



United Nations Environment Programme

**Evaluation of the
UNEP Sub-programme on
Climate Change**

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FINAL REPORT

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WORKING PAPERS

Component assessments

- Adaptation
- Mitigation
- REDD+

Country case studies

- Albania
- Bangladesh
- China
- Ghana
- Montenegro
- Peru
- Tanzania
- Tunisia

The working papers can be obtained from the UNEP Evaluation Office upon request.

Acronyms

AAKNet	Africa Adaptation Knowledge Network
AAP	Africa Adaptation Programme
ACAD	African Carbon Asset Development Facility
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AF	Adaptation Fund
AFOLU	Agriculture, Forestry and other Land Use
AREED	African Rural Energy Enterprise Development
APAN	Asia-Pacific Adaptation Network
AR4	Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC
BALREP	Balkan Renewable Energy Programme
CASCADE	Carbon Finance, Silviculture, Conservation and Action against Deforestation
CBD	Convention on Biological Diversity
CC	Climate Change
CC DARE	Climate Change and Development – Adapting by Reducing vulnerability
CCSP	Climate Change Sub-programme
CD4CDM	Capacity Development for the CDM
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CECSC	Clean Energy Solutions Center
CF-SEA	Carbon Finance for Sustainable Energy in Africa
CFIF	Climate Finance Investment Facility
CIRAD	Centre de Cooperation Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement
COP	Conference of Parties
CPEIR	Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Review
CRR	Climate Risk Reduction
CTCN	Clean Technology Center and Network
DAF	Development Assistance Framework
DCPI	UNEP Division of Communication and Public Information
DELC	UNEP Division of Environmental Laws and Conventions
DENR	Department of Environment and Natural Resources
DEPI	UNEP Division of Environmental Policy Implementation
DEWA	UNEP Division of Early Warning and Assessments
DRC	UNEP Division of Regional Cooperation
DTIE	UNEP Division of Technology, Industry and Economics
EA	Expected Accomplishment
EbA	Ecosystem-Based Adaptation
EC	European Commission
ECA	Energy Conservation Agency
ECCO	Environment and Climate Change Outlooks
EE	Energy Efficiency
EF	Environment Fund
EIRET	Enhancing Information for Renewable Energy and Technology
EU	European Union
FACET	Finance for Access to Clean Energy Technologies
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
FCPF	Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
FE	Formative Evaluation
FIP	Forest Investment Program
GAN	Global Adaptation Network
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GCF	Green Climate Fund

GEF	Global Environment Facility
GFEI	Global Fuel Economy Initiative
GHG(s)	Greenhouse Gas(es)
GNESD	Global Network on Energy for Sustainable Development
GSR	Global Renewables Status Report
GSWH	Global Solar Water Heating Market Transformation and Strengthening Initiative
HLCP	High Level Committee on Programmes
IEA	International Energy Agency
IEA	Integrated Environmental Assessment
IEMP	International Ecosystem Management Partnership
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
JP CCA	Joint Programme on Climate Change Adaptation
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
LDCF	Least Developed Countries Fund (of the GEF)
LULUCEF	Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry
MDG-F	Spanish Millennium Development Goal Achievement Fund
MEA	Multilateral Environmental Agreement
MEDREP	Mediterranean Renewable Energy Programme
MGSB	Major Groups and Stakeholder Branch
MIF	Mediterranean Investment Facility
MOST	Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology
MPTF	Multi-Partner Trust Fund
MRV	Measurement, Reporting and Verification
MTE	Mid-Term Evaluation
MTS	Medium-Term Strategy
NAMA(s)	Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action(s)
NAP	National Adaptation Plan
NAPA	National Adaptation Program of Action
NEDA	National Economic and Development Authority
NESTLAC	Network for Environmentally Sustainable Transport in Latin America and the Caribbean
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OfO	Office for Operations
ONF	Office National des Forêts
PCFV	Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles
PEI	Poverty-Environment Initiative
PES	Payment for Ecosystem Services
PIMS	Programme Information and Management System
PM	Project Manager
POW	Programme of Work
PPCR	Pilot Program for Climate Resilience
PPR	Programme Performance Report
PRC	Project Review Committee
PROSOL	Programme Solaire
PROVIA	Programme of Research on Climate Change Vulnerability, Impacts and Adaptation
PSC	Project Support Costs
QAS	UNEP Quality Assurance Section
RBM	Results Based Management
RC	Resident Coordinator
RE	Renewable Energy
REDD+	Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
REGATTA	Regional Gateway for Technology Transfer and Climate Change Action
RO	Regional Office

ROA	Regional Office for Africa
ROAP	Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific
ROE	Regional Office for Europe
ROLAC	Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean
ROWA	Regional Office for West Asia
SCAF	Seed Capital Assistance Facility
SCCF	Special Climate Change Fund (of the GEF)
SEFI	Sustainable Energy Finance Initiative
SEPC	Social and Environmental Principles and Criteria
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Time bound
SP	Sub-programme
SPE	Sub-programme Evaluation
SWERA	Solar and Wind Energy Assessment
SWH	Solar Water Heating
TACC	Territorial Approach to Climate Change
TNA	Technology Needs Assessment
TOC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNCCD	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNSG	United Nations Secretary General
VIA	Vulnerability and Impact Assessment
WARN-CC	West Asia Regional Network on Climate Change
WB	World Bank
WCMC	World Conservation Monitoring Centre
WMO	World Meteorological Organisation
XB	Extra-budgetary

Summary of key findings and recommendations

INTRODUCTION

- i. Climate Change is considered by many to be the major, current environmental and human development challenge facing the globe. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC – adopted in 1992) provides a basis for concerted international action to mitigate climate change. Despite many efforts, GHG emissions are still on the rise and pledges of future action within the UNFCCC process currently fall short of what science suggests is necessary to keep the increase in temperature below 2°C. The potential disruption, displacement and adaptation to phenomena such as sea-level rise or extreme weather events, represents a profound challenge to sustainable development and can reverse hard-won development gains.
- ii. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) helped establish the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) with the World Meteorological Organization in the 1980s and conducted assessments of the scientific understanding of climate change in preparation for the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development leading to the UNFCCC. UNEP also supports the negotiations of the UNFCCC. Even though UNEP has been working on climate-related issues for more than twenty years, UNEP has a formal Climate Change Sub-programme (CCSP) only since the Medium-Term Strategy (MTS) for 2010-2013. UNEP's activities relevant to climate change were previously embedded in the Sub-programmes organized along the divisional structure of UNEP.
- iii. According to the MTS 2010/13 UNEP's CCSP objective is *"to strengthen the ability of countries to integrate climate change responses into national development processes"*. UNEP is expected to support countries and institutions to meet the challenges of climate change by promoting ecosystem-based approaches to adaptation, up-scaling the use of and facilitating access to financing for clean and renewable energy and technologies, and capitalizing on the opportunities of reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. UNEP is also working to improve awareness and understanding of climate change science for policy decision-making. As such, the UNEP CCSP is organized around four Programme Frameworks (PFs) or components – Adaptation, Mitigation, REDD+, and Science and Outreach – with corresponding Expected Accomplishments (EAs) and Programme of Work (POW) Outputs.
- iv. In 2009, following shortly after the development of the MTS 2010/13 and POW 2010/11 for the climate change strategy (2008), the UNEP CCSP underwent an internal review process which identified (i) ecosystems-based adaptation (EbA), (ii) reduced emissions from deforestation and land degradation (REDD+), and (iii) clean technology readiness as the three "flagships". These are areas to focus efforts and resources, with the aim to improve marketing of UNEP to external audiences, cultivate partnerships, and the branding of UNEP as an innovator.
- v. Under the MTS 2010-2013, and to date, the Lead Division for the CCSP is the Division for Technology, Industry and Economics (DTIE). DTIE, through its Energy Branch, is accountable for delivering all POW Outputs under the Mitigation component, EAs (b) and (c). The Division of Environmental Policy Implementation (DEPI), through its Climate Change Adaptation and Terrestrial Ecosystems Branch, manages the majority of projects under the Adaptation and REDD+ components corresponding to EAs (a) and (d). The Division for Early Warning and Assessments (DEWA) is accountable for the delivery of certain outputs mainly related to assessments and assessment capacity building under the Science and Outreach component, EA (e) and also under the Adaptation and REDD+ component. UNEP Regional Offices (formerly under the Division of Regional Cooperation - DRC) manage a number of sub- regional and country-level adaptation and mitigation projects; the Division of Environmental Law and Conventions (DELIC) provides support to climate change negotiators and a climate-neutral UN; and the Division of Communications and Public Information (DCPI) is accountable for delivering a series of outputs related to awareness-raising, outreach and education.

THE EVALUATION

- vi. This Evaluation of the UNEP Sub-programme on Climate Change was conducted by the UNEP Evaluation Office in line with the UNEP Evaluation Policy, the Evaluation Office Work Plan for 2012/13 and in consultation with the relevant UNEP Divisions. The Sub-programme Evaluation aimed at assessing the relevance and overall performance of UNEP work related to climate change in the last three biennia (from 2008 onwards) according to standard evaluation criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact).
- vii. The evaluation was conducted at four levels of analysis – UNEP corporate level, Sub-programme Level, Programme Framework level, and country level (in selected countries). This helped the evaluation team identify patterns in the different scales of activities and objectives interlinked through the UNEP CCSP results framework. Strategic objectives and policies at an institutional level (UNEP) affect and interact with the strategic objectives and actions taken at the sub-programme level, as well as affect how projects are designed and managed across the respective programme frameworks at local levels in-country. Across these levels, the evaluation sought to answer the following **key questions**:
- **Strategic Relevance:** Are the Sub-programme objectives and strategy relevant to the global challenges posed by climate change, global, regional and country needs, the international response and UNEP’s evolving mandate and capacity in this area? How are the respective strategies of the programme frameworks designed to ensure relevance in their respective thematic areas and how do their efforts address crosscutting areas (DRR, land-use, etc)?
 - **Performance:** Has UNEP achieved its objectives in the area of climate change? Have projects been efficiently implemented and produced tangible outputs as expected? Are the main drivers present and are the key assumptions made valid for the outputs delivered by the Sub-programme to lead to sustainable, higher-level results? What are the respective achievements and constraints of the programme frameworks, and their overlapping and/or combined effects?
 - **Factors Affecting Performance:** What are the key factors affecting sub-programme performance, namely: How well are the overall sub-programme and its project portfolio designed and structured? Are organizational arrangements adequate, and what is the quality of management within the operational units? Have human and financial resources been optimally deployed to achieve sub-programme objectives? What role do partnerships play in achieving sub-programme objectives and are these optimally developed? How well are sub-programme activities and achievements monitored and evaluated?
- viii. In order to obtain a coherent picture of how the UNEP CCSP intends to achieve its objectives, the evaluation reconstructed a Theory of Change (TOC) of the Sub-programme. This is a logical model derived directly from the Programmes of Work and strategy/design documents that shows the causal relationship between UNEP outputs, intended outcomes and expected impacts of the sub-programme. The TOC also highlights drivers and assumptions, which are important external factors affecting change at different levels of the causal pathways. Forming a TOC of the CCSP helped the evaluation team to understand the intervention strategy, derive meaningful evaluation questions, and provide a logical basis for assessing strategic relevance and progress made in achieving outcomes and impacts.
- ix. The evaluation had several limitations, including a lack of written monitoring and evaluation information in particular regarding effectiveness, sustainability, replication and efficiency of interventions; a limited number of country visits; long delays incurred during data collection and the review of interim evaluation products; and inadequate evaluation of the science and outreach component which was considered through the other components as a cross-cutting theme.

MAIN EVALUATION FINDINGS

Strategic Relevance

- x. The CCSP is consistent with UNEP’s mandate and does address UNEP corporate objectives, including the CCSP objective expressed in the Medium-Term Strategy 2010/13, which is to “strengthen the ability of countries to integrate climate change responses into national development processes.” UNEP’s climate change work is strongly supported by UNEP mandates and decisions by the Governing Council/Global Ministerial Environment Forum. It is considered highly relevant to the recommendations of the IPCC and UNFCCC objectives, and key areas of cooperation have been agreed

with the UNFCCC Secretariat in a joint work programme including strategic communications and support to international negotiations.

- xi. UNEP has several comparative advantages that make it fit to engage on CC issues, especially at the global level, such as a broad environmental perspective and expertise in linking climate change to other environment and development issues in an integrated manner; a global environmental mandate; and scientific expertise supported by a wide network of scientific institutions and collaborating centres.
- xii. Although its primary role and mandate is at a global level, the UNEP climate change objectives are largely centred at the country level, aimed toward assisting (developing) countries to integrate climate change into national development planning processes. Combining the promotion of cooperation at global and regional levels with the provision of policy, institutional and technology support at the country level, the CCSP seeks to be relevant to both global and country-level needs. The CCSP strategy largely focuses on achievements at the country level, but is also derived from relevance to global agreements and the need to devise, test and standardize tools and methodologies for specific environmental challenges with global applicability. Units of intervention vary widely across components. In the case of science and outreach the focus is more on global efforts in the context of the MEAs/climate negotiations. This is also the case for the REDD+ component. For adaptation, the unit of intervention is the particular ecosystem which is often not contained within national boundaries. The mitigation component, having the closest direct link to the UNFCCC high-level objectives, is perhaps the most evenly balanced between global and country level objectives.
- xiii. During the biennium 2008/09, UNEP's climate change initiatives were dispersed across different divisions/sub-programmes. From 2010 onwards the biennial UNEP Programmes of Work (POWs) were arranged along thematic sub-programmes, including one for Climate Change, that cut across divisions. Sub-programme objectives were based on, *inter alia*, a prioritization of global, regional and national needs identified through various processes while taking into account UNEP's comparative advantage and menu of services. The creation of a specific sub-programme on Climate Change helped define more specific objectives for UNEP's work, tightened the EAs around clear cut components and enabled a clearer causal mapping of results from outputs through to higher levels of accomplishment. The five EAs under the climate change sub-programme paint a much more focused, strategic picture of UNEP's objectives than at the start of the period considered by the evaluation.
- xiv. Generally, the "how" of UNEP's objectives is defined at the project level; i.e. the project is the modality for how activities and outputs will contribute to high-level objectives. Projects are delivered through a variety of products and services, in the form of technical assistance, policy advice, workshops/trainings, papers/reports, assessments, scientific research, etc. UNEP's work is largely normative and focuses on supporting the uptake of scientific information and best practices in policies, strategies and their implementation. Interventions of a more operational nature are usually limited to developing, testing and demonstrating tools and approaches in a restricted geographical area, that are expected to be scaled up at the national level through much larger, national programmes often supported by other development agencies.
- xv. Many of UNEP's deliverables are pitched at the global level but are well known at the country level. Some of UNEP's more widely read publications are the Emissions Gap Reports, the Black Carbon Report, and also flagship publications covering CC as part of a wider range of topics (GEO Report, the Green Economy Report). Also particularly strong are some of its regional and/or global platforms for technology transfer, and adaptation policy and research. In competition with the GEF, UNEP (DTIE) was recently awarded by the UNFCCC with the position of hosting – in collaboration with UNIDO - the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), which was considered an important affirmation of UNEP's approach and foundation of work in clean technology.
- xvi. UNEP's effective collaborative partnerships utilize the relative contributions of UN-Agencies and also engage dedicated and/or strategic government counterparts in country. For example, the Poverty-Environment Initiative (PEI) collaborates across various government actors, including powerful Finance Ministries, and the UN-REDD Programme engages UNDP, UNEP and FAO. However, the evaluation found that, in comparison to some other UN Agencies, UNEP struggles to fully embrace operating under One UN at the country level. The track record of relevance to United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) is inconsistent and is highly dependent on the individuals in regional offices and relationship with relevant government and UN counterparts (see recommendation 9).

- xvii. The CCSP is dominated by global and national level initiatives, with regional engagement and the role of the Regional Offices (ROs) somewhat unclear in between these two scales of effort. The addition of regional outputs is a good start, but the regional delivery mechanisms are muted in the CCSP, and the artificial breakdown of the sub-regions (Africa, West Asia, etc.) does not serve the purpose of aligning UNEP’s strategy with some key ongoing collaborative efforts and initiatives based on trade and/or economics. For instance, in expanding use of better technologies one has to consider the underlying markets and trade patterns, which often are an ill match for the political boundaries of the UNEP Regions. While regional presence has increased over the period considered by the evaluation (2008 to 2013), Regional Offices and regional collaborative efforts are chronically under-resourced, and a lack of country presence exacerbates communication and increases transaction costs, leading to frequent administrative delays.
- xviii. The scope and scale of UNEP interventions appear to primarily flow from the UNFCCC and its funding mechanisms, and support from other major donors, as well as existing partnerships or relationships in countries and regions. UNEP’s criteria for identifying and designing interventions are therefore shaped primarily by UNFCCC priorities and/or the partner countries’ policies and objectives, and are not necessarily directed at areas of greatest climatic stresses. There does not appear to be a clear approach on engagement with particular countries, nor a coherent strategy for identifying potential new partner countries, nor a great attention for possible synergies at the regional level. Countries are targeted by donors and aid agencies under their respective strategies and programmes of work (ADB, World Bank, EU, bilaterals, etc), and, therefore, even though requests come from the countries or regional offices, funding is only made available through a process of coordination between countries, UNEP and the respective donors. UNEP also seems cautious to work in countries or regions where it does not have a high potential to showcase positive results and/or have high visibility. This is mostly true for interventions meant to test and demonstrate approaches as part of larger regional or global programmes. There is a risk there of conditions being less representative which may render the pilots less easy to replicate in less favourable conditions.

Recommendation 1: UNEP should establish component-specific criteria for geographic targeting of interventions so that engagement is not only a factor of available funding, existing relationships, country demand and likelihood of (local) success at the time of planning, but also a matter of relative value-added, scalability, and likelihood of replication. Selection of which projects to undertake in what locations should be balanced between donors' priorities and a set of robust criteria defined by UNEP according to its strategic priorities and its comparative advantages, providing UNEP with a stronger basis on which to negotiate with donors regarding country selection.

Effectiveness

- xix. Over the period 2010-2013, based on reporting in the UNEP Programme Performance Reports (PPRs) and UNEP’s Programme Information and Management System (PIMS), achievement of EA indicator targets exceeded expectations across most of the sub-programme. The proportion of POW outputs for which targets were achieved or exceeded slightly declined between the 2010/11 and 2012/13 biennia, mainly due to incomplete reporting on POW output indicators. Delivery of outputs across components presented a somewhat mixed picture. Over the two biennia, the output delivery ratio remained consistently high for EA(e) - Science and Outreach, made a marked improvement for EA(b) - Clean Energy - and lost some ground on EA(d) - REDD+. Delivery on output targets decreased the most on EA(c) - Energy Finance - where two out of three targets were not achieved. Overall, survey responses and interviews with UNEP staff and field visit partners viewed UNEP as becoming more effective by being more focused and strategic under the CCSP over the course of the period considered by the evaluation.

Achievement of direct outcomes

Improved access of partner countries to appropriate adaptation, mitigation and REDD+ information, approaches, measures and technologies

- xx. **Adaptation.** During the period considered by the evaluation, UNEP implemented three large umbrella projects that offered a “comprehensive package” approach ranging from vulnerability assessments, through adaptation capacity building and demonstration projects, to supporting governments in adaptation policy setting, planning, and implementation. UNEP’s Vulnerability and Impacts Assessments (VIAs), training and adaptation knowledge products have been in high demand over the period considered by the evaluation, and were well received by partner countries.

- xxi. UNEP has promoted South-South cooperation for knowledge exchange and information sharing on adaptation. Platforms such as the Regional Gateway for Technology Transfer and Climate Change Action (REGATTA) in Latin America act as hubs for linking southern centres of excellence working on adaptation-related activities. Because of the complex and relatively new technical concepts and challenges that adaptation presents, hands-on support activities (thematic workshops, specific trainings, active knowledge exchange events) that connect actors with information are essential complements to more passive approaches to making knowledge available such as publications and websites.
- xxii. Piloting is a key strategy to in-country capacity development to implement EbA actions. UNEP relies heavily on in-country partners to pilot EbA practices on the ground, and then seeks to up-scale the EbA pilots through UN agencies (FAO and UNDP) and other partnerships.
- xxiii. **Mitigation.** UNEP's technical global studies, such as the Emissions Gap Reports, as well as national Technology Needs Assessments, are in high demand and have been very well received and respected by the international community and partner countries. These important analyses continue to inform climate change negotiations and new climate initiatives with mitigation components. Launched in 2009, the Technology Needs Assessment (TNA) project was entrusted to UNEP which provided, in collaboration with the Risoe Centre, support to 36 countries to prioritize mitigation sectors and technologies. To date, 32 countries have completed their TNA reports with UNEP's assistance and 30 have also produced national Technology Action Plans (TAPs).
- xxiv. UNEP appears to have been very successful in establishing knowledge networks on energy and climate change mitigation in several parts of the world. They are seen as good opportunities to information exchange, comparative analyses and mutual learning by both country representatives met during the field visits and by UNEP staff posted in the regional offices.
- xxv. Regarding technologies, efforts made by UNEP in terms of capacity building, awareness raising, production of proven scientific material and publications, have enabled countries to have access to and use cleaner, more efficient and renewable energy technologies. Piloting at the country level has been an important intervention strategy. At the UNFCCC COP 18 in Doha held at the end of 2012, UNEP was chosen to host and manage the Climate Technology Centre and Networks, created by the UN Climate Change Conference in Cancun, in collaboration with UNIDO and 11 leading technical organizations from both developing and developed countries.
- xxvi. **REDD+.** UNEP's role in the UN-REDD Programme is to provide normative guidance in areas related to sector transformation (green economic development), safeguards, and the realisation of multiple benefits (MB) from avoided deforestation. By the end of 2013, the UN-REDD Programme has grown to include 51 registered partner countries – covering almost 60 percent of the world's tropical forest, including 18 countries receiving support to National Programmes, and 29 that have received targeted support.
- xxvii. UNEP has met and exceeded targets for assessing land-use change, biodiversity, forest loss, carbon stocks and multiple benefits over the period considered by the evaluation.
- xxviii. UNEP has contributed to establishing a useable knowledge base on the multiple benefits of REDD+. Knowledge on a wide array of elements of REDD+, from multiple ecosystem benefits to REDD+ as a potential for a green economy transition, has been generated and disseminated and lessons on multiple benefits and ecosystem services have been shared in a variety of fora. The proliferation of knowledge on REDD+ is apparent when compared to what little material was available at the start of 2010. UNEP has greatly added to this knowledge through its work on multiple ecosystem benefits, guidelines for safeguards (the Social and Environmental Principles and Criteria), and a policy brief outlining the potential opportunity for REDD+ to be a catalyst for a green economy transition entitled "REDD+ and the Green Economy: Opportunities for a mutually supportive relationship". However, many partner country interviewees were not aware which knowledge products and tools were developed specifically with the support of UNEP.

Improved enabling policies and regulatory frameworks for adaptation, mitigation and REDD+ in partner countries

- xxix. **Adaptation.** UNEP has successfully supported numerous vulnerability assessments and technical studies across key sectors in partner countries that helped shape adaptation strategies and policies. For example, research completed through CC-DARE contributed toward creating opportunities for integrating climate change adaptation into national development planning and decision-making in 11 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Small Island Developing States.

- xxx. The UNEP-UNDP Poverty and Environment Initiative supported Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Reviews (CPEIR) in Tanzania, Bangladesh and Nepal were also particularly well-received by partner countries and have been heavily utilized for talking points for political actors and decision-makers.
- xxxi. In consultation with key ministry officials and relevant agencies, UNEP has been successful in supporting countries in their adaptation planning processes. Where requested, UNEP provided assistance to the development of National Adaptation Plans of Action (NAPAs), but has also moved beyond broad plans into new specific arenas to inform governments and policies under the EbA approach, such as toward coastal ecosystems, urban settings and the agricultural sector. Through participation on Joint Programmes with UNDP and FAO at the country level, UNEP has also been relatively successful in encouraging and influencing CC adaptation policies and strategies as was the case in the Philippines and Peru.
- xxxii. **Mitigation.** Most UNEP mitigation projects in the evaluation portfolio include a direct or indirect policy dimension but since UNEP's projects typically target groups of countries, results under similar types of efforts are often heterogeneous, depending on country specificities, and not all have generated policy-related changes. But UNEP's interventions have been successful in influencing some countries in making sound mitigation policy choices such as on the adoption of improved policies and practices in terms of using solar-based technologies.
- xxxiii. UNEP has been successful as well in establishing public-private partnerships to phase out inefficient energy technologies such as incandescent light bulbs through the GEF-funded en.lighten initiative and inefficient/highly polluting motor vehicles through the Global Fuel Economy Initiative (GFEI), and the Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles (PCFV).
- xxxiv. **REDD+.** Although not without its challenges under the period considered by the evaluation, UNEP is making progress toward demonstrating the long-term feasibility of a REDD+ mechanism at the national and global levels by supporting scientifically informed policies, and strong governance on land-use and forestry. Through the Global and National programmes, UNEP's assistance on assessments for mapping land-use change, biodiversity and forest stock; carbon benefits tools; and legal and regulatory improvements are all key inputs to devising and implementing effective sustainable forest management plans.
- xxxv. As of December 2013, four countries (out of a target of six) had completed national strategies for terrestrial carbon emission mitigation that account for the multiple ecosystem benefits and development goals. UNEP also worked with three countries to develop and implement safeguards, covering conservation of natural forests and biological diversity, transparent and effective national forest governance structures, as well as protecting knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and local communities. UNEP's visibility on REDD+ policy input is somewhat limited, however, as UNDP's role as the lead agency on governance systems surrounding REDD+ tends to dominate.

Increased partner country capacity and potential to leverage and secure climate financing

- xxxvi. **Adaptation.** Partner country interviewees expressed increased confidence and capability within national governments (especially Ministry of Environment) to secure financing for adaptation over the period considered by the evaluation.
- xxxvii. UNEP was accredited as a Multilateral Implementing Entity (MIE) of the Adaptation Fund (AF) in June 2010. In this role, UNEP supported numerous countries towards accreditation of their National Implementing Entities (NIEs) for direct access to the AF and also several countries to submit project proposals for AF funding. UNEP has also supported over a dozen countries to develop adaptation projects under GEF's Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and to bolster their capacity to access financing from the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), Adaptation Fund, MDG Fund and other funding sources. With financing secured, implementation of NAPA priorities has started, addressing the resilience of ecosystems (water, forests, and land).
- xxxviii. The UNEP-UNDP Poverty and Environment Initiative was also particularly useful in prioritizing long-term climate financing in six countries. UNEP and other partners facilitated direct engagement between government representatives, civil society, and climate change and finance experts to form comprehensive, national climate fiscal frameworks.
- xxxix. Under the Microfinance for EbA Project partnerships were developed with six MFIs in two LAC countries and investment decision-making processes were created for financing EbA actions by small-scale farmers. Privately financed investments have begun to flow.

- xi. **Mitigation.** UNEP has continued to develop and test different options to increase available climate financing under five broad areas: public financing, innovative financing, end-user finance, carbon finance, and finance networks. Initiatives are numerous and varied, including the innovative Seed Capital Assistance Facility (SCAF) which provides seed capital and technical assistance to clean energy fund managers to invest in clean energy projects; the Mediterranean Investment Facility (MIF) which supports end-user finance for solar water heating and energy efficiency in the Mediterranean and the Balkan regions; the End-User Finance for Access to Clean Energy Technologies (FACET) in South and South-East Asia, which partners with local banks to finance small-scale clean energy technology investments; and the Climate Finance Investment Facility (CFIF) which supports finance-industry engagement in new climate sectors, such as renewable energy, energy efficiency, and sustainable forestry.
- xli. By the end of 2013 about US\$ 432 million of national investment had been recorded by UNEP, by far exceeding the cumulative target of US\$ 300 million for the MTS period. This should be seen in a broader context where the overall market demand for carbon offsets and related investments in climate change mitigation programmes and projects has been declining steadily since 2013, with investments under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) grinding to a halt since the UNFCCC COP in Warsaw (November 2013).
- xlii. The UNEP Finance Initiative's Climate Change Working Group involves leading financial organizations who benefit from several activities aimed at adopting best practices and up-scaling mobilisation of private sector financing for low-carbon energy technologies, REDD+ and other climate change investments in developing countries.
- xliii. **REDD+.** Under the POW 2010/11, the target of US\$ 25 million for the "Total amount of funding for land-use, land-use change and forestry projects, with emphasis on carbon sequestration as a result of UNEP interventions" was significantly exceeded with around USD \$150 million mobilized in partnership with FAO and UNDP within the UN-REDD Programme. By the end of 2013, the UN-REDD Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) had received over US\$ 215 million.
- xliv. UNEP helped demonstrate the full value and transformative potential of forests in part through the policy brief on REDD+ and the Green Economy exploring REDD+ as a source of investment for green development and as a natural capital-led investment strategy. UNEP also demonstrated the potential of management of agricultural landscapes for terrestrial carbon sequestration.
- xlv. Engagement of the private sector with partner country governments has been encouraged though approval by the UN-REDD Programme's 7th Policy Board meeting to investments in 'REDD+ as a catalyst of a Green Economy', as well as seeking influence on the Forest Investment Programme's investments.
- xlvi. UNEP has helped form the basis for regulating incentives, establishing rights and climate financing options at the national level. However, the drivers of standardizing the use of safeguards and engagement with the private sector each require strong regional and in-country partnerships outside of direct government/ministerial entry points. Therefore, at least as REDD+ work expands and more countries express a desire to work with UNEP on these topics, unless UNEP manages to meet this demand by further bolstering its regional presence and/or expanding the depth or reach of its strategic partnerships, it will not necessarily be apparent whether UNEP has contributed to strengthening institutional ability to leverage investments and resources for REDD+.

Likelihood of impact

- xlvii. To assess the likelihood of impact, the evaluation used the reconstructed Theory of Change of the CCSP to assess, to the extent possible, the likelihood that UNEP's efforts contributed to positive changes at the medium-term outcome and intermediate state levels, and also verified the presence of drivers and validity of assumptions along the causal pathways in the reconstructed TOC required for higher-level results to be achieved, sustained and up-scaled.
- xlviii. The medium-term outcomes to which UNEP's CCSP is expected to contribute are that: countries increasingly use appropriate climate change adaptation approaches; countries move towards sustainable forest management and conservation; and countries increasingly use cleaner and more efficient technologies and renewable energy sources. The first and second medium-term outcome are expected to contribute to improved resilience of vulnerable ecosystems and sustained ecosystem services under climate change, while the second and third are expected to contribute to reduced global GHG emissions.
- xlix. There are signs in many countries that positive changes are happening on all three medium-term outcomes, but evidence that UNEP has contributed to these changes at any large scale beyond pilot initiatives is practically non-

existent. Progress on direct outcomes is quite encouraging as presented above, but it is in many cases too early, there are too many other (f)actors involved, and/or there is insufficient evidence available (from monitoring and evaluation) to prove contribution of UNEP's climate change efforts to any changes beyond direct outcomes at this point in time. Notwithstanding, during the desk review and country visits the evaluation collected some anecdotal evidence which helps to illustrate UNEP contributions towards impact.

- I. **Adaptation.** The EbA flagship has increased UNEP's visibility on adaptation. The case for EbA is convincing as the approach has potential to deliver multiple co-benefits and help avoid mal-adaptation. The EbA approach is considered a "triple win" solution, since it can provide cost-effective risk reduction, support biodiversity conservation, and enable improvements in economic livelihoods and human well-being, particularly for the poor and vulnerable. Through the EbA approach, communities vulnerable to climate change have increased their resilience due to effective use of ecosystem services for adaptation and targeted measures.
- ii. **Mitigation.** UNEP has planted valuable seeds in all three areas of technology transfer, policy improvement and financing, with the most visible results in energy finance, and the CDM in particular, even though financing for the mechanism has been declining since mid-2012. Mature technologies such as solar water heating systems and energy saving light bulbs are increasingly adopted by countries. In most cases, it is the combination of progress in two or more of these areas that allowed countries to initiate a transition towards cleaner, more efficient and/or renewable energy use.
- lii. **REDD+.** While it is generally accepted that the UN-REDD Programme helps to create favourable conditions for the adoption of more sustainable forest management practices and for addressing the drivers of forest loss, it remains too early to tell what effects the Programme will have in terms of improving sustainable forest management, reducing deforestation or increasing socio-economic benefits. The purpose of this first phase is to build REDD+ "readiness", not implementation. While the drivers of deforestation are generally identified early on during the readiness phase, efforts to tackle some of these issues tend to begin relatively late in the process, if at all, usually through pilot initiatives and theoretical contributions. UNEP has greatly contributed to conceptual work on multiple benefits, safeguards and green economy transformation, but evidence suggests that the wealth of existing scholarship and experiences on such matters as sustainable forest governance and management, conservation, land tenure, poverty alleviation, rural development, sustainable agriculture, structural reforms, and even corporate risk management have yet to percolate through the Programme's overall approach.

Sustainability, replication and upscaling

- liii. Sustainability plans are not systematically incorporated into UNEP CCSP projects, and project-planning documents typically fail to outline hand-over strategies, or address risks and mitigation measures for factors affecting sustainability. Already on-going and pre-existing projects and programs strongly shape current interventions but in many cases the sustainability lessons drawn from these interventions are not explicitly stated and brought forward into current activities. Such design flaws can reduce the chances of attaining continuing benefits, replication and up scaling.
- liv. Even though projects often set up demonstrations of approaches or measures in only a few countries that are expected to be replicated somehow in a larger number of countries, replication or upscaling strategies, let alone resources for upscaling, are hardly ever foreseen at project design. However, some projects have specific outputs intended to promote dissemination of best practices and lessons learned e.g. through climate change knowledge networks supported by UNEP. Capacity building of national and regional stakeholders is also a relatively common means for enabling replication. Despite these design shortcomings, there are several examples of projects where replication and upscaling are happening.
- lv. UNEP's role in supporting countries with communication is not prominent in the results framework even though it is a key aspect to the relationship with UNFCCC. Both science and awareness/communication/dissemination are major elements in all CCSP PF documents, but strategic communications - a CCSP component and output, also part of the UNFCCC joint work programme - and awareness raising - an area of 'distinctiveness' - are not well defined and supported in CCSP implementation. Interviewees both across UNEP staff and in-country stakeholders have voiced concern over the lack of resources devoted to communication, dissemination, translation of reports, memos and publications into local languages to help ensure the materials reach intended audiences.

Recommendation 2: Project designers, the Sub-programme Coordinator and the Project Review Committee should ensure that all projects have a clear sustainability strategy and plan, acknowledging the external factors and conditions that might affect sustainability and how the project intends to take these factors into account and mitigate sustainability risks. In order to further leverage the sub-programme’s work, UNEP should seek to fully resource hand-over and follow-up actions and strengthen strategic partnerships to support uptake of UNEP assessments and guidance, promote active South-South cooperation, and enable replication of best practices. Furthermore, project designers, the Sub-programme Coordinator and the Project Review Committee should ensure that communication and dissemination plans and budget, including translation into local languages as appropriate, are built into the project design to the extent possible, and pilot/demonstration projects should incorporate replication and upscaling strategies based on partnerships and strong communication elements.

Drivers and assumptions affecting impact, sustainability, replication and up-scaling

- lvi. There is very little reporting on the presence of drivers and assumptions supporting the achievement of higher-level changes in and beyond partner countries, and affecting the sustainability of achievements. In addition, projects miss opportunities to reorient and better focus on achieving intended changes by not regularly incorporating assumptions and drivers into planning and implementation. Although assumptions are commonly listed in project document logframes as risks, corresponding mitigation strategies are not systematically proposed and/or utilized, and those employed are not recorded for purposes of learning, RBM or accountability. There is typically no risk management process or system in place for UNEP projects. Even though they are often factors the project implicitly seeks to influence, drivers are rarely explicitly stated. The next paragraphs discuss the main drivers and assumptions affecting achievement of higher level results, sustainability, replication and up-scaling of UNEP’s efforts.
- lvii. **Effectiveness of international climate change processes, in particular UNFCCC.** UNEP contributes to the UNFCCC through high quality assessments such as the Emissions Gap Reports, preparation of negotiators to achieve a common (sub-)regional stand, and support to specific UNFCCC work streams, especially the work of the Expert Group on Technology Transfer, efforts on financing climate investments and REDD+. UNEP’s work has been increasingly utilized by the UNFCCC COPs to inform discussions, and UNEP has been increasingly requested by the UNFCCC and by countries to take up work on climate change, with REDD+ and the TNAs, and most recently as host to the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) which started operating in 2013. Several other major international governmental processes made use of UNEP’s climate related findings – the Integrated Assessment of Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone in particular - to reshape their approach to the subject matter.
- lviii. **Partners and networks leverage approaches, measures and technologies promoted by UNEP.** UNEP largely works with and through partners in order to support national capacity building for climate change. The collective influence of UNEP and partners and the multiplier effects become apparent at the higher results levels. Partners value UNEP for its in-house expertise as well as its access to targeted technical assistance through regional and global knowledge networks. UNEP is seen as playing a unique role in capturing, refining, summarizing and communicating lessons learned, tested methodologies, best practices and approaches to countries.
- lix. Under the One UN approach, UNEP works to coordinate with other UN agencies in countries where it operates, and UNEP assessments and technical input are used to bring climate change and environmental sustainability into UNDAFs, for example. In addition, UNEP has relatively strong partnerships with other UN agencies for the purposes of particular interventions. UNEP tries to encourage UN Agencies to systematically utilize UNEP tools and approaches, such as applying an EbA approach in the adaptation and REDD+ work of other UN agencies. Attempts are being made to mainstream EbA approaches in the work of other UN agencies and already UNDP and FAO are applying the EbA approach.
- lx. While UNEP does not commonly have strong partnerships within the private sector at the project level, areas such as climate technology and climate finance are growing exceptions. Many mitigation projects involve the private sector directly or through industry associations and private sector engagement was key for the positive results achieved in energy finance related projects.
- lxi. Regional and global networks are used to help replicate and upscale UNEP’s work through knowledge-sharing and capacity building activities. Project websites and online platforms are also a recurring tool used in all projects implemented by UNEP for sharing knowledge, presenting databases, technical guidelines, country case studies, etc. but

tracking use by partner and other countries of UNEP-supported platforms or tools is seldom done, so it is difficult to say how effective these really are in disseminating adaptation, mitigation and REDD+ information, approaches and technologies beyond project stakeholders. The catalytic and upscaling effects of these partnerships, networks and online tools are often unknown and/or unrecorded, with the only evidence found at the output level. Leveraging of UNEP products and services could benefit from better tracking of uptake and leveraging of UNEP products across networks and by other development partners. In addition, the nature and level of engagement required with stakeholders is dependent on a clear assessment of partner capacities, willingness, and expected roles. These steps and the resulting understanding gained are not currently incorporated in project design and represent missed opportunities.

- lxii. **Stakeholder buy-in and ownership.** UNEP typically engages most relevant stakeholders in its projects and makes efforts to address their concerns. This engagement and participation of stakeholders creates buy-in for planning and investing, which promotes uptake and use of approaches, measures and technologies promoted by UNEP and contributes to sustainability and up-scaling. This increased country-level buy-in has become more prominent over the period considered by the evaluation. However, stakeholder involvement, especially at the country level, could be stronger during the design stage of projects. This is often limited due to budget constraints at the project design stage.
- lxiii. Typically, adaptation projects seek strong stakeholder involvement in assessments, planning and policy processes, which should increase ownership of results and possibly contribute to socio-political sustainability. In mitigation projects, UNEP is also dedicating significant efforts to develop direct relationships with key stakeholders at country level and increase their ownership and involvement in all phases of the interventions. In most cases, main stakeholders are at least members of the project steering committees. As regards REDD+, the sense of ownership by governments and the incentives for maintaining results are weakened because most countries involved in the UN-REDD Programme do not provide any resources beyond a small contingent of government officials to move their national REDD+ agendas. Government expectations are that external funding (carbon offsets) would finance REDD+ actions and that the costs associated with building country capacities for REDD+ readiness are fully assumed by the international community, which is currently the case.
- lxiv. **Government commitment, also beyond the direct project partners.** Changes in political administration may impact on climate priorities – regular consultation and involvement is required to ensure that government commitments are maintained. For example, strong engagement with government is expected to ensure that countries integrate, disseminate and apply the knowledge, tools and methodologies gained from the UN-REDD Programme. UNEP’s REDD+ readiness work on multiple benefits and the potential for REDD+ to contribute to a green economy transition likely contribute to this essential government commitment in a context of uncertainties at the international level.
- lxv. **Good coordination on policies and actions among ministries and sectors,** as climate change issues go beyond the environment and cut across ministries and sectors. Achieving this inter-sectorial coordination is often a challenge in UNEP projects. Newer projects, such as the FIRM, have specific work dedicated to promoting cross-ministerial and multi-sectorial collaboration. UNEP increasingly establishes inter-ministerial task teams at the outset of projects.
- lxvi. **Capacity of local partners.** At national level, strong institutions are essential to put to use the enhanced information, improved planning and enhanced skills created by UNEP’s support. Although UNEP may build planning capacity, it does not directly support national climate change institutions in terms of organisation, governance or resource mobilization and in some cases this local capacity has been overestimated.
- lxvii. **Availability of sufficient human and financial resources in government partners/ministries to execute policies and strategies, and enforce laws and regulations.** Given the lack of country offices in most places, UNEP is only in a position to monitor this assumption from a distance. Because the presence of sufficient human resources and technical capacity in government agencies is such an important assumption, it is often among the main criteria for selecting the countries where approaches are piloted. Overall, the global economic and financial downturn has slowed down investment decisions of financial institutions and governments towards environmental objectives.
- lxviii. **Private sector and other key actors sufficiently incentivised to invest and change practices.** Fluctuations in oil prices affect competitiveness of renewable energy solutions, and diving carbon prices have reduced the feasibility of CDM projects. However, technological advances and massive expansion of production capacity particularly in China have increased the competitiveness of RE and EE technologies.

