to meet immediate relief needs. On the other hand, greater attention for the environment and natural resource management can provide opportunities for more sustainable recovery and reconstruction (“building back better”) or provide a platform for peacebuilding around shared natural resources.
89. The recent increase in natural hazards and accelerated industrial development also warrant greater attention to crisis prevention and preparedness for environmental emergencies. Furthermore, there is no more doubt about the critical role of environmental management in risk reduction as clearly explained in – among other publications – the discussion paper “Environment and Disaster Risk” published by UNEP in 2007 on behalf of the UNISDR Environment and Disaster Working Group, and the UNEP co-authored PEDRR contribution to the UNISDR Global Assessment Report 2011 entitled “Demonstrating the Role of Ecosystem-based Management for Disaster Risk Reduction”.

UNEP mandate

90. The evaluation finds that UNEP’s involvement in the environmental dimensions of disasters and conflicts is fully aligned with UNEP’s mandate as expressed in several Governing Council decisions and the current Medium-term Strategy. The Sub-programme objectives are in line with several UN General Assembly Resolutions and Reports issued between 1989 and 2011, in particular the ones relating to the UNISDR and Natural Disasters and

Vulnerability⁸. Recent policy reports of the Secretary-General from 2009 and 2010 have further justified the need to integrate natural resource management into peacebuilding plans. The independent report to the Secretary-General on “Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict” (CIVCAP) identified natural resource management as an important gap in existing UN capacities that affect its ability to support conflict-affected states, and it was considered one of the “core tasks” for international support in the aftermath of conflict, with UNEP identified as the lead UN agency assigned to this task within the macroeconomic recovery pillar led by the World Bank.

91. The UNEP Governing Council (GC) has given UNEP the mandate to respond to environmental emergencies in several decisions since 1989. In 2003, the GC requested UNEP to work on further improvement of environmental emergency prevention, preparedness, assessment, response and mitigation and, in 2005, it asked UNEP to make post-conflict environmental assessments and follow-up programmes one of the formal technical services it could offer to Member States.
92. The Governing Council has also mandated UNEP to respond to specific disasters. For example, following the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami UNEP GC issued a decision UNEP/GC.23/7(2005) where it explicitly requested UNEP to “continue work in the tsunami affected countries in cooperation with the respective governments as well as other relevant institutions...”. Following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti UNEP was mandated by the UN Relief Coordinator to coordinate the environmental response to the earthquake and the UNEP GC requested UNEP to play a key role in the recovery and sustainable development of Haiti.
93. The UNEP Medium-Term Strategy (MTS) for 2010-2013 was developed in consultation with the UNEP Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR), the representatives of UNEP-administered Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and representatives of civil society and the private sector. The MTS identified Disasters and Conflicts for the first time as one of the six cross-cutting thematic priorities (sub-programmes)⁹, thus identifying it as one of the thematic areas in which UNEP has a comparative advantage. The D&C Sub-programme higher level goal, as stated in the MTS 2010-2013 is to “*Minimize environmental threats to human well-being arising from the environmental causes and consequences of conflicts and disasters*”. The MTS emphasizes the importance of UNEP’s increased country and regional presence and capacity building activities.
94. The UNEP mandate, as summarized in the UNEP Medium-Term Strategy comprises five interrelated areas, and the D&C Sub-programme fits particularly under the following three: (a) Catalysing and promoting international cooperation and action; (b) Providing policy advice and early warning information, based upon sound science and assessments; and (c) Strengthening technology support and capacity in line with country needs and priorities.
95. For previous biennia there was no MTS and sub-programmes corresponded to the divisions in UNEP. In the Programmes of Work 2006-2007 and 2008-2009 the disasters and conflicts work of UNEP was for the largest part located under the Environmental Policy Implementation Sub-programme, with the exception of the APELL programme which was under the Technology, Industry and Economics Sub-programme.

Comparative advantage of UNEP

96. The evaluation finds that UNEP’s comparative advantage in the area of environmental causes and consequences of disasters and conflicts is clear. It lies in the organisation’s experience since the early 1990s in: (i) assessing and addressing the environmental consequences of conflicts and disasters; (ii) developing a series of tools for identifying risk factors and providing early warning and alerts; (iii) assisting local actors in preparing for industrial accidents with the APELL process; and, since the early 2000s, (iv) strategic environmental coordination at the country level. UNEP has become the focal point for the environment in a wide range of UN and other international processes and networks where UNEP can ensure that the environment is given due attention, both as a potential contributing factor to disaster vulnerability and conflict, and also as a key livelihood asset suffering serious consequences from disasters and conflicts. These include international networks and partnerships for DRR, humanitarian response clusters, early recovery programmes, post-crisis needs assessments etc.
97. UNEP’s most ancient expertise (since the late nineties) in the area of disasters and conflicts lies in the conduct of post-crisis environmental impact assessments and providing technical advice in the immediate aftermath of crises for sustainable recovery. In these roles, UNEP is quite unique in the UN and the larger humanitarian and

⁸ See <http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/resolutions-reports#gavulnerabilities>

⁹ (1) Climate change; (2) Disasters and conflicts; (3) Ecosystem management; (4) Environmental governance; (5) Harmful substances and hazardous wastes; (6) Resource efficiency

development system and has developed considerable credibility and visibility. Since the Bali Strategic Plan for Technology Support and Capacity-Building¹⁰, the opportunity has arisen for UNEP to develop longer-term country-level capacity development programmes and the D&C team was among the first in UNEP to take this opportunity. It is however important for UNEP, and the D&C Sub-programme within the broader UNEP in particular, to specify its niche in disaster risk reduction and post-disaster recovery work to avoid duplicating efforts of other UN agencies and INGOs with perhaps larger implementing resources and firmer long-term commitment at the country level.

98. UNEP’s experience in promoting sound environmental management to contribute to risk reduction is more recent (the last five years or so), but also unique within the UN system. There are, however, a number of International NGOs such as IUCN and WWF, themselves active members of the PEDRR and other DRR networks, who have also been giving increasing importance to ecosystem management for DRR and acquiring quite significant field experience in the area over the same period. UNEP doesn’t have much concrete, mature field experience in this area yet. However, UNEP is the only UN agency that has a programme on prevention and preparedness for industrial accidents (APELL).
99. The comparative advantages of UNEP as whole, as set out in the MTS 2010-2013, provide further justification of why UNEP is well placed to work on environment-disaster and environment-conflict linkages, especially at the advocacy and country capacity building level, on policy and planning in particular. UNEP is regarded as the neutral and independent technical authority on environmental policy. UNEP has, inter alia: a central role in the UN system for dealing with the environment, and for achieving coherence, through its participation in numerous inter-agency boards, partnerships and other mechanisms; the convening power for addressing the full range of environmental issues and has extensive experience in establishing networks with Governments, United Nations entities, international institutions, the broad scientific community, civil society and the private sector; extensive experience in working with scientific and technical communities and at the science-policy interface; partnership agreements with collaborating centres of excellence and hosting the secretariat of many partnership initiatives; a network of Regional Offices; etc.

What?

100. What does UNEP want to achieve? This question covers the strategic focus of the core service areas and the D&C country programmes: What is the strategic focus of the Sub-programme? How well are the EAs formulated and logically organized in the programme frameworks? Are UNEP’s objectives relevant to global and country needs?

Strategic focus

101. The strategic focus of the D&C Sub-programme is clear. Figure 10 below gives a graphical representation of the different components of the D&C Sub-programme.




Figure 10. Schematic representation of the strategic focus of the D&C Sub-programme

¹⁰ Bali Strategic Plan for Technology Support and Capacity-building, adopted by the UNEP Governing Council in decision 23/1 I.

102. The D&C Sub-programme is currently divided in two programme frameworks and three Expected Accomplishments (EA). The first Programme Framework covers the preventive aspects of D&C, addressing vulnerability to conflicts and disasters from environmental factors. It includes EA(1) *“Capacity of member states to contribute to natural and human-made disaster risk reduction is enhanced”*. The strategic focus of this Programme Framework is on three distinct elements with limited linkages: 1) environmental management for peacebuilding, conflict prevention and transboundary cooperation; 2) environmental management for disaster risk reduction; and 3) preparedness for environmental emergencies.

103. The second Programme Framework focuses on the response aspects of D&C, covering UNEP’s work in post-crisis situations. It includes the two other EAs of the Sub-programme: EA(2) *“Rapid and reliable environmental assessments following conflicts and disasters as requested”* and EA(3) *“The post-crisis assessment and recovery process contributes to improved environmental management and the sustainable use of natural resources”*. The strategic focus of this Programme Framework is on three more or less sequential elements: 1) rapid and more in-depth environmental impact assessments; 2) the integration of environmental needs and priorities into recovery, peacebuilding and development planning; and 3) country capacity building for improved environmental management to support long-term stability and economic development.

Programme Framework logic

104. The evaluation considers the joining of disaster and conflict issues under the Programme Frameworks and EAs, both for the preventive and the recovery work, rather artificial. DRR and conflict prevention (joined in Programme Framework 1 and EA(1)) are very distinct fields, with different approaches and different national and international actors. In the immediate aftermath of disasters and conflicts, the humanitarian response (including UNEP’s involvement through the JEU with OCHA) might be quite similar, but then the UN structures that take control over the post-crisis stabilisation/reconstruction - and this is where UNEP’s role becomes most pronounced through Programme Framework 2 - are quite different in post-natural disaster and post-conflict situations.

105. It does make sense though to separate the preventive / preparedness work from the post-crisis recovery work as it is currently the case to emphasise that the first deserves much greater global and country-level attention at a much larger scale. Country and donor interest in risk reduction and peacebuilding usually flares up after a major crisis has occurred, and, therefore, post-crisis recovery and reconstruction often provide opportunities for introducing more sustainable environmental management systems and institutions, and also to literally “build back better”. However, sustainable recovery and reconstruction efforts are usually limited to the areas affected by the crisis (disaster or conflict) and do not protect other areas which might be as vulnerable as or even more vulnerable than the past affected areas. DRR, emergency preparedness and conflict prevention need to be addressed at much larger scale.

106. There is also something to be said about the location of the DRR area of work within the D&C Sub-programme. At first glance, it seems rather obvious that DRR would be part of this Sub-programme, as it strongly relates to disasters, and it makes eminent sense to expand the post-disaster assessment and recovery work into the realm of disaster risk reduction, just like the post-conflict assessment and recovery work has been expanding in the conflict prevention and peacebuilding area. However, contribution by the “broader” UNEP to DRR currently happens mostly through the Climate Change Sub-programme¹¹, compared to which the DRR work in the D&C Sub-programme is quite small, even after its size is, rather artificially, inflated by the APELL programme which could as well be located under the Sustainable Consumption and Production or the Harmful Substances and Hazardous Waste Sub-programmes. The size of DRR compared to the rest of the D&C Sub-programme is very small and global DRR resources are limited compared to CC or humanitarian response. Thus, does it make sense to have a separate, very small team working on DRR within the D&C Sub-programme, quite removed and isolated from the Sub-programmes where the substantive work is done and ample financing is available, or would it make more sense to spread the DRR CSA over other Sub-programmes? Having a single centralized team within the D&C Sub-programme might have its advantages in terms of coordination, but the condition for this single team to be effective is good understanding of what UNEP as a whole is doing in the field of DRR, good communication and a strong collaborative spirit between units involved in DRR-related activities across the organization. There appears to be quite some room for improvement here.

¹¹ At the time of evaluation, secured funding for the active Climate Change Adaptation portfolio in UNEP is approximately US\$ 30 million (excluding the GEF-funded projects), about 30 times the secured funding for active DRR projects in the D&C Sub-programme.

Relevance to global and country needs

107. Overall, UNEP's areas of focus in the disasters and conflict sub-programme are relevant to global and country needs. The needs and UNEP's response to those needs are presented below for each core service area.
108. **Disaster Risk Reduction.** While there is a strong case for integration of environmental management and DRR (see paragraph 84 above), consideration of environmental issues in DRR approaches and vice versa has been very limited so far, be it in policy and planning, institutional organisation or implementation; and sectoral approaches to DRR, Climate Change and environmental management remain predominant both at the international and national level. There has also been little progress in the integration of environment and DRR considerations into development assistance. UNEP's work on environmental management for DRR responds to this gap by promoting environment-DRR approaches into humanitarian and development organisations through the PEDRR and other partnerships, and by assisting vulnerable countries in integrating environment-DRR measures into their national development planning. On the other hand, the capacity of most developing countries and emerging economies to deal with industrial accidents is still weak, in particular in terms of preparedness at the local level, and industrial accidents continue to have serious consequences for the health and livelihood of communities living and working in and around accident sites. The APELL programme assists local authorities, industry and communities to increase their understanding of industrial disaster risks, to take preventive measures and to plan for potential accidents so that they can be better prepared to respond.
109. **Assessments.** UNEP responds to requests to conduct environmental assessments in countries where critical ecosystems or natural resources have been damaged or destroyed by conflicts or disasters, posing serious threats to human health and livelihoods. In those countries, local and national capacities are often overstretched and/or the technical expertise is usually not available to conduct such assessments without the external scientific and technical support provided by UNEP. On the other hand, a lack of information and understanding on vulnerabilities due to environmental mismanagement, and on the extent and possible consequences of environmental damage, often leads to inadequate prioritization of environmental issues in international humanitarian and development aid. UNEP provides support in the immediate post-crisis period through the UNEP/OCHA Joint Environment Unit (JEU) which can mobilize environmental experts at very short notice to rapidly assess acute environmental risks to human health. UNEP PCDMB can then further assist by conducting more in-depth post-crisis environmental assessments based on a sound scientific approach using modern technologies.
110. **Post-disaster response and recovery.** Similarly, in countries affected by conflict or a disaster, the national capacity to rapidly mitigate acute environmental risks e.g. from hazardous chemicals is often lacking. The JEU can then coordinate the international response for emergency mitigation measures. In countries where UNEP has conducted a detailed environmental assessment, there is usually a strong demand for further assistance in addressing identified environmental priorities and UNEP can assist governments in developing a post-crisis environmental recovery programme, mobilizing funding for it and managing its execution. The following examples show the high variety of country interventions after some of the recent most devastating natural disasters:
111. One of the largest UNEP post-disaster recovery programmes was conducted after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. UNEP rapid post-disaster environmental assessments reported similar environmental problems across the affected countries. Since the magnitude of the disaster attracted considerable amounts of international funding UNEP was able to respond to requests of affected countries: Thailand, Indonesia, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Somalia/Puntland, Yemen and the Seychelles. For example, in Indonesia the government requested UNEP assistance in establishing an environmental assessment centre, to provide environmental assistance to the Ministry of Environment in supporting field assessments and developing an action plan for addressing the identified issues. To respond to this request UNEP deployed staff to Indonesia and the JEU deployed an environmental expert to the UNDAC team to conduct a rapid environmental assessment in Banda Aceh. UNEP further developed and implemented the DEBRI project to assist the government in the treatment of the tsunami debris. The Central Environmental Authority of Sri Lanka requested UNEP assistance to urgently assess environmental impacts of the tsunami, including impacts to coral reefs, shore erosion, coastal and land use planning, water pollution and soil contamination. To respond to the request, UNEP deployed staff, including a resident programme officer and environmental experts.
112. Another major post-disaster programme has been ongoing in Haiti where following the hurricanes in 2008, the Government of Haiti requested UNEP to support the recovery efforts and to establish a country programme. After the country programme was established Haiti was further struck by an earthquake in 2010 magnifying the existing environmental problems. UNEP was mandated by the UN Relief Coordinator to coordinate the environmental

response to the earthquake and the UNEP Governing Council requested UNEP to play a key role in the recovery and sustainable development of Haiti. Based on this, UNEP expanded the ongoing activities in Haiti to include technical assistance to relief and early recovery efforts in cooperation with UN Country Team, providing environmental coordination and recovery planning. The country strategy was redirected to support the government recovery plan.

113. **Peacekeeping, peace consolidation and post-conflict peacebuilding** efforts often ignore the important role that natural resources and the environment could have played in the conflict and can play in peacebuilding and sustainable, equitable development. Indeed, many conflicts are linked to disputes about the governance of environmental resources or financed by natural resource exploitation. In addition, peacekeeping operations also tend to ignore their own often serious environmental impacts. Through the ECP programme UNEP aims at integrating risks and opportunities from NR and the environment into peacebuilding strategies, to help peacekeeping operations limit their environmental impact, to encourage the use of natural resources as a platform for dialogue and cooperation between countries and to promote the application of international law regarding the protection of the environment during armed conflict. Similarly, the ENVSEC programme uses the environment as a platform for cooperation between countries in the wider European Region and seeks to transform tensions surrounding transboundary natural resources into opportunities for collaboration and confidence building.
114. **Post-conflict country programmes.** The focus of the UNEP post-conflict country programmes is determined by the priorities identified in the environmental assessments and is agreed with the Government and the aid community, including the donors. The post-conflict programmes in Afghanistan and Sudan are the most mature and diverse country interventions of the D&C sub-programme and possibly of UNEP as a whole.
115. UNEP's support to Afghanistan stems from the findings of the *Afghanistan Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment Report* and reflects the Government's priorities. Prior to UNEP's support, there was no effective institutional set up for environmental or natural resource management; a coherent policy framework at the national level was lacking and the legal basis was inadequate; there were no environmental impact assessments nor any pollution control measures in place; and formal environmental education and awareness programmes were inexistent. UNEP's support, focused on these core issues, is therefore entirely relevant to country needs and would be in similar post-conflict situations where environmental institutions have been weakened.
116. UNEP's work in Sudan also builds on the findings and recommendations of the Post Conflict Environmental Assessment which was developed in collaboration with government institutions and the civil society of Sudan. UNEP interventions are mainly responding to the recommendations on environmental governance, livelihoods, water security and sustainable forest management. At the time of UNEP's environmental assessment, environmental governance of Sudan was described as having a high level of knowledge and skills but being under-resourced, ineffective and scattered within various small government arms with duplicated responsibilities and little if no interaction. The focus of UNEP's programme in Sudan on strengthening environmental governance appears therefore entirely relevant to country needs. UNEP work in Sudan builds on the premise that both strengthening environmental organizations and improving their interaction and complementarity are necessary to promote sustainable and equitable environmental governance, which is a requisite for stability and peace. However, whilst environmental issues concern the entire country and all levels of society, UNEP's work is only reaching higher-level decision makers in Khartoum and limited regions of Darfur. In addition, several environmental concerns, such as waste management and oil production were identified in the Post Conflict Environmental Assessment as priority needs but UNEP is not (yet) addressing them, even though they pose potential threats to the environment and human well-being.

How?

117. How is UNEP attempting to contribute to the Sub-programme's objectives? This question addresses the appropriateness of approaches used and outputs delivered to achieve the D&C Sub-programme objectives.
118. Two approaches are predominant in the D&C Sub-programme. There is a rather supply-driven, top-down approach, where principles, concepts and tools - that have been tested and demonstrated on the ground by UNEP or others - are disseminated at the global or regional level. There is also a demand-driven, bottom-up approach, where interventions are determined largely by country needs and demand. Both approaches are appropriate for the respective objectives they try to achieve, but linkages between the two in terms of knowledge exchange and mobilization of global partnerships at the country level are still underdeveloped.

119. The demand-driven, country-level approach is predominant in the D&C Sub-programme. In terms of mobilized financing, for instance, it accounts for more than two thirds of the sub-programme portfolio. This is exceptional within UNEP, where, overall, the supply-driven approach strongly linked to UNEP's normative and catalytic role is definitely predominant.

Supply-driven approach

120. This is the main intervention approach used for the preventive and preparedness work of the sub-programme, namely in the projects promoting environmental management for DRR and environmental emergency preparedness. It is also the main approach of the Environmental Cooperation for Peacebuilding programme which started from global advocacy with the relevant international organisations to influence their policies and in its second phase started providing pilot support to a few post-conflict countries in the areas of environmental assessment, natural resource management and environmental restoration and remediation in the context of conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

121. Broadly speaking, the projects and programmes under the prevention and preparedness programme framework (with the exception of ENVSEC – see below) follow a “classic” piloting-and-dissemination approach. Among the main concepts and tools that were piloted and disseminated so far were the participatory industrial accident preparedness approach (APELL), coastal environmental management for DRR, environment-sensitive disaster risk assessment (Risk & Vulnerability Assessment Methodology – RiVAM – piloted in Jamaica), Integrated Strategic Environmental Assessment (piloted in Sri Lanka), environmental impact assessment of extractive industries (Sierra Leone), integrating environmental considerations in peacekeeping operations, country-level planning for environmental emergency preparedness etc.

122. The piloting-and-dissemination approach consists of four steps:

- (i) Developing / collecting concepts and tools. This is done in most cases by bringing international experts together to develop a draft approach and draft guidance material based on previous experiences;
- (ii) Testing and demonstrating those concepts and tools. This is usually done at a relatively small scale (only in a handful of sites or countries) and by, or in close collaboration with, local stakeholders (public services, in particular). Project support comes in the form of training and coaching;
- (iii) Learning lessons from the pilots, and fine-tuning, generalization and validation of concepts and tools, usually resulting in publications;
- (iv) Promoting customization and uptake of concepts and tools by countries (pilot countries and other similar countries) either indirectly via advocacy within the relevant international and national communities and mechanisms, or directly through policy briefs, technical guidelines, training and technical assistance to countries.

123. It is important to note that the UNEP authored or co-authored publications (policy briefs, discussion papers, contributions to larger publications, guidelines etc.) are often based on more than the UNEP-supported pilots. And in some cases, UNEP doesn't have any first-hand experience to account for. A real effort is done to collect case studies, best practices and lessons learned from others, which enables the authors to more convincingly generalize the concepts and tools proposed in the publications. There are even a number of publications that are entirely based on case-studies – this is a variant on the piloting-and-dissemination approach where the piloting has actually been done entirely by others. Furthermore, publications always go through a peer review process, within UNEP at the minimum, but usually also involving external, internationally recognized experts. This should definitely contribute to the rigour and usefulness of the publications.

124. The last step – dissemination of concepts and tools – targets two major groups: the international humanitarian and development communities, and, ultimately, public and private stakeholders in vulnerable and fragile countries. The first group, which has been UNEP's primary target so far, includes UN agencies and INGOs, who are reached mostly through sharing of publications and knowledge exchange at international fora and events, but also – in the pilot countries – at the country level. They are actually an “intermediary” target, because they are expected to integrate concepts and tools in their own approaches and help UNEP with up-scaling through their own capacity development efforts at the country level. The choice of this group as a primary target is understandable, considering that UNEP doesn't have the resources to do much dissemination at the country level by itself, and UNEP needs “heavy” partners to add weight and help repeat UNEP's messages in order to swing opinions and convince decision makers at country level.

125. The second group includes decision-makers for whom policy briefs are prepared, and technical staff of both public agencies and the private sector, at whom the technical guidelines and training efforts are aimed. This second group so far has been limited to public and private stakeholders in the pilot countries themselves. The contents of briefs, guidelines and training have come directly from the pilot experiences in those same countries with a few exceptions. Spreading out to other countries is intended but has not taken place yet. Customization of concepts and tools is on-going, e.g. the approach for DRR in coastal settlements piloted in India and Thailand is in fact an adaptation of the APELL approach, originally used mostly in the chemical and mining sectors; customizing of the RiVAMP approach to other sectors or eco-systems (e.g. drylands or mountainous areas) is also planned.
126. It should be mentioned that in post-crisis country programmes, the piloting-and-dissemination approach is also used, the pilots serving for field-testing and -demonstration, but also as a tool to develop local and national skills. For example, both in Sudan and Afghanistan, UNEP is piloting a community-based natural resources management approach in a limited number of pilot sites, or, in Sierra Leone, UNEP supported the clean-up of a hazardous chemical dump site near the capital. It seems, however, that in those cases less thought has gone into the dissemination and upscaling of these demonstrations, which could have modified the approach and organisation of the demonstrations, e.g. by involving local partners with the appropriate experience more from the start.