- lxix. Closely related to government commitment is the assumption of **national and regional economic and political stability**. Political stability at the country level and no key changes in national priorities are required for particular intervention areas to advance to high-level results. Experience has shown that this is not always the case, leading sometimes to countries opting out of projects or, worse, entirely abandoning/postponing CC planning and action.
- lxx. **Clarity on the climate finance future including an adequate carbon price**. This is a critical assumption to boost carbon markets and to find an outlet to CDM projects designed and registered thanks to UNEP's support, in particular the CDM projects of Sub-Saharan countries. Impacts of satisfactory results already achieved by UNEP in terms of CDM are depending on the outcome of negotiations and discussions to be taken on the future of the climate finance.
- lxxi. **Increased international commitment to REDD+**. In particular, the likelihood of a viable performance-based financing mechanism for REDD+ remains a moving target. While the commitments of the period 2010-2012 and subsequent negotiations are helping to create a favourable momentum for ongoing climate change negotiations, culminating with a possible international agreement by 2015, the evolving global context and the future of REDD+ financing inspire less optimism. Even if a new climate agreement is reached in 2015, there will be no clear global financing strategy for REDD+ until the new protocol takes effect in 2020, and even the proposition that a fully operational carbon market would be in place by then is questioned by many.

Efficiency

- lxxii. UNEP did not systematically build cost-saving measures into project design, but changing circumstances leading to resource constraints sometimes required project teams to take cost-saving measures during implementation. Most adaptation and mitigation projects; built on successful experiences and lessons learned from prior activities, took advantage of pre-existing systems, methods and data sources and/or sought to exploit complementarities and synergies with other initiatives. The UN-REDD programme and other joint programmes by design sought to draw out the comparative advantages of each partner agency, though those collaborations have high transaction costs due to different administrative systems, reporting requirements, mutual consultation requirements etc.
- lxxiii. The majority of UNEP projects experienced delays that often required extensions to their duration (sometimes several times) to allow for completion of activities. Delays were due to a variety of reasons, often external factors such as political instability or bureaucratic requirements and lack of capacity of national agencies, but also UNEP's cumbersome/slow administrative processes regarding legal matters, human resources and procurement processes that, despite some progress being made, remain inefficient and hinder effective project management.

Factors affecting performance

Programme Design and Results Framework

- lxxiv. UNEP has organized a hierarchy of results frameworks – from the Medium-term Strategy, to Climate Change Strategy, down to the POW and Programme Framework Documents under the Expected Accomplishments – to focus limited resources, align with UNEP's mandates and relevant international resolutions, as well as build on UNEP's perceived comparative advantages in climate change. The overlaying "flagship" areas have served as a marketing tool for packaging UNEP as a prime-mover or innovator on the application of EbA and clean technology, and its visibility in REDD+ has improved.
- lxxv. The two most recent POWs were developed by DTIE through a consultative approach across all divisions involved in CC, and also solicited input from regional and country offices. This process was thorough but time-consuming and UNEP staff were generally favourable to this new way to deliberate on their collective vision of the CCSP. There were some fundamental flaws in the structure and intended logical connections within the CCSP results framework for 2010/11. These include the lack of causality from outputs to EAs, a lack of appropriate performance indicators, and insufficient targets and indicators. The revised 2012/13 EAs have shown progress in terms of bringing clarity to intended results, and helping UNEP staff to communicate, both internally and externally, the relative value-added or niche of the CCSP. The changes provide some precision and realism to otherwise very ambitious objectives with a wide scope of work and variety of actors involved.
- lxxvi. The EAs for adaptation, energy finance and science & outreach are pitched at the direct outcome level, which is the outcome level at which UNEP can still realistically be held accountable. The EAs for clean energy and REDD+, however,

are formulated at a level beyond which UNEP can be held accountable or UNEP actions would be readily attributable. These EAs are therefore not appropriate to monitor UNEP's progress over the course of POW implementation.

- lxxvii. The increase in focus by UNEP on climate change over the period considered by the evaluation has meant some tensions between corporate strategy and the climate change strategy. For example, the CCSP deliberately abandoned some smaller areas of work in order to streamline the programme of work. It has also meant working in fewer countries, concentrating efforts in countries where UNEP has a proven track record or previous relationships, and grouping related projects together within those countries. Other areas noted as important to UNEP's corporate image and overall effectiveness according to strategy - but under-executed due to a lack of resources and incentives - were ensuring participatory project development, replication/scaling up of projects (exit strategies and follow-on plans for pilots), and risk management.
- lxxviii. UNEP does not appear to have a vision in terms of harmonizing efforts under the climate change components to look for synergies and reduce duplication of efforts. There are clear theoretical ties between science and outreach, REDD+, mitigation and adaptation, but these are not systematically addressed in UNEP's long-term strategy. As a result, collaboration across divisions on, among others, assessments, legal issues, REDD+ and carbon finance remains largely informal (see recommendation 7).

Project Design

- lxxix. Many projects under the period considered by the evaluation still contained design flaws indicative of the previous reporting periods, and about one third were still not aligned with the current results framework. This was partly attributable to a lack of funds to design projects, resulting in a perpetual pattern of borrowing from existing projects to develop new ones. Despite these challenges and gaps, project documents were generally of higher quality under the POW 2012/13 in comparison with the previous POW. These noticeable improvements were due in part to better conditions (less time constraints and better guidance), but also the advent of a new Project Preparation Template for the 2012/13 POW and an enhanced PRC process. This evaluation desk-reviewed about one-third of the portfolio, using a representative balance of components and geographic range. The following describes the main strengths and weaknesses of project design under the climate change sub-programme.
- lxxx. **Theory of Change.** While most project documents reviewed presented some form of problem analysis, none of them presented an explicit Theory of Change of the project (This was not a requirement at the time these projects were designed). There was usually sound causal logic from project outputs to project outcomes but intermediary states between results levels were often not considered. Drivers were also largely absent from project design documents. Assumptions were presented in the form of risks, corresponding with the situation where the assumption would prove false. For all risks identified, the project document format required details on how they would be managed. However, risks were often poorly formulated and projects rarely foresaw a mechanism to monitor risks.
- lxxxi. **Milestones/targets.** Climate change project milestones and targets were often represented as periodic markers for activities and did not necessarily reflect an adequate measurement of whether the project is moving toward a particular output or outcome. According to QAS, many projects are submitted to PRC without 6-month milestones and targets for each indicator and QAS makes suggestions for milestones and targets which project managers are often expected to take up by the PRC.
- lxxxii. **Stakeholder Engagement.** Projects were generally designed in collaboration with key (government) stakeholders – and often as a result of a direct government request - thereby resulting in strong country/stakeholder ownership; which can also improve sustainability and likelihood of impact. Scoping exercises and assessments (sometimes at the global level) lead to consultations and further feasibility studies, usually early in implementation. On the whole, however, stakeholder analysis and capacity assessment in the design stages was often weak and infrequently used to better identify the respective capacities and define potential roles of specific direct and indirect intervention partners. This often amounted to missed opportunities to avoid particular risks and/or engage timely and strategic partners for targeted capacity building.

Recommendation 3: Climate Change project design and revisions should be improved on several aspects. Project documents should systematically present a Theory of Change showing how project outputs are expected to lead to outcomes and impact, external factors affecting change (drivers and assumptions) and key stakeholders involved in the

intended change processes. Appropriate milestones should be developed both at output and outcome level that show progress towards achievement of expected result. Drivers and assumptions should be given greater emphasis in project design to shape strategy and ensure benefits continue after project closing, as part of, or in support of risk management and sustainability plans. The Theory of Change of the project should be regularly revisited and possibly adjusted during implementation as part of project revisions. Stakeholder analysis should also be improved to go beyond listing partners, to include a minimum level of capacity assessment appropriate for the types and levels of expected involvement, and an analysis of how stakeholders are expected to influence the project and/or may be affected by the project. Stakeholder involvement at the country level should be stronger at the project design stage. Overall, more resources should be specifically dedicated to project design.

- lxxxiii. **Gender & Poverty.** Potential gender linkages are probably strongest in adaptation and REDD+ interventions, but also downstream mitigation projects might have important gender aspects. Project Documents refer to “consideration” of gender issues, with the broad assumption that women and children are the most vulnerable to climatic changes, regardless of intervention and/or context. Most of the projects did not include design elements that explicitly addressed gender or recognized the potential active role of women and/or marginalized groups in improving the quality of outputs or outcomes, or likelihood of replication, up-scaling.
- lxxxiv. **Umbrella Projects.** The biennium 2010-11 introduced fewer but larger projects, in an attempt to consolidate several smaller projects under larger ‘umbrellas’ to increase efficiency in design, supervision and reporting. Gains were not as great as expected due in particular to the burden of still having to manage many sub-projects with little efficiency gains, while also having to take into account the multiple small projects initiated during earlier planning cycles that had limited connection between them, despite being retrofitted or realigned to the new results frameworks. Umbrella projects did not present a Theory of Change explaining the coherence between their sub-projects and sub-project results were difficult to identify and track for the purposes of learning and accountability. Managers have lost a measure of ownership and control over the ‘bundled’ projects and reporting and monitoring information for these entities is not meaningful at a programme or corporate level. Output milestones and targets developed for the umbrella projects were quite meaningless for monitoring progress at the level of the individual sub-projects. It has been decided in UNEP discourage the submission of umbrella projects from 2014 onwards.

Organization and Management

- lxxxv. Each CCSP PF document contains an “internal management and reporting requirements” section. However, UNEP’s ambitions sometimes seem to exceed its ability and means to manage and coordinate efforts. The dual modality of normative and field activities may be a lot to ask of UNEP’s considerably limited country-based resources. In order to support the geographically dispersed efforts, when the CCSP was first launched, climate change experts were placed in each of the regional offices. However, to date, not all ROs retain these Regional CC Coordinators, and other Regional Office staff sometimes step in for CCSP coordination, with technical support from project staff. Notwithstanding significant challenges, UNEP’s competent and qualified staff have (long since) adapted to the lack of on-the-ground presence to the extent possible by leveraging partnerships and ensuring close communications with their government counterparts.
- lxxxvi. The barriers to internal coherence and cooperation appear to revolve around two issues: budget and authority. DTIE as the Lead Division makes the final budgetary decisions. There is a strong perception that DTIE abused its budget control to acquire a relatively larger amount of Environment Fund financing for its projects. The evaluation was unable to find evidence that this was really the case but this perception of unfairness creates mistrust and disincentives for collaboration. In addition, even though it is the CCSP Coordinating Division, DTIE has no authority over POW outputs other than mitigation [EA(b) and EA(c)] which makes overall coordination of the sub-programme very difficult from DTIE’s perspective.
- lxxxvii. The transition to an inter-divisional matrix structure for the climate change sub-programme was a good step toward collaboration in theory, but in practice it did not seem to create the communication channels and coordination mechanisms to capitalize on synergies and identify and capitalize on opportunities between divisions. Most staff seem quite indifferent to the (lack of) changes it brought in their particular area of work, and many felt strongly that the process was insufficiently supported. Despite expressed need since the time of the matrix transition, with the exception of the Energy Branch - which has developed and distributed a staff Manual explaining its management

structure and protocol - there is little evidence of efforts to help staff gain better understanding of their own divisional operations and/or to incentivize collaboration within and/or across the divisions, let alone with other sub-programmes.

Recommendation 4: UNEP management should offer orientation materials to their new staff, consultants and interns that are not only a basic overview of the organization management structure and main operational functions, but also act as a 'how to' reference for processes such as project design, procurement, contracts, translation, web services etc. UNEP should provide additional communication and management resources to staff and managers in the form of more support hired, trainings and management tools made available to UNEP staff, and encourage their use by providing time and other incentives.

- lxxxviii. One of the findings of the UNEP MTS evaluation was that "the current interpretation of matrix management in UNEP is not providing the clear lines of authority and accountability for programme delivery that are needed." That is to say, there are too many different forms of accountability for programme delivery and a "lack of clear distinction between the 'programmatic' axis i.e. the responsibility for overseeing the achievement of the sub-programme objectives - the what - and the 'implementation' axis i.e. the responsibility for the day-to-day technical delivery of the programme - the how". DTIE has the responsibility of coordination and allocation of funding for the CCSP but without an accountability mechanism. Staff report that they manage the lack of clear authority by knowing how to navigate the systems in place and meet administrative requirements. This has functioned for a few years for those staff that have remained in their respective roles/positions long enough to learn these options or gain some level of authority, but is not helpful to new staff and nor does it present a long-term solution.
- lxxxix. The flagship areas of the CCSP (EbA, clean energy and REDD+) are an additional dimension cutting across the SPs and divisions (which already overlap but do not systematically coordinate). These flagship areas have (4 years later) motivated staff to focus efforts on specific problem/solution areas under the CCSP. They also seem to have been useful for purposes of marketing and communicating UNEP's brand to external audiences, thereby assisting staff in mobilizing resources on particular topics or in particular countries of interest by donors. The flagships have nevertheless also caused tensions largely as a result of resistance to change, including a loss of influence over the direction of programming for some teams.
- xc. While the flagships have been used to describe and highlight already ongoing programmatic foci, on the other hand, the formation of umbrella projects the sub-projects of which do not go through QAS or a PRC, has meant administratively lumping together sets of projects among which some might be completely freestanding and independently managed. The result is a greater loss of accountability and control of the component portfolios by respective managers, even while the scope of the respective POWs has sharpened during the period considered by the evaluation.
- xc. Each POW Output (for both 2010/11 and 2012/13) has been assigned to one Division accountable for its delivery. Only for the Mitigation component have all POW Outputs been assigned to a single Division – DTIE – while the outputs under EA(a), EA(d) and EA(e) are dispersed among the 5 other UNEP divisions. This dispersion has been reduced dramatically for POW 2012/13 with DEPI managing now 4 out of 5 Adaptation outputs and all 3 REDD+ outputs, and DEWA being accountable for 2 out of 4 Science and Outreach outputs. While DRC managed two CC outputs under POW 2010/11 it retained none for POW 2012/13. DELC also lost two outputs from one biennium to the other (adaptation and REDD+) but retained an output under Science and Outreach regarding the information of climate negotiators.
- xcii. Programme Officers within each of the respective divisions are responsible for all aspects of project implementation, including technical, financial and administrative aspects. Though the process of developing the POW (every two years) and project approval through the Project Review Committees (PRCs) provide regular opportunities to bring together staff from different divisions, there are no regular managerial or administrative ties between sub-programmes.
- xciii. The relationship between financial allocation decisions and the management of substantive activities appears to be less than ideal. Some teams expected to be budgeted under the CCSP between 2010-13 ended up assigned with responsibilities for only a minimal activity budget. Those teams were incentivized to find other means to create financial leeway or leverage external resources when possible, and also to take cost-saving measures, but this also led to a prioritization of engagement with partners who can provide funding or other forms of cost-saving. Also, it appears that the allocation made to DRC and the ROs to hire staff capable of contributing to activities and supporting the CCSP

in their respective regions, was sometimes used to pay support staff salaries (such as office messengers or clerks) as a result of the pressures on the ROs to show reduced spending on the core budget.

- xciv. Through their delegated authority Division Directors have the ultimate authority over decisions for each sub-programme, regardless of managers and SP Coordinators. Furthermore, the alignment of sub-programmes with divisions (the CCSP Coordinator is housed in DTIE) reinforces “silos” that amplify competition between the divisions and diminishes SP coherence. Though they are responsible for oversight of the SPs, the SP Coordinators are seen as having relatively little to no “power” relative to the Division Directors. Within each division, the Branch Chiefs are responsible for the overall management and strategic direction of her/his respective Branch, including overseeing day-to-day operations of projects and providing strategic guidance, direction and support to her/his Division.

Human and Financial Resources Administration

Human resources

- xcv. UNEP staff are generally regarded by implementing partners and field visit country interviewees as highly qualified and technically skilled in their respective areas of expertise. UNEP’s competence and good reputation is exemplified by the extensive network of partnership arrangements and trust placed in UNEP’s staff at the individual and organizational levels. There is nevertheless some concern over striking an appropriate balance in staff skillsets between more specialized or technical backgrounds and managerial capabilities. RBM training has been provided to all Programme Officers since 2012, and staff indicate it has helped them better understand (and shape) the POW and MTS but it appears that RBM concepts have not yet been fully embraced. Some managers and staff see RBM as an external imposition rather than a management approach that supports meeting their key deliverables.
- xcvi. Administrative recruitment procedures are very cumbersome and slow. They generate huge delays in recruitment that impact project and sub-programme performance. The CCSP as a whole is chronically stifled by staff shortages, largely due to vacancies that remain open due to the slow recruitment process. As many global programmes reach periods of expansion, so too will technical assistance demands increase as new countries begin implementation. Staff shortages mean UNEP cannot be in regular attendance at all key political meetings and is sometimes unable to embrace important opportunities to strategize or form collaborative relationships with new partners. Also, the lack of staff funded by reliable sources (both extra-budgetary funding and Environment Fund funding appear unreliable) has meant relatively high rates of fluctuation of team sizes and turnover in some units, many of whom have lost more than half their original number since 2010. These dramatic changes also impede retention of institutional knowledge.

Recommendation 5: An internal administrative review should be conducted across the Climate Change sub-programme to determine the causes of common administrative and procedural delays that have negative impacts on project and programme performance (both an additional burden on project managers and a potential cost to UNEP). Those issues that can be addressed by the divisions and project managers should be identified and prioritized for corrective actions. Some issues can only be addressed at the UNEP corporate level or even outside of UNEP, such as by UNON, and will require senior management involvement.

- xcvii. There is still demand for more resources at the regional level. Coverage and workload of regional offices is higher than for any other UN agency. UNEP claims to have insufficient resources to open sub-regional offices. The few UNEP country offices (China, Tanzania), though playing a very important role, are also very small, with no more than about four staff, including interns, to coordinate activities at the country level.

Financial resources

- xcviii. Accurate information on funding of the CCSP could not be obtained by the evaluation team. The financial management system used by UNEP (the UN-wide Integrated Management Information System - IMIS) does not lend itself to straightforward extraction and summarizing of financial information at the sub-programme, EA or POW output level. UNEP’s PIMS has the capacity to record project-level financial information, which can be aggregated to the EA and sub-programme level, but is not updated regularly. According to PIMS and data provided by UNEP Fund Management Officers, the total approved budget (this is the estimated cost at design) for UNEP’s CCSP across all components over the period 2008 – 2012 was approximately \$270 million, with a total programmed amount (that is the funding that could be mobilized) of about \$90 million (data as of April 2013) i.e. one third of the approved budget.

- xcix. The portfolio considered by the evaluation¹ is comprised of about 89 projects with EF and/or XB funding. This includes GEF-funded projects that are internally executed by UNEP, but not the externally executed ones for which UNEP only played a design and supervisory role as the GEF Implementing Agency. At least one third (about 35) of the 89 projects, 25 of which are under mitigation, are sub-projects or initiatives that are under umbrella projects for budgetary and administrative purposes. This brings the “actual” count in PIMS (where sub-projects under the umbrella projects are not listed separately unless they went through PRC) to about 57 projects.
- c. Rough estimates indicate that, for the portfolio considered by the evaluation, DTIE was responsible for approximately 40 per cent of the planned financial volume of CCSP work but 61 per cent of the programmed (mobilised) volume. DEPI is responsible for 45 per cent of the planned funding, but only 36 per cent of the programmed funding. Other divisions, mainly DEWA and DCPI, shared the remainder.
- ci. Both DTIE and DEPI have a substantial proportion of their funding from extra-budgetary (XB) sources (slightly above 90 per cent). Besides the GEF, the main donors for the CCSP are Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Germany, Spain and Italy. Environment Fund resources are generally allocated to (some) staff salaries, office rent, IT and communication charges, some mission travel and other ‘core’ costs, as well as post-project activities. The increasing proportion of funding has meant that project managers and teams have become dependent on raising funds for the continuation of projects underway. Securing funding from external donors is time intensive and does not typically guarantee continuity (e.g. donors can end funding at any time) and furthermore those projects that are fully funded from external sources (e.g. GEF) do not currently require reporting to the Sub-programme Coordinator under the POW. However, the relatively small amount of EF funding can also be unpredictable, as EF funds are only gradually released as donors make their contributions to UNEP. Often this means a sudden allocation of additional EF cash late in the year with a requirement to spend it quickly.
- cii. In many cases, project funding was not (fully) secured when implementation began and capacity to mobilize adequate funding for projects is a major concern, in particular for adaptation projects. In some cases, funding constraints made it impossible to conduct the planned field demonstrations and to provide follow-up after training courses. The prevalence of unsecured funds forced managers to take a phased implementation approach where activities would start at a smaller scale, while further funding was being mobilized. Underfunded projects can lead to higher than anticipated delays, and were sometimes absorbed into a larger project that also didn’t manage to secure large parts of its funding. For mitigation projects, unsecured funds also remain an issue even if they did not cause major blockages recently, with the exception of projects with several phases for which funds were not available in advance. Generally, this led to delays before the next phase could start causing a loss of momentum and bringing the risk to lose the gains achieved in the preceding phases.
- ciii. There was little consistency in how project document budgets were presented before 2010. Since 2010, there is a standard format for project budgets, formulated around expenditure categories that are ‘inputs’ (e.g., staff salaries, travel, consultants, printing of publications, meeting room rental, computers, office rent, etc.). Project Documents hardly ever present budgets that are broken down to the output or activity level.
- civ. The CCSP has no explicit resource mobilisation strategy, with most of the resources being mobilised on an ad hoc basis by project managers. Resource mobilization for mitigation often revolves around existing relationships and the technical needs expressed by countries. Since adaptation covers a range of disciplines and thematic areas, managers use a variety of strategies for resource mobilization. Many funding relationships are built on the basis of an expression of interest for donors to cover interventions on particular topics or in particular countries or regions, but also frequently build on already on-going initiatives.

Recommendation 6: The CCSP would benefit from its own resource mobilisation strategy that would include a summary of current funding sources across sub-programme components, profiles of existing and potential donors, guidelines for managers on how to approach donors (in a coordinated manner) and a mechanism to keep track of resource mobilisation successes and failures and amounts mobilised per donor. The strategy would be prepared and implemented in coordination with the Donor Partnerships and Contributions unit.

¹ Including all projects under the climate change sub-programme either on-going or started after 1 January 2008 and before April 2013.

Cooperation and Partnerships

UNEP Internal Cooperation

- cv. Although the matrix structure for the creation of sub-programmes has been useful for solidifying UNEP's strategy and delivery mechanisms in climate change, there is little evidence it has strengthened divisional linkages, and almost no indication that it has improved connections between sub-programmes. Furthermore, as more partnerships are in demand, within UNEP and the UN, but also with external partners, project teams have to devote additional time and energy to maintaining those relationships.
- cvi. While there are multiple opportunities, collaboration between the various components of the CCSP is limited so far. Adaptation and mitigation are essentially complementary approaches to the climate change challenge, but there is little evidence of cooperation between UNEP's adaptation and mitigation components. It would appear that UNEP is more at ease when reaching outward for partnering than when looking in. This is not altogether surprising or necessarily bad. There is often more in common professionally among experts working on the same technical topics in different organizations, than there is among UNEP's staff working on that topic and staff working on different climate change related topics. However, the main reasons for the lack of collaboration between components (and also between CCSP components and other sub-programmes in UNEP) seem to be the lack of incentives for staff in different units to work together and the complexities of managing financial resources across divisions.
- cvi. Collaboration between CCSP components and other sub-programmes in UNEP does exist, for instance between CC adaptation and Ecosystem Management, but there are some opportunities that could be much further developed, such as CC adaptation and disaster risk reduction under the Disasters and Conflicts Sub-Programme, or CC mitigation and Resource Efficiency.
- cviii. There have been numerous instances of cross-divisional collaboration driven by informal relationships. However, despite many good intentions presented in the POWs, Programme Framework documents and project documents, there is little evidence of effective formal collaboration between UNEP divisions related to the CCSP. According to the Mid-term Evaluation of the MTS and the survey for this evaluation, there was still room for improvement in communication and collaboration between Divisions and Regional Offices and in enabling Regional Offices to be more directly involved in the operations of the CCSP. An exceptional success story of internal collaboration at the global level is UNEP's participation in various formal meetings of the UNFCCC, where there was a much stronger UNEP team spirit in the past few years. UNEP staff have increasingly attended as one team, with more coherent common messages and backed by influential publications such as the Emissions Gap Reports prepared by the UNEP Chief Scientist with DTIE support since 2010. UNEP's role and visibility in the UNFCCC process was also boosted by UNEP support to CC negotiators from developing countries since 2007 to reach a common regional position on the main issues under discussion during the COPs.

Recommendation 7: A sub-programme-wide reflection is needed to explore ways to better exploit opportunities for strategic collaboration between CC components, divisions and other sub-programmes in order to capture value-added of combined efforts and reduce duplication of efforts. After opportunities have been agreed upon, incentives need to be put in place to promote on-going collaboration between teams; senior managers should actively support putting ideas to action.

- cix. At the country level, even though some efforts are made at the beginning of a new engagement to map all related activities both national and international to examine possible synergies and risk of overlap, overall, UNEP-supported interventions are often fragmented. This has to do with the fact that UNEP interventions are usually components or pilots of different projects, managed by different staff at the local level, in ROLAC and UNEP Nairobi. These projects have not been designed in a way that would promote collaboration at the national level. This often translates into missed opportunities that would increase the likelihood of impact of UNEP's interventions.
- cx. The actual role of the Regional Offices ranges from providing in-country contacts and liaison, assisting in country and national partners' selection, to country-level project development and implementation; a set of responsibilities generally beyond formally recognized expectations. Regional Offices face a significant shortage of technical and non-technical staff, and for this reason direct relationships are often maintained and strongest between the Division and country counterparts. This further diminishes UNEP's already low regional/local presence and country-level coordination, and underutilizes the regional and country knowledge in the ROs.

Recommendation 8: UNEP Branches implementing the Climate Change Sub-programme and UNEP's Regional Offices should enhance their collaboration during project design and implementation to ensure that UNEP's activities are regionally relevant and appropriate, and so that synergies between projects and between sub-programmes at the regional level are capitalised upon. This would also reduce duplication of effort and lack of coordination at the country and regional levels by enhancing communication between regional and country-level activities and relevant divisions. UNEP Branches and Regional Offices should also work together in further developing modalities for collaboration with emerging regional partners and programmes, whether economic, social or environmental, in order to ensure their strategy and focus on specific topics has potential for scale-up and replication, and remains relevant to needs. Adequate resources need to be set aside to strengthen both the Regional Offices and relevant regional cooperation.

External Partnerships

- cx. The UNEP climate change strategy explicitly notes the significance of partnerships to drive the work. These partnerships are important both for global efforts, such as the preparation of annual global reports that help establish and track norms and progress in achieving them, as for efforts at the regional and country level.
- cxii. Since UNEP is a non-resident agency, it must rely on operating through partners at the country level, with collaboration between ROs and other UNEP Offices. Cooperation with government and other local partners is necessary because the country projects/pilots serve the double purpose of developing and testing concepts and tools, but also to build country capacity and ownership in using them to promote in-country replication. Local partners also often bring complementary technical skills, as is the case for the global/regional partners. Its closest country-level relationships are usually government counterparts or UNDP, though sometimes UNEP might operate through another development agency, national institution, etc. Over the last few years, more and more partnership requests have been coming in from a variety of stakeholders, and developing these relationships is time-consuming.
- cxiii. Partnerships are often formed on the basis of available funding (or donor preferences) or building on previous/on-going efforts and relationships. There does not appear to be any guidance or strategy within the CCSP for establishing partnerships, even when those partnerships have implications for sustainability, country ownership, and/or likelihood of reaching impacts; nor a system for tracking the relative effectiveness and lessons learned in partnering.
- cxiv. Despite this, UNEP has been successful in developing partnerships for adaptation, and has a strong reputation for bringing highly competent technical support into projects and engaging a wide variety of stakeholders. Being a relatively small "player" on the mitigation scene, in terms of human and financial resources capacities, not being a resident agency in the countries where it operates, and because mitigation cuts across ministries and involves many different stakeholder groups, cooperation and partnerships are critical to the successful implementation of UNEP's interventions. At country level, UNEP is increasingly building strong partnerships beyond traditional partners (e.g. Ministries of Environment). UNEP has been able to establish numerous partnerships with external players, such as UNFCCC for responses to decisions of the COPs and information of negotiating processes; UNDP for scaling up innovative approaches demonstrated through projects; development banks for supporting accelerated investment in low-GHG technologies; the IPCC for supporting global assessments and translation of IPCC's analyses to interventions etc. The recent evaluation of the UN-REDD Programme found that, at the management level, inter-agency coordination is thought to have improved significantly since the Programme was first created but, beyond the core management structure, views on the efficacy of inter-agency coordination differ considerably, especially at the global and country level. Due to the proximity of peers from the different agencies, more consistent efforts to coordinate were observed at the regional level. At the country level, the benefits of inter-agency coordination and collaboration have yet to affect implementation. Working with the UN-REDD Programme entails inescapable transaction costs, such as the need to operate through three distinct budget lines, internal procedures, and complex decision-making.
- cxv. The establishment of relevant contractual agreements with project partners presents constant challenges with regards to UNEP administrative processes. The overall administrative burden, in particular the long lead-times to get contracts out, is an area of concern. Also, establishing durable relationships between UNEP and external partners is a challenge when based on a sequence of contracts or projects, rather than some longer-term MOU and a continuing funding base, since there is little institutional continuity or incentives to continue collaboration.
- cxvi. As the "principal body within the UN in the field of environment", UNEP should theoretically be a consistent signatory of the UNDAF in every country in which UNEP is working. However, without being a resident agency, it is sometimes

complicated for UNEP to be fully involved in the preparation of the document and/or to regularly attend the meetings. Regional offices make efforts to follow-up on the UNDAF preparation process but due to limited resources, they cannot participate in the UNDAF preparation of all the countries pertaining to the region and very often, the UNEP programming cycle does not match with that of the UNDAF. In some countries, UNEP has completely independent interventions that are not even mentioned in the UNDAF document of the country and uses its own channels of communication with the government. This is to be expected at times when UNEP's work is ahead of the UNDAF process in areas where UNEP is framing issues or conceptualizing responses that are not yet mainstreamed.

Recommendation 9: UNEP Divisions involved in the CCSP should pursue both the "One UNEP" and "One UN" approaches, especially at the country level, in order to promote joint efforts toward increased likelihood of project success in reaching deliverables and outcomes, while avoiding duplication of projects. Stronger connections and coherence should be sought between UNEP activities at the country level and how this will happen should be demonstrated in the Programme Framework Document and project design documents. Project teams should also be encouraged to utilize UN resources at the country level to the fullest extent.

cxvii. Some key lessons learned on partnerships across the CCSP are:

- Working with governments often entails slower and more tedious processes for numerous reasons, but the capacity built through this process could be considered more closely aligned with UNEP's mandate than work that is generated through consultants, NGOs and other international experts, for example. In CDM and TNA countries a model is used where both government and a local technical institutions are engaged in a triangular set-up with government responsibility but capacity built and retained in the local technical institution. Whenever possible, UNEP should understand and weigh the different implications and practical matters in working with government partners to develop products and services, vs. relying on academic institutions, private sector, NGOs or individual consultants/experts.
- UNEP sometimes loses control of its "messages", tools and concepts as they are taken up by other partners, whether development agencies or government, thereby making it difficult to identify and assess UNEP's relative contribution to efforts. Choosing small, periodic milestones for testing whether messaging or concepts have been adopted may be easier than attempting to track down policies to uncover 'language' borrowed from UNEP reports. Uptake of UNEP can also be found in close communications between individuals, and therefore requires some means to identify and regularly record evidence.

Monitoring & Evaluation

- cxviii. Progress has been made in the last four years to implement results-based management (RBM) under the MTS. However, the Project Documents of most projects designed for the biennium 2010/11 did not present even a basic M&E plan and often contained the same standard text on M&E, regardless of project specificities. Project design issues related to M&E included: ignored/unclear baselines, meaningless project milestones, issues with the project logical framework, lack of M&E budget etc. Most of the time, indicators were defined in the logical framework matrix included in the project document, but quite often they were not SMART² and not monitored regularly in the course of project implementation.
- cxix. PIMS is certainly being used more for M&E under the POW2012/13, with records of progress at six-month milestones. For more recent projects more monitoring information is available in PIMS, though still quite basic and often with a positive reporting bias. Nevertheless, over the course of the period considered by the evaluation there is a general lack of progress reporting and evaluations. Publicly available outputs (assessments, guidelines etc.) can be found online, but information on their utility and use is non-existent. Most donors require at least annual submission of substantive and financial reports associated with the funds that they have provided, but it appears that reports to donors are not systematically archived either in PIMS or in any other shared database.
- cxx. The use and effectiveness of M&E was a general concern of all interviewees; however, a lack of leadership on the significance of M&E in some units where senior management do not believe in its usefulness, and a resistance to

²Specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, timely/time-bound

change has meant that the burden of improved systems and use of systems has fallen on a few individuals. PIMS is still not considered a user-friendly system, with few incentives to use it for management decision making.

- cxxi. When monitoring and reporting is conducted, UNEP managers strongly rely on input and management systems from their partner organizations, and/or very close communications with their national counterparts (usually in government). This is combined with emails, calls and (often infrequent) visits, indicative of UNEP's need to compensate for a lack of on-the-ground presence.
- cxxii. An independent external evaluation is required by UNEP EO for all projects over US\$ 0.5 million. However, it is the responsibility of the respective division to request the evaluation to the EO, and the cost of evaluation is expected to be borne by the project. Many projects have not been evaluated, either because their evaluation was not requested or because no adequate evaluation budget was built in the project budget or both. Even when sufficient funding was foreseen in the Project Document budget, the real amount available for evaluation was often compressed due to insufficient project resources. GEF-funded projects fared much better, as GEF rules regarding reporting and evaluation have been much more strictly applied in UNEP.
- cxxiii. M&E information is sorely under-utilized to understand the causalities and relative effectiveness of advisory services and policy guidance, but also for identifying key drivers that UNEP interventions should seek to influence. An ever present challenge is that much of UNEP's CC work is 'up front' and relates to policy change or related measures. The causal chains may be tight and traceable, but it may take several years before policies translate into actual investment in better technologies, which is when increased resilience or reduction in GHG emissions relative to a baseline can be measured with some confidence and degree of accuracy. If/when impact occurs, projects are often long since completed in the official UNEP sense, and there is as yet no good way of tracking over longer periods of time the impacts of UNEP interventions or support.
- cxxiv. There are several issues with the results framework itself at the sub-programme level. Three out of five 2012/13 EAs are pitched at an outcome level where UNEP cannot be held accountable for their achievements. UNEP can only provide the best possible products and services, target those to the most appropriate people in the most appropriate format. Attribution is a major issue and requires an evaluative approach. Those EAs are therefore not appropriate for monitoring UNEPs performance in the course of POW implementation. Most EAs incorporate the strategy or means (basically the outputs) by which UNEP intends to achieve or contribute to them. The indicators and units of measurement are then often indicating the delivery of these outputs rather than the extent to which the EA has been achieved. Other indicators are incomplete and do not indicate the full extent of achievement of the EA. It is unclear how baselines and targets have been determined and many baseline numbers are too "rounded" to be credible.
- cxxv. Sub-programme and component-level monitoring is done through the sub-programme module in PIMS, and has much improved between the biennia 2010/11 and 2012/13 with practically no reporting gaps in PIMS for the biennium 2012/13. Both PIMS and PPRs, however, seem to have a strong positive reporting bias (only achievements are reported, not failures). Interviews and survey response suggest that there is still much room for improvement as regards the use of the reporting structure and M&E system in place, but also in terms of funding M&E.

Recommendation 10: CC projects should be allocated adequate resources (human and financial) for results-based monitoring, providing real-time information on delivery, efficiency and progress towards outcomes so that timely adjustments can be made during implementation. Budgets set aside for evaluation in project budgets should be adequate and under control of the Evaluation Office of UNEP and should not be "compressed" when the overall funding ratio of the project is lower than expected. More regular and detailed record-keeping is necessary for the full implementation of results-based management at all levels of the sub-programme, and is the foundation for current and forthcoming evaluative processes as well as critical to transparent and accurate reporting to UNEP's governing bodies. There is need for revising and improving PIMS in order to make it more user friendly for reporting and for tracking of finances and management decisions, for tracking projects with potential synergies and/or overlaps, as well as for learning and reflection.

1 Introduction

1.1 Background on Climate Change and the UNFCCC

1. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines Climate Change as “a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.”³ Climate change is considered by many to be the major, current environmental and human development challenge facing the globe. The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) states that it is no longer relevant to debate whether human activities impact the global climate but rather how much change we are committed to and how fast this will occur. In addition the IPCC emphasized that climate change, while a long-term issue, needs to be considered as a medium term problem requiring short-term action. Mitigation and adaptation actions to address the climate change challenge need strong policies, technology development and transfer of technologies using a broad range of policy and technical options.
2. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) provides the basis for concerted international action to mitigate climate change. The UNFCCC is an international environmental treaty adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, informally known as the Earth Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The objective of the treaty is to “stabilize greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”. The UNFCCC entered into force on 21st March 1994 and there are now 195 Parties (member countries) to the Convention, an almost global membership. The UNFCCC Secretariat supports the intergovernmental climate change negotiations and an increasing number of constituted bodies including the Conference of the Parties (COP), the subsidiary bodies (which advise the COP), and the COP Bureau. More recently, a major part of the Secretariat’s work involves the analysis and review of climate change information and data reported by Parties.⁴
3. The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997 and operationalizes the UNFCCC to set binding obligations on industrialised countries to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. It entered into force in 2005. The Protocol’s first commitment period started in 2008 and ended in 2012. In Doha, Qatar, on 8 December 2012, the "Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol" was adopted. The amendment includes *inter alia* new commitments for Annex I Parties to the Kyoto Protocol who agreed to take on voluntary commitments in a second period from 2013 to 2020; and a revised list of greenhouse gases (GHG) to be reported on by Parties in the second commitment period.⁵
4. The 13th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC held in Bali in December 2007 reached an agreement on the fight against global warming and the world community’s ability to deal with climate change. Decision 1/CP.13 (the Bali Action Plan), launched a comprehensive process to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention through long-term cooperative action. The Copenhagen Accord reached in 2009 invited developed countries to submit economy-wide emission reduction targets for 2020 and developing countries to submit Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs), in order to reduce global emissions with an aim at limiting the global average temperature increase to maximum 2°C above pre-industrial levels. Though not legally binding, the Cancun Agreements (2010) recognized these voluntary pledged targets and actions, anchoring them in the UNFCCC.⁶
5. Despite many efforts, GHG emissions are still on the rise and pledges of future action within the UNFCCC process currently fall short of what science suggests is necessary to keep the increase in temperature below 2°C. The potential disruption, displacement and adaptation to phenomena such as sea-level rise or extreme weather events, represents a profound challenge to sustainable development and can reverse hard-won development gains.

³ <http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg2/index.php?idp=689>

⁴ <http://unfccc.int/secretariat/items/1629.php>

⁵ http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php

⁶ http://unfccc.int/key_steps/cancun_agreements/items/6132.php

1.2 UNEP's Response to Climate Change

6. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) was established by the General Assembly following the Stockholm Conference by Resolution 2997 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972. The five core areas of UNEP's current mandate, according to the Medium-Term Strategy 2010-2013⁷, are to:
 - a. Keep under review the world environmental situation in order to ensure that emerging environmental problems of wide international significance receive appropriate and adequate consideration by Governments;
 - b. Catalyze and promote international cooperation and action in the field of the environment and to recommend, as appropriate, policies to this end;
 - c. Provide policy advice for the direction and coordination of environmental programmes within the United Nations system, and provide advice and early warning information, based upon sound science and assessments;
 - d. Strengthening technology support and capacity in line with country needs and priorities; and
 - e. Facilitating the development, implementation and evolution of norms and standards and developing coherent inter-linkages among international environmental conventions.
7. UNEP helped establish the IPCC with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in the 1980s and conducted assessments of the scientific understanding of climate change in preparation for the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development. UNEP also supports the negotiations of the UNFCCC. Beyond its support for science and legal mechanisms, UNEP's work has concentrated on efforts to reduce emissions of GHGs, mainly by promoting renewable energy and improved energy efficiency, and spurring development of a carbon market and supporting the UN-REDD programme. UNEP has also been active in efforts to reduce the risks of, and improve society's resilience to climate change – adaptation – notably through its support to the development of National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) and the implementation of projects addressing the priorities therein. Many of UNEP's activities, while not driven solely by climate concerns, have sought to incorporate positive mitigation or adaptation impacts.⁸
8. Although UNEP has been working on climate change-related issues for more than twenty years, until the development of the UNEP Medium-Term Strategy (MTS) for 2010-2013 presented to the UNEP Governing Council in 2008, UNEP did not have a Climate Change Sub-programme (CCSP). UNEP's activities relevant to climate change were previously embedded in the Sub-programmes organized along the Divisions of UNEP. Although they were expected to contribute directly to meeting needs in the areas of mitigation, adaptation and science and outreach, many activities were not explicitly labelled as climate change but as energy efficiency or pollution control.
9. According to the MTS 2010-2013 UNEP's CCSP objective is *"to strengthen the ability of countries to integrate climate change responses into national development processes"*. UNEP is expected to support countries and institutions to meet the challenges of climate change by promoting ecosystem-based approaches to adaptation, up-scaling the use of and facilitating access to financing for clean and renewable energy and technologies, and capitalizing on the opportunities of reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. UNEP is also working to improve awareness and understanding of climate change science for policy decision-making.
10. The UNEP CCSP is organized around four Programme Frameworks (PFs) – Adaptation, Mitigation, REDD, and Science and Outreach – with corresponding Expected Accomplishments (EAs) and Programme of Work (POW) Outputs as presented in Table 1 below. Between the two biennia 2010/11 and 2012/13 some changes were made in the formulation of the EAs to strengthen their direct causal linkages to UNEP outputs but the overall structure in four PFs remained the same. However, POW Outputs were significantly adjusted. In the table, plain arrows show how the outputs of POW 2010-2010 have been moved and merged into the POW 2012/13. Outputs marked in red have not been carried over from one POW to the other while outputs marked in green are new since the POW 2012/13.

⁷UNEP. United Nations Environment Programme Medium-term Strategy 2010–2013. *Environment for Development*.

⁸UNEP 2008. CC Strategy. P 5, 13, 14, 23.

Table 1. Climate Change Sub-programme EAs and POW Outputs, [Targets] and {Managing or Accountable Division} in POW 2010/11 and 2012/13

POW 2010/11		POW 2012/13	
ADAPTATION EA(a): Adaptation planning, financing and cost-effective preventive actions are increasingly incorporated into national development processes that are supported by scientific information, integrated climate impact assessments and local climate data {Coordinating Division: DEPI}	1. Vulnerabilities to CC and adaptation services of critical ecosystems are assessed and findings are integrated into national decision-making, planning and adaptation practices. [four countries with coastal megadeltas or vulnerable mountain or freshwater ecosystems] {DEWA}	ADAPTATION EA(a): Adaptation, including an ecosystem-based adaptation approach, is incorporated into country development planning and policymaking based on scientific assessments, policy and legislative advice and lessons learned from pilot projects supported by UNEP and adaptation experiences, including an ecosystem-based approach, showcased at the global level	1. Ecosystem-focused adaptation and vulnerability assessments and associated capacity development actions are undertaken and best practice approaches disseminated through relevant networks and partnerships. [four countries] {DEWA}
	2. Resilience of key ecosystems vulnerable to CC is increased through effective adaptation measures in selected drylands, low-lying areas and mountains. [four countries] {DEPI}		2. Countries are supported in efforts to maintain and restore the functioning of targeted ecosystems to provide adaptation services by undertaking EbA pilots and by scaling them up through UN and other partnerships and in efforts to strengthen in-country capacity to implement adaptation actions, including EbA approaches. [four countries] {DEPI}
	3. National policies and institutional capacities for adaptation planning are strengthened using knowledge, technology and policy support from global and regional networks. [four countries in Asia and the Pacific and Africa] {DEPI}		3. Countries are supported in integrating adaptation, particularly ecosystem-based adaptation approaches, into national development and CC policies and plans, and guidelines and materials developed to mainstream ecosystem-based adaptation into the work of United Nations partners. [four countries] {DEPI}
	4. National knowledge and capacities for undertaking integrated vulnerability and adaptation assessments are strengthened using scalable methodologies and tools. [25 countries] {DEWA}		4. Understanding of the economics of climate change impacts and economic value of ecosystem services for adaptation is strengthened and shared with United Nations partners for inclusion in their programmes. [four countries] {DEPI}
	5. National economic, legal, institutional and regulatory frameworks comply with climate change vulnerability and adaptation elements contained in international climate change treaties. [four countries] {DELC}		5. Countries are supported in efforts to gain access to adaptation financing and to build their capacities for direct access to such financing [five countries] {DEPI}
	6. Climate change adaptation is integrated into national development planning processes [four countries] {DRC}		
	7. Technical, analytical and policy support are provided to major climate change financing mechanisms to support the coherence of their operations and ensure transformational investments in climate change [three interventions] {DEPI}		
CLEAN ENERGY EA(b) Countries make sound policy, technology, and investment choices that lead to a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions and potential co-benefits, with a focus on clean and renewable energy sources, energy efficiency and energy conservation. {Coordinating Division: DTIE}	1. Technical and economic assessments of renewable energy potentials are undertaken and used by countries in making energy policy and investment decisions favouring renewable energy sources [four countries] {DTIE}	CLEAN ENERGY EA(b) Low carbon and clean energy sources and technology alternatives are increasingly adopted, inefficient technologies are phased out and economic growth, pollution and greenhouse gas emissions are decoupled by countries based on technical and economic assessments, cooperation, policy advice, legislative support and catalytic financing mechanisms	1. Economic and technical (macroeconomic, technology and resource) assessments of climate change mitigation options that include macroeconomic and broad environmental considerations are undertaken and used by countries and by major groups in developing broad national mitigation plans. [eight countries] {DTIE}
	2. National climate technology plans are developed and used to promote markets for cleaner energy technologies and hasten the phase-out of obsolete technologies [four countries] {DTIE}		2. Technology-specific plans are developed through public-private collaboration and used to promote markets for and transfer of cleaner energy technologies and speed up the phase-out of obsolete technologies in a manner that can be monitored, reported and verified. [eight countries] {DTIE}
	3. Knowledge networks to inform and support key stakeholders in the reform of policies and the implementation of programmes for renewable energy, energy efficiency, and reduced greenhouse gas emissions are established [two subregions] {DTIE}		3. Knowledge networks and United Nations partnerships to inform and support key stakeholders in the reform of policies, economic incentives and the implementation of programmes for renewable energy, energy efficiency and reduced greenhouse-gas emissions are established, supported and used to replicate successful approaches. [three regional networks] {DTIE}
	4. Macro-economic and sectoral analyses of policy options for, fostering low greenhouse gas emissions, including technology transfer, are undertaken and used [two global, four countries] {DTIE}		
	5. Sustainability criteria and evaluation tools for biofuels development are refined globally and applied nationally [four countries] {DTIE}		
	6. Public/private partnerships are promoted and best practices are applied leading to energy efficiency improvements and greenhouse gas emission reductions [two energy intensive industries/sectors such as transport, building and construction] {DTIE}		

<p>ENERGY FINANCE EA(c) Improved technologies are deployed and obsolescent technologies phased out, through financing from private and public sources including the CDM and the Joint Implementation Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol. {Coordinating Division: DTIE}</p>	<p>1. Barriers are removed and access is improved to financing for renewable and energy efficient technologies at the national level through targeted analysis of costs, risks and opportunities of clean energy and low carbon technologies in partnership with the finance sector [4 countries] {DTIE}</p> <p>2. Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects are stimulated through market facilitation and the application of relevant tools, methodologies and global analyses, including on environmental sustainability [two global, ten countries with few CDM projects to date] {DTIE}</p> <p>3. National institutional capacity for assessing and allocating public funding and leveraging private investment for clean energy is strengthened [four countries] {DTIE}</p> <p>4. New climate finance instruments are launched and investments in clean energy are made by first-mover financiers and lenders and investors [four instruments] {DTIE}</p> <p>5. Financial institutions adopt best climate, environmental and sustainability practices [ten financial institutions] {DTIE}</p>	<p>ENERGY FINANCE EA(c) Countries' access to climate change finance is facilitated at all levels, and successful innovative financing mechanisms are assessed and promoted at the regional and global level</p>	<p>1. Financing barriers are removed and access to financing is improved for renewable and energy-efficient technologies through public-private partnerships that identify costs, risks, and opportunities for clean energy and low-carbon technologies. [eight countries; leveraging of \$10 million] {DTIE}</p> <p>2. Use of the CDM and other innovative approaches to mitigation finance is stimulated through analyses and the development and application of relevant tools and methodologies, including on environmental sustainability and measuring, reporting and verification compatibility. [eight countries; leveraging of \$30 million] {DTIE}</p> <p>3. Institutional capacity for assessing and allocating public funding and leveraging private investment for clean energy is strengthened and new climate finance instruments are developed and applied by financiers, lenders and investors. [Target: eight countries; leveraging of \$60 million] {DTIE}</p>
<p>REDD EA(d) Increased carbon sequestration occurs through improved land use, reduced deforestation and reduced land degradation. {Coordinating Division: DEPI}</p>	<p>1. Mapping and assessment of land-use change, biodiversity, forest loss and carbon stocks, and associated capacity building, are undertaken to provide the knowledge base for reducing emissions from deforestation [four assessments] {DEWA}</p> <p>2. Tools for examining and modeling greenhouse gas emissions and carbon stocks from deforestation, land use change, forest and land cover degradation are developed and tested [four countries] {DEPI}</p> <p>3. Legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks governing land use and forestry are strengthened to promote greenhouse gas emission reduction from deforestation and land use change [four countries] {DELC}</p> <p>4. Lessons from the development of monitoring and evaluation systems, payments for ecosystem services and carbon markets are used to support the development of readiness in a number of relevant developing countries and to provide support to global processes. [NB: no target] {DEPI}</p>	<p>REDD EA(d) Reduction in deforestation and land degradation with countries moving towards sustainable forest management, conservation and full terrestrial carbon accounting based on tackling all drivers of deforestation, and taking fully into account co-benefits and safeguards</p>	<p>1. Countries are supported in efforts to develop their capacities for delivering REDD and transforming the management of their forests and related sectors to achieve lower greenhouse-gas emissions, conservation, more sustainable forest development and enhancement of forest stocks through the assessment of drivers of deforestation, the analysis and application of guidelines for addressing multiple benefits, and their monitoring, and trade-offs among forest and land-use choices and in promoting stakeholder participation. [five countries] {DEPI}</p> <p>2. Countries are supported in building their capacities to leverage investments for sustainable changes to forest use and to negotiate and reach investment agreements that draw on opportunities arising out of REDD (forest carbon) and broader use of and benefits from forests. [two countries] {DEPI}</p> <p>3. Tools to enable the full inclusion of terrestrial carbon mitigation (or accounting) are developed (i.e., agriculture, other land uses and coastal areas) and tested for broader uptake in the work of three international partner agencies. [three agencies (UNDP, FAO, CGIAR)] {DEPI}</p>
<p>SCIENCE & OUTREACH EA(e): National-level policymakers and negotiators, civil society and the private sector have access to relevant climate change science and information for decision-making. {Coordinating Division: DEWA}</p>	<p>1. A science-based assessment is undertaken and publicized to increase awareness of climate change and its impact on specific sectors and promote the integration of climate change concerns into policy making [two assessments] {DEWA}</p> <p>2. Capacity-building with respect to customizing climate change data, information and scenarios is provided at the national and sub-regional levels to strengthen climate change policy planning. [four countries] {DEWA}</p> <p>3. Climate change negotiators and stakeholders charged with implementing climate related multilateral environmental agreements are equipped with scientific information relevant to their negotiations [three groups of negotiators] {DELC}</p> <p>4. Advisory and support services are provided to major groups to demonstrate how climate change can be integrated into their operations [three services] {DRC}</p> <p>5. Awareness-raising, outreach, education and training for major groups and the broader public are conducted to promote climate awareness [three engagements] {DCPI}</p> <p>6. Successful climate change programmes are communicated to key stakeholders to promote replication of best practices and success stories. [NB: no target] {DCPI}</p>	<p>SCIENCE & OUTREACH EA(e): Increased access of target audiences to relevant climate change assessments and information for decision-making and long-term planning</p>	<p>1. Science-based assessments (including sectors and scenarios) are undertaken and publicized and used to support climate change policy planning and decision-making [three assessments] {DEWA}</p> <p>2. Climate negotiators, decision makers and other affected stakeholders are provided with relevant scientific information [three groups of negotiators] {DELC}</p> <p>3. UNEP climate change work to support countries on adaptation, clean technology and forest management and other major climate change subjects is communicated to key target audiences, including major groups, leading to discourse and uptake of policy and implementation in countries. [All countries receiving UNEP support in this sub-programme] {DCPI}</p> <p>4. Research and assessment capacities are strengthened in developing countries to prioritize, accelerate, consolidate, harmonize and mobilize research on climate change vulnerability, impact and adaptation to support decision-making by policymakers, planners and resource managers. [eight countries] {DEWA}</p>

Notes: - Since POW 2012-13 the concept of "Coordinating Division" for the EAs has been abandoned.

- Plain arrows show how outputs in POW2 010-2010 have been carried over into the outputs of the POW 2012/13.

- POW outputs marked in **red** have not been carried over from POW 2010/11 to the POW 2012/13; POW outputs marked in **green** are new since the POW 2012/13.

11. In 2009, following shortly after the development of the MTS and Programme of Work for the climate change strategy (2008), the UNEP CCSP underwent an internal review in order to further refine UNEP’s thematic areas according to “flagships”. The process identified (i) ecosystems-based adaptation (EbA), (ii) reduced emissions from deforestation and land degradation (REDD+), and (iii) clean technology readiness as the three areas to focus efforts and resources, with the aim to improve marketing UNEP to external audiences, cultivate partnerships, and branding of UNEP as an innovator for creating “test beds” for new methodologies and tools. Climate finance which was arguably the main focus of UNEP’s CC work before the MTS 2010/13 was oddly not considered a flagship which, in the view of some interviewees, was a mistake considering that UNEP had developed considerable expertise and strong partnerships, and that it is a fundamental driver for upscaling CC action globally. However, climate finance remained a separate EA and was carried by a continuous portfolio of global and regional projects.
12. Under the MTS 2010-2013, the Lead Division for the Climate Change Sub-programme is the Division for Technology, Industry and Economics (DTIE). DTIE, through its Energy Branch, is accountable for delivering all POW Outputs under the Mitigation component, EAs (b) and (c). The Division of Environmental Policy Implementation (DEPI), through its Climate Change Adaptation and Terrestrial Ecosystems Branch, manages the majority of projects under the Adaptation and REDD+ components corresponding to EAs (a) and (d). The Division for Early Warning and Assessments (DEWA) is accountable for the delivery of certain outputs mainly related to assessments and assessment capacity building under the Science and Outreach component, EA (e) and also under the Adaptation and REDD+ component. For the POW 2010/11 the overall coordination of each EA was allocated to one “Coordinating Division”. Since POW 2012-13 the concept of “Coordinating Division” for the EAs has been abandoned. Table 1 above shows the Managing Divisions for each POW Output.
13. UNEP Regional Offices under the Division of Regional Cooperation (DRC) manage a number of sub- regional and country-level adaptation and mitigation projects; the Division of Environmental Law and Conventions (DELIC) provides support to climate change negotiators and a climate-neutral UN; and the Division of Communications and Public Information (DCPI) is accountable for delivering a series of outputs related to awareness-raising, outreach and education. The Divisions are indicated under the corresponding components in Figure 1 below.




Figure 1. UNEP CCSP components and implementing Divisions

Note: Divisions indicated in *italic* were only assigned POW Outputs under POW 2010/11 and not under POW 2012/13

1.3 The Evaluation

14. This section briefly describes the evaluation objectives, scope, approach and limitations. More details on evaluation methods, resources and audience can be found in Annex 1 and in the Inception Report of the evaluation⁹.

1.3.1 Objectives

15. The Sub-programme Evaluation (SPE) of UNEP's Climate Change Sub-programme aims at assessing the relevance and overall performance of UNEP work related to climate change in the last three biennia (from POW 2008 onwards) according to standard evaluation criteria (relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and impact). The Evaluation assesses whether, in the period under review, UNEP was able to strengthen the ability of countries to integrate climate change responses into national development processes, by providing environmental leadership in the international response to climate change and complementing other processes and the work of other institutions.

1.3.2 Scope

16. The evaluation covers the four main areas of work – components or Programme Frameworks - of the CCSP: Adaptation; Mitigation; REDD; and Science and Outreach. However, Science and Outreach [EA (e)] is treated as a cross-cutting issue within the other three components. The portfolio includes 57 projects registered in UNEP's Programme Information and Management System (PIMS) that have been classified as belonging to the CCSP and were either on-going or have been started after 1 January 2008. A little over half (32) of these projects were completed at the time of the evaluation, 20 were on-going and the remaining 5 were inactive or unknown status.

17. Within this portfolio, there are a number of interventions known as “umbrella projects”, which include several sub-projects contributing to the same EA or (set of) POW Outputs. If all sub-projects are counted, the total evaluation portfolio comprises about 88 interventions. Their spread over the different programme frameworks or thematic components is as follows: 60 per cent are mitigation, 23 per cent are adaptation, 5 per cent are REDD, and 9 per cent science and outreach. The remaining combine both mitigation and adaptation objectives. A detailed list of the CCSP portfolio projects, including the desk review sample, can be found in Annex 4. This evaluation does *not* cover the UNEP portfolio of GEF projects unless executed directly by UNEP (see paragraph 18 of the TORs).¹⁰

1.3.3 Approach

18. The evaluation was an in-depth, independent exercise conducted with oversight from the UNEP Evaluation Office, and according to the following principles to ensure a fair evaluation:

- *Focus on results:* Expected results, performance indicators, as well as potential risks were identified to ensure coherent and integrated results based management (RBM) to frame the evaluation.
- *Learning:* The evaluators have adapted RBM principles, tools and indicators (i.e. the evaluation matrix), based on the needs and context of this evaluation, with the aim of increasing the potential for learning and focus on the achievements of the UNEP CCSP.
- *Participatory:* The evaluation process ensured a consultative and collaborative approach with the UNEP staff members - Sub-programme Coordinator, Division Directors, Programme Managers, the Office for Operations (OfO) - and other relevant internal and external stakeholders who were kept informed and regularly consulted throughout the assessment.

⁹ The Inception Report of the evaluation is available from the UNEP Evaluation Office upon request.

¹⁰ This cohort includes approximately 25 GEF regional and global projects, as well as 30 projects at the national level over the evaluated period for which UNEP was the Implementing Agency or co-Implementing Agency. This set of projects is not considered part of UNEP's biennial programmes of work and support budgets and is assessed through other evaluative processes.

- *Evidence-based*: The evaluation aimed to gain insights and conclusions based on a variety of data and data collection methods, and, wherever possible, information was triangulated (obtained from different sources) in order to ensure the reliability of evidence.
19. As illustrated in Figure 2 below, the evaluation was conducted at four levels of analysis – UNEP corporate level, Sub-programme level, Programme Framework (component) level, and country level. This helped the evaluation team to identify patterns at different scales of activities and objectives interlinked through the UNEP CCSP results framework. Strategic objectives and policies at an institutional level (UNEP) interact with the strategic objectives and actions taken at the sub-programme level, and affect how projects are designed and managed across the respective PFs at the country level. Across these levels, the evaluation sought to answer the following key questions grouped in three areas of focus:
- **Strategic Relevance**: Are the Sub-programme objectives and strategy relevant to the global challenges posed by climate change; global, regional and country needs; the international response; and UNEP’s evolving mandate and capacity in this area? How are the respective strategies of the CCSP components designed to ensure relevance in their respective thematic areas and how do their efforts address crosscutting areas (DRR, land-use, etc.)?
 - **Performance**: Has UNEP achieved its objectives in the area of climate change? Have projects been efficiently implemented and produced tangible outputs as expected? Are the main drivers present and are the key assumptions valid so that the outputs delivered by the Sub-programme can lead to sustainable, higher-level changes at outcome and impact level? What are the respective achievements and constraints of the CCSP components, and their overlapping and/or combined effects?
 - **Factors Affecting Performance**: What are the key factors affecting sub-programme performance? How well are the overall sub-programme and its project portfolio designed and structured? Are organizational arrangements adequate, and what is the quality of management within the operational units? Have human and financial resources been optimally deployed to achieve sub-programme objectives? What role do partnerships play in achieving sub-programme objectives and are these optimally developed? How well are sub-programme activities and achievements monitored and evaluated?




Figure 2. Areas of focus and levels of analysis of the evaluation

20. An Evaluation Matrix was used to outline the detailed evaluation questions within these three areas of evaluation and four levels of analysis. As shown in Figure 2, the three areas of evaluation focus are interrelated and dynamic. First, the strategic relevance of UNEP's involvement in CC determines the scope and scale of the sub-programme and thereby shapes the kinds of products, services and delivery mechanisms used to reach core objectives. Decisions surrounding strategic relevance of the CCSP also influence the underlying design of the programme, including administrative, management and implementation structure, and other factors that affect sub-programme performance. Coming full circle, sub-programme performance also shapes strategic decisions about the thematic and geographic focus of UNEP's work as well as factors affecting performance through re-orientation of objectives and lesson learning.

1.3.4 Limitations

21. Lack of recorded/reported evaluative data: The evaluation team faced severe limitations in availability of documented evidence, and most of the documents available were design/ex-ante, or documents generated as project outputs (assessments, guidelines etc.) rather than actual progress reports, reviews or evaluations. For more recent projects, especially those implemented from 2011 onward, very basic reporting was done in PIMS but for the earlier period this was not the case. Completion report or evaluations are not commonly available, even for those projects that were closed for more than one year. Only 9 of the 32 closed projects had either a terminal evaluation or some other completion report that the evaluation team could obtain after several requests; 6 had occasional annual or semi-annual progress reports or expenditure reports.
22. Attribution vs Contribution: UNEP's CCSP does not operate in isolation and contributes toward the results of a much wider set of actors and development partners. While this evaluation sought to identify and qualify UNEP's relative contribution toward the high-level objectives pursued under each component and toward the CCSP overall, this was often very challenging considering the very crowded climate change arena.
23. Results levels and sub-programme accountability: The current expected accomplishments (MTS 2010-2013) are set at a high results level (medium term outcome or intermediate state towards impact), and are therefore often far beyond UNEP's control and difficult to attribute to UNEP or any single agency or entity alone. On the other hand, POW output statements are also often set at the immediate or medium term outcome level. In order to assess Sub-programme effectiveness, the Evaluation Team therefore attempted to extract the intended immediate and medium-term outcomes from the diverse result statements embedded in the component EAs and POW Outputs. Since the effectiveness of the sub-programme is assessed against these deduced, revised outcomes, rather than against the component EA and POW output statements, the UNEP management staff / component team's agreement on these outcomes statements was essential to ensuring the legitimacy of the analysis. However, the evaluation team was not able to gain input and consensus on these outcome statements early in the evaluation process, and relied on the revision process of the respective component working papers in order to do so. This required several rounds of adjustment of the results statements against which the sub-programme was being evaluated.
24. Determining causality from limited results information: Since data at the direct outcome level, and especially at the medium-term and intermediate outcome level, has been difficult to come by or triangulate, the evaluation team had to, in some cases, rely on the evaluative evidence of quality and utility of outputs (products and services) delivered by UNEP interventions over the period considered by the evaluation of 2008-2013. The theory of change analysis has helped overcome this limitation to the assessment, drawing out intended outcome level results, assumptions, and drivers from a variety of sources.
25. Limited field visits: Out of a global programme, this evaluation sampled only a small number of countries (6 in depth country case studies) across the four regions of Latin America, Africa, West Asia, and Asia and the Pacific, in order to take a deeper look at UNEP's strategic relevance and performance at the country level. The field visits attempted to highlight areas of relative effectiveness, (potential) synergies between activity areas, complementarities, and remaining gaps; and in some cases, in how the expected outcomes are defined and addressed in specific contexts. However, this sample can by no means be considered statistically valid, and in most countries not visited the evaluation team was not able to obtain additional sources of evidence other than UNEP staff reports and testimonies.

26. **Timing/Delays:** The data collection phase for the evaluation was expected to take place over a relatively short timeframe from January to March 2013. However, some country visits had to be rescheduled due to unavailability of key persons or conflicting schedules within the Evaluation Team, prolonging the data collection until June 2013. The country case studies, working papers and main report went through several rounds of comments from the Evaluation Office and UNEP stakeholders, which prolonged the evaluation process until January 2014. Considering that the initial cut-off date for information was 31 December 2012, there is a time lag of more than one year between much of the information, opinions and perceptions collected for this report and its publication. However, during finalisation of the report data from the UNEP Programme Performance Report 2012/13 was incorporated where appropriate to make the report as up-to-date as possible.
27. **Inadequate evaluation of the Science and Outreach component:** Due to human resource and time constraints within the evaluation team, the evaluation only conducted an in-depth analysis of the mitigation, adaptation and REDD+ components of the CCSP. Science and Outreach [EA (e)] was considered as a cross-cutting theme and therefore not assessed separately and as in-depth as the other components. With hindsight, considering its relatively high visibility within the Sub-programme, it would have been better to give the assessment of this component the same level of depth as was given to the others.

2 Evaluation Findings

2.1 Relevance and appropriateness of CCSP objectives and strategy

28. In order to examine the strategic relevance of the Climate Change Sub-programme, the following section considers the questions: 'Why?' 'What?' 'How?' and 'Where?' In order to give a general introduction to the CCSP intervention strategy and for ease of understanding, the section begins with a presentation of the CCSP Theory of Change (TOC) as reconstructed by the Evaluation Team on the basis of strategic and programming documents and key stakeholder consultations. Each of the relevance questions is then answered separately.

2.1.1 Reconstructed Theory of Change

29. The TOC is a logical model derived directly from the Programmes of Work and strategy/design documents that shows the causal relationship between UNEP outputs, direct outcomes, medium-term outcomes, intermediate states and impact of the sub-programme. The TOC also highlights drivers and assumptions, which are important external factors affecting change at different levels of the causal pathways. Forming a TOC of the sub-programme helps to understand the intervention strategy, derive meaningful evaluation questions, and provide a logical basis for assessing strategic relevance and progress made in achieving outcomes and impacts under the sub-programme. It can also help identify key underlying factors enabling and/or hindering progress.
30. The stated overall objective of the CCSP is to **“Strengthen the ability of countries to integrate climate change responses into national development processes.”** This objective summarizes the expected accomplishments of the sub-programme rather than representing a consequence of these EAs at the intermediate state or impact level. The **overall impact** at the highest level can be formulated as **reduced climate change impacts on human wellbeing**. This impact closely ties in with reducing climate-related pressures on attaining sustainable development goals. This impact is expected to be achieved by two **intermediate states (IS)**:
- **IS 1. Improved resilience of vulnerable ecosystems to climate change, and sustained ecosystem services under climate change.** This includes reducing various causes of biodiversity loss and environmental destruction brought on by the direct and indirect impacts of climate change and increased variability, and also relates to using ecosystem services to increase resilience of human and natural systems to seasonal and long-term pressures, as well as sudden shifts and climate-related disasters.
 - **IS 2. Reduced global GHG emissions caused by fossil fuel use, low energy efficiency, deforestation and land degradation.** This is the expected impact of climate change mitigation efforts, also contributed to by the REDD+ component.

31. The intermediate states of the CCSP are further characterized by significant co-benefits in improved ecosystems functioning through reduced human and climatic pressures on natural systems, as well as the human and economic gains made through the transformation of sectors and industries toward more efficient resource utilization and use of better technologies.
32. Those intermediate states are expected to be achieved through three **medium-term outcomes (MTOs)**, which reflect the transition of countries towards a more resilient and climate-friendly development path:
- **MTO 1. Countries increasingly use appropriate climate change adaptation approaches.** This outcome relates to the up-scaled results of steps taken to improve the quality and reach of conservation measures and other targeted actions to accelerate restoration processes and improve the resilience of ecosystems and ecosystem services. Under this MTO, countries increasingly adopt ecosystem-based adaptation measures.
 - **MTO2. Countries move towards sustainable forest management and conservation.** This would be the result of countries achieving REDD+ readiness with the appropriate social and environmental safeguards in place, and moving towards investments in sustainable forest management and conservation incentivised by their multiple benefits.
 - **MTO 2. Countries increasingly use cleaner and more efficient technologies and renewable energy sources.** This outcome involves the large-scale replacement of polluting, non-renewable and inefficient energy technologies with renewable energy and energy efficient technologies and measures, as energy efficiency and renewable energy markets grow. This, together with the scale-up of REDD+ measures under MTO3 provides the foundation for demonstrated reductions in GHG emissions and other co-benefits at a global scale.
33. The above MTOs are expected to be achieved through three **direct outcomes (DOs)** at the country capacity level that result directly from UNEP services and products (UNEP outputs). The knowledge gained, experiential learning and awareness acquired from UNEP-facilitated research and assessments, advisory services, publications, trainings and pilot initiatives is expected to enhance partner country capacity to take appropriate policy decisions, plan, access financing and act on climate change objectives.
- **DO 1. Improved access of partner countries to appropriate adaptation, mitigation and REDD+ information, approaches, measures and technologies.** Access to contextually appropriate, affordable and timely climate change options and technologies comes from an awareness and understanding of relevant scientific information. UNEP facilitates the production and dissemination of such materials for decision-makers and various stakeholder groups. This direct outcome is also a result of identifying appropriate measures and using international best practices to support governments in developing and executing sectoral strategies and technological options.
 - **DO 2. Improved enabling policies and regulatory frameworks for adaptation, mitigation and REDD+ in partner countries.** This direct outcome relates to strengthened governance systems and policies as a foundation for actions toward a green economy and more climate resilient ecosystems. It is central to UNEP's intervention strategy to achieve MTO 1 and MTO 2. UNEP's normative work with governments is a process with iterative deliverables that build an enabling policy and institutional environment for reducing and responding to climate change as an integral part of countries' broader development objectives. UNEP advisory services and technical support help countries to integrate science into planning processes and policies.
 - **DO 3. Increased partner country capacity and potential to leverage and secure climate financing.** UNEP aims at strengthening the ability of countries to more readily identify and secure climate financing options for mitigation, adaptation and REDD+ measures. These options become available as countries can demonstrate, for example, their capacities for taking action on climate change with clear and appropriate sector specific investment plans. This means that countries are able to encourage investment by setting and meeting standards of financial accountability through improved governance frameworks, legal and regulatory systems in place, and through the active use of environmental and social safeguards.
34. Critical to the functionality of the programme theory behind the CCSP are **assumptions** pertaining to external factors or conditions that are beyond the control of UNEP but have the potential to affect the extent and scope of outcomes and progress towards impact. These assumptions need to be identified early in the design and implementation stages so that project/programme approaches and management decisions can be made to manage their nature or level of influence, or lessen their potential negative impacts – in other words, to put in place an appropriate risk management strategy. Likewise, the evaluation needs to be aware of these assumptions and their validity in order to make a sound


judgment of the likelihood of sub-programme impact and sustainability in and beyond supported countries. There are several key **assumptions** identified by the reconstructed TOC:

- Capacity of local partners
- Availability of sufficient human and financial resources in government partners/ministries to execute policies and strategies, and enforce laws and regulations
- Private sector and other key actors sufficiently incentivised to invest and change practices
- National and regional economic and political stability
- Clarity on the climate finance future including an adequate carbon price
- Increased international commitment to REDD+

35. There are also numerous **drivers** – external factors over which UNEP has a certain degree of control, that contribute to “driving” change between the respective results layers from outputs through to impacts and that the CCSP can and should encourage or support in order for the programme theory to function as intended. If drivers are not adequately supported by the sub-programme, the likelihood that outcomes and impact are achieved in and beyond partner countries is reduced. The same drivers usually also affect sustainability and possible up-scaling of results. The most important drivers identified for UNEP’s CCSP are:

- Effective international climate change process, in particular UNFCCC
- partners and networks leverage approaches, measures and technologies promoted by UNEP
- stakeholder buy-in and ownership
- government commitment, also beyond the direct project partners
- good coordination on policies and actions among ministries and sectors

Figure 3. UNEP Climate Change Sub-programme Reconstructed Theory of Change



2.1.2 Why should UNEP be involved in climate change?

36. This section considers whether UNEP's climate change objectives are aligned with the global context and needs and UNEP's mandate. The evaluation concludes that through a tightened scope of work and consistency with both international/political drivers and its corporate strategy and mandate, UNEP has demonstrated its comparative advantages as a technical and strategic partner in climate change interventions. Nevertheless, some inconsistencies and gaps remain in using a results-based approach and in harnessing opportunities for cross-fertilization and collaboration both internally and under the One UN approach to increase leveraging of resources and efforts.

International/Political drivers

37. There is significant political support for UNEP's climate change work. Member States have expressed their support through UNEP mandates and decisions by the Governing Council/Global Ministerial Environment Forum. The approved programmes of work incorporate a range of activities across all Divisions to address the climate challenge in line with a global set of priorities agreed through the UNFCCC. According to the GEF Annual Monitoring Review (2011), the UNEP Medium-Term Strategy (MTS) is also aligned to GEF focus area goals and UNEP's mandated role in keeping the environment under review. UNEP's scientific normative work and testing of new models and innovations on emerging issues are of use to help the GEF partnership mainstream environment into all sectors.¹¹

38. As mentioned in the climate change strategy and the MTS, some examples of the key resolutions that UNEP aims to address under climate change and development, include:

- The Malmo Ministerial Declaration (1999), recognizing the “tremendous risk of climate change” as an environmental issue that needs to be addressed;¹²
- The adoption of a cross-cutting issue on biodiversity and climate change within the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD);
- The UN Millennium Declaration (2000) and its series of time-bound targets known as the MDGs, namely,
 - Target 7A: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources [calling for action on deforestation and climate change],
 - Target 7B: Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving, by 2010, a significant reduction in the rate of loss [the need for the protection of key habitats for endangered species and for sustainable global fisheries];¹³
- The Cartagena package (2002) which emphasized the need for UNEP to strengthen, inter alia, its science base;
- UNEP's Bali Strategic Plan (2005), which required a more coherent, coordinated and effective delivery of environmental capacity building and technical support in response to country priorities and needs, mentions climate change as one of the main areas of technology support and capacity building¹⁴;
- The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), which called for the alignment of aid with partner countries' priorities; and
- The Rome Declaration on Harmonisation (2003), which focussed on national development processes.¹⁵

Comparative advantages

39. Within this global context of international accords and resolutions to take action, according to UNEP's CC strategy, the way in which UNEP delivers its products and services for capacity building fall across the following 'areas of distinctiveness' that constitute its relative strengths:

- a. A broad environmental perspective and expertise in linking climate change to other environment and development issues in an integrated manner;

¹¹MTE of the MTS p 13.

¹² UNEP, 2010. United Nations Environment Programme Medium-term Strategy 2010–2013. Environment for Development. UNEP/GCSS.X/8. P 6.

¹³ UNEP 2012. UNEP Programme Manual. December 2012. P 41; UN 2013. <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/environ.shtml>

¹⁴ <http://www.unep.org/GC/GC23/documents/GC23-6-add-1.pdf>

¹⁵ UNEP 2012. MTS. P 7.

- b. A global environmental mandate that allows UNEP to both work with developed and developing countries on normative frameworks and undertake projects in developing countries;
- c. Scientific expertise and a science-based approach that is strongly supported by a wide network of world-class scientific institutions and UNEP collaborating centres;
- d. Convening power and proven ability of working on issues through multi-stakeholder and multi-disciplinary approaches, including its strong relationship with the private sector; and
- e. Proven track record of raising public awareness on environmental and climate change issues.¹⁶

UNEP's mandate

40. As illustrated in Chart 1, according to the survey conducted for this evaluation, between 65 per cent and 77 per cent of respondents, who are largely UNEP staff, (strongly) agreed¹⁷ that UNEP's areas of support under the CCSP are relevant to UNEP's current mandate and strategy.




Chart 1. Survey Responses to "Given its current mandate and strategy, in what areas is UNEP's climate change sub-programme most relevant?" (n = 70)

41. At the component level(s) of the CCSP, the EA(a) makes reference to integrated climate impact assessments which are aligned with the first area of UNEP's mandate to keep the world environmental situation under review. At output level, the CCSP keeps the world situation under review primarily through various types of assessments related to vulnerability, black carbon, tropospheric ozone and HFCs. Catalysing and promoting international cooperation and action – the second area of UNEP's mandate – is captured at output level through for example, public private partnerships on energy efficiency and clean energy. The third area of UNEP's mandate is providing policy advice and early warning information based upon sound science and assessments and this is reflected by the mitigation EA(b) and science and outreach EA(e) components. At output level, dissemination of climate change information to regions to assist them in CC negotiations contributes to this mandate. The adaptation component EA(a) contributes to the fourth area of UNEP's mandate that is facilitating the development, implementation and evolution of norms and standards and developing coherent inter-linkages among international environmental conventions. Outputs contributing to this mandate include support to developing protocols and tools for carbon management, forestry and land use regulations by integrating REDD+ into national development planning. The mitigation EA(b) and EA(c) and REDD+ components EA(d) address strengthening technology support and capacity building in line with country needs and priorities which is the fifth area of UNEP's mandate.¹⁸

Medium-Term Strategy (MTS) and the Climate Change Sub-programme (CCSP)

42. As UN and non-UN development agencies are increasingly mainstreaming environmental issues and climate change in particular into their work over the past several years, and as environment and climate change issues have become increasingly integrated into national planning processes, UNEP's role has evolved. At the start of the

¹⁶ UNEP 2008. *UNEP Climate Change Strategy for the UNEP Programme of Work 2010-2011*. ISBN: 978-92-807-2985-3. P6. http://www.unep.org/pdf/UNEP_CC_STRATEGY_web.pdf

¹⁷ Given the relatively large proportion of UNEP staff among the survey respondents, any conclusions based on these findings need to be tempered by the likelihood of confirmation bias.

¹⁸ MTE of the MTS. P9-10.

period considered by the evaluation (biennium 2008-2009), each UNEP Division was constituted as a sub-programme, each with an objective and an expected accomplishment; none of which mentioning climate change. The UNEP Medium-term Strategy 2010-2013 introduces cross-divisional sub-programmes including one specifically centred on climate change, with five climate change-related expected accomplishments.

43. The MTS 2010-2013 places greater emphasis and a renewed focus on UNEP's delivery, effectiveness and efficiency by aiming at:
 - a. Significantly enhancing its capacity to deliver country-level technical assistance and capacity-building;
 - b. Further embracing its role as the leading environment programme of the United Nations;
 - c. Ensuring UNEP interventions are founded on sound science; and
 - d. Fully implementing results-based management.
44. Under the MTS 2010-2013 UNEP's climate change objective is to "strengthen the ability of countries to integrate climate change responses into national development processes"¹⁹. As described in the UNEP climate change strategy for 2010/11²⁰ UNEP will, "in order to confront the challenges spelled out clearly by the IPCC, [...] significantly scale up its climate activities where it can add more value, working always with its major partners and stakeholders." Combining the promotion of cooperation at (sub-)regional and global levels with the provision of policy, institutional and technology support at the country level, the CCSP seeks to be relevant to both global and country-level needs and is fully consistent with UNEP's mandate and strategies.
45. In comparison, during the first biennium of the period considered by the evaluation (2008-2009), while it was UNEP's "mandate and duty to undertake climate change initiatives," those activities were dispersed across different divisions/sub-programmes. The Programme Performance Report (PPR) for the biennium 2008-2009 notes that "UNEP works with a wide range of partners and implements, among others, the following activities: Assess global, regional and national environmental conditions; create awareness, build consensus and influence policy at international and national level, develop international and national environmental instruments; strengthen institutions for the management of the environment; facilitate the transfer of knowledge and technology and encourage new partnerships and mind-sets within civil society and the private sector"²¹.
46. From 2010 onwards the biennial UNEP Programmes of Work (POWs) were arranged along thematic sub-programmes that cut across divisions. The MTS and POWs for 2010-2013 present high-level objectives designed to be more focused on UNEP's dominant areas of work, while remaining relatively open to opportunities beyond the current scope of work, depending on funding sources, partnership options and specific regional or country requests. The 2012/13 Programme Performance Report (PPR) notes that those objectives were "based on, *inter alia*, a prioritization of global, regional, and national needs identified through analysis and combination of data obtained from UNEP's Chief Scientist, the UNEP GEO reports as well as from DRC and other UNEP Divisions while taking into account UNEP's comparative advantage and menu of services."²² This shift helped define more specific objectives for UNEP's work on climate change, tightened the EAs according to clear-cut components and enabled a clearer causal mapping of results from outputs through to higher levels of accomplishment.
47. Achievement of UNEP's climate change objectives under its current mandate goes beyond the quality and relevance of UNEP's global products, services and advice, towards actual, large-scale adoption of approaches, measures and technologies at the national level. The five EAs under the climate change sub-programme and four key points of the MTS (see above) collectively paint a much more focused, strategic picture of UNEP's objectives than at the start of the period considered by the evaluation, as presented in the Programme Framework Documents of each component:
48. **Adaptation Component EA(a):** The goal of engaging in climate change adaptation is 'adapting by building resilience to a changing climate.' The Programme Framework on adaptation for 2010/11 indicates that EA(a) will be undertaken through three interlinked components or actions: (i) Impact and vulnerability assessment; (ii) Adaptation capacity, policy and planning support; and, (iii) Ecosystem-based Adaptation (EbA) support; which together will ensure a coherent approach towards achieving the EA. UNEP's work on adaptation will help to build

¹⁹UNEP 2010. MTS p 10.

²⁰UNEP 2009. CC strategy p 5.

²¹PPR 2008/2009. P 6

²² PPR 2012. P 58-59.

and scientific and knowledge base, develop enabling capacity necessary to integrate science into adaptation policy setting and planning to support countries in building ecosystem resilience and increase ecosystem services for adaptation.²³ UNEP will also support existing and future adaptation finance mechanisms, and help countries access climate finance resources.

49. **Mitigation Component EA (b) and (c):** These EAs come from the need to reduce global GHG emissions and are coherent with UNEP's climate change SP objective - to strengthen the ability of countries, in particular developing countries, to integrate climate change responses into national development processes. Until recently, climate change mitigation was seen as a responsibility of developed countries only. Improved scientific evidence on the need to reduce GHG emissions in the next decades and the rapid increase in emissions from developing countries point to the need for wider approaches that will bring deeper and downward trend the worlds GHG emission trajectory. The energy sector is targeted in mitigation due to its dominant contribution to GHG emissions and the focus is on cleaner, efficient and low emission energy technologies to replace conventional technologies in both the developed and developing countries.²⁴
50. **REDD+ Component EA(d):** Agriculture, forestry and other lands uses (AFOLU), previously referred to as land-use and land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) projects will build on both internally executed GEF projects and other broad GEF portfolio as a whole together with partnerships established at the regional and country levels. The main actors in this programme are the target countries in which the changes need to take place.²⁵
51. **Science and Outreach Component EA(e):** The programme framework is coherent to UNEPs Climate change objectives because it encompasses UNEP's activities in the area of climate change science and communication, including the target audience of climate negotiators. UNEP supports the development of scientific climate change information support package for use at the global and sub-global levels.²⁶

Remaining inconsistencies

52. The new organisation of sub-programmes under the MTS 2010-2013 has two fundamental aims: 1) to enhance UNEP's results orientation to address major environmental challenges, rather than simply to provide a range of potentially disparate environmental services; and 2) to enable the effective and efficient delivery of UNEP services in a complementary and synergistic manner to address these challenges, through greater cross-divisional collaboration and communication. The Mid-term Evaluation of the MTS found that while UNEP has become more relevant and appropriate to the first goal through deliberate partnering and seeking strategic areas of focus (e.g. flagships), the second goal remains largely under-delivered despite the matrix/cross-cutting organization of the sub-programmes that was put in place²⁷. Although relatively early in UNEP's transition to the current sub-programme 'matrix' structure, to date there is little evidence to support the assumption that services would be delivered more effectively and efficiently throughout the climate change sub-programme, with 'complementary and synergistic' efforts (See Section 2.3.2).
53. UNEP appears to have grown beyond its quite unique role as the UN's leading, norm-setting organisation on the environment, toward engaging a broader spectrum of partners for collaboration and collective influence. Concurrently, UNEP has more explicitly declared its intention to focus on specific environmental challenges such as climate change, harnessing external (extra-budgetary) sources of funding, and further building on existing and new partnerships with international organisations, MEAs and UNEP-affiliated research centres as well as fostering South-South cooperation. Part of this foundation in partnerships was laid well before the MTS and the development of the CCSP, with *inter alia* the Green Economy Initiative (GEI). A growing number of programmes involve other UN agencies in the UNEP CCSP such as the Ecosystem-based Adaptation programme with UNDP, the Climate Technology Centre & Network with UNIDO, the Green Climate Fund with UNDP, UN-REDD with FAO and UNDP, and the Poverty and Environment Initiative with UNDP. Much of UNEP's mitigation work is, by design, executed through partnerships (including with several non-UN organisations), and this is noted as a comparative advantage in the Programme Framework Document.
54. On the down side, field visits and regional office interviews generally indicated that in comparison to some other UN Agencies, UNEP struggles to fully embrace operating under One UN at the country level. The track record of

²³Adaptation PF p5-6.