Demand-driven / needs-based approach

127. In post-crisis countries a bottom-up approach to assessments, emergency response and recovery support is used. This is essential because of the high diversity of situations. Relief and recovery activities need to be tailored to each country since the disaster or conflict and its impact vary across countries and the country priority needs are different. As interventions are often request-based, the type of support provided will also vary according to the specific request for assistance from the government and the UN system in the country. The post-disaster and post-conflict environmental assessments ensure that country-specific needs are recognized, since the assessments are science-based and done in cooperation and consultation with national government partners and other stakeholders. This demand-driven approach results in a high variety of outputs, contributing to multiple immediate outcomes at the country level as discussed under the “What?” question above.
128. The demand-driven approach takes different shapes at the country programme level. In Sudan and Afghanistan, UNEP leads stand-alone environmental recovery programme in collaboration with a limited number of government partners (the Environmental Protection Agency and the Ministry of Environment, respectively) and funded by a limited number of donors (the most prominent being DFID in Sudan and the EU in Afghanistan). Programme design has been predominantly a PCDMB-driven exercise, relying heavily on a few competent individuals. The programmes are not really designed to fit either in the UNDAFs or equivalent at the country level (even though they have been integrated when UNEP was involved in the UNDAF development process), or in UNEP higher-level strategy and planning processes (even though some kind of a retro-fitting, ex-post justification exercise has been done because all UNEP projects and programmes must be aligned to the MTS and PoW). Inputs from the broader UNEP, including Regional Offices are limited (see paragraphs 292-301). Country support has evolved from a rather disconnected set of interventions without a common programme framework to a much more coherent programme based on 4-5 core areas. Even though expectations from the environmental assessments were very high, the country programmes managed to keep the expected outcomes at a level manageable by the limited staff and funding, and at a pace that could be absorbed by the national counterparts. The idea of maintaining a comprehensive framework but incrementally adding activities to the programme, as the national capacities improved, worked well.
129. In Sierra Leone, the amount of outcomes expected to be achieved by UNEP’s work is staggering. However, UNEP’s contributions are usually only one or two essential, catalytic outputs that are certainly strategic but in no case sufficient to achieve the key outcomes and drive higher level changes. These changes are very dependent on contributions by others with whom partnerships have been built. The current strategy is a combination of picking low-hanging fruits (low-input support activities from which high-impact is expected) and filling “strategic” gaps on many fronts, rather than focussing and taking leadership on filling a few key capacity building gaps as has been the case in Sudan and Afghanistan. In the context of severely limited resources and uncertainties about the future in-country presence, UNEP seems to be compelled to spread itself thin.
130. The Haiti programme had to change course several times due to external circumstances. Recently, it has taken the shape of an umbrella environmental rehabilitation coordination programme under which partners are invited to fit their projects. The first project was designed to respond to hurricane caused environmental damages and to

develop a longer-term country programme based on lessons learned from past environmental projects in Haiti in order to identify main challenges and best practices. However, planning of the long-term programme was disturbed by the 2010 earthquake. To respond to the earthquake, UNEP hastily developed a new project to provide early relief technical assistance to the government and humanitarian practitioners. Conceptualization of the longer-term country programme was resumed after one year and finally the Haiti Regeneration Initiative was launched in late 2010 under the Ecosystem Management Sub-programme.

131. The ENVSEC programme is actually a rather incoherent ensemble of many sub-regional projects tackling very locally specific, transnational environmental issues as they occur and requests for support come in. The evaluation by the Government of Finland (late 2010) concluded that “these ENVSEC project activities address relevant environmental issues in the target countries, also from the point of view of environment and security inter-linkages, and that the ENVSEC projects are contributing to the reduction of environment and security risks. The evaluation concludes that the ENVSEC projects are making progress, help to build confidence and generate regional cooperation in Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Central Asia, and have generally gained the support of key authorities.” However, their integration into national strategic frameworks and the wider regional cooperation and donor strategies (such as those elaborated by the UN) is weak.

Linkages between global advocacy work and country programmes

132. One could expect strong linkages between the supply-driven, global advocacy work (mostly on the prevention and preparedness side) and the demand-driven country programmes (mostly on the recovery side) in terms of knowledge exchange and global partnerships. Figure 10 above shows how post-crisis recovery work often attempts to improve natural resource and environmental management to prevent relapse into conflict, make environmental benefits more sustainable and to “build back better”, so that vulnerabilities to future disasters and conflicts can be reduced: therefore crisis prevention becomes an objective of post-crisis recovery work. Similarly, strong global partnerships have been developed for DRR and conflict prevention / peacebuilding advocacy work that could be mobilized at the country level where UNEP decides to develop a country programme.

133. However, the post-crisis country programmes, where the substance of the support is determined by the needs identified in the post-crisis assessment and specific country or UNCT requests, have so far made surprisingly little use of any of the toolkits or training packages developed by the global “prevention” projects. Likewise, strong partnerships developed at the global level – basically with headquarters of the partner agencies – are rarely translated into strong cooperation at the country level. The country programmes have, in return, maybe because of the very heterogeneous and tailored support they provide to the countries, hardly generated any DRR or conflict prevention tools that are being disseminated by the global projects. As mentioned above, the global, supply-driven projects do have pilot experiences at country-level to show-case policy applications on the ground, but the pilots can hardly be considered demand-driven because the “tool-kits” and “training packages” they test and demonstrate are usually developed by international expert teams to have broad applicability. An exception for this is the ECP programme, where the pilots (e.g. Sierra Leone) are needs-based and demand-driven. They are definitely generating interesting insights for the global component of the programme, but are actually most relevant at the country level. However, while learning a lot from its own pilot countries, the ECP programme has made quite sparingly use so far of experiences and insights accumulated in the larger post-conflict country programmes (Afghanistan and Sudan) with only a few case studies captured in recent and up-coming ECP publications. The ENVSEC programme, on the other hand, appearing to be a rather heterogeneous collection of loosely related projects, has, as a regional programme, hardly collected and disseminated lessons learned from its vast array of experiences so far regarding security – environment linkages¹². Up to now, the ECP has also made little use of ENVSEC experiences to widen its field experience base, except for including a case study from ENVSEC in an ECP publication and involving ENVSEC in the peer review of ECP policy reports. There is limited methodological exchange between the ENVSEC and ECP.

Where?

134. This question concerns the adequacy of the geographical scope and country targeting strategy of the D&C Sub-programme.

¹² A recently commissioned study to propose ways for reinforcing the security aspects of ENVSEC initiative is expected also to draw lessons from past and on-going ENVSEC projects.

135. According to the Programme Framework Document for EA(a) the D&C Sub-programme is global in scope in the areas of advocacy and training towards governments and international organisations on environmental management for DRR and conflict prevention, but the primary targets of UNEP assistance would be countries that are particularly vulnerable to natural hazards or conflict, are experiencing serious development pressures and environmental decline, and have poor governance systems to manage natural resources. Knowledge gathered through past or on-going projects as well as scientific tools developed by UNEP, such as the early warning tools developed by DEWA, would be instrumental for identifying those countries.
136. In reality, for the group of projects promoting environmental management for DRR and conflict prevention, country interventions have remained limited so far, as their main purpose has been to pilot tools for assessment, planning and training.
137. The ECP programme targets countries that face significant conflict risks as well as peacebuilding opportunities offered by natural resources and the environment. "Proof of concept" support has been provided mainly to sub-Saharan African countries (Sierra Leone, the Central African Republic, Guinea-Conakry, Somalia, DR Congo and Rwanda), of which the first three are currently on the agenda of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. This focus on Africa might be justified by the relatively high concentration of conflicts fuelled by natural resources and high number of UN Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding missions on the continent. Those are also among the poorest countries, the most fragile states and the hardest countries to work in, which adds relevance to UNEP's work there in relation to the broader Millennium Development Goals.
138. In the area of DRR, country-level work has been concentrated on a few Indian Ocean Tsunami-affected countries (India, Thailand, Indonesia and Sri Lanka) and Jamaica. The intention now is to fan out to other Caribbean islands, and also to disaster-vulnerable countries where UNEP has on-going projects/programmes such as South Sudan. This choice of pilot countries definitely makes sense, as they dispose of diverse ecosystems and a rich biodiversity under serious development pressure, are definitely prone to natural hazards, and also have capable and committed local partners that can contribute and make use of the training and technical assistance provided. In the Caribbean, for instance, there are relatively more DRR capacities in place within the universities and the national authorities. However, African countries have received very little to no support from UNEP in the field of natural disaster risk reduction. This is in contradiction with the recognized very high vulnerability of the African continent to droughts and floods, which are exacerbated by climate change.
139. The APELL projects are undertaken mainly in the Asia Pacific Region and Latin America, in countries where a need exists but also where success is most likely and the potential impact is the largest. Country commitment to the APELL approach and presence of committed public agencies and technical institutions are the first two country selection criteria. In most cases, and not surprisingly given the selection criteria, these are middle-income / emerging economy countries rather than developing countries in the strict sense as the title of the last project in the series might suggest. China, for instance, has been one of the major recipients of APELL support. The APELL approach has not been introduced in Sub-Saharan Africa so far even though safety issues with mining are very significant and the chemicals industry is very poorly regulated. However, there are a number of reasons that make it very complex, politically risky, expensive and often dangerous to work in mining sites in Africa: security concerns, poor governance, corruption, child labour issues, conflict between companies and local communities about benefit sharing and environmental pollution, risks of UNEP being hi-jacked by political interests, etc. There might be opportunities, however, to use APELL as a peace building tool, but this would require appropriate country conditions, a lot of resources and, most probably, a separate project.
140. As regards the project portfolio of the second Programme Framework – the post-crisis interventions – a distinction must be made between the advocacy work at the global level in the area of emergency response, the assessments and the country recovery programmes. UNEP's work at global level is focused on strengthening cooperation and capacity on the environmental aspects of emergency response. Where country-level support for emergency environmental assessments and response coordination is provided by the JEU depends on country requests: in the past, the JEU has been able to get involved following all government or UNCT requests, in most cases by facilitating an environmental expert to join the UNDAC team. However, the JEU has not always been requested to assist, as was the case in some of the largest natural disasters during the period under review (China, Haiti, Japan and Thailand) and the reasons for this are not always clear. In-depth environmental impact assessments and post-crisis country support with extended country presence are only provided when adequate funding could be mobilized, and not all country requests can be satisfied. Disaster-struck or post-conflict countries have requested UNEP to provide

longer-term assistance in their recovery programmes, but UNEP could often only respond to those requests with short-term post-crisis response assistance.

141. Importantly, UNEP does not have formal, independent criteria to select countries where more in-depth and long-term post-crisis support is justified. The first impression might be that UNEP follows the funding, and that therefore UNEP's interventions are determined by donor interests rather than needs-based and mandate-related criteria – a situation that would be highly undesirable. However, in truth, UNEP has often catalysed the funding for its country programmes: UNEP has usually awakened donor interest through its high-quality environmental impact assessments, advocacy and strong fund raising efforts. Therefore, because UNEP does take decisions on where in-depth environmental impact assessments are conducted and where extra fund raising efforts are made, the issue of country selection criteria remains relevant and should definitely be addressed.

4.2 Performance of the D&C Sub-programme

4.2.1 Effectiveness

142. The assessment of effectiveness looks at the achievement of outcomes. It is organized according to the immediate outcomes that the UNEP D&C Sub-programme attempts to achieve. Those are the different components or dimensions of country capacity for environmental management and emergency preparedness, expected to contribute to a reduction of environmental causes and consequences of disasters and conflicts, as presented under paragraphs 65-79 discussing the Theory of Change of the Sub-programme.

143. Even though evidence on outcome achievement is patchy at best¹³, the evaluation can draw conclusions about UNEP's effectiveness with a reasonable degree of confidence because information on the quality and scope of outputs is quite abundant and there is a direct link between the outputs and these immediate outcomes. However, drawing any firm conclusions on how UNEP's efforts have influenced environmental management and emergency preparedness practices, which is one step beyond the immediate capacity enhancement outcomes listed above, is more difficult. The evaluation has identified a number of drivers and assumptions required for these immediate outcomes to lead to the medium-term outcome of improved environmental management and emergency preparedness practices, and an assessment of to what extent these drivers and assumptions are present or valid, can strengthen our degree of confidence in estimating the likelihood of achievement of the medium-term outcomes.

144. Moving further up in the Theory of Change, beyond the behavioural change of key stakeholders, it becomes increasingly difficult to assess the contribution of UNEP's work. For instance, even if we did see an improvement in environmental management that could be traced back to UNEP's capacity building efforts, it would be very difficult to prove with concrete evidence that this change in management practice has effectively led to a reduction of the frequency, size or consequences of hazards and conflicts, let alone any further impact on the sustainability of environmental benefits and human livelihoods. The higher we go in the Theory of Change, the more theoretical and speculative the contribution assessment becomes.

145. Therefore, the effectiveness assessment remains at the level of immediate, capacity enhancement outcomes, and also draws some conclusions about the likelihood of achieving medium-term, behavioural change outcomes and longer term impacts on the environment and human health and livelihoods with the help of an analysis of outcome drivers and assumptions.

¹³ Across the D&C Sub-programme evaluative evidence on the achievement of outcomes is weak. Completion reports, let alone independent evaluations, for most projects in the D&C portfolio are missing. Publications based on pilot experiences do not often provide a credible picture of project performance and outcome achievement, because their purpose usually is to promote a certain concept or tool and not to critically review the effectiveness of the project under which the concept or tool was being developed. Other publications are targeted at donors, from whom funding is expected, or international agencies concerned by disasters and conflicts, who are expected to replicate and scale up, or at public and private stakeholders at the country level, who are expected to adopt the concepts and tools into their policy, planning and implementation processes.

Achievement of immediate outcomes

Raised awareness and better information on environment-disaster and environment-conflict linkages

146. The D&C Sub-programme has been successful in enhancing availability and access to environmental information in the aftermath of natural and industrial disasters and conflicts by delivering quality environmental impact assessments. Increasingly professional communication strategies and plans help ensure that the newly generated information is accessed and internalized by the right target audiences. Assessment results are usually well accepted by all, sometimes by opposing parties, because UNEP is widely believed to provide neutral and independent, scientifically sound and politically balanced reports (E.g. the Gaza Strip assessment of 2009 was accepted both by the Palestinian Authority and Israel).
147. In the period under review, UNEP staff and consultants contributed their expertise to environmental assessments in numerous post-disaster countries, for instance in those 7 countries most affected by the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004, and several other countries affected by hurricanes (Myanmar, Haiti...) and earthquakes (China, Pakistan, Haiti...). Depending on the country, requests made to UNEP and funds availability, UNEP teams were involved in emergency rapid environmental assessments or more detailed environmental impact assessments. The rapid assessments, in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, were usually conducted with experts deployed by the UNEP/OCHA JEU as part of United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) post-disaster needs assessments, but also sometimes by UNEP alone as in several countries affected by the tsunami or after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. It has been difficult to find concrete examples of follow-up on findings and recommendations of rapid environmental assessments because implementation of assessment recommendations is not systematically tracked. A system to track follow-up on assessment findings and recommendations could provide evidence of utility of the assessment and valuable lessons for future assessments. In addition, if the Government of the affected country doesn't wish a report to be published -for whatever reason- this request is respected by the JEU and no visible output of the JEU or UNEP's efforts is ever published. The evaluation sees a real risk here that valuable findings and recommendations will then never be known outside very restricted circles and, therefore, possibly never be acted upon. Rapid environmental assessment reports come in a variety of shapes and colours, because the various experts that are dispatched use to a large extent their own personal or organisation's report format instead of a standard template provided by the JEU. While flexibility has to be allowed to adjust to a particular country and disaster context, an opportunity for stronger communication and branding of the JEU (and UNEP) is lost because of the high heterogeneity of assessment reports. Besides, several cases were noted where UNEP staff participated in UNDAC post-disaster needs assessments without UNEP being mentioned as a contributing agency in the UNDAC report. Better visibility of UNEP's contribution could have raised the credibility of those reports.
148. More in-depth post-disaster environmental assessments have been conducted by UNEP PCDMB in a few post-disaster countries, such as the assessment of environmental impact of the tsunami in Sri Lanka and other affected countries, and the assessment of the environmental and other consequences of oil pollution in Ukraine (2008) and Nigeria (2011). Within the period covered by this evaluation, most in-depth assessments by PCDMB were conducted, however, in post-conflict countries. Post-conflict environmental assessments were prepared for Gaza (2006), Sudan (2007), Lebanon (2007), Sierra Leone (2009), Gaza (2009), DR Congo (2011) and Rwanda (2011). The reliability and usefulness of these assessments is overall considered very high. The post-conflict environmental assessments of Sudan, for example, was highly praised by Government, humanitarian and development partners, and civil society for its scientific rigour and success in raising knowledge and understanding of the key natural resource-related contributing factors and environmental consequences of the multi-layered conflict. In the case of Sudan and Sierra Leone, the assessment has laid the foundation for UNEP's continued post-conflict recovery support to the countries, and the DRC assessment is expected to be followed by a new UNEP country programme in DRC. In-depth post-crisis assessment reports are usually well written and illustrated, even though in the opinion of this evaluation, the reports could have a more standardized format (for easier reading and comparison across assessments), should systematically contain a summary for policy makers (cf. DRC Assessment) and should have the section on assessment methods and techniques in annex rather than in the beginning of the report (it is important to prove scientific rigor but tedious reading for the key target audiences).
149. In post-conflict programme countries, in addition to the post-conflict environmental assessments, UNEP has helped raise stakeholder knowledge and understanding concerning important environmental issues by contributing to the generation of useful environmental information and analysis. The most remarkable case for this continued support to field research is probably Sudan where, in Darfur, UNEP has conducted widely known research in collaboration

with international and national researchers on key themes such as pastoralist livelihoods, water resource management, forest resource use, energy resources and markets. UNEP has succeeded in increasing understanding among government and aid agencies of pastoralists and the effects of environmental change and conflicts on their livelihoods. This would have contributed to the fact that Government is now increasingly consulting with pastoralists on decisions that might affect them. Analysis and monitoring of markets led by UNEP is mostly targeted towards the local government and the donor community, which it has already influenced in some instances. Research on groundwater resources and continued groundwater monitoring in IDP camps in Darfur has contributed to improved water resource management around IDP camps.

150. In Sierra Leone, UNEP-supported assessments, knowledge exchange events, technical assistance and communications have also raised government, project staff and civil society awareness of environmental challenges (and their link to conflict), but in a less structured way and more on an *ad hoc* basis. For example, a process was launched to prepare a State of the Environment Report and UNEP facilitated a pilot Strategic Environmental Assessments concerning off-shore oil and gas exploration, introducing the SEA approach to a cross-section of government and civil society organisations. In Afghanistan, the first activity was an environmental assessment report that provided the basis for a national environmental management framework. Subsequently, UNEP did not support field research but invested a lot of effort in developing national government capacity to raise public awareness, for instance by supporting regional workshops and yearly events such as World Environment Day, Climate Change Week, Ozone Day, regular radio and TV programmes etc. Presenting environmental protection in the context of Islam was perhaps one of the most relevant and effective approaches to awareness raising in the country.
151. In the area of DRR, through the UNDAC mechanism countries can request an assessment of their preparedness for natural and industrial disasters. Over 20 countries received UNDAC Disaster Response Preparedness missions with participation of environmental experts facilitated by the UNEP/OCHA JEU, and likely became better informed about environmental risks.
152. It is important to note that, in most cases, country-level stakeholders have not really been equipped with the tools and skills to update or generate new knowledge and information by themselves. Some have been directly involved in assessments and field research, and should have acquired new skills through that involvement, but so far the sub-programme has produced little in terms of manuals, tool kits and training material, capitalizing rather poorly on more than 12 years of post-crisis assessment experience. An exception to this has been in the area of DRR where the focus has actually been on the development of several assessment tools, their demonstration in a limited number of pilot countries and their dissemination through publications and training: the hazard and disaster risk preparedness assessment as part of the 10-step APELL process; the Community Risk Profile Tool also developed by APELL; the Risk and Vulnerability Assessment Method developed by RiVAMP; the Integrated Strategic Environmental Assessment tool for DRR developed with UNDP, and the Strategic Environmental Assessment tool for integrating environmental concerns into national reconstruction plans. These tools are being customized and replicated at a larger scale with the help of partners.

Improved environmental and emergency preparedness strategies and planning

153. Even though evidence is scarce, the evaluation is quite confident that UNEP post-crisis assessments, sometimes followed by more specific field research on environment-conflict or -disaster linkages, have, by raising awareness and understanding among decision makers, influenced strategies and planning for recovery, prevention and preparedness. In many instances, however, UNEP has also provided additional technical assistance and training to promote the use of this raised awareness and understanding for improving strategies and planning.
154. During the period under review, UNEP supported several governments of natural disaster affected countries in integrating environmental needs and priorities into recovery plans. For this, the basis was usually an environmental assessment in which UNEP had been involved, followed by technical advice and/or training provided by UNEP environmental recovery experts. For example, in the Maldives UNEP was credited with having influenced the Government's decision to include environmental protection as one of the five post-tsunami recovery themes as a result of a training cycle for government officials. In China, UNEP has ensured, through technical assistance, that the environment became a key priority in the post-earthquake reconstruction programme and that DRR was integrated into reconstruction in order to "build back better". In Myanmar, a UNEP environmental expert was deployed to undertake a comprehensive overview of national recovery plans, provide advice for further mainstreaming of

environmental considerations into recovery planning, and review recovery plans for all UN agencies and national and international NGOs. More recently, in Cote d'Ivoire, UNEP supported the preparation of a Hazardous Waste Plan for the Port of Abidjan.

155. In some cases, UNEP's support went further than planning and led to the preparation of stand-alone environmental recovery strategies, such as the Strategic Environmental Framework prepared in collaboration with the Ministry of Environment of tsunami-affected Indonesia.

156. Also in post-conflict programme countries, UNEP has in some instances supported government agencies directly with the development or up-dating of general and sector-specific environmental strategies and plans. For example, in Sudan UNEP *inter alia* assisted the environment ministry with the preparation of a National Plan for Environmental Management, and a UNEP-led study on the wood energy situation in Darfur supported the drafting of a strategy on wood energy. In Sierra Leone, UNEP supported the revision of the National Environmental Action Plan and is working with WHO and other partners on an Integrated Waste Management Plan for the country. In Afghanistan, UNEP assisted the national Government with preparing the National Environment Action Plan, but also supported the development of a Landscape Master Plan and participatory planning for 18 villages within a Protected Area.

157. UNEP has also gone a long way in introducing environmental management in DRR planning (Eco-DRR) and improving planning for preparedness for industrial accidents (APELL). Access to environmental management and risk information is expected to contribute to improved planning for DRR, and UNEP has directly promoted the use of assessment information for DRR planning in a limited number of countries supporting emergency preparedness planning as part of local APELL demonstrations, both in industrial parks and coastal tourism sites, and supporting the design of local coastal protection projects. Planning for DRR has been more indirectly supported through a training initiative on Eco-DRR in partnership with the PEDRR. Each training session culminates in the preparation of an Agenda for Action discussed with senior policy makers and high-level government officials. The RiVAMP process ends with a stakeholder discussion of the findings and recommendations but no action plan is agreed upon at the end of the process. This might be a missing final step needed to ensure that the assessment feeds into planning or policy.

Improved policies for environmental management

158. Similar to the immediate outcome above, it is quite likely that UNEP post-crisis assessments, and subsequent field research carried out in some cases on more specific themes, have, by raising awareness and understanding among decision makers, influenced policy making towards more sustainable environmental management. In a few instances, UNEP has also provided direct policy advice, and in particular on how to integrate assessment and field research recommendations in environmental policy. Understandably, direct policy support was concentrated in those countries where UNEP has a longer-term country presence because policy work usually requires long-term engagement and close collaboration and trust relationships with the relevant decision makers.

159. In Sierra Leone, UNEP has provided inputs in the new Land Policy and the strategy and roadmap for land tenure reform. In Afghanistan, UNEP assisted the Government with formulating a National Waste Management Policy and a National Pollution Control and Management Policy. In Sudan, UNEP provided advice and training on how to integrate climate change issues into development policies, led a comprehensive policy review to identify policy gaps regarding pastoralists, and is currently contributing to the formulation of an integrated water management policy.

160. Policy for DRR has been more indirectly supported through the training initiative on Eco-DRR with the preparation of an Agenda for Action at the end of each training session which is discussed with senior policy makers and high-level government officials. However, it is very difficult to trace any policy changes at the country-level back to UNEP's work.

More adequate environmental regulatory framework

161. The D&C Sub-programme has contributed to improving a quite varied and dispersed set of laws, regulations and guidelines in several post-disaster and post-conflict countries aiming at reducing the environmental impact of disasters, conflicts and reconstruction efforts, as well as promoting more sustainable post-crisis reconstruction. For example, after the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, UNEP developed an environmental screening tool for Banda Aceh Province to evaluate the environmental impact of reconstruction projects, and the tool was later used by the Government of Indonesia to revise the national regulations regarding EIAs. In the Maldives, UNEP drafted technical

standards for landfill sites and, in Sri Lanka, contributed to the development of national hazardous waste guidelines. UNEP awareness raising efforts in China, would have contributed to the fact that it was forbidden to use asbestos-contaminated demolition debris for reconstruction after the Sichuan Province earthquake. In collaboration with UN-Habitat, UNEP developed guidelines for integrating sustainability measures into reconstruction, which were used by government reconstruction planners in Indonesia and Maldives.

162. In post-conflict country programmes, UNEP also managed to influence regulatory frameworks through its assessments, research, advocacy and, sometimes, direct technical assistance. This was especially notable in Afghanistan, where legal and regulatory frameworks relating to the environment, both 'green' and 'brown', did not exist prior to UNEP's support and UNEP has assisted in the development, drafting and finalisation of many laws and regulations. The Environment Law passed in 2007 and its accompanying regulatory framework is considered to be the UNEP programme's most significant achievement. The Law made it possible for the GoA to subsequently develop an Environmental Impact Assessment policy and legal framework together with supportive tools and techniques including pollution control policies and regulatory frameworks. A *National Waste Management Policy*, *Clean Air Regulation and Fuel Quality Standards* have been approved and are now being disseminated. A *National Pollution Control and Management Policy*, *National Ambient Air Quality Standard for Afghanistan*, and *Vehicle Emission Standards* have also been developed. UNEP also supported the drafting of a Forest Law and Rangeland Law, which have been ratified by Parliament. In Sudan, UNEP research and advocacy efforts changed the subsidy regime for LPG to promote the use of LPG as an alternative cooking energy source but further effects of UNEP's work on regulatory frameworks remain to be seen.