²⁴EA(b)&(c) PF p5

²⁵EA(d) PF p 5

²⁶EA(e) PF p 3-4.

²⁷MTE of the MTS p 3

relevance to United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) is inconsistent and is highly dependent on the individuals in regional offices and relationship with relevant government and UN counterparts. This is further discussed under 2.3.4 Cooperation and Partnerships (paragraph 295). In the case of UN Joint Programmes, like in Peru or Panama, a number of activities were jointly implemented with success, but overall programme execution never reached full integration. Programme components were usually run independently by the respective agency in charge, with little efforts to seek cross-component synergies.

55. Finally, a weakness under this revised mandate and MTS objective to improve delivery through the CCSP, which is critical to UNEP's strategic relevance, is enabling and supporting regional cooperation. Although about half the projects under the portfolio are regional, UNEP Regional Offices and regional collaborative efforts are chronically under-resourced, and a lack of country presence exacerbates communication and increases transaction costs, leading to frequent administrative delays. These matters are discussed further in Sections 2.1.4 (Where is UNEP relevant?) and 2.3.2 (organization and management).

2.1.3 What does UNEP want to achieve with the CCSP?

56. This question looks at the relevance of UNEP's objectives to global and country needs, and their consistency with the UNFCCC and complementary with the broader international response to climate change. The evaluation concludes that UNEP's core objectives have become increasingly sharpened and relevant over the period considered by the evaluation, and are wholly consistent with major MEAs, and particularly the decisions of the UNFCCC. More effectively and fully utilizing resources at the regional level, and clarifying complementarities between the programme frameworks and divisions can further enhance UNEP's strategic focus at both component (EA) and Sub-programme levels.

Global and country needs

57. The CCSP strategy largely focuses on achievements at the country level, but is also derived from relevance to global agreements and the need to devise, test and standardize tools and methodologies for specific environmental challenges. Roughly three in four survey respondents agreed²⁸ that UNEP is relevant to global, regional and national climate change needs, but a significantly higher percentage of respondents *strongly* agreed that UNEP's CC work is more relevant to global needs than to regional or country needs. As described in the respective Programme Framework Documents (see paragraphs 47 to 50 above) most components of the CCSP centre on country-level needs and results that are derived from – and expected to contribute to – global environmental objectives. However, in the case of science (assessments) and outreach (awareness raising) the focus appears to be more on global (and “sub-global”) efforts in the context of the MEAs/climate negotiations. This is also the case for the REDD+ component. For adaptation the unit of intervention, rather than a country, is actually various ecosystems and ecosystem-services which are often not contained within national boundaries. The mitigation component, having the closest direct link to the UNFCCC high-level objectives, is perhaps the most evenly balanced between global and country level objectives. A further discussion of the design of the CCSP components can be found in Section 2.3.1.

Consistency with UNFCCC & MEAs

58. Eighty percent of survey respondents for this evaluation agree that UNEP's CCSP is relevant to “supporting UNFCCC objectives” under its current mandate and strategy. Key areas of cooperation that have been agreed with the UNFCCC Secretariat in a joint work programme under the period considered by the evaluation (starting in 2008) include:
- Strategic communications;
 - Utilizing UNEP's analytical capacity to support the negotiations process; and
 - Assisting developing countries in the international negotiations, including capacity building and the provision of targeted analysis, such as the role of public finance institutions in spurring low carbon investment.²⁹
59. The respective programme frameworks explain their relevance to the UNFCCC and other MEAs. UNEP's work on adaptation is a “direct response” to the IPCC AR4 and the Bali Action Plan, recognizing the importance of promoting adaptation and taking action in order to bring the convention into full force. The work is both “guided

²⁸ Among the persons who “agree” to a particular statement made in the survey, we count both those who selected the options “agree” and “strongly agree”. The majority (approximately 80%) of the 70 respondents for this question are UNEP staff which could have introduced a bias in the responses.

²⁹ UNEP 2009 (?). CC partnerships brochure.

by and will contribute to” the Nairobi Work Programme on Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation under UNFCCC. The activities supporting adaptation to climate change in various ecosystems is expected to contribute towards the attainment of MDG 7 (ensure environmental sustainability), and at the same time help ensure that climate change impacts are taken into account in the various activities towards its attainment.³⁰ REDD+ work, on the other hand, centres more on the shared vision for long-term cooperative action and a long-term goal for emission reductions in line with the Bali Action Plan by fostering South-South Cooperation and promoting partnerships between countries.³¹

60. The mitigation component relates to UNEP’s support of UNFCCC work streams in emissions reductions, especially pertaining to the Expert Group on Technology Transfer, and efforts on shaping and increasing targeted climate investment. Specifically, UNEP contributes through scientific assessments, policy and legislative advice, and by undertaking pilot interventions on clean technology readiness. Due to the development of the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the relative attention on climate finance (climate finance readiness, energy finance, forming investment plans etc.) has recently increased. The science and outreach component also falls under an advisory/technical role in relation to the UNFCCC and negotiations process since its main target audience is climate negotiators and decision makers. The component addresses science and communication by developing scientific climate change information support packages for use at the global and sub-global levels.
61. There is no indication in the Programme Framework Documents of an intent to align with or complement other major multilateral agreements or strategies that have integrated climate change into their focal areas such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) or the UN International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR).

Complementarity with broader response

62. Based on its areas of relative strength under the CCSP, UNEP forms strategic partnerships to leverage resources, technical and operational assistance, and dissemination/outreach support. The UNEP Programmes of Work present a short list of potential partners (generally two or three, such as UNDP, Risoe Centre, World Bank, UN-REDD etc.) under each POW Output, without details on the role of those partners, their complementary efforts/initiatives, and/or how UNEP would engage with them on these outputs.³² Regional and national partners are to be identified based on country requests for support – existing and necessary long-standing regional partnerships critical to the achievement of specific components at the regional level are not mentioned. The Programme Framework Documents contain additional details on the role and nature of complementary efforts and collaborative intent with key partners. Key actors/initiatives include:
63. **Adaptation Component:** The PF for adaptation is void of a section on partnership roles/contributions and sister initiatives, but this is because the PF builds on existing projects already under implementation. UNEP’s primary partners under this component are national government and UN agencies. Engagement with regional adaptation networks ensures continued relevance to regional needs and priorities. In Africa, the CC-DARE project is mentioned as a key initiative to build on, as are the numerous UNEP-GEF projects supporting National Adaptation Plans of Action (NAPAs) in 15 countries. The PF document also mentions contributing towards existing projects dealing with water resources management and target ecosystems – dry lands, mountains, and coastal areas – though specific partners and roles envisioned to ensure complementarity are not drawn out.³³
64. **Mitigation Component:** The PF envisions both public and private partnerships as essential to the component’s success, and lists these key partners, including the UNFCCC, UNDP, World Bank, IPCC, IEA, UNIDO and private sector entities. For each of the listed partners there is a brief description of their roles relative to UNEP in the area of energy technology, clean energy, and/or policy, analysis/assessments. Climate finance partners are notably absent. Unique to the mitigation PF is a description of the UNEP internal branches and units and their relative contributions as related to the EAs.³⁴
65. **REDD+ Component:** UNEP’s REDD+ work is to be undertaken within the joint UNDP-FAO-UNEP UN-REDD Programme and in close collaboration with the UNFCCC and the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). Other key partners are the Coalition for Rainforest Nations, major tropical forest countries and key bilateral donors. The PF document also suggests key technical partners but not specific roles or UNEP’s relationship with

³⁰EA(a) PF p 5-6.

³¹EA(d) PF p 3-4.

³²UNEP POW 2012-13. P 33-38.

³³EA(a) PF p 6-7.

³⁴EA(b)&(c) PF p 8-9.

their initiatives. GEF-funded work on Agriculture, Forestry and other Land Use (AFOLU) is also named as an area on which UNEP will build at regional and country levels. The distinct communities that the programme must “foster partnerships” between are climate, forest, agroforestry and development. Absent from the list are the World Bank’s CIF and also Indigenous (rights) groups.³⁵

66. **Science and Outreach Component:** UNEP is to play a lead role in communication and outreach for the UNFCCC, closely tied to UNEP’s leadership in coordination processes of the Chief Executives Board for Coordination of the UN System / High Level Committee on Programmes (HLCP). Also, UNEP’s analytical capacity is meant to support international climate change negotiations. UNEP is expected to work with the IPCC through capacity building of scientists and potential contributors from developing countries, developing strategic scientific publications that bridge the gap between periodic IPCC assessments; and helping to communicate the results of the IPCC assessments to a wider audience. Collaboration is envisioned with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the Stockholm Environment Institute, the UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre (WCMC) and UN-Habitat.³⁶
67. During the period considered by this evaluation, the Division of Regional Cooperation (DRC) also had the responsibility of managing UNEP’s coordination and relations with key partners as tied to sub-regional cooperation under MEAs and other international resolutions. The Major Groups and Stakeholders Branch (MGSB), with core staff in Nairobi and focal points in the Regional Offices, was created to help widen the scope of work with civil society and better align to the principles and approach of Agenda 21 regarding public participation.³⁷
68. Another means of ensuring collaboration and reducing duplication of effort is the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) Common Country Programming process, which allows UNEP to develop joint programmes, mainly with UNDP, on climate change interventions at the national level, giving UNEP opportunities and visibility on the ground.³⁸ However, evidence from Regional Offices and field visits reveal a spotty record for UNEP’s implementation of or compliance with the UNDAF at the country level, and more generally a challenging relationship between UNDP and UNEP. A further discussion on internal and external partners is presented in section 2.3.4.

2.1.4 How does UNEP intend to contribute to the CCSP objectives?

69. This question addresses the appropriateness of approaches used and outputs delivered to achieve the Climate Change Sub-programme objectives. Each of the CCSP components appear to have delivery mechanisms relevant to UNEP’s objectives, and to have developed products and services to better match technical and planning/policy needs requested by countries over the period considered by the evaluation. Despite its lower emphasis relative to other components on the whole (in terms of budget and number of projects), the science and outreach component has produced some highly visible outputs such as the annual Emissions Gap Reports (since 2010) and the Black Carbon Report (2011)³⁹. UNEP has not always been able, however, to keep up with demands for platforms on exchange and learning, including virtual interactions and translation/dissemination of materials. Long-term multi-agency collaborations with the UN and/or public sector partners have been particularly effective, while other partnerships (private sector, non-UN organisations) have been less successful to date in contributing to CCSP objectives.

Modalities for delivery

70. Generally, the “how” of UNEP’s objectives is defined at the project level; i.e. the project is the modality for how activities and outputs will contribute to high-level objectives. Projects are delivered through a variety of products and services, in the form of technical assistance, policy advice, workshops/trainings, papers/reports, assessments, scientific research, etc. UNEP’s work is largely normative and focuses on supporting the uptake of scientific information and best practices in policies, strategies and their implementation. Interventions of a more operational nature are usually limited to developing, testing and demonstrating tools and approaches in a restricted geographical area, that are expected to be up-scaled at the national level through much larger, national programmes often supported by other development agencies. Outlined in each of the original Programme

³⁵EA(d) PF p 5.

³⁶EA(e) PF p 6.

³⁷UN SLNG 2009. *Engagement with External Actors*. United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP). http://www.un-ngls.org/spip.php?page=article_fr_s&id_article=814

³⁸Survey respondent.

³⁹UNEP and WMO 2011 – Integrated Assessment of Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone

Framework Documents are key types of outputs and activities under the component, sometimes framed within specific projects or programmes:

71. **Adaptation Component - EA(a):** The adaptation component was envisioned as a comprehensive package of three projects that, taken together, were intended to constitute a coherent response to adaptation needs:
- Impact and vulnerability assessment project (Project 1aP3)
 - Adaptation capacity, policy and planning support projects (Project 1aP2)
 - Ecosystem-based adaptation support projects (Project 1aP3)⁴⁰
72. **Mitigation Component - EA(b) and EA(c):** UNEP's approach to mitigation is through three core "services," namely:
- Analysis of GHG emission reduction opportunities made possible by new technologies and efforts to shift to a green economy;
 - Assistance to public sector entities that support development of better policies and planning processes, consistent with evolving global norms; and
 - Promotion of private sector opportunities for expanding markets for low GHG goods and services made possible through conducive government policies.⁴¹
73. **REDD+ Component - EA(d):** When the REDD+ component was designed, it built on the following two projects, which continued through cooperation with the UN-REDD Programme:
- UN-REDD Programme: a global and national support programme implemented by UNEP, UNDP and FAO. UNEP contributes to readiness at country and global level on tools and methodology to determine reference to emission levels, systems for monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV), multiple benefits, payment distribution mechanisms, and REDD+ strategies.
 - Carbon benefits project – modelling, measurement and monitoring: Implemented by UNEP, Colorado State University, WWF and others. UNEP specifically provides rigorous, cost-effective tools to establish carbon benefits of sustainable land use in terms of carbon stocks and reduced GHG emissions.⁴²
74. **Science and Outreach Component - EA(e):** Science and outreach efforts were designed along the following key deliverable/project areas that target national level policy-makers and negotiators, civil society groups, and the private sector:
- Scientific Support package for global and national climate information (Project 1-e-P1)
 - Climate Negotiators support package (Project 1-e-P2)
 - Climate Communication, education and outreach package (Project 1-e-P3)⁴³
75. As illustrated in Chart 2 below, the survey conducted for this evaluation shows on average that only half of all respondents found that UNEP climate change sub-programme activities and outputs are clearly linked to intended results (in terms of outcomes and impacts) in each component. The percentage of respondents that resolutely found that linkages were not clear was low (about 5 percent), but between one third (adaptation) and half (REDD+) of respondents were unsure about those linkages. Since the large majority of survey participants are UNEP staff and involved in the CCSP, this high uncertainty may be indicative of a lack of exposure of staff to the work carried out in components they are not directly involved with, or, at the very least, of a lack of effective communication between components.

⁴⁰EA(a) PF p6

⁴¹EA(b) and (c) PF p 6-8.

⁴²EA(d) PF p 4-5.

⁴³EA(e) PF p 5-6.




Chart 2. Survey responses to “Are UNEP climate change sub-programme activities and outputs clearly linked to intended results (in terms of outcomes and impacts) in each programme framework?” (n = 5944)

76. Many of UNEP’s deliverables are pitched at the global level but are well known at the country level. On the basis of interviews, some of UNEP’s more widely read publications are the Emissions Gap Reports, the Black Carbon Report, and also flagship publications covering CC as part of a wider range of topics (GEO Report, the Green Economy Report). Also particularly strong are some of its regional and/or global platforms for technology transfer, and adaptation policy and research. In competition with the GEF, UNEP (DTIE) was recently awarded by the UNFCCC with the position of hosting – in collaboration with UNIDO - the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), which was considered a great affirmation of UNEP’s approach and foundation of work in clean tech. The Programme of Research on Climate Change Vulnerability, Impacts and Adaptation (PROVIA), managed by DEWA, and the Asia-Pacific Adaptation Network (APAN), with Secretariat at ROAP, are also two other platforms considered highly appropriate to UNEP’s role as a convener and coordinator around building capacities for adaptation.
77. UNEP’s effective collaborative partnerships utilize the relative contributions of UN-Agencies and also engage dedicated and/or strategic government counterparts in country. For example, the Poverty-Environment Initiative (PEI) collaborates across various government actors, including powerful Finance Ministries, and the UN-REDD Programme engages UNDP, UNEP and FAO. Similarly, South-South cooperative actions, such as the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology - UNEP Cooperation Action on Water / China-UN Water Resource project in Africa can be highly appropriate and effective with the right balance of structured partnerships and country ownership. Also, in terms of convening, broadly speaking, UNEP workshops and trainings are very well received as key functions of UNEP at the activities and output level; however, their outcomes are often untracked and unknown.
78. One of the difficulties in identifying “how” – or whether – UNEP does contribute to its high level objectives through specific services or products is that projects are lumped together under larger ‘umbrella projects’, which may contain several sets of products and services (from different ‘sub-projects’) that are reported under a single output or indicator. Several sub-projects under the larger umbrella projects did not go through the in-house quality assurance process (Project Review Committee – PRC)⁴⁵ and therefore their relevance to the UNEP POWs and quality-at-entry was not verified at the corporate level in UNEP beyond the sub-programme and Division designing and managing the project. Understanding the appropriateness of a particular approach is impossible if the narrative and corroborating evidence is absent and to explain how particular products and services were received and used in a specific context.
79. A regular internal review, and periodic independent assessment of measures taken up at the country and/or regional level on the basis of UNEP outputs/assessments or activities, are usually absent from regular reporting and assessment processes. These could be very useful for learning what and why particular measures, models, and methods might be appropriate to high-level objectives.

⁴⁴ n = 58 for REDD

⁴⁵ The evaluation team notes that it was unable to determine exactly how many sub-projects, under each umbrella project, did go through a quality review process with the PRCs. This statement is deduced from interviews and a lack of PRC review comments reports at the sub-project level.

80. The results of the survey conducted for this evaluation indicate that eighty per cent of survey respondents agree that UNEP is relevant to “providing coordination and/or platforms for learning and information exchange,” under its current mandate. However, there are some concerns regarding UNEP's efforts to providing good quality products and services to this end, as this delivery mechanism appears to be undermined by increasingly ‘malfunctioning web-hosting services’⁴⁶ and lack of IT support at HQs. Either these platforms need to function more smoothly or the alternative is to give HQs a role of providing guidance, but to further decentralize operations closer to project implementation (to Regional Offices and Technical Divisions).
81. South-South cooperation is a delivery modality intended to enhance UNEP’s ability to deliver environmental capacity building and technology-support activities in developing countries and regions of the South. The MTS refers to South-South cooperation as a process to implement the Bali Strategic Plan (a UNEP GC Decision from 2004), however, South-South cooperation is neither clearly captured in the MTS SP Expected Accomplishments nor in the CCSP POW Outputs. Although the South-south Cooperation Unit undertakes a number of activities and guidance on integration of SSC approaches into the POWs, as well as coordination with other UN agencies for strategic partnerships, these are not sufficiently reflected in the CCSP design and results framework.

2.1.5 Where should UNEP focus its CCSP efforts?

82. This question concerns the adequacy of the geographical scope and country targeting strategy of the Climate Change Sub-programme. The evaluation concludes that the CCSP has a strong country-level engagement though UNEP’s products and services are best known and demanded at the global level. Regional Offices (ROs) have grown in size and responsibility over the period considered by the evaluation, but demand for localized problem-solving and regionally-based partnering seems to exceed UNEP’s capacity to respond. There is a great need to outline criteria for country engagement, and a frank internal discussion on the balance between different levels of engagement and expectations as a result of increased levels of extra-budgetary funding.
83. In the case of mitigation, work is largely centred on UNEP’s perceived organizational and/or thematic comparative advantages (e.g. expertise in scientific and economic assessment, convening power, etc.), and the same has followed for REDD+ (multiple benefits, carbon accounting, etc.) and science and outreach. Due to its focus on ecosystems and ecosystem services, the adaptation component is one exception among the components, however, as it has identified focal areas on the basis of geographic features/landscapes and vulnerability (e.g. Africa, small island states, and areas with mega deltas; ecosystems vulnerable to climate change – mangroves, coral reefs, low-lying coasts and dry lands; mountains and tropical forests in highly vulnerable ecosystems in Asia and Latin America).⁴⁷
84. The role and mandate of UNEP is primarily at a global level (e.g. responsiveness to the UNFCCC and the Bali Action Plan). The UNEP climate change objectives are, however, largely centred at the country level, aimed toward assisting (developing) countries to integrate climate change into national development planning processes. The MTS was designed through a mapping process of examining country needs and priorities using the results from various regional and national documents and ministerial as well as expert fora. This helped to align regional and national priorities with global priorities. However, there does not appear to be a clear approach on engagement with particular countries, nor a coherent strategy for identifying potential new partner countries, nor a great attention for possible synergies at the regional level.
85. The scope and scale of UNEP interventions appear to primarily flow from the UNFCCC and its funding mechanisms, and support from other major donors, as well as existing partnerships or relationships in countries and regions. UNEP’s criteria for identifying and designing interventions are therefore shaped primarily by UNFCCC priorities and/or the partner countries’ policies and objectives, and are not necessarily directly derived from areas of greatest climatic stresses. For instance, the GEF Least Developed Countries Fund funds most of UNEP’s adaptation projects, which are therefore mostly located in Least Developed Countries (LDCs). But, as a result, some areas with great climatic stress that are not LDCs, such as the Arctic or middle income coastal cities on deltas, receive far less attention. Countries are targeted by donors and aid agencies under their respective strategies and programmes of work (ADB, World Bank, EU, bilaterals, etc), and, therefore, even though requests come from the countries or regional offices, funding is only made available through a process of coordination between countries, the Division Director and the respective donors. The trend toward donor-tied preferences increases in cases where extra-

⁴⁶Survey respondent and multiple interview respondents.

⁴⁷EA a PF p6.

budgetary funding far exceeds the Environment Fund (EF) in any particular thematic area of work – and this seems largely the case in the CCSP.

86. Several partner country interviewees and UNEP staff perceive that UNEP doesn't work in countries or regions where it does not have a high potential to showcase positive results and/or have high visibility. This is likely true for interventions meant to test and demonstrate approaches as part of larger regional or global programmes. While the policy of giving precedence to countries where UNEP support is expected to make a timely and visible contribution may be a strategic and welcomed practice on the whole, UNEP could be more transparent about this targeting approach both towards internal and external audiences. The consequence of selecting countries with adequate capacity and resources to successfully implement pilots, is that learning from pilots regarding capacity building and resource mobilisation at the national level is limited, even though these are challenges that are likely to be met in many countries where replication is desired.
87. On the basis of evidence reviewed, the CCSP is dominated by global and national level initiatives, with regional engagement and the role of the ROs somewhat unclear in between these two scales of effort. While regional presence has increased over the period considered by the evaluation (2008 to 2013), there is still a demand for more resources to be devoted to the regional level for technical and administrative support to respond to regional and country-specific needs. Connections across common goals and barriers to effective climate change policies at the regional level, and especially through organizations of political and economic cooperation, have been largely overlooked in programme strategies and delivery mechanisms as a means to improve sustainability, ensure ownership, and shape and increase potential impacts. The addition of regional outputs is a good start, but the regional delivery mechanisms are muted in the CCSP, and the artificial breakdown of the sub-regions (Africa, West Asia, etc.) does not serve the purpose of aligning UNEP's strategy with some key ongoing collaborative efforts and initiatives based on trade and/or economics. The needs have yet to be met in a "visible, strategic, systematic, and meaningful manner, through support to existing and emerging Regional groupings such as Southern African Development Community (SADC), Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), Central American Integration System (SICA), and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)."⁴⁸ For instance, in expanding use of better technologies one has to consider the underlying markets and trade patterns, which often are an ill match for the political boundaries of the UNEP Regions.

2.2 Overall Performance of the Sub-programme

2.2.1 Effectiveness

Introduction and overview

88. Effectiveness is defined as the extent to which UNEP achieved the direct outcomes as identified in the reconstructed CCSP Theory of Change (See Figure 3). This section explores UNEP's progress and challenges in reaching its intended output and outcome targets under the corresponding programmes of work for the period considered by the evaluation of 2008-12. Even though the initial cut-off data for information collection for this evaluation was 31 December 2012, more up-to-date information up to the end of 2013 from the UNEP Programme Performance Report (PPR) 2012/13 and PIMS was incorporated during finalisation of the report.
89. The evaluation found that reporting in PPRs and PIMS is positively biased to listing successes and largely omitting failures. This affects the below assessment of sub-programme effectiveness, creating an overly positive impression of achievement. The reader needs to be aware of this bias in interpreting the results presented below, which to a large extent only show the successful side of UNEP's work.
90. Tables 2 and 3 below show the level of achievement of Expected Accomplishments and POW Outputs for the biennia 2010-11 and 2012-13 based on reporting in the UNEP PPRs. Achievement of EA indicator targets exceeded expectations across the sub-programme with only a few exceptions where the target was still expected to be met with some delay. In one instance, no records were kept on the indicator making reporting impossible.

Table 2. Achievement of indicator targets for Expected Accomplishment for the MTS period 2010-2013

	2010/11	2012/13
EA(a)	Adaptation considerations have been incorporated into national planning documents in 4 countries (target: 3)	5 additional countries (target: 4) have integrated adaptation, including an ecosystem-based approach,

⁴⁸Survey respondent.

	and adaptation planning activities are underway in many more.	into their national development plans with the assistance of UNEP
EA(b)	20 countries (target: 16) are in the process of identifying and implementing clean energy policies and measures as a result of UNEP supported projects.	27 additional countries (target: 8) implement energy plans, including low-carbon alternatives, with explicit renewable energy or energy efficiency policies with the assistance of UNEP
EA(c)	More than USD 200 million in total value of investments (target: USD 200 million) that result from UNEP projects in clean energy.	USD 432 million (target: USD 300 million) in national investments in clean technology projects and projects related to adaptation and mitigation supported by UNEP, implemented with international climate change funding with the assistance of UNEP
EA(d)	USD 150 million have been mobilized (target: USD 25 million). The UN-REDD Programme has expanded beyond the initial 9 pilot countries to provide support in over a dozen countries.	(i) 12 additional countries (target: 5) implementing sustainable forest management plans, including REDD+ plans, with the assistance of UNEP (ii) 3 new REDD+ investment plans (target: 5)
EA(e)	(i) Monthly average of 169,540 visits of UNEP climate related web pages (target: 64,800). (ii) Access to relevant climate change science was enhanced and integrated into national programs and decision-making entities in 12 instances (target: 14).	(i) Unknown change in the number of sector-specific local, national and regional development plans that incorporate climate-related assessments with the assistance of UNEP (ii) 34,005 recorded instances (target: 1850) where findings or results from UNEP climate change work was reported in press and media with the assistance of UNEP

Legend: Green = target achieved or overachieved; red = target not achieved

91. The proportion of POW outputs for which targets were achieved or exceeded went down from about 79 to 67 per cent between the 2010/11 and 2012/13 biennia, mainly due to incomplete reporting on POW output indicators. The proportion of POW outputs that were delivered below target slightly increased from about one in seven to one in six. Delivery of outputs across components presented a somewhat mixed picture. Over the two biennia, the output delivery ratio remained consistently high for EA(e) - Science and Outreach, made a marked improvement for EA(b) - Clean Energy - and lost some ground on EA(d) - REDD+. Delivery on output targets decreased the most on EA(c) - Energy Finance - where two out of three targets were not achieved.

Table 3. Delivery of POW output targets for the MTS period 2010-2013

	2010/11				2012/13			
	Reporting incomplete (%)	Outputs below target (%)	Outputs on target (%)	Outputs exceeding target (%)	Reporting incomplete (%)	Outputs below target (%)	Outputs on target (%)	Outputs exceeding target (%)
EA(a)	14		43	43	40		20	40
EA(b)	17	50	17	17			33	67
EA(c)		20	40	40		67		33
EA(d)			50	50		33		67
EA(e)			50	50	25		25	50
Overall	7	14	39	39	17	17	17	50

Legend: Green = target achieved or overachieved; red = target not achieved or reporting incomplete

Source: UNEP Programme Performance Reports 2010/11 and 2012/13 and PIMS

92. This reported performance at the output level was not always consistent with the reported levels of achievement of EA indicator targets, the latter being very high across the board with only few exceptions. This finding leads us to question the quality of the indicators both at EA and POW output level and, in some cases, also the strength of the causal linkages between POW outputs and the EAs. The increase in incomplete reporting on the achievement of output targets, might have to do with the positive reporting bias mentioned above (unachieved targets were deliberately not reported upon) or with the fact that the number of outputs was reduced between the two biennia leaving less room for comprehensive reporting on outputs (PIMS allows for a maximum of 150 words for each output – and the PPR is distilled mainly from PIMS).
93. As illustrated in Chart 3 below, survey respondents came to similar conclusions when asked whether the climate change sub-programme was reaching the objectives of each component. The vast majority would place UNEP's effectiveness in the satisfactory zone, but only about one third of respondents felt that UNEP was more than

moderately effective in reaching component goals. This proportion was higher for the science and outreach component (44 per cent) and respondent comments indeed suggested a higher perception of effectiveness in science and outreach - and the science-policy interface. This observation may be related to its cross-cutting nature as part of the foundation of all other components, but may also be due to the more realistic results level at which EA(e) is pitched compared to the others for the POW 2010/11, in that it encompasses access to relevant climate change science and information for decision-making, rather than behavioural change as a result of better awareness and information.




Chart 3. Survey Responses to “Is the UNEP climate change sub-programme effective in reaching its high-level objectives (according to each performance framework area)?” (n = 59)

94. Overall, survey responses and interviews with UNEP staff and field visit partners viewed UNEP as becoming more effective by being more focused and strategic under the CCSP over the course of the period considered by the evaluation. But about one quarter of survey respondents and interviewees stated that they were unsure - not in a position to say, either because their particular work had not changed or they had too little knowledge of the full range of CC work by UNEP to judge where the CCSP was particularly (in)effective.

Direct Outcomes

95. The direct outcomes identified for the CCSP by the reconstructed TOC (see Section 2.1.1) are presented in Table 4 with the related direct outcomes from the reconstructed TOC of each of the climate change sub-programme components⁴⁹. Direct outcomes are those changes outside UNEP interventions resulting from the use of UNEP products and services, for which UNEP can be held largely accountable. Effectiveness is defined as the extent to which direct outcomes have been attained. Beyond direct outcomes, more and more external factors and conditions come into play to support or inhibit changes, and the level of accountability of UNEP diminishes accordingly.

Table 4. CCSP Direct outcomes based on Reconstructed Theories of Change

CCSP Direct Outcomes	Related component outcomes
DO 1. Improved access of partner countries to appropriate adaptation, mitigation and REDD+ information, approaches, measures and technologies.	<p>Adaptation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Countries undertake ecosystem focused adaptation and vulnerability assessments to increase their knowledge and understanding of local vulnerabilities and opportunities to adapt to climate change • In-country capacity to implement adaptation actions, including ecosystem-based adaptation approaches, is strengthened • Effective adaptation measures are available and well-known in dry lands, low lying areas and mountains <p>Mitigation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Effective knowledge networks inform and support policy reform processes

⁴⁹ The TOCs reconstructed for each component can be found in the Working Papers prepared for this evaluation.

	<p>and RE and EE programmes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Technologies are available to countries for using clean, more efficient and renewable energy sources <p>REDD+</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enhanced country capacities for assessing drivers of deforestation and conduct full terrestrial carbon accounting, and for identifying and applying safeguards and multiple benefits - including carbon - of sustainable land-use and forestry
DO 2. Improved enabling policies and regulatory frameworks for adaptation, mitigation and REDD+ in partner countries.	<p>Adaptation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> National capacities for adaptation policy and planning are strengthened in countries in Asia and the Pacific and Africa National policies and plans for climate change adaptation are strengthened, incorporating an ecosystems-based adaptation approach <p>Mitigation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Countries develop broad national mitigation policies and plans using technical and economic assessments and analyses of policy options Countries develop technology specific plans through public-private collaboration to promote markets for cleaner energy technologies and phase-out of inefficient technologies Countries have an enabling policy and planning framework in place that promotes the adoption of cleaner, more efficient and renewable energy sources <p>REDD+</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Partner countries identify and understand needs and gaps in forestry and land use policies and plans Improved national legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks governing land use and forestry
DO 3. Increased partner country capacity and potential to leverage and secure climate financing.	<p>Adaptation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capacities enhanced in countries to gain (direct) access to adaptation financing Increased investment in climate change adaptation <p>Mitigation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Barriers are removed to financing for RE and EE technologies at the national level Countries' access to private and public financing for RE and EE technologies is increased <p>REDD+</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enhanced country capacities to leverage investments in sustainable land-use and forestry Countries have sustainable REDD+ investment strategies directing investments toward sustainable land and resource use

96. The following describes examples in detail under each component for each direct outcome.

Direct Outcome 1. Improved access of partner countries to appropriate adaptation, mitigation and REDD+ information, approaches, measures and technologies

Adaptation

97. The main entry point of UNEP's climate change adaptation work is through promoting Ecosystem-based Adaptation (EbA). EbA is defined by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) as "the use of biodiversity and ecosystem services to help people adapt to the adverse effects of climate change". This definition also includes the

“sustainable management, conservation and restoration of ecosystems, as part of an overall adaptation strategy that takes into account the multiple social, economic and cultural co-benefits for local communities”⁵⁰. EbA embraces the integrated management of land, water and living resources that promotes conservation and sustainable use in an equitable way, in the context of supporting communities in coping with climate change impacts. It therefore employs familiar tools and measures but conceptualizes and implements them specifically for adaptation to climate change.⁵¹

98. UNEP’s Vulnerability and Impacts Assessments (VIAs), training and adaptation knowledge products have been in high demand over the period considered by the evaluation, and have been well received by partner countries. Specifically, UNEP has strengthened capacities to conduct VIAs in about 40 countries by supporting nine national Environment and Climate Change Outlooks (ECCOs), seven city-level ECCOs and four sub-regional ECCOs (in West Africa, the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, the Pacific and the Caribbean, and the Andes and Chacos) with training and technical assistance on VIA. Also, a methodology for climate change vulnerability and impact assessment (VIA) in cities has been peer reviewed and finalized and made available online, together with a general VIA module and e-learning course. A number of thematic climate change vulnerability studies were supported as well regarding specific ecosystems and issues such as coral reefs in the Netherlands Antilles, sea-level rise in Senegal and China, mountain ecosystems in Peru, Uganda and Nepal and hydrological modelling in the Nile River Basin, providing governments with a better understanding of specific vulnerabilities to climate change. In 2013, UNEP published the report *Africa’s Adaptation Gap* highlighting the continent’s increasing vulnerability to climate change and providing estimates of adaptation costs. Guidance on the environmental and financial benefits and costs of 40 EbA actions was produced in the context of partnership with microfinance institutions. Cost-benefit analyses of EbA in mountain ecosystems are under way in several countries.
99. UNEP has promoted South-South cooperation for knowledge exchange and information sharing on adaptation. For example platforms such as the Regional Gateway for Technology Transfer and Climate Change Action (REGATTA) in Latin America, the Africa Adaptation Knowledge Network (AAKNet), the Asia Pacific Adaptation Network (APAN), the Adaptation Knowledge Platform for Asia (AKP) and the Global Adaptation Network (GAN) act as hubs for linking southern centres of excellence working on adaptation-related activities. REGATTA, for instance, has developed an online knowledge platform⁵² providing a listing of key climate change institutions and Regional Centres of Knowledge and Technology, information on climate change negotiation topics, links to communities of practice and an inventory of initiatives on adaptation, mitigation and technology development in the region and tools, methods, case studies, best practices and lessons learned. REGATTA has established agreements with various Knowledge Centres for Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation in the region in order to strengthen its reach and leadership in the region. Some activities include participatory workshops and on-line discussion forums through “Communities of Practice”, conducted in collaboration with the IDB (Inter-American Development Bank), sub-regional vulnerability and hotspot analyses and legal framework assessments. APAN together with AKP has fostered generation and exchange of knowledge and practices in Asia, and supported integration of knowledge into decision making processes. They have launched a web portal; organized learning seminars; knowledge management workshops and training needs assessment; undertaken a review of assessment frameworks; methods and tools; conducted gap analyses; needs assessments and a compilation of good adaptation practices in South Asia; as well as initiated knowledge support activities in the five sub-regions. Training Needs Assessments have been undertaken in five countries, and training modules for the agriculture sector developed in Bangladesh, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Mongolia and Nepal. Also, the International Ecosystem Management Partnership (UNEP-IEMP), a collaborative centre of UNEP hosted by the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) in Beijing created in November 2011, has documented and disseminated experiences and knowledge on using an ecosystem management approach toward a green economy.
100. At the global level, Adaptation Knowledge Days I and II in Bonn in June 2010 and 2011 brought together policy-makers and practitioners to exchange knowledge and experiences. In Africa, good adaptation practices have been synthesized across the Nile River Basin, for dissemination through networks. Efforts are underway to develop similar networks in West Asia and in Africa.

⁵⁰ <http://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/?id=12299>

⁵¹ <http://ebaflagship.org/images/ContentsForPublications/eba%20policy%20brochure%20web.pdf>

⁵² <http://www.cambioclimatico-regatta.org/index.php/en/>

101. While UNEP has built a large volume of knowledge products and formed networks and databases on research and experiences, interviewees suggest that because of the complex and relatively new technical concepts and challenges that adaptation presents, hands-on support activities (thematic workshops, specific trainings, active knowledge exchange events) that connect actors with that information are preferred over more passive approaches to making knowledge available such as publications and websites.
102. Piloting was a key strategy to in-country capacity development to implement EbA actions, as it can demonstrate the potential of taking on particular methods or strategies. UNEP relied heavily on in-country partners to pilot EbA practices on the ground, and then sought to up-scale the EbA pilots through UN agencies (FAO and UNDP) and other partnerships. During the period considered by the evaluation, UNEP implemented three large umbrella projects that offered a “comprehensive package” approach (e.g. ranging from vulnerability assessments, over adaptation capacity building and demonstration projects, to supporting governments in adaptation policy setting, planning, and implementation). The EbA Mountains project, for example, was launched in parallel in three countries of Latin-America (Peru), Africa (Uganda) and Asia (Nepal) to build national capacities to strengthen ecosystem resilience for promoting ecosystem based adaptation (EBA) options and to reduce the vulnerability of communities, with particular emphasis on mountain ecosystems. The project is a joint and complementary effort of UNEP, UNDP and IUCN with UNDP and IUCN ensuring country level coordination through the UN country teams. The project will develop and test adaptation methodologies and tools for mountain ecosystems through EbA pilots at the ecosystem level, and is expected to influence national policies by building an economic case for EbA. The evaluation field visit to Peru found the project well underway. In Tanzania, UNEP is also supporting climate change adaptation projects (AF and LCDF supported adaptation project) implemented by the Division of Environment, Vice Presidents Office. The two projects that began in 2012 pilot innovative adaptation solutions on coastal areas that will result into increased institutional and local level capacity to effectively analyse and address the threats resulting from climate change along coastal areas in Tanzania.
103. Most UNEP interventions at country level are pilots of distinct regional or global projects that are managed by different staff in Regional Offices and UNEP Nairobi. Of the adaptation projects in the evaluation sample, the project managers are mostly in Nairobi (eight projects) and Paris (two planned projects and one implemented project). Many of these projects have not been designed in a way that would promote collaboration with other projects and programmes (including UNEP projects) at the country level; and therefore there is a loss of opportunities for realizing their full potential. Also, maybe because of the pilot nature of in-country interventions, stakeholder analysis was often weak and/or community engagement not clearly defined, decreasing the technical and strategic value of the pilots. In addition, more consideration is needed to account for already multiple on-going interventions⁵³ initiated during earlier planning cycles, and stronger incentives and practical agreements are needed with UN partners to ensure that successfully demonstrated approaches move beyond the pilot phase.

Mitigation

104. UNEP’s technical global studies, such as the Emissions Gap Reports, as well as national Technology Needs Assessments, are in high demand and have been very well received and respected by the international community and partner countries. These important analyses continue to inform climate change negotiations and new climate initiatives with mitigation components.
105. UNEP, together with the scientific community, published the first Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2010) just ahead of the Climate Convention meeting in Cancún (COP 16 – November 2010). This report synthesized the latest scientific knowledge about the possible gap between the global emissions levels in 2020 consistent with the 2° C target versus the expected levels if countries fulfil their emission reduction pledges. Many parties to the Climate Convention found this analysis useful as a reference point for establishing the level of ambition that countries needed to pursue in controlling their greenhouse gas emissions. As a result they asked UNEP to produce annual follow-ups, with updates of the gap and advice on how to close it. Besides updating the estimates of the emissions gap, the 2011 report also looked at feasible ways of bridging the gap from two perspectives (UNEP, 2011). The first was from the top-down viewpoint of integrated models, which showed that feasible transformations in the energy system and other sectors would lower global emissions enough to meet the 2° C target. The second was a bottom-up perspective, which examined the emissions reduction potential in each of the main emissions-producing sectors of the economy. These bottom-up estimates showed that enough total potential exists to bridge the emissions gap in 2020. The 2012 report presented an update of the gap but also good examples of best-practice policy

⁵³ CC DARE Terminal Evaluation Report p.65-68.

instruments for reducing emissions. Among these were actions such as implementing appliance standards and vehicle fuel-efficiency guidelines, which are working successfully in many parts of the world and are ready for application elsewhere to help reduce emissions. The 2013 report reviews the latest estimates of the emissions gap in 2020 and provides plentiful additional information relevant to the climate negotiations. Included are the latest estimates of: the current level of global greenhouse gas emissions based on authoritative sources; national emission levels, both current (2010) and projected (2020), consistent with current pledges and other commitments; global emission levels consistent with the 2° C target in 2020, 2030 and 2050; and progress being made in different parts of the world to achieve substantial emission reductions. New to this fourth report is an assessment of the extent to which countries are on track to meet their national pledges. Also new is a description of the many cooperative climate initiatives being undertaken internationally among many different actors – public, private, and from civil society. Special attention is given to analysing new scenarios that assume later action for mitigation, compared to those used earlier to compute the emissions gap. The report also describes new findings from scientific literature about the impacts of later action to reduce global emissions. This year the report reviews best practices in reducing emissions in an often-overlooked emissions-producing sector – agriculture. Innovative ideas are described for transforming agriculture into a more sustainable, low-emissions form.

106. Technology transfer to developing countries was a topic of intense discussion following the Rio Summit in 1992 but the discourse on climate-relevant technology transfer really culminated in the endorsement by COP 14 (December 2008) of the Poznan Strategic Programme on Technology Transfer, under which the GEF was mandated to provide funding (about 9M US\$ GEF grant complemented by 2,85 M US\$ in co-financing) for implementation of improved Technology Needs Assessments (TNAs), building on lessons learned from the initial efforts during the 1999-2004 period. Launched in 2009, the TNA project was entrusted to UNEP which provided, in collaboration with the Risoe Centre, support to 36 countries to prioritize mitigation sectors and technologies. To date (as of April 2013), 32 countries had completed their TNA reports with UNEP's assistance and 30 had also produced national Technology Action Plans (TAPs). Building on the TNAs, UNEP supports 7 countries for the design nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs). At the UNFCCC COP 18 in Doha held at the end of 2012, UNEP was chosen to host and manage the Climate Technology Centre and Networks, created by the UN Climate Change Conference in Cancun, in collaboration with UNIDO and 11 leading technical organizations from both developing and developed countries.
107. UNEP appears to have been very successful in establishing knowledge networks on energy and climate change mitigation in several parts of the world. They were seen as good opportunities to information exchange, comparative analyses and mutual learning by both country representatives met during the field visits and by UNEP staff posted in the regional offices. Interviewees in the field acknowledged the usefulness of these communities of practice and believed that partners tended to take advantage of the information resources provided as long as these were somehow linked to the UNEP project they were involved with. However, opportunities for partnerships between network members were frequently identified but rarely pursued unless funds were available to facilitate exchanges and maintain contacts among participants. In addition, if the selected topics did not exactly meet the interest of the countries, it was quite difficult to expect full involvement.
108. Regarding technologies, efforts made by UNEP in terms of capacity building, awareness raising, production of proven scientific material and publications, have enabled countries to have access to and use cleaner, more efficient and renewable energy technologies. Piloting at the country level has been an important intervention strategy. In terms of piloting alternative fuels and renewable energy technologies, under the Finance for Access to Clean Energy Technologies (FACET) project, Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines were selected as the 3 targeted countries for implementation. In Vietnam, biogas digesters and solar water heaters were selected as most appropriate for the FACET approach. Further analysis will be required to determine which of these technologies should be promoted, and the discussions with the financial partner are well advanced. FACET will promote biogas digester technology in Indonesia, and up-scale the usage of "green charcoal" for household cooking needs in the Philippines.

REDD+

109. As mentioned, UNEP works on REDD+ mainly through the UN-REDD programme in partnership with FAO and UNDP. FAO is responsible for giving technical assistance in measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) systems and related technical issues; UNDP advises on the development of institutional capacities related to governance, stakeholder engagement, safeguards, and fund management; and UNEP provides normative guidance in areas related to sector transformation (green economic development), safeguards, and the realisation of multiple benefits (MB) from avoided deforestation. By the end of 2013, the UN-REDD Programme has grown to include 51

registered partner countries – covering almost 60 percent of the world’s tropical forest, including 18 countries receiving support to National Programmes, and 29 that have received targeted support.

110. At a global level, findings from UNEP REDD+ activities are widely disseminated and the proliferation of platforms on REDD+ has advanced the availability of information and tools for understanding and addressing the drivers of deforestation. Partner country interviewees expressed great interest in REDD+ knowledge products and tools, though many were not aware which were developed with the support of UNEP vs. other development and forestry partners.
111. UNEP has met and exceeded targets for assessing land-use change, biodiversity, forest loss, carbon stocks and multiple benefits over the period considered by the evaluation. Over 2010/11, assessments for mapping land-use change, biodiversity and forest stocks have been completed in six countries, used in a variety of REDD+ Readiness activities including communication work, stakeholder engagement, identification and assessment of multiple ecosystem benefits etc. In 2013, UNEP completed a mapping study in Tanzania to increase understanding of the spatial distribution of potential REDD+ benefits and also to support decision-making on where and how REDD+ might be implemented. The Tanzania “model” was used to develop technical guidelines in the use of open source software for REDD+ planning and shaped work in at least six other countries where UNEP provided targeted support for the assessment of multiple benefits. Appropriate tools and protocols for modelling, measuring and monitoring the carbon benefits of sustainable land management (SLM) interventions, in terms of protected or enhanced carbon stocks and reduced greenhouse gas emissions, were produced and tested in projects in five countries. Standard protocols and tools were also designed for actual measurement of above-ground and soil carbon, combining remote sensing and ground sampling.
112. UNEP has contributed to establishing a useable knowledge base on the multiple benefits of REDD+. Knowledge on a wide array of elements of REDD+, from multiple ecosystem benefits to REDD+ as a potential for a green economy transition, has been generated and disseminated and lessons on multiple benefits and ecosystem services have been shared in a variety of fora. The proliferation of knowledge on REDD+ is apparent when compared to what little material was available at the start of 2010. UNEP has greatly added to this knowledge through its work on multiple ecosystem benefits, guidelines for safeguards (the Social and Environmental Principles and Criteria), and a policy brief outlining the potential opportunity for REDD+ to be a catalyst for a green economy transition entitled “REDD+ and the Green Economy: Opportunities for a mutually supportive relationship”. Besides generating knowledge, there has been much work to communicate it through different media including a monthly newsletter, films, side events at international fora, workshops and a dedicated website.
113. Although demand for UNEP technical assistance on assessments has generally remained strong, the 2012 PPR noted that the Country Needs Assessment for REDD+ indicated a waning political interest in some countries which could result in delays of implementation. As a response to this UNEP (within the UN-REDD Programme) is working on building a stronger business case for REDD+. Country interviews also revealed that partner governments sometimes struggle to gain internal support and secure funding for REDD+ work due to its cross-cutting nature between mitigation and forestry, and prevailing uncertainties on a global REDD+ financing mechanism. This amplifies the potential of UNEP’s role in creating awareness and generating materials and services that illustrate the multiple benefits of forests to partner countries beyond obtaining carbon financing.

Direct Outcome 2. Improved enabling policies and regulatory frameworks for adaptation, mitigation and REDD+ in partner countries

Adaptation

114. The initial performance indicators adopted for the 2010 – 2011 biennium counted the “number of concrete adaptation activities” in 40 countries. Since this measurement approach was not definitively attributable to the actions of UNEP, the sub-programme adopted improved units of measurement for the 2012-13 biennium that focused on measuring the number of countries incorporating adaptation in national development strategies and plans with the support of UNEP, and the number of such strategies and plans.⁵⁴ For continuity between the POWs into the 2014-2015 biennium, these units of measurement have remained relatively similar in order to allow for

⁵⁴ Nevertheless, UNEP is not the only actor supporting each partner country and therefore the improved policies and strategies are not solely attributable to UNEP.

the measurement of their cumulative targets (the target was seven countries by the end of 2013).⁵⁵ This indicator appears to be relevant and appropriate for the adaptation component.

115. UNEP has successfully supported numerous vulnerability assessments and technical studies across key sectors in partner countries that helped shape adaptation strategies and policies. For example, research completed through CC-DARE contributed toward creating opportunities for integrating climate change adaptation into national development planning and decision-making in 11 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Small Island Developing States. The EU funded project, *Climate Change Adaptation in the Alpine Space* helped integrate spatial planning into national adaptation strategies, e.g. in Switzerland and Austria.
116. To give some other concrete examples, adaptation needs were integrated in the National Science and Technology Policy in Malawi, and brought into the priorities of Bangladesh's Sixth 5-Year Plan through the UNDP/UNEP Poverty Environment Initiative. UNEP also supported the finalization of the Adaptation Strategy for Ghana, a climate change integration policy in Senegal, and the development of a National Adaptation Strategy in Turkey. Vietnam, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Bangladesh, each were supported by UNEP to develop a series of legal provisions to strengthen existing sector-specific laws and regulations as a foundation for the implementation of adaptation measures. The UNEP-PEI supported Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Reviews (CPEIR) in Tanzania, Bangladesh and Nepal were also particularly well-received by partner countries and have been heavily utilized for talking points for political actors and decision-makers.
117. In consultation with key ministry officials and relevant agencies, UNEP has been successful in supporting countries in their adaptation planning processes. Where requested, UNEP provided assistance to the development of NAPAs (e.g. Myanmar), but has also moved beyond broad plans into new specific arenas to inform governments and policies under the ecosystems-based adaptation approach, such as toward coastal ecosystems, urban settings and the agricultural sector. However, using the EbA approach as the forerunner "flagship" of the adaptation component is not without its challenges for wider scale policy application. Two of the underlying drivers for the adaptation component to reach high-level outcomes are that countries and partners need to be convinced of the usefulness of an EbA approach based on a credible case for the economic impacts of climate change and ecosystem services for adaptation, and EbA approaches will need to be mainstreamed in the adaptation support provided by other UN agencies.
118. Assessments initiated with funding from the previous biennium have been used to inform decision-making. Following a participatory vulnerability assessment of 13 provinces of Turkey, a National Adaptation Strategy has been developed and the Government has allocated funds for follow-up. Assessments in Mozambique and the Philippines were used to integrate climate change into development plans (provincial, water, agriculture, health). In Senegal, a projected movement of the shoreline due to sea level rise has led to the urban development plans of two coastal settlements being updated. In China, reports were completed on impacts of sea level rise and glacier melt in the Himalaya region. Four provincial impact reports were also developed for incorporation into 2011-2015 Development Plans.
119. Over the evaluation period considered, UNEP has been relatively successful in encouraging and influencing CC adaptation policies and strategies. The UN Joint Programme on CCA in the Philippines, for example, was successful in delivering most of the outputs expected from the intervention, and some of these outputs could have a strategic impact on climate change adaptation in the Philippines. UNEP's contribution was mainly on outcomes 1 and 2: climate risk reduction (CRR) integrated into key national and selected local development plans and processes; and, enhanced national and local capacity to develop, manage and administer projects addressing climate change risks respectively. UNEP's technical guidance to national institutions, namely the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), through expertise and knowledge of its regional staff in Bangkok has been critical toward attaining this medium-term outcome. In Peru, the JP helped incorporate adaptation measures into environmental resource management in two High Andean micro-watersheds.

Mitigation

120. Most UNEP climate change mitigation projects in the evaluation portfolio include a direct or indirect policy dimension. But since UNEP's projects typically target groups of countries, results under similar types of efforts are often differentiated and/or mixed according to country specificities, and not all have generated policy-related

⁵⁵ The PPR 2012 notes that the actual value was 6 through the end of 2012.

changes. For example, the EIRET project implemented in Brazil, China, and South Africa, has enabled enhancement of national capacities in each country in terms of solar and wind resources, but results were mixed according to country. In Brazil, the project was effective in advancing national capacities to formulate solar energy policies, but for wind energy the project came comparatively late. In China, EIRET was particularly effective with respect to feed-in legislation, thanks to the influential role of the project partner, the Energy Research Institute (ERI). In South Africa, even though stakeholders have judged the project as successful, it was not able to develop stronger links into policy-making. Therefore, due to these differentiated results, the project was rated "moderately satisfactory" for its effectiveness in the project terminal evaluation conducted.⁵⁶

121. Even when, or especially when, policy applications were not (yet) possible, UNEP was sometimes in a particularly good position to be an observer and to advance work on particular topics of government interest that ended up shaping policy. For example, although 'mitigation' presented as such was a challenging topic in China, in partnership with the ILO, UNEP helped to assess the size and nature of the green jobs market. UNEP's support in this area came at a critical point since China was working on its own national climate change strategy. In another case, the "MCA4climate" tool was used to give a broader development perspective to the existing climate policy planning processes. The tool had one global and three national applications over the biennium 2010-11. South Africa⁵⁷ is a successful illustration of a country that has used the analytical tool provided to assess a range of energy planning scenarios in order to identify and prioritize mitigation policies consistent with development goals.
122. UNEP's interventions have been successful in influencing some countries such as Tunisia and Montenegro for instance, in making sound mitigation policy choices such as on the adoption of improved policies and practices in terms of using solar-based technologies. By introducing a subsidy for the promotion of the SWH systems and amending the Energy law accordingly, the financial mechanism put in place, PROSOL, was able to shift household demand preferences and indirectly displace fuel subsidies (on LPG fuelled water heating systems) and thus, ultimately benefit the Tunisian public budget. In Montenegro, although results achieved were not as high as expected due to external factors, the Government remained convinced by the project and has recently adopted a rules book which include that each new building will have to have at least 30 per cent of its energy needs covered by solar energy, and this, in compliance with the EU directive 2001/77/EC on promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the internal electricity markets, in the context of the European Union accession process.
123. Expectations for policy impacts are quite high from certain knowledge products and sharing mechanisms, such as the Clean Energy Solutions Centre (CESC), which is a collaborative effort by several international organizations including UNEP that strives to provide support and timely information to policymakers worldwide. By the end of 2012, more than 80 requests for expert assistance were made to the CESC⁵⁸. In some cases, interventions have already produced tangible results, such as support provided to the Ministry of Energy and Energy Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, which helped inform the drafting of the Energy Policy and supported the decision of the Government to ratify the Policy during the 41st Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED).
124. On another, more regional, level of support toward integration of scientific research and analysis into policy, UNEP has translated into Arabic its "Guide for Standardization and Quality Assurance for Solar Thermal," which became a reference document for the "ArSol" certification scheme for the Arab region. As part of the UNEP Global Solar Water Heating (GSWH) project, the guide is the result of a joint effort with the GEF and the European Solar Thermal Industry Federation (ESTIF).
125. Another key example of promoting enabling policies for CC mitigation is the en.lighten initiative, a global public-private partnership programme, launched in 2010 and financed by the GEF, phasing out inefficient incandescent lights and promoting high performance energy efficient lighting technologies with consideration for mercury free alternatives. Regional workshops involving close to 60 countries were held to disseminate guidance and discuss achieving the accelerated global phase-out of inefficient incandescent lamps by 2016. As a result, 55 countries had joined the global partnership by the end of 2013. Twenty-seven countries from Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and the Middle East have initiated the development of National or Regional Efficient Lighting Strategies seeking to phase-out incandescent lamps by 2016. A set of support guides have been developed and a dedicated group of lighting specialists started to assist countries in developing policies, standards and collection and recycling

⁵⁶Final Evaluation of the UNEP Project "Enhancing Information for Renewable Energy Technology Deployment in Brazil, China and South Africa" (EIRET), Andreas Jahn, March 2012

⁵⁷ UNEP 2011. "A practical framework for planning pro-development climate policy." http://www.unep.org/pdf/Planning_Pro-Dev.pdf

⁵⁸<https://cleanenergysolutions.org/expert/impacts>

schemes, in partnership with the private sector. A proposal for an "en.lighten II" initiative is under preparation which seeks to up-scale the approach developed during en.lighten I to the industrial and commercial sectors as well as to the public street lighting.

126. Other examples are the public-private partnership Global Fuel Economy Initiative (GFEI), and the Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles (PCFV). Under the GFEI, as one of the four pilot projects,⁵⁹ Chile is establishing a system of incentives for low emission and fuel efficient vehicles to promote a vehicle fleet transformation towards more efficient vehicles that present less local and global pollutant emissions. Chile, among several countries, has also developed a mandatory vehicle fuel efficiency labelling. With the PCFV's support, Mauritius, among seven countries up to the end of 2013, adopted the 50 ppm national standard for sulphur in diesel fuel, becoming thus the first Sub-Saharan African country to adopt this standard. Each of these transport pilots has demonstrated clean vehicles and auto fuel and vehicle efficiency worldwide. As a last example of policy influence, the aim of the 'Share the Road' initiative was to fight road congestion and promote road safety. As a result of this project, Kenya has integrated non-motorized transport elements in its urban road infrastructure policy,⁶⁰ which drew on a GHG emissions mapping methodology developed under the Global Bioenergy Partnership project.⁶¹

REDD+

127. Although not without its challenges under the period considered by the evaluation, UNEP is making progress toward demonstrating the long-term feasibility of a REDD+ mechanism at the national and global levels by supporting scientifically informed policies, and strong governance on land-use and forestry. Through the Global and National programmes, UNEP's assistance on assessments for mapping land-use change, biodiversity and forest stock; carbon benefits tools; and legal and regulatory improvements are all key inputs to devising and implementing effective sustainable forest management plans.

128. Specifically, UNEP has assisted 16 countries through consultation and guidance on identifying gaps and preparing forestry and land-use policies for REDD+. Following a review of existing legislation in nine UN-REDD countries, UNEP provided technical advice on strengthening legal and institutional frameworks to enable REDD+ preparedness in four National Programme countries, following awareness-raising events, research and analysis for their REDD+ strategy development. As of December 2013, 4 countries (out of a target of 6) had completed national strategies for terrestrial carbon emission mitigation that account for the multiple ecosystem benefits and development goals. Working with the Tanzania Forest Service, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, UNEP helped Tanzania devise its National REDD+ Strategy and Action Plan. UNEP also worked with three countries (out of a target of 5 for the period up to 2015) to develop and implement safeguards, covering conservation of natural forests and biological diversity, transparent and effective national forest governance structures, as well as protecting knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and local communities.

129. UNEP's visibility on REDD+ policy input is somewhat limited, however. Field visit interviews suggest that UNDP's role as the lead agency on governance systems surrounding REDD+ and its support for Participatory Governance Assessments (PGA) and anti-corruption measures, for example, tends to dominate. Nevertheless, partner countries do specifically ask for UNEP technical support (from the WCMC) with direct links to policy, such as with recent requests from Argentina, Bhutan, and Costa Rica.

130. Though UNEP has conducted some legal reviews and other advisory services, it is mainly focused on support for national processes toward REDD+ readiness, which include helping to put in place the capacities and systems required to implement forestry and land-use programs with REDD+ potential. UNEP has a relatively marginal influence on the legal frameworks of countries for REDD+ preparedness compared to other actors such as UNDP, but this outcome is potentially shaped by UNEP reports and assessments on land-use to determine appropriate strategies and policies. As with other governance topics, much of this work has been carried out through cooperation with UNDP through its country offices.

⁵⁹ Kenya, Indonesia, Ethiopia, Chile

⁶⁰ After being the first pilot country of the "Share the road" initiative in 2009, the Kenyan Government adopted in 2011 a policy change to integrate walking and cycling facilities on all new urban road projects. Such infrastructure for non-motorized transport (NMT) is being incorporated in donor-supported projects as well. See: UNEP 2013. *Kenya: Share the Road's First Pilot Country and First Success*. Share the Road Initiative.

<http://www.unep.org/transport/sharetheroad/Countrypages/kenya.asp>; *Updates and News*.

http://www.unep.org/transport/sharetheroad/News_info/news.asp

⁶¹ UNEP undated. Global Bioenergy Partnership (GBEP).

<http://www.unep.org/climatechange/mitigation/Bioenergy/Activities/GlobalBioenergyPartnershipGBEP/tabid/29481/Default.aspx>

III. Increased partner country capacity and potential to leverage and secure climate financing

Adaptation

131. A multi-sector study on the economics of adaptation in Africa was completed in early 2010, to support financing mechanisms in targeting investment. Study results were discussed at a roundtable on adaptation financing strategies for Africa in April 2010 in Tunis.
132. UNEP was accredited as a Multilateral Implementing Entity (MIE) of the Adaptation Fund (AF) in June 2010. In this role, UNEP supported three countries (Madagascar, Tanzania and Cambodia) to submit project proposals for finance. UNEP has also supported 19 countries towards accreditation of their National Implementing Entities (NIEs) for direct access to the AF. UNEP provided advisory services on institutional capabilities required for direct access, helped prepare and implement a capacity development strategy based on a capacity needs assessment, and supported the preparation of the application for accreditation for direct access. Nine countries had submitted applications and two were accredited by the end of 2013. UNEP has further assisted one regional entity, the Regional Organization for the Conservation of the Environment of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, in the process towards accreditation. UNEP has also supported over a dozen countries in preparing, presenting and implementing adaptation projects under GEF's Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF). UNEP has also worked with at least eight countries in the Asia-Pacific region and numerous others globally to bolster the capacities of government staff and other in-country partners to access financing from the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), Adaptation Fund, MDG Fund and other funding sources. Partner country interviewees expressed increased confidence and capability within national governments (especially Ministry of Environment) to secure financing for adaptation over the period considered by the evaluation. With financing secured, implementation of NAPA priorities has started in Djibouti, Rwanda, the Gambia, Comoros, Cambodia, and Lesotho, all addressing the resilience of ecosystems (water, forests, and land). UNEP assisted Tanzania in accessing both LDCF and AF funding to build resilience of coastal ecosystems and for infrastructure works, respectively.
133. Another finance-related initiative that was frequently cited by interviewees is the Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Review (CPEIR) under the UNEP-UNDP Poverty and Environment Initiative. In partnership with Ministries of Finance and Planning and other partners such as the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and the Capacity Development for Development Effectiveness (CDDE) Facility, the PEI helped launch a series of reports and facilitated policy dialogue on defining Climate Change Expenditure for government representatives, civil society, and climate change and finance experts. The CPEIR process was particularly useful to prioritizing long-term climate financing in six countries. UNEP and other partners facilitated direct engagement between government representatives, civil society, and climate change and finance experts to form comprehensive, national climate fiscal frameworks. In Nepal, a CPEIR resulted in the creation of a climate finance working group, coordinated by the national planning commission, to develop climate budget codes and define climate and environmental expenditures.
134. Under the Microfinance for EbA Project partnerships were developed with six MFIs in two countries (Peru and Colombia) and investment decision-making processes were created for financing EbA actions by small-scale farmers. Privately financed investments have begun to flow. Public policy opportunities are being identified in order to catalyse large-scale EbA. The main idea behind the Microfinance for EbA project in Peru, which has a very advanced microfinance sector, is that CC adaptation measures taken by clients can improve their credit risk profile, allowing the MFIs to lower their loan costs and to become more competitive. MFIs could stimulate their clients to take appropriate CC adaptation measures through providing them with special loan packages and, possibly, by lowering interest rates for more CC resilient clients. The clients, in return, would lower their production risks and possibly benefit from better interest rates on loans. At the time of evaluation, the project had established firm contacts with two major MFIs in Peru. Next steps were to conduct an institutional analysis and to support the MFIs with assessing CC vulnerability of their lending portfolios and designing of EbA loan packages.

Mitigation

135. UNEP has continued to develop and test different options to increase available climate financing under five broad areas: public financing, innovative financing, end-user finance, carbon finance, and finance networks.⁶² The 2010/11 target of US\$ 200 million of national investment in clean tech projects was exceeded, and by the end of 2013 about US\$ 432 million of national investment had been recorded by UNEP, by far exceeding the cumulative

⁶² UNEP 2012. *Investing in a Climate for Change*. http://www.unep.org/pdf/UNEP_Investing.pdf

target of US\$ 300 million for the MTS period. This should be seen in a broader context where the overall market demand for carbon offsets and related investments in climate change mitigation programmes and projects has been declining steadily since 2013, with investments under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) literally grinding to a halt since the UNFCCC COP in Warsaw (November 2013).⁶³

136. During the period considered by the evaluation, four projects were underway to build capacities to manage public funding and leverage private investment. Public finance institutions in five countries and one region⁶⁴ have received climate finance related technical assistance.
137. The innovative Seed Capital Assistance Facility (SCAF) which provides seed capital and technical assistance to clean energy fund managers to invest in clean energy projects, and related assessment of risk management mechanisms have encouraged private sector investments. They helped leverage a total investment of US\$ 330 million over the period considered by the evaluation, spanning over 15 countries. The SCAF operates in Asia and Africa through six private equity funds and has provided enterprise development support and seed funding to develop renewable energy projects in six countries⁶⁵. The projects co-financed by SCAF have included a wind farm in South Africa, a small hydropower project in Tanzania, a bank-lending programme in China, and a solar microfinance programme in Nepal. Besides USD 10 million in seed capital raised for 19 projects, two SCAF-supported projects are now at the construction phase, with USD 215 million in financing secured. USD 60 million was committed by investors under the SCAF to the Armstrong Fund for renewables projects. USD 45 million was recently committed by the Lereko Metier Sustainable Capital Fund. Based on successful implementation of the SCAF, funding in the order of USD 18 million has been secured from two countries to support a programme aimed at engaging funds and investors that provide early stage financing to low carbon project developments and ventures in the next eight years.
138. The Mediterranean Investment Facility (MIF) has supported end-user finance for solar water heating and energy efficiency in the Mediterranean and the Balkan regions. With on-going programmes in six countries,⁶⁶ it is demonstrating good results, with expansion bringing additional end-user revenues. In combination with the complementary commercialization and market transformation activities of the Global Solar Water Heating Market Transformation and Strengthening Initiative (GSWH), they have leveraging a total of US\$ 84.5 million in private and public sector funding up to the end of 2013. The GSWH projects faced some challenges in obtaining government approvals⁶⁷ and donor funds⁶⁸. The End-User Finance for Access to Clean Energy Technologies (FACET) in South and South-East Asia, has partnered with two local banks to commit a collective amount of over US\$10 million prior to the operational phase, to finance small-scale clean energy technology investments. The FACET is now moving to the implementation phase, focusing on installation of biogas digesters in Indonesia and Vietnam. A new end-user finance initiative is in development in South Africa for the solar water-heating sector.
139. Phase II of the African Rural Energy Enterprise Development (AREED-II) programme promotes clean energy services. More than 30 enterprises have received Enterprise Development Services (EDS) and about 20,000 households globally have been provided End-Users Financing (EUF) through local finance and micro-finance institutions in Ghana, Senegal, Mali, Tanzania and Zambia. By the end of 2013, the AREED Programme had leveraged nearly USD 2 million from local banks for clean energy projects.
140. The Climate Finance Investment Facility (CFIF) has also stimulated over US\$16 million to date toward supporting finance-industry engagement in new climate sectors, such as renewable energy, energy efficiency, and sustainable forestry. Currently, nine financial institutions from Asia are receiving support for new financial product developments, covering 8 countries⁶⁹.
141. CDM development for Carbon Finance, Silviculture, Conservation and Action against Deforestation (CASCADe) was stimulated in seven countries⁷⁰. Project Development Designs (PDDs) for 12 selected CASCADe-supported projects were completed by year-end 2011, of which four reached the registration stage, one under the regulated-CDM-

⁶³ GCP, IPAM, FFI, & UNEP-FI. (2014). Stimulating Interim Demand for REDD+ Emission Reductions: The Need for a Strategic Intervention from 2015 to 2020. Global Canopy Programme, Oxford, UK; the Amazon Environmental Research Institute, Brasília, Brazil; Fauna & Flora International, Cambridge, UK; and UNEP Finance Initiative, Geneva, Switzerland.

⁶⁴ Vietnam, Benin, Ghana, El Salvador, Costa Rica and the South Pacific region

⁶⁵ South Africa, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, the Philippines and India

⁶⁶ Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania

⁶⁷ Algeria

⁶⁸ Albania

⁶⁹ China, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, Philippines, Mongolia and Cambodia.

⁷⁰ Senegal, Mali, Benin, Gabon, DRC, Cameroon, and Madagascar

market, and three in the voluntary carbon-market. The African Carbon Asset Development project (ACAD) was successful in helping countries to develop projects for the Carbon markets (including the CDM). ACAD received 74 high-quality applications and expressions of interest from 20 countries, including 14 LDCs. Projects are in nine countries⁷¹ covering a wide range of technologies and sectors in Africa; all together amounting to 15 CDM projects in eight countries (except Mozambique) by the end of 2011.

142. UNEP Finance Initiative's Climate Change Working Group seeks to identify and communicate the role of financial services sector and capital markets in transition towards low-carbon, CC resilient economies. Leading financial organizations⁷² have been involved, and/or are beneficiary of several activities aimed at adopting best practices and up-scaling mobilisation of private sector financing for low-carbon energy technologies, REDD+ and other climate change investments in developing countries.

REDD+

143. Under the POW 2010/11, the target of US\$ 25 million for the "Total amount of funding for land-use, land-use change and forestry projects, with emphasis on carbon sequestration as a result of UNEP interventions" was significantly exceeded with around USD \$150 million mobilized in partnership with FAO and UNDP within the UN-REDD Programme. By the end of 2013, the UN-REDD Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) had received over US\$ 215 million.

144. UNEP helped demonstrate the full value and transformative potential of forests in part through the policy brief on REDD+ and the Green Economy exploring REDD+ as a source of investment for green development and as a natural capital-led investment strategy. This became a concrete focus of work with Indonesia and the DR of Congo, as well as work commencing in a number of other countries. The potential of management of agricultural landscapes for terrestrial carbon sequestration is another area in which UNEP is focusing efforts to push for climate smart agriculture and the delivery of multiple benefits for climate, development and ecosystem services.⁷³

145. DEPI reports in PIMS that current efforts are aimed towards developing frameworks for investment (e.g. together with UNEP Finance Initiative the 'REDDy-Set-Grow' series), and the development of investment strategies to transform forested landscapes based on REDD+ investments toward a green economy (e.g. UN-REDD Policy Brief No 1). Political commitments in Indonesia and the DRC demonstrate the growing potential to utilize REDD+ investments for economic transition. Also, UNEP is devising scenarios to inform investment opportunities (e.g. the Threshold-21 Kalimantan model and 'storylines' developed for the DRC). Engagement of the private sector with partner country governments has been encouraged through approval by the UN-REDD Programme's 7th Policy Board meeting to investments in 'REDD+ as a catalyst of a Green Economy', as well as seeking influence on the Forest Investment Programme's investments.

146. UNEP has helped form the basis for regulating incentives, establishing rights and climate financing options at the national level. However, the drivers of standardizing the use of safeguards and engagement with the private sector each require strong regional and in-country partnerships outside of direct government/ministerial entry points. Therefore, at least as REDD+ work expands, and more countries express a desire to work with UNEP on these topics, unless UNEP manages to meet this demand by further bolstering its regional presence and/or expanding the depth or reach of its strategic partnerships, it will not necessarily be apparent whether UNEP has contributed to strengthening institutional ability to leverage investments and resources for REDD+. UNEP's relationship with the private sector and other potential REDD+ investors appears to be relatively weak.

2.2.2 Likelihood of impact, sustainability, replication and up-scaling

147. The evaluation used the reconstructed Theory of Change of the CCSP (Figure 3) to evaluate the likelihood that UNEP's CCSP has contributed to reducing the impacts of climate change on human well-being, the sustainability of results achieved, and their replication and up-scaling. To the extent possible, the evaluation assessed the likelihood that UNEP's efforts contributed to positive changes at the medium-term outcome and intermediate state levels, and also verified the presence of drivers and validity of assumptions along the causal pathways in the reconstructed TOC. Assuming that the reconstructed Theory of Change of the CCSP holds, the confidence with which the evaluation can affirm UNEP's contribution to impact depends on the extent to which contributions of UNEP at direct outcome, medium-term outcome and intermediate state level can be shown, and also on whether

⁷¹ Burkina Faso, Kenya, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, and Uganda

⁷² Munich RE, DB, HSBC, Société Générale, Swiss RE, KfW, Development Bank of Southern Africa, JICA, and Carbon RE

⁷³ UNEP 2012. PPR 2010/11. P 51.

the essential drivers and assumptions are in place. UNEP contributions to direct outcomes were discussed under effectiveness (2.2.1). The following sections discuss UNEP's contribution to medium-term outcomes and intermediate states, replication and up-scaling and the presence of drivers and validity of assumptions. Because the drivers and assumptions that affect impact are often similar or the same to those factors that promote replication and up-scaling, and sustainability of results, the drivers and assumptions that influence "likelihood of impact", "sustainability", and "replication and up-scaling" are discussed under one sub-section.

UNEP's contribution to medium-term outcomes and intermediate states

148. The medium-term outcomes to which UNEP's CCSP is expected to contribute are that:

- countries increasingly use appropriate climate change adaptation approaches,
- countries move towards sustainable forest management and conservation, and
- countries increasingly use cleaner and more efficient technologies and renewable energy sources.

The first and second medium-term outcome are expected to contribute to improved resilience of vulnerable ecosystems and sustained ecosystem services under climate change, while the second and third one are expected to contribute to reduced global GHG emissions.

149. There are signs in many countries that positive changes are happening on all three medium-term outcomes, but evidence that UNEP has contributed to these changes at any large scale beyond pilot initiatives is practically non-existent. However, this is not because UNEP's climate change interventions would be unlikely to contribute to medium-term outcomes and impact, but rather due to i) the crowded scene, with UNEP being a relatively minor player whose contributions are often overshadowed by bigger actors, ii) weak outcome monitoring, iii) the relative immaturity of UNEP's climate change portfolio (with the exception of GEF-funded projects which fall largely outside the scope of this evaluation), and iv) the related lack of evaluation of UNEP's climate change projects. In fact, progress on direct outcomes related to access to information and appropriate approaches and technologies; enhanced policies and institutional frameworks, and climate change financing, is quite encouraging as presented under section 2.2.1, but it is in many cases too early, there are too many other actors involved, and/or there is insufficient evidence available (from monitoring and evaluation) to prove contribution of UNEP's climate change efforts to any changes beyond direct outcomes at this point in time. Notwithstanding, during the desk review and country visits the evaluation collected some anecdotal evidence which helps to illustrate UNEP contributions towards impact.

150. As regards **climate change adaptation**, the EbA flagship has increased UNEP's visibility on adaptation and the approach has potential to deliver multiple co-benefits and help avoid mal-adaptation. The EbA approach is considered a "triple win" solution, since it can provide cost-effective risk reduction, support biodiversity conservation, and enable improvements in economic livelihoods and human well-being, particularly for the poor and vulnerable. Through the EbA approach, communities vulnerable to climate change have increased their resilience due to effective use of ecosystem services for adaptation and targeted measures. In the Nile River Basin, hydrological modelling is taking place in order to advise governments about climate sensitive hotspots and adaptive actions to be taken. In Togo the rehabilitation of small dams in northern Savane region has enabled the local communities to improve their access to water under changed rainfall conditions. Appropriate vegetation cover was introduced around the water points, reducing evaporation and encouraging maintenance of biodiversity. In Tanzania (Makete district) woodlot farming is practiced as an adaptation strategy following agricultural crop failure to diversify incomes of communities. In Mozambique the capacity of over 200 local level decision-makers, community leaders and teachers has been increased to integrate climate change considerations in their work, and adaptation measures such as rainwater harvesting have been implemented in the dry-land environment. This has increased their resilience to drought conditions. Ecosystem resilience has been used as the key approach for the Madagascar Adaptation Fund project which aims to build resilience of the rice sector in Alaotra Lake region.

151. In Peru, UNEP's contributions on the UN Joint Programme on Climate Change Adaptation are mainly related to capacity development. This is a good example of a case where many external factors come into play before these enhanced capacities can be translated in improved resilience of people and ecosystems to climate change. However, it is quite likely that the programme will contribute to impacts because the environmental management instruments focusing on climate change adaptation in two regions of Peru are likely to attract public and foreign funding for concrete adaptation projects that will reduce climate vulnerability in the priority watersheds in both regions, and also because enhanced awareness and technical capacities at regional, provincial and district level are likely to make local managers take climate change risks into account in their decision making, potentially making the sectors on which these decisions have a bearing less vulnerable to climate. The case for EbA in Peru is

convincing, and the EbA Mountains pilot is likely to ground-truth it for high mountainous ecosystems, potentially convincing the government of Peru to mainstream EbA approaches in national policy. At a smaller scale, both the quick “no-regret” actions already being initiated by the project, and the more elaborate, larger scale EbA measures that will be demonstrated later on (the latter grounded in an in-depth understanding of local conditions and taking traditional practices into account) will likely reduce climate vulnerability in the intervention area.

152. In Panama, UNEP’s contributions on the UN Joint Programme on Climate Change Adaptation have contributed to the development of a Climate Change Information Monitoring system to reduce the risks related to climate change in two priority river basins. The system, connected to the National Civil Protection System, already had an impact on human lives in that it allowed timely evacuation of communities during floods in December 2010. Equipment acquired by the programme for the early warning system were crucial in keeping local communities informed during the disaster. The systems are still in place and functioning.
153. As regards **climate change mitigation**, UNEP has planted valuable seeds in all three areas of technology transfer, policy improvement and financing, with the most visible results in energy finance, and the CDM in particular, even though financing for the mechanism has been declining since mid-2012. Mature technologies such as solar water heating systems and energy saving light bulbs are increasingly adopted by countries.
154. In most cases, it is the combination of progress in two or more of these areas that allowed countries to initiate a transition towards cleaner, more efficient and/or renewable energy use. In Tunisia, for instance, by introducing a subsidy for the promotion of the solar water heating systems and amending the Energy Law accordingly, the financial mechanism put in place (PROSOL) was able to shift household demand preferences and indirectly displace subsidies on LPG fuelled water heating systems and thus, ultimately, benefit the Tunisian public budget. In Albania, legislation covering all renewables with specific targets for solar energy was approved, including mandatory use of solar water heating in new buildings, technical specifications and minimum efficiency requirements for solar water heating systems, and exemption on custom duties and VAT. A diverse set of professionals have been trained on solar water heating technology and a training curriculum on solar water heating was introduced in Professional Vocational Training Centres. This has contributed to a growth rate of annual sales of over 20 percent since 2011.
155. In Montenegro, although results achieved were not as extensive as expected due to external factors, the Government remained convinced by the project and has recently adopted a rules book which include that each new building will have to have at least 30% of its energy needs covered by solar energy. The initiatives on renewable energy in Ghana and Tanzania that led to the emergence of new energy entrepreneurs seem to have a positive impact on uptake of renewable energy technologies in those countries. Already the financial sector has begun financial support in renewable energy investments. The energy end-user support has helped develop new skills in the field of renewable energy.
156. Under **REDD+**, while it is generally accepted that the UN-REDD Programme helps to create favourable conditions for the adoption of more sustainable forest management practices and for addressing the drivers of forest loss, it remains too early to tell what effects the Programme will have in terms of improving sustainable forest management, reducing deforestation or increasing socio-economic benefits⁷⁴. Indeed the purpose of this first phase is to build REDD+ “readiness”, not implementation. While the drivers of deforestation are generally identified early on during the readiness phase, efforts to tackle some of these issues tend to begin relatively late in the process, if at all, usually through pilot initiatives and theoretical contributions. Land rights, for instance, constitute a critical underlying issue in several countries which will not be resolved overnight. Moreover, even though the Programme promotes a multi-sectoral approach, evidence indicates that the Programme has had limited success so far in terms of effectively engaging policy-makers and cross-sectoral representatives, including the private sector, on REDD+ and the factors that affect forest trends. While the Programme is helping to inform readiness efforts and REDD+ processes more generally – creating a legacy of knowledge and experience on which to build, as a result of the Programme’s strong emphasis on setting up the technical components to REDD+ readiness (MRV, stakeholder engagement, fund management, safeguards), the lessons of past and present efforts to achieve sustainable resource governance have only recently begun to be explored. UNEP has greatly contributed to conceptual work on multiple benefits, safeguards and green economy transformation, but evidence suggests that the wealth of existing scholarship and experiences on such matters as sustainable forest governance and

⁷⁴ UN-REDD, 2014. External Evaluation of the United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (the UN-REDD Programme), Volume I – Final Report, June 2014.

management, conservation, land tenure, poverty alleviation, rural development, sustainable agriculture, structural reforms, and even corporate risk management have yet to percolate through the Programme's overall approach.

Replication and upscaling

157. Even though UNEP is more of a coordinating and normative agency than an implementing agency, the demonstration and piloting modality is a major aspect to UNEP's body of work in climate change. According to the survey conducted for this evaluation, 65 per cent agree that UNEP's CCSP is relevant to "piloting new tools, models, and/or technologies," and only 10 per cent disagree. However, exit strategies and deliberate design elements or mechanisms for scale-up and replication are largely absent from the programme results frameworks. Similarly, replication or upscaling strategies are hardly ever explicitly mentioned or developed in project design documents. For instance, Projects 1bcP3 and 1bcP3a focus on raising awareness and helping 'first-movers' to invest in clean energy. It is not clear how the projects will ensure that experiences and information are distributed to enable replication beyond these 'first movers'. However, some projects do have specific outputs intended to promote dissemination of best practices and lessons learned e.g. best practices drawn from the project 1bcP1 should be disseminated through the climate change knowledge networks strengthened by the project through output D, involving 16 countries. Capacity building of national and regional stakeholders is also a relatively common means for enabling replication. How replication will be funded is never addressed in project documents. Despite these design shortcomings, there are several examples of projects where replication and upscaling are happening:
158. Related to the above, UNEP's role in supporting countries with communication is not prominent in the results framework even though it is a key aspect to the relationship with UNFCCC. Also both science and awareness/communication/dissemination are major elements in all CCSP components. (Strategic) communications (a CCSP component and output, and also part of the UNFCCC joint work programme) and awareness raising (an area of 'distinctiveness') are key areas that are not well defined and supported in CCSP implementation. Interviewees both across UNEP staff and in-country stakeholders have voiced concern over the lack of resources devoted to communication, dissemination, translation of reports, memos and publications into local languages to help ensure the materials reach intended audiences.
159. Under adaptation, CC DARE was meant to pilot innovative interventions for up-scaling and mainstreaming by governments. Its Terminal Evaluation revealed that the programme has largely influenced on-going and planned projects and programmes⁷⁵. In the case of Rwanda, the investment of USD 25million toward the implementation of the Land Suitability Plan by government was replicated through two national projects by GEF and UNDP Japan (AAP).
160. Under mitigation, the EIRET project, providing three countries with a comprehensive package of services to help expand the deployment of renewable energy technologies, was a scale-up of successful activities achieved by the Solar and Wind Energy Resource Assessment (SWERA) project, started in 2001, to advance the large scale use of renewable energy technologies by increasing the availability and accessibility of high quality solar and wind resource information. SWERA began as a pilot project with funding from the Global Environment Facility (GEF), in collaboration with more than 25 partners around the world. With the success of the project in 13 pilot countries, SWERA expanded in 2006 into a full programme aimed at providing high quality information on renewable energy resources for countries and regions around the world, along with the tools needed to apply these data in ways that facilitate renewable energy policies and investments. UNEP has attempted to replicate the financial mechanism developed under PROSOL in Tunisia, within the country and also in others countries⁷⁶. Within Tunisia, three other initiatives that shared the essential PROSOL structure (providing subsidies on capital costs, interest rates and maintenance costs) have been launched in the Tertiary and the Industry sectors as well as for other technologies such as small-scale photovoltaic systems in the residential sector. The GEF funded project aimed at developing the market of financial risk management instruments for financing renewable energy, was designed to complement the Sustainable Energy Finance initiative (SEFI), a global partnership between UNEP and 275 financial institutions, including banks, insurers, and fund managers who are working together to understand the impacts of environmental and social considerations on financial performance.