Enhanced environmental management skills

163. Better information availability through assessments, field-research and training courses have contributed to enhanced technical and managerial skills in supported countries, but are usually not enough. These need to be paired with technical advice during practical use of concepts and tools by in-country stakeholders in research, policy development, planning etc. This immediate outcome was achieved to a certain extent where UNEP provided technical advice to efforts led by national and local stakeholders. This was most often the case in demonstration sites, where pilot project stakeholders received technical coaching during the practical implementation of UNEP-promoted environmental management and industrial emergency preparedness approaches. Generally speaking, skills development has usually not been comprehensive in terms of whose skills were built or of what kind of skills were built. Most attention was given to policy and planning skills, while assessment, management, monitoring and enforcement skills have received less attention (with some exceptions e.g. extractive industry monitoring in Sierra Leone and DRR-related assessment skills in Jamaica).

164. Across the post-conflict country programmes, skills were built for a quite diverse range of stakeholders in varied fields. For example, in Sudan, national researchers are strongly involved in field research in Darfur and have enhanced their research skills as regards livelihoods analysis, market analysis etc. thanks to coaching by UNEP partners. National NGO staff supporting pilot communities in North Darfur have acquired additional skills about community-level environmental planning. In Afghanistan, staff skills have been built essentially in one government agency (NEPA) through on the job training, mentoring and technical assistance in the areas of programme planning, the conduct of awareness campaigns and the development of laws and regulations. By putting the national counterpart as the lead, skills development has been the stronger. However, technical capacities within the organisation to develop plans and projects to international standards are still limited. Institutional sustainability requires political influence and technical competency. NEPA has political influence due to its leadership, but still lacks technical capacity. And other key government agencies received far less support. Also, at the provincial level, staff claim that their knowledge and skills (as well as their resources) to work effectively are still limited. The same can be said of Sierra Leone, where, for various reasons, essentially one national government agency (EPA-SL) has benefited from quite intensive UNEP coaching and assistance, while others also have huge capacity gaps. The district level has largely been ignored so far as well. In Sierra Leone, EPA staff primarily improved their skills in verifying EIAs for mining operations and monitoring mining sites. They have also learned how to manage a basic toxic waste disposal intervention from the UNEP-facilitated clean-up of a Tetraethyl lead dump site near the capital.

165. The D&C Sub-programme's direct engagement in environmental restoration and management projects in post-disaster situations has been rather limited and mainly focussed on the same countries where assessments and policy/planning support has been provided. In those quite dispersed cases, UNEP provided very specific technical advice to government and communities that were engaged in restoration and reconstruction efforts, contributing

to the development of their implementation skills. For example, after the Indian Ocean tsunami, UNEP supported emergency hazardous waste clean-up efforts in the Maldives and Indonesia, building local technical capacity for waste management and proper handling and storage of hazardous waste. UNEP technical advice also raised the waste management capacity of local government in Banda Aceh, Indonesia. By means of several partnership-based interventions in the Maldives, Indonesia and Sri Lanka, UNEP built skills of tsunami-affected communities in coastal ecosystem management and restoration. There are several other, quite diverse examples in China, Myanmar, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Haiti.

166. In the area of DRR, implementation skills have been built mostly in demonstration sites e.g. APELL industrial sites; and for coastal zone managers in India, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. The Environmental Management for DRR project was expected to link the Eco-DRR course to support to field projects in the countries where the training was rolled out, but this was not possible due to a lack of funding.

Stronger environmental institutions

167. This component of country capacity relates to the structural and managerial capacity of the institutions expected to adopt concepts and tools promoted by UNEP. Similarly to policy and regulatory framework support, direct institutional support has been focussed on countries where UNEP has a longer-term country presence. In Afghanistan, UNEP has advised NEPA on creating its internal structure including support on job descriptions and creation of provincial offices. In Sudan, a major accomplishment with direct UNEP support has been the establishment of Ministries of Environment at State level.

168. Understandably, no institutional support is provided by the disaster risk reduction core service area, which would have required a different country engagement strategy with long term presence. In fact, for this service area, country selection had to a large extent to be based on the presence of adequate institutions to ensure that countries could absorb UNEP support on assessments, planning and implementation for DRR concentrating most support to middle-income rather than the poorest, often most vulnerable, countries.

Outcome Drivers & Assumptions

Better integration of environmental concerns in DRR, peacebuilding and recovery work of other UN agencies and other humanitarian and development actors

169. In the overall Theory of Change of the D&C Sub-programme, integration of environmental considerations into UN and other international organisations is considered a crucial outcome driver needed to make countries put their enhanced capacities due to UNEP's support into practice. These organisations indeed often provide support to countries that goes beyond capacity building, directly supporting government agencies and other stakeholders with environmental management for recovery and improved resilience from disasters and conflicts. Other UN and international organisations are furthermore expected to play a major role in replication and up-scaling of capacity building efforts beyond the relatively limited geographical areas where UNEP is directly active.

170. However, to a certain extent, integration of environmental considerations into DRR, peacebuilding and recovery efforts led or executed by international organisations also has a direct bearing on the environment, e.g. by reducing the environmental footprint of peacekeeping operations, or by ensuring that environmental considerations are integrated in debris clearing, clean-up and reconstruction efforts carried out directly by humanitarian organisations. On the other hand, by making international humanitarian and development organisations such as DPKO, WFP or UNHCR more aware of their own environmental impact it is likely that they pay greater attention to environmental considerations in their overall country programmes and intervention strategies.

171. That being said, results towards this outcome driver have been quite impressive and worth mentioning in some detail.

172. **At the global level**, the UNEP D&C Sub-programme has been very active in advocacy and training towards the UN and other international agencies to bring the environment on the forefront of DRR, recovery and peacebuilding approaches. UNEP is also the focal point for environment in the UNDG where it advocates for incorporating environmental issues in emergency and recovery policies, guidelines and operations. In this regard, UNEP (through the ECP programme) has chaired a process to develop UN-wide guidelines on addressing natural resources in post-conflict transition settings together with an assessment toolkit on natural resource risks and opportunities.

173. UNEP is the focal point for environment within the humanitarian coordination system (the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, IASC Cluster Approach) and the Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery (CWGER) through the project *“Environment, humanitarian action and early recovery”*. The project was designed to provide technical support to the humanitarian system to integrate environment into their programmes and plans. UNEP established an Environment Network and has been involved with the humanitarian clusters to raise awareness, develop assessment tools, train responders, provide technical assistance on environmental considerations and advocate the inclusion of environmental components in Flash Appeals and Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP). This did not meet with great success in terms of take-up due to lack of funding, despite honest efforts by UNEP.
174. The projects promoting environmental management for DRR have produced several communication outputs and held dissemination events to promote integration of concepts and tools developed into policies and practices of international organisations, and there is already some evidence of effective influence by UNEP. For instance, the RIVAMP assessment tool was presented at several occasions to members of the wider DRR community (3rd International Disaster Risk Conference in Davos, the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) in Mauritius, the German Development Bank etc.). UNEP has further contributed to bringing the environment forward as an essential element in DRR through its active participation in the UNISDR. UNEP has led the UNISDR Environment and Disaster Working Group (EDWG) between 2005 and 2008. Within the framework of the project *“Strengthening the role of environmental management in DRR”* UNEP prepared a number of papers and contributed to multi-author publications that were presented at key international DRR events, such as the discussion paper *“Environment and Disaster Risk: Emerging perspectives”* (2007) and the paper *“Reducing Risk through Environment in Recovery Operations”* (2009) presented at the UNISDR 2009 Annual Forum of the International Recovery Platform (IRP). The project also supported the creation of the PEDRR, a global alliance of UN agencies, NGOs and specialist institutes from the environment and disaster reduction communities (see paragraph 220). Through the current *“Environmental Management for DRR”* project and in close collaboration with PEDRR partners, UNEP has continued to be active in advocacy and outreach towards the broader DRR community, by pursuing the same approach of presenting papers and co-organizing sessions at important DRR events. The Council of Europe’s *“EUR-OPA Major Hazards Agreement”* now has endorsed Eco-DRR to be implemented by signatory member states. The European Union’s DRR Strategy for Developing Countries includes addressing environmental vulnerabilities as a result of a UNEP intervention at a Brussels consultation meeting. UNEP with PEDRR later provided written inputs into the final document. This strategy has now been translated into an Implementation Plan 2011 - 2014 to which an up-coming DRR Project under the EUROPEAID thematic programme for Environment and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources including Energy (ENRTP) will be contributing.
175. The ECP programme has also been successful in introducing natural resources and the environment as both critical peacebuilding assets and potential sources of conflict in UN policy, guidelines and training curricula. The flagship Policy Report *“From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment”* published early 2009 raised awareness within the UN on environment-conflict linkages and was mentioned in several high-level UN reports¹⁴, debates and learning events¹⁵. This publication and further UNEP advocacy efforts have also raised the interest of the UN Peacebuilding Fund to finance programmes on natural resources that support conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and might have influenced the introduction of a priority area on addressing conflict risks and peacebuilding opportunities from natural resources within the European Instrument for Stability (not verified by this evaluation). A second Policy Report *“Protecting the Environment during Armed Conflict: An inventory and analysis of International Law”* published late 2009 has influenced UN policy at the global level, such as the choice of environmental protection as the third priority for strengthening International Humanitarian Law by the ICRC. It was also proposed by the International Law Commission to be added as a topic in the long-range plan. Three other flagship policy reports were also under production at the time of writing¹⁶. ECP also catalyzed and co-coordinated the largest research efforts of its kind on lessons learned in managing natural resources in post-conflict countries. Together with the Environmental Law Institute and the Universities of McGill and Tokyo, the research programme

¹⁴ 2010 Progress Report on the Report of the UNSG on Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict; and in the UNSG Report on Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications.

¹⁵ Two dedicated sessions of the Working Group on Lessons Learned of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Debate of the UN Security Council on Climate Change.

¹⁶ These include: a joint UNEP-UNDP report on the risks and opportunities from natural resources regarding the reintegration of ex-combatants, a joint UNEP-UNDP-PBSO-UN-WOMEN report focusing on the linkages between natural resources and women in the context of conflict and peacebuilding, and a report by UNEP and DPA focusing on mediating natural resource conflicts.

collected over 150 case studies written by more than 225 scholars, practitioners, and decision makers from around the world. The cases will be published in a series of six thematic books and then summarized in a single synthesis book. These books are expected to become an important milestone toward improving knowledge and understanding regarding post-conflict resource management and to be a source of knowledge and best practice for evidence-based policies, programming and training.

176. A few policies and guidelines used by other UN agencies have been prepared with UNEP technical inputs, such as the “Environmental Policy for UN Peace Operations” prepared by DPKO and DFS in 2009 and the “Second generation disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration practices in peace operations” published by DPKO early 2010. The ECP also contributed to training programmes for the UN staff college, peacekeeping troops, NATO and EC delegations working in fragile states. For example, UNEP helped develop an environmental component for the DPKO/DFS pre-deployment training and conducted training for peacekeepers on natural resource management and environmental issues. UNEP also worked with DPKO and DFS over a two year period to assess the level of implementation of the 2009 environmental policy for UN Peace Operations¹⁷.

177. **At the country level** there is evidence of integration of environmental concerns in UN and other international organisations’ programming and interventions due to efforts of the UNEP post-conflict country programmes.

178. In Sudan, for example, even though *before* UNEP moved in the environment was already recognized as one of the underlying issues of conflict and the UN agencies already considered the environmental impact of their programming to a certain extent, it was UNEP’s active advocacy efforts – supported by the post-conflict environmental assessment and in-depth field research – that made the environment one of the priority themes in the UN vision for Sudan. The environment has been a priority in the four latest UN Humanitarian Work Plans and UNEP’s work is embedded in the UNDAF for Sudan and several UN strategic and planning documents for Darfur. UNEP-led research coupled with advocacy has influenced decisions by individual UN agencies as well, even though the work has been a bit scattered and *ad hoc*. Examples of this are drought contingency planning for IDP camps by UNICEF, and the inclusion of sustainable construction guidelines in the 2010 UN Work Plan.

179. In Sierra Leone, UNEP has played an important advisory role on environmental issues – and their relationship with conflict – to the UN peacebuilding mission and the UN Country Team (UNCT). The awareness of the UNCT and UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) about environmental issues related to the conflict is currently very high, owing to regular meetings between the UNEP Programme Coordinator and the Executive Representative of the Secretary General (ERSG). The UNCT and UNIPSIL plan with much attention to environmental issues. This was first the case with UNEP’s involvement in the preparation of the UN “Joint Vision” 2009-2012 and, more recently, with the inclusion of the environment & NRM as a key priority in the UN family’s Transitional Joint Vision for Sierra Leone 2013-2014.

180. UNEP seems to have been less successful in more recent times in mainstreaming environmental concerns in the UN agencies operating in Afghanistan. The environment and natural resources constituted one of the priority UNDAF areas of cooperation for 2006-2008, and UNEP’s work on environmental policies and regulatory frameworks was fully integrated there. But under the current UNDAF (2010-2013) the environment is degraded to a second priority, under the sustainable livelihoods key area of intervention, which – as regards the environment – only covers community based NRM and land-and water dispute resolution, and UNEP co-leads this area with FAO, an agency that has a much larger programme in Afghanistan and much more clout with the chief line ministry. These changes have reduced the visibility of environment in the UN system. Also, collaboration with UNDP and FAO in practice has been very limited up to now.

181. After major disasters, UNEP has deployed experts to support UNDAC and UNCT teams to ensure that the environment was integrated into UN recovery operations, most often by advocating for giving the environment a prominent role in UN recovery strategies. For instance, after the Indian Ocean Tsunami, UNEP proposed several projects for the OCHA Flash Appeals and helped design environmental components for projects led by other agencies. UNEP advocacy ensured that the UNCT integrated environmental protection and DRR as one of three core principles in the UN recovery strategy for the Maldives. Other examples are UNEP’s technical support to the UN system following the Wenchuan earthquake in China, making sure that environmental issues were covered in the UN appeal for earthquake early recovery, and the support provided by a JEU expert to UN humanitarian cluster

¹⁷ The results were published in May 2012 in a joint report entitled “Greening the Blue Helmets: Environment, Natural Resources and UN Peacekeeping Operations”.

partners on mainstreaming environmental considerations into their humanitarian operations following the Pakistan floods.

182. In Haiti, UNEP was mandated by the UN Relief Coordinator to coordinate the environmental response to the 2010 earthquake. After conducting a rapid environmental assessment, UNEP's work focused on providing *ad hoc* technical assistance in cooperation with UNCT to a wide range of organizations and engaging with the inter-cluster coordination process to advocate for the inclusion of environmental considerations. UNEP, as a member of the Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery (CWGER), has succeeded in integrating environmental considerations into the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs. UNEP also delivered a series of training courses for humanitarian and early recovery practitioners to identify key environmental issues for further follow-up. However, the integration of environmental concerns into humanitarian operations in Haiti was seriously hampered by a lack of funding and staff resources, and also limited interest and support from the humanitarian agencies' headquarters.

Stronger non-governmental stakeholder ownership

183. Stronger non-governmental stakeholder (including local communities, civil society and the private sector) ownership of decisions is essential to drive behavioural change of all capacitated actors, and governments in particular, towards improved environmental management and more effective environmental emergency prevention and response. For stakeholders to use their enhanced capacity (enhanced knowledge, policies, planning, regulatory framework, institutions and implementation skills) it is essential that their attitude evolves as well, and this can be driven strongly by increasing ownership and accountability among all actors for several reasons:

- Community choices and preferences on quality of life and lifestyle, and private sector choices on technology and social responsibility have major effects on the environment, and on the exposure and vulnerability of local stakeholders to natural hazards and industrial accidents. By involving both local communities and industry in risk assessments and decision making on environmental management and DRR planning, their commitment to common goals will be raised and it will become much easier to convince them to make different choices at the root of many risks. Civil society can also influence those choices by raising awareness and mobilize community action when needed. Similarly, involving communities and the private sector (e.g. the mining industry) in peacebuilding efforts is essential because these stakeholders' behavior is often at the root or exacerbates tensions around natural resources and the environment;
- Communities, civil society and industry have a wealth of knowledge and understanding, and also physical resources that can be tapped to improve environmental management for DRR, conflict prevention and emergency preparedness, and make environmental recovery efforts better suited to the local conditions. Their active participation in assessments, planning and practical action is needed for these resources to become available and used in the most efficient way;
- The participation of non-governmental stakeholders in monitoring changes in management practices and their consequences increases the accountability of all stakeholders towards each other, including that of government decision makers and managers towards local communities and private businesses; and
- By giving marginalized groups a voice, their participation in assessments, planning and management can counter social exclusion and ensure that all vulnerable population groups can benefit from recovery efforts and reduced threats to livelihoods and life.

184. In the D&C Sub-programme civil society, community and private sector participation takes place to varying degrees in assessments, planning and implementation, but is usually of a consultative nature and can rarely be considered as true participation in decision making, management and monitoring. Ownership by non-governmental stakeholders might therefore not be strong enough to make these stakeholders feel responsible to change their own life choices, or hold themselves and others (such as government actors) accountable to comply with agreements and decisions made. A focus on building civil society capacity to engage in natural resource decision making in fragile states is an area of focus of the third phase of the UN-EU partnership.

185. In a few country programmes, stronger non-governmental stakeholder participation is, however, actively promoted by UNEP. This is most explicit in Afghanistan, where UNEP is piloting a Community-based Natural Resources Management approach as a component of support provided to the establishment and management of a Protected Area. Use was made of social structures developed under previous development initiatives and work has well advanced with respect to community mobilisation and awareness. The purpose of the pilots is to demonstrate the application of policy to practice, but there is a need for a more regular feedback mechanism for both the Government and UNEP to ensure that maximal learning from this experience can take place. Also, reaping the

benefits of even the demonstrations may require a longer-term engagement at the community level that may well be beyond UNEP's mandate. Collaborative partnerships with organisations that could provide this longer-term presence and upscale UNEP's pilot experiences such as UNDP and FAO remain under-developed in Afghanistan. In Sudan, UNEP is piloting Community Environmental Action Plans, which are participatory planning instruments used by communities to prioritize and address environmental issues or take environmental opportunities for local socio-economic development. There is a question however on whether UNEP should directly support these community-level demonstrations, considering that several NGOs have locally accumulated considerable experience in this area. UNEP would be better placed to support the up-scaling of these approaches through advocacy towards government and the donor community – something NGOs are less well placed for.

Good collaborative relationships between stakeholders

186. In addition to enhanced capacity, it is important that interaction, alignment and complementarity are strengthened between groups and organisations involved in environmental management, in order to promote more sustainable and equitable environmental governance.
187. UNEP has directly and indirectly contributed to cooperation at the supra-national level (between two or more countries). This was mostly (but not exclusively) the case through the ENVSEC programme partnership. In Central Asia, for instance, ENVSEC promoted cooperation on dam safety and advised countries on radioactive waste management across borders.
188. At the national level, work on relationships has been most explicit in Sudan. To support sustainable and equitable governance, management and use of environmental resources, UNEP actively promotes collaborative relationships between government, UN and civil society institutions. UNEP's focus of support has been on relationships between Government institutions, but field research has also investigated relationships between communities, and between traditional leadership and "modern" local authorities. For example, UNEP has brought several government agencies together to conduct research and change the pricing strategy of LPG, a more environmentally friendly alternative to charcoal for cooking in Darfur. UNEP also brought pastoralist leaders, researchers, government and other stakeholders together in a Pastoralist Policy Forum to inform and influence policies that concern pastoralist communities. The Darfur International Water Conference and two study tours brought federal and state-level institutions together and helped develop an IWRM process in the 3 Darfuri states, with a shared vision and effective joint action. Both in Afghanistan and Sierra Leone, UNEP has also undertaken considerable effort to strengthen collaboration between environment-related government agencies, attempting in particular to bring the environmental protection agency – which receives the lion's share of UNEP's capacity building support – out of isolation and obtain stronger cooperation from sector ministries such as agriculture, forestry, water and mining.
189. In the field of DRR, the APELL approach is also very conducive to building relationships between government, the private sector and communities living and working close to industrial areas. These relationships are absolutely essential for improving accident prevention and emergency preparedness. In environment-DRR demonstration countries, the PCDMB team has also somewhat promoted collaboration between the traditional DRR institutions (National Centres for DRR, civil protection agencies etc.) with environment-related agencies by involving them both in training sessions and, where possible, in field demonstration projects. This is particularly important because environmental management is often considered outside the mandate of the traditional DRR institutions, and they need the environmental agencies' support to promote a change in environmental management practices to support DRR.

Stable political and security situation

190. As mentioned in paragraph 75 there is a basic assumption in the countries where the D&C Sub-programme operates that the political and security situation will not deteriorate to a level that makes UNEP's work too difficult or dangerous, hampers the uptake of UNEP's products and services by stakeholders in the country, or adds serious non-environmental threats to the environment or livelihoods that overshadow any positive impacts that could have been achieved through UNEP's work.
191. The risk that the security situation deteriorates where D&C staff are working on the ground is real, and in some countries this risk can even be considered high. Even though the D&C teams have learned, to a certain extent, to cope with insecurity, often relying on the services of partners because UNEP is not equipped with the proper systems and procedures to support field operations in insecure environments (see paragraphs 272-273), there is

definitely a limit to where UNEP teams, and their local partners, can continue operating on the ground without putting persons in danger. In some places, such as Afghanistan, Sudan or DRC, security risks already seriously hamper the movement, and therefore the effectiveness, of field staff.

192. As regards the political situation, there is also a moderate to high risk of instability in many post-crisis countries. Typical consequences of political turmoil can be removal of people with whom UNEP has developed a trust relationship from key decision making positions, temporary closure of key national partner institutions, interruptions in counterpart funding flows, restrictions of access to information and project sites, difficulties to obtain visas for visitors, withdrawal of authorisations of key non-governmental partners to operate in the country, and a general deterioration of the security situation. The only way for UNEP to manage this risk is really to diversify its partners both at the government and the civil society level, so that a fall-back is available in case some partners would lose their effectiveness in the country. The evaluation found that partnerships are currently not diverse enough and UNEP risks to lose a lot from political instability which is quite likely in many D&C countries where it operates.
193. As mentioned before, there is a feedback loop from the intermediate states (frequency, size and severity of consequences of disasters and conflicts reduced) down to the political and security stability assumptions at the medium-term outcome, immediate outcome and output levels. This means that UNEP, in the longer term, is expected to contribute to a more stable and safe environment, which, in turn, is required for UNEP products and services to be delivered efficiently and capacity building and behavioural change outcomes to be achieved effectively. In this sense, the assumption could actually be considered a driver, because UNEP does attempt to contribute to the assumption being true.

Adequate financial resources

194. Financial resources are required to transform policy, plans, regulations and skills into action. Long-term funding to address environmental issues is often lacking because countries affected by disasters or conflict have usually a very weak financial resource base and the environment is often not an immediate concern for the government and for most donors. Besides, in many countries such as Afghanistan 'the game is changing' from bi-lateral to thematic multi-donor trust fund support, where environment gets buried under rural development and livelihood support funding. The EU, as a major funder for UNEP in Afghanistan, confirmed this shift: environment is no longer a programme priority and that the EU will direct its funding more towards the pooled mechanisms. Accessing funds for environment from the Government and donors may pose an increasing challenge to national partners, worsened by the fact that technical capacities to develop programmes and projects to international standards are still limited.
195. In some cases, UNEP has provided direct support to countries to raise funds to put policies, plans and regulations to practice (this is distinct from fund raising for humanitarian or development projects and programmes) and might thus have built some fund raising capacity. But reporting on results in this area is very poor and no concrete examples of success could be identified by the evaluation.
196. Noteworthy is the case of resource-rich countries emerging from a civil war that was fuelled by high-value natural resources. The conflict will usually have slowed down legal extraction operations and undermined the capacity of the government to recover and equitably redistribute the value of the natural resources being extracted. In Sierra Leone, such a situation existed shortly after the conflict, but efforts by the World Bank in collaboration with UNEP and others, are contributing to an improvement of governance and transparency of the extractive industries and better deals for the Government. This should gradually raise the financial situation of the country and make more resources available for environmental management. In Sudan, however, the situation has strongly deteriorated since the recent separation between north and south. The National Forestry Corporation, in charge of managing forests in Sudan, entirely functions on income generated by forest exploitation. Since the separation, the productive forest area of the (northern) Republic of Sudan, which suffers from a much higher deforestation rate than South Sudan, is disappearing at an alarming pace, and so is the income of the National Forest Corporation. At the same time, because of continued disagreement on the distribution of oil wealth between the two countries, oil extraction has practically been halted and this has dramatically reduced government income for both States, even further reducing the likelihood that adequate government funding will be dedicated to natural resources management and the environment.

197. There are encouraging signs of increasing private sector funding, notably for environmental clean-up and rehabilitation of contaminated sites because of industrial activity (e.g. oil pollution in Ogoniland, or environmental damage caused by industrial mining in Sierra Leone) or for industrial emergency preparedness (e.g. APELL in China). Private sector funding is probably an important part of the future and the D&C Sub-programme should increase efforts to mobilize it. However, there are not always clear benefits for the private sector to fund environment-related investments and governments need funding to continue fulfilling their regulatory functions. Therefore, for certain investments and government services, funding from the state budget will always be needed.