⁷⁵ CC DARE Terminal Evaluation Report p.65-68

⁷⁶ Such as Morocco, Egypt and Algeria in the Mediterranean region and Montenegro and Macedonia for the Balkans.

Drivers and assumptions affecting impact, sustainability and replication and up-scaling

161. There is very little reporting on the presence of drivers and assumptions supporting the achievement of higher-level changes in and beyond partner countries, and their sustainability. The below assessment is therefore largely based on interviews and review of external documentation.

Drivers

162. A key driver that influences both progress towards medium-term outcomes and other drivers, is the **effectiveness of international climate change processes, in particular UNFCCC**. UNEP contributes to the UNFCCC through high quality assessments such as the Emissions Gap Reports, preparation of negotiators to achieve a common (sub-)regional stand, and support to specific UNFCCC work streams, especially the work of the Expert Group on Technology Transfer, efforts on financing climate investments and REDD+. UNEP's work has been increasingly utilized by the UNFCCC COPs to inform discussions, and UNEP has been increasingly requested by the UNFCCC and by countries to take up work on climate change, with REDD+ and the TNAs, and most recently as host to the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) which started operating in 2013. As reported in PIMS for the biennium 2012-2013 several other major international governmental processes made use of UNEP's climate related findings – the Integrated Assessment of Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone in particular - to reshape their approach to the subject matter. With the Camp David Declaration (May 2012) the G8 recognized the impact of short-lived climate pollutants on near-term climate change, and agreed to support comprehensive action to reduce these pollutants. The Svalbard Declaration (March 2012) by the Nordic Environment Ministers stated that, as emissions of short-lived climate forcers have a negative impact on both the climate and human health, there is a need to regulate them as part of the range of international environment agreements. UNEP's climate related findings were used to justify the revision of the Gothenburg Protocol to the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (revisions adopted in May 2012).

163. An important driver for wide-spread uptake is **that partners and networks leverage approaches, measures and technologies promoted by UNEP**. UNEP largely works with and through partners in order to support national capacity building for climate change. This is also discussed later in the report under Section 2.3.4 Cooperation and Partnerships. The collective influence of UNEP and partners and the multiplier effects become apparent at the higher results levels, between medium-term outcomes through to intermediate states and impacts. Its partners value UNEP for its in-house expertise as well as its access to targeted technical assistance through regional and global knowledge networks. UNEP is seen as playing a unique role in capturing, refining, summarizing and communicating lessons learned, tested methodologies, best practices and approaches to countries.

164. Under the One UN approach, UNEP works to coordinate with other UN agencies in countries where it operates, and UNEP assessments and technical input are used to bring climate change and environmental sustainability into UNDAFs, for example.⁷⁷ In addition, UNEP has relatively strong partnerships with other UN agencies for the purposes of particular interventions. UNEP tries to encourage UN Agencies to systematically utilize UNEP tools and approaches, such as applying an EbA approach in the adaptation and REDD+ work of other UN agencies. Attempts are being made to mainstream EbA approaches in the work of other UN agencies and already UNDP and FAO are applying the EbA approach.

165. While UNEP does not commonly have strong partnerships within the private sector at the project level, areas such as climate technology and climate finance are growing exceptions. Many mitigation projects involve the private sector directly or through industry associations, for example en.lighten, the Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles, the Global Solar Water Heating project, and Seed Capital Assistance Facility SCAF. Private sector engagement was key for the positive results achieved in energy finance related projects, for example, where UNEP was able to develop risk guarantees, a major concern of financial institutions, and able to involve the public electricity utilities for renewable energy technologies deployment.

166. Replicating vulnerability and adaptation assessments is enabled by the development of networks and partnerships that enhance knowledge-sharing and capacity building activities in adaptation. One example is the Asia-Pacific Adaptation Network (APAN). The first Asia Pacific Adaptation Forum was organized by APAN and partners in Bangkok in October 2010. The online knowledge portal "Climate Change Adaptation in Asia and the Pacific"⁷⁸ was launched in December 2010. LAC region climate change gateway (REGATTA) and West Asia Regional Network on Climate Change (WARN-CC) were launched in December 2010. Adaptation Knowledge Days I and II in Bonn in

⁷⁷ PPR 2012. P 31.

⁷⁸ <http://www.asiapacificadapt.net>

June 2010 and 2011, brought together experts, practitioners and policy-makers to exchange experiences and discuss latest developments in adaptation.

167. Under mitigation, three regional networks on CC have been supported by UNEP activities in South East Asia, Central Asia and Latin America to promote information exchange and mutual learning among CC focal points of participating countries: the Southeast Asia Network of Climate Change Offices (SEAN-CC) which supports capacity and governance strengthening, knowledge sharing and peer-learning, and negotiation capacity enhancement, the Capacity Building in Development of Policy Framework for Promotion of Low Carbon Emission Societies in Central Asia Network which supports the uptake of cleaner energy and energy efficient technologies and services and the Regional Gateway for Technology Transfer and Climate Change Action (REGATTA) which supports the transfer of knowledge, technology and experience in Latin America and the Caribbean (the latter is both an adaptation and mitigation knowledge network). Three additional regional networks are under development in South Asia, Africa and West Asia. Three global knowledge sharing networks/portals have also been supported and further contribute to the adoption of transformative clean energy policies and deployment programmes (Clean Energy Solutions Center – CESC), the establishment of synergistic opportunities between energy access and development (South-South Global Network on Energy for Sustainable Development – GNESD) and to a more rapid global transition to renewable energy (multi-stakeholder Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century, REN21, for which UNEP serves as co-secretariat), and which released in July 2010 and 2011 its annual Renewables Global Status Report (GSR).
168. UNEP has expanded the knowledge base on REDD+ with key reports such as the policy brief "REDD+ and the Green Economy: Opportunities for a mutually supportive relationship" which explores REDD+ as a source of investment for green development and as a natural capital-led investment strategy, and offers recommendations for creating a roadmap for REDD+ in the context of green development. UNEP has also expanded on its 2009 *Multiple Benefits – Issues and Options for REDD* with numerous issue papers and briefs outlining the practical gains from enhancing carbon stocks and ensuring that ecosystem-services are conserved or enhanced through sustainable forestry and land management. In conjunction with the products and services provided by the World Conservation Monitoring Centre (UNEP-WCMC) on multiple benefits, UNEP's contributions to REDD+ have the potential to be transformative, as it aims to "identify the interventions that add value to the economy, increase revenue, and provide new livelihood opportunities while conserving forests and reducing emissions."⁷⁹ Through promoting forest sector investment and forest conservation policies, UNEP seeks to demonstrate the strong inter-linkages between mitigation, adaptation, and development objectives. Another role is to catalyse high-level convening of officials around REDD+ and bolster the capacity of governments through training, information, and knowledge sharing at the regional and global levels.
169. Project websites and online platforms are also a recurring tool used in all projects implemented by UNEP for sharing knowledge presenting databases, technical guidelines, country case studies, etc. but tracking use by partner and other countries of UNEP-supported platforms or tools is hardly done, so it is difficult to say how effective these really are in disseminating adaptation, mitigation and REDD+ information, approaches and technologies beyond project stakeholders.
170. However, the catalytic and upscaling effects of these partnerships, networks and online tools are often unknown and/or unrecorded, with only evidence found at the output level. Leveraging of UNEP products and services could benefit from better tracking of uptake and leveraging of UNEP products across networks and by other development partners. In this regard, UNEP may want to survey the use of its products and services in countries by other UN agencies, as well as reconsider its official role in relationship with the UNDAFs. In addition, the nature and level of engagement with stakeholders required is dependent on a clear assessment of partner capacities, willingness, and expected roles. These steps and the resulting understanding gained are not currently incorporated in project design and present missed opportunities.
171. Another important driver for achieving higher-level changes, sustainability and up-scaling is **stakeholder buy-in and ownership**. UNEP typically engages most relevant stakeholders in its projects and makes efforts to address their concerns. This engagement and participation of stakeholders creates buy-in for planning and investing, which promotes uptake and use of approaches, measures and technologies promoted by UNEP and contributes to

⁷⁹ UNEP website, undated. UNEP's contribution to the UN-REDD Programme. <http://www.unep.org/climatechange/reddplus/UNEPandtheUNREDDProgramme/tabid/29536/Default.aspx>

sustainability and up-scaling. This increased country-level buy-in has become more prominent over the period considered by the evaluation.

172. Typically, adaptation projects seek strong stakeholder involvement in assessments, planning and policy processes, which should increase ownership of results and possibly contribute to socio-political sustainability. The three umbrella project concepts for the adaptation component EA(a) describe how sustainability of project results will be ensured. For Project 11-P1 for example the Project Document indicates that sustainability would be ensured through extensive stakeholder consultation and a strong communication strategy that aims at feeding into the existing environmental strategy processes. The VIAs are based on a modified version of the overall IEA methodology, which is already a wide-reaching capacity development tool, and the resulting assessments were designed to be deployed at opportunistic times in political decision-making processes.
173. The CC DARE Project terminal evaluation report indicates that socio-political sustainability was evident throughout the project implementation; from the level of engagement, ownership and uptake by communities, local and national government, and civil society practitioners. Because the sub-projects were demand-led and chosen by countries through the proposal ranking approach, the level of ownership was very evident. For the UN Joint Program on Strengthening the Philippines' Institutional Capacity to Adapt to Climate Change project, sustainability plans were in place and actual hand-over occurred at project closing. Agreements were made with the national partners to assume some key activities and the outputs that had been completed as of that date. These partners are the national and local institutions present in the PMC, and which are mainly the traditional counterpart agencies of the UN Agencies. Efforts were also made to include the Climate Change Commission in post-programme activities, although its limitations are acknowledged due to its newness as an agency and its currently limited capacity. However, it did appear that their financial capacities are adequate to sustain their use of the programme outputs. Reports from the evaluation indicate that there are plans and opportunities to replicate and scale up the programme outputs.
174. As regards mitigation projects, UNEP is also dedicating significant efforts to develop direct relationships with key stakeholders at country level and increase their ownership and involvement in all phases of the interventions. In most cases, main stakeholders are at least members of the project steering committees. Within the framework of the EIRET project for instance, UNEP has given the targeted countries the opportunity to define themselves the areas and topics of research that will constitute the support of renewable energies deployment in their respective countries. This has ensured a strong ownership of the project by the governments involved⁸⁰. In Tunisia, beyond the prevailing enabling conditions⁸¹ that helped sustain the project results, the project team was able to associate all the key stakeholders, in particular the state-owned electric utility that was critical for the success of the financial mechanism put in place. As a result of this strong commitment of the government, project findings have been quickly translated into the legal framework (the Energy law was amended accordingly) and, at the institutional level, a special unit for SWH has been created within the Energy Conservation Agency (ECA) to ensure a proper follow-up of all related issues.
175. According to the recent evaluation of the UN-REDD Programme, few countries involved in the UN-REDD Programme provide any resources beyond a small contingent of government officials to move their national REDD+ agendas. Government expectations are that external funding (carbon offsets) would finance REDD+ actions and that the costs associated with building country capacities for REDD+ readiness are fully assumed by the international community, which is currently the case. This weakens the sense of ownership and the incentives for maintaining results. As long as there is external funding, countries will continue to support REDD+. If resources diminish, the incentive to maintain results will likewise fade, unless the fundamental message of REDD becomes institutionalised and championed by communities and governments alike.
176. Closely related to stakeholder buy-in and ownership is the need for **government commitment, also beyond the direct project partners**. Changes in political administration may impact on climate priorities – regular consultations and involvement is required to ensure that government commitments are maintained. For example, strong engagement with government is expected to ensure that countries integrate, disseminate and apply the knowledge, tools and methodologies gained from the UN-REDD Programme. In return, it is expected that national governments – the main implementation partners of the programme - will engage with, and respect the rights and

⁸⁰EIRET Terminal Evaluation Report p29

⁸¹Existence of a strong political willingness to promote SWH systems and lessons learned from two previous non-UNEP initiatives, SWH system is a mature technology in the country, it has a high customer acceptance, there is a local manufacturing base, and a favourable financial reform encouraging the development of consumer loans, all these elements also contributed to the success of the project and to its continuity.

interests of Indigenous Peoples' and civil society organisations. The Programme posits that REDD+-related capacities, including stakeholder engagement, transparent and inclusive governance, and the equitable sharing of benefits will be achieved, monitored and enforced once external funding support ends. In other words, the Programme assumes that participating countries are committed to social and economic transformations, and that they will engage in the requisite policy reforms. To this end, the Programme anticipates that participating countries will commit to low-carbon, climate-resilient development pathways and undertake system-wide change as required. UNEP's REDD+ readiness work on multiple benefits and the potential for REDD+ to contribute to a green economy transition likely contribute to this essential government commitment in a context of uncertainties at the international level. Another example of the importance of government commitment is China where government commitment to UNEP initiatives in reaching impacts is shown by three elements: government interest (the government is a willing and active participant on climate change and related cross-cutting issues, which is only supported further by recent public pressures), active promotion of ideas that the Government wants to push politically or economically (either through PR outreach or subsidies/other incentives), and uptake into policies of products, tools and methods into their policies (e.g. Uptake by State Council of the Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB), UNEP assessments integrated into 11th and 12th Five Year Plans etc.).

177. Another essential driver for uptake is **good coordination on policies and actions among ministries and sectors**, as climate change issues go beyond the environment and cut across ministries and sectors. Achieving this inter-sectorial coordination is often a challenge in UNEP projects. Newer projects, such as the FIRM, have specific work dedicated to promoting cross-ministerial and multi-sectorial collaboration. UNEP increasingly establishes inter-ministerial task teams at the outset of projects.

178. The case of REDD+ is a good example of the importance of this driver. Forestry and environment ministries may be committed to the UN-REDD Programme and fully grasp the potential of REDD+ but such enthusiasm and awareness need to be shared by others, both across sectors and vertically, from national to local governments and communities. As shown in a recent study of 32 REDD+ readiness proposals (R-PPs)⁸² only one quarter propose mechanisms to coordinate REDD+ across scales, such as including sub-national governments in REDD+ decision-making bodies. Without a vertically integrated approach that involves local decision-making bodies in whose jurisdiction forests are principally located, the likelihood that any forest conservation effort succeeds is minimal – especially if financial resources remain centralised, as is currently the case. Despite a handful of examples that appear to demonstrate stronger political support for the pursuit of a national REDD+ agenda, the recent UN-REDD Programme evaluation found overall weak political commitment to REDD+ action. For the most part, ministries or departments dealing with finance, national planning, agriculture, industry, commerce, and education were conspicuously absent from the relevant discussion tables.

Assumptions

179. **Capacity of local partners** is an important assumption made in many UNEP projects. At national level, strong institutions are essential to put to use the enhanced information, improved planning and enhanced skills created by UNEP's support. In the case of adaptation, a strong national institution should have among others sufficient human resources and technical capacity to implement the national adaptation strategies and measures. Although UNEP builds adaptation planning capacity, it does not directly support national climate change institutions in terms of organisation, governance or resource mobilization. In some cases, local capacity has been overestimated e.g. in the case of PROVIA where government partners were sometimes found to have limited capacity to carry out administration and operational functions. Government partners in Bangladesh were not in a position to receive and manage project funds directly.

180. Another important assumption is made in most projects as regards **the availability of sufficient human and financial resources in government partners/ministries to execute policies and strategies, and enforce laws and regulations**. Given the lack of country offices in most places, UNEP is only in a position to manage this assumption from a distance. Because the presence of sufficient human resources and technical capacity in government agencies is such an important assumption, it is often among the main criteria for selecting the countries where adaptation projects are piloted. Overall, the global economic and financial downturn has slowed down investment decisions of financial institutions and governments towards environmental objectives.

181. **Private sector and other key actors sufficiently incentivised to invest and change practices**. Fluctuations in oil prices affect competitiveness of renewable energy solutions, and diving carbon prices have reduced the feasibility

⁸² L. G. Williams (2013)

of CDM projects. However, technological advances and massive expansion of production capacity particularly in China have increased the competitiveness of RE and EE technologies. On the other hand, the growing number of climate-related natural disasters and related human and economic losses, have made the adoption of adaptation measures by farmers and other sectors gain traction.

182. Closely related to government commitment is the assumption of **national and regional economic and political stability**. Political stability at the country level and no key changes in national priorities are required for particular intervention areas to advance to high-level results. The Network for Environmentally Sustainable Transport in Latin America and the Caribbean (NESTLAC) project aimed at promoting sustainable transport in Panama, for example, and was initially high on the list of priorities; but due to political turn over, the government decided to opt out of the project before it began. UNEP has generally addressed and managed this assumption with flexibility, though sometimes country partners may be disappointed when funding is stalled or withheld due to political turmoil or instabilities.
183. **Clarity on the climate finance future including an adequate carbon price** is a critical assumption to boost carbon markets and to find an outlet to CDM projects designed and registered thanks to UNEP's support, in particular the CDM projects of Sub-Saharan countries. Impacts of satisfactory results already achieved by UNEP in terms of CDM are depending on the outcome of negotiations and discussions to be taken on the future of the climate finance.
184. A specific assumption for the REDD+ component, is **increased international commitment to REDD+**. In particular, the likelihood of a viable performance-based financing mechanism remains a moving target. According to the recent evaluation of the UN-REDD programme⁸³, the programme exerts a positive influence on the need to reposition the critical importance of forest ecosystem services and benefits in national, regional, and global policy arenas; strengthen the rigour of the REDD+ agenda; and build the capacity of partner countries to develop sustainable economic pathways that support the maintenance of forest resource systems. But while the commitments of the period 2010-2012 and subsequent negotiations are helping to create a favourable momentum for ongoing climate change negotiations, culminating with a possible international agreement by 2015, the evolving global context and the future of REDD+ financing are not as rosy. Even if a new climate agreement is reached in 2015, there will be no clear global financing strategy for REDD+ until the new protocol takes effect in 2020, and even the proposition that a fully operational carbon market would be in place by then is questioned by many. The Parties to the UNFCCC will also have to decide on appropriate measures to deal with the risk that integration of REDD+ credits in any market (whether national, regional or global) would likely reduce the value of carbon offsets and crowd out other mitigation efforts. Admittedly, the Warsaw Framework for REDD+ (COP 19) provides technical guidance for the full implementation of REDD+ and includes a decision on results-based payments that clarifies the diversification of potential sources of REDD+ finance, including the role of the Green Climate Fund. However, the complexity of setting up a payment for ecosystem services system and the difficult task of ensuring the permanence and additionality of avoided deforestation efforts are far from being resolved. Moreover, agriculture – the leading cause of tropical deforestation – has not been a central focus of UNFCCC negotiations processes nor of REDD+ efforts in general.

2.2.3 Efficiency

185. Efficiency has been assessed on the basis of whether UNEP built cost-saving measures into intervention design and/or whether such measures were adopted during implementation (to keep within the planned implementation timeframe and/or budget), and whether UNEP made use of existing efforts, systems and synergies to help bring about or multiply positive results. This evaluation concludes that there is no strong indication that UNEP systematically manages to put in place cost-saving measures for adaptation or mitigation measures in the project design phase, but resource constraints have sometimes forced adaptive management to introduce cost-saving measures. Evidence suggests, however, that UNEP project teams do typically make use of pre-existing systems, methods, and on-going or previous efforts in similar areas of new interventions. In terms of timeliness of interventions, UNEP commonly faces funding disbursement delays and administrative delays, and the relatively low administrative fees recorded in documentation mask that funds are frequently borrowed from on-going interventions to pay for the launch, or completion, of other interventions.

⁸³ UN-REDD, 2014. External Evaluation of the United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (the UN-REDD Programme), Volume I – Final Report, June 2014.

Cost or time-saving measures

186. The majority of projects reviewed did not have explicit cost or time-saving measures built into their design. An exception was the CC DARE project which demonstrated very good cost efficiency. Funds were disbursed through the UNEP-Risoe Centre directly to implementing actors who were also the target 'beneficiaries' of capacity building efforts. This increased speed and rigor in financial management.
187. However, changing circumstances sometimes required project teams to take cost-saving measures during implementation as was the case in the GEF funded project "Assessment of risk management instruments for financing renewable energy", for instance, where the project team had to face a too low initial budget for the outputs to be produced and therefore had to implement a tighter financial management to execute project activities. A decision was taken to launch a call for tenders for the preparation of the feasibility studies to be conducted, which ended up saving funds that helped support the formation of a public-private partnership platform for renewable energy insurance in developing countries. Also, a reduction in travel costs were used to produce a training kit/manual for insurance of renewable energy projects that was not initially planned and that was considered very useful by insurers and consulting firms involved⁸⁴.

Using Pre-Existing Systems

188. A key characteristic to be highlighted for adaptation projects is that most projects build on successful experience or lessons learnt from prior projects or represent a scale-up of earlier successful activities. For example, many programmes and projects build on UNEP's experiences of helping countries prepare National Communications and NAPAs. Similarly, evidence suggests that UNEP often seeks complementarities and synergies with other UN Agencies and donor funded projects. For example, in the UN Joint Programme on Climate Change in Philippines (MDG-F project) national institutions are part of the Project Management Committee and the National Steering Committee took an active role in its meetings and in the other activities (e.g. conferences, IEC activities, mid-term and final evaluations) related to the programme. Integrated environmental assessments (IEAs), including the vulnerability of urban settlements to climate change and its impact on human health, are also linked to existing initiatives of UN-Habitat, the Pan American Health Organization, and UNDP in Latin America and the Caribbean. Adaptation projects use the existing South-South network of GEO collaborating centres as a supportive framework for IEA climate change assessments; and draw from the extensive network of experts that work with UNEP on a variety of projects. In addition, by working directly with national institutions and UN Country Teams, UNEP generates buy in, takes advantage of pre-existing systems and also seeks to exploit complementarities and synergies with other projects or initiatives in the countries where initiatives are undertaken.
189. For mitigation projects, in every case examined for this evaluation UNEP takes advantage of pre-existing systems, methods and data sources from other partner initiatives or previous UNEP projects and seeks to exploit complementarities and synergies with other projects or initiatives. Most projects build on successful experience or lessons learnt of previous ones or represent a scale-up of previous successful activities. For example, the Programme Solaire (PROSOL) project in Tunisia, part of the Mediterranean Renewable Energy Programme (MEDREP), was built on the lessons learned of two previously implemented initiatives⁸⁵ that failed to deliver long-term effects. Balkan Renewable Energy Programme (BALREP) was built on the successful experience of MEDREP, replicating the combination of measures tested and implemented by this latter project to promote the deployment of solar energy, in particular Solar Water Heating systems in Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt. Carbon Finance for Agriculture, Silviculture, Conservation and Action against deforestation (CASCADe) has built on the experience and success of a previous UNEP project "Carbon Finance for Sustainable Energy in Africa (CF-SEA)".
190. The project EIRET (Enhancing Information for Renewable Energy Technology) was part of UNEP's larger SWERA (Solar and Wind Energy Assessment) effort and represented a scale-up of its successful activities. SWERA data and tools have largely been used in EIRET's activities. Similarly, within the mitigation component, evidence suggests that UNEP systematically seeks complementarities and synergies with other donor funded projects. CASCADe built on the experience of a UNF/WB funded project for CDM capacity building in Sub-Saharan Africa (that ended in December 2007). Duplications were avoided by directly involving the leading organizations (the Bio Carbon Fund, CIRAD, ONF, Risoe) in the project. In order to avoid overlapping, the CD4CDM national project in Morocco merged with the UNDP project. Still within the CD4CDM project, a close coordination was developed with UNDP in the Philippines and with GTZ in Ghana again to avoid overlap and to maximize synergies. In Sri Lanka, a tight

⁸⁴Project TE, p 27, footnote n°25

⁸⁵A Tunisian government initiative in 1984 and a GEF/WB project with a Belgium co-financing in 1996

collaboration was developed with the WB's CF-Assist programme, which was already operating on CDM capacity building.

191. In the context of REDD+, efficiency of UNEP is both a measure of internal processes and management, as well as of UNEP's ability to leverage resources and utilize existing systems, efforts, and data. By design, the UN-REDD Programme intends to draw out the "value added" of each core agency to ensure a cohesive delivery mechanism, though it can come at transaction costs such as delays in reporting and communications between regional offices and headquarters, and with external partners. External relationships with the GEF and the World Bank FCPF have developed well but ties to the World Bank CIF (FIP, PPCR) have not materialized.

Timeliness of Implementation

192. Though planning efficiency has been relatively good over the period considered by the evaluation, there are a number of adaptation activities that were pushed later into their respective planned year of execution, and several were extended to subsequent years. There are also several project revisions; an indication that revisions were made to original plans in order to ensure that important outputs were completed. In some cases the recipient country, organization, and or institutions lacked ownership and had limited capacity, and in other cases, there were problems with project design requiring changes in log-frame and activities. UNEP project reporting on PIMS indicates, that for most adaptation projects, there are delays due to insufficient funding and delayed funding (disbursement or allotment); delays or lack of capacity by implementing partners; delays by UNEP administrative processes (legal, HR, procurement). For example, the CC DARE project's planned duration was 36 months but in fact the project took 52 months to complete.

193. Almost all mitigation projects reviewed have had a time extension to allow for the completion of their activities, ranging from 6 months to up to four years.⁸⁶ Even though projects tend to stay within their budget limits, delays are almost systematic and mean higher staff and administrative costs. These delays seem to occur most often during project implementation and additional time is often needed to complete project activities. Reasons are multiple, ranging from project external factors such as impact of the economic downturn (Montenegro), political reshufflings (Czech Republic CP/EMS TE) or administrative bureaucracy from the national partner (limited availability, work overload, slowness of validation process) but also from internal factors such as staff turnover or UNEP's slow contracting procedures or funds transfers⁸⁷. Completed projects are also kept open in an administrative sense so that the funds in the project budget line for evaluation can be used for the formal, final evaluation overseen by the Evaluation Office. When requests for evaluation are made late or not made at all, or delays occur in the completion of terminal evaluations, projects cannot be closed.

Administrative Costs

194. The costs that UNEP incurs as an organization to design, supervise, and report on projects, are expected to be covered largely by Programme Support Costs (PSC). A review of Project Documents and PIMS reporting indicates that for most adaptation projects PSC range between 7 and 13 per cent of project expenditures. The project with the lowest PSC is CC DARE project with 2.2 per cent of the project budget and the highest is the *Adaptation capacity, policy and planning support programme*, at 13 per cent. The initial PSC for the *Vulnerability and Impact Assessment for EbA to climate change project* (at project design and approval) was 13 per cent but in the project revision it was reduced to 8 per cent of the funded budget.

195. This range in the PSC percentages is a reflection of the types of project arrangements set up for the execution of activities and not necessarily an indication of (a lack of) efficiency measures. The CC DARE (Climate Change Adaptation and Development Initiative) project, for example, applied an action-research or learning-based approach in which country partners planned, researched and executed activities that are reported to CC DARE. This model entails low administrative costs on the part of UNEP administration and staff. On the other hand, some interventions are planned and managed intensively by UNEP staff and therefore require these expenditures be incorporated into the budget.

196. For mitigation, regarding project support (or administrative) costs that UNEP take on all projects, given available information, they range between 6 and 11,5 per cent and are sometimes partly shared with the co-implementing agency subcontracted by UNEP (such as the UNEP Collaborating Centres) to execute the project on the ground.

⁸⁶ For details and examples, see UNEP CC mitigation portfolio in the Mitigation working paper.

⁸⁷ NESTLAC Terminal Evaluation p26, MEDREP Project Supervision Review, GEF/RIM Terminal Evaluation report

197. The MPTF Office serves as the Administrative Agent to the UN-REDD Programme Fund, and charges, in accordance with the PF Document, a 1 per cent fee for administration and fiduciary responsibilities to be provided in advance on the basis of Programme Documents budgets approved by the Policy Board.⁸⁸ As of December 2012 (totalled for 2011 and 2012) the Administrative Agent received slightly less than 1 per cent of the cumulative source of available funds (gross contributions, interest and investment income and interest from participating organizations). While this fee is small in relative terms, there are also signs of significant inefficiencies due to a lack of harmonization of administrative procedures between the UN Agencies, as reported by several National Programmes (of which UNEP manages Panama).⁸⁹

2.3 Factors Affecting Sub-programme Performance

2.3.1 Design and Structure

Programme Design and Results Framework

198. As its main objective is “to strengthen the ability of countries, in particular developing countries, to integrate climate responses into national development processes,” capacity building is the core business of the UNEP CCSP. UNEP has organized a hierarchy of results frameworks – from the Medium-term Strategy, to Climate Change Strategy, down to the POW and Programme Framework Documents under the Expected Accomplishments – to focus limited resources, align with UNEP’s mandates and relevant international resolutions, as well as build on UNEP’s perceived comparative advantages in climate change. Within the strategic foci, two core roles have remained consistent: providing normative frameworks/policy advice, and promotion of scientific research and science-based decision-making. In addition to these nested layers of priorities, the overlaying “flagship” areas have served as a marketing tool for packaging UNEP as a first-mover or innovator on application of EbA and clean technology, and has improved its visibility in REDD+.

199. The respective POW outputs under each component have undergone remedial changes to adjust and focus the activities around strategic areas during the period considered by the evaluation. The two most recent POWs were developed by DTIE through a consultative approach across all divisions involved in CC, and also solicited input from regional and country offices. This process was thorough but very time-consuming and UNEP staff were generally favourable to this new way to deliberate on their collective vision of what the UNEP CCSP aimed to accomplish during the respective biennia. However, a few interviewees felt that the ‘back and forth’ to ensure inclusiveness in the decision-making process was too much. Interview findings are consistent with survey (n = 57) results: 63 per cent of survey respondents thought “more” inclusiveness of the process for determining the programme of work helps improve the management of UNEP’s CCSP; 21 per cent thought “less”; and 14 per cent were “unsure”.

200. As both the Formative Evaluation and the MTE of the MTS have previously analyzed, there were fundamental flaws in the structure and intended logical connections within the CCSP results framework for 2010/11, from the component EA level down to POW outputs. These include the lack of causality from outputs to EAs, a lack of appropriate performance indicators, and insufficient targets and indicators.⁹⁰ As can be seen in Table 5 below, between the two biennia 2010/11 and 2012/13 some changes were made in the formulation of the EAs to strengthen their direct causal linkages to UNEP outputs, but the overall structure in four PFs remained the same. The revised 2012/13 EAs have shown progress in terms of bringing clarity to intended results, and helping UNEP staff to communicate, both internally and externally, the relative value-added or niche of the CCSP. The changes provide some precision and realism to otherwise very ambitious objectives with a wide scope of work and variety of actors involved in helping to attain each of them.

⁸⁸ This fee is not comparable across components since it is only a portion of the administrative costs. UN-REDD PF Doc. P 23.

⁸⁹ UN REDD 2012. *Fourth Consolidated Annual Progress Report of the UN-REDD Programme Fund | 1 January – 31 December 2012*. P 29, 33.

⁹⁰ See the Formative Evaluation of UNEP’s Programme of Work 2010-2011 (2010) and its Climate Change Sub-programme Annex, and the Medium Term Evaluation of the Medium-Term Strategy (2012) for detailed analysis.

Table 5. Evolution of EAs from POW 2010-11 to 2012-13

EA	POW 2010/11	Changes	POW 2012/13
(a) Adaptation	Adaptation, planning, financing and cost-effective preventive actions increasingly incorporated into national development processes supported by scientific information, integrated climate impact assessments and local climate data.	Strengthened EbA focus in line with EbA flagship; Tools to reach EA and UNEP's support spelled out	Adaptation, including an ecosystem-based adaptation approach, is incorporated into country development planning and policymaking based on scientific assessments, policy and legislative advice, and lessons learned from pilot projects supported by UNEP and adaptation experiences, including an ecosystem-based approach, showcased at the global level
(b) Clean energy	Countries make sound policy, technology, and investment choices leading to reduction in GHG emissions and potential co-benefits, with focus on clean and RE sources, EE and energy conservation.	Economic growth and GHG emissions decoupled; Tools to reach EA spelled out.	Low carbon and clean energy sources and technology alternatives increasingly adopted, inefficient technologies phased out and <u>economic growth, pollution and GHG emissions decoupled</u> by countries based on <u>technical and economic assessments, cooperation, policy advice, legislative support and catalytic financing mechanisms</u>
(c) Energy finance	Improved technologies deployed and obsolescent technologies phased out, through financing from private and public sources including CDM and JI Implementation mechanism of KP.	Broadening of overall objective on promoting access to climate financing at all geographic scales	Countries' access to climate change finance is facilitated at all levels and successful innovative financing mechanisms are assessed and promoted at the regional and global level
(d) REDD+	Increased carbon sequestration occurs through improved land use, reduced deforestation and reduced land degradation.	Emphasis on support to countries to bring about more holistic and sustainable changes in the forest sector by leveraging on the opportunities that REDD+ readiness provides. Inclusion of co-benefits and safeguards.	Reduction in deforestation and land degradation with countries moving towards sustainable forest management, conservation and full terrestrial carbon accounting based on tackling all drivers of deforestation, and taking fully into account <u>co-benefits and safeguards</u>
(e) Science & outreach	National-level policymakers and negotiators, civil society and the private sector have access to relevant climate change science and information for decision-making.	Emphasis on increased provision of substantive input by UNEP for decision making and long term planning process	<u>Increased</u> access of target audiences to relevant climate change assessments and information for decision-making and <u>long-term planning</u>

Source: UNEP Climate Change Sub-programme Coordinator

201. The full list of EAs and respective outputs for the POW 2010-11 and POW 2012-13 is presented in Table 1 (pages 3-4). The five EAs are structured according to the four CCSP thematic areas (components). There is usually one EA per component except for mitigation which has two EAs. The following analysis focusses on the EAs for 2012-13 because these are the most up-to-date and are slightly better formulated than the EAs for 2010/11.

202. The EAs for adaptation, energy finance and science & outreach are pitched at the direct outcome level, which is the outcome level at which UNEP can still realistically be held accountable. The EAs for clean energy and REDD+, however, are formulated at results levels that are beyond what UNEP can be held accountable for. These EAs are therefore not appropriate to monitor UNEP's progress over the course of POW implementation. A further discussion on the design of each programme framework under the sub-programme is presented in the next sub-section.

203. The increase in focus by UNEP around climate change over the period considered by the evaluation has meant some tensions between corporate strategy and the climate change strategy. For example, the CCSP deliberately abandoned some smaller areas of work in order to streamline the programme of work going from five to three main areas of work. It has also meant working in fewer countries, concentrating efforts in countries where UNEP

has a proven track record or previous relationships, and grouping related projects together within those countries. Other areas noted as important to UNEP's corporate image and overall effectiveness according to strategy - but under-executed due to a lack of resources and incentives - were ensuring participatory project development, replication/scaling up of projects (exit strategies and follow-on plans for pilots), and risk management.

204. The following two sections provide a more detailed critique of design and structure at the programme framework and project level, respectively.

Programme Framework Design

205. UNEP does not appear to have a vision in terms of harmonizing efforts under the climate change components to look for synergies and reduce duplication of efforts. There are clear theoretical ties between science and outreach, REDD+, mitigation and adaptation, but these are not systematically addressed in UNEP's long-term strategy. As a result, collaboration across divisions on, among others, assessment, legal issues, REDD+ and carbon finance remains largely informal. The Formative Evaluation (2010) made the following overall comments on the CCSP PF Documents:

- The baseline situation and gaps and needs analysis – to which the interventions proposed under the PFs are expected to respond – is generally weak. The justification of the projects is mostly based on internationally agreed priorities (e.g. the areas of focus for CC adaptation action spelled out in the Bali Action Plan) and the mandate or previous experiences of UNEP.
- There is no discussion of the causal linkages between PoW Outputs and the EA(s). The PF Documents present the main areas of interventions making reference to the proposed projects, but they do not make reference to the PoW Outputs (even though there often seems to be an implicit correspondence). The documents explain in a few paragraphs how the areas of intervention or projects link up with global priorities and UNEP's mandate/comparative advantage.
- Most PF Documents provide a short narrative on the relationship between the different projects proposed – focussing on their complementarities but not on possible collaborative links. Project concepts in the PF Documents do not provide any additional information on these relationships.
- External partnerships to deliver the EA(s) are quite well spelled out: in all PF Documents key actors and partners are listed with a few lines on their role in the partnership with UNEP.
- Internal partnerships, i.e. contributions from and collaboration arrangements between Divisions to deliver the EA(s), are not adequately developed: in the PF Documents for mitigation and REDD+ the discussion of these contributions/collaborations is limited to a list of Divisions involved with a few lines on their respective roles in the PF; in the PF Document for adaptation it is limited to a list of Divisions without comments; and in the PF Document for science and outreach it is not even mentioned that the delivery of the EA involves several Divisions.

206. Below a few specific remarks are made on the individual programme frameworks over the period considered by the evaluation.⁹¹

Adaptation

207. The programme framework and POW outputs for EA(a) on adaptation is coherent with UNEP's climate change objectives. It is intended to reduce vulnerability and build resilience to the impacts of climate change by building and strengthening national institutional capacities for vulnerability assessment and adaptation planning, and integrating ecosystems-based adaptation into management practices and policies. The strategy focuses on a variety of climate change vulnerable landscapes, including mountains, river basins, dry-lands and low-lying coasts.

208. The EA(a) statement is pitched at an appropriate results level - capacity building at country level - because it captures the direct outcomes expected from UNEP's outputs. UNEP's efforts can directly affect change at that level. However, UNEP has opted, allegedly due to resource constraints and not because of a strategic choice, for playing a catalytic role rather than a direct country support role relying on "intermediaries" (other UN agencies, International and local NGOs, government institutions, academic and research institutions) to work at the country level. This means it is often quite difficult to assess UNEP's direct contribution to country capacity improvements.

⁹¹ Dissection and analysis of the EAs, PFs and POWs has been completed by the Formative Evaluation, and also covered in parts of the MTE of the MTS.

209. The POW outputs for EA(a) have undergone changes from the 2010/11 to the 2012/13 POW. The number of outputs was reduced from 7 to 5 by merging two pairs of closely related outputs. One output was abandoned (support to countries to comply with vulnerability and adaptation elements of the UNFCCC) and one was added (understanding economics of climate change impacts and ecosystem services for adaptation). EbA is explicitly mentioned in 3 out of 5 outputs. Under the POW 2010/11 the outputs under EA (a) were pitched at very different levels. Only one was actually an output (i.e. types of goods and services delivered by UNEP's interventions, or in other words what UNEP *does*) while at least 5 were pitched at the same level or a higher level than the EA (basically, what changes UNEP tries to achieve beyond its interventions). UNEP could not really be held accountable for delivering the latter, but only to contributing to it. This situation has been rectified with all outputs under the POW 2012/13 now formulated as actual UNEP goods or services. While DELC and DRC were responsible for one output each in the POW 2010/11, they were not anymore for the POW 2012/13.
210. Within the component, two core roles have remained consistent: providing normative frameworks/policy advice, and promotion of scientific research and science-based decision-making. In addition, the adaptation "flagship" area (EbA) serves as a marketing tool for packaging UNEP as a first-mover or innovator in the application of EbA approach. However, as with other components, a Theory of Change (TOC) was not envisaged at the planning stage of the programme framework, which could have been used to shape the types of interventions to address the intended objectives, and provide a basis for adaptive management. The programme framework also does not distinguish assumptions and impacts drivers in the risk assessment.

Mitigation

211. Climate change mitigation interventions are consistent with UNEP's climate change strategy and objectives under the respective POWs. UNEP conducts assessments, feasibility studies and intense consultations with various stakeholders to capture the needs at global, regional and country levels, as well as according to the thematic areas. These scoping exercises are performed during the design phase of a programme/project or early in the implementation.
212. The EA(b) statement is at a level beyond UNEP's control, as the adaptation of clean energy sources and technologies and phase-out of inefficient technologies by countries will depend on many other factors than UNEP's outputs. The EA(c) statement has been brought down one level between biennia, and seems now within the grasp of UNEP's energy finance interventions.
213. For both EA(b) and (c) the POW outputs have undergone changes from the 2010/11 to the 2012/13 POW. The number of outputs has been drastically reduced from 11 to 6 by abandoning three outputs (see Table 1) and merging two pairs of outputs – one pair of which seems rather unrelated (strengthening of national institutional capacity to allocate public funding and leveraging private investment, on one hand, and development of new finance instruments, on the other). Most outputs under the 2010/11 POW contained an output-level statement, but add use of the output as part of the output (e.g. assessments of RE potentials are undertaken and used by countries). Use of outputs is in fact the definition of outcomes – even though every effort should be made to ensure use of outputs, this cannot be considered as a direct deliverable of UNEP's intervention. This issue remains the same with the reformulated/merged outputs for the POW 2012/13. Besides, under the energy finance EA all three outputs are resolutely at the outcome level.