Low staff turn-over and adequate staff numbers

198. Because a lot of the advocacy and skills development work by UNEP is targeted towards government institutions, UN and a few other aid agencies, adequate staff numbers and low staff turn-over within these institutions are necessary for medium term outcomes (larger-scale changes in environmental management practices for instance) and progress towards impact (reduction of vulnerabilities to disasters and conflicts) to be achieved.

199. In the D&C country programmes, trust relationships built by UNEP staff with government, civil society, private sector and other aid agencies (including bilateral donors) are often invaluable. These relationships are often personal and remain in place only as long as the same people remain in place.

200. As regards adequate staff numbers, the assumption has often proved wrong. Most government partner agencies of UNEP remain seriously understaffed. For example, the environmental protection agency of Sierra Leone operates at about 10 per cent of its minimum staff requirement and the same in Afghanistan, though much better staffed, has still one third of its staff positions unfilled. Also the aid community usually lacks staff numbers affecting the achievement of UNEP outcomes. For example, UNEP failed to mainstream environment in humanitarian planning in Haiti, in part because staff of humanitarian agencies were already overstretched with other priorities and could not spare any time to deal with environmental concerns. Generally speaking, there are serious concerns about the absorption capacity of several key UNEP partners at country level due to a lack of staff resources.

201. Fortunately, the assumption of low staff turn-over in government partner agencies has proved valid so far in most countries. This should, however, probably be attributed to coincidence. It is very common in developing countries that highly qualified government staff leave their government job to join international development partners or the private sector because these offer better wages and working conditions. UNEP teams – themselves quite stable – have drawn real benefits of being able to work with broadly the same people over several years. However, in complex post-conflict settings, staff turn-over in aid agencies can be considerable and those agencies are sometimes said to “renew their ignorance about every two years”. Some donors’ interest for environmental issues (and sometimes also key UN partners such as UNDP) seems to vary sometimes with the personal interests of their senior in-country staff. In several countries, UNEP relationships and collaboration opportunities with those agencies have known ups and downs because of staff changes with donors or UN partner agencies.

Progress on medium-term outcomes and likelihood of impact

202. In the medium term, the D&C Sub-programme is expected to contribute to improved and equitable environmental management and governance for disaster risk reduction, improved environmental emergency response, conflict prevention and peace building, and environmental recovery in supported countries.

203. UNEP’s efforts are focussing on building different dimensions of capacity in countries vulnerable to disasters and conflicts, as the immediate outcomes, so that environmental management and governance can be improved in the medium-term. As mentioned earlier, whether these capacity building efforts can effectively contribute to changes in environmental management and governance, depends on the degree to which these immediate outcomes have effectively been achieved and the extent to which the required drivers and assumptions are present.

204. The challenge is to have all immediate outcomes, drivers and assumptions sufficiently achieved or present in any given country to enable behavioural change needed for a reduction of threats and vulnerabilities, and ultimately a positive impact on the sustainability of environmental benefits and livelihoods. If one or more immediate outcomes, drivers or assumptions remain lacking, they constitute obstacles or bottlenecks and the likelihood of achieving lasting change in terms of environmental management and governance is reduced, as is the likelihood of contributing to sustainable recovery of environmental benefits and livelihoods.

205. Obviously, UNEP cannot ensure by its own efforts alone that all these elements are present, and has therefore targeted its capacity building efforts towards the most important gaps in the countries' institutional framework, where UNEP, with its mandate and limited resources, believes it is likely to make a difference. Also, UNEP has made considerable efforts to partner with and seek leverage from other aid agencies, in particular those belonging to the UN system, so that other major gaps beyond UNEP's reach could also be filled. This increases the likelihood of achieving medium-term outcomes and impact in the supported countries.
206. There are signs of country-wide improvements in environmental management and governance in the countries supported by UNEP, but these can only credibly be attributed to UNEP's work in countries where UNEP has had a permanent presence for an extended duration. Continued and intensive country support by UNEP has been required to really affect environmental management and governance, as has been the case in Afghanistan and Sudan, and is starting in Sierra Leone.
207. Where UNEP projects provided training and coaching linked to field demonstrations, e.g. with the APELL programme, or with coastal managers in Thailand and Indonesia, or on monitoring of industrial mining sites in Sierra Leone, behavioural changes have also been triggered, even though the scope of these changes is usually quite restricted. But a strong basis for replication and up-scaling is being built through partnerships and efforts for knowledge sharing at a broader scale (see next section).
208. Even though environmental causes and consequences of disasters and conflicts might have been reduced, the likelihood of impact is affected by the assumption that non-environmental causes of disasters and conflicts are not increasing. This assumption has held true in most countries supported by UNEP to date, even though some countries e.g. Sudan and DRC, might still be at serious risk of relapse into violent conflict due to on-going political struggles. If this would happen, most of UNEP's achievements in those countries could be erased as would other development gains. Climate change is also likely to increase the frequency and extent of extreme weather events (droughts and tropical storms) and their related socio-economic consequences. UNEP attempts to increase the resilience of vulnerable communities by supporting climate change adaptation within the Climate Change Sub-programme.

4.2.2 Sustainability, replication and upscaling

Sustainability

209. The sustainability assessment looks primarily at factors affecting sustainability and the likelihood that results achieved so far will be sustained after UNEP support has been withdrawn. The evaluation reviews the sustainability factors according to four standard categories: i) Socio-political sustainability; ii) Financial resources; iii) Institutional framework; and iv) Environmental sustainability. Many aspects of these categories have already been discussed above and, in these cases, only a short summary will be provided here with reference to the above paragraphs.

Socio-political sustainability

210. These factors relate strongly to ownership by both governmental and non-governmental stakeholders. The UNEP D&C sub-programme is largely geared towards building government capacity. The facts that national government agencies are in most cases the primary beneficiaries of UNEP's support and that they are always closely involved in – and often leading – UNEP-supported pilot initiatives, ensure that ownership by national government is usually high. However, UNEP's support is quite often too narrowly focussed on one or two government institutions and depends on a relatively small number of very good personal relationships within these institutions, which can constitute a risk in terms of sustainability in case the institution would suddenly lose the support of the political class in the country, or in case key government staff would be transferred.
211. Ownership by non-governmental stakeholders is an important outcome driver that has been discussed above, but it is also a sustainability factor, because communities, civil society and the private sector need to feel responsible for adjusting their own behaviour towards the environment and natural resources, and also for holding their government accountable for making changes towards more sustainable and equitable environmental governance. With some exceptions where UNEP has directly worked at a relatively small scale with civil society organisations and communities in Sudan and Afghanistan, sustainability of inputs by communities and civil society usually remains weak. In the area of DRR, the APELL approach strongly involves all stakeholders, including the private sector and the

local communities, in industrial emergency preparedness planning and drills, and this strongly contributes to sustainability of any emergency response systems put in place in industrial parks.

Financial resources

212. The availability of financial resources was already discussed above as an assumption that is required to transform policy, plans, regulations and skills into action. Long-term funding to address environmental issues is often lacking because countries affected by disasters or conflict have usually a very weak financial resource base to start with, and the environment is in most cases not a national priority concern, neither for the government nor for most donors. This constitutes a serious threat to sustainability of all types of capacity building results achieved in most fragile states.

213. In resource-rich countries emerging from conflict, there might be opportunities to redress the financial resource base of the countries by improving natural resource governance and there are some encouraging signs such as in Sierra Leone, but the risks of relapse into conflict are high and the financial situation of countries can also very quickly deteriorate as is currently seen in Sudan and South-Sudan.

214. There are also some positive signs of increasing private sector funding, notably for environmental clean-up and rehabilitation of contaminated sites because of industrial activity (e.g. oil pollution in Ogoniland, or environmental damage caused by industrial mining in Sierra Leone) or for industrial emergency preparedness (e.g. APELL in China) as mentioned under paragraph 194 above.

Institutional framework

215. This dimension of sustainability relates to factors regarding governance structures and processes, policies, national agreements, legal and accountability frameworks etc. required to sustaining results. Policies, strategies, planning and regulatory frameworks are at the core of UNEP's recovery support to post-crisis countries and some significant results have been achieved there as presented at length above among the immediate outcomes. Initial steps towards the improvement of strategies and planning for DRR by means of enhanced environmental management have also been taken in a number of disaster-vulnerable countries.

216. However, even in the countries where UNEP provided quite intensive support (Afghanistan and Sudan), though significant progress has been made, governance structures and processes remain fragile and may need further strengthening for considerable time to come. Donors interviewed in Afghanistan, for example, believe that sustainable environmental management is a development process that needs decades to make a change in post-conflict countries. In their view, none of UNEP's government partners have reached the desirable level of capacity to sustain the environmental agenda without UN support.

217. As stated in the MTR of the ECP programme, continued corruption, poor management practices and environmental negligence in many countries can hamper sustainable outcomes. These are, of course, much larger issues than UNEP alone can address.

Environmental sustainability

218. UNEP's work in the area of D&C is expected to contribute to enhanced and more equitable environmental and natural resources management, as a medium-term outcome, so that countries can sustainably recover from disasters or conflicts and reduce their vulnerability to future hazards. As discussed earlier, the extent to which UNEP's efforts to build capacities in supported countries, as the immediate outcome, then really contribute to better environmental management, depends on the degree to which the immediate outcomes have been achieved and the presence of the required drivers and assumptions. Visible change in environmental governance and management has only been evident in countries where UNEP has worked in the longer term on priority capacity gaps identified in post-conflict environmental assessments, and developed strong partnerships with government and development agencies.

Replication and up-scaling

219. Replication and up-scaling of UNEP's direct results is essential to drive change at a larger scale, i.e. beyond the relatively few partner countries and demonstration sites. A key element of the up-scaling strategy is the promotion of up-take of UNEP concepts and tools by public and private partners at the national and international level, and the broader, international D&C and environmental communities, who in many cases cover a much larger

geographic area than UNEP projects are able to cover directly. These actors are expected to integrate the concepts and tools in their own approaches and work. UNEP promotes this in two ways: by involving these actors directly through partnerships at the national and international level, and through communication (publications, presentations at major events etc.) and training.

220. Replication of certain types of assessments by other partners (government agencies, civil society, international organisations etc.) would be possible (even though we found no evidence that it has actually happened beyond expressions of intent) because the teams conducting those assessments have capitalized on the experience by doing an effort to formalize the approach and tools in a manual or guideline, and sometimes even to organize training on how to conduct those assessments. This was the case, for example, for the rapid environmental impact assessment approach built into post-crisis needs assessments by the JEU, the RIVAMP environment-sensitive disaster risk assessment method developed by the eco-DRR team in PCDMB and the APELL approach by the SCP Branch in DTIE. For post-conflict assessments, a UNEP Conflict Analysis Framework has been formalized¹⁸, which was applied in Sierra Leone, Rwanda and DRC and could be used by others for conducting similar assessments, but this framework does not really provide a method, i.e. a systematic approach with tools and instruments. However, some major post-disaster assessments such as the Ogoniland assessment were very little capitalized on to develop guidelines, lessons learned etc. and, unless the same teams are hired, if such assessments were to be conducted again the team will not have much guidance and learning from previous assessments to rely on.
221. In the area of post-conflict and peacebuilding work, the ECP programme has produced many knowledge products to equip national stakeholders, the UN and the EU systems with the necessary awareness and tools, as detailed above in paragraphs 172-173. In terms of establishing new partnerships and building a community of practice, the programme has also made significant progress. Technical partnerships exist with the EU, and key UN agencies such as DPKO, DFS, PBSO, HABITAT and UNDP. The programme has also created an active Expert Advisory Group on Environment, Conflict and Peacebuilding that leverages the technical expertise and networks of different organizations.
222. In countries where UNEP has been present for some time, it has played a significant catalytic role. UNEP has provided assistance to Afghanistan and Sudan to accede to key multilateral environmental agreements, linking to GEF to secure funding for enabling activities, ensuring that the countries could fulfil their obligations under the conventions. The country programmes have served as an anchor point for the various convention secretariats such as UNFCCC, the Ozone Convention and the Convention on Biodiversity. For example, the GEF recently accepted to fund a project to produce a 'National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan for Afghanistan' for the Convention on Biological Diversity as part of Afghanistan's commitment to ensure its further access to GEF-CBD Funds. In Afghanistan, catalytic effects in-country have remained limited due to weakly developed operational partnerships with other UN agencies (UNDP, FAO). Also, there are concerns about up-scaling of CBNRM pilot results, because a functional partnership with NGOs/CSO networks is not in place at a scale for any national scaling up. In Sudan, there are more encouraging signs of interest in replication and up-scaling, but in most cases concrete results also still have to be seen. For example, environment is one of the four priorities of the current long term planning document of the UN in Darfur *Beyond Emergency Relief* and the outlined areas of work regarding environment are directly in line with UNEP's work in Sudan. Environmental issues on which UNEP is working, such as sustainable construction, energy and water monitoring are being increasingly integrated into the work plans of other UN agencies, and UNEP's research on markets and trade has triggered additional funding from the European Commission to conduct market monitoring in West Darfur.
223. Environmental management for DRR concepts and tools have been promoted in the first place by the projects developing them, through communication products (case study reports, manuals, guidelines etc.), trainings and dissemination events, with encouraging results in terms of replication in-country and statements of interest for replication by other countries. The PEDRR partnership – a mix of international environment and disaster/emergency agencies – is currently the main instrument to up-scale environmental management for DRR outside the pilot countries. The platform serves as a forum for knowledge exchange, but has also, under UNEP's leadership, prepared and started rolling out a training of trainers program on ecosystem-based DRR.
224. The APELL program also relies mainly on partnerships for replication and up-scaling. At national level, partnerships with either public or private partners are strongest, depending on the country context. Partnerships with industry

¹⁸ As presented in the Policy Report From Conflict to Peacebuilding – The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment.

associations at the international level also played a major role in APELL replication in new countries and customization to new sectors (e.g. tourism and mining).

4.3 Factors affecting performance

4.3.1 Sub-programme design and structure

Critique of the overall results framework

225. The reconstructed ToC of the D&C Sub-programme is presented under paragraphs 65-79. A comparison of the “official” results hierarchy and the reconstructed ToC leads to the following findings:
226. Expected Accomplishment 1 – “Capacity of member states to contribute to natural and human-made disaster risk reduction is enhanced” – is pitched at an appropriate level of capacity building at country level because it captures well the immediate outcome expected from UNEP’s outputs. UNEP’s efforts can directly affect change at that level. However, UNEP has opted for playing a catalytic role rather than a direct country support role, focussing its efforts on advocacy in international fora, and training of trainers, and relying largely on “intermediaries” (other UN agencies, INGOs, national training centres and academic institutions) to work at the country level. UNEP country operations are usually limited in scope, and larger country programmes are limited to a number of extreme cases of environmental degradation following conflict or disasters. It is therefore often quite difficult to assess UNEP’s direct contribution to country capacity improvements at the global scale.
227. The EA statement does not capture UNEP’s work on environmental emergency preparedness (APELL and part of the JEU’s work), which constitutes more than three quarters of the DRR project portfolio in terms of secured financing for the period covered by this evaluation¹⁹. This might indicate that the intended emphasis of the DRR component is now environmental management for DRR, but does not give a fair statement of what most of the portfolio is about.
228. Expected Accomplishment 2 – “Rapid and reliable environmental assessments following conflicts and disasters as requested” – is pitched below the immediate outcome level and actually corresponds to a set of outputs, also captured in PoW Outputs (211), (221), (222) and (224). It is also referred to in EA(3) as one of the foundations on which improved environmental management and sustainable use of natural resources can be built. Therefore, it does not appear in the reconstructed ToC as an immediate outcome. EA(2) has no valid reason for existence.
229. Expected Accomplishment 3 – “The post-crisis assessment and recovery process contributes to improved environmental management and the sustainable use of natural resources” – contains result statements at different levels, but seems to imply that UNEP should influence the post-crisis assessment and recovery processes, so that these processes contribute to improved environmental management and sustainable use of natural resources. These processes are, in theory, driven by governments and other national stakeholders, but, in reality, and in particular in the most vulnerable countries, to a large extent by UN and other aid agencies. UNEP therefore has to build country capacity (influence at the national level), but also conduct advocacy and provide technical support to the relevant UN and other international organisations involved in post-disaster and post-conflict assessment and recovery processes (influence at the global level). In the reconstructed ToC, the national influence is captured in the immediate outcome of enhanced country capacity, and the “global” influence is captured as an outcome driver towards the more equitable and sustainable environmental governance and management for environmental recovery and, where relevant, for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
230. Except for the draft Sub-programme strategy (2008), no other strategic or planning documents describe the causal links between the EAs, PoW outputs and planned project activities explicitly, but these links can be derived from reading the Programme Frameworks. The same can be said for the relationship between the Sub-programme goals and the Expected Accomplishments.
231. Most PoW Outputs combine several services or products of a different nature, and some contain results at different results levels with a cause-to-effect relationship. Some PoW Outputs contain a result statement that is at an outcome level or even higher. Examples were mentioned in paragraph 70. PoW Outputs should be pitched at the “output” result level that is, at the level of services or products delivered by UNEP’s interventions. A PoW Output

¹⁹ This percentage excludes the APELL Project “Community Vulnerability Reduction - prevention and preparedness for disaster reduction” for which no financial data is available. If this project was counted in, the percentage would be even higher.

can be quite generic to encompass several project outputs of a very similar nature and purpose – in that sense PoW Outputs are rather “categories” of products and services delivered by UNEP – but they should mention whom these outputs are targeted to (who would be the users).

Critique of project design

Project logic

232. The intervention logic of the projects in the D&C portfolio is globally coherent and strategic. Different phases are usually well linked and complementary: consecutive phases build progressively upon the results of previous phases, and an evolution can be seen between projects belonging to a same core service area or country programme. For example, for the Environmental Cooperation for Peacebuilding programme, there is a progression from global lessons learning and advocacy, over field ground-truthing to (future) country support at a broader scale. In Haiti, a programme development phase was followed by a programme coordination phase.
233. Project design quality is rather heterogeneous, with an overall improvement in the quality of ProDocs since the PoW 2010-2011. Some project designs were found particularly poor, but this was because of reasons beyond UNEP’s control such as the urgency with which they needed to be prepared (e.g. the PEDRR in Haiti following the 2010 earthquake). A number of “projects” are actually programmes (ECP, Sudan Integrated Environment Programme...) with several components that could very well constitute interlinked but stand-alone projects. It is hard to see an overall programme logic emerging from the project documents, except in very broad terms. Causal or other linkages between programme components have not been thoroughly pondered. The combination of multiple interventions under one, large and complex project was done with the expectations of strengthening integration and complementarities between components and reducing the management burden, but we are not convinced that these expectations have been met. In particular, much more could be done in order to ensure maximal benefits from the synergies and complementarities between the different components. Another drawback from presenting those large programmes as a single UNEP project, is that the level of detail for each component is usually insufficient. In truth, most donors require a much more detailed project document following their own templates because the UNEP ProDoc is inadequate as a design document for more complex, multi-component programmes, or because some donors only fund one component of the programme anyway.
234. The projects differ greatly in terms of formulation of project outcomes and outputs in the project LogFrames. A few propose their own outcome, others use a PoW Output, and most refer to an EA as the project outcome. This is partly due to constant changes in project design templates and guidelines, but also to rather inconsistent guidance from the UNEP Assurance Section. Many project outputs are pitched at a too high result level, well beyond the services or products delivered by UNEP they are supposed to state. Pitching outputs at a too high level is neither fair nor helpful in the process of monitoring the projects’ performance and steering it towards outcome achievement.
235. Often, projects are contributing to several PoW outputs but only one PoW Output is mentioned in the Logical Framework. As a result, causal connections to and synergies with other PoW Outputs may receive insufficient emphasis in project management, reporting and monitoring and there is a risk that the contribution will be overseen in higher-level reporting. There are a number of links between project outputs and PoW Outputs that seem to exist but are not captured in the Programme Framework Document or the ProDocs. Inversely, there are also a few such links “claimed” in Programme Framework Document or ProDocs that do not seem to exist in reality.
236. Most milestones are below the project output level which allows only to measure progress towards the delivery of project outputs, but not further towards the outcome level. In order to assess what happens between the project output level and the outcome, additional milestones should be identified.

Project governance model and supervision arrangements presented in project design

237. How project management and supervision arrangements are spelled out in the ProDocs is quite uneven. Project 213 is directly implemented by PCDMB, but internal management and supervision arrangements are not clear. Project 215 is implemented by the Business and Industry Unit of the SCPB with Implementation Officers in each Regional Office. The ProDoc provides short but clear descriptions of the roles of reporting officer (=supervisor), project manager and Implementation Officers. Project 214 is implemented by the JEU, with a dedicated project manager reporting to the Chief of the JEU, advised by an Advisory Board whose role is well spelled out.

238. All Projects were expected to benefit from strategic guidance and review of progress by a D&C Advisory Committee, comprised of the Sub-programme coordinator and the acting Sub-programme coordinator, the PCDMB Operations Manager, one staff from DEWA and one staff from DTIE, one staff member from each relevant sub-programme, one staff member from each Regional Office and external experts by invitation. This joint Advisory Committee for all on-going projects in the portfolio was expected to replace the traditional individual Steering Committee for each project. As will be discussed later, the Committee was never created.

239. The presentation of the role of collaborating UNEP units also varies across ProDocs, and is in no case ideal. For Project 213, roles of UNEP Divisions are summarized (2-3 sentences) under the Organisation & Management section of the ProDoc. In the Project Delivery Plan & Budget, the responsible division is indicated only for each of the 3 broad project outputs. Surprisingly, no mention is made of DEPI's Climate Change Adaptation Unit, even though there are clear complementarities and synergies between this project and UNEP's Climate Change Adaptation work. For Project 214, there are no details about the roles of other UNEP units under the Organisation & Management section, but the Project Delivery Plan & Budget allocates detailed responsibilities for all outputs and activities to specific UNEP units. For Project 215, the description of roles of other UNEP units is well detailed under the Organisation & Management section, but not mentioned at all in the Project Delivery Plan & Budget. Even if the "what" is more or less clear, in no case do ProDocs specify "how" collaborating UNEP units are expected to contribute and what that would mean in terms of resources.

Complementarities and synergies between interventions

240. Complementarities and synergies between the groups of projects delivering roughly the same PoW Outputs are usually well described in the ProDocs, as there is usually a logic sequence between these projects or there are clear opportunities for collaboration. The connection between these different groups is, however, largely absent, even within the same Programme Framework where all projects are aiming towards the same Expected Accomplishment. This lack of explicit complementarities and synergies, despite several real opportunities, can probably be explained through the historical and structural disconnect between the groups of projects.

Partnerships and stakeholder analysis in project design

241. Implementation of projects relies heavily on partners such as Governments, International and National Organizations, Research institutes, and NGOs (see paragraphs 282-291). Whilst the list of partners in ProDocs is generally thorough, their specific roles and responsibilities in the projects are usually quite vague with some exception. Rather, the ProDocs focus more on defining who the partners are and why they have been selected. When roles and responsibilities remain vague, project management has a lot of freedom in developing certain partnerships over others and "partnerships" can remain very superficial. Vague partnerships will also cause attribution problems down the line, in terms of how results can be attributed to UNEP and what is the result of the work of others.

242. In the ProDocs reviewed, stakeholders are usually considered to be the direct beneficiaries of the intervention or users of the project outputs. The UNEP definition of stakeholders, however, also includes those persons, groups, organizations etc. that can affect the project and its outcomes. The latter are not considered under the Stakeholder Analysis section of the ProDocs. The documents provide a list of stakeholders with some very broad statements about their needs and how they would benefit from the project. With a few exceptions, it is usually not clear how local communities will be engaged to contribute to the project, or how they would benefit from the project other than potential (and very far removed) impact of the project on livelihoods and environmental benefits.

Strategy to sustain results set out in project design

243. Most of the ProDocs do not present an explicit strategy to sustaining project outcomes and benefits. Handover modalities to partners (be it other UNEP Sub-programmes, international partners or national partners) are not mentioned, which is problematic considering the purpose and scope of the Sub-programme. Some ProDocs state that an exit strategy will be developed later on and the Programme Framework 2 emphasizes the need for a handover strategy. The evaluation found no indications that any project in the D&C portfolio was really preparing for its exit.

244. The most credible sustainability measures proposed relate to the immediate outcomes and outcome drivers of the Sub-programme themselves: developing capacities of countries and communities in applying the concepts and tools promoted by UNEP and partnerships at all levels to help achieve this goal and take it to the next level. Implicitly,

sustainability of results will also be ensured through the strong “like-mindedness” of a number of large partnerships developed by the Sub-programme (PEDRR, Expert Advisory Group on ECP, ENVSEC...) who can definitely carry UNEP’s agenda forward after the end of the projects.

245. Linking with national plans and responding to national development policies and processes are sometimes mentioned as means to promote sustainability. Whilst this will be good for country ownership, it is not sufficient to ensure that the project will be handed over adequately when the funding ends. Research products, guidance documents and training modules are also sometimes considered as a means to ensure sustainability. However, as discussed under sustainability, much more than these outputs is required to ensure the continued use by stakeholders of the concepts and tools they communicate.

Financing in project design

246. In contrast with the “older” generation of projects in the D&C portfolio, most projects under the PoW 2010-2011 had only limited funding secured at the time of design and approval. The capacity to mobilize adequate funding for the implementation of the projects is a major concern. The availability of resources is rightly identified in several ProDocs as a critical success factor, and the lack of financing is also sometimes mentioned as a risk factor with a high potential impact and a high likelihood. However critical adequate financing might be, none of the ProDocs proposes a credible way to promote and ensure mobilization of resources, or a prioritization of outputs in case insufficient funding could be secured.

Critical success factors and risks identified at project design

247. ProDocs do not properly distinguish between critical success factors (which are under control of project management) and risks (which are not) and similar issues are raised in ProDocs as both critical success factors and risks. For example lack of partner capacity and commitment should not be a risk since it can be avoided by proper selection of partners, formalizing cooperation agreements through MoUs and ensuring that capacity of partners is enhanced to enable them to implement the project.

248. A problem arises when a risk is considered a critical success factor, and not really acknowledged as a risk. This is because the ProDoc template does not require a management strategy and safeguards for critical success factors as it does for risk factors. For example, the ProDoc of Project 215 (APELL) mentions the state of markets and the economy as a critical success factor at the national level that would influence the capacity of individual companies to engage in the project and attend training workshops. This factor is a risk, not a critical success factor, and an appropriate risk management strategy should be reflected upon and presented in the ProDoc.

Gender and poverty in project design

249. Many ProDocs pre-dating the PoW 2010-2011 have a replicated ‘standard text’ for gender considerations, thus gender seems to have been incorporated into project plans mainly because it was supposed to be instead of truly examining how the projects could contribute to gender equity.

250. In most recent ProDocs, women and the poor are rightly considered as more vulnerable to natural hazards due to their limited access to resources, restricted rights, livelihoods highly dependent on natural resources, “forced” proximity to hazards, and limited mobility. They are, therefore, considered important beneficiaries of project impacts. Even though several ProDocs recognize that women and the poor might have different needs than other community members, they do not spell out in detail what these needs are and how these would be addressed.

251. However, several ProDocs also present – in a few lines – how women and the poor will be engaged in key project activities such as assessments, emergency planning and training. This could help with the design of more gender and poverty sensitive responses to environmental emergencies.

4.3.2 Sub-programme organization and management

Sub-programme organisation and UNEP reform

252. Since the Medium-Term Strategy 2010-2013, UNEP has engaged in a reform process which includes a transition from a division/branch-based structure to a thematic modality aimed to foster collaboration and synergies within UNEP and to break down the culture of working in divisional silos. This transition made the Division of

Environmental Policy Implementation (DEPI) the lead division of the D&C Sub-programme (as well as the Ecosystem Management Sub-programme). Following the reform process DEPI, DEWA, DTIE and DELC were to engage in joint-planning and implementation across the six thematic sub-programmes, the Division of Regional Coordination (DRC) was vested with the responsibility of coordinating implementation at the regional and country level, and the Division of Communication and Public Information (DCPI) was to be responsible for outreach and the production of publications for all sub-programmes. The D&C Sub-programme is, to a large extent, coordinated by DEPI PCDMB from Geneva, designated as the lead office for this task. Even though potential synergies exist with the work implemented by various other UNEP Branches and Divisions, very little if no collaboration takes place. The ROs still enjoy more of a representational and supporting role; they are kept informed of D&C Sub-programme related activities within their respective regions and are from time to time invited to engage in advocacy with the respective governments but have neither time nor resources to be involved substantially and consistently in individual projects in the field (see paragraphs 299-301). DCPI's role within the Sub-programme is limited, according to Sub-programme staff interviewed by the evaluation because of some performance issues on DCPI's part, but also because the PCDMB prefers to keep a tight control over communications towards the outside on sometimes extremely sensitive issues. The PCDMB has integrated its own small communications team in Geneva that has a dual reporting line to the Branch Head and to DCPI.

253. The identification of synergies and enhanced collaboration between PCDMB and other UNEP divisions and DEPI branches has also been limited to plans in design documents. Collaboration is rare and takes place more on a case-by-case basis than as a regular practice. The Sub-programme has recognized the potential value of enhanced collaboration with the other implementing divisions of UNEP, and some initiatives have been made for joint programming. However, exchanges with the administrative and management levels at the Headquarters are generally perceived to be rather adding to the workload instead of providing support and benefits. This is discussed more in detail under section 4.3.4 Collaboration and Partnerships.

254. The lack of cohesion between functional units extends all the way into the Sub-programme itself. Even though synergies and interlinkages exist among the different initiatives of the Sub-programme, the programmes and projects are to a large extent designed and managed by small and rather isolated teams led by highly experienced senior staff, who in the opinion of their colleagues, are not always the best team players. For example, distribution of duties between the Post-Disaster Recovery Team of PCDMB and the JEU is rather unclear even though mutually endorsed Standard Operating Procedures exist where PCDMB refers requests from the affected country governments to the JEU and the two entities agree on the mode of engagement. The scope of work in terms of early response assistance, however, seems to be somewhat overlapping with both entities responding to the requests in a similar fashion. Even though the JEU is responsible for mobilizing and coordinating the environmental response to natural and man-made disasters it has not been given an explicit global mandate nor is there an international agreement to recognize and specify its existence. Thus, it remains an administrative arrangement rather than a formal organizational structure. The UNEP/OCHA JEU baseline study²⁰ identified some problems deriving from the lack of mandate; for example continued operation of the JEU is dependent on voluntary contacts which makes the operations somewhat unstable; there is no comprehensive international system or procedure to respond to environmental disasters; and the lack of clear agreements makes coordination with multiple organizations challenging.

255. Another illustrative example of a lost opportunity for stronger collaboration within the sub-programme, is the ECP and the post-conflict recovery country programmes. The ECP has managed to build strong relationships with the relevant UN peacebuilding bodies and gathered and built knowledge not present in any other UNEP entity. However, collaboration has been limited to the country programme in Sierra Leone and in Haiti, which are ECP pilot countries, even though collaboration with the other country programmes could also benefit both sides in terms of knowledge and experience sharing. The new strategy of the Sub-programme foresees that ECP country programmes as they progress into longer term recovery will become stand-alone post-conflict country programmes like Afghanistan and Sudan.

256. As regards DRR, collaboration between the JEU and the other teams has grown over the last years e.g. by jointly participating in recent international DRR events, or the joint preparation of a training on industrial accident preparedness with the APELL team. However, collaboration between the DRR team in PCDMB and the APELL team

²⁰ Strengthening international governance systems to respond to environmental emergencies: A baseline review of instruments, institutions, and practice. Prepared for the Joint UNEP/OCHA Environment Unit, 2009.

in Paris has been virtually non-existent; the APELL team says that they hardly know what the DRR team in Geneva is doing and they met each other only once in person, by coincidence during the third Global Platform meeting in Geneva. Still, the APELL team provides inputs to the D&C Sub-programme Quarterly Progress Reports upon request and keeps the D&C Sub-programme Coordinator and the DRR team informed about relevant APELL country activities to identify possible synergies.

257. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to note that whereas collaboration with other parts of UNEP has been rather limited, collaboration with other UN agencies, both at the global and the country level, has been quite strong. At the country level UNEP's engagement in the UN Country Teams has generally been good and this has brought along many advantages including access to funding, human resources (including the remuneration of UNEP staff), logistics (office space, vehicles, security), knowledge sharing with colleagues, political support in-country, and increased access and influence (e.g. towards other UN agencies). For example, the DRR team within the D&C Sub-programme maintains UNEP's links with the UNISDR, the PEDRR and other international platforms for DRR, compared to the Climate Change Unit of UNEP, which barely has any contact with them. An excellent example of inter-agency management structures is the ENVSEC which evolved from a relatively informal partnership initiative into a programme formally co-managed by a Management Board composed of representatives of each of the partner organisations: UNEP, OSCE, REC, UNDP and UNECE, with NATO as an observer. Also the ECP serves as a good example of a UNEP programme that has strong collaboration with other organizations, including UNDP, the UN Peacebuilding Support Office, the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support and the European External Action Service. More details about external partnerships are provided under section 4.3.4.

Supervisory and management arrangements

258. The internal management and supervision processes within the Sub-programme seem to be well defined and functioning, partly perhaps due to the small size of the core D&C Sub-programme team. The UNEP Division of Environmental Policy Implementation (DEPI) is accountable for the delivery of vast majority of the D&C Sub-programme interventions. The head of PCDMB also acts as the D&C Sub-programme Coordinator and reports to the Division Director of DEPI. The Sub-programme Coordinator has delegated a considerable portion of his coordination duties to an Acting Sub-programme Coordinator and this arrangement has worked well. The Sub-programme Coordinator takes the overall responsibility of the delivery of the Sub-programme but in practice the Acting Sub-programme Coordinator is in charge of the development and coordination of the D&C Sub-programme PoW, consisting of policy and programming, reporting and monitoring, internal communication and information flow and coordination of fundraising. Supervision arrangements within the Sub-programme are the traditional UNEP supervisor-supervisee arrangements, with supervisors providing strategic guidance and technical back-stopping. Supervisors are often very closely involved in project activities, which is not best practice in terms of respecting a clear management-supervision firewall. Usually a senior long-term staff member from PCDMB supervises several staff members or consultants on short-term contracts due to funding constraints.

259. For example, the ECP-Programme is mainly being managed by a small PCDMB team in Geneva, with support from New York and various partner organizations. One staff member in ROA was also funded by the ECP but the position is no longer in place due to shortage of funding. Within ENVSEC, the day-to-day activities are coordinated by the ENVSEC Secretariat which comprises a Coordination Unit hosted by the UNEP Regional Office for Europe and four Regional Desk Officers hosted on a rotational basis by the other partner organisations. In their respective regions, each Regional Desk Officer monitors the implementation of the regional work programmes and organises regional coordination meetings. Implementation of each ENVSEC project activity is the responsibility of one or several ENVSEC partner organizations designated by the ENVSEC Management Board.

260. There is frequent communication and exchange between the Sub-programme Coordinator, Acting Sub-programme Coordinator and the Programme Managers and Coordinators. The Country Programmes seem to enjoy a high level of trust from the Sub-programme Coordinator and Acting Sub-programme Coordinator and are given considerable freedom in terms of design and delivery of their interventions. A good example of this is the Country Programme in Sudan, which is led by a Programme Manager who reports to the Operations Manager of PCDMB in Geneva. The Programme Manager supervises two Programme Coordinators based in Khartoum and Darfur and project officers in Khartoum, El Fasher and Nyala. Even though PCDMB provides administrative and substantive support as needed, the programme is to a large extent developed by the country team with Geneva being kept up-to-date regularly. Similarly the communication between the Programme Manager and the rest of the country team seems to be open and easy, enabling good supervision and quick feedback and support. Also, the organizational status of the Sudan

Country Programme helps in terms of delivering effectively. The Programme Manager has a delegated authority to represent UNEP to the Government of Sudan and to participate in the UN Country Team as the Head of Agency. This differs from Afghanistan where the 'non-programme' status of the UNEP intervention has been a limiting factor for the Programme and undermined the authority of the Programme Manager who has no delegated authority to commit UNEP, sign a project agreement, or transfer funds.

261. An exception to the supervisory arrangements is the Country Programme in Sierra Leone where the Environmental Programme Coordinator is officially hired and supervised by the UN Secretariat Department of Political Affairs and not by UNEP. At least for now the arrangement has worked fine, in part because of the professionalism of the officer. In fact, being supervised externally provides an incentive for him to make sure that UNEP's work is of service to the UNCT and UNIPSIL and, in return, it increases UNCTs and UNIPSILs ownership of UNEP's work in SL. The UNEP Programme Coordinator used to receive most back-stopping from the D&C focal point in ROA Nairobi, but the focal point's contract was not extended beyond 31 December 2011, and it remains unclear whether any replacement will be recruited. Other UNEP staff (the UNEP Programme Associate and driver) are on UNDP contracts but managed by the UNEP Programme Coordinator, which is a common set-up in UNEP country programmes. The UNEP Programme Coordinator has no control over staff from other agencies taking part in the UNEP-led environmental programme of the UN Joint Vision for Sierra Leone.
262. The majority of the projects in the current D&C Sub-programme portfolio has no classic Steering Committee because the structure was supposed to be replaced by a D&C Advisory Committee. However, this committee has never been set up because of time and resource constraints and the projects, therefore, have no "external" entity to review progress and to provide strategic guidance. For a few projects under the Disaster Recovery CSA the role of SC was given to an internal project team, which however, does not meet the purpose and requirements of a Steering Committee. There are some exceptions, such as projects under the activities of the JEU that are reviewed and guided by the Advisory Group on Environmental Emergencies and the Steering Committee on Environmental Emergencies. Within the ENVSEC Initiative the ENVSEC Management Board is the key decision-making body, composed of representatives of each of the partner organizations providing guidance on key strategic, policy, and regional issues. Within the ECP programme UNEP's Expert Advisory Group (EAG) on Environment, Conflict and Peacebuilding consisting of ten external experts and associated institutions provides strategic and technical advice.

4.3.3 Human and financial resources

Human resources

263. This evaluation has not reviewed curricula vitae and performance reports of staff, nor systematically collected opinions about their competencies. It is therefore not appropriate to make any judgements here regarding the competence of the human resources employed in the Sub-programme. However, the time most staff have been "on the job" by itself could be an indicator of the trust that their supervisors and UNEP senior management have in their expertise and skills (and also an indicator of their job satisfaction). From the sample of outputs the evaluation team has seen and the interviews it had with staff, there is no doubt that D&C Sub-programme staff are competent and experts in their field of work. However, in general, staff have relatively little familiarity with the "broader" UNEP, having often no prior UNEP or even UN experience and, except for the more senior staff, most have hardly ever visited the Headquarters in Nairobi.
264. For example in Afghanistan UNEP is valued the most for its technical rigour. Programme managers have been exceptionally appreciated and the technical staff are seen as true experts in their field. There is a good sense of collaborative teamwork between the international and the national staff and counterparts. UNEP has followed a strategy of minimizing consultant involvement, preferring to invest in Afghan expertise, or in long-term international staff instead of a high turnover of short-term consultants. This too has been a key factor in the programme's success. Also the country programme in Sudan has succeeded in assembling a strong team of experts much valued by the Sudanese Government counterparts as well as other UN agencies operating in the country.
265. A general issue across the Sub-programme is that human resources are not sufficient in number to meet the needs for full work plan implementation and staff are frequently putting in over-time to deliver quality work. In some ways, however, the problems related to insufficient human resources are the consequences of a successfully growing programme, partly due to the lack of dedicated UNEP core resources and to some extent related to management systems that are not well suited to becoming operational at the field level.

266. Staff capacity depends naturally on available funding. In the post-tsunami recovery programme UNEP was able to deploy staff in the field, e.g. in Sri Lanka UNEP deployed 5 staff members for a limited time, including a resident programme officer and environmental experts who participated in UNCT, and in the Maldives a total of 4 UNEP staff were deployed temporally to provide technical advice to the Ministry of Environment and Construction. However, the Geneva/PCDMB-based D&C Sub-programme team working on disaster recovery is small and the main part of project design and implementation falls on the shoulders of a few individuals. Also the Joint UNEP/OCHA Environment Unit has a very small core team, limiting its work to coordination and mobilisation of international assistance rather than being involved in practical work. In Sudan and Afghanistan, the teams are small compared to their workloads but staff is very dedicated and often working outside office hours to deliver quality products. In Afghanistan UNEP's staff included 5 Internationals and 24 nationals (technical counterparts, translators, administration and drivers) at its maximum, and down to seven at the time of the review and even though it may sound a large team by UNEP standards it is meagre by the standards of any other operational UN agency.
267. Also short duration of contracts and the insecurity regarding their renewals has set pressure on human resources and work motivation. For example the DRR CSA project portfolio is managed to a large extent by temporary personnel, supervised by UNEP staff on a part time basis and a similar situation exists in JEU as well as in the APELL team in the Business and Industry Unit (BIU) of DTIE's Sustainable Production and Consumption Branch in Paris. Also the ECP programme depends largely on the human resources made available or recruited by the partner organisations and given the number of activities to be managed and the catalytic nature of the ECP programme, human resource demands have grown rapidly and this has strained the programme at times. Among other constraints it has resulted in "bottlenecks" occurring in information flow, enormous pressure on key staff and less communication with some of the key groups (such as the EG) than would be ideal for an effective programme. This has caused important delays in the delivery of some key publications expected from the programme.
268. In Sierra Leone UNEP human resources are very limited but to some extent the shortfall is, again, compensated by the high motivation and competency of the staff. At the time of evaluation, the environment team was comprised of a Programme Coordinator, a Programme Associate and a driver and the team was frequently complemented by interns providing important inputs. The Programme Coordinator was on a consultancy contract for 9 months until the end of March 2011, funded by Delivering as One funds. Since April 2011, he was paid by Assessed Contributions and was under a contract with UN Department of Political Affairs. His contract was guaranteed for one year (until the beginning of April 2012) but he was recently informed that it might be extended until end of 2012. In part because of these uncertainties, the Programme Coordinator has decided to leave Sierra Leone in April 2012. The rest of the UNEP team in Sierra Leone is on UNDP contracts, paid by the second phase of the ECP programme. According to the Sub-programme Coordinator, UNEP is still committed to working in Sierra Leone, and is currently participating in the design and fundraising for the next phase of the work.
269. The Sub-programme relies quite heavily on consultants, in particular for the conduct of post-crisis environmental assessments. This brings the advantage that UNEP is able to hire the best suited experts available for a particular job, and for just the amount of time needed to complete the job, but this also has time and cost implications (consultants are expensive and not always available at short notice) and makes UNEP miss out on opportunities for internal capacity building in terms of best practices and lessons learned. The latter is also true for the JEU that relies mainly on experts provided by partner countries.
270. Despite the sometimes uncertain contract conditions, constant heavy workload and, at country level, sometimes particularly challenging working conditions (low comfort, insecurity, poor communication to the outside, harsh climate etc.), the turn-over rate of personnel within the D&C Sub-programme is low. Most staff have been in post for more than 2 years, and some for close to nine years. In general, the Sub-programme staff seem to have a high degree of ownership of their work and the nature of the work, in terms of tangible results on the ground, visibility and close interaction with beneficiaries might add to their high job satisfaction. Also from an administrative point of view the Sub-programme has found ways to keep the same consultants on board for longer periods of time.
271. The sub-programme has, however, experienced difficulties in recruiting qualified people to fill vacant positions at the country offices, for example in Sudan. This has increased the workload of the existing staff even further, for example in Sudan most research and field pilots are conducted in Darfur but currently there are only 3 UNEP personnel located there and even the team in Khartoum is stretched under the workload. Even though the country programme has been able to mitigate the problem to some extent by working through partners, it has also set limitations to the work programme. In other situations, security risks have been high and not matched by adequate

provisions from UNEP's side, creating high stress for field staff and, at times, putting them at unacceptable risk. This is further discussed under paragraph 273 below.

Administrative processes

272. Administrative arrangements, such as human and financial resources management, recruitment and procurement procedures from UNEP and other agencies such as UNON and UNDP are generally considered inadequate, in particular for the country-level operations conducted by the D&C Sub-programme. Even though UNEP's achievements and aspirations in post-conflict situations would deserve better organisational and administrative arrangements, UNEP has never taken the bold steps to come up with a model of management arrangements for the few exceptional cases where UNEP needs to become operational to add its value and where the governments and donors are supportive.
273. The administrative processes have caused delays in programme delivery in several occasions, such as in the project *Strengthening national capacities for effective environmental emergency preparedness*. In general the recruitment process of international staff is very long, since it needs to go through the UNEP Division Director in Nairobi, the human resources office in Geneva as well as the human resources office in Nairobi. This introduces delays in the arrival of new staff members. The delays can also affect negatively the credibility of UNEP within the eyes of partners when approval of contracts and agreements or procurement of equipment takes months or even years. For example, in Sudan the delays due to administrative processes caused lateness in some major agreements causing the need for a project to be extended in order to complete all project components. Moreover, the delays and complex procedures are not only cumbersome to UNEP but also to partners. For example the need to renew MoUs on an annual basis creates extra administrative work and might discourage and inhibit long-term commitment.
274. The Sudan country programme has come up with some creative solutions to reduce delays and frustrations due to administrative processes. Delegated authority from the DEPI Director to the PCDMB Head and -more limited- delegated authority from the PCDMB Head to the Sudan Programme Manager as regards *inter alia* travel and service contract approvals, have helped to somewhat accelerate cumbersome and long processes.
275. As regards the country level operations, UNEP does not have the necessary procedures or capacity to provide administrative and operational support, making UNEP reliant on other UN institutions such as UNDP. Sometimes reliance on the services of others makes procedures complex and time consuming. In Sudan, for example, the services for local recruitment, procurement and disbursement of payments are provided by UNDP. The programme receives no core funding from the UNEP Environment Fund and in general receives very little support from the UNEP HQ in Nairobi on administrative and operational issues. Regardless of the lack of support, 13 per cent of project funds are directed to the HQ for support services. In addition to UNDP, UNAMID provides free of charge security services within Darfur and air transport services between Khartoum and Darfur. In addition, staff in Darfur is reliant on the assistance of other agencies, such as OCHA for office space and transportation. In Sierra Leone, the administrative and logistical support from UNDP is overall very helpful, as is the logistic support from UNIPSIL for monitoring missions of extractive industries (helicopter).
276. Within the D&C Sub-programme UNEP works at times in fragile states or countries recovering from conflicts where security sometimes becomes a limiting factor for operations. Regardless of this, UNEP does not have adequate operating procedures in place to define work approaches and processes in countries with security constraints. UNEP operates under the UN Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) and the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) principles, but insecurity is still a major constraint and UNEP as an institution lacks the necessary organizational arrangements to enable a safe working environment in these settings. For example, security and logistics support was considered seriously inadequate in Nigeria where UNEP completed an assessment of the environmental impacts of oil contamination in Ogoniland and administrative rules and procedures severely compromised the team's security on several occasions. UNEP had to rely on a private service provider to ensure logistics, health and security of its staff in the field. Security is also a constraint in Sudan and Afghanistan where, justifiably, project locations are limited to areas which can be accessed relatively safely. Even then, access to project sites is often limited. Security clearances are mandatory in order to move beyond larger towns, and access is only granted with UNAMID escorts. Therefore UNEP staff are able to visit the project sites only occasionally. In contrast, UNEP's government and civil society partners, not bound by UN security regulations, take sometimes important risks in visiting project sites on a regular basis without any protection.

Financing

277. Exact financial data on projects and other activities under the D&C Sub-programme are hard to get by and patchy at best, as it is for all other UNEP Sub-programmes. Financial information in the PIMS is incomplete and has not been updated since July 2011. Extracting up-to-date information from the IMIS is complicated and would require a lot of support and time from UNEP financial management officers, and, even then, there is no guarantee that figures will be fully reliable as a lot of cross-financing is going on between trust funds, budget lines for different projects and sub-programme staff. The financial figures used for this evaluation should therefore be considered as approximate and used for broad analysis and comparisons only.
278. The D&C project portfolio for the period under review (2006-2011), comprising of 47 projects (see Annex 3) had an estimated total planned budget of US\$ 155.43 million and a programmed (mobilized) budget of US\$ 184.43 million (Table 1). For the current PoW 2010-2011 the total planned budget is approximately US\$ 37.1 million of which US\$ 30.6 could be mobilized. These figures show that in previous biennia project costs were sometimes underestimated on the basis of fund mobilization prospects rather than real project funding needs. Projects quite often had to be extended and additional funding had to be mobilized to complete the projects. For the biennium 2010-2011, project designers have been encouraged by UNEP's Quality Assurance Section to "think big" and estimate costs for very ambitious projects based on real funding needs, regardless of fund mobilization prospects. They were forced to submit project design documents for review by a fixed deadline, before funds could be secured. As a result, real mobilized funding was significantly less (about 17 per cent) than was required in the project design documents.

Table 1. Estimated D&C Sub-programme project portfolio cost 2006-2011

Project start period	Planned budget (US\$ million)	Programmed (mobilized) budget (US\$ million)
Full period: 2011 or earlier	155.43	184.43
Biennium 2010-2011	37.08	30.61
Previous biennia: 2009 or earlier	118.35	153.82

279. Looking at mobilized financing across the four core service areas of the D&C Sub-programme, environmental recovery projects definitely take the lion's share with close to US\$ 130.4 million over the period under review, good for about 71 per cent of the whole D&C Sub-programme project portfolio (see Figure 11). It should be mentioned, however, that the post-conflict country programmes account for about US\$ 62 million within this amount (45 per cent of the whole D&C Sub-programme portfolio), and these country programmes often contain interventions related to peace building or DRR: they are not exclusively "environmental recovery" programmes. Disaster risk reduction and emergency preparedness projects take the smallest portion of D&C Sub-programme funding, with only 5 per cent of the overall portfolio's programmed budget over the period under review. Assessment-related and peacebuilding projects roughly account for 15 and 10 per cent respectively.