REDD+

214. As with mitigation and adaptation, a process of consolidation occurred under the new POW 2012/13 and EA(d) mostly revolves around the UN-REDD collaborative partnership (FAO/UNDP/UNEP), though there are small parallel activities through bilateral donors. All REDD+ activities, however, regardless of funding source, fall under or align with the POW. The Programme Framework Document is fairly well formulated though it lacks a stakeholder analysis with a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities. The UN-REDD Programme Framework Document envisions a general risk analysis but not relative to UNEP's role in the partnership. Gender and poverty are relatively superficial.
215. The REDD+ activities undertaken during the period considered by the evaluation do reflect desired POW outputs and are coherent with the CCSP strategy as a whole. However, the lack of sequential causality between lower and higher levels of expected results in the 2010/11 POW⁹² prevented drawing conclusions on UNEP's respective

⁹² E.g. "mapping, assessments, modelling tools, institutional frameworks and "readiness" of a number of developing countries do not directly lead to improved land use and reduced deforestation, let alone increased carbon sequestration and reduced land degradation."

contributions namely to UN-REDD outcomes during that period. Also, EA(d) comprises elements of the environmental impact expected (reduced CO2 emissions) as well as the means to achieve it (improved land use and reduced deforestation); both of which are at a results level far beyond UNEP's direct influence. Even though the results level of the EA has been brought down from one biennium to the other, it is still pitched at a level beyond UNEP's control.

216. Between the biennia 2010/11 and 2012/13, two outputs have been abandoned (mapping and assessments of land-use change, forest loss, biodiversity etc., and strengthening of national frameworks governing land use and forestry) while one new one was added (country capacity to leverage investments in sustainable forest use). No outputs have been merged. As a result of abandoning certain outputs, DELC and DEWA who were responsible for one output each in the POW 2010/11, were removed from the POW 2012/13. The 2012/13 results framework is somewhat improved in that the outputs (investment, carbon accounting tools, country capacities) flow better into the outcomes (countries moving towards sustainable forest management, conservation and full terrestrial carbon accounting). Outputs are pitched at the right level (i.e. what UNEP does, and not what UNEP tries to achieve/contribute to).

Project Design

217. Projects under the period considered by the evaluation usually build on existing UNEP efforts, and sometimes the work of other partners (see discussion under strategic relevance), and address intended global, regional and country-level needs according to UNEP's mandate and MTS. However, they still often contain many of the design flaws indicative of the previous reporting periods, and many⁹³ are still not aligned with the current results framework. This is partly attributable to a lack of funds to design projects, resulting in a perpetual pattern of borrowing from existing projects to develop new ones. Despite these challenges and gaps, project documents are generally of higher quality under the POW 2012/13 in comparison with the previous POW. These noticeable improvements are due in part to the sub-optimal conditions under which the POW 2010/11 were prepared (time constraints and lack of up-to-date guidance), but also the advent of a new Project Preparation Template for the 2012/13 POW. This evaluation desk-reviewed about one-third of the portfolio, using a representative balance of components and geographic range. The following describes the main strengths and weaknesses of project design under the climate change sub-programme.

Theory of Change

218. While most project documents reviewed present some form of problem analysis, none of them present an explicit Theory of Change of the project. This is not surprising as it was not a requirement at the time these projects were designed. Looking at the logical framework diagrams, there is usually sound causal logic from project outputs to project outcomes but intermediary states between project outputs and the project outcome (often the EA) are sometimes not considered, and the activities or outputs needed to move from outputs to the project outcome are then often missing. Most frequently ignored or under-developed are communication/dissemination, policy advice or capacity building activities. The level of detail in presenting project activities is heterogeneous but often insufficient to understand what exactly the projects intends to do and whether the activities are likely to deliver the outputs and drive the outputs to the outcome. Sometimes activities are clearly missing to achieve a project output.

Drivers, assumptions and risk analysis

219. Drivers, or those external factors and conditions over which UNEP has some level of control, were not required to be identified in the design stages and are therefore also largely absent from project design documents. Instead, project documents for the period under review mention critical success factors, which include drivers but also internal factors (such as the availability of funding to the project). For critical success factors, however, the project document does not require any details on how will be dealt with critical success factors. A simple list suffices. Critical success factors are often not explicitly built into the project activities and outputs, and come as additional measures.

220. Assumptions, or those factors and conditions over which UNEP has no control, are presented under the form of risks, corresponding with the situation where the assumption proves false. For all risks identified, the project document format requires details on impact severity, likelihood of occurrence, a risk management strategy &

⁹³According to QAS, 33% of all UNEP projects (not only in CCSP) are still in the process of being aligned to EAs and POW outputs. Eight CCSP projects were not yet aligned as of the close of 2012.

safeguards and by when and whom the risk will be dealt with. However, projects rarely have a mechanism in place to monitor risks. Furthermore, the risks are often poorly formulated and mix internal and external factors, and also factors the project can and cannot influence. Similarly to critical success factors, risk management is also often not explicitly built into the project activities and outputs.

221. Project design documents also quite often mix up critical success factors (which can be influenced by the project) and risks (which cannot). The most problematic is when a risk is listed as a critical success factor, because then the project document does not need to present how the project will deal with it (it is assumed that it is part of the project's intervention logic).

Milestones/targets

222. Climate change project milestones and targets are often represented as periodic markers for activities and do not necessarily reflect an adequate measurement of whether the project is moving toward a particular output or outcome. According to QAS, many projects are submitted to PRC without 6-month milestones and targets for each indicator and QAS makes suggestions for milestones and targets which project managers are often expected to take up by the PRC. In the case of umbrella projects, milestones or targets are quite meaningless for monitoring progress at the level of the individual sub-projects.

Sustainability and Replication

223. Each of the projects listed under the respective programme frameworks typically contains a brief section on sustainability of results. With the exception of GEF projects, however - which are required to include elements pertaining to impact, replication, sustainability and catalytic effects - most projects do not include a well-articulated exit strategy or plan for uptake, replication or up-scaling by partners, even though such factors are critical to much of UNEP's work in climate change. This may be due to the fact that the Project Document template for the period under review did not have a specific section on sustainability, replication and up-scaling.

224. Typically, projects seek strong stakeholder engagement and ownership in assessments, planning and policy processes, which should increase ownership of results and possibly contribute to socio-political sustainability (see Section 2.2.2 Likelihood of impact, sustainability, replication and up-scaling). Capacity building (mostly through training of individuals, but also sometimes through institutional support e.g. to "Centers of excellence" in Project 1bcP2) of national and regional stakeholders is a relatively common means for increasing sustainability. However, how these stakeholders are to fund the continuation of the work post-project is never addressed, so financial sustainability remains a big question mark.

225. In some cases, sustainability considerations appear at the level of critical success factors (e.g. In Project 1bcP1 commitment to long-term policy planning by governments is considered as a critical success factor of the project: government climate change agencies will be involved in all stages of the project to ensure government ownership). Elsewhere, sustainability is considered in light of long-term government policy and planning and/or addressed in the form of 'capacity building' measures, but it is generally unclear how replication and up scaling is supposed to happen through communication, awareness raising and often insufficiently resourced follow-up activities. There are some exceptions, though, such as the UN Joint Program on Strengthening the Philippines' Institutional Capacity to Adapt to Climate Change, which effectively formed and followed a plan for national partners to assume roles and activities following project closure.

Stakeholder Engagement

226. Projects are generally designed in close collaboration with key (government) stakeholders – and often as a result of a direct government request - thereby resulting in strong country/stakeholder ownership; which can also improve sustainability and likelihood of impact. Scoping exercises and assessments (sometimes at the global level) lead to consultations and further feasibility studies, usually early in implementation. Such was the case for the Poverty Environment Initiative (PEI)/PECM⁹⁴ in Bangladesh, where the Planning Commission had complete design and execution control, as the focal point of collaboration between Ministries mainstreaming climate change into their planning processes. In another example, whereas many UNEP publications make use of research institutions or think tanks to develop knowledge products, in contrast, partnering government leadership and government staff primarily drive the production of ECCO reports in partnership with UNEP staff.

⁹⁴The planning commission renamed the PEI initiative to emphasize the climate aspects: Poverty, Environment and Climate Mainstreaming.

227. On the whole, however, stakeholder analysis and capacity assessment in the design stages is often weak and amounts to missed opportunities to avoid particular risks and/or engage timely and strategic partners for targeted capacity building. Insufficient stakeholder analysis can be especially problematic for adaptation interventions since the risks of not doing so are highest for the most vulnerable beneficiaries.

Gender & Poverty

228. Potential gender linkages are probably strongest in adaptation and REDD+ interventions, but also downstream mitigation projects might have important gender aspects. Some general text on “gender integration” into approaches and tools can be found in the POWs. Though gender differentiation by projects is possible, none of the key indicators – or programme frameworks - capture the social or economic dimensions of gender and poverty. Documents refer to “consideration” of gender issues, with the broad assumption that women and children are the most vulnerable to climatic changes, regardless of intervention and/or context. Most of the projects do not include design elements that explicitly address gender or recognize the potential active role of women and/or marginalized groups in improving the quality of outputs or outcomes, or likelihood of replication, up-scaling. However, efforts have been made in some cases, such as in the stakeholder analysis conducted during the design phase of the Balkan Renewable Energy Programme (BALREP). Women were featured in all aspects of the project, such as being given priority for commercial loans and ensuring equal consideration for consultancies.

Umbrella Projects

229. There is a trend toward fewer but larger projects, in an attempt to consolidate several smaller projects under a larger ‘umbrella’ to increase efficiency in design, supervision and reporting. For example, the three large adaptation projects examined in detail for this evaluation were a composite of interventions already under implementation and had to be aligned with the current POW. The three mitigation umbrella projects implemented over the period considered by the evaluation have been defined in areas where UNEP had a proven expertise with the intention to adopt a more coherent approach, and increase visibility and potential impacts. Results were not as positive as expected due in particular to the burden of still having to manage many sub-projects with little efficiency gains, while also having to take into account the multiple small projects initiated during earlier planning cycles that had limited connection between them, despite being retrofitted or realigned to the new results frameworks. Umbrella projects do not present a Theory of Change explaining the coherence between their sub-projects and sub-project results are difficult to identify and track for the purposes of learning and accountability (e.g. the specific performance aspects of sub-projects is subsumed into the larger framework of the umbrella project). Managers have lost a measure of ownership and control over the bundled projects and reporting and monitoring information is not meaningful at a programme or corporate level. It has now been decided in UNEP to not accept any new umbrella projects from 2014 onwards.

2.3.2 Organization and Management

Coordination Arrangements

230. Two important objectives of UNEP’s Mid-Term Strategy (MTS) were to enable a stronger results orientation towards addressing key environmental challenges, and better delivery of UNEP’s services through leveraging enhanced synergies and collaboration across UNEP divisions. During 2010/11, a matrix management approach was adopted, in which day-to-day responsibility for the delivery of the overall programme continued to rest largely with the six divisions, while programmatic responsibility for the supervision of programme contents and reporting on achievements rested with Sub-programmes coordinated by Sub-programme Coordinators, supervised by a Lead Division Director. As the Mid-term Evaluation of the MTS explained, divisions continued to be responsible for the “how” of the programme, while the Sub-programme Coordinators (and their respective Lead Divisional Directors) were responsible for the “what”. The MTE of the MTS further noted that the lack of clear accountability arrangements under this structure was a significant weakness for the sub-programmes due to the conflicting dual roles of programming and implementation for the Lead Division Director.⁹⁵

231. Under the matrix structure, the Division of Technology, Industry and Economics (DTIE) is the Lead Division for the Climate Change Sub-programme and houses the CC Sub-programme coordinator. For POW 2010/11 responsibility had been further devolved to divisions to coordinate Programme Frameworks and deliver the POW outputs – the so-called Coordinating Divisions. DTIE was the Coordinating Division for the mitigation PF, DEPI for the adaptation

⁹⁵ UNEP 2012. MTE of the MTS. P 45.

and REDD+ PFs, and DEWA for the science and outreach PF. Since POW 2012/13 the concept of Coordinating Division was abandoned but the distribution of responsibility for output delivery over different divisions remained (even though it became much more concentrated).

232. Each CCSP PF document contains an “internal management and reporting requirements” section. However, evidence seems to suggest that UNEP’s ambitions sometimes exceed its ability and means to manage and coordinate efforts. The PF for adaptation states a comprehensive set of expectations: “UNEP possesses a broad environmental perspective, expertise in linking climate change to other environment and development issues and a mandate that allows it both to work on normative frameworks and to undertake activities on the ground in developing countries, building from a science-based approach strongly supported by a network of world-class scientific institutions and UNEP collaborating centres.” However, interviews suggest the dual modality of normative and field activities is a lot to ask of UNEP’s considerably limited country-based resources. In order to support the geographically dispersed efforts, when the CCSP was first launched, climate change experts were placed in each of the regional offices. However, to date, not all ROs retain these Regional CC Coordinators, and DRC staff sometimes step in for CCSP coordination, with technical support from project staff. This leaves the unanswered question of whether CCSP regional – and by extension, country – coordination does or should happen in practice.
233. Notwithstanding significant challenges, UNEP’s competent and qualified staff have (long since) adapted to the lack of on-the-ground presence to the extent possible by leveraging partnerships (to act as their hands, eyes and ears) and ensuring close communications with their government counterparts. The biggest challenge reported by UNEP staff on coordination was not in outreach and external communications but on internal coordination.
234. The barriers to internal coherence and cooperation appear to revolve around two issues: budget and authority. First, since DTIE is the Lead Division, it makes the final budgetary decisions. Multiple interviews with staff from across divisions reveal a strong perception that because DTIE controls the budget, it directs a disproportionately large amount of Environment Fund funding to its own divisional activities. The evaluation was unable to find evidence that this was really the case but figures certainly indicate a large difference in the amount of financing that DTIE projects received from the Environment Fund compared to DEPI projects (for the project portfolio covered by the evaluation, DTIE received between US\$4 and 5 million from the Environment Fund while DEPI received about US\$1 million). This perception of unfairness creates mistrust and disincentives for collaboration. Also, even though it is the CCSP Coordinating Division, DTIE has no authority over POW outputs other than mitigation [EA(b) and EA(c)]. For example, the Divisions engaged in adaptation work (mostly DEPI, but also DEWA) are based at HQ in Nairobi Kenya and the work is managed by staff from HQ or ROs. These issues are discussed further below.

Transition to the Matrix Structure

235. Interviewees viewed the transition to an inter-divisional matrix structure for the climate change sub-programme as a good step toward collaboration in theory, but in practice it did not create the communication channels and coordination mechanisms to capitalize on synergies and identify and capitalize on opportunities between divisions. Most staff (who were present at the time) are relatively indifferent to the (lack of) changes it brought in their particular area of work, and many felt strongly that the process was insufficiently supported and unrealistic to complete in a period of eighteen months. Some further noted that it led to mistrust, especially below the management level; that staff felt as if they were ‘left hanging,’ without managers able to handle practical and administrative details of the restructuring. Despite expressed need since the time of the matrix transition, with the exception of the Energy Branch - which has developed and distributed a staff Manual explaining its management structure and protocol - there is little evidence of efforts to help staff gain better understanding of their own divisional operations and/or to incentivize collaboration within and/or across the divisions, let alone other sub-programmes.
236. As mentioned above, one of the findings of the UNEP MTS evaluation was that “the current interpretation of matrix management in UNEP is not providing the clear lines of authority and accountability for programme delivery that are needed.” That is to say, there are too many different forms of accountability for programme delivery and a “lack of clear distinction between the ‘programmatic’ axis i.e. the responsibility for overseeing the achievement of the sub-programme objectives - the what - and the ‘implementation’ axis i.e. the responsibility for the day-to-day technical delivery of the programme - the how”.⁹⁶ The 2010 audit of UNEP’s internal governance under the MTS

⁹⁶ UNEP EO 2010. Mid-Term Evaluation of UNEP’s Medium-term Strategy 2010 – 2013. December 2012. P 45

also revealed "a real need for clarity regarding the assigning of authority, responsibility and accountability of the various divisions and staff members involved in the implementation of the CCSP."⁹⁷ DTIE has the responsibility of coordination and allocation of funding for the CCSP but without an accountability mechanism. Staff report that they manage the lack of clear authority by knowing how to navigate the systems in place and meet administrative requirements. This has functioned for a few years for those staff that have remained in their respective roles/positions long enough to learn these options or gain some level of authority, but is not helpful to new staff and nor does it present a long-term solution.

237. The question of what thematic and substantive issues each respective division and SP should cover is also an area somewhat unsettled since the transition to a matrix structure. For example, many interviewees, both UNEP staff and in-country partners, questioned the distinction between ecosystem-based adaptation and the mainstreaming of climate change into on-going activities in vulnerable sectors such as forestry, agricultural, and/or planning. The flagship areas of the CCSP (EbA, clean energy and REDD+) are an additional dimension cutting across the SPs and divisions (which already overlap but do not systematically coordinate). These supra-thematic areas have (4 years later) motivated staff to focus efforts on specific problem/solution areas under the CCSP. They have also been useful for purposes of marketing and communicating UNEP's brand to external audiences, thereby assisting staff in mobilizing resources on particular topics or in particular countries of interest by donors. The flagships have nevertheless also caused tensions largely as a result of resistance to change, including a loss of power over the direction of programming for some teams.

238. While the flagships have been used to describe and highlight already ongoing programmatic foci, on the other hand, the formation of umbrella projects (as already discussed in sections 2.1.3, 2.2.1, and 2.3.1), the sub-projects of which do not go through QAS or a PRC, has meant administratively lumping together sets of projects among which some might be completely unrelated. The result is a greater loss of accountability and control of the component portfolios by respective managers, even while the scope of the respective POWs has sharpened during the period considered by the evaluation.

Management

239. As explained in the introduction of this report, in terms of management and administration, each component has a coordinating division under the CCSP. For example, the Division of Environmental Policy Implementation (DEPI) through its Climate Change Adaptation and Terrestrial Ecosystems Branch (Nairobi) is the coordinating/managing division for EA(a) on adaptation and EA(d) on REDD+, and related POW outputs. Each POW Output (for both 2010/11 and 2012/13) has been assigned to one Division accountable for its delivery, commonly referred to as the "Managing Division".

240. Only for the Mitigation component have all POW Outputs been assigned to a single Division – DTIE – while the outputs under EA(a), EA(d) and EA(e) are dispersed among the 5 other UNEP divisions. For POW 2010/11 DEPI was accountable for only 3 out of 7 outputs under Adaptation and 2 out of 4 for REDD+, while DEWA managed only 2 out of 6 Science and Outreach outputs. This dispersion has been reduced dramatically for POW 2012/13 with DEPI managing now 4 out of 5 Adaptation outputs and all 3 REDD+ outputs, and DEWA being accountable for 2 out of 4 Science and Outreach outputs. While DRC managed two CC outputs under POW 2010/11 it retained none for POW 2012/13. DELC also lost two outputs from one biennium to the other (adaptation and REDD+) but retained an output under Science and Outreach regarding the information of climate negotiators.

241. Programme Officers within each of the respective divisions are responsible for all aspects of project implementation, including technical, financial and administrative aspects. While the process of developing the POW (every two years) and project approval through the Project Review Committees (PRCs) provide regular opportunities to bring together staff from different divisions, there are no regular managerial or administrative ties between sub-programmes. This topic was extensively covered in the 2010 governance audit, the recommendations of which have been accepted by management but were, at the time of this evaluation, at different levels of operationalization.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ OIOS 2010. Audit Report. Internal Governance in UNEP: Implementation of the Medium Term Strategy will be accomplished through provision of adequate resources to strengthen consultation, coordination and accountability mechanisms in UNEP. 23 September 2010. <http://usun.state.gov/documents/organization/159736.pdf>

⁹⁸ OIOS 2010. Audit Report. Internal Governance in UNEP: Implementation of the Medium Term Strategy will be accomplished through provision of adequate resources to strengthen consultation, coordination and accountability mechanisms in UNEP. 23 September 2010. <http://usun.state.gov/documents/organization/159736.pdf>; Also based on HQ and DTIE interviews with managers and staff.

242. Another consideration of authority between the divisions is whether there is the relationship between managers and financial and administrative functions. Building on previous assessments as outlined above,⁹⁹ the interviews and the survey conducted for this evaluation reveal a less than ideal relationship between financial allocation decisions and the management of substantive activities. For example, some staff expected to be budgeted under the CCSP between 2010-13 ended up assigned with responsibilities for only a minimal activity budget. To the extent that there is a perception that DTIE 'takes away' other divisions' funding, those teams in other divisions are incentivized to find other means to create financial leeway or leverage external resources when possible. This can lead to efficiency measures, but it can also mean widening the operational gap between the divisions by prioritizing engagement with partners who can provide funding or other forms of cost-saving. Also, it appears that the allocation made to DRC and the ROs to hire staff capable of contributing to activities and supporting the CCSP in their respective regions, was sometimes used to pay support staff salaries (such as office messengers or clerks) as a result of the pressures on the ROs to reduce perceived spending on their 'core staff'.

243. Through their delegate authority Division Directors have the ultimate authority over decisions for each sub-programme, regardless of managers and SP Coordinators. Furthermore, the alignment of sub-programmes with divisions (the CCSP Coordinator is housed in DTIE) reinforces "silos" that amplify competition between the divisions and diminishes SP coherence. Though they are responsible for oversight of the SPs, the SP Coordinators are seen as having relatively little to no "power" relative to the Division Directors. Within each division, the Branch Chiefs are responsible for the overall management and strategic direction of her/his respective Branch, including overseeing day-to-day operations of projects and providing strategic guidance, direction and support to her/his division and its Director, the Deputy Director, and other Branch Chiefs.

2.3.3 Human and Financial Resources Administration

Human Resources

244. UNEP staff are generally regarded by implementing partners and field visit country interviewees as highly qualified and technically skilled in their respective areas of expertise. UNEP's competence and good reputation is exemplified by the extensive network of partnership arrangements and trust placed in UNEP's staff at the individual and organizational levels.

245. Interviews with UNEP staff and survey respondents nevertheless indicate some concern over striking an appropriate balance in staff skillsets between more specialized or technical backgrounds and managerial capabilities. For example, RBM training has been provided to all Programme Officers since 2012, and staff indicate it has helped them better understand (and shape) the POW and MTS. However, based on discussions with UNEP staff during the evaluation mission, it appears that RBM concepts are not yet fully embraced; some staff see it as external to rather than supportive of meeting their key deliverables. A majority of survey respondents were favourable to having more staff with administrative and management skills, *and* to having more staff with specialized thematic capabilities. The proportion of respondents in favour of more climate change and environment generalists among the staff was less prominent (less than 20 percent).

⁹⁹ OIOS Government Audit (2010) (see above footnote); Formative Evaluation (2010) and Climate Change Annex; Medium Term Evaluation of the Medium-Term Strategy (2012) for detailed analysis.




Chart 4. Staff Qualifications – Responses to “In order to improve the management of UNEP’s climate change sub-programme, should there be more, less or the same amount of the following (or does it not matter)? (n = 57)

246. Quite an important number of survey respondents also thought that both an increase in Environment Fund – funded staff and an increase in staff dedicated full-time to the CCSP would improve its management. Managers had been given five years to align the budget with the hiring process to transition persons over to the relevant SPs (so that all climate change SP staff are reflected in the CC budget and the CC budget only reflects CC staff), but this process is not yet complete.
247. UNEP staff interviews highlighted that many teams have nevertheless become reliant on XB funding because the EF has already been ear-marked for sets of activities in a particular division (not by sub-programme). The lack of consistently funded staff (under the EF) has meant relatively high rates of fluctuation of team sizes and turnover in some units, many of whom have lost more than half their original number since 2010. These dramatic changes also impede retention of institutional knowledge.
248. As the lead division, there are seven persons working 100 per cent of their time on climate change in DTIE at the onset of the POW 2014/15, including the Chief of the Energy Branch, Head of Technology Unit, and head of the Risoe Center, as well as four programme officers. Another six staff spend between 10-30 per cent of their time on climate change, including the Division Director, Deputy Director, two programme and two information officers. DTIE recently gained a new CCSP Coordinator, the second one since the first CCSP started in 2010, who was previously working on adaptation finance in DEPI, and prior to that as the Regional CC Coordinator for Africa.
249. At the end of 2013, there are a total of 25 professional staff within the Climate Change Adaptation and Terrestrial Eco-systems Branch, the branch within DEPI that leads the adaptation component. Among them, 6 work in the CC Adaptation Unit – with one of them based in the Regional Office for Latin America and Caribbean (ROLAC) and another one based in the Regional Office for Africa (ROA). The REDD+ team is located in the Terrestrial Ecosystem Unit, and count 9 staff, two of which are out-posted to the Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (ROAP) and ROLAC respectively. UNEP also hosts the UN-REDD Secretariat in Geneva (three staff). UNEP staff are also periodically placed in various research centres or on specialised initiatives through the UNEP FI (Finance Initiative), and the UNEP-WCMC, for example.
250. The CCSP as a whole is chronically stifled by staff shortages, largely due to vacancies. For example, no fewer than six staff (out of a potential nine) positions were open under the REDD+ component as of March 2013, and throughout 2012, understaffing has put a toll on the very limited and geographically spread-out team. As many global programmes reach periods of expansion, so too will technical assistance demands increase as new countries begin implementation. Staff shortages mean UNEP is not in attendance at key political meetings and unable to embrace opportunities to strategize or form collaborative relationships with (new or existing) key partners. Some recent projects and initiatives (e.g. en.lighten, REDD+) have been hampered by slow recruitment of technical experts caused, in part, by UNEP’s lengthy recruitment processes. This is despite recent progress in establishing operational standards, undergoing management reviews, and making real-time adjustments to meet operational and administrative challenges.

251. In particular, although interviewees and survey respondents note an overall increase in UNEP regional presence, there appears to be a remaining demand for more resources at the regional level. In terms of coverage and workload of regional offices, in some cases one office (ROA) has to theoretically cover 54 countries, which, for example is not ever the case for UNICEF, UNDP, or UN-HABITAT. African ministers have requested UNEP sub-regional offices, but UNEP has expressed that it has insufficient resources to do so. The few UNEP country offices (China, Tanzania) are also very small, with no more than about four staff, including interns, to coordinate activities at the regional and country levels, but also by liaising with HQ and/or other offices overseeing global initiatives.

Financial Resources

252. Accurate information on funding of the CCSP could not be obtained by the evaluation team. The financial management system used by UNEP does not lend itself to straightforward extraction and summarizing of financial information. While an effort was made by several Fund Management Officers to update financial information for the various projects in the CC portfolio following the request by the evaluation team, there are many gaps in the data. Therefore, there are numerous potential inaccuracies and inconsistencies in much of the recorded evidence used for this assessment. The following represents estimates based on available information, and each component is discussed further in detail below.

253. According to PIMS and data provided by UNEP Fund Management Officers, the total approved budget (this is the estimated cost at design) for UNEP’s CCSP across all components over the period 2008 – 2012 was approximately \$270 million, with a total programmed amount (that is the funding that could be mobilized) of about \$90 million (data as of April 2013). Table 6 below shows overall estimated expenditure for the CCSP for the biennia 2010/11 and 2012/13 obtained from mixed sources. There is a slight decrease both in Environment Fund (EF) and extra-budgetary (XB) funds expenditure from one biennium to the other. The share of the CCSP in the Environment Fund also slightly declined from about 19 per cent to about 16 per cent between the two biennia.

Table 6. CCSP estimated expenditure over the biennia 2010-2011 and 2012-2013 (US\$ million)

	2010/2011	2012/2013
Environment Fund	27.4	25.3
Trust Funds	55	50.8
Regular Budget	1	1.1
Total	83.4	77.2

Sources: A/67/5/Add.6 - Financial report and audited financial statements for the biennium ended 31 December 2011 and Report of the Board of Auditors; UNEP Programme Performance Report 2012-2013 and UNEP Medium-term Strategy 2014-2017.

254. The portfolio considered by the evaluation¹⁰⁰ is comprised of about 89 projects with EF and/or XB funding. This includes GEF-funded projects that are internally executed by UNEP, but not the externally executed ones for which UNEP only played a design and supervisory role as the GEF Implementing Agency. At least one third (about 35) of the approximately 89 projects, 25 of which are under mitigation, are sub-projects or initiatives that are under umbrella projects for budgetary and administrative purposes. This brings the “actual” count in PIMS (where sub-projects under the umbrella projects are not listed separately unless they went through PRC) to about 57 projects.

255. Rough estimates indicate that, for the portfolio considered by the evaluation, DTIE is responsible for approximately 40 per cent of the planned financial volume of CCSP work but 61 per cent of the programmed (mobilised) volume. DEPI is responsible for 45 per cent of the planned funding, but only 36 per cent of the programmed funding. Other divisions, mainly DEWA and DCPI, shared the remainder. Both DTIE and DEPI have a substantial proportion of their funding from XB sources (around 90 per cent).

256. Interviews with Quality Assurance Section (Office of Operations) indicate that eight climate change projects were not aligned with the POW at the close of 2012. Reliance on GEF and bilateral funding creates implications as to whether UNEP should take on new thematic areas, or address substantive issues marginal to the core mandate and strategy specifically because they may present longer-term sources of financing. The completion of climate science

¹⁰⁰ Including all projects under the climate change sub-programme either on-going or started after 1 January 2008 and before April 2013.

and assessments comes out of a corporate budget reserve, for example, as a result of the directive of the Chief Scientist.

257. The steady increase in the proportion of CCSP finances coming from extra-budgetary (XB) funding sources over the course of the period considered by the evaluation has meant that programme managers and teams have become dependent on raising funds for the continuation of projects underway; or in some cases funding is needed to begin implementation when approved projects are not fully financed. Securing funding from external donors is time intensive and does not typically guarantee continuity (e.g. donors can end funding at any time) and furthermore those projects that are fully funded from external sources (e.g. GEF) do not require reporting to the sub-programme coordinator under the POW. However, the relatively small amount of EF funding can also be unpredictable, as additional EF funds are released as donors make their overall contributions to UNEP. Often this means a sudden allocation of additional EF cash late in the year with a requirement to spend it quickly.
258. There is also little consistency in how project document budgets are presented before 2010. Since 2010, there is a standard format for project budgets, formulated around expenditure categories that are 'inputs' (e.g., staff salaries, travel, consultants, printing of publications, meeting room rental, computers, office rent, etc.). Budgets are not typically broken down to the output or activity level, and some budget expenditures are not minimally grouped by types of activities or work phases.
259. PIMS is now set up to help track the securing and utilization of funds, but it is a long process to enter data for all projects into the system, and only very recent projects contain up-to-date information. Forty two per cent of survey respondents (n=57) indicated that they would prefer "more" use of PIMS for management functions (real time budget, administrative tasks) and 40 per cent thought the same for use of PIMS for M&E. Eight people were neutral and three thought less would be better, for each, respectively. This shows there is a willingness to use systems if they are appropriately designed, and if their use is positively reinforced. The following discusses the component financing in detail.

Mitigation

260. According to data in PIMS (as of April 2013), for the portfolio of projects considered by this evaluation, the estimated planned budget at approval under mitigation was around US\$ 98 million, of which a little over half, US\$ 54 million, was secured. Over half (51 per cent) of the budget at approval and 90 per cent of programmed funds were from extra-budgetary sources, which were provided more or less equally by bilateral donors and the GEF. Aside from GEF, the major bilateral and ML donors for mitigation included Germany, Denmark, Italy, Finland and the UN Foundation. Environment Fund resources are generally allocated to (some) staff salaries, office rent, IT and communication charges, some mission travel and other 'core' costs, as well as post-project activities. Resource mobilization strategies for mitigation revolve around existing partnerships (see next section) and the technical needs expressed by countries. In many cases UNEP is approached by the UNFCCC secretariat to address particular topics such as tech transfer or climate finance.
261. Unsecured funds remain an issue even if, to date, they did not cause major blockages for mitigation projects, with the exception of the BALREP component in Macedonia and the GSWH project in Albania, for which the donor has not complied with its pledges, causing prejudice, both to the beneficiary country and UNEP. This is also the case for projects with several phases and for which funds are not available in advance. Generally, this leads to higher than anticipated delays for continuing, as for the RIPECAP project. In addition to the loss of momentum, the risk is to lose the gains achieved in the preceding phases.

Adaptation

262. The sum of planned budget at approval for adaptation for the portfolio of projects considered by this evaluation, (data as of April 2013) was about US\$ 71 million, with a programmed budget of about US\$ 11.5 million (15 per cent of planned budget). Funding sources were diverse but mostly extra-budgetary (about US\$ 10.5 million); amounting to over 90 per cent of the programmed budget. In addition to the GEF, Spain, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Germany, and Italy were other major contributors. Since adaptation covers a range of disciplines and thematic areas, managers and staff use a variety of strategies for resource mobilization for adaptation. Many funding relationships are built on the basis of an expression of interest for donors to cover particular topics or in particular countries or regions, but also frequently builds on already on-going initiatives.
263. Capacity to mobilize adequate funding of projects is a major concern. In some cases, funding constraints made it impossible to conduct the planned field demonstrations and to provide follow-up coaching after training courses. None of the current POW 2010/11 projects had any significant funding secured at the time of design and approval.

The prevalence of unsecured funds required from managers to take a phased implementation approach where activities could start at a smaller scale, while further funding was being mobilized. Underfunded projects could lead to higher than anticipated delays, and were sometimes absorbed into a larger project that had also not secured all of its required financing.

REDD

264. For the portfolio of projects considered by this evaluation under the REDD+ component, the planned budget was about US\$37 million and a programmed budget of US\$20 million (54 per cent of planned budget). According to the PF document, for work between 2008 and 2011, the EF secured amount was US\$ 5,753,400, with estimated extra budgetary funding of US\$ 15 million (US\$ 10 million secured through UN-REDD, and US\$ 5 million unsecured), and no financing from GEF. The main XB donors for REDD+ were Norway and Sweden, whose contributions amounted to about US\$ 12million of the total programmed budget (or about 60 per cent), for one large project, providing a “readiness package” for REDD+ to targeted countries. The remainder of the budget (almost US\$ 8 million) was secured through UN-REDD and was allocated to two key projects (capacity building measures by UNEP to support UN-REDD countries and support the UN-REDD Secretariat in Geneva).
265. The REDD+ projects outlined in the Programme Framework Document budget were already under implementation and expected to continue through the 2010/11 biennium. The total budget allocation for UNEP, UNDP, FAO was US\$ 52 million. The actual budget for UNEP (estimated at US\$ 10 million from 2008-2015) would depend on the number of pilot country programmes that were presented at the UN-REDD Policy Board Meeting in October 2009 and March 2010. Within the UN-REDD Programme, UNEP has the lowest approved budget (USD US\$ 38.9 million compared to US\$ 60.1 million for UNDP and US\$ 58.3 million for FAO) and the lowest net funded amount (UNEP US\$ 30.7 million, UNDP US\$ 47.8 million; FAO US\$ 45 million), but has performed well in terms of financial management.¹⁰¹

Science and Outreach, Mitigation and Adaptation

266. Although not extensively examined for the purposes of this evaluation, the Science and Outreach component had a planned budget of about US\$ 36 million for the portfolio of projects considered by this evaluation, of which only about US\$ 3 million was programmed (less than 10 per cent). Extra-budgetary funding accounted for about one third (31 per cent) of the programmed budget, the main sources of which were Germany, Denmark, and Finland.
267. The three projects from the evaluation portfolio that were a combination of mitigation and adaptation had a planned budget at approval of about US\$30 million, of which about US\$ 1.3 million (less than 5 per cent) was programmed. All of the funding was extra-budgetary, and most came from a Spanish MPTF with UNDP. Funding from GEF and Norway was planned but was not programmed.

2.3.4 Cooperation and Partnerships

UNEP Internal Cooperation

268. Although the matrix structure for the creation of sub-programmes has been useful for solidifying UNEP’s strategy and delivery mechanisms in climate change, there is little evidence it has strengthened divisional linkages, and almost no indication that it has improved connections between sub-programmes. Furthermore, as more partnerships are in demand, within UNEP and the UN, but also with external partners, project teams have to devote additional time and energy to maintaining those relationships.
269. Within the Climate Change Sub-programme the Lead Division has the task of ensuring that the involved Divisions are coordinated among each other and that their work is complementary on delivering the Sub-programme. Furthermore, the Lead Division is responsible for ensuring that the results of each project feed into the next. For example the results of the supported climate change assessments under the adaptation component should feed into the science and outreach component, which, in return, informs the policy and pilot definition process under the adaptation component. The policy work under the respective mitigation and adaptation components feeds into the negotiator training included in the science and outreach component and the networks formed through the adaptation component can help disseminate acquired climate change knowledge and provide practitioners with best practices.

¹⁰¹ MDTF website. UN-REDD Programme Fund. <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/CCF00> Accessed May 2013.

270. In practice, collaboration between the various components (adaptation, mitigation, REDD+ and science and outreach) is limited so far within the Climate Change Sub-programme; even though all people interviewed indicated multiple potential opportunities. Adaptation and mitigation are essentially complementary approaches to the climate change challenge, but there is little evidence of cooperation between UNEP's adaptation and mitigation components. For example, appropriately designed ecosystem management initiatives can also contribute to climate change mitigation by reducing emissions from ecosystem loss and degradation, and enhancing carbon sequestration¹⁰². It also seems very difficult to make staff work together on adaptation and REDD+ components. In cases where REDD+ integrates EbA approaches, both climate change adaptation and mitigation can be achieved simultaneously, and this is being tested in agroforestry. It would appear that UNEP is more at ease when reaching outward for partnering than when looking in. This is not altogether surprising or necessarily bad. There is often more in common professionally among experts working on, say, renewable energy finance in different organizations, than there is among UNEP's staff working on that issue and staff working on other climate change related topics, say, EbA. UNEP staff have a common institutional home (and degree of allegiance) but it is not realistic to expect that deep professional bonds exist across topics and areas of expertise that are very different. However, the main reasons for the lack of collaboration between components (and also between CCSP components and other sub-programmes in UNEP) seem to be the lack of incentives for staff in different units to work together and the complexities of managing financial resources across divisions.
271. Collaboration between CC components and other sub-programmes in UNEP does exist but there are some largely unexplored opportunities. For instance, there are clear overlaps between climate change adaptation and ecosystems management. The EbA approach (one of the solutions to address climate change impacts) is based on the ecosystem management approach spearheaded by the Ecosystem Management Sub-Programme. UNEP's adaptation team therefore also handles ecosystem management activities with an adaptation focus. On the other hand, although there are clear commonalities between climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction (climate change adaptation is a response, *inter alia*, to climate related risks and disasters) collaboration between Climate Change Adaptation and the Disasters and Conflicts Sub-Programme is insufficient for the moment in UNEP.
272. Results from the survey for this evaluation indicate that collaboration between Divisions, although improving to build the "One UNEP" approach, is an issue of concern. 84 percent of respondents were of the view that improving communication between Divisions could facilitate Sub-programme management. The Mid-term Evaluation of the MTS also affirmed the need for stronger inter-divisional communication in UNEP, mentioning that there was still room for improvement in communication and collaboration between Divisions and Regional Offices and in enabling regional offices to be more directly involved in the operations of the CCSP. Even though there is little evidence of formal collaboration between divisions in UNEP, there have been many instances of cross-divisional collaboration driven by informal relationships e.g. between the DTIE Energy Branch and DELC and DEWA, on CDM legal issues and the Emissions Gap Reports, respectively, or between DEPI and ROA on CC Dare.
273. An exceptional success story of internal collaboration at the global level is UNEP's participation in various formal meetings of the UNFCCC (COPs and Subsidiary Body meetings), where there was a much stronger UNEP "esprit de corps" evident in the past few years. This could in part be a consequence of the new structure, particularly the emphasis the first Sub-programme Coordinator put on developing a UNEP presence in the international CC arena. UNEP has been present every year in UNFCCC COPs, originally with many staff attending with their own agenda. Since the COPs in Copenhagen (2009) and Cancun (2010) UNEP staff have attended as one team, with more coherent common messages and backed by strong and influential publications such as the Emissions Gap Reports prepared by the UNEP Chief Scientist with DTIE support since 2010. Coordination among Divisions usually started about 6 months before the COP meetings to discuss and prepare UNEP's engagement and during the COP meetings UNEP staff met on a daily basis to discuss progress and coordinate strategy. UNEP's role and visibility in the UNFCCC process was also boosted by UNEP support to CC negotiators from developing countries since 2007 to reach a common regional position on the main issues under discussion during the COPs.
274. Also within the separate components internal partnerships are complex. A review of the Programme Framework Document for EA(a) and Project Documents from the adaptation component reveals the important roles for UNEP divisions and branches other than the Lead and Coordinating Divisions in the execution of adaptation projects under the CCSP. For the biennium 2010-2011, apart from DEPI, the POW outputs had different accountable divisions including DEPI (the overall Coordinating Division for the EA), DEWA, DELC, and DRC. Each of the three umbrella projects under EA(a) are coordinated by DEPI, as managing and accountable division, but also involves

¹⁰² www.unep.org/climatechange/adaptation/EcosystemBasedAdaptation/tabid/29583/Default.aspx.

other Divisions. For Project 1aP1, DEPI is the coordinating division, DEWA (Capacity Development Branch) is the managing division, and DEWA, 5 Regional Offices (ROA, ROAP, ROWA, ROE and ROLAC) and DEPI (Marine Branch) are the implementers. In general, DEWA mainly focuses on the technical aspects of assessments and capacity development; DRC and Regional Offices on policy advice regarding to regional and sub-regional development initiatives; and DCPI on outreach and communication.

275. At the country level, even though some efforts are made at the beginning of a new engagement to map all related activities both national and international to examine possible synergies and risk of overlap, overall, UNEP-supported interventions are often fragmented. In Peru, for example, there has been very little effort to seek synergies and complementarities between UNEP interventions. This has to do with the fact that UNEP interventions are components or pilots of different projects, managed by different staff at the local level, in ROLAC and UNEP Nairobi. These projects have not been designed in a way that would promote collaboration at the national level. Likelihood of impact in Peru could have been higher had the EbA-mountains pilot been implemented in the same area as the Joint Programme¹⁰³, further building on this programme's achievements, and, also, had the pilot covered a larger spectrum of ecosystems farther down the watershed. The limited geographical and ecosystem scope of the EbA-mountains pilot also reduces potential synergies with the Microfinance for EbA project. Even though the Microfinance for EbA project has planned to consider EbA measures demonstrated by the EbA-mountains pilot to design loan packages, opportunities are likely to be limited.
276. The actual role of the Regional Offices ranges from providing in-country contacts and liaison, assisting in country and national partners' selection, to country-level project development and implementation; a set of responsibilities generally beyond formally recognized expectations. Teams indicated being unaware of each other's respective travel plans, for example, and individuals are not necessarily inclined to offer help to colleagues with outreach or networking on their limited time and budget. Regional offices face a significant shortage of technical and non-technical staff, and for this reason communications often flow from headquarters or the division directly to country counterparts. This further diminishes UNEP's already low regional/local presence and country-level coordination, and underutilizes the regional and country knowledge in the ROs.