Figure 11. Estimated project portfolio costs 2006-2011 for the four D&C core service areas

280. **Funding sources.** The D&C Sub-programme is funded for the largest part by trust funds and earmarked contributions (extra-budgetary resources), with the UNEP Environment Fund (often referred to as the UNEP “core funding”) providing only 2.2 per cent of total project funding over the last six years. Most Sub-programmes in UNEP are funded more by trust funds and earmarked contributions than by UNEP core funding (the exceptions being the Environmental Governance Sub-programme and the Eco-system Management Sub-programme), but in all cases the proportion of core funding is significantly higher than in the D&C Sub-programme. The fact that the D&C Sub-programme is funded almost entirely by extra-budgetary resources is somewhat in contradiction with its mandate and purpose within the organisation. It makes the D&C Sub-programme less flexible in assigning its resources than it should be to be able to respond quickly to environmental emergencies and specific requests coming from countries in crisis situations. In a sense, the Sub-programme has become the victim of its own fundraising successes in the past: UNEP senior management has allocated much less core resources to the sub-programme than to others because it considered the D&C Sub-programme quite capable of mobilizing extra-budgetary resources on its own. It is important to consider the success of the Sub-programme in mobilizing extra-budgetary funding when thinking about handing over certain interventions to other Sub-programmes in UNEP, who might not have built the same credibility and trust relationships with donors interested in funding environment-related interventions in post-crisis countries.

281. The five largest donors of the D&C Sub-programme over the period under review are the UK, Finland, the EC, Norway and Sweden, providing about 70 per cent of the Sub-programme’s project funding over the period (Table 2). It should be noted, though, that the top three donors of the Sub-programme fund very specific interventions: the UK’s contributions were solely directed to the UNEP Country Programme in Sudan and South Sudan, Finland was the principal donor of the ECP, and the brunt of the EC’s funding was dedicated to the Afghanistan Country Programme. Funding has often been “ad hoc” rather than based on long term partnerships, which is not favouring funding security for the Sub-programme.

Table 2. Funding sources and amounts to D&C projects per biennium

Donor	2006-2007	2008-2009	2010-2011	Total	Per cent
United Kingdom	2.54	24.5		27.04	31.7
Finland	4.56	3.5	4.1	12.16	14.2
EC	7.12	0.43		7.55	8.8
Norway	2.28	2.32	2.37	6.97	8.2
Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. (Nigeria) Ltd.		5.42		5.42	6.4
Sweden	5.22			5.22	6.1
UNEP Environment Fund		1.6	0.25	1.85	2.2
USA	1.8			1.8	2.1
Netherlands	1.68			1.68	2.0
Greece			1.6	1.6	1.9
Spain	1.44			1.44	1.7
OCHA	1.34			1.34	1.6
Italy	1.18			1.18	1.4
Germany	1.11			1.11	1.3
Others (< US\$1 million)	1.96	0.45	6.57	8.98	10.5
Total	32.23	38.22	14.89	85.34	100.0

282. Almost all extra-budgetary funding is “development” funding. The D&C Sub-programme has rarely benefitted from humanitarian funding largely because it has not systematically engaged in the standard mechanisms for requesting pooled humanitarian funding, such as Flash Appeals and Consolidated Appeals. This is despite the fact that UNEP plays an increasingly important role within the international humanitarian response system. In those cases where UNEP has engaged with humanitarian organisations, success has been limited in part because environmental concerns still remain a relatively low priority for the humanitarian community during crisis situations.

283. The Shell Petroleum Development Company (Nigeria) Ltd.²¹ was the largest public-private sector donor to the D&C Sub-programme with its significant contribution (over US\$ 5.4 million) to the Nigeria Ogoniland environmental impact assessment. Until now, however, the D&C Sub-programme’s engagement with the private sector has been quite weak, partly because of the stringent rules and regulations applied by UNEP when it comes to accepting direct funding from the private sector. However, there are alternative approaches that can be explored such as direct funding of local implementation partners or partnering with international partners who can access private sector donations more easily.

284. The D&C Sub-programme has developed a sound Resource Mobilization Strategy since 2009 which has been regularly updated with the evolving context of humanitarian and development aid financing. The two main trusts proposed by the strategy make eminent sense: first to make sure that the environmental dimensions of disasters and conflicts become and remain a priority in policies, strategies and plans of donors and crisis countries alike; and second to increase the submission of high quality programme and project proposals to the relevant, both traditional and new funding sources. The strategy is structured around four core recommendations, fully supported by this evaluation:

- *Maintain and enhance relations with bilateral donors, the traditional “top” donors in particular.* This is essential to ensure financial stability and predictability for the Sub-programme and will require a shift in approach towards longer-term relationships and stronger engagement with donors at the country level;
- *Strengthen and diversify the relationship with the European Union.* Alignment of proposals with EU policies and priorities is essential for funding eligibility. Therefore, advocacy at the EU level in Brussels but also at the country delegations for systematically incorporating environment/disaster/conflict linkages in policies and funding

²¹The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria is the operator of a Joint Venture Agreement involving the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (which holds 55 per cent), Shell (30 per cent), Elf Petroleum Nigeria Limited (10 per cent) and Agip (5 per cent).

frameworks is very important. The D&C Sub-programme also needs to raise its visibility and build stronger personal relationships within different EU Directorates and at the country EU delegation level, and find creative ways, such as country-level partnerships, for tapping EU direct budget support to crisis countries;

- *Leverage humanitarian funding mechanisms.* The D&C Sub-programme needs to make additional outreach efforts – both with donors and with humanitarian partners on the ground – to make the case for addressing environmental issues as part of humanitarian response, and to participate more systematically in humanitarian funding mechanisms, such as Flash Appeals and the Consolidated Appeal Process. UNEP will need to raise its profile within the humanitarian community, move beyond ad hoc contacts and avoid operating as a stand-alone actor. Stronger engagement in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), the inter-agency forum for coordination, policy development and decision-making involving the key UN and non-UN humanitarian actors, would enable UNEP to garner both visibility and credibility as a humanitarian partner; and
- *Consider other multilateral sources and non-traditional donors.* Other multilateral sources include the UN Peacebuilding Fund, the UN Trust Fund on Human Security, country-specific Multi-donor Trust Funds for post-crisis countries, and several D&C-related funds managed by the World Bank. Non-traditional donors include decentralized cooperation, private foundations and the private sector. More research into these funding opportunities is required, and the D&C Sub-programme needs to enter into dialogue with new potential donors to advocate its case and better understand the funding opportunities and conditions.

4.3.4 Cooperation and partnerships

External partnerships

285. The D&C Sub-programme has succeeded in establishing good external partnerships. These are very important in order to achieve a wide array of immediate outcomes and outcome drivers with limited resources. The depth of partnerships as well as distribution of roles and responsibilities, however, varies.

286. At the international level, partnerships are fostered to reach a wider audience for UNEP's advocacy and awareness raising work and to add weight to UNEP's messages. For example, to effectively address the environmental dimensions of conflicts and peacebuilding, complementary skills and influence are required that can only be achieved through partnership with a wide range of actors and therefore the ECP programme strategy has been based on partnerships and cooperation from the start. The most extensive partnership has been established by ENVSEC and the projects depend heavily on the six international partners and the relevant national partners for the delivery of outcomes. ENVSEC has a small secretariat that coordinates a significant number of projects, around 50 in 2011, and 150 since 2003, through a web of partnerships. UNEP hosts the Coordination Unit of the ENVSEC Secretariat and either leads, or participates in a significant number of these projects. Chairmanship of the Initiative rotates annually among the partner organisations.

287. The longstanding partnership between UNEP and OCHA through the Joint Environment Unit to conduct rapid environmental assessments is very useful because OCHA's operational procedures and the UNDAC mechanism are designed to mobilize experts and logistics at much shorter notice than UNEP procedures would allow. The same partnership allows UNEP to bring an environmental dimension to UNDAC Disaster Response Preparedness missions assessing countries' preparedness for natural and industrial disasters. Within the DRR core service area, strong partnerships have been established with international DRR organizations, such as UNISDR, PEDRR and other relevant global and regional platforms and networks and the global partnerships have been deemed essential for delivering the expected outcomes and upscaling of results.

288. However, overly relying on partners also has risks. There is a certain loss of control over what really happens to UNEP's concepts and tools once they have been adopted by partners. With respect to JEU-supported UNDAC disaster preparedness assessments, and from a UNEP perspective, it could be considered problematic that the delivery of a UNEP PoW Output (214) is to a large extent in the hands of another organisation (OCHA). Also, an attribution problem arises at the EA level and higher results levels, as it becomes quite impossible to separate results that can be attributed to UNEP from results that are delivered by others or results that are products of collective efforts that could not have been achieved by any single member of the partnership alone.

289. **At the country level**, partnering with other UN agencies, government institutions and the civil society is a practical approach, since UNEP lacks the resources to conduct large scale capacity building programmes. UNEP's ability to catalyse environmental action by **international organizations** such as other UN agencies and donor organizations

depends on the level of field presence that can be maintained for participation in the UN Country Teams. UNEP's collaboration with the UNCTs has been quite strong as regards identifying environmental risks and integrating environment in the recovery plans. Partnering with UN agencies and other humanitarian and development organisations in post-disaster settings can, however, be problematic since agencies are occupied with meeting their own immediate mandates and generally environment is not seen as a priority in post-conflict and disaster situations. Moreover, establishing partnerships with other UN agencies has been challenged to some extent because there still seems to be a 'credibility gap' in partners' eyes when it comes to UNEP working on a country level since UNEP is not seen as an operational programme.

290. Country-level partnerships with other UN agencies on a more long-term operational level are quite limited in number and scope and often said to be so due to lack of higher-level institutional agreements. However, even if "global" collaborative agreements exist between UNEP and another organization, collaboration at the country level does not necessarily take place. An example is UNDP which in most country level operations would be the natural partner to hand over the programmes and is an agency that would have capacity and resources to scale-up UNEP approaches. An institutional partnership agreement exists between the two agencies but at the field level cooperation seem to depend on the country teams and their personal priorities and relationships. In Afghanistan, good collaboration was established with UNDP during the early stages of the programme, but currently no programmatic collaboration exists. In Haiti, UNEP and UNDP seem to have drifted into a state of a 'boundary conflict' where it has been very difficult to form a working partnership and where the workplans of the two organizations overlap and the agencies are competing over the same resources instead of pooling funds into joint projects. In Sierra Leone links with UNDP are strongest from all partners but, even though the UNEP and UNDP team working on environmental issues are expected to deliver on the same programme and even share the same office, the variety of subjects the team is working on is neatly split between UNEP and UNDP and UNDP staff is hardly familiar with the details of UNEP's work. UNDP is not in a position to take over from UNEP in case UNEP should leave the country in the near future. In Sudan, collaboration with UNDP on substance is minimal, and restricted to UNDP providing administrative support. Also collaboration with FAO has been rather limited across the sub-programme even though linkages exist among the work plans of the two organizations. Good partnerships have, however, been established for example with UNICEF and UNOPS in Sudan regarding water security. Partnership with UNOPS was also well functioning in Haiti.
291. Joint planning is strong in some components of the country level interventions, such as water security projects with UNICEF and UNOPS in the Sudan Country Programme. However, in other country level interventions, programme design seems to be done mainly by UNEP and collaboration is usually on a level where UNEP is in charge of project management and partners supply logistics, administrative support and some technical advice only. For example, in most projects in Sudan the normal partnership arrangement was that UNEP played the main role in programme design, provided project management and technical expertise and was responsible for monitoring and reporting, whereas the partner organizations provided facilities and logistics and sometimes executed field-level activities. In terms of disaster recovery work, partnerships and cooperation could be strengthened especially at the project planning stage; partners are rarely identified at the time of project approval but partners are sought during the early implementation phase. This is partly due to the unpredictable nature of disasters and the need to establish response and recovery operations quickly in the aftermath of a disaster. However, international partnerships developed through the global advocacy work could be used more to foster joint planning and implementation at the country level.
292. **At the country level partnerships with national stakeholders** serve a double purpose: on the one hand, they are used to develop and test approaches and practices but, on the other, partnerships with local and national institutions are used to raise awareness and build capacity which is essential for ownership, sustainability and institutional up-take of practices and approaches. For example, as regards the DRR programme at the country level, the intention of partnerships with national and local DRR agencies has generally been to sensitize them on the importance to improve environmental aspects of disaster risk reduction.
293. At the country level UNEP collaborates with government institutions with mandates in environment and has been quite successful in establishing good partnerships. Especially in cases where UNEP's resources were very limited but the agenda was large, UNEP has adopted a technical advisory role within national partnerships rather than being itself a full executing agency. The country programmes in Afghanistan and Sierra Leone are examples where this approach has been adopted with considerable success and helped to foster greater ownership by the national partners. Sometimes collaboration with government institutions is, however, challenging because of low capacity,

both in terms of skills and resources, within the relevant government institutions. Usually government entities with mandates in environment are the most under-resourced and under-staffed government institutions making their absorption and operational capacities relatively low. Moreover, in post-conflict countries the institutional structures have often been either broken down or weakened and in order for UNEP to integrate environment in the decision making, long-term interventions are required since the work needs to begin from scratch by establishing the structures of environmental governance. Also, UNEP's partnerships with governments often rely on very few institutions and placing too much reliance on single institutions might cause risks in terms of continuity, sustainability and replication.

294. Partnerships with civil society organizations are established to execute small-scale demonstration projects within the longer-term country programmes at a country level and in general seem to be relatively limited. Within the Post-Tsunami Recovery Programme UNEP was partnering with environmental INGOs in ecosystem restoration initiatives. Within the Sudan Country Programme UNEP is partnering mainly with a Darfurian NGO in community outreach initiatives. In Sudan the unstable political situation affected the availability of civil society partners to some extent, when several international NGOs, such as Oxfam, which was partnering with UNEP in water security initiatives, were expelled from the country especially during 2009. In addition, local and national NGOs sometimes have problems in being officially registered by the government, which also restricts the pool from which partners can be selected. In Haiti, establishment of partnerships has been restricted because of lack of time and interest from the humanitarian sector to work on environmental issues. Also, the Haiti programme has been chronically underfunded and since in "humanitarian mode" funding is always secured for very short-term projects, partnerships are always built on unstable short-term agreements that need to be renewed regularly.

Internal cooperation in UNEP

295. Across the Disasters & Conflicts sub-programme cooperation with other UNEP divisions and branches has been generally limited and, as discussed earlier, even within the D&C sub-programme interventions are implemented by specified small teams with little or no interaction. In general, cooperation with external partners seems to be perceived as more important and beneficial than collaboration within UNEP, even though many of the interviewed people expressed their interest in strengthened collaboration across UNEP and believe that many opportunities exist.

296. The D&C Sub-programme is mainly delivered by PCDMB with limited interaction with other UNEP divisions or other DEPI branches. However, the country programmes in particular often resemble a 'mini-UNEP' covering similar themes being implemented by other parts of UNEP. The ecosystem management demonstrations as well as the climate change adaptation projects might as well be delivered by other branches of DEPI. PCDMB, within the D&C Sub-programme is, in a way, assembling the standard UNEP products from other parts of UNEP and delivering them in a post-crisis context where the operational capacity and experience of other UNEP entities is lacking. Thus, even though the context where the D&C Sub-programme works is different from the rest of UNEP, the subjects and deliverables are similar, which is why the lack of collaboration and communication within the organization is in many cases really a lost opportunity. PCDMB, as the main implementer of the D&C Sub-programme could learn from the branches with high level of expertise working in the specific fields of work, and, similarly, the other UNEP divisions and DEPI branches could learn a lot from experiences from long-term country programmes, unique to the D&C Sub-programme.

297. For example, as regards DRR, substantive expertise regarding the concepts and tools that are promoted by UNEP for DRR, as well as the expertise on the causes of hazards and people's vulnerability to disasters, are dispersed all across UNEP; early warning and assessment expertise is located in DEWA; ecosystem management expertise is spread over different branches within DEPI; climate change adaptation expertise is located in the Climate Change Adaptation Unit of DEPI; and expertise on industrial risks and preparedness and chemical/waste hazards is present in the SCP and Chemicals Branches of DTIE.

298. The most commonly stated reason for the lack of programmatic collaboration within UNEP is the lack of cross-divisional work plans and resources as well as limited staff-time. For example the country programme in Sudan covers nearly all of the UNEP sub-programmes but the work is done entirely in-house and lack of collaboration is attributed to lack of funding to undertake joint-planning and implementation. In Afghanistan it was indicated that recruiting expertise from outside is easier than from within UNEP due to limited time that can be dedicated by UNEP staff on administrative issues. According to the team in Haiti, it has been difficult to integrate with other

divisions because of the operational nature of the country programme and the attempts to engage with other UNEP divisions have gone vain. This, however, does not seem fully correct: there are other branches in UNEP implementing projects in fragile states. For example, DEPI's ecosystem based climate change adaptation programmes extend to Sudan and DR Congo and DTIE is implementing a project in Asia, including in countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, on policy and technical advice for managing harmful substances and waste. These projects might be of a shorter duration, but then again, the country programmes are also based on projects on a one to three year basis. It seems that UNEP funding and staffing arrangements have not kept abreast of the changes in the organizational structure (often referred to as the "matrix" structure) and that difficulties to pool resources for joint planning and implementation are restricting more efficient collaboration among different divisions. Staff of other UNEP divisions, even if they are interested in collaboration, is not able to allocate time to the D&C Sub-programme unless it is a part of their work plan from the start. UNEP currently does not have an organisation-wide incentive system for both intra-divisional and cross-divisional consultation, knowledge exchange and cooperation.

299. Another reason might simply be the physical barrier created by the distance between Geneva and Nairobi. The Sub-programme is to a large extent coordinated from Geneva by PCDMB, and only a few individual projects are managed by other units in UNEP such as the sustainable building reconstruction work under the Disaster Recovery CSA and APELL under the DRR CSA (managed by DTIE), the interventions of the ENVSEC Initiative (coordinated by the Regional Office for Europe), and the development of an environmental quality monitoring system in Lebanon (coordinated by the Regional Office for West Asia). There are, however, also benefits from being located in Geneva. Geneva has historically been the "hub" for the international DRR, emergency and disaster response agencies (OCHA, International Federation of the Red Cross, International Committee for Red Cross and UNISDR). It is also an emerging global centre for conflict mediation and peacebuilding organizations.
300. However, if collaboration in terms of joint design and implementation of projects is still restricted by the organizational structures, there should be nothing to prevent different divisions from communicating and sharing experiences on a more regular and structured manner. A general finding of the evaluation is that there is some exchange between the country programmes and the relevant UNEP Regional Offices, but very little exchange with other divisions, other DEPI branches as well as the administrative and management structures at the headquarters level. The envisaged D&C Advisory Committee could have played an important role in promoting for stronger collaboration across the organization, but the committee has never been realized. Another proposed initiative to promote intra-agency collaboration was to hold regular meetings between the sub-programme coordinators to facilitate joint planning, to develop joint policies and to ensure that the designed activities and outputs are closely coordinated. This has not been realized either, for example within the DRR only one meeting has ever been organized between the DRR team from Geneva, the Ecosystems Management sub-programme and the Climate change sub-programme adaptation team, where ideas were shared for future joint initiatives. However, six months down the road no follow-up activities had taken place. A reason why the Sub-programme coordinators do not meet more regularly might be that their roles and power within the organization is far less than originally envisaged in the UNEP reform. With their present mandate, it would be very hard for them to conduct any planning, to develop policies or even to affect coordination of outputs that are not under their direct control within the organization.
301. Practically there is no co-planning and only very little co-implementation with the rest of UNEP even though collaboration is always, and increasingly, flagged out in project planning documents. Some levels of collaboration have been established with DTIE and DEWA in project planning and implementation. Collaboration with DTIE was good in the Post-Tsunami Recovery Programme and later within the Sustainable Building Reconstruction – project. DTIE was also "pulled" in the Sub-programme when it was decided to lodge the APELL programme under the DRR Programme Framework of the D&C Sub-programme. With DEWA collaboration has been restricted to some DRR interventions, which have made use of GRID-made tools to develop disaster risk reduction materials, but without actively involving DEWA units in project steering, management or implementation. The Afghanistan country programme was, to some extent, supported by DEPI regarding environmental policy and DELC regarding environmental laws and conventions.

Collaboration with UNEP Regional Offices

302. A certain level of collaboration has been established between the country programmes and UNEP Regional Offices (ROs) even though often the roles of ROs are limited to liaison activities and assisting in establishing national and regional contacts and selecting partners. Programming documents are systematically shared and the ROs have

increasingly been invited to contribute to brainstorming sessions and discussions around programme design. However, the level of technical expertise – and often also knowledge of the specific country context – is lacking in the ROs to really influence programming. Very rarely have ROs been involved in project implementation.

303. In Haiti and Sierra Leone, programme implementation was temporarily under the responsibility of a Regional Office. In Sierra Leone the country coordinator reported to, and, for a certain time the country team received good back-stopping from the D&C focal point situated in the Regional Office for Africa (ROA). However, political support from the RO was minimal and when the D&C focal point departed due to ROAs failure to mobilize funding for the position, ROA's involvement in Sierra Leone was reduced to a minimum. UN "Delivering as One" funding for the programme in Sierra Leone flowed through ROA for about one year, but this overly complicated financial management. When the funding source became the ECP programme, ROA was not further included in the financing circuit. In Haiti, the programme was led by the Regional Office for Latin America (ROLAC) for the first year. However, the Regional Office had limited operational capacity, funding and delegated authority to run the programme efficiently and after the 2010 earthquake the programme was handed over to PCDMB in Geneva, leaving ROLAC with only a minor role. There is no D&C focal point in ROLAC but information regarding the few joint actions between PCDMB and ROLAC flows well. According to the PCDBM, there is a need for ROLAC to get more involved in the decision-making and implementation of D&C related activities in Haiti because the PCDMB Country Programme Manager cannot spend more than 50% of his time in Haiti. However, they believe that ROLAC is not yet ready to take over the coordination of the country programme.
304. Elsewhere, the role of Regional Offices has been even more limited. As regards the Country Programme in Afghanistan, the Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (ROAP) has not been equipped to run a programme that requires a sustained country presence and therefore the lead has remained with PCDMB. The working relationship between PCDMB and ROAP has, however, been good and ROAP has been involved e.g. in establishing the ozone convention in Afghanistan. However, the various capacities in ROAP and relevant units of UNEP could have been used better had there been a joint planning process in place; the new matrix-based way of working should foster this process. The involvement of ROA in the Sudan Country Programme as well as in the Ogoniland Environmental Assessment has also been weak, ROA having insufficient time and resources to play any meaningful role in the interventions. While the APELL projects are undertaken mainly in the Asia Pacific Region and Latin America, the programme is largely unknown by ROAP and ROLAC staff as verified by the evaluation team's visits to these ROs.

4.3.5 Reporting, monitoring and evaluation

Reporting, monitoring and evaluation in UNEP - generalities

305. Reporting, monitoring and evaluation in UNEP are governed by a Secretary-General Bulletin dated April 2000 (ST/SGB/2000/8). Up to the PoW 2010-2011, reporting and monitoring were conducted chiefly at the divisional level based on the Costed Work Plans and Budgets. Since the UNEP Governing Council Decision GC.25/13 approving the PoW 2010-2011, the emphasis has changed to project and sub-programme level reporting and monitoring. Evaluations have always been conducted chiefly at the project level, but the frequency of Sub-programme evaluations is increasing.
306. Monitoring in UNEP serves three functions: supporting management decision making, lesson learning and providing a basis for accountability. The first two functions receive most emphasis at the project level, while the last are the main purpose of "upwards" reporting and monitoring at the Sub-programme level.
307. Because monitoring and reporting are governed by both a UN-wide SG Bulletin and a UNEP-specific GC Decision, UNEP is compelled to monitor and report on its activities following two different, though – in principle – quite similar systems: one towards the UN General Assembly and the other towards the UNEP governing bodies.
308. UNEP reports to the General Assembly via the UN Department of Management (DM) every six months on the progress of output delivery by means of the Integrated Monitoring and Documentation Information System (IMDIS)²². At the 12, 18 and 24 month marks UNEP reports on the progress made in achieving sub-programme EAs.

²² IMDIS is the online tool for planning, monitoring and reporting of results-based programme performance in use at the United Nations Secretariat since 1998.

UNEP's submissions to DM form the basis of the SG's report to the GA on the performance of the UN's Programme 14: Environment.

309. UNEP also reports to its governing bodies: the Governing Council/Global Ministerial Environment Forum (GC/GMEF) and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR). In the course of a PoW biennium, UNEP reports to the CPR on a six monthly basis on the implementation of the PoW by means of the cumulative Programme Performance Reports (PPR). The PPR shows progress towards EAs and highlights the sub-programmes' achievements. Progress in implementing the PoW is also reported to the GC at its regular and special sessions at the 12 and 24 month marks respectively, using the same information as the reports to the CPR. Late 2010 UNEP introduced an online monitoring system – the Programme Information and Management System (PIMS) and all “upwards” reporting and monitoring is now done through this system. The PPRs are generated based on data captured at the project level from PIMS. While the system has its merits as a project database, a monitoring tool for UNEP senior management and a reporting tool towards the UNEP Members States, its usefulness as a monitoring instrument for management decision making at the project and sub-programme level is very limited. In fact, UNEP divisions (and sub-programmes) are free to adopt their own internal reporting and monitoring mechanisms for management purposes, as long as these generate reviews at least every six months to support and complement the six-monthly reporting to UNEP governing bodies and the UNGA.
310. According to the same SG Bulletin of 2000, UNEP must evaluate all its activities at completion. The UNEP Evaluation Policy approved by the Executive Director in 2009 specifies the main types of independent evaluations to be conducted by the UNEP Evaluation Office: Project Evaluations, Sub-programme Evaluations and Impact Evaluations. Project level evaluations have constituted the brunt of the Evaluation Office's work so far, but Sub-programme Evaluations receive increasing attention.

Reporting, monitoring and evaluation in the D&C Sub-programme

Reporting

311. Progress reporting in the D&C Sub-programme has improved considerably since the PoW 2010-2011. Before 2010, reporting requirements for projects lacked clarity on the contents, periodicity, reporting lines and reporting responsibilities. Progress reports for individual projects are scarce and, when they exist, of very variable quality. Most completed projects also lack a completion report worth the name.
312. Currently, reporting in the D&C Sub-programme is quite systematic and standardized: mission reports of UNEP staff, quarterly progress reports of the D&C sub-programme (recently reduced to twice a year), six-monthly reporting to PIMS and to IMDIS. Reporting in PIMS is done against project milestones, which in most cases coincide with the completion of a project activity under a project output. Reporting is a shared responsibility between the project managers and the Sub-programme coordinator.

Monitoring

313. It is fair to say that, across the Sub-programme, monitoring is essentially done at the activity and output level. The immediate outcome level and above are not monitored in any formal way. When mention is made of contributions to country capacity, this is usually assumed from the nature and quality of outputs delivered; e.g. issues papers, case study reports and other advocacy efforts of UNEP and its partners at the Global Platform for DRR might have convinced decision makers to review their environmental and DRR policies and planning. Evidence about whether decision makers did review their policies and planning is not captured in any systematic way, and credible evidence that changes are really attributable to UNEP efforts is even scarcer.
314. Immediate outcome and outcome monitoring is difficult for several reasons: there is usually little baseline information, EA indicators are inadequate, there are significant attribution problems and there is usually no separate provision for monitoring in project budgets. Generally, the projects do not include a baseline study, mainly because there is no funding for project design (!) but also because countries where support will be granted are not always identified up-front due to the responsive nature of important parts of the Sub-programme. It must be noted though that in countries where an environmental impact assessment was conducted, this assessment usually provides a broad baseline on both physical and institutional environment and natural resources-related aspects.
315. As an illustration of inadequate indicators, the indicator for EA(1) “Increased investment in combined DRR and natural resource management schemes in countries targeted for UNEP assistance” is inadequate to show that “the

capacity of Member States for environmental management was enhanced in order to contribute to natural and planned disaster risk reduction” as the EA states. The PPR 2010-2011 claims that the significant increase in funding for projects using NRM as a tool for disaster and conflict risk reduction shows that UNEP has successfully demonstrated the role of natural resources can play in conflict and disaster vulnerability. This is of course not necessarily true. Links between natural resources management practices and disaster vulnerability have been recognized and studied by some key donors (including other PEDRR members and the EU) well before UNEP started developing its environmental management for DRR advocacy work, so any evolution in donor funding in the countries where UNEP has been active could be unrelated to UNEP’s efforts. Besides, additional investment due to development assistance (the indicator does not specify the source of funding, so development assistance can be counted) would not demonstrate a sustainable capacity improvement of Member States. The indicators for EA(3) “The percentage of inter-agency post crisis needs assessments and early recovery plans that identify, prioritize and cost environmental damage and needs increases” and “the percentage of the total long-term relief and crisis recovery funding focused on environment and natural resource management and associated livelihood projects increases” are also both focused on development assistance and provide no reliable indication that country capacity would have been enhanced or that “the post-crisis assessment and recovery process has contributed to improved environmental management and the sustainable use of natural resources” as the EA states.

316. Performance indicators for individual projects are mainly quantitative (e.g. ‘number of policies’ ‘percentage of ...’) which is often not sufficient in measuring the quality of the output or the higher level change. Quantitative targets for outputs do not say anything about the output’s usefulness to contribute to the achievement of the immediate outcome (enhancement of capacities of stakeholders). Indicators for higher level results usually have an attribution problem, since performance is measured at a level where it is impossible to grant success to a specific entity. It should also be noted that there are no indicators for PoW Outputs. PoW Output targets are usually quantitative (a number of countries in which the PoW output has been delivered, or a number of pilot projects carried out) and say nothing about the quality of the output delivered or the change achieved.
317. Monitoring of the larger “programmes” within the D&C Sub-programme is quite uneven. The ECP and the Sudan Country Programmes are exemplary, with sound donor-imposed logframes and good practices in programme-wide monitoring of results at the outcome level. The ECP, for example, keeps track of issues and concepts incorporated in UN documents, references to environment and peacebuilding linkages, as well as the role of UNEP in SG statements to show the global policy influence from the programme. The ECP is also very systematic in learning from other organisations’ and (some) UNEP experiences, documenting and disseminating knowledge and best practices in the form of policy reports, guidance materials and books. However, the ECP country pilot of Sierra Leone is quite weak in terms of monitoring as the small country programme does not use any formal logframe, work plan or indicators. A noteworthy good practice there, though, is that the UNEP team “keeps the environment under review” for example by scanning the media for news on the environment sector, and shares information on recent developments with colleagues and interested partners in the country. For the Sudan Country Programme, performance indicators at the immediate outcome level (wrongly called “outputs” in the logframe) are generally well formulated in the DFID-driven project logframe. Though mostly quantitative, they are generally a good measure of progress towards the delivery of individual outcomes. For monitoring the programme’s contribution to its outcome “Improved sustainable and equitable governance, management and use of environmental resources, contributing to MDG 7” the team developed a tool to measure progress in the effectiveness of relationships between key environmental actors at different levels, on the assumption that progress in those relationships in a fragile state context can be considered as a good indication of overall progress in environmental governance and management.
318. Monitoring in the Afghanistan Country Programme has been focused more on outputs, activities and finances. The outcome indicators in the programme logframe, suggested by the EU-led MTE of the programme, are impractical because they rely on nationwide data which is not so easy to collect due to security issues and poor technical capacity of government institutions. However, the programme is also very well documented and achievements are disseminated widely in Afghanistan and internationally, in particular through the well-maintained web site of the programme which contains all the relevant publications and reports. ENVSEC has hardly any monitoring at the programmatic level to speak of. There are no clearly defined expected results at the programme level and project monitoring is expected to be done by the member organisations involved in project implementation towards their own headquarters and according to their own monitoring requirements. Therefore, it has been difficult to establish the overall impact and success of the ENVSEC Initiative at sub-regional or regional level. The recent Programme and

Projects Guidelines should help to further standardize reporting, monitoring and evaluation procedures and responsibilities. The security outcomes of the projects are rarely monitored or reported, which undermines the possibility to learn, replicate and further build the knowledge base on environment and security inter-linkages that are so central to this initiative. The ENVSEC definition of security is too broad and defined nationally at the individual project level. It is therefore difficult to measure if the programme reduced security risks and what has been UNEP's contribution to it. A recently finalized study with 14 recommendations for strengthening security aspects of the ENVSEC Initiative is expected to further clarify the security focus and improve monitoring and reporting on security related outcomes. Projects and the Initiative regularly report back to the donors and the Board. The chairperson also makes an annual Report. More attention should be given to the aspect of the outcomes and impacts in monitoring the projects in addition to the current focus, which is aimed at tracking funds and activity expenditure. Valuable lessons learned from the significant number of projects should also be systematically compiled, analysed and disseminated.

319. According to the Project Documents of most projects designed under the PoW 2010-2011, monitoring reports should have been submitted to a D&C Advisory Committee for review of progress and strategic guidance. This Committee was never functional (see paragraph 235 and 259).

Evaluation

320. There is, overall, little independent evaluative evidence for the projects in the D&C portfolio. Out of 21 closed or inactive projects, only a handful were independently evaluated and a few more underwent a semi-independent review. For example, the ECP programme has gone through a semi-independent MTR in mid-2011, the recommendations of which were fed into Phase III of the programme. The Afghanistan Country programme was reviewed twice and formally evaluated once. In most cases where an evaluation or a review was conducted, recommendations were fed into subsequent phases.
321. None of the post-disaster or post-conflict environmental impact assessments conducted by UNEP has ever been evaluated. Although such evaluations could have been extremely useful to draw lessons from experience, the limited budgets of most assessments could not have covered an ex-post, independent evaluation of the assessment process, products and outcomes.
322. None of the ProDocs of the current projects have planned or budgeted for mid-term evaluations. Terminal evaluations are planned and more or less adequately budgeted for (between 25,000 and 30,000 US\$). However, the very low ratio of secured funding for many projects raises concerns about the actual availability of funds to conduct a terminal evaluation.

5 Conclusions and recommendations

5.1 Conclusions

323. UNEP's D&C Sub-programme is expected to contribute to improved and equitable environmental management and governance for disaster risk reduction, improved environmental emergency response, conflict prevention and peace building, and environmental recovery in supported countries. The evaluation found that the Sub-programme is highly relevant. It is well aligned with UNEP's mandate as expressed in several UN General Assembly and UNEP Governing Council documents. Its objectives and interventions are fully justified by increasing global and country needs. The overall strategic focus of the sub-programme is clear with four areas of work: post-crisis assessments, disaster risk reduction, environmental recovery and peacebuilding. UNEP has a clear comparative advantage to contribute to the Sub-programme objectives and deliver in this four areas through the accumulation of significant experience and expertise in post-crisis environmental assessments, industrial emergency preparedness, strategic environmental coordination and support at the country level and so on, but also due to UNEP's central role in the UN system to deal with the environment, UNEP's convening power and UNEP's access to the scientific research community, high-level decision makers in Governments and international organisations.
324. UNEP's niche is well defined in post-conflict countries, providing environmental information, strategic and planning advice and institutional support, but this is not always the case in countries supported with DRR or with environmental recovery after natural disasters, where UNEP's specific role is sometimes unclear with a risk of duplication of efforts of other organisations. The DRR work in the D&C Sub-programme is rather small compared to

DRR-related work in UNEP as a whole, in particular in the Climate Change Sub-programme. Even though the DRR team from the D&C Sub-programme has made efforts to link up with the other sub-programmes, it has no formal UNEP-wide coordination role in the area of DRR and the connection between the D&C sub-programme's ecosystem management for DRR work on the one hand and other DRR-related work in UNEP such as Climate Change Adaptation work, on the other, remains weak.

325. The predominant intervention strategy of the D&C Sub-programme is a needs-based, country-level approach that is used in post-crisis countries, where assessments, emergency response and recovery assistance must be tailored to the specific country context. This approach is rather unique in UNEP as an organisation, where most interventions are normative in nature and managed from UNEP headquarters or regional offices with very specific short-term support provided at the country level. UNEP's support and longer-term presence in post-conflict countries (but also some disaster-prone countries such as Haiti) is fully justified because of the erosion in those countries of not only the environment but also the environmental policy and institutional frameworks and international connection to the multilateral environmental agreements. Yet, the concept of "country programme" is not well understood and broadly accepted in UNEP in terms of how it is defined, what the different operating modalities can be, which conditions or criteria would justify the creation of a country programme, who should be leading it under what circumstances etc.
326. The second intervention strategy is a more supply-driven approach, much more common in UNEP as a whole, where approaches, concepts and tools - that have been tested and demonstrated on the ground by UNEP or others - are disseminated at the global or regional level. This is the main intervention approach of the preventive and preparedness work of the Sub-programme. The evaluation concludes that both intervention strategies are appropriate to meet the diverse Sub-programme objectives, but linkages between the global/regional preventive work and the country-level recovery work are not fully exploited leading to some missed opportunities in terms of knowledge exchange and mobilization of partnerships. Also, insufficient attention is sometimes given at the country level to building strategic partnerships to promote dissemination and up-scaling of local pilots.
327. In terms of geographic targeting, the Sub-programme is global in scope in the areas of advocacy and training towards governments and international organisations, but, according to UNEP strategic documents, country assistance would be granted primarily to those countries that are particularly vulnerable to natural hazards or conflict with a strong environmental dimension. This is largely true for the peacebuilding and post-crisis recovery work. However, targeting of DRR and industrial accident preparedness work (APELL) has been biased towards middle-income countries rather than the poorest or most vulnerable countries, because committed public agencies and capable technical institutions are considered a pre-requisite for successfully introducing UNEP's approaches and tools. In-depth environmental assessments and longer-term recovery support by PCDMB teams was provided following major disasters and conflicts, but funding availability sometimes limited the extent of UNEP's support. With its current resource base, UNEP cannot be everywhere. However, UNEP does not have formal criteria to select countries where more in-depth and longer-term intervention is justified and therefore the impression is created that "UNEP goes where the funding is", i.e. that country choice is driven by donor interests rather than country needs or the UNEP mandate.
328. Whether these capacity building efforts can effectively contribute to changes in environmental management and governance, depends on the degree to which these immediate outcomes have effectively been achieved and the extent to which the required drivers and assumptions are present. On the basis of a reconstructed Theory of Change of the Sub-programme, six immediate outcomes were identified corresponding to different dimensions of country capacity for environmental management and emergency preparedness. Across the D&C Sub-programme evaluative evidence on the achievement of outcomes and higher level results is weak, in part due to the difficulty of developing and measuring indicators at those levels. Therefore, the evaluation had to rely a lot on assessing the quality of outputs -and processes to deliver those outputs- as proxies for the achievement of outcomes.
329. As regards effectiveness, the immediate outcomes that the Sub-programme aims to achieve are improvements in the different dimensions of capacity of countries vulnerable to disasters and conflicts, so that environmental management and governance can be improved in the medium term. The D&C Sub-programme has been effective in enhancing access to environmental information and increasing understanding of the links between the environment on the one hand, and conflicts and disasters on the other, through high-quality environmental assessments and numerous high-level communications and publications. In some cases, however, funding constraints have limited the timely follow-up that could be given to assessments, awareness raising or training

events, reducing the likelihood that recommendations have been implemented or that approaches and tools have been widely and sustainably transferred. Also, environmental assessment skills have rarely been transferred to partners.

330. The Sub-programme has also been successful in supporting the integration of environmental concerns in DRR and recovery plans, strategies, and policies, on which much of the country-level support has been focused. As a result of UNEP's support, several disaster-affected countries have better integrated environmental needs and priorities into recovery plans and, in a few cases, with the help of UNEP prepared stand-alone environmental recovery strategies. Also, in post-conflict programme countries, UNEP has in some instances supported government agencies directly with the development or up-dating of general and sector-specific environmental strategies and plans. UNEP post-crisis assessments and occasional field research on more specific themes are likely to have influenced policy making towards more sustainable environmental management. In a few post-conflict countries, UNEP has also provided direct policy advice, in particular on how to integrate assessment and field research recommendations in environmental policy. Real influence on policy and institutional processes could be demonstrated in those countries where UNEP had a longer term presence such as Afghanistan, Sudan and Sierra Leone.
331. The Sub-programme has significantly contributed to a number of key drivers that are necessary so that enhanced country capacities can really lead to improved environmental governance and management, and, ultimately, to reduced vulnerability to disasters and conflicts at a large scale. Integration of environmental considerations into UN and other international organisations is considered one of the most crucial outcome drivers because these organisations often provide support to countries that goes well beyond technical assistance and training, and play a major role in replicating and up-scaling UNEP concepts and tools. The Sub-programme has been effective in global advocacy to bring environment to the fore in DRR, recovery and peacebuilding interventions of UN and other international organisations, even though efforts towards the humanitarian community have been less consistent. At the country level mainstreaming of the environment in UN and other international players was also often successful, but highly dependent on the supportiveness of individuals in key agencies, and much more challenging in the case of humanitarian organisations due to a lack of resources and support from humanitarian agencies' headquarters.
332. While UNEP has made a significant contribution to relationships between actors e.g. in post-crisis country programmes, through the APELL programme or during environmental diplomacy efforts, participation by non-governmental stakeholders at country level could be stronger. This participation is an important outcome driver because non-governmental stakeholders need to feel responsible to change their own behaviour and at the same time hold their governments accountable for improving environmental governance and management. In some countries UNEP is promoting this participation by involving civil society in training, field activities, community-based environmental planning etc., but learning from these experiences and experiences of others is not yet systematic. On the other hand, UNEP should rethink its role in promoting community participation in environmental planning and management which currently does not make full use of UNEP's comparative advantages at the country level.
333. There are also a number of contextual factors, outside UNEP's control, that affect the achievement of longer term outcomes and impact such as political stability in the countries where the D&C Sub-programme operates, or the availability of adequate resources (human and financial) to countries to translate their enhanced capacities into effective changes in environmental governance and management. The evaluation found that these assumptions quite often do not hold true, and that, therefore, there is a moderate to high risk that immediate outcomes (enhanced country capacity) achieved by UNEP will not lead to significant behavioural change (improved governance and management) or impacts (reduced vulnerability to conflicts and disasters) further up the causal pathways. For instance, political instability can easily (re-)occur and result in that people with whom UNEP has developed a trust relationship are removed from key decision making positions. Also, long-term funding to address environmental issues is often lacking in countries affected by disasters or conflict because these countries often have a very weak financial resource base to begin with, and do not consider the environment as a priority concern in the aftermath of the crisis.
334. As regards sustainability of results achieved with UNEP's support, the evaluation found that the main factor in favour is strong government ownership. Indeed, government agencies have in most cases been the direct beneficiaries of UNEP's support, or, at least, been directly involved in UNEP interventions. However, environmental governance in many supported countries remains fragile and continued support will be needed for an

unforeseeable time. The main obstacle to sustainability of the results achieved up to now is the absence of long-term financing for addressing environmental issues in most fragile states where the Sub-programme operates.

335. There are several internal factors that have contributed to the overall satisfactory delivery of outputs and short-term immediate outcomes in supported countries. Sub-programme staff were found competent in their field and internal management arrangements seem to work well. Most projects have an appropriate and coherent intervention strategy. Partnerships with international organisations at the global and regional level, and with government agencies at the country level have played a major role in achieving, consolidating and replicating results. The Sub-programme has also been overall very successful in mobilizing extra-budgetary funding sources and disposes over an exemplary resource mobilization strategy that, if implemented, should ensure future funding for most project activities.
336. On the other hand, there are a number of factors that have led to missed opportunities, have negatively affected performance, or have put the future performance and sustainability of achievements at risk. The overall results framework as presented in the MTS 2010-2013 and Pow 2010-2011 presents several problems that make sub-programme reporting and monitoring difficult and hereby reduce accountability and opportunities for capturing lessons and recognizing higher-level results achieved. Project design quality has improved since the Pow 2010-2011 but is still uneven with generally a lack of detail and consistency in the presentation of project management and supervision arrangements, roles of collaborating units within UNEP and of external partners, connections between projects, and how gender issues would be addressed. Most projects have also no explicit exit strategy, and hand-over modalities to ensure continuity are seldom clear.
337. Project supervision arrangements are often inappropriate. Because teams are small, management and supervision functions are often fulfilled by the same persons, and most projects have no Steering Committee. Due to this, there is a risk of management issues going undetected for a long time and opportunities for mutual support and learning between teams in the Sub-programme are lost. Country programme management arrangements have been developed on a case-by-case basis and are not always optimal e.g. in terms of delegation of authority from Geneva to the country-level managers. Administrative procedures in UNEP are not well adapted for field-based operations and have led to many delays, frustrations and, occasionally staff insecurity despite many efforts by managers to find solutions.
338. The ratio of core funding over extra-budgetary funding for the Sub-programme is very low compared to other UNEP Sub-programmes. This is contradictory to UNEP's global mandate and poses several challenges: essential non-project activities such as Sub-programme coordination, resource mobilization, project design and knowledge management need to be largely funded by project budgets; many staff are contract insecure; and the Sub-programme cannot quickly launch environmental assessments or recovery operations without first securing donor support etc. On the other hand, it is important to consider the success of the Sub-programme to mobilize extra-budgetary funding when thinking about handing over certain interventions to other Sub-programmes in UNEP who might not have built the same credibility and trust relationships with donors interested in funding environment-related interventions in post-crisis countries.
339. The evaluation found that collaboration with the rest of UNEP could be much stronger, despite several efforts by Sub-programme teams to engage with other Sub-programmes, and therefore many opportunities for collaboration and knowledge exchange within UNEP are missed. This weak internal collaboration is not unique for the Sub-programme and is caused by several factors such as the difficulties to pool resources across divisions, the lack of an incentives system to promote in-house collaboration, and a lack of staff time dedicated to knowledge exchange and mutual support. The D&C Advisory Committee which was intended as a common steering mechanism for all projects in the Sub-programme and would also have contained members from other UNEP Sub-programmes and collaborating divisions, has never seen the light of day. The Regional Offices could also play a much stronger role in project design and implementation, but would therefore require a stronger operational capacity, adequate funding and appropriately delegated authority.
340. Last, there have been improvements in monitoring and reporting over the last biennium, but there is still a lot of room for improving project completion reporting. Outcome monitoring is also still weak due to poor baseline information, sometimes un-SMART indicators and limited monitoring budgets. There is insufficient evaluative evidence on project performance and progress made towards impact. So far, only a small number of projects in the D&C portfolio have been independently evaluated.

5.2 Recommendations

341. The evaluation makes 10 key recommendations of which 4 are considered critical. Other opportunities for improvement are mentioned in the Summary of Findings and Recommendations in the beginning of the report and throughout the text of the main report. Implementation of recommendations will be tracked jointly by the Sub-programme Coordinator and the Evaluation Office by means of a Recommendations Implementation Plan²³.

Critical recommendations

342. **Recommendation 1: Human and financial resources security.** It is imperative that contract security is improved for all staff in the Sub-programme and that staffing requirements of all functional units are fully met. The latter is a condition for some other recommendations of this evaluation to be feasible, as these would require additional staff time and efforts.
343. UNEP should allocate more core resources to the D&C Sub-programme. This would be more in line with the overall UNEP mandate, which is global and not limited to the countries where the donor community might believe that UNEP support is required. It would also contribute to contract security of personnel, reduce reliance on consultants for longer-term assignments and make the Sub-programme more flexible to quickly assign resources to areas of need in response to environmental emergencies and requests for assistance from countries in crisis. Furthermore, more core funding would provide a more stable and reliable funding base for the preventive side of the Sub-programme which has struggled at times to raise adequate extra-budgetary funding.
344. However, the D&C Sub-programme should continue its efforts to mobilize extra-budgetary resources, in the first place by:
- a. Ensuring that the environmental dimensions of disasters and conflicts become and remain a priority in policies, strategies, plans and financing frameworks of donors and crisis countries alike;
 - b. Increasing the submission of high quality programme and project proposals to relevant, both traditional and new funding sources. In this light, it is also imperative to strengthen national capacities in post-crisis countries to mobilize funding for addressing environmental issues; and
 - c. Enhancing relations with bilateral donors, the traditional “top” donors in particular. This will require a shift in approach towards longer-term relationships (as opposed to the current rather ‘ad hoc’ relationships), an increased diversification of what is funded by those donors and stronger engagement with those donors at the country level.
345. **Recommendation 2: Country-level operations.** UNEP should define clear criteria for selecting vulnerable or post-crisis countries where more in-depth and/or long-term UNEP support and involvement is justified, differentiated for each core service area (assessments, peacebuilding, DRR and post-crisis recovery). Administrative arrangements and procedures for field-level operations, such as human and financial resources management, recruitment and procurement procedures should be thoroughly reviewed, adapted and more standardized, including stronger delegation of authority to the country level and the possibility to fast-track administrative and operational requests when needed. UNEP should also put special operating procedures and administrative management processes in place to support work in countries with severe security constraints. Country operations should also always have a clear exit strategy with explicit criteria and appropriate modalities for hand-over of management to country stakeholders (other UN agencies, Government, civil society etc.) and/or other UNEP sub-programmes and units. Regional Offices in particular should play a more important role in D&C country programmes, possibly even taking over the coordination of the longer-term recovery support from the PCDMB after the crisis has receded. For this, a joint planning and implementation arrangement needs to be put in place between functional units (PCDMB and others) and the Regional Offices, and the operational capacity, funding and delegated authority of ROs need to be improved.
346. **Recommendation 3: Project Steering Committees.** All projects should have a Steering Committee to provide adequate strategic oversight and guidance. The composition and working modalities of these committees may vary

²³ The Recommendations Implementation Plan is the management response to the evaluation recommendations, specifying who is responsible for implementing the recommendations and what has been and will be done by when. It is updated on a six-monthly basis for two years following the completion of the evaluation process, and available upon request from the UNEP Evaluation Office.

with the particularities of each project (size, duration, number of partners involved, budget and scope) but will include, at minimum: the sub-programme coordinator, a senior manager from the implementing entity, one national counterpart, one key partner, and the project manager. Steering Committees should meet at least on an annual basis.