External Partnerships

277. The UNEP climate change strategy explicitly notes the significance of partnerships to drive the work: "working always with its major partners and stakeholders."¹⁰⁴ These partnerships are important both for global efforts, such as the preparation of annual global reports that help establish and track norms and progress in achieving them, as for efforts at the regional and country level.
278. Since UNEP is a non-resident agency, it must rely on operating through direct partnerships at the country level, with collaboration between ROs and other UNEP Offices. Its closest country-level relationships are usually government counterparts or UNDP, though sometimes UNEP might operate through another development agency, institution, etc. Over the last few years, more and more partnership requests have been coming in from governments, other UN agencies, private sector companies, think tanks etc., for instance as a result of the Emissions Gap Reports, and developing these relationships is time consuming. The EbA flagship and REDD+ flagship have also increased UNEP's visibility and demand for technical and advisory services to countries.
279. UNEP has too many partnerships to cover in a systematic manner within the scope of this evaluation. Generally speaking, in terms of perceived effectiveness of UNEP's partnering efforts, the survey from this evaluation finds that UNEP is slightly more effective at partnering directly with governments, NGOs, private sector, non-government bodies and other (non-UN) development partners (with over half of the respondents indicating "highly satisfactory" or "satisfactory" effectiveness in accomplishing these partnerships) than at partnering with UN Agencies. Indeed, depending on the programme under which any UNEP staff may work, and their office and location, they may have a very different experience with their sister agencies in the UN. At least 22 per cent of respondents also gave UNEP unsatisfactory or moderately unsatisfactory ratings for engagement with governments, which might also be a reflection of specific contexts.

¹⁰³ Full project name : Joint Programme - Integrated and Adaptive Management of Environmental Resources and Climate Risks in High Andean Micro Watersheds

¹⁰⁴ CC strategy doc p5

Chart 5. Partnerships - Responses to "How effectively does the UNEP climate change sub-programme accomplish the following?" (n = 64)



280. UNEP has a Major Groups and Stakeholders Branch (MGSB) that manages relations, especially non-government relations, such as with NGOs, CSOs, etc. However, partnerships are often formed on the basis of available funding (or donor preferences) or building on previous/on-going efforts and relationships. There does not therefore appear to be any guidance or policy for establishing partnerships at the CCSP level, even when those partnerships have implications for sustainability, country ownership, and/or likelihood of reaching impacts; nor a system for tracking the relative effectiveness and lessons learned in partnering.

Adaptation

281. Partners envisioned in the Programme Framework Document include IUCN, and regional political and economic organizations such as the African Ministerial Conference on Environment (AMCEN), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Caribbean Community, which are essential strategic partners for implementation of activities under this programme framework; in particular with regard to the development of an enabling environment for policy and institutional capacity. Other prominent adaptation partners include the Stockholm Institute, World Bank-supported Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, WMO, and the UNFCCC Secretariat. UNEP also works closely with UNDP (in the spirit of the 'one United Nations') and IUCN in implementation of programme framework activities at national and local levels, in particular in the context of the Ecosystem-based Adaptation Flagship programme and the Mountain EbA project.

282. Being a non-resident agency, UNEP relies on operating through direct partnerships at the country level and also at the regional level. Cooperation with government and other local partners is necessary because the country projects/pilots serve the double purpose of developing and testing concepts and tools, but also to build country capacity and ownership in using them to promote in-country replication. Local partners also often bring complementary technical skills, as is the case for the global/regional partners. EbA is often most usefully applied as an integral component of a broad range of adaptation strategies. Therefore, UNEP engages with partners working on the full range of adaptation approaches, particularly with other organizations that have complementary areas of expertise. UNEP has been successful in developing partnerships for adaptation efforts on the whole, and has a strong reputation for bringing highly competent technical support into projects and deeply engaging a wide variety of stakeholders. As with other components, however, managers and staff working under adaptation may benefit from a plan or strategy for how UNEP engages with its partners and also avoids duplication of efforts with other actors across key thematic areas.

Mitigation

283. Being a relatively small "player" on the mitigation scene, in terms of human and financial resources capacities, not being a resident agency in the countries where it operates, and because mitigation cuts across ministries and involves many different stakeholder groups, cooperation and partnerships are critical to the successful

implementation of UNEP's interventions. At country level, UNEP is increasingly building strong partnerships beyond traditional partners, such as ministries of Environment.

284. UNEP has been able to establish numerous partnerships with external players, such as UNFCCC for responses to decisions of the COPs and information of negotiating processes; UNDP for scaling up innovative approaches demonstrated through projects; the World Bank and other development banks for supporting accelerated investment in low-GHG technologies; the IPCC for supporting global assessments and translation of IPCC's analyses to interventions; the International Energy Agency for undertaking joint analyses of energy sector emission trends and identification of reduction opportunities; UNIDO for supporting developing countries in the adoption of low emission technologies; and with the private sector for forging partnerships aimed at market development and the accelerated implementation of cost-effective mitigation options¹⁰⁵.

285. Some partnerships on specific topics within the mitigation component EA(b) and EA(c) include:

- *Finance* - Long-standing partnership through collaborative efforts with the Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, around which UNEP conducts period studies and research on climate finance readiness and financial safeguards, especially in light of the establishment of new finance mechanisms such as the Green Climate Fund. Another effort falls under the Sustainable Energy Finance Initiative (SEFI), which fosters investment in sustainable energy by providing financiers with tools, support and information, such as the 2008 *Global Trends in Sustainable Energy Investment*. SEFI has also launched the SEF Alliance, a network of public finance institutions, and is working with the UNFCCC to examine how public finance mechanisms could form part of a future climate agreement. UNEP is also working with the insurance industry to develop products that mitigate risks for sustainable energy projects, such as when a wind farm produces less electricity than envisaged.
- *CDM* - The UNEP Risoe Centre on Energy, Climate and Sustainable Development (URC), provides technical and financial support to developing countries to participate in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and other international efforts to address climate change and promote sustainable development. The CD4CDM and related projects helped 32 developing countries participate in the CDM. URC also facilitates developing countries' participation in the dynamic developing carbon market. URC's Energy and Carbon Finance Programme continuously analyzes market barriers, the actions needed to overcome them, and ways to strengthen emerging CDM sectors.
- *Energy* - Examples include the Global Network on Energy for Sustainable Development (GNESD) which is a collaboration of more than 20 centres of excellence in both developing and industrialized countries noted for their work on energy, development and environmental issues, including a study on energy and the MDGs; and the Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21) which supports policy development and decision making at the local, national and international levels to facilitate a rapid expansion of renewable energy, along with an annual "industry standard" *Global Status Report*, and is co-hosted with the German technical cooperation agency (GIZ).¹⁰⁶

REDD+

286. For REDD+, the Project Document describes the partnerships, including "UN and multilateral agencies such as the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility of the World Bank, civil society organizations, government agencies, donors and knowledge generating agencies such as universities and international non governmental organizations." The stakeholders are to be "embedded into every activity, especially those that traditionally do not have a voice at the negotiating table." Furthermore, UNEP is to play a convening role by bringing together climate, forest/agroforestry and development communities. It also notes that different stakeholders will be involved in REDD+ readiness at different stages, such as for legal frameworks vs. MRV. There is not a specific plan or outline of roles/responsibilities for each stakeholder category or entity, however.

287. The recent evaluation of the UN-REDD Programme found that, at the management level, inter-agency coordination is thought to have improved significantly since the Programme was first created. Management-level discussions are viewed as being open, constructive, and productive. Programme coordination is principally achieved through a Management Group composed of the most senior operational UN-REDD staff of each agency and the Head of the UN-REDD Secretariat. In moving ahead with the challenges posed by joint programming and implementation, senior officials of all three agencies iterated their confidence in the Management Group's ability to solve emerging

¹⁰⁵ PF 2010-2011 p8

¹⁰⁶ CC strategy p 25.

issues and build a stronger and more unified Programme, capable of “delivering as one.” However, beyond the core management structure, views on the efficacy of inter-agency coordination differ considerably.

288. Global expertise, mostly located in Rome (FAO), Geneva, New York and Oslo (UNDP), as well as Cambridge (WCMC/UNEP) and Nairobi (UNEP), is either channelled through the regional hubs or provided directly to the partner country. When the latter occurs, incidences of unannounced and therefore uncoordinated interventions were noted in every country visited. Due to the proximity of peers from the different agencies, more consistent efforts to coordinate were observed at the regional level. In spite of the fact that not all agencies have a regional coordinator position (e.g., until recently – FAO didn’t have one in LAC and UNEP didn’t have one in Africa) and that regional staff have different positions within the agency system (implying more or less autonomy), amiable coordination, meetings, and joint mission planning are taking place (in some regions more frequently than in others). At the country level, the benefits of inter-agency coordination and collaboration have yet to affect implementation. Working with the UN-REDD Programme entails inescapable transaction costs, such as the need to operate through three distinct budget lines, internal procedures, and complex decision-making. In this context, coordination among the three UN agencies is in practice a matter of inter-personal dynamics. Although there are positive examples of inter-agency coordination, in most countries, it is a challenge.

Field Visit Observations

289. Some of the key observations and lesson learned on forming partnerships across the climate change sub-programme that were gathered from field visit interviews include:

290. Contract-to-contract partnerships and one-off programmes or projects do not work well in establishing durable relationships between UNEP and external partners, since there is no institutional continuity or incentives to continue collaboration; yet it is difficult to establish long-term partnerships without some standing mutual MOU and funding. This is one of the many reasons why effective regional and global networks are a challenge, even those with great interest to participants. The Adaptation Knowledge Partnership (AKP) for example, was not well-designed for long-term sustainability because it did not adequately match its intended audience with preferred forums and information services,¹⁰⁷ whereas APAN, Provia and IEMP, to name a few, have been able to learn from earlier experiences.

291. Whenever possible, UNEP should understand and weigh the different implications and practical matters in working with government partners to develop products and services, vs. relying on academic institutions, private sector, NGOs or individual consultants/experts. If UNEP chooses to work with the government, the process will be slower and more tedious for numerous reasons, but the capacity built through this process could be considered more closely aligned with UNEP’s mandate than work that is generated through consultants, NGOs and other international experts, for example. In CDM and TNA countries a model is used where both government and a local technical institutions are engaged in a triangular set-up with government responsibility but capacity built and retained in the local technical institution.

292. UNEP loses control of its messages, tools and concepts as they get taken up by other partners, whether development agencies or government, thereby making it difficult to identify and assess UNEP’s relative contribution to efforts. Choosing small, periodic milestones for testing whether messaging or concepts have been adopted may be easier than attempting to track down policies to uncover ‘language’ borrowed from UNEP reports. Uptake of UNEP can also be found in close communications between individuals, and therefore requires some means to identify and regularly record evidence.

293. The establishment of relevant contracts and agreements with project partners presents constant challenges with regard to UNEP administrative processes. Interviewees and survey respondents noted concern over the long lead-time to get contracts out and the overall need to ease the administrative burdens. In response to this, both the SMT and DTIE have tried to do so by allowing a certain degree of flexibility.

294. Finally, in terms of operating as One UN and the UN Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAF) on the ground, as the “principal body within the UN in the field of environment,” UNEP should theoretically be a consistent signatory of the UNDAF in every country that UNEP is working. However, as mentioned before, without being a resident agency, it is sometimes complicated for UNEP to be fully involved in the preparation of the document and/or to regularly attend the meetings. Regional Offices make efforts to follow-up on the UNDAF preparation

¹⁰⁷ Country field visit interviews: UNEP was the lead for the AKP (an older project prior to the CCSP), with support from SIDA, with SEI and ADB and other partners. A special unit was set up in UNEP to manage the platform but it was not considered successful, and funding was not renewed.

process but due to limited resources, they cannot participate in the UNDAF preparation of all the countries pertaining to the region and very often, the UNEP programming cycle does not match with that of the UNDAF. In some countries, such as Tunisia or Bangladesh, UNEP has completely independent interventions that are not even mentioned in the UNDAF document of the country and uses its own channels of communication with the government. This is to be expected at times when UNEP's work is ahead of the UNDAF process in areas where UNEP is framing issues or conceptualizing responses that are not yet mainstreamed. In those cases, there might be a real value to being the 'canary in the coal mine'. For example, in the area of mitigation finance UNEP is now spending time on an effort that would, if successful, get national pension funds to put more of their institutional money into climate friendly investments. That sort of work would probably not make it into an UNDAF. In countries where UNEP's work is incorporated in the UNDAF, such as Albania and China, UNEP usually chairs the environment cluster sometimes alternating with UNDP.

2.3.5 Monitoring & Evaluation

M&E at the project level

295. Progress has been made in the last four years to implement results-based management (RBM) under the MTS. However, the Project Documents of most projects designed for the biennium 2010/11 did not present even a basic M&E plan, let alone a costed one, and often contained the same standard text on M&E, regardless of project specificities. Project design issues related to M&E included: ignored/unclear baselines, meaningless project milestones, issues with the project logical framework, lack of M&E budget etc. Most of the time, indicators are defined in the logical framework matrix included in the project document, but quite often they are not SMART¹⁰⁸ and not monitored regularly in the course of project implementation.

296. PIMS is certainly being used more for M&E under the POW2012/13, with records of progress at six-month milestones. For more recent projects, especially implemented from 2011 onward, more monitoring information is available in PIMS even though it is often very basic and tends to be biased towards successes. Nevertheless, as mentioned under limitations in the introduction, over the course of the period considered by the evaluation there is a general lack of progress reporting and evaluative evidence against plans/intent. Most of the documents and information available in PIMS are still ex-ante, rather than progress reports or evaluations and therefore the narrative leading from UNEP activities to results achieved is weak or absent. Publicly available outputs such as assessment reports and guidelines can be found online, but information on their utility and use is non-existent other than through individual interviews. Progress reports and evaluations (or completion reports) are not commonly available, even for those projects that were closed for more than a year¹⁰⁹ (only 9 of the 32 closed projects in the portfolio reviewed had either a terminal evaluation or some other completion report that the evaluation team could locate; 6 had one or more periodic progress reports or expenditure reports). This is quite puzzling, especially for projects that are largely externally funded, as almost all donors require at least annual submission of substantive and financial reports associated with the funds that they have provided. It appears that reports to donors are not systematically archived either in PIMS or in any other shared database.

297. An independent external evaluation is required by UNEP EO for all projects over US\$ 0.5 million¹¹⁰. However, it is the responsibility of the respective division to request the evaluation to the EO (this is done towards the end of each year), and the cost of evaluation is expected to be borne by the project. Many projects 'slip through the cracks' as divisions sometimes omit projects from their annual evaluation requests, and many projects also do not have an adequate evaluation budget in their overall project budget – or the evaluation budget has been compressed as a result of limited resources mobilized by the project - in which case the EO cannot undertake the evaluation. GEF-funded projects fared better, as GEF rules regarding reporting and evaluation have been much more strictly applied in UNEP. GEF project are required to prepare annual Project Implementation Reviews (PIRs) and medium and large-sized projects must also complete a Terminal Evaluation (TE) for which a specific budget is built into the project budget. Evaluation coverage for GEF-funded climate change projects is practically 100 per cent.

298. The use and effectiveness of M&E was a general concern of all interviewees; however, a lack of leadership on the significance of M&E in some units where senior management do not believe in its usefulness, and a resistance to

¹⁰⁸ Specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, timely/time-bound

¹⁰⁹ The policy is to conduct and evaluation within 60 days after financial completion.

¹¹⁰ The threshold became US\$1 million as of December 2013.

change has meant that the burden of improved systems and use of systems has fallen on a few individuals. PIMS is still not considered a user-friendly system, with few incentives to use it for management decision making. Underfunding of development and implementation of M&E plans is also reflected in a lack of resources devoted to M&E within divisions. In the case of REDD+, for example, there is essentially one person who collects M&E data (which is not provided in the format of UNEP's results framework) from several sources and aggregates and reports it to UNEP (PIMS) and also to the UN MDTF. Also, project manager names recorded in the PIMS systems (who are more senior and therefore more likely to be longer-term staff) are often not the person responsible for tracking project results.


299. When monitoring and reporting is conducted, UNEP managers either rely on input and management systems from their partner organizations (UNDP), and/or very close communications with their national counterparts (usually in government). Frequent emails and calls and less frequent field visits were reported for most projects in the field, and are indicative of UNEP's need to compensate for a lack of on-the-ground presence. Still, if it is the intent to eventually do so, there is much more effort and revision to PIMS required in order to use it as a tool for tracking of management and financing decisions as well as for learning and reflection on strategy and approach.
300. Drawing from UNEP's *original* mandate (see introduction), there is still strong demand for the 'review of impact of (discrete) policies' in developing countries, as well as identifying and managing incremental cost (additional costs over business-as-usual) of environmental and especially climate change measures, this area seems to have been filtered out as an area of work under UNEP's CCSP. M&E information is sorely under-utilized to understand the causalities and relative effectiveness of advisory services and policy guidance, but also for identifying key drivers that UNEP interventions should seek to influence. Also, the GEF manual for calculating emissions reductions is not in standard use for tracking the GHG impacts of respective interventions. An ever present challenge is that much of UNEP's CC work is 'up front' and relates to policy change or related measures. The causal chains may be tight and traceable, but it may take several years before policies translate into actual investment in better technologies, which is when increased resilience or reduction in GHG emissions relative to a baseline can be measured with some confidence and degree of accuracy. If/when impact occurs, projects are often long since completed in the official UNEP sense, and there is as yet no good way of tracking over longer periods of time the impacts of UNEP interventions or support.

M&E at the sub-programme and component level

301. There are several issues with the results framework itself at the sub-programme level. Three out of five 2012/13 EAs are pitched at an outcome level where UNEP cannot be held accountable for their achievements. UNEP can only provide the best possible products and services, target those to the most appropriate people in the most appropriate format. Attribution is a major issue and requires an evaluative approach. Those EAs are therefore not appropriate for monitoring UNEPs performance in the course of POW implementation. Most EAs incorporate the strategy or means (basically the outputs) by which UNEP intends to achieve or contribute to them. The indicators and units of measurement are then often indicating the delivery of these outputs rather than the extent to which the EA has been achieved. Other indicators are incomplete and do not indicate the full extent of achievement of the EA. It is unclear how baselines and targets have been determined and many baseline numbers are too "rounded" to be credible.
302. Sub-programme and component-level monitoring is done through the sub-programme module in PIMS, by reporting on EA indicators and POW Output achievement against targets set in the POW. Lessons learned and risk analysis are also reported on, every six months and at the end of each biennium, respectively. Sub-programme level reporting in PIMS has much improved between the biennia 2010/11 and 2012/13. For instance, for the biennium 2010/11 there was no reporting at all on the outputs under EA(c) – Energy Finance – and also on most outputs under EA(e) – Science and Outreach. There was also no reporting in PIMS on the indicators for EA(b) – Clean Energy, EA(c) and EA(e). However, the PPR for that biennium did give a summary on results achieved under each output and did provide figures for the indicators not reported upon in PIMS. The PPRs are prepared on the basis of PIMS, but in some cases, when there were gaps in information, the UNEP Quality Assurance Section in charge of compiling the PPRs had to go back to sub-programme staff to collect the missing information directly from them. There were practically no reporting gaps in PIMS for the biennium 2012/13. In the PPRs, however, as noted earlier, there is a relative increase in incomplete reporting on the achievement of output targets, most likely due to a positive reporting bias (only achievements are reported, not failures) and/or the fact that the number of outputs was reduced between the two biennia leaving less room for comprehensive reporting on outputs.

303. As shown in Chart 6 below, only about half of survey respondents found that UNEP uses information from M&E systems to improve efforts, plans or strategies 'moderately effectively' or better. About 30 per cent felt that UNEP uses this information 'moderately ineffectively' or worse. About 20 per cent was unsure. In terms of devoting resources to M&E, about one third of survey respondents thought that resources devoted by UNEP to follow-up and impact assessment were moderately sufficient or sufficient, but about the same proportion thought those resources were moderately insufficient or insufficient. About one quarter was unsure. On the basis of these responses and corroborating evidence, it appears that there is still much room for improvement as regards the use of the reporting structure and M&E system in place, but also in terms of funding M&E.

Chart 6. M&E - Responses to "How effectively does the UNEP climate change sub-programme accomplish the following? (n = 64)



Annex 1. Evaluation Objectives, Methodology, Resources and Audience

Objectives

1. The evaluation of the UNEP Sub-programme on Climate Change was conducted by the UNEP Evaluation Office in line with the UNEP Evaluation Policy and the Evaluation Office Work Plans for 2010/11 and 2012/13. The Sub-programme Evaluation aimed at assessing the relevance and overall performance of UNEP work related to climate change in the last three biennia (from POW 2008 onwards) according to standard evaluation criteria (relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and impact).
2. The Evaluation considered whether, in the period under review, UNEP was able to strengthen the ability of countries to integrate climate change responses into national development processes, by providing environmental leadership in the international response to climate change and complementing other processes and the work of other institutions. In its inception report, the evaluation team presented its approach and methodology, and detailed work plan, to conducting the evaluation of the UNEP Sub-programme on Climate Change in line with the TOR for this assignment.
3. In sum, the evaluation:
 - Extensively reviewed and analyzed the activities conducted and results achieved in the face of the objectives of the programme across its four main areas of: (i) Adaptation; (ii) Mitigation; (iii) REDD+; and (iv) Science and Outreach;
 - Assessed the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and impact of the programme as applied to formulation/design, implementation, and results, respectively;
 - Identified success factors/enabling conditions, assumptions, limitations and risks towards programme objectives;
 - Synthesized lessons learned and proposed recommendations aimed to improve the programme's implementation and management; and
 - Covered other the TOR questions and areas for learning, including those surrounding programme performance, design, strategy, reporting, and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E).

Methodology

4. The evaluation was comprised of 4 phases – inception, data collection, data analysis and interpretation, reporting - as described below:
5. **Inception:** In order to prepare the inception report, the evaluation team conducted a preliminary documentation review to help clarify the context surrounding the programme, conducted interviews with key UNEP staff and managers, and begun to identify the main challenges of the evaluation mission(s) and information gaps to be filled. The inception report captured the results of that process by outlining the evaluation team's understanding of the assignment, and proposed approach and methodology, which was offered to UNEP CCSP staff and managers for the opportunity to inform and help finalize.
6. **Data Collection:** Both primary and secondary data were collected and analysed as part of the evaluation process. Secondary data was obtained mainly from the UNEP EO, UNEP Nairobi and Paris offices, as well as relevant partners and other organizations. Primary data was gathered through qualitative and quantitative methods, including desk review and semi-structured interviews. The in-country missions enabled the evaluation team to meet with the main stakeholders involved in the programme: government officials, supporting organisations, other development partners, involved NGOs and local organisations, as well as make direct observation, where appropriate. This allowed an in-depth analysis of the context surrounding and influencing the sub-programme, its relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impacts and sustainability, as well as the level of involvement of the different stakeholders and concerned communities, and synergies with other on-going actions at the regional and country levels.
7. **Data Analysis& Interpretation:** The review team compiled and analysed all collected data on progress towards meeting the project targets, intermediate results achieved, surrounding conditions and context, and gaps reported, if any. In order to ensure that the information is collected and cross-checked by a variety of informants, data triangulation was key tool for the verification and confirmation of the information collected. The evaluation team applied both deductive and inductive logic for interpretive analysis of findings in relation to key evaluative criteria.

8. The evaluation team developed **theories of change** at the component/programme framework and at the sub-programme level. Reconstructing theories of change (TOC) helped set the stage for understanding progress made – and challenges faced - in achieving outcomes and impacts under the CCSP, as well as identifying key underlying factors enabling and/or hindering progress. Developing the TOCs required discussions and inputs from UNEP staff, managers and in-country partners in order to make explicit those dimensions of the SP that may not be outwardly observable or intentionally part of design and strategy. Following UNEP’s M&E terminology, the TOC as a logical model was in the first place derived directly from the programme of work and strategy/design documents under each component to identify and help explain the causal relationship between intended actions, outputs, direct outcomes, mid-term outcomes, intermediate states and impacts of under the CCSP from 2008-2013 (though namely from 2010-2013).
9. On the basis of this initial framework, the evaluation team then assessed evidence gathered throughout the evaluation process to determine to what extent intended outcomes have been attained according to the POW, and in comparison with the assessment of the design intent and strategy, the evaluation team considered a reformulation of performance criteria, especially those at the direct outcome level - the limit of accountability. These reconstructed Theories of Change (TOC) were completed as part of each of the component papers, and are included in Annex 5. Figure 3 of this evaluation presents an overall CCSP reconstructed TOC, with discussion under the Effectiveness section 2.2.1. Underlying these reconstructed TOCs was an exploration of the underlying assumptions in operation in each component, and those of the CCSP strategy overall; as well as identification of the potential key drivers activating progress between increasingly higher levels of results.
10. **Reporting & Review:** Following on these three phases, the evaluation team delivered internal country case study papers for information-sharing on the field visits, as well as the following component working papers for review by the Evaluation Office, UNEP staff and management (including relevant component teams):
 - a. Working Paper on Adaptation [EA(a)]
 - b. Working paper on Mitigation (EA b, c)
 - c. Working Paper on REDD+ (EA d)

Following the submission of these reports for review by the UNEP EO and quality assurance by an independent senior evaluator, the relevant UNEP programme framework/component teams were presented with the working papers for comments and additional input.
11. The draft CCSP evaluation will undergo a similar review process, with initial quality assurance, followed by sharing the report with UNEP CCSP staff and managers for clarification points, additional factual information, observations, and suggestions. The evaluation team will take into account the respective reviewers’ remarks and provide structured responses in the form of corrections, revisions and/or explanations for the original point.

Resources

12. The following briefly describes the key sources and resources utilized during the evaluation process. See respective annexes as noted below for details.
 - Interviews with UNEP staff and managers: HQ, lead division, four regional offices (Latin America, West Asia, Africa, Asia and the Pacific) and two country offices (China, Tanzania) [See Annex 1 for a full list of interviewees]
 - Interviews with UNEP partners and stakeholders: in-country government officials, NGOs, development partners, recipients of UNEP technical and/or financial support
 - Project documentation review: Representative sample of projects from the portfolio selected to illustrate a balance of components and geographic distribution [Annex 4 for the portfolio list of projects with noted desk review sample]
 - Non-project documentation review: UNEP CCSP evaluations (Mid-Term Review, Formative Evaluation), strategy and planning documents [See Annex 2 for the bibliography of documentation resources]
 - Internet: Online supporting materials from the UNEP, its partners and collaborative initiatives
 - Survey of UNEP staff and limited external stakeholders: 56 respondents from UNEP staff and managers, with a small selection of external actors outside of UNEP

Audience

13. The potential users of this evaluation include:

- UNEP Senior Management Team, including the Executive Director, the Deputy Executive Director, the Divisional Directors, the Director of the GEF Coordination Office, the Chief of the Executive Office and the Chief of the Office for Operations;
- Directors of the Regional Offices and Regional Office staff involved in the CC Sub-programme;
- Relevant staff from the Executive Office and Office of Operations, and in particular the Chief Scientist and the Quality Assurance Section, respectively;
- CC Sub-programme Coordinator and other Sub-programme Coordinators;
- UNEP managers and other staff involved in the CC Sub-programme;
- UNEP Committee of Permanent Representatives and the UNEP Governing Council/Global Ministerial Environmental Forum; and
- Other stakeholders and partners, including the UN Secretariat, UN or other international bodies working on climate change adaptation and mitigation, Secretariats and offices of relevant cooperation agreements, commissions and committees, NGOs and civil society groups, research centres and academia.

Annex 2. Persons Interviewed

UNEP/DTIE (Paris)

- Sylvie LEMMET (Ms), Director
- Kaveh ZAHEDI, Deputy Director
- Merlyn Van Voore (Ms), CCSP Coordinator
- Mark Radka, Chief, Energy Branch.
- Seraphine Haeussling (Ms), Programme Officer
- Rahel Steinbach (Ms), Programme Officer
- Dean Cooper, Head of the Energy Finance unit
- Edu Hassing, GEF Task Manager
- Djaheezah Subratty (Ms), Programme Officer (Policy unit)
- Jonathan Duwyn, Programme Officer (Technology unit)
- Françoise d'Estais (Ms), Project Manager (Finance unit)
- Kathryn Conway (Ms), Programme Officer (Technology unit)
- Geordie Colville (UNEP executed GEF projects, Nairobi)
- Gustavo Manez Gomis, Project Manager (Technology unit)
- Marie Leroy (Ms), Consultant (Technology unit)
- Amr Abdelhai, Project Coordinator (Technology Unit)
- Ghita Hannane (Ms), Consultant (Finance unit)
- Myriem Touhami (Ms), Programme Manager (Finance unit)
- Mario Lionetti, Programme Officer (Finance unit)
- Eric Usher, Manager (Finance unit)
- Jérôme Malavelle, Programme Officer (Policy unit)

UNEP Headquarters (Nairobi)

- Amina Mohammed, Deputy Executive Director - Assistant Secretary General
- Michele Candotti, Chief Executive Office - Principal Advisor to the Executive Director
- Michael Spilsbury, Senior Evaluation Officer - Evaluation Office
- Keith Alverson, Chief of the Climate Change Adaptation and Terrestrial Ecosystems Branch, DEPI
- Mario Boccucci (former Chief of the Terrestrial Ecosystems Unit, DEPI; current head of UN-Secretariat)
- Anna Kontorov, Global Adaptation Network
- Musonda Mumba, EBA Coordinator, DEPI
- Felicitas van der Plaat, Associate Programme Officer, DEPI
- Monika MacDevette, Chief of the Capacity Development Branch, DEWA
- Fanina R. Kodre-Alexander, Climate Change Information Officer
- Ermira Fida, GEF - Climate Change Adaptation Unit
- Janet Macharia, Senior Gender Advisor
- Isabell Kempf, Poverty and Environment Initiative
- Jason Jabbour, Program Analyst in Scientific Assessment - Coordinator Global Environment Outlook
- Fatoumata Keita-Ouane (Chief, Scientific Assessment Branch)
- Arkadiy Levintanus (MEAs, outreach and public awareness on UNFCCC)

UNEP Riso Centre (by phone and mail)

- John Christensen, Director

Regional Office for West Asia (ROWA) - Bahrain

- Iyad Abumoghli, Regional Director
- Abdul-Majeid Haddad, Regional Climate Change Coordinator

- Abdulelah Al-Wadaee, CAP Regional Network Coordinator
- Melanie Hutchinson (Ms), Programme Officer
- Marie Daher Corthay (Ms), Information and Outreach Officer

Regional Office for Latin America and Caribbean (ROLAC) - Panama

- Silvia Giada, Programme Officer, Division of Early Warning and Assessment and project manager for the EbA project in Peru, ROLAC
- Andrea Brusco, Legal Officer, ROLAC
- Jason Spensley, Programme Officer, Climate Change Projects (REGATTA and Microfinance for EbA) , ROLAC
- Margarita Astrálaga, UNEP Regional Director and Regional Representative, ROLAC
- Kim Bolduc, UN Resident Coordinator in Panama
- Gisele Didier, UNDP Focal Point for MDG-F JP
- Adolfo Mezua, President, Organización de Jóvenes Embera y Wounaan de Panamá(OJEW) –(NGO)
- Berta Olmedo, Manager-Hydrometeorology, Empresa de Transmisión Eléctrica, S.A. de Panamá (ETESA)
- Frieda Dominguez, Sistema de Protección Civil (SINAPROC)
- Mara Murillo, Deputy Director, ROLAC
- Ing. Cordoba, CC Unit, Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente (ANAM)
- Rosa Montañes, Executive Director, Fundación para la Conservación de los Recursos Naturales
- Roberto Borjabad, Programme Officer, Climate Change Mitigation, ROLAC
- Martin Candanedo, Facultad de Ingeniería Civil, Universidad Tecnológica de Panama (UTP)
- Jacinto Buenfil (climate change project development in-house consultant) and Mayte Gonzalez (REGATTA climate finance and knowledge sharing in-house consultant), ROLAC
- Charles Davies, Andrea Salinas, Programme Officers and Patricia Miranda, Consultant, Division of Early Warning and Assessment, ROLAC
- Christophe Jungfleisch , Senior Project Manager, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management (based at ROLAC)
- Heraclio Herrera, MDG-F JP Consultant for Chucunaque and Tabasará Watersheds
- Erika Mattsson, Acting FMO for ROLAC
- Gabriel Labate, UN-REDD Regional Advisor, ROLAC
- Ericka Espino, Evelyn Madrid and Paulette, General Staff at ROLAC

Ghana

- Wolfgang Hass –Resident, UN Coordination Specialist, UN Resident Coordination Office, Accra, Ghana
- Joseph Yaw Appiah-Gyapong, Programme Specialist – Sustainable Development – (Environment, Energy and Climate Change), UNDP, Ghana
- Kareff May Rafisura, Technical Specialist- Climate Change, UNDP Ghana
- Christopher Gordon, Director, Institute of Environment and Sanitation Studies, University of Ghana
- Adelina Mensah, Lecturer - Department of Marine and Fisheries Sciences, University of Ghana
- Edwin A. Gyasi, Department of Geography and Resource Development, University of Ghana
- Nicholas K. Iddi, National Project Coordinator, Ghana Environmental Conventions Coordinating Authority
- Raymond Babanawo, Technical Assistant (in charge of FIRM Project), Ghana Environmental Conventions Coordinating Authority
- Oppong Boadi, Chief Program Officer; UNFFCC Focal Point on Climate Change , Environmental Protection agency (EPA), Ghana
- Atwi-Boasiako Amoah, Senior Program Officer, Contact Person CC-DARE Project , Environmental Protection agency (EPA), Ghana
- Ishmael Edjekumhene, Executive Director, AREED Project, KITE, Ghana

Tanzania

- Clara Makenya, UNEP National Officer, UNEP/UNDP
- Getrude Lyatuu, Practice Specialist Environment, UNDP
- Rolf Ernest, UN REDD Coordinator, UNDP
- Julius Ningu, Director of Environment, Division of Environment - Vice President's Office
- Editruda Daulinge, Business and Marketing Officer, Tanzania Traditional Energy Development Organization (TaTEDO) – Implementing AREED Project
- Richard Muyungi, Assistant Director (Environment EIA & Climate Change), Division of Environment – Vice President's Office,
- Ladislaus Kyaluzi, Environmental Management Officer, Division of Environment – Vice President's Office,
- Joshua Katami, Lecturer, Sokoyine University of Agriculture – implementing CC DARE Project
- Pius Yanda, Professor, University of Dar-es-Salaam – Implementing UNEP--START/Science Dialogue Platforms

Bangladesh

- A.K. Mamunur Rashid, PEI/PECM Project Manager, Ministry of National Planning
- Md. Rezaul Karim, Joint Chief and National Project Director PEI Bangladesh (PECM) , Ministry of National Planning
- Mohammed Solaiman Haider, Department of Environment/Vulnerability and Impact Assessments, Ministry of Environment and Forests (MOEF)
- S.M. Munjurul Hannan Khan, Deputy Secretary/ NCFISP, LDCF, Ministry of Environment and Forests (MOEF)
- Aminul Islam, Senior Advisor, Sustainable Development, UNDP
- Abu Mostafa Kamal Uddin, Climate Change Specialist, UNDP
- Mohammed Sifayet Ullah, Programme Analyst, Disaster and Adaptation, UNDP
- Md. Tarik-ul-Islam, Assistant Country Director & Cluster Head Climate Change, UNDP
- Mohammad Rezaul Haque, Programme Associate, UNDP Bangladesh Climate Change, Environment & Disaster Management, UNDP
- Md Abu Syed, Research Fellow, Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies
- Khandaker Mainuddin, Senior Fellow (Economist/Statistician) , Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies
- Atiq Rahman, Executive Director, Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies
- Golam Rabbani, Fellow, Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies
- Sanaul Mostafa, Independent Consultant; M&E, sustainable development , Cogent Consulting

Peru

- Silvia Giada, UNEP/DEWA/ROLAC Programme Officer
- Amelia Ysabel Díaz Pabló, Presidenta Ejecutiva, Sistema Nacional de Meteorología e Hidrología (SENAMHI)
- Gabriela Rosas Benancio, Directora de Meteorología Aplicada, Sistema Nacional de Meteorología e Hidrología (SENAMHI)
- Javier Caravedo Chocano, Director Ejecutivo, Prevención y Resolución de Conflictos (ProDiálogo)
- Cesar Bedoya García, Consultor Asociado, Prevención y Resolución de Conflictos (ProDiálogo)
- Jorge Alvarez, Programme Officer, Energy and Environment, United Nations Resident Coordination Office
- Rebeca Arias, UN Resident Coordinator, UN System in Peru
- Eduardo Durand López-Hurtado, Director, Dirección General de Cambio Climático, Desertificación y Recursos Hídricos, Ministerio del Ambiente (MINAM)
- Laura Avellaneda, Dirección General de Cambio Climático, Desertificación y Recursos Hídricos, Ministerio del Ambiente (MINAM)
- Ana María Zegarra Leyva, Gerente General, Financiera Edyficar
- Gustavo Morón, Gerente de Negocios, Financiera Edyficar

- Gaby Cárdenas Quezada, Gerente de Proyectos, Financiera Edyficar
- Edith Fernández-Baca, National Coordinator, EbA-M Project Perú
- Pablo Dourojeanni, Scientific Advisor, EbA-M Project Perú
- Juan Vaccari Chávez, Director Ejecutivo, Instituto de Desarrollo del Medio Ambiente (IDMA)
- Marco Arenas Aspilcueta, Coordinador Nacional, Servicio Nacional de Areas Naturales Protegidas por el Estado - SERNANP
- Marco Chevarría, UNEP Project Coordinator, JP CCA Peru
- Flor Villa, Communication Consultant, JP CCA Peru
- Edwin Mansilla, Coordinador, Unidad Operativa Regional Frente al Cambio Climático en Cuzco, Gobierno Regional de Cuzco
- Amanda Maldonado, Directora, Instituto de Investigación, Universidad Nacional San Antonio Abad
- Dr. Pompeyo Cossío, Vicerector Académico, Universidad Nacional San Antonio Abad
- Nicolás Cáceres, Academic Coordinator of the Diploma Course Cycle, Instituto de Investigación, Universidad Nacional San Antonio Abad
- Nilton Montoya, Administrative Coordinator of the Diplomado Course Cycle, Instituto de Investigación, Universidad Nacional San Antonio Abad
- Víctor Bustinza, Subdirector Nacional, Programa de Adaptación al cambio climático (PACC)
- Javier Boluarte, Gerente, Gerencia de Recursos Naturales y Medio Ambiente, Gobierno Regional de Apurímac
- Hernán Sanchez, Sub gerentede Recursos Naturales y Áreas Protegidas, Gerencia de Recursos Naturales y Medio Ambiente, Gobierno Regional de Apurímac
- Wagner Huari, Coordinador Regional Apurímac, Instituto de Desarrollo del Medio Ambiente (IDMA)
- Edgard Ochoa Pezo, Director Adjunto, Instituto Machu Pichu (IMAPI)
- Francisco Cueva García, Director Ejecutivo, Asociación ARARIWA

Albania

- Elvita Kabashi (Ms), Programme Officer, UNDP

Montenegro

- Mija Nenezic (Ms), Energy Efficiency Sector, Ministry of Energy
- Milos Miketic (NLB) (by mail)
- Vladimir Jankolovic (Hypo group bank) (by mail)

Jordan

- Mohammed Dabbas, Director of Energy Efficiency and Energy Conservation Department, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources
- Batir Wardam, Project manager, "Enabling activities for the preparation of Jordan's third national communication report to the UNFCCC" project

Tunisia

- Fethi Hanchi, Director for the Rational Use of Energy, ANME (National Agency for energy Conservation)
- Nejib Osman, Director for Studies and Planning, ANME
- Imed Landoulsi, PROSOL Residential Project Manager, ANME
- Souad Abrougui (Ms), Financial Assistant, ANME
- Samir Amara, Engineer, Enlighten project team, ANME
- Ashraf Bouzida, Engineer, Enlighten project team, ANME
- Oussama Nagati, Financial Assistant, Enlighten project team, ANME
- Mohamed Toumi, director, National Agency for waste Management (ANGeD)
- Amel Guinoubi (Ms), Project Assistant, ANGeD
- Hamadi Trigui, Director, Technical Center for Mechanical and Electrical Industries (CETIME)
- Saber Ben Ameer, Engineer, CETIME

- Ben Abdessalem, President, National Federation for Electrical Companies (FEDELEC)
- Adel Gaaloul, Director, SOMEF (private electrical appliance retailer and manufacturer)
- Leila Bahri (Ms), Director, Mediterranean Renewable Energy Center (MEDREC)
- Caroline Pellegrin-Maatoug (Ms), Director, TEKNO-LED (private importer and retailer of LED technology related products)
- Aida Robbana (Ms), Coordination Specialist, UN Coordination Office
- Jihene Touil (Ms), Energy and Environment Programme Associate, UNDP Tunisia

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Albania

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- BALREP Activity Delivery Report from January to June 2009
- Project document of the Country Programme of Albania under the Global Solar Water Heating Market Transformation and Strengthening Initiative
- UNDP Status update of country projects presented during the national workshop in India in August 2012
- "Albania- Introducing solar-powered water heating" (<http://waterwiki.net>)
- " Albania: New Draft Law to Support Solar Water Heating"
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- MTE of the GEF/UNDP Market Transformation for Solar Thermal Water Heating in Albania, L-P Lavoie, August 2012

Jordan

- Draft national status report of energy efficiency in lighting for Jordan, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, January 2013

Montenegro

- BALREP project document (final version)
- BALREP Activity Delivery Report from January to June 2009
- MIF annual progress reports for 2010, 2011 and 2012
- Notes on UNEP activities in Montenegro (project team)
- List of MONTESOL qualified companies
- Sample of authorization delivered to a distributor/installer
- www.solarthermalworld.org
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Tunisia

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