347. **Recommendation 4: Internal collaboration in UNEP.** Opportunities for collaboration and knowledge sharing between the D&C Sub-programme and other UNEP sub-programmes, divisions and branches should be better exploited. The PCDMB, as the main implementer of the D&C Sub-programme, should rely more on other UNEP units with a high level of expertise in specific fields, and other UNEP units could learn more from PCDMB experience with more intensive or longer-term country operations. Cohesion and team work within the D&C Sub-programme itself should also be improved. To make better use of these in-house opportunities for collaboration and learning it is necessary that:
- a. UNEP funding and staffing arrangements and procedures are adapted to the reforms made to the organizational structure of UNEP. E.g. pooling of human and financial resources for joint-planning and implementation should be made possible to allow for more efficient collaboration among different divisions; temporary staff secondment across UNEP entities to benefit from learning opportunities should be made easier etc.;
 - b. UNEP develops a stronger organisation-wide incentive system for both intra-divisional and cross-divisional consultation, knowledge exchange and cooperation;
 - c. Adequate staff time is set-aside to allow more frequent and systematic communication and experience sharing between different functional units and Sub-programmes of UNEP;
 - d. At the UNEP corporate level, more regular meetings are held between the sub-programme coordinators to facilitate joint planning, to develop joint policies and to ensure that the designed activities and outputs are more closely coordinated;
 - e. Reports and other materials with relevant content for the D&C Sub-programme are more frequently peer reviewed (with more coherent communication and respected deadlines); and
 - f. JEU, APELL and ENVSEC participate in PCDMB staff meetings, while PCDMB is represented in ROE programme meetings when useful.

Important recommendations

348. **Recommendation 5: UNEP's niche in disaster management.** To avoid duplication of roles and perhaps gaps in country support, UNEP should better specify its niche in country-level disaster risk reduction and post-disaster recovery work vis-à-vis other UN agencies and INGOs with often larger implementation resources and firmer long-term commitment at the country level.
349. **Recommendation 6: External partnerships.** At the country level UNEP should develop stronger operational partnerships with key UN agencies to enhance catalytic effects in-country. International partnerships developed through global advocacy work could also be used more to foster joint planning and implementation at the country level. On the other hand, broader and longer-term partnerships with governmental and non-governmental stakeholders are essential for sustainability and could provide a safety net for UNEP to cope better with potential staff turn-over and political instability. UNEP's support should be more broadly targeted on a larger number of government institutions than is currently the case and should also reduce its dependency on a relatively small number of very good personal relationships within these institutions. Participation and ownership by non-governmental stakeholders should also be strengthened, so that these stakeholders feel responsible to change their own life choices, and hold themselves and others (such as government actors) accountable to comply with agreements and decisions made.
350. However, UNEP also needs to think of ways to better monitor and maintain an adequate level of quality control over how UNEP's messages are translated to practice or disseminated by partners following UNEP's advocacy work, trainings and technical assistance. Furthermore, UNEP's role in piloting environmental management approaches at the sub-national level needs to be re-thought. Rather than re-inventing the wheel by directly testing approaches and tools at a very local level, UNEP's role should be focused on collecting, assessing and disseminating "upwards"

the local experiences of NGOs that are better placed to engage on a continuing basis with communities but have less voice with the government agencies and international organizations based in the capitals.

351. **Recommendation 7: Linkages between normative and operational work.** Linkages between the more supply-driven, global/regional advocacy work and the more needs-based interventions in post-crisis countries could be strengthened in terms of knowledge exchange and mobilization of global partnerships at the country level, to make more use of existing opportunities.
352. **Recommendation 8: Disaster risk reduction in UNEP.** Having a single centralized team within the D&C Sub-programme working on DRR has its advantages in terms of coordination, but there is a need to formally assign that role to the D&C Sub-programme.
353. In addition, the DRR team needs to:
 - a. Continue building and sharing its understanding of what UNEP as a whole is doing in the field of DRR, and share this information with the rest of UNEP;
 - b. Further improve on its communication and work more on the collaborative culture between units involved in DRR-related activities across the organization; and
 - c. More specifically, seek stronger collaboration between the promotion of environmental management approaches to DRR (Eco-DRR) and climate change adaptation work, both conceptually and programmatically, to better use UNEP's growing capacity and role in the field of climate change adaptation to leverage attention and funding for Eco-DRR approaches.
354. **Recommendation 9: Sub-programme and project design.** In the overall results framework of the Sub-programme, Expected Accomplishments, PoW Outputs, project outcomes and outputs should be pitched at the correct results levels, corresponding to the current UNEP definitions. Specifically, EAs and project outcomes should be pitched at the immediate outcome level, which corresponds to change that is a direct result of stakeholders using project products and services outside the project setting. In the D&C Sub-programme this corresponds best with enhanced country capacity. Outputs should be pitched at the level of services or products delivered by UNEP's interventions. A PoW Output can be quite generic to encompass several project outputs of a very similar nature and purpose – in that sense PoW Outputs are rather “categories” of products and services delivered by UNEP.
355. There is also room for improvement of project design, which should in future be more explicit and provide more detail on, inter alia, management and supervision arrangements, the roles and responsibilities of internal and external partners and gender considerations. To allow for an adequate level within the existing project document format, large programmes composed of several, large interlinked but stand-alone components should be presented as a set of individual projects, with a “cover page” that provides the common background and justification for the projects, and the overall Theory of Change of the programme, including synergies and complementarities between the projects.
356. **Recommendation 10: Monitoring and evaluation.** Across the Sub-programme, monitoring should keep better track of effectiveness, i.e. progress on achievement of outcomes. For progress monitoring on immediate outcome and outcomes to be possible, better baseline information is needed, indicators need to be SMARTer, and a decent budget needs to be set aside for monitoring in project budgets. On the other hand, to strengthen the evaluative evidence base on achievement of Sub-programme outcomes and progress towards impact, it is imperative that all projects are independently evaluated around the time of completion. Good quality completion reports should be systematically prepared by the project teams to provide a strong basis for the subsequent independent terminal evaluation. The ability to demonstrate achievements at the outcome and impact level and being fully transparent on success and failure alike will stimulate internal learning, help to improve branding of UNEP's D&C Sub-programme and support fund raising efforts for the Sub-programme's activities.

Annex 1. List of persons interviewed

Nairobi

1. Achim Steiner, Executive Director, UNEP
2. Amina Mohamed, Deputy Executive Director, UNEP
3. Christophe Bouvier, Chief, Office of Operations, UNEP (Former Director, Regional Office for Europe)
4. Sheila Aggarwal-Khan, Senior Programming Officer, Quality Assurance Section, Office of Operations, UNEP
5. Ibrahim Thiaw, Director, Division for Environmental Policy Implementation, UNEP
6. Mounkaila Goumandakoye, Director, Regional Office for Africa, UNEP
7. Desta Mebratu, Deputy Director, Regional Office for Africa, UNEP
8. Keith Alverson, Head, Climate Change Adaptation and Terrestrial Ecosystems Branch, DEPI, UNEP
9. Peter Gilruth, Director, Division for Early Warning and Assessment, UNEP
10. Joseph Alcamo, Chief Scientist, UNEP
11. Brennan van Dyck, Director, Resource Mobilisation Unit, Office of Operations, UNEP
12. Jeanette Clover, D&C Focal Point, ROA, UNEP
13. Norberto Fernandez, GEMS Programme Coordinator, DEWA, UNEP
14. Daniel Lewis, Chief, Disaster and Post-Conflict Section, UN-Habitat
15. Ansa Masaud, Human Settlements Officer, Disaster and Post-Conflict Section, UN-Habitat

Geneva

16. Henrik Slotte, D&C Sub-programme Coordinator and Chief, PCDMB, UNEP
17. Silja Halle, Acting D&C Sub-programme Coordinator and Programme Officer, PCDMB, UNEP
18. Marisol Estrella, Project Coordinator DRR, PCDMB, UNEP
19. Muralee Thummarukudy, Senior Programme Officer, PCDMB, UNEP
20. Renee Nijenhuis, UNEP Programme Officer, JEU, UNEP/OCHA
21. David Jensen, Policy and Planning Coordinator, PCDMB, UNEP
22. Cecilia Fantoni, Consultant, JEU, OCHA
23. Hassan Partow, Programme Officer, PCDMB, UNEP
24. Asif Zaidi, Operations Manager, PCDMB, UNEP
25. Andrew Morton, Haiti Regeneration Initiative Coordinator, PCDMB, UNEP
26. Natalie Barefoot, Programme Officer, PCDMB, UNEP
27. Mike Cowing, Hazardous waste and landfill consultant, PCDMB, UNEP
28. Pascal Peduzzi, DEWA/GRID-Geneva, UNEP
29. Julie Marks, Communications Advisor, PCDMB, UNEP
30. Laura Rio, Senior Programme Manager, ENVSEC
31. Marika Palosaari, ENVSEC Coordination Officer, ROE, UNEP
32. Jorge Flores Lepe, Administrative Management Officer, PCDMB, UNEP
33. Satu Ojaluoma, former AMO, PCDMB, UNEP
34. Glaucia Boyer, Programme managers, DDR, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP
35. Adrienne Stork, Programme managers, DDR, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP
36. Radhika Murti, IUCN (via telecom)

Paris (telecom)

37. Thomas Marques, Programme Officer, SCPB, DTIE, UNEP
38. Ruth Do Coutto, SCPB, DTIE, UNEP
39. Kurt Karigan, Coordinator, Sustainable Reconstruction, DTIE, UNEP
40. Seraphine Haeussling, Climate Change Sub-programme Coordinator a.i., Energy Branch, DTIE, UNEP

Bahrain (telecom)

41. Adel-Farid Abdel-Kader, Regional Director, ROWA, UNEP
42. Melanie Hutchinson, D&C Coordinator in ROWA, UNEP
43. Fouad Abousamra, Project Manager for Environmental Quality Monitoring System for Lebanon, UNEP

Sudan

44. Robin Bovey, UNEP Sudan Country Programme Manager, PCDMB, UNEP
45. Brendan Bromwich, SIEP Coordinator, PCDMB, UNEP
46. Adrian Tumusime, Administrative Officer, PCDMB, UNEP
47. Magda Nassef, Project Manager Environment & Livelihoods, PCDMB, UNEP
48. Tom Maisiba Omange, Programme Officer, UNEP
49. Corrina Bothe, Consultant, UNEP
50. Ernest Mutanga, Consultant, UNEP
51. Mey Ahmed, Climate Change & Peace Building Focal Point, UNEP
52. Abdelazim Mirghani Ibrahim, General Manager, Forests National Corporation (FNC), Ministry of Environment, Forests and Physical Development (MEFPD)
53. Hanadi Awadalla, Chief Extension Department, FNC, MEFPD
54. Sayeda Khalil, Head Afforestation Department (REDD), FNC, MEFPD
55. Osman Omar, Chief Technical Sector, FNC, MEFPD
56. Nagmeldin Gutbi, High Council for Environment and Natural Resources, MEFPD
57. Mohamed Siddig Suliman, Area Coordinator - North Darfur, Practical Action
58. Margue Buchanan-Smith, Livelihoods and food security specialist
59. Jeffrey McMurdo, Head of Office, UNOPS Sudan
60. Oriano Micaletti, Director a.i., Humanitarian, Protection Strategy Coordination Division, UNAMID
61. Simon Narbeth, Social Development Adviser, UKaid – DFID Sudan
62. Emmanula K. Mollé, Chief, Water and Environmental Protection Section, UNAMID
63. Khalil Wagan Briema, North Darfur Program Manager, Darfur Development & Reconstruction Agency
64. Mrs. Hint, DDRA
65. Mohammed Djidou, DDRA
66. Villagers of Maba Village, North Darfur
67. Pontus Ohrstedt, Team Leader, Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit, UNDP
68. Abubaker H.A. Yahya, Environmental Inspector, Ministry of Environment, Forests and Physical Development
69. Dr. Abduljabar, Consultant on Marketing Monitoring Network, El Fasher
70. Nihal Samarasinghe, Project Manager, UNOPS, Darfur

Bangkok

71. Young-Woo Park, Director, Regional Office for Asia and Pacific, UNEP
72. Dechen Tsering, ROAP, UNEP
73. Elik Adler, ROAP, UNEP
74. Hu Shaofeng, ROAP, UNEP
75. Stefanos Fotiou, ROAP, UNEP
76. Saurabh Kumar, ROAP, UNEP
77. Subrato Sinha, ROAP, UNEP
78. Rajiv Garg, ROAP, UNEP
79. Kakuko Nagatani, ROAP, UNEP
80. Christian Marx, ROAP, UNEP

Afghanistan

81. Andrew Scanlon, UNEP
82. Rajiv Garg, Project Officer, Climate Change Network, UNEP
83. Hamidullah Akbary, Climate Change Coordinator, UNEP
84. Saurabh Kumar, Programme Officer, UNEP
85. Ernie Wijangco, CBNRM Expert, UNEP
86. Michael McMahon, USA Embassy
87. UK Mission, DfID
88. Giacomo Misericchi, Rural Development, EU
89. Micha Ramakers, EU
90. Michael Keating, SRSG, UN
91. Mudakkik Wali, NEPA
92. Malikyar, NEPA
93. OCHA

Sierra Leone

94. Oli Brown, Programme Coordinator and Environmental Affairs Officer, UNEP/UNIPSIL
95. Fatmata Sarah Turay, Project Associate, UNEP Sierra Leone
96. Marcus Wangel, Intern, UNEP Sierra Leone
97. Mariatu Swaray, Portfolio Manager Environment and Disaster Risk Reduction, UNDP
98. Mohamed Abchir, Deputy Country Director, UNDP Sierra Leone
99. Haddijatou Jallow, Executive Chairperson, Environmental Protection Agency of Sierra Leone
100. Kolleh A. Bangura, Director, Environmental Protection Agency of Sierra Leone
101. Keith Wright, Principal Technical Advisor, UNDP Sierra Leone
102. Abu-Bakar S. Massaquoi, Communications Manager, STEWARD Programme
103. Sebora A. Kamara, Health and Environment Officer, WHO Sierra Leone
104. Michael von der Schulenburg, Executive Representative of the Secretary General, UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL)
105. Philip Dive, Head of Strategic Planning Unit, UNIPSIL
106. Anita McKenna, Marketing & Outreach Volunteer, Tacugama Chimpanzee Sanctuary

Haiti

107. Ernst Charles, Directeur Départemental, Les Cayes, Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation
108. Elliasaint Magloire, Organisation pour la Rehabilitation de l'Environnement (ORE), Les Cayes
109. Pierre Finigan, ORE, Les Cayes
110. Patrick Conde, ORE, Les Cayes
111. Aysha Kassim, Catholic Relief Service (CRS)
112. Paulina Blanco, The Earth Institute (EI) of Columbia University
113. Peter Veldman, The Earth Institute (EI)
114. Bennett Nemser, The Earth Institute (EI)
115. Antonio Perera, Manager, Cote Sud Initiative (CSI)
116. Jacqueline Fabius, Operations & Communications Coordinator, CSI
117. Jean Elie Thys, Environnemental Lead, CSI
118. Lourdes Aladro, Infrastructure Coordinator, CSI
119. Marie Nellie Jeantillon, Education Lead, CSI
120. Lino Roberto Georges, Health Lead, CSI
121. Marleen Julien, Tourism Lead, CSI
122. Dario Noel, Marine Lead, CSI

123. Andrew Morton, Coordinator, Haiti Regeneration Initiative (HRI)

Jamaica

124. Claire Bernard, Director Sustainable Development & Regional Planning, Planning Institute of Jamaica

125. Le-Anne Roper, Sustainable Development Planning Officer, Planning Institute of Jamaica

126. Anthony McKenzie, Director, Policy Planning & Evaluation, National Environment and Planning Agency

127. Edward Robinson, Project Manager, The Marine Geology Unit, Department of Geography and Geology, The University of the West Indies

128. Shakira Khan, Project Officer

129. Miss Read, Community Development Officer Minister of Sports

130. Chris Corbin, UNEP Project Office, Kingston

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Annex 3. D&C projects on-going on or after 1 January 2006 and before 31 December 2011

No.	Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Status	Planned Budget (US\$1,000)	Programmed Budget (US\$1,000)	Managing Division	Countries	CSA
1	(AE30200708) - Environmental Diplomacy for Peacebuilding.	01/12/2007	31/12/2009	Closed	2,882	5,633	DEPI		PB
2	(21-P1)-Environmental Cooperation for Peacebuilding (Phase II)	01/04/2010	31/12/2011	Ongoing	9,981	9,419	DEPI	Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominican Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea-Conakry, Haiti, Liberia, Peru, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste	PB
3	(CP50230704) - Support to the Environment and Security Initiative in Europe.	01/08/2007	31/07/2008	Inactive	839	2,261	DRC		PB
4	(21-P2) - Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC) - Phase II	30/12/2009	30/12/2013	Ongoing	8,800	373	DRC	Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Montenegro, Republic of Moldova, Serbia, Tajikistan, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan	PB
5	(NF40000601)-Engaging business and the supply-chain in safer production and emergency preparedness: A commitment to Corporate Social Responsibility at the site level	30/09/2006	30/09/2008	Inactive	689	689	DTIE		DRR
6	Disaster Reduction through Awareness, Preparedness and Prevention Mechanisms in Coastal Settlements in Asia: Demonstration in Tourism Destinations	01/10/2006	30/09/2008	Inactive	816	816	DTIE		DRR
7	(CP30200702) - Strengthening the role of environmental management in DRR	01/05/2007	31/10/2007	Inactive	86	194	DEPI		DRR
8	(CP30200741) - Costed Workplan - Division of Environmental Policy (DEPI) - Post-Conflict and Disaster Management Branch (PCDMB): Strengthening the role of Environmental Management in Disaster Risk Reduction.	01/05/2007	31/10/2007	Inactive	237	237	DEPI		DRR
9	(AE30200805) - Capacity Building to Integrate Disaster Risk Reduction into Coastal Zone Management.	01/12/2007	31/12/2009	Inactive	450	1,031	DEPI	India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka	DRR
10	(CI30200802) - Capacity-Building Project in co-operation with the Secretariat of the Basel Convention for Hazardous Waste Management in Cote d'Ivoire and the Monitoring and Control of trans-boundary movements of hazardous Waste.	01/01/2008	31/12/2011	Ongoing	1,717	3,012	DEPI	Cote d'Ivoire	DRR
11	(AE30200803) - Development of an Environmental Quality Monitoring System for Lebanon.	01/03/2008	31/12/2009	Ongoing	1,640	1,020	DRC	Lebanon	DRR
12	(CP40200803) - Promoting Safer Operations and Emergency Preparedness in the Value of the Chemical Sector.	01/10/2008	31/12/2010	Inactive	647	513	DTIE	China	DRR
13	(NF30200808) - Integrating Ecosystem and Climate Change Factors into Disaster Risk Assessments and Associated Planning Processes.	01/11/2008	30/11/2009	Inactive	250	449	DEPI	Jamaica	DRR
14	(21-P4) - Strengthening National Capacities for Effective	01/01/2010	31/07/2013	Ongoing	173	317	DEPI		DRR

	Environmental Emergency Preparedness								
15	(21-P5) - Building Capacity for Industrial Risk Reduction with a focus on Emergency Preparedness in Developing Countries – APELL	01/01/2010	31/12/2011	Ongoing	2,100	350	DTIE	Argentina, Chile, China, India, Peru, Thailand	DRR
16	(21-P3) - Environmental Management for Disaster Risk Reduction	01/01/2010	31/12/2011	Ongoing	3,955	350	DEPI	Haiti, Jamaica, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Sudan	DRR
17	Strengthening International Cooperation on the Environmental Aspects of Emergency Response and Preparedness	01/10/2011	31/05/2013	Ongoing	300	300	DEPI		DRR
18	(RA30200503) - Post Tsunami Environmental Recovery Programme, Phase 1	01/09/2005	30/06/2007	Inactive	2,984	3,036	DEPI	Indonesia, Maldives, Sri Lanka	ER-PD
19	(EE30200601) - Post Tsunami Environmental recovery Programme Phase II	01/01/2006	31/12/2007	Ongoing	250	250	DEPI		ER-PD
20	(CP30200704) - Strengthening Ministry of Environment of Indonesia's Capacity to address environmental dimensions of disaster recovery in connection with the Siduarjo mudflow disaster	01/07/2007	31/12/2007	Inactive	70	62	DEPI	Indonesia	ER-PD
21	(CP30200903) - Haiti programme development and disaster recovery support	01/05/2009	31/12/2009	Inactive	1,600	2,434	DEPI	Haiti	ER-PD
22	Haiti post-disaster environmental emergency and early recovery support I Rev.3	01/01/2010	31/12/2011	Ongoing	1,003	19,223	DEPI	Haiti	ER-PD
23	(23-P8)-Sustainable Building Reconstruction in Disaster-affected Countries	01/04/2010	31/12/2011	Ongoing	783	32	DTIE	Haiti, Pakistan, Sudan	ER-PD
24	(BK30100035) - Clean-up of Environmental Hotspots Following the Kosovo Conflicts and Preparation of Guidelines on Assessment and Remedial Measures for Post-Conflict Environmental Damage	01/07/2000	31/12/2008	Inactive	12,843	11,173	DEPI		ER-PC
25	(AE/302004/2) - Capacity Building for Environmental Management in Afghanistan (I & II)	01/01/2004	31/12/2008	Inactive	4,849	18,536	DEPI	Afghanistan	ER-PC
26	(AE30200471) - Capacity Building for Environmental Management in Afghanistan - Finland	01/05/2004	31/12/2009	Ongoing	16,650	16,650	DEPI	Afghanistan	ER-PC
27	(AE30200403)-Strengthening Environmental Governance in Iraq	01/08/2004	31/12/2006	Inactive	6,734,238	7,029,661	DEPI	Iraq	ER-PC
28	(CP30200502) - Capacity Building and Institutional Development for Environmental Management in Liberia and Sierra Leone	01/05/2005	31/12/2007	Completed	333	367	DEPI	Liberia, Sierra Leone	ER-PC
29	(SE/3020-05-04) – Post-Conflict Interventions and Peace Building	01/12/2005	31/12/2006	Completed	2,628	0	DEPI		ER-PC
30	(AE30200801) - Capacity Building and Institutional Development Programme for Environmental Management in Afghanistan (Phase III).	01/03/2007	31/12/2011	Ongoing	7,230	11,940	DEPI	Afghanistan	ER-PC
31	(SE30200703) - Post-Conflict Interventions and Peace Building, Phase II.	01/06/2007	31/12/2008	Ongoing	4,300	8,422	DEPI		ER-PC
32	(AE30200707) - Darfur Integrated Water Resource Management	01/10/2007	30/09/2009	Inactive	1,014	1,657	DEPI	Sudan	ER-PC
33	(AE30200706) - Darfur Aid and Environment	01/10/2007	30/09/2009	Inactive	1,064	1,767	DEPI	Sudan	ER-PC
34	(AE30200804) - UNEP and Partners in Sudan Joint Programme on Environment and Natural Resource Management: Darfur Timber and Energy Project.	01/03/2008	31/12/2009	Ongoing	1,400	3,128	DEPI	Sudan	ER-PC
35	(AE30200902) - Sudan Integrated Environment Project /	01/04/2009	30/06/2012	Ongoing	23,986	24,514	DEPI	Sudan	ER-PC

	Revision 1								
36	(23-P6) - UNEP Country Programme for the Democratic Republic of Congo	01/01/2010	31/12/2011	Ongoing	2,102	446	DEPI	Democratic Republic of the Congo	ER-PC
37	(23-P9) - Support to the environmental rehabilitation of the occupied Palestinian territories	01/01/2010	31/12/2011	Ongoing	2,606	0	DRC	Occupied Palestinian Territory	ER-PC
38	(22/3-P5)-Capacity-Building and Institutional Development Programme for Environmental Management in Afghanistan (Phase IV)	01/04/2011	30/04/2014	Ongoing	12,000	0	DEPI	Afghanistan	ER-PC
39	(BK/3010-00-08)-Scientific Assessment to determine health or environmental risks due to the use of depleted uranium(DU) during the Kosovo Conflict, 1999/Rev.6	12/12/2000	31/12/2007	Completed	859,463	859,463	DEPI	Bosnia and Herzegovina	PCEA
40	(AE/3010-03-11)-Desk Study on the Environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territories	01/06/2002	31/12/2007	Completed	574,040	823,089	DEPI	Occupied Palestinian Territory	PCEA
41	(AE30100325) -Iraq Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment	01/12/2003	30/06/2008	Inactive	2,226	3,167	DEPI	Iraq	PCEA
42	(CP30200501) - Asia disaster regional environmental assessment	01/01/2005	31/12/2007	Inactive	5,595	6,198	DEPI	Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Maldives, Myanmar, Seychelles, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Yemen	PCEA
43	(AE/3010-06-16) - Post Conflict Environmental Assessment of Lebanon	31/08/2006	31/07/2007	Completed	791	1,911	DEPI	Lebanon	PCEA
44	(AE30200701) - Environmental Survey of Ogoniland, Nigeria	01/03/2007	30/12/2011	Ongoing	5,677	10,446	DEPI	Nigeria	PCEA
45	(CP30200705) - Environmental Assessment module for the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment Framework.	01/10/2007	31/12/2008	Completed	1,166	1,166	DEPI		PCEA
46	(NF30200807) - UN and Partners Post Conflict Environmental Assessment of the Democratic Republic of Congo.	01/11/2008	31/12/2011	Ongoing	1,200	2,350	DEPI	Democratic Republic of the Congo	PCEA
47	(22-P4)-Environment, Humanitarian Action and Early Recovery	01/01/2010	31/12/2011	Ongoing	2,082	169	DEPI		PCEA

Source: UNEP Programme Information and Management System (project list) and PCDMB (updated financial data